Hamas

Escalation of terrorist activity in Judea and Samaria Following the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip

Hamas' ambition was to turn Judea and Samaria into an arena for terrorism as part of the campaign to destroy Israel which began with the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre. However, the counterterrorism actions taken by the Israeli security forces, which included the detention and elimination of thousands of wanted persons and terrorist operatives and the seizure of weapons prevented a wave of terrorism from Judea and Samaria; Following the ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) began efforts to shift the center of the "resistance" to Judea and Samaria, encouraging attacks on Israeli security forces and settlers; Iran also continues its central role in efforts to turn Judea and Samaria into an active terrorist arena against Israel. A shipment of weapons from Iran was intercepted, which included powerful explosive charges and explosive-carrying drones; Qods Force operatives in Lebanon who were involved in the smuggling routes of weapons were eliminated; In ITIC assessment, after the ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian terrorist organizations, with Iranian assistance, will direct a significant portion of their activity to Judea and Samaria to justify their existence by continuing the "resistance." The terrorist organizations will also try to exploit the return of the Palestinian issue to the global stage and the regional and international involvement in the Gaza Strip within the framework of the ceasefire to create pressure on Israel, provoking attacks which could escalate Israel's response in Judea and Samaria. Moreover, the return of hundreds of terrorist operatives from Israeli jails to Judea and Samaria will intensify the activity of the terrorist organizations, which will exploit the knowledge and experience of the released prisoners and the cooperative networks they built in prison. Read more...

Hamas activity to restore its civilian governance In the Gaza Strip after the ceasefire

The ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip on October 10, 2025, allowed Hamas to demonstrate governance and all facets of a return to normal life, despite the massive destruction and dismantling of the civilian infrastructure in the Strip caused by the war which began on October 7, 2023; Hamas deployed police and security forces in areas evacuated by the IDF to restore public order, along with a campaign against "collaborators" and those involved in criminal activity and price gouging. Hamas government mechanisms and local authorities began working to repair the damage in fields including health, education, welfare and transportation; In ITIC assessment, despite the severe blow to Hamas' civilian leadership and the destruction of civilian infrastructure in the Gaza Strip throughout the war, Hamas managed to quickly regain almost full control over the areas it held, activating government mechanisms and attempting to provide basic services, while also using force against the Gazans as a means of deterrence. Hamas understood that overt control of the Strip would deter the international community from transferring the funds required for reconstruction, delay the rebuilding of the Strip and could spark civilian unrest, and therefore signaled its willingness to transfer the civilian administration to a Palestinian technocratic government, while refusing to disarm. Nevertheless, Hamas' absolute control over government institutions and the provision of services, including at the local level, will leave it with significant influence, even if an alternative body is established to manage the Strip in accordance with the second stage of the American plan. Read more...

Spotlight on Terrorism – October 2025

During October 2025, fighting continued in the Gaza Strip and in Judea and Samaria, and the Houthi attacks continued from Yemen. On October 10, 2025, a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip went into effect, also pausing the Houthi attacks. The ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah was maintained despite IDF attacks on Hezbollah targets; The Gaza Strip: Until the ceasefire on October 10, the IDF continued attacking terrorist targets from the air and on the ground throughout the Strip, focusing on maneuvering inside Gaza City. Two IDF soldiers were killed. Eight rockets were fired at Israel. After the ceasefire began and IDF forces withdrew from parts of the Strip, the IDF continued enforcing the agreement against threats to its forces and in response to Hamas violations. Three IDF soldiers were killed. As part of the agreement, the twenty remaining live hostages held in the Gaza Strip were released, along with the bodies of seventeen murdered hostages from the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre. Eleven bodies of murdered hostages remain in the Gaza Strip; Judea, Samaria, and Israel: There was one terrorist attack, compared to four the previous month; there were no casualties. Israeli security forces continued counterterrorism operations throughout Judea and Samaria, during which rockets were found, terrorist operatives planning attacks were eliminated, and a large shipment of weapons from Iran was seized; Lebanon: The IDF intensified its activity to prevent Hezbollah from violating the understandings of the ceasefire which went into effect on November 27, 2024, and against the organization's efforts to regain its military capabilities and restore its arsenal. More than twenty Hezbollah operatives were eliminated, including the logistics commander of the southern front headquarters and commanders and operatives from the Radwan Force. Hundreds of engineering vehicles and military infrastructures were destroyed; Syria: IDF forces prevented weapons from being smuggled into Israel and Lebanon from southern Syria; The Houthis: Until the Gaza ceasefire on October 10, the Houthis claimed responsibility for one ballistic missile attack on targets in Israel. The IDF spokesperson reported the interception of one ballistic missile and seven UAVs. The Houthis also claimed responsibility for an attack on a cargo ship in the Gulf of Aden, during which one crew member was killed. The Houthis announced the death of their chief of staff in an Israeli attack at the end of August 2025. Read more...

