Financing Terrorism

Hamas Media as Reflected in Documents Brought Back from the Gaza Strip

Hamas' media system is an extensive network which integrates overt and covert, formal and informal communication channels and targets diverse audiences. It serves as a propaganda and incitement tool in Hamas' battle for hearts and minds; Hamas documents brought back by the IDF during the Gaza Strip War showed that Hamas exercises full control, administratively, financially and strategically over its affiliated media outlets in terms of content and messaging, although such bodies are represented as independent, allowing Hamas to maneuver communicationally, diplomatically and militarily; The documents revealed that Hamas' media activity was based on an orderly, multi-year master program divided into 25 projects, each with quantifiable objectives, content production quotas, timetables and resource allocations; An important element of the program was a propaganda campaign to sabotage Israel's resilience by disseminating fake news, funding targeted advertisements for audiences in Israel, operating satirical pages to mock Israeli leaders and symbols, sowing doubts to demoralize the Israeli public; Hamas invests considerable resources in shaping an English-language narrative tailored to the West to mobilize legitimacy for the "resistance" and to defame and demonize the State of Israel; Internal audits reveal that Hamas' media outlets suffer from deficits, bad debts and poor asset management. The findings indicate absolute dependence on the transfer of funds from Hamas' coffers, including via Turkey; In ITIC assessment, the documents show that the affiliated media are at the core of Hamas' battle for hearts and minds, and make the information department particularly important in formulating media policy and managing all the media institutions operating in the service of Hamas, including those the organization does not define as officially affiliated with it. Read more...

Hamas Deploys to Recover and Retain Its Military Strength and Influence over the Gaza Strip

According to the second phase of the ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip, Hamas will transfer authority in the Gaza Strip to a Palestinian technocrat committee, and the movement and all other armed terrorist organizations will disarm. In practice, the start of the new administration committee's practical activity has been delayed. It has not yet entered the Strip and Hamas is exploiting its absence to consolidate its civilian and security governance, accompanied by a public refusal to disarm the "resistance"; The Israeli security establishment has said that since the ceasefire went into effect in October 2025, Hamas has accelerated its economic and military buildup. It is relying on locally produced weapons and smuggling weapons from Egypt using UAVs, and filling its coffers by taxing the entry of humanitarian aid trucks and smuggling cigarettes and other goods, which generate millions of shekels in revenue. In addition, thousands of new operatives have been recruited and trained and infrastructures serving security needs have been rehabilitated; In ITIC assessment, although Hamas ostensibly claims it is prepared to relinquish control in favor of the new technocrat administration dictated by the United States and the mediators, it is building a network which will enable it to remain significant and an influential power factor on "the day after" and do everything in its power complicate its disarmament. To that end, it is strengthening its military arrays by producing and smuggling weapons, recruiting and training new operatives and renewing its facilities, some of which operate in civilian buildings. It is also integrating its operatives into the civilian mechanisms and security forces of the technocrat committee. In addition, a future opening of the Rafah Crossing for the transfer of goods will in all probability again make it possible for Hamas to smuggle in materials to assist its military reconstruction. As long as nothing is done to halt Hamas' military buildup and disarm the movement along with the establishment of an effective alternative administration in the Gaza Strip which has active international support and no Hamas personnel, the movement will remain an active threat to IDF forces and to the State of Israel. Read more...

Spotlight on Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (February 10-17, 2026)

IDF forces continued operating within the Yellow Line in the Gaza Strip to locate and destroy weapons and terrorist facilities. They eliminated terrorist operatives from Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in response to a violation of the ceasefire agreement after the terrorists emerged from a tunnel in an area under IDF control in the northern Gaza Strip; Doctors Without Borders announced it had suspended its activities at Nasser Hospital in Khan Yunis due to the takeover of the hospital by "armed men"; Members of the technocrat committee for administering the Gaza Strip called for the full authority required to carry out their duties, amid concern that Hamas was attempting to impose its presence on the committee's work by integrating its personnel into the new security forces; As the Muslim religious month of Ramadan approaches, Hamas government employees in the Gaza Strip have been protesting the delay in the payment of their salaries; Hamas figures met in Qatar with the head of Iran's Supreme National Security Council and expressed solidarity with Tehran. The spokesperson of Hamas' military wing warned that any attack on Iran would be considered an attack on the Islamic nation; A Hamas delegation met with the commissioner of the Peace Council to discuss implementing the second phase of the ceasefire agreement. Hamas said no official decision had been made to freeze the use of weapons and added that any foreign force entering the Gaza Strip had to operate solely to maintain peace and to separate the population from Israel; Turkey is expanding its involvement in the Gaza Strip by constructing mosques and schools; Palestinians condemned the Israeli government's designation of land in Judea and Samaria as state lands; The prime minister of the Palestinian Authority (PA) said the past year had marked international diplomatic momentum in favor of the Palestinians. Read more...

Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah and Lebanon (February 9-16, 2026)

In south Lebanon the IDF continued attacking Hezbollah targets and eliminated two of the organization's terrorist operatives, part of enforcing the ceasefire agreement from November 2024 and preventing Hezbollah's renewed military-terrorist build-up. Several terrorist operatives from the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) were eliminated in the Beqa'a Valley near the border with Syria; Hezbollah continued criticizing the Lebanese regime because of the ongoing Israeli attacks and the plan to disarm the organization. The organization's secretary general, Na'im Qassem, called on the government not to yield to Western pressure and to rely on the capabilities of the "resistance."; Lebanon's prime minister and army commander held meetings with foreign officials in preparation for the international conference to support the Lebanese security forces which will be held in Paris in early March 2026; The commander of the United States Central Command praised the Lebanese army for exposing another giant Hezbollah tunnel in south Lebanon; Hezbollah launched its campaign for the general parliamentary elections to be held this coming spring and agreed with the Amal Movement on full coordination; Hezbollah's secretary general announced that the organization would pay rent for three months for anyone whose house was damaged in the fighting with Israel, however residents in Shi'ite areas protested there was no long-term commitment and raised claims of unequal distribution of payments; The United States Treasury imposed sanctions on a Lebanese company converting Hezbollah's gold reserves into liquid assets for the organization's reconstruction. Read more...

Spotlight on Terrorism – January 2026

During January 2026, the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip remained in force, while counterterrorism operations continued in Judea and Samaria. The ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah continued, despite IDF attacks on Hezbollah targets; The ceasefire in the Gaza Strip that went into effect on October 10, 2025 continued. IDF forces attacked suspects who crossed the Yellow Line and eliminated terrorist operatives in response to ceasefire violations. The body of the last murdered Israeli hostage, held in the Gaza Strip since the October 7, 2023 terrorist attack and massacre, was returned, after which the transition to the second stage of the ceasefire agreement was announced. No rockets were launched into Israeli territory; Israel, Judea and Samaria: There was one terrorist attack, with no casualties. Israeli security forces continued counterterrorism operations throughout Judea and Samaria, during which wanted individuals and terrorist operatives who attacked IDF forces or planned attacks were eliminated and weapons were located; The IDF continued attacks on Hezbollah attempts to violate the understandings of the November 27, 2024 ceasefire and on the organization's reconstruction efforts. Nineteen Hezbollah terrorist operatives were eliminated; IDF forces continued to operate in southern Syria; The Houthis did not attack Israel or ocean-going vessels, in accordance with their plan not to attack once the Gaza Strip War ended. However, they threatened to resume attacks following alleged "Israeli violations" in the Gaza Strip and in Lebanon, and threatened to attack Israeli targets in Somaliland in the Horn of Africa; An attack on the Israeli embassy in Azerbaijan was prevented. Read more...

The Reorganization of Hezbollah Leadership and the Resignation of Wafiq Safa

The Israel-Hezbollah War ended in November 2024, and since then Hezbollah has been reorganizing to repair the damage it suffered, including to the top leadership, and to adapt to Na'im Qassem as the new secretary general; Alongside reports of disputes and power struggles between the "pragmatic" figures led by Qassem, and the proponents of an extremist approach, senior organization figures claimed that Hezbollah had recovered and rebuilt the leadership structure, adapting it to the continued Israeli targeted killings as part of enforcement actions, and preparations for a new war; According to reports, at the beginning of February 2026, Hezbollah's leadership accepted the resignation of Wafiq Safa, who had headed the Coordination and Liaison Unit since 1987 and was considered close to Hassan Nasrallah and one of the most prominent and influential figures in the organization's top leadership. Media commentaries opined that he resigned because of his disputes with Qassem, but also noted that the move was part of the secretary general's efforts to reorganize Hezbollah's hierarchy by tightening his control over the organization's media, and political and "security" forces, while relying on figures loyal to himself and with lower media prominence, in order to reduce the risk of being targeted by Israel; In ITIC assessment, the termination of Wafiq Safa's role was intended to stabilize Hezbollah's leadership, reduce the vulnerability of senior figures and consolidate the secretary general's control after the profound shock undergone by the organization. However, concentrating authority in the secretary general's office and weakening veteran power centers may awake latent frictions and undermine internal balances. The success of the move will be partially measured by the organization's ability to preserve cohesion, prevent further intelligence leaks and redefine Hezbollah's relations with the Lebanese state without relinquishing its core principles. Read more...

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