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Hamas

Spotlight on Syria (Following the Toppling of the Syrian Regime) January 8–15, 2025

The de facto leader of Syria, Ahmed al-Sharaa (Abu Muhammad al-Julani), said it was necessary to adopt a "state-building mentality" and abandon revenge to make it possible to establish stable Syrian institutions; The Syrian defense minister and chief of staff met with the heads of armed militias, and reportedly an agreement was reached to integrate most of them into the Ministry of Defense and the new Syrian army; Al-Sharaa continued meeting with foreign diplomats who arrived in Damascus, including the interim prime minister of Lebanon. Al-Sharaa declared that Iran and Hezbollah had caused damage to Syria and that the transfer of weapons from Iran to Hezbollah through Syria would not be permitted. The Syrian foreign minister participated in a meeting of Arab and Western foreign ministers in Saudi Arabia, who called for preserving Syria’s unity and lifting sanctions; The Syrian justice minister announced courts would be established to prosecute those who committed crimes against the people and to pursue senior figures of the previous regime who were abroad. Security forces of the new regime continue their operations to locate senior officials of the Assad regime still in the country. Two security personnel were ambushed and killed by Alawite gunmen. Syrian security forces and Hezbollah operatives smuggling weapons exchanged fire on the Syria-Lebanon border; The commander of the Kurdish militia of the Syrian Democratic Forces said they did not seek to separate from Syria but wanted geographic autonomy to safeguard their rights. Turkish President Erdogan justified his country's involvement in Syria. A report of unclear reliability claimed that Iran would supply Kurdish organizations in Iraq and Syria with 1,500 UAVs to counter Turkish activity; IDF operations continue in the demilitarized zone in the Golan Heights, with thousands of weapons seized. The international community expressed concern over Israel's "invasion" of Syria.
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Spotlight on Iran and the Shiite Axis (January 8 – 15, 2025)

Senior Iranian officials continued to glorify the power of Iran and the “resistance front” even amid the developments in the region. Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei stressed Iran’s support for the “resistance” in the Palestinian arena, in Lebanon, and in Yemen. IRGC commander Salami declared that developments in the region have no impact on Iran’s deterrence capability and that it is stronger than ever; The Iranian foreign minister appointed his envoy to the Middle East, Mohammad-Reza Sheibani, as his special representative for Syria. He stressed that decision-making regarding the future of Syria depends on the Syrian people; A former senior IRGC officer in Syria admitted that Iran had suffered a severe defeat in Syria and criticized the Assad regime’s lack of commitment to Iran and the “resistance,” as well as Russia’s conduct in Syria. His remarks are a clear deviation from the official Iranian line, which tries to downplay the importance of developments in Syria for Iran and the pro-Iranian axis in the region; Iran welcomed the election of Joseph Aoun as president of Lebanon, stressing that his election was made possible by Hezbollah’s support and does not pose a threat to the interests of Iran or Hezbollah; In a meeting with the Iraqi prime minister, who visited Tehran, the Supreme Leader stressed that the pro-Iranian Shiite militias are one of the most important components of the government in Iraq and must be strengthened even more. His remarks were made amid reports regarding the possibility of integrating the militias into the Iraqi armed forces; The Houthis claimed responsibility for six attacks against Israel using ballistic missiles, drones, and cruise missiles. The IDF Spokesperson said two missiles and four drones were intercepted. The Israeli Air Force carried out another attack against Houthi targets in Yemen. Senior Houthi regime officials made it clear that they would continue the attacks as “support” for the Gaza Strip and promised “surprises"; The Houthis claimed responsibility for two attacks on the American aircraft carrier in the Red Sea, but the claims have not been verified. The US Central Command reported attacks against underground facilities for storing advanced Houthi weapons.
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Spotlight on the Israel-Palestinian Conflict (January 7 – 14, 2025)

