1. Home
  2. Publications
  3. Ad Hoc Studies

Ad Hoc Studies

The future of Hamas’ weapons and its efforts to rebuild the military wing

The American Twenty-Point Plan, which served as the basis for the ceasefire agreement to end the Gaza Strip War, explicitly stipulates that during the second phase Hamas and the other armed terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip will be required to disarm and the Strip will become a demilitarized zone; Senior Hamas figures made it clear that although they were committed to maintaining the ceasefire, they were not willing disarm the "resistance" until the establishment of a Palestinian state. They also reiterated that it was "a complex issue that had to be deliberated' within "a broader framework of general Palestinian understandings about the future of the Strip."; As after the previous rounds of fighting, and despite the demand that it disarm, Hamas quickly took advantage of the ceasefire to rebuild its military wing by collecting unexploded ordnance and ammunition left in the Gaza Strip after two years of war. In all probability, to restore its arsenal Hamas will use weapons smuggled across the Egyptian border via civilian drones and the entry of raw materials and dual-purpose equipment intended for the reconstruction of the Strip to manufacture weapons; In ITIC assessment, Hamas' unwillingness to relinquish the weapons of the "resistance" reflect its determination to continue the armed "struggle" against Israel under the pretext of a "legal and religious [sic] right to fight the occupation." Therefore, until a new, temporary administration is established in the Gaza Strip, Hamas can be expected to take advantage of the interim period to rebuild its military capabilities, with Iran also expected to continue backing Hamas by providing financial aid, supplying weapons, and transferring technical and other knowledge and training. The involvement of Qatar and Turkey, Hamas' allies, in shaping the "day after" in Gaza can be expected to obstruct the establishment of a temporary administration which could lead genuine, sincere efforts to limit Hamas' activity and disarm it. However, even if the temporary administration demonstrates determination, Hamas will continue to use its proven experience to adapt its military buildup processes to the changing situations on the ground.
Read more...

Hezbollah’s Reconstruction Efforts Amid the IDF’s Enforcement of the Ceasefire in Lebanon

Since the ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon went into effect on November 27, 2024, Hezbollah has been making efforts to restore its capabilities, which were severely damaged in the campaign against Israel between October 2023 and November 2024, while adapting the organization’s structure to the new reality. Senior Hezbollah officials have even declared that the organization is prepared for a new confrontation with Israel. Hezbollah’s reconstruction activities in southern Lebanon constitute a violation of the understandings prohibiting Hezbollah’s presence south of the Litani River; In light of identifying accelerated efforts to reconstruct the organization’s infrastructure, the IDF carried out hundreds of attacks against Hezbollah operatives and the organization’s military infrastructure in southern Lebanon and other areas of the country. Since the beginning of October 2025, a total of 20 attacks have been carried out to enforce the ceasefire understandings, destroying capabilities that aided in reconstructing Hezbollah’s infrastructure, including hundreds of engineering vehicles and a concrete production quarry; Hezbollah has continued the line it has taken since the beginning of the ceasefire, calling on the Lebanese authorities to intensify their efforts against “Israeli aggression,” while vaguely threatening that the “resistance” may lose its patience; The Israeli strike that destroyed hundreds of engineering vehicles intensified the anger and criticism from the Lebanese leadership, which accused Israel of attempting to undermine Lebanon’s reconstruction efforts in general and efforts to reconstruct the villages in southern Lebanon in particular. Prime Minister Salam also instructed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to file a complaint with the UN Security Council; Against the backdrop of the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and the attempt to increase American pressure on Israel, Lebanese President Aoun proposed opening indirect negotiations with Israel to resolve disputed issues. It was reported that Hezbollah did not reject the idea, but demanded as a precondition the cessation of strikes, withdrawal of IDF forces from southern Lebanon, and the release of Lebanese detainees held in Israel; In the ITIC’s assessment, Hezbollah is expected to continue efforts to restore its capabilities despite IDF enforcement actions, with emphasis on areas north of the Litani River to minimize friction with Lebanese Army forces working to implement the state monopoly on weapons in southern Lebanon. The ITIC assesses that if the trend of Israeli strikes against Hezbollah operatives and infrastructure intensifies, Hezbollah is expected to increase criticism and pressure on state leadership, but it appears that for now, the organization remains restrained and will avoid direct action against Israel. However, if Israeli strikes result in widespread harm to uninvolved civilians, Hezbollah may respond more extensively under the pretext of “defending Lebanon.”
Read more...

Hamas Activity to Restore Security Governance in the Gaza Strip after the Ceasefire

The ceasefire in the Gaza Strip which began on October 10, 2025, provided Hamas with an opportunity to deploy its security forces in areas evacuated by the IDF and to demonstrate governance, despite the severe damage they suffered during the war; The Hamas security forces focused on fighting local clans accused of collaboration with Israel or identified as power centers which might threaten the movement's position in the Strip. The security forces carried out raids and arrests, confiscated equipment, and executed "collaborators" in full view of local residents; Hamas violence received support from the "resistance" [terrorist] organizations in the Gaza Strip and the umbrella organizations of clans which disowned the "collaborators" among them, but provoked angry reactions from the Palestinian Authority and the United States. However, Hamas claimed that their activity was intended to prevent "anarchy and chaos," but reportedly agreed to stop public executions; In ITIC assessment, as long as there is no actual change in the control of the Gaza Strip as part of the second phase of the ceasefire agreement, in which Hamas is supposed to relinquish power and disarm, the movement can be expected to continue using its security forces to attack any groups which might threaten it. The objective of using force, especially the executions, was to instill fear in the local population and ensure that Hamas retained influence even if it relinquished its governmental power centers. However, if fighting against Israel resumes, the militias and clans opposed to Hamas can be expected to take action to expand their areas of influence throughout the Strip.
Read more...

Instructions Given by Yahya al-Sinwar for the October 7, 2023 Attack and Massacre

After Operation Guardian of the Walls (or "The Sword of Jerusalem Battle," as Hamas calls it) in May 2021, the Hamas leadership, led by Yahya al-Sinwar, leader of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, began planning a campaign to realize the vision of "the destruction of Israel."; In addition to the Hamas leadership's strategic coordination with Iran and Hezbollah, al-Sinwar personally participated in planning the terrorist attack and massacre carried out by the organization's military wing; A document handwritten by al-Sinwar in August 2022, which was found by the IDF in the Gaza Strip, detailed his instructions, from the deceptions in the weeks before the invasion to the conduct of invasion itself, based on the understanding that the Israeli defense measures along the border would not be able to stop the waves of attacking terrorists; According to the document, al-Sinwar kept the plan secret from the other terrorist organizations operating in the Gaza Strip, intending to involve them only in subsequent waves after Hamas had secured control of Israeli territory; Al-Sinwar expressed his confidence that the Hamas offensive would lead to a multi-front campaign involving Israeli Arabs, Judea and Samaria, and east Jerusalem, as well as an invasion of Israel's north by Hezbollah; A central part of the document is dedicated to the psychology of the attack, with al-Sinwar's explicit instructions to document Hamas terrorist operatives indiscriminately slaughtering civilians, trampling soldiers' bodies, burning residential neighborhoods, and blowing up tanks. The documentation of the atrocities was intended not only for internal use but was planned as a psychological tool to shock and terrorize the Israeli public and send a message of power to "resistance" operatives in the region; The document shows al-Sinwar's control over all the details of the invasion as it was carried out during the early hours of the attack on October 7, 2023. In ITIC assessment, al-Sinwar was not content with a large-scale terrorist attack or with sending a message but aspired to a complete strategic change on the ground through prolonged physical control of command centers, communication hubs, and IDF bases to leverage Israel's initial confusion and establish a new reality before the IDF or the international community could respond.
Read more...

Reactions to the Wave of Recognition of a Palestinian State

About ten countries, including France, Britain, Canada and Australia, announced their recognition of a Palestinian state, bringing the number of countries recognizing "Palestine" to 159 of the 193 UN member states. The announcements came after the UN General Assembly adopted the "New York Declaration," which supports advancing the two-state solution as the basis for ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; The Palestinian Authority welcomed the recognition and called for practical steps which would enable the establishment of the state of "Palestine." Hamas said that the recognition was the result of the October 7, 2023 attack and the organization would continue with armed "resistance." However, Palestinian Internet users doubted that the wave of diplomatic recognition would end the war in the Gaza Strip or improve the humanitarian situation; In the United States, the countries that recognized a Palestinian state were condemned, while in Italy and Germany it was called a premature step which would not advance negotiations to end the war and resolve the conflict. According to the Arab world, recognition gave Palestinians hope for realizing their rights; In ITIC assessment, adopting the New York Declaration and the additional recognition of a Palestinian state are a cognitive achievement for the Palestinians after the Palestinian issue had been pushed to the sidelines in recent years, and strengthen Hamas' arguments about the "historical importance" of the October 7, 2023 terrorist attack and massacre. However, the actual establishment of a Palestinian state is still in the distant future because of Israel's control of territory and resources, the weakness of the Palestinian Authority and its support for terrorism, in addition to the security situation in the Gaza Strip and Hamas' continued terrorist activity. American opposition to the recognition of a Palestinian state and its ability to veto a Security Council resolution to establish a Palestinian state leave the current move at the declarative level.
Read more...

The Anniversary of Nasrallah’s Death and the Challenges facing Hezbollah

Hezbollah held formal ceremonies to mark the anniversary of the pager attack and the deaths of secretary general Hassan Nasrallah and his designated successor Hashem Safi al-Din, among others. The ceremonies exposed the challenges facing the organization, led by the demand it disarms, its status in Lebanon, continued Israeli attacks and economic and other internal difficulties; Hezbollah secretary general Na'im Qassem and others used the ceremonies as a platform to reiterate that the "resistance" would not disarm and threatened violence if disarmament were implemented by force. On the other hand, President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam reiterated their intention, with increasing American pressure, to achieve a state monopoly on weapons: Aoun was the more cautious of the two, fearing civil war; Hezbollah ignored the ban on projecting pictures of Nasrallah and Safi al-Din on the tourist site of the Raouche [Pigeon] Rock in Beirut, causing the tensions between the organization and Prime Minister Salam to resurface; Salam demanded the arrest of those responsible and threatened to resign; In ITIC assessment, the Lebanese state's inability to enforce its sovereignty over Hezbollah, despite the blows inflicted on the organization in the past two years, reflects the Lebanon's fundamental weakness and the difficulty of the international system to motivate the state's institutions to act. Hezbollah, on the other hand, maintains its military capabilities and has a wide enough circle of loyalists to allow it to challenge the decisions of the government of which it is a part and to use threats of force to achieve its goals. However, the continuing attempts to disarm Hezbollah and the continued Israeli enforcement of the ceasefire agreement may cause Hezbollah to use force in the domestic arena, or attempt to act against Israel as a "common Hezbollah and Lebanon enemy," despite its weakness and its restraint so far. 
Read more...

Previous years bulletins

20262025202420232022202120202019201820172015201420132012201120102009