Ad Hoc Studies

The Mood in Gaza on the First Anniversary of the Gaza Strip War

A year after the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack and massacre, and the outbreak of the Gaza Strip War, the Gazans' euphoria has been replaced by despair over the heavy destruction, the displacement from homes and the high death toll; The main criticism on Palestinian social networks in Gaza focuses on the hardships of life amid the ongoing war, uncertainty about the future, hunger, high food prices and difficulties in finding shelter and food; Considerable criticism is also directed at Hamas, particularly its "external" leaders who do not live in Gaza and are perceived as disconnected from the growing suffering of the residents. Since the death of Yahya al-Sinwar, head of the Hamas political bureau in the Gaza Strip, who was seen as the "architect" of the October 7, 2023 attack, Khaled Mashal, head of the "external" Hamas leadership, has become the primary target of Gazan anger; In addition to the criticism on social media, feelings of despair and anger toward Hamas are reflected in public opinion polls, which show low support for the possibility of Hamas' continuing to rule Gaza after the war, as well as low approval for the October 7 attack and the continuation of "armed resistance" against Israel; Despite criticism and frustration, there has not yet been a broad public protest against Hamas in Gaza, most probably because of fear of retaliation, especially in light of Hamas efforts to maintain its power on the ground, including through the Interior Ministry's Sahem Unit, which theoretically operates against looters and disorderly conduct. Despite internal criticism of the leadership in Gaza, Israel is still perceived as the primary enemy and is described as "cruel and genocidal." Read more...

The Rebel Attack in Syria: What does it mean for Israel?

On November 27, 2024, armed organizations opposing the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, led by the Islamic-jihadist organization Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, launched Operation Deterrence of Aggression Operation (Rad' al-Udwan) against Syrian army forces and their allies in northwestern Syria. On November 30, 2024, Turkish-sponsored rebel organizations Operation Dawn of Liberation initiated Operation “Dawn of Liberation” (Fajr al-Hurriya) in the Aleppo region, attacking Syrian regime forces and the Syrian Democratic Forces, a Kurdish-Arab militia supported by the United States. The rebels took control of Aleppo and Hama, as well as military bases, airfields and security facilities operating under the sponsorship of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Hezbollah; Iran and "resistance axis" organizations expressed support for the Syrian regime, making diplomatic efforts to calm the situation and deploying forces to Syria. Iran also accused the offensive of being an "Israeli-American conspiracy" whose objective was to weaken the "resistance axis." According to the rebels, they wanted to prevent Syrian regime forces from attacking the opposition enclave in northwestern Syria. They also noted that the "resistance axis" focus on fighting Israel and the withdrawal of Hezbollah forces from Syria to Lebanon were key factors in their considerations for initiating the offensive at this time; In ITIC assessment, although the rebels currently focus on fighting Assad's regime and its allies, and Islamic-jihadist takeover of advanced weaponry, including fighter jets, could pose a long-term threat to Israel. In addition, the increasing instability in Syria could trigger a new wave of displaced persons who might also move toward Israel's border. However, the rebels' offensive also poses a threat to Iran and the "resistance axis," which have used Syria as a route for transferring weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon and a location from which to attack Israel. The focus of Iran and the militias on fighting the rebels, who have also taken control of strategically important "resistance axis" sites, may hinder their ability to assist Hezbollah in the reconstruction process after the fighting against Israel. Read more...

The Israel-Lebanon Ceasefire Agreement The Lebanese Point of View

On November 27, 2024, a ceasefire agreement between Israel and Lebanon went into effect, halting the fighting which broke out on October 8, 2023. According to the agreement, Israel will gradually withdraw its forces from south Lebanon over 60 days, while the Lebanese army will deploy its forces in south Lebanon and work to prevent armed organizations, primarily Hezbollah, from holding weapons or operating military facilities south of the Litani River. An American-led committee will oversee the implementation; Hezbollah is attempting to establish a narrative of victory, claiming that the fighting ended with an Israeli defeat, despite the heavy losses to the organization, including the killing of its secretary general Hassan Nasrallah and its military leadership. Na’im Qassem, the new secretary general, claimed it was a greater victory than the one in the 2006 war, adding that the organization was committed to cooperating with the Lebanese army to implement the agreement. A Hezbollah-affiliated journalist said Hezbollah would free its prisoners "by any means"; Immediately after the ceasefire, thousands of displaced persons began returning to their homes in south Lebanon, the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in Beirut, and the Beqa'a. However, the IDF and the Lebanese army warned them not to return to villages near the border, and the IDF opened fire on Lebanese attempting to return to south Lebanon. From Hezbollah's perspective, the return of the displaced to their homes in south Lebanon is another expression of victory, in contrast to Israelis, who cannot return to their homes along the border; Lebanon’s interim prime minister and other government officials said they would give the army all the necessary authority to implement the ceasefire agreement in south Lebanon. Nabih Berri, the speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, said that Lebanon had overcome "Israeli aggression"; Hezbollah’s political and social media opponents expressed wonder and criticized Hezbollah's declarations of victory, given the extensive destruction in Lebanon and the blows to the organization. They also expressed hope that the agreement would lead to Hezbollah’s disarmament and criticized the "resistance axis" for its claims of supporting Lebanon while not paying a price; In our assessment, Hezbollah will continue to promote and reiterate its victory narrative and adopt a policy of brinkmanship. Its operatives will attempt to challenge the implementation of the ceasefire until the planned withdrawal of IDF forces from south Lebanon by the end of January 2025. Even after the withdrawal, the Lebanese army will most likely be unable to enforce the ceasefire, prevent Hezbollah operatives from reaching south Lebanon or fully oversee the dismantling of Hezbollah’s infrastructure south of the Litani River, due to Hezbollah’s efforts to integrate its activities into the local population and the army’s desire to avoid direct confrontation with Hezbollah. Read more...