IDF forces continued extensive operations in the northern, central and southern Gaza Strip. They eliminated dozens of terrorists from the air and on the ground and destroyed terror facilities. According to reports, Hamas operatives were using tunnels in northern Gaza and had restored communication systems. Twelve IDF soldiers were killed in the fighting in the northern Gaza Strip; A breakthrough was reported in the indirect negotiations in Qatar, and final responses from Israel and Hamas regarding the first stage of the agreement are pending. Senior Hamas figures discussed the negotiations with the Emir of Qatar and the head of Turkish intelligence; A senior Hamas figure said they had agreed to establish a support committee to administer the Gaza Strip based on technocrats, and claimed the movement did not seek to control the Strip. According to reports, the Palestinian Authority (PA) informed Egypt of its opposition to the idea of the support committee; A new "popular" movement was announced in the Gaza Strip, accusing Hamas of not representing the public and intimidating local residents; According to reports, internal elections to choose the new head of the political bureau to replace Yahya Sinwar will take place in March 2025; Israeli security forces continued counterterrorism operations in Judea and Samaria. Two terrorists en route to carry out an attack were detained; The PA security forces continued their operations against armed terrorists in the Jenin refugee camp. Seventeen booby-trapped vehicles and more than 240 explosive devices were neutralized. Hamas condemned the PA's actions and called on the public to stop them.
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Documents captured show how Hamas uses information published by an Israeli research center

IDF forces in the Gaza Strip captured thousands of Hamas documents, including those relating to the routes Iran used to smuggle weapons to its proxies in the "resistance axis." One of the documents described the smuggling routes for weapons, technological information and money from Iran to Lebanon and Syria, in order to examine the measures taken by Israel and the United States to prevent the smuggling; An examination of the data showed that a significant portion of the information in the captured document, including the maps, was based on and copied from publications by the Alma Center, an Israeli research institute. It is noted that the captured document contained less information than the original document; Documents published by Israeli research institutes are used by Hamas to understand to what extent its capabilities and those of the "resistance axis" are exposed, and it is entirely possible that on occasion the information is presented as Hamas insights without references to the original source. The author of the document in question pretended to have written it, presenting information as if he had acquired it himself, apparently to make it seem as though he were an authority. 
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Spotlight on Iran and the Shiite Axis (January 1-8, 2025)

Senior Iranian figures continued to express confidence in the ability of the “resistance front” to overcome the challenges it faces amid the recent developments in the region, which have undermined its capabilities, and to emphasize Iran’s determination to continue its support for the “resistance.” These statements may indicate Iran’s intention to try to maintain some of its influence in Syria by strengthening and encouraging trends of destabilizing the country over time; An Iranian plane was detained at the Beirut airport on suspicion of transferring funds intended for Hezbollah. The incident drew criticism in Tehran, although the Iranian diplomats on the plane were eventually allowed to bring in the bags containing the money; The commander of the IRGC’s Qods Force visited Baghdad and met with senior Iraqi government officials and commanders of the pro-Iranian Shiite militias. He reportedly made it clear that Tehran would not interfere in any decision by the Iraqi government regarding the future of the militias considering the pressure to disarm them; The Houthis claimed responsibility for six attacks against Israel using ballistic missiles and drones. The IDF Spokesperson reported the interception of two missiles and a drone, and senior Houthi regime officials claimed that the defense systems deployed in Israel were unable to cope with the missile launches; The Houthis claimed responsibility for an attack on an American aircraft carrier in the Red Sea. The claim has not been verified. The US Central Command reported attacks against underground facilities for storing Houthi weapons.
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Spotlight on Syria (Following the Toppling of the Syrian Regime) January 1 – 8, 2025

Between October 8, 2023, when Hezbollah first attacked Israel "to support" the Gaza Strip during the Hamas terrorist attack and massacre which began the previous day, and the ceasefire which went into effect on November 27, 2024, the organization used a wide range of weapons to attack Israeli civilian and military targets. It used various types of rockets, ballistic missiles, UAVs, anti-tank missiles, artillery shells and surface-to-air missiles; Hezbollah deployed its forces in such a way that each escalation saw the introduction of new weapons intended to increase the range, effectiveness and intensity of its attacks on Israel; The vast majority of the weapons were manufactured in Iran and Russia and smuggled to Hezbollah via direct flights from Iran or convoys passing through Syrian territory. the organization also produced its own weapons; This study reviews the weapons used by Hezbollah beginning on October 8, 2023; The variety of weapons used by Hezbollah reflected the organization's advanced military capabilities acquired in the years between the Second Lebanon War in 2006 and the start of the fighting in October 2023, as well as its operational capabilities against Israel, both near the border and in its ability to threaten targets deep within Israel. Despite the extensive damage inflicted by the IDF on Hezbollah's weapons capabilities during the current conflict, in ITIC assessment the organization still possesses capabilities and knowledge which will enable it to continue posing a threat unless it is completely disarmed throughout Lebanon.
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