Hamas

IDF Operation in Beit Jinn amid Efforts to Promote Terrorism Against Israel in Southern Syria

On the night of November 27-28, 2025, IDF fighters operated in the village of Beit Jinn in southern Syria as part of an arrest operation against Al-Jama’ah al-Islamiyya terrorist operatives who were planning attacks against IDF forces and Israeli territory. In the ensuing exchange of fire, six IDF soldiers were wounded and about 20 terrorist operatives were eliminated; Al-Jama’ah al-Islamiyya is a Sunni Islamist movement that is the offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood in Lebanon. The movement has a close ideological connection with Hamas and cooperates with Hezbollah, and its military wing operatives took part in the campaign against Israel in Lebanon after the October 7, 2023 attack. After the incident in Beit Jinn, the movement denied any involvement and claimed that it operates only in Lebanon; The Syrian regime condemned the “aggression” in Beit Jinn and called it a “war crime.” Senior regime officials accused Israel of wanting to destabilize the country and stressed that the “civilians” would defend themselves “by all means”; The exposure of the terrorist infrastructure in Beit Jinn indicates a renewed establishment of terrorist elements affiliated with Iran and its proxies in southern Syria. In the ITIC’s assessment, the continuation of Israeli counterterrorism activity against terrorist threats in southern Syria, alongside the Syrian regime’s inability to impose its authority on the various elements operating in the area due to the Israeli demand to demilitarize the area, may lead to continued attempts by armed organizations to establish themselves and carry out attacks against IDF forces and Israeli territory.
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نحو 60% من الأشخاص الذين صُنّفوا كصحفيين وإعلاميين وقُتلوا في حرب “السيوف الحديدية” في قطاع غزة كانوا منتمين لحماس ولتنظيمات إرهابية أخرى

النقاط الرئيسية[1] تولي حركة حماس أهمية كبيرة لدور الصحفيين خلال الحروب والمواجهات مع إسرائيل، وتَنظر إليهم باعتبارهم جزءًا من منظومة الدعاية وصراع الوعي والتحريض. تُدير التنظيمات الإرهابية في قطاع غزة، وفي مقدمتها حركة حماس، عددًا كبيرًا من وسائل الإعلام داخل القطاع، وهي قنوات تابعة لها أو مرتبطة بها تنظيميًا وفكريًا. خلال هجوم الـ 7 من أكتوبر
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Spotlight on Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (November 18-25, 2025)

IDF forces continued operating in areas within the Yellow Line in the Gaza Strip to destroy tunnels and terrorist facilities, and eliminated terrorist operatives who posed a threat to the forces and those hiding in tunnels in Rafah. Following Hamas violations of the ceasefire agreement, senior operatives in Hamas' military wing were eliminated; Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) continued searching for the bodies of the three murdered hostages still in the Gaza Strip. A Hamas delegation arrived in Cairo for talks about [alleged] Israeli "violations" and to discuss the second stage of the ceasefire agreement; The Gaza Humanitarian Aid Foundation announced the termination of its activity after more than four months; A former officer in the Palestinian Authority security forces announced the establishment of a new militia in Khan Yunis which opposes Hamas, while Hamas continues to implement security and civilian governance in the areas under its control in Gaza; The European Union announced that it would assist in training thousands of Palestinian police officers in preparation for their deployment in the Gaza Strip; An Israeli civilian was killed in a combined vehicular ramming and stabbing attack at the Gush Etzion Junction; the two terrorists who carried out the attack were shot and killed. Israeli security forces continued counterterrorism activity in Judea and Samaria, eliminating two terrorists who killed a civilian and IDF soldiers and a terrorist who served in the Palestinian police; three others were detained; The Palestinian Authority prime minister said implementing the required reforms was expected to last about two and a half years, but most would be completed in the coming year. An investigation revealed that the Palestinian Authority continues paying the families of prisoners and terrorists who had been killed despite its public commitment to stop.
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Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah and Lebanon (November 17-24, 2025)