Arrest of Hamas Terrorist Cells in Europe: Hamas May Carry Out Attacks Abroad

Over the years, Hamas established a network across Europe, operating charitable societies and institutions to raise money for its civilian and military facilities in the Gaza Strip and Judea and Samaria, even though Hamas was put on the European Union's list of terrorist organizations as early as 2003. Hamas representatives in Europe carried out extensive propaganda activity, including early attempts to establish political parties; Only after the Hamas terrorist attack and massacre on October 7, 2023, and the pro-Hamas demonstrations throughout Europe, did European countries institute serious measures against Hamas, including outlawing the movement and shutting down its financial sources; In October 2025, three Hamas terrorist operatives were arrested in Germany on suspicion of preparing to attack Israeli and Jewish targets in the near or immediate future. In December 2023, four Hamas operatives were arrested in Germany and the Netherlands, suspected of being responsible for maintaining hidden weapons caches in Europe under the supervision of the movement's military wing branch in Lebanon; In ITIC assessment, the arrests indicate that for the first time, Hamas was planning to attack Israeli and Jewish targets on European soil. The arrest of the movement's operatives, some of whom were known to authorities as fundraisers, indicates Hamas' desire to exploit its fundraising and propaganda networks in Europe, especially in Germany and Austria, to carry out attacks, despite the efforts of European authorities to take action against the movement following the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre. Hamas is liable to use people who participated in the pro-Hamas demonstrations in Europe in the past two years to attack Israeli and Jewish targets. Meanwhile, Hamas operatives are also liable to exploit the pro-Hamas demonstrations to establish parties which will seek to enter the political arena and increase Hamas and its supporters' efforts to influence public opinion and decision-makers in Europe. Read more...

Preparations for “the Day After” in the Gaza Strip: The Palestinian Organizations Meet in Cairo

On October 23 and 24, 2025, the Palestinian organizations met in Cairo at a conference sponsored by Egypt with Qatari and Turkish support, to formulate a unified Palestinian position, regarding the administration of the Gaza Strip and the disarmament of Hamas and other armed organizations in preparation for the next phase of the ceasefire. Most of the organizations sent representatives, including Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP): Fatah was not represented; According to the closing statement issued after the conference, the organizations agreed to continue the ceasefire, demanding the withdrawal of the IDF from the Gaza Strip, the lifting of the "siege," the opening of the crossings and the beginning of a reconstruction of the Strip. They agreed that the administration of the Strip would be transferred to a temporary committee of independent professionals in cooperation with Arab and international actors, along with an international committee for funding and supervision, and a temporary international force along the borders; In addition to the conference, a meeting was held between a Hamas delegation, led by the head of the movement in the Gaza Strip, Khalil al-Hayya, and a delegation of the Palestinian Authority (PA), headed by the deputy chairman, Hussein al-Sheikh. The Egyptian intelligence chief also met separately with representatives of the organizations; Senior Hamas figures claimed the movement was committed to relinquishing control of the Gaza Strip and to reaching understandings with other Palestinian organizations regarding a joint vision for the ceasefire agreement, but would not state that Hamas was prepared to give up its weapons or to accept PA responsibility for the Strip. Fatah, however, said the PA had to assume responsibility for the Gaza Strip, including the administrative committee to be established to manage the territory and for maintaining security, and called on Hamas to act within the framework of the PLO; In ITIC assessment, the Palestinian organizations have realized that there is a narrow window of opportunity to form a national consensus and an interim framework acceptable to all sides, chiefly Hamas and Fatah. The outcome of the war and the pressure from the United States and the mediators have caused a cautious shift within Hamas toward relinquishing formal rule in favor of technocratic civil administration and elections, with the understanding that the proposed governance model, i.e., technocratic management under Arab and international oversight, would allow the movement to retain influence in the Strip. Hamas also understands that disarming would determine its fate, and in ITIC assessment, the movement will attempt to obscure and postpone the issue of disarmament within any future agreement. However, even if understandings are formally reached and the sides announce a joint decision without binding commitments or a practical plan for disarming the organizations, Israel will face a dilemma regarding the implementation of a full withdrawal, the opening of crossings and approval for Gaza's reconstruction. Read more...

Iran and the Continued Aid to the Axis of Resistance amid the Ceasefire in the Gaza Strip

The ceasefire between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip was achieved at a time when Iran and the “Axis of Resistance” which it leads are facing significant challenges at home and in the region, especially in light of the weakening of the axis and the consequences of the “12-Day War” between it and Israel and the United States in June 2025; Senior Iranian officials expressed support in principle for the ceasefire agreement and claimed that Iran had supported every initiative aimed at ending the war over the past two years. However, they expressed doubts about Israel’s commitment to abide by the agreement. In addition, the officials stressed that the decision on the ceasefire was made exclusively by Hamas without any involvement from Tehran. Iran also rejected the invitation to participate in the peace summit in Sharm al-Sheikh, claiming that it could not participate with those who attacked it during the “12-Day War.”; Iran’s state media portrayed the end of the war as a strategic victory for Hamas and the Palestinians, who succeeded in putting the Palestinian issue back at the top of the global agenda, and as a severe defeat for Israel, which did not achieve its goals and was weakened militarily, economically, socially, and internationally; Before and after the ceasefire, senior officials and media outlets in Iran stressed that, despite the challenges and pressures facing the Islamic Republic and the pro-Iranian axis in the region, Tehran has no intention of abandoning its allies. They emphasized the importance of continuing the “resistance” and Iranian support for it. At the same time, Iran continues to deliver aid, including weapons, to its proxies in the region, including the terrorist organizations in Judea and Samaria, Hezbollah, and the Houthis; In the ITIC’s assessment, the end of the war in the Gaza Strip is not expected to bring about a significant change in Iran’s policy or put an end to its efforts to expand its influence in the Palestinian arena and to continue providing aid to Hamas and the other Palestinian terrorist organizations. In Tehran’s assessment, Hamas’ continued presence in the Gaza Strip and Judea and Samaria may also provide it with future opportunities to rebuild the movement’s capabilities and preserve some of Iran’s influence, despite the operational, logistical, and financial constraints that limit Iran’s continued support for the Palestinian terrorist organizations. At the same time, Iran is expected to continue its support for the other components of the “Axis of Resistance” in the region, first and foremost Hezbollah, which is in the midst of a recovery process despite the IDF’s attacks and the demand for the organization to disarm, and the Houthis, who are taking advantage of the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip to continue acquiring weapons and improving their offensive capabilities. Read more...

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