Ad Hoc Studies

Yahya al-Sinwar Named Head of Hamas Political Bureau: Reactions and Significance

On August 6, 2024, Hamas announced that Yahya al-Sinwar, head of the Hamas political bureau in the Gaza Strip, had been unanimously chosen as the movement's new head following the elimination in Tehran of Isma'il Haniyeh, its former head, which was attributed to Israel. Hamas represented al-Sinwar's appointment as indicating Hamas' strength and national unity; In the Palestinian arena, al-Sinwar's appointment was welcomed. Jibril al-Rajoub, secretary of Fatah's Central Committee, called al-Sinwar a "pragmatic, realistic, logical person; Iran and the "resistance axis" congratulated al-Sinwar and called it a blow to Israel, which had not been able to significantly damage Hamas since the beginning of the war; Al-Sinwar, one of the leaders of Hamas' military wing, spent more than 20 years in an Israeli prison until his release in 2011 as part of the Gilad Shalit exchange deal. He became the most influential person in Hamas, with connections in both the movement's military and political wings. Since 2017 he has been the head of the Hamas movement in the Gaza Strip, and, with Muhammed Deif, the commander of Hamas' military wing who was killed in July 2024, planned and orchestrated the terrorist attack and massacre on October 7, 2023; In ITIC assessment, appointing Yahya al-Sinwar writes finish to the separation of "internal" and "external" Hamas and concentrates complete control in the hands of al-Sinwar, who will remain the decisive factor in the negotiations for the end of the war in the Gaza Strip and the release of the hostages. Since al-Sinwar has not been seen in public since the beginning of the war and is hiding in the tunnels in the Gaza Strip, apparently there is no continuous communication with him. He is therefore expected to rely on those in the "external" leadership who are loyal to him to promote negotiations and manage Hamas' relations with Iran and the "resistance axis." Read more...

Cooperation between the Shi’ite militias in Iraq and the Houthis in Yemen

The cooperation between the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq and the Houthis in Yemen has intensified in recent weeks, as reflected in announcements of joint UAV and cruise missile attacks on Israel "in support of the Palestinians" and in response to Israel's [alleged] "massacres" in the Strip Gaza; Between June 6, 2024 and August 4, 2024, the Iraqi militias and the Houthis announced 12 joint attacks on Israel, most of them involving UAVs and some involving cruise missiles. Apart from one incident in which the IDF confirmed the interception of a UAV, there has been no practical verification of the other claims of responsibility; The increasing cooperation between the Shi'ite militias in Iraq and the Houthis in Yemen is part of the concept of the "unity of the arenas" against Israel promoted by the Iranian regime, especially since the beginning of the war in the Gaza Strip; In ITIC assessment, following the Israeli attack on the Houthi-controlled port city of al-Hudaydah in Yemen, carried out in response to the Houthis' ongoing attacks against Israel and the launching of the UAV that exploded in Tel Aviv, the cooperation between the Houthis and the Iraqi militias is expected to increase and escalate. It is also expected to be reflected in the "resistance axis" response to the killing of Isma'il Haniyeh, head of Hamas' political bureau in Tehran, attributed to Israel, and in response to Israel's elimination of Fuad Shukr, Hezbollah's most senior military commander, in Beirut. Read more...

Reactions to the Deaths of Fuad Shukr and Isma’il Haniyeh

In the southern suburb of Beirut on July 30, 2024, the IDF eliminated Fuad Shukr, Hezbollah's most senior military commander. The attack was carried out in response to a rocket fired by Hezbollah which hit the Druze village of Majdal Shams and killed 12 children and teenagers. Hezbollah confirmed the death of Shukr, stating that he was one of Hezbollah's founders and had led its military operations against Israel. Hezbollah secretary general Hassan Nasrallah stated that a new phase in the war had begun, claiming that revenge would; On July 31, 2024, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps and Hamas announced that Isma'il Haniyeh, head of Hamas' political bureau, had been killed in an attack on the building where he was staying in Tehran, having come to participate in the swearing-in of Masoud Pezeshkian, the new Iranian president. They claimed Israel was behind the attack. Israel did not claim responsibility. Hamas' military wing has threatened to retaliate. The Palestinian Authority (PA) and other Palestinian organizations issued; Iran's leaders made it clear that they would respond to Haniyeh's killing in Tehran; The "resistance axis" condemned Israel's elimination of Shukr in Beirut and the killing of Haniyeh in Tehran, and threatened to retaliate against Israel and the United States; there were condemnations in the Arab-Muslim world, concern of escalation was expressed in the international arena; In ITIC assessment, Hezbollah's response can be expected to exceed the parameters and the self-determined "equations" according to which it has operated from the beginning of the fighting. Hezbollah will most likely employ concentrated firepower, including the use of missiles and UAVs to attack military and civilian sites in northern Israel which so far have not been its targets, increasing the range of attacks on Israeli territory, possibly as far as the center of the country. Iran can also be expected to attack Israel with missiles and UAVs. Hamas will try to increase terrorist activity in Judea and Samaria and attack inside Israeli territory as well. In the short term, the elimination of Haniyeh may also affect efforts to reach a ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip and to release the hostages. Read more...

Reactions to the Hezbollah Rocket Attack on Majdal Shams

On July 27, 2024, Hezbollah launched a Falaq 1 rocket from south Lebanon at the Druze town of Majdal Shams in the northern Golan Heights. The rocket hit a soccer field and killed 12 children and teenagers, and injured more than 40 other people; Hezbollah initially claimed it had launched a rocket at the IDF base in the Hermon area, but then published a false statement denying any connection to the attack on Majdal Shams. In view of Israel's threats of a powerful response to the attack, Hezbollah warned it was prepared for a counterstrike, even if it led to an all-out war; In Lebanon, politicians avoided blaming Hezbollah. The Lebanese foreign minister proposed the establishment of an independent commission of inquiry to determine who was responsible for attacking Majdal Shams; Iran warned that an Israeli response could expand the arena of the war, and Syria accepted Hezbollah's claim that Israel was responsible for launching the rocket which hit Majdal Shams. The Druze community in Syria blamed Hezbollah and called for the organization to be punished; The international community condemned the attack on Majdal Shams. However, many of the condemnations avoided directly blaming Hezbollah for launching the rocket. Read more...

Escalation of the Confrontation Between Israel and the Houthis Background and Significance

On July 19, 2024, an Iranian-made UAV launched in Yemen by the Houthis exploded in Tel Aviv, killing one civilian and injuring eight others; In response, on July 20, 2024, the Israeli Air Force attacked several targets in the area of the Houthi-controlled Red Sea port of al-Hudaydah, in northwest Yemen. According to reports, at least six people were killed and more than 80 injured; On July 21, 2024, the Houthis announced the launch of ballistic missiles at Eilat. the IDF reported intercepting a missile before it entered Israeli territory; The leader of the Houthi movement said the UAV attack marked the beginning of the "fifth phase" in the "conflict" with Israel. Senior Houthi officials claimed that the Israeli attack on al-Hudaydah was a "crime" committed against "civilian facilities" which would not keep the Houthis from "supporting" the Gaza Strip; Palestinian terrorist organizations and organizations affiliated with the Iranian-led "resistance axis" praised the; In ITIC assessment, the Houthis fully intend to react directly against Israel, possibly leading to further escalation in the confrontation. Iran, whose influence on the Houthis is limited, seems to have no particular interest in expanding the conflict. Read more...

Considerable effort by Iran to emphasize the continued support for the “resistance front” following the election of President Pezeshkian

Following the election of Masoud Pezeshkian as president of Iran on July 5, 2024, there has been a marked effort by Iran to emphasize its commitment to continuing support for the “resistance front” it leads. This is apparently due to concerns among elements of the pro-Iranian axis in the region about the consequences of the election of the reformist-leaning president, especially in view of the ongoing Iranian-led regional campaign and the fear of a possible deterioration into an all-out confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah. There have been several expressions of the effort to demonstrate continuity in the policy of support for the pro-Iranian axis in the region: messages of support from the president-elect to senior members of the “resistance front; Qods Force commander Esmail Qaani’s visit to the region in recent days and his meetings with senior members of the “resistance front”; Iranian officials’ comments about continuity of regional policy based on the perception that strengthening the “resistance” is one of the permanent pillars of the Islamic Republic; commentaries in the conservative Iranian media presenting Pezