Hamas

Arrest of Hamas Terrorist Cells in Europe: Hamas May Carry Out Attacks Abroad

Over the years, Hamas established a network across Europe, operating charitable societies and institutions to raise money for its civilian and military facilities in the Gaza Strip and Judea and Samaria, even though Hamas was put on the European Union's list of terrorist organizations as early as 2003. Hamas representatives in Europe carried out extensive propaganda activity, including early attempts to establish political parties; Only after the Hamas terrorist attack and massacre on October 7, 2023, and the pro-Hamas demonstrations throughout Europe, did European countries institute serious measures against Hamas, including outlawing the movement and shutting down its financial sources; In October 2025, three Hamas terrorist operatives were arrested in Germany on suspicion of preparing to attack Israeli and Jewish targets in the near or immediate future. In December 2023, four Hamas operatives were arrested in Germany and the Netherlands, suspected of being responsible for maintaining hidden weapons caches in Europe under the supervision of the movement's military wing branch in Lebanon; In ITIC assessment, the arrests indicate that for the first time, Hamas was planning to attack Israeli and Jewish targets on European soil. The arrest of the movement's operatives, some of whom were known to authorities as fundraisers, indicates Hamas' desire to exploit its fundraising and propaganda networks in Europe, especially in Germany and Austria, to carry out attacks, despite the efforts of European authorities to take action against the movement following the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre. Hamas is liable to use people who participated in the pro-Hamas demonstrations in Europe in the past two years to attack Israeli and Jewish targets. Meanwhile, Hamas operatives are also liable to exploit the pro-Hamas demonstrations to establish parties which will seek to enter the political arena and increase Hamas and its supporters' efforts to influence public opinion and decision-makers in Europe. Read more...

Preparations for “the Day After” in the Gaza Strip: The Palestinian Organizations Meet in Cairo

On October 23 and 24, 2025, the Palestinian organizations met in Cairo at a conference sponsored by Egypt with Qatari and Turkish support, to formulate a unified Palestinian position, regarding the administration of the Gaza Strip and the disarmament of Hamas and other armed organizations in preparation for the next phase of the ceasefire. Most of the organizations sent representatives, including Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP): Fatah was not represented; According to the closing statement issued after the conference, the organizations agreed to continue the ceasefire, demanding the withdrawal of the IDF from the Gaza Strip, the lifting of the "siege," the opening of the crossings and the beginning of a reconstruction of the Strip. They agreed that the administration of the Strip would be transferred to a temporary committee of independent professionals in cooperation with Arab and international actors, along with an international committee for funding and supervision, and a temporary international force along the borders; In addition to the conference, a meeting was held between a Hamas delegation, led by the head of the movement in the Gaza Strip, Khalil al-Hayya, and a delegation of the Palestinian Authority (PA), headed by the deputy chairman, Hussein al-Sheikh. The Egyptian intelligence chief also met separately with representatives of the organizations; Senior Hamas figures claimed the movement was committed to relinquishing control of the Gaza Strip and to reaching understandings with other Palestinian organizations regarding a joint vision for the ceasefire agreement, but would not state that Hamas was prepared to give up its weapons or to accept PA responsibility for the Strip. Fatah, however, said the PA had to assume responsibility for the Gaza Strip, including the administrative committee to be established to manage the territory and for maintaining security, and called on Hamas to act within the framework of the PLO; In ITIC assessment, the Palestinian organizations have realized that there is a narrow window of opportunity to form a national consensus and an interim framework acceptable to all sides, chiefly Hamas and Fatah. The outcome of the war and the pressure from the United States and the mediators have caused a cautious shift within Hamas toward relinquishing formal rule in favor of technocratic civil administration and elections, with the understanding that the proposed governance model, i.e., technocratic management under Arab and international oversight, would allow the movement to retain influence in the Strip. Hamas also understands that disarming would determine its fate, and in ITIC assessment, the movement will attempt to obscure and postpone the issue of disarmament within any future agreement. However, even if understandings are formally reached and the sides announce a joint decision without binding commitments or a practical plan for disarming the organizations, Israel will face a dilemma regarding the implementation of a full withdrawal, the opening of crossings and approval for Gaza's reconstruction. Read more...

Iran and the Continued Aid to the Axis of Resistance amid the Ceasefire in the Gaza Strip

The ceasefire between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip was achieved at a time when Iran and the “Axis of Resistance” which it leads are facing significant challenges at home and in the region, especially in light of the weakening of the axis and the consequences of the “12-Day War” between it and Israel and the United States in June 2025; Senior Iranian officials expressed support in principle for the ceasefire agreement and claimed that Iran had supported every initiative aimed at ending the war over the past two years. However, they expressed doubts about Israel’s commitment to abide by the agreement. In addition, the officials stressed that the decision on the ceasefire was made exclusively by Hamas without any involvement from Tehran. Iran also rejected the invitation to participate in the peace summit in Sharm al-Sheikh, claiming that it could not participate with those who attacked it during the “12-Day War.”; Iran’s state media portrayed the end of the war as a strategic victory for Hamas and the Palestinians, who succeeded in putting the Palestinian issue back at the top of the global agenda, and as a severe defeat for Israel, which did not achieve its goals and was weakened militarily, economically, socially, and internationally; Before and after the ceasefire, senior officials and media outlets in Iran stressed that, despite the challenges and pressures facing the Islamic Republic and the pro-Iranian axis in the region, Tehran has no intention of abandoning its allies. They emphasized the importance of continuing the “resistance” and Iranian support for it. At the same time, Iran continues to deliver aid, including weapons, to its proxies in the region, including the terrorist organizations in Judea and Samaria, Hezbollah, and the Houthis; In the ITIC’s assessment, the end of the war in the Gaza Strip is not expected to bring about a significant change in Iran’s policy or put an end to its efforts to expand its influence in the Palestinian arena and to continue providing aid to Hamas and the other Palestinian terrorist organizations. In Tehran’s assessment, Hamas’ continued presence in the Gaza Strip and Judea and Samaria may also provide it with future opportunities to rebuild the movement’s capabilities and preserve some of Iran’s influence, despite the operational, logistical, and financial constraints that limit Iran’s continued support for the Palestinian terrorist organizations. At the same time, Iran is expected to continue its support for the other components of the “Axis of Resistance” in the region, first and foremost Hezbollah, which is in the midst of a recovery process despite the IDF’s attacks and the demand for the organization to disarm, and the Houthis, who are taking advantage of the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip to continue acquiring weapons and improving their offensive capabilities. Read more...

The future of Hamas’ weapons and its efforts to rebuild the military wing

The American Twenty-Point Plan, which served as the basis for the ceasefire agreement to end the Gaza Strip War, explicitly stipulates that during the second phase Hamas and the other armed terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip will be required to disarm and the Strip will become a demilitarized zone; Senior Hamas figures made it clear that although they were committed to maintaining the ceasefire, they were not willing disarm the "resistance" until the establishment of a Palestinian state. They also reiterated that it was "a complex issue that had to be deliberated' within "a broader framework of general Palestinian understandings about the future of the Strip."; As after the previous rounds of fighting, and despite the demand that it disarm, Hamas quickly took advantage of the ceasefire to rebuild its military wing by collecting unexploded ordnance and ammunition left in the Gaza Strip after two years of war. In all probability, to restore its arsenal Hamas will use weapons smuggled across the Egyptian border via civilian drones and the entry of raw materials and dual-purpose equipment intended for the reconstruction of the Strip to manufacture weapons; In ITIC assessment, Hamas' unwillingness to relinquish the weapons of the "resistance" reflect its determination to continue the armed "struggle" against Israel under the pretext of a "legal and religious [sic] right to fight the occupation." Therefore, until a new, temporary administration is established in the Gaza Strip, Hamas can be expected to take advantage of the interim period to rebuild its military capabilities, with Iran also expected to continue backing Hamas by providing financial aid, supplying weapons, and transferring technical and other knowledge and training. The involvement of Qatar and Turkey, Hamas' allies, in shaping the "day after" in Gaza can be expected to obstruct the establishment of a temporary administration which could lead genuine, sincere efforts to limit Hamas' activity and disarm it. However, even if the temporary administration demonstrates determination, Hamas will continue to use its proven experience to adapt its military buildup processes to the changing situations on the ground. Read more...

Hamas Activity to Restore Security Governance in the Gaza Strip after the Ceasefire

The ceasefire in the Gaza Strip which began on October 10, 2025, provided Hamas with an opportunity to deploy its security forces in areas evacuated by the IDF and to demonstrate governance, despite the severe damage they suffered during the war; The Hamas security forces focused on fighting local clans accused of collaboration with Israel or identified as power centers which might threaten the movement's position in the Strip. The security forces carried out raids and arrests, confiscated equipment, and executed "collaborators" in full view of local residents; Hamas violence received support from the "resistance" [terrorist] organizations in the Gaza Strip and the umbrella organizations of clans which disowned the "collaborators" among them, but provoked angry reactions from the Palestinian Authority and the United States. However, Hamas claimed that their activity was intended to prevent "anarchy and chaos," but reportedly agreed to stop public executions; In ITIC assessment, as long as there is no actual change in the control of the Gaza Strip as part of the second phase of the ceasefire agreement, in which Hamas is supposed to relinquish power and disarm, the movement can be expected to continue using its security forces to attack any groups which might threaten it. The objective of using force, especially the executions, was to instill fear in the local population and ensure that Hamas retained influence even if it relinquished its governmental power centers. However, if fighting against Israel resumes, the militias and clans opposed to Hamas can be expected to take action to expand their areas of influence throughout the Strip. Read more...

The Turkish IHH, which led the Mavi Marmara flotilla, operates in the Gaza Strip and is involved in its reconstruction

The Turkish IHH organization announced the launch of a project to clear rubble and open blocked roads in the Gaza Strip as part of reconstruction efforts, following the declaration of a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas. The organization was involved in launching flotillas to the Gaza Strip, foremost of which was the Mavi Marmara flotilla which ended in a violent confrontation with IDF forces in May 2010 and the Global Sumud ("resilience''') flotilla, which was halted by the IDF in October 2025; The IHH is an NGO founded in 1992 and with close ties to the Turkish government. It promotes radical Islamist, anti-Israeli and anti-Western activity. Bülent Yıldırım, the head of the organization, has repeatedly made anti-Israeli and antisemitic statements; The IHH also has ties with Hamas and was outlawed in Israel in 2008 due to its involvement in a network of charity associations which raised funds for Hamas institutions abroad; This study is based on dozens of report issued about the IHH by the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (ITIC) since 2010. It summarizes the main aspects of the ties between the organization and Hamas and the central role Bülent Yıldırım plays, in cooperation with Hamas, in the campaign to delegitimize Israel; In ITIC assessment, the IHH's involvement in reconstruction activity in the Gaza Strip may be another way of strengthening Hamas' influence over affairs in the Strip even after the ceasefire goes into effect. The locating of Hamas headquarters in Turkey, which is one of the sponsors of the ceasefire agreement, and the ties between the movement and the IHH, may also provide Hamas with a direct channel for transferring funds and equipment to restore the military wing, under the cover of humanitarian aid. In addition, the direct connection between the IHH and the Turkish government, one of the signatories to the ceasefire agreement and an unreserved supporter of Hamas, gives the Turkish regime a foothold in the Gaza Strip and increases its regional influence on Israel's border. Read more...

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