Ad Hoc Studies

Disarming the Palestinian Factions in Lebanon

The Palestinian factions in Lebanon have maintained an armed presence in the refugee camps for decades without interference from the authorities. In recent years, the Hamas branch in Lebanon has become the most powerful military force among the factions, and its active involvement in fighting alongside Hezbollah in the latest conflict drew significant public and political attention; The ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon in November 2024, which ended the fighting between Israel and Hezbollah, led the Lebanese authorities to declare their willingness to institute a state monopoly of weapons throughout the country. The declaration was reinforced under the new president, Joseph Aoun, and the new government headed by Nawaf Salam; The rocket fire attacking northern Israel at the end of March 2025 and the exposure of Hamas operatives as responsible led the authorities to warn the movement not to threaten national security. Following the warning, in an unprecedented move Hamas handed the Lebanese army suspects involved in the rocket fire; At this stage, it is unclear whether Lebanese security forces intend to act militarily to collect the weapons in the country’s Palestinian refugee camps or to simply reorganize relations and increase coordination over weapons use. In ITIC assessment, a successful assertion of state authority over the Palestinian factions could set a precedent for a similar move against Hezbollah, which is considered a more complex and sensitive challenge for Lebanon. As a result, Hezbollah may attempt to prevent a forceful move by the Lebanese army against the Palestinian factions but may also assist in resolving the issue through dialogue. Read more...

Demonstrations in the Gaza Strip against Hamas

On March 25, 2025, Gazans held spontaneous popular demonstrations in Beit Lahia in the northern Gaza Strip to protest the continuation of the war and Hamas rule, the first major public protest against Hamas since October 7, 2023. In the following two days, additional demonstrations took place in Beit Lahia and in other areas of the Gaza Strip. However, since March 28, 2025, no physical demonstrations have been recorded and the protest has continued mainly on social media. Each demonstration was attended by dozens to hundreds of protesters; Alongside the calls to end the war, in light of the renewal of IDF attacks in the Gaza Strip, the demonstrators accused both Hamas and Israel of responsibility for their suffering and demanded Hamas relinquish control of the Gaza Strip, which it has held since 2007; Hamas initially tried to represent the demonstrations as protesting "Israeli aggression," but also claimed that "parties with suspicious agendas" were leading the protest in the service of Israel. Later, Hamas forces used violence, and according to reports activists who participated in the protest or promoted it on social media received threats from Hamas operatives and were physically attacked, including a protester who was tortured to death; The Palestinian Authority and Fatah denied involvement in the demonstrations but called on Hamas to respond to the Gazans' calls and relinquish control of the Gaza Strip; Most of the reports on the protest appeared in media outlets not affiliated with Hamas and on social media. Hamas media outlets, and those affiliated with it such as Al Jazeera, either did not report on it or claimed it was directed against Israe; In our assessment, the demonstrations express the Gazans' genuine pain, and therefore are spontaneous, without leadership or direction. However, the fear of the Hamas forces, whose use of physical force instills fear among the residents, may prevent an alternative leadership from emerging. After three days the demonstrations waned and ended, but if the fighting and the humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip continue without a diplomatic breakthrough, the protest may be renewed and Hamas can be expected to suppress it rapidly. Read more...

Hamas Promotes a “Victory” Narrative for Gaza Strip War

The announcement of the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, even before it went into effect on January 19, 2025, provided Hamas with an opportunity to start promoting a "victory" narrative over Israel in the aza Strip War, which they refer to as Operation al-Aqsa Flood, which began with the Hamas terrorist attack and massacre on October 7, 2023; Official statements from Hamas and its senior figures, amplified by the movement's official and affiliated media outlets, as well as during public "release ceremonies" for Israeli hostages, aimed to promote the narrative that Israel had failed to achieve its objectives against the "resistance" and the "steadfastness" of the Gazans; Hamas' media made extensive use of statements from Israeli political, military and media figures, which in their perspective reinforced the message of Israel's "failure" to achieve the war's objectives; In ITIC assessment, Hamas will continue highlighting Israel's failure to achieve its objectives and promoting the "victory" narrative as long as the ceasefire agreement is maintained, in order to soften public criticism in Gaza of the extensive devastation in the Strip. If the agreement transitions to the second phase, which is expected to include further Israeli withdrawals from Gaza and the release of more prisoners who committed particularly serious crimes, Hamas will intensify its "victory" propaganda to increase its power in Gaza and maintain its position in the Palestinian arena, even if it is forced to relinquish actual control over the Gaza Strip. Read more...

Al-Jazeera Program about the October 7, 2023, Terrorist Attack and Massacre

On January 24, 2025, al-Jazeera TV aired a special episode of the investigative program "What Is Hidden Is Greater." It focused on the Hamas terrorist attack and massacre on October 7, 2023 [the so-called "Operation al-Aqsa Flood"] from the perspective of Hamas' military wing; The program aired previously-unseen footage of Muhammed Deif, the commander of Hamas' military wing, and Yahya al-Sinwar, head of the Hamas political bureau in the Gaza Strip; The program promoted Hamas's false narrative that the attack was intended only to harm Israeli military personnel and abduct soldiers and officers while not harming children and the elderly; In ITIC assessment, the program was broadcast to reinforce the "victory" narrative Hamas has been promoting since the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip went into effect and to justify the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre as a "legitimate military action." Al-Sinwar in the Rafah was shown in the combat zone to establish the narrative of the "fighter leader" who was on the front lines until his death, not hiding in tunnels. The details the programs revealed about al-Sinwar and Deif provided further evidence of the close connection between Hamas and Qatar's al-Jazeera network, as did its correspondents' exposure as operatives in the Hamas military-terrorist wing and its exclusive permission to cover the release of Israeli hostages. Read more...

The atmosphere among Palestinians who returned to the northern Gaza Strip

Opening access to northern Gaza, as part of the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas, led to euphoria among the returnees, who did not hide their happiness and felt a sense of participation in the "victory" narrative promoted by Hamas. However, encountering the widespread destruction of homes and infrastructure in northern Gaza led to frustration and anger, and thousands of displaced Gazans returned to the south of the Strip; Some of the criticism was directed at Hamas, with accusations that the movement was not addressing the urgent needs of the residents and was instead focusing on hostage "liberation ceremonies". Nevertheless, criticism remains limited due to fears of a violent response from Hamas, which was quick to demonstrate power and governance as the ceasefire went into effect; In ITIC assessment, uncertainty regarding the timetable for Gaza's reconstruction, particularly in the north, will most likely increase frustration and many may return to the displaced persons camps in the south, where basic services exist and there is a steady supply of humanitarian aid. In addition, given President Trump's proposal to temporarily or permanently relocate the residents of the Strip, the destruction may increase willingness, especially among the younger generation, to consider leaving for abroad in hopes of building their future. In ITIC assessment, Hamas will suppress critical voices by force. However, given public frustration, the extensive destruction in Gaza will make it difficult for Hamas to sustain its "victory" narrative over time without presenting solutions, and may seek to shift responsibility, for instance to the committee for managing the Strip which Egypt is trying to promote, while striving to maintain its military strength. Read more...

The issue of emigration from the Gaza Strip in light of President Trump’s proposal

On January 25, 2025, after the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip went into effect, U.S, President Trump proposed the temporary or permanent relocation of all Gazans in light of the extensive destruction and to facilitate reconstruction. The proposal sparked condemnations from the Palestinians, Iran and Arab states, which accused it of being a "forced displacement" in violation of international law; The proposal reignited the issue of emigration from the Gaza Strip in general and of young people in particular, known even before the Gaza Strip War. Unofficial data indicated that approximately 300,000 young people had left the Strip since Hamas took control in 2007, primarily due to the economic situation and lack of hope for the future; The Hamas leadership sought to downplay emigration, calling any reference to it a Palestinian Authority smear campaign, but a document found by the IDF in Gaza written by the Khan Yunis Brigade of Hamas' military wing indicated concerns over the departure of young people, who constituted a significant part of the movement’s fighting force; In ITIC assessment, the Palestinians and Arab states will continue to present a united front against the plan in an attempt to eliminate it in its early stages. However, even if the plan is not implemented, the opening of the Rafah Crossing and others at the end of the war could lead to a significant wave of emigration from Gaza because of the widespread destruction and uncertainty about the future. Such a scenario would pose a significant challenge to Hamas, which would do everything in its power to prevent the emigration of young people, which could weaken its political and military stranglehold on the Gazan public. Read more...

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