Hamas and Hezbollah Activities in Europe: Germany as a Test Case

In November 2024, charges filed in Germany against four suspects affiliated with Hamas for operating weapons depots for Hamas in Europe and planning attacks on Israeli, Jewish and Western targets in Germany. In July 2024, the German ministry of the interior ordered the closure of the Islamic Center in Hamburg after evidence was found that for years it had served the interests of Iran and Hezbollah in the country; Both cases provide evidence of the continued presence of Hamas and Hezbollah in Europe in general and Germany in particular, despite efforts by authorities to limit or prevent their activities, especially following the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre in Israel; Germany, like other European countries, has always walked a fine line between counterterrorism, its commitment to absorbing immigrants and the protection of human rights. That was why for years if did not designate Hamas and Hezbollah as terrorist organizations or outlaw outlawing them, allowing their organizations and charities to raise funds for terrorist activities which also targeted German; In 2020, Germany ended the EU's arbitrary separation between Hezbollah’s military wing and its so-called political wing, and designated Hezbollah a terrorist organization. A similar move against Hamas was taken only in November 2023, although the movement as a whole had been designated a terrorist organization by the EU since 2014; An October 2024 report issued by Germany’s Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) warned that in addition to actions by individuals motivated by antisemitism, the escalation in the Middle East also posed a threat to Jewish and Israeli targets because of operational preparations by Iranian or Hezbollah proxies or by Hamas; In ITIC assessment, German law enforcement authorities will continue efforts to prevent Hamas and Hezbollah activities as part of a growing European effort to reduce the risk from Iranian proxies. However, the threat posed by Hamas and Hezbollah can be expected to remain high for Europe in general and for Germany in particular. The arrest of Hamas operatives and the exposure of weapons depots may indicate a change in the movement’s activities in Europe, which until now avoided carrying out attacks abroad and focused on fundraising and promoting its agenda within civilian social organizations. Hezbollah may also activate its network, which in all probability still exists in Germany, to attack Israeli and Jewish targets, either as revenge for the killing of Hassan Nasrallah and senior organization members or as part of a possible Iranian response to the Israeli strike on Iran in October 2024. Hamas and Hezbollah may also exploit the radicalization of Muslim immigrant communities in Europe, as demonstrated by the attack on Israeli soccer fans in Amsterdam in November 2024, to construct a support base which would help them spread their anti-Israeli and antisemitic agenda and even carry out attacks. Read more...

Muhammad Dahlan and His Possible Involvement in “The Day After” in the Gaza Strip

In attempts to find a party to manage the Gaza Strip "the day after," the name of Muhammad Dahlan, a senior Fatah figure in exile in the UAE, has occasionally come up as a potential candidate oversee Gaza's administration after the war, at least temporarily. In September 2024, the Fatah leadership under Mahmoud Abbas decided to promote a reconciliation initiative with Dahlan and other ousted Fatah members; Dahlan's name emerged prominently due to his involvement in Gaza during the war through UAE humanitarian aid efforts and his political connections with various Gaza figures, including Yahya al-Sinwar, who was head of the Hamas political bureau until he was killed in October 2024; Muhammad Dahlan himself has denied the reports, claiming he refuses to take on any security, governmental or executive role and was solely focused on humanitarian aid activities; Born in Khan Yunis in the Gaza Strip, Dahlan was a prominent figure in the "middle generation" of Fatah leadership. Following the Oslo Accords and the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) he held senior roles, including head of the preventive security forces in Gaza and minister of civilian affairs. As part of his role he engaged in political and security discussions with Israeli officials, but after the outbreak of the second intifada his name was mentioned in connection with to terrorist activities against Israel; In 2011, Dahlan was expelled from Fatah over claims he attempted to overthrow PA chairman Mahmoud Abbas. He relocated to the UAE, becoming a close advisor to President Muhammad bin Zayed. Meanwhile he worked to maintain his status within the PA through political alliances and by strengthening ties with Hamas in Gaza; In ITIC assessment, reconciliation talks between Fatah and Dahlan can be expected to continue, as they serve both sides. For the PA, they represent an opportunity to draw closer to the UAE and Gulf States, which were expected to play a central role in Gaza's reconstruction after the war. For Dahlan, the process helps strengthen his standing within the PA as a potential leader after the Mahmoud Abbas era, especially if Marwan Barghouti remains imprisoned in Israel during negotiations with Hamas over the release of the hostages. Dahlan also has the advantage of not currently being associated with the PA leadership and was recognized as a prominent rival to Mahmoud Abbas and the leadership, which was widely perceived as corrupt by the public. Read more...

Captured Documents Show Iranian Support for Hamas in the Gaza Strip

Iran has been Hamas' primary strategic supporter since 2014, providing military equipment and training as well as financial aid amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars for the movement's leadership and its military wing. Senior Hamas figures have also publicly thanked Tehran for providing weapons enabling attacks deep inside Israeli territory; Hamas documents captured by IDF forces during the Gaza Strip War offer a glimpse into the extent of Iranian penetration of Hamas as part of constructing the "resistance axis" against Israel. In addition to supporting Hamas' military activities, Iran supports other Gazan terrorist organizations and funds civilian, educational and cultural initiatives; The documents also provide new information on Iran's involvement in Hamas' preparations for the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre, including coordination with Hezbollah and Hamas deployment in the Lebanese arena; The documents reveal a strategic Iranian process to gain a foothold and exert influence over Hamas in particular and the Gaza Strip in general. Iran carried out the process by means of extensive funding, partially directed towards civilian programs, strengthening Shi'a within the Sunni society in Gaza (and influencing Hamas' decision-making by controlling financial sources and the significant procuring of weapons. Read more...

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