The IDF eliminated Hezbollah's acting chief of staff, Haytham Ali Tabatabai, in a targeted attack on the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in Beirut. He was responsible for efforts to reconstruct the organization and replenish its arsenal. Hezbollah confirmed his death and the deaths of four other operatives, but did not explicitly threaten Israel, instead calling on Lebanese authorities to take an "appropriate response."; IDF forces continued attacking Hezbollah facilities in south Lebanon and the Beqa'a Valley and eliminated terrorist operatives as part of the ongoing activity against Hezbollah's presence in south Lebanon, which violates the understandings of the ceasefire agreement, and following the organization's attempts to reconstruct itself and replenish its arsenal. The forces attacked rocket launch sites and weapons depots, and eliminated eight terrorist operatives; Hezbollah continued to reiterate its dissatisfaction with the responses of the Lebanese government to Israel's continued attacks, and called on it to formulate a plan for "confronting the occupation."; Lebanon's President Aoun said he was prepared to participate in regional peace processes under the United States or UN auspices, while Prime Minister Salam accused Israel of being unwilling to negotiate and not adhering to the conditions of the ceasefire agreement; Despite the Lebanese government and army's claims that "progress was being made" in removing Hezbollah's presence from south Lebanon and implementing the state monopoly on weapons, a senior Hezbollah figure stated that the organization would not disarm and would not hand over its weapons to state authorities, but would preserve its military capabilities; UNIFIL began to reduce its forces in south Lebanon following the UN budget cut; The visit of the commander of the Lebanese army to the United States was reportedly canceled after he referred to Israel as "an enemy" and because of American dissatisfaction with the pace of Hezbollah's disarmament; According to reports, Hezbollah and Iran began using the port of Tripoli for smuggling weapons and goods because of the tightened oversight at the port of Beirut and at the international airport; The IDF attacked a Hamas training compound in the Ein al-Hilweh refugee camp, killing 13 Hamas terrorist operatives. The compound served Hamas in Lebanon as a training site and a location for preparing to carry out terrorist attacks against Israel. Hamas claimed Israel attacked a sports field where youths were present.
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Hamas’ Battle for Hearts and Minds after the Ceasefire Agreement in the Gaza Strip

After previous rounds of fighting conducted by Hamas, the movement made sure to promote a "victory narrative" and to emphasize its achievements, usually through ostentatious public ceremonies, such as those held for the release of the Israeli hostages during the ceasefire that between January and March 2025; However, since the ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip went into effect on October 10, 2025, Hamas has used other media tactics, showing relative restraint and without unequivocal claims of "victory."; An examination of the Hamas' narrative promoted by its spokesmen and its affiliated media indicates an ongoing effort to market a series of achievements, including the shock generated in Israel by the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre and the damage caused to Israel’s international standing, Hamas’ survival as a governing and military presence in the Strip, Israel’s failure to disarm the "resistance," the release of Palestinian prisoners who had murdered Israelis and the new regional era initiated by Yahya al-Sinwar; In ITIC assessment, Hamas' relatively moderate and cautious media products are the result of its desire to tiptoe through this period, which is sensitive for it, while continuing to wage a narrative offensive for three reasons: one, strengthening civilian and security governance in the Strip before progressing to the next stages of the ceasefire agreement. According to public statements made by senior Hamas figures they want to move forward, but it is still unclear to what extent that will be translated into action on the ground, at least in the foreseeable future. Two, the movement’s desire to prevent a confrontation with the states supervising the implementation of the agreement. Three, Hamas’ understanding that after two years of war, the dire humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip is incompatible with "victory celebrations," which could damage its image at a time when it has to struggle for its existence in general and for its future as a controlling and influential actor in the Gaza Strip in particular.
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UN Security Council Resolution 2803 for the Future of the Gaza Strip – Positions of Power Actors

On November 17, 2025, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 2803, which adopts the 20-point American plan for a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and for "the day after."; The resolution endorses the establishment of a Board of Peace which will temporarily administer the Gaza Strip until control is transferred to the Palestinian Authority. It also approves the establishment of an international stabilization force, which will operate alongside a vetted Palestinian police force, in coordination with Israel and Egypt, to ensure the demilitarization of the Strip and the disarmament of "armed groups."; The resolution does not include an explicit commitment to a Palestinian state, but expresses hope for the creation of a "credible pathway" to Palestinian self-determination if the Palestinian Authority implements the required reforms; Hamas and the other terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip rejected the resolution and warned that any international force that arrived in the Gaza Strip would be considered an "occupying force" if it attempted to disarm them. Iran and the Houthis subscribed to Hamas' position and claimed that the resolution was intended to serve Israeli objectives. The Palestinian Authority, however welcomed the resolution and expressed readiness to assume full responsibility for the Gaza Strip; In ITIC assessment, despite the importance of the Security Council resolution as an outline for a course for "the day after" in Gaza which includes full demilitarization and a stable, non-Hamas rule, it is a declarative step and it is unclear whether it can be implemented. In all probability, the refusal of Hamas and the other terrorist organizations to disarm, and the threat that they will regard the international force as an "occupying force," will increase friction between them and the foreign forces arriving in the Strip and lead to violent clashes which might also affect IDF forces. In addition, the uncertainty regarding the Palestinian Authority's ability to fully and credibly implement the required reforms and the absence of agreements between Hamas and Fatah regarding the identity of the technocratic management committee, alongside the inherent difficulty in establishing effective control and supervision over the Palestinian population, will create a vacuum in governance which will allow Hamas to continue securing its security and civilian governance in the Strip.
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