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Ad Hoc Studies

Oil Exports, an Important Component of Iran’s Funding for Terrorism

For over four decades Iran has been considered the world’s leading sponsor of terrorism, with the regime in Tehran using the Qods Force of the Revolutionary Guards to directly support a range of proxy organizations operating against the United States, Israel and pro-Western Arab states across the Middle East. According to estimates, Iran provides hundreds of millions of dollars annually in financial assistance to Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in the Gaza Strip, the Houthis in Yemen and the Shi'ite militias in Iraq; The Iranian regime’s main source of revenue is its energy sector, which generates about half the country’s export income. Iran’s security bodies receive state allocations of oil which they are expected to sell themselves, and the profits from the sales are used to fund their own operations and those of affiliated terrorist organizations; The United States has imposed sanctions on Iran with the objective of restricting its ability to sell oil on international markets. In an effort to circumvent the sanctions, Iran operates a complex network of intermediaries, front companies, and “shadow fleet“ of tankers; With the formation of the Trump administration at the beginning of 2025, the United States renewed its “maximum pressure” policy on Iran, which had been in effect during Trump’s first term between 2018 and 2020. In recent months, the United States has worked to tighten the sanctions while exposing dozens of entities involved in Iran’s illegal oil trade; At the same time, Iranian opposition elements have exposed dozens of companies, individuals and financial entities involved in Iran’s sanction-evasion operations. The exposures reflect the extensive scope of Iran’s illegal activities and provide a broad foundation for expanding the campaign against Tehran’s attempts to evade American sanctions; The aim of this report is to shed light on how the Iranian security bodies use the illegal oil trade to finance support for terrorist organizations across the Middle East, as well as the entities assisting them. It can be assumed that a focused application of sanctions targeting Iran’s ability to export oil could yield two achievements, namely increasing economic pressure on Iran as part of the “maximum pressure” strategy and directly undermining the financing the support and military buildup of the terrorist organizations loyal to the Tehran regime.
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“Resistance Axis” Reactions to the Israel-Iran Military Conflict

On June 13, 2025, Israel launched a preemptive attack in Iran on dozens of military and security targets and sites of the nuclear program across Iran. More than 20 senior figures in the security leadership, military commanders and nuclear scientists were eliminated, including the commander of the armed forces and the commander of the Revolutionary Guards; Iran confirmed the deaths of the senior officials. Regime officials threatened that "the Zionist regime" would pay a "steep price," and the Revolutionary Guards launched Operation True Promise 3, attacking Israel with UAVs and ballistic missiles; Members of the "resistance axis" condemned Israel, accused it of "crossing red lines," and expressed solidarity with Iran;  According to reports, the Lebanese government conveyed a message to Hezbollah that it alone decided whether or not to go to war. A senior Hezbollah figure said the organization was satisfied with issuing a condemnation and did not plan to respond militarily against Israel; The Houthis claimed that they had attacked targets in Israel in coordination with the Iranians; The pro-Iranian militias in Iraq condemned Israel for violating Iraqi airspace during the attacks on Iran and threatened to take action against American interests if the United States joined the fighting alongside Israel. It was reported that the Iraqi prime minister conveyed messages to the militia leaders that he would act against them if they intervened in the war; Iran built the military capabilities of the Hezbollah-led "resistance axis" as a deterrent against Israel and as part of its response capabilities in the event of an attack on Iranian nuclear facilities. The responses of the organizations were limited to condemnations, indicating the "resistance axis" had been weakened by Israel during the fighting in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon since October 7, 2023. In ITIC assessment, in light of the strategic changes in the Middle East, Hezbollah is currently restrained and the Lebanese government has, for now, successfully imposed its will on the organization. The Shi'ite militias in Iraq are also reluctant to intervene because of pressure from the Iraqi government. Therefore, at this stage, the "resistance axis" organizations, except the Houthis, will most likely not join the fighting. However, active American involvement alongside Israel could lead to an active response by the "resistance axis," especially in Iraq.
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The Armed Palestinian Terrorist Organizations in Lebanon

 The Palestinian terrorist organizations have maintained an armed presence in the Lebanese refugee camps for decades without intervention by the authorities. Because of the Palestinians' involvement in the Lebanese civil war in the 1970s and reluctance to take action against the Palestinian "struggle," the authorities did nothing about the Palestinian weapons in Lebanon.
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Lebanese Positions on Disarming Hezbollah

The Lebanese leadership expressed a desire to conduct a dialogue with Hezbollah to ensure the organization’s disarmament in order to reduce the risk of bloodshed. The Lebanese army took control of a significant portion of Hezbollah’s military infrastructure south of the Litani River, while the United States increased its pressure on Lebanon to accelerate the dismantling Hezbollah’s military capabilities, threatening to allow Israel itself to take action against the organization; Hezbollah absolutely refused to give up the “resistance” against Israel, but gradually mitigated its position, claiming it was prepared to engage in dialogue with the Lebanese government to formulate a national defense strategy which would allow Hezbollah to retain its "military capabilities" alongside the country’s security forces. However, even within the Shi'ite community, voices were heard emphasizing the need to relinquish the weapons, given the blows Hezbollah had suffered during the war against Israel; As of now, the issue of Hezbollah’s disarmament is prominent in Lebanon’s public discourse, and for the first time since the organization’s founding more than four decades ago, there is an understanding that the matter is critical for the country’s future and its chances of recovery after the war with Israel. Although President Aoun and senior officials are currently proceeding cautiously, international pressure, especially from the United States and the Gulf States, is growing for Lebanon to complete Hezbollah’s disarmament quickly. Furthermore, conditioning the much-needed economic aid for Lebanon’s recovery on enforcing the state’s monopoly on weapons could place Lebanon’s political and military leadership on a direct collision course with Hezbollah and its supporters and increase internal security tensions.
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Disarming the Palestinian Factions in Lebanon

The Palestinian factions in Lebanon have maintained an armed presence in the refugee camps for decades without interference from the authorities. In recent years, the Hamas branch in Lebanon has become the most powerful military force among the factions, and its active involvement in fighting alongside Hezbollah in the latest conflict drew significant public and political attention; The ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon in November 2024, which ended the fighting between Israel and Hezbollah, led the Lebanese authorities to declare their willingness to institute a state monopoly of weapons throughout the country. The declaration was reinforced under the new president, Joseph Aoun, and the new government headed by Nawaf Salam; The rocket fire attacking northern Israel at the end of March 2025 and the exposure of Hamas operatives as responsible led the authorities to warn the movement not to threaten national security. Following the warning, in an unprecedented move Hamas handed the Lebanese army suspects involved in the rocket fire; At this stage, it is unclear whether Lebanese security forces intend to act militarily to collect the weapons in the country’s Palestinian refugee camps or to simply reorganize relations and increase coordination over weapons use. In ITIC assessment, a successful assertion of state authority over the Palestinian factions could set a precedent for a similar move against Hezbollah, which is considered a more complex and sensitive challenge for Lebanon. As a result, Hezbollah may attempt to prevent a forceful move by the Lebanese army against the Palestinian factions but may also assist in resolving the issue through dialogue.
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Demonstrations in the Gaza Strip against Hamas

On March 25, 2025, Gazans held spontaneous popular demonstrations in Beit Lahia in the northern Gaza Strip to protest the continuation of the war and Hamas rule, the first major public protest against Hamas since October 7, 2023. In the following two days, additional demonstrations took place in Beit Lahia and in other areas of the Gaza Strip. However, since March 28, 2025, no physical demonstrations have been recorded and the protest has continued mainly on social media. Each demonstration was attended by dozens to hundreds of protesters; Alongside the calls to end the war, in light of the renewal of IDF attacks in the Gaza Strip, the demonstrators accused both Hamas and Israel of responsibility for their suffering and demanded Hamas relinquish control of the Gaza Strip, which it has held since 2007; Hamas initially tried to represent the demonstrations as protesting "Israeli aggression," but also claimed that "parties with suspicious agendas" were leading the protest in the service of Israel. Later, Hamas forces used violence, and according to reports activists who participated in the protest or promoted it on social media received threats from Hamas operatives and were physically attacked, including a protester who was tortured to death; The Palestinian Authority and Fatah denied involvement in the demonstrations but called on Hamas to respond to the Gazans' calls and relinquish control of the Gaza Strip; Most of the reports on the protest appeared in media outlets not affiliated with Hamas and on social media. Hamas media outlets, and those affiliated with it such as Al Jazeera, either did not report on it or claimed it was directed against Israe; In our assessment, the demonstrations express the Gazans' genuine pain, and therefore are spontaneous, without leadership or direction. However, the fear of the Hamas forces, whose use of physical force instills fear among the residents, may prevent an alternative leadership from emerging. After three days the demonstrations waned and ended, but if the fighting and the humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip continue without a diplomatic breakthrough, the protest may be renewed and Hamas can be expected to suppress it rapidly. 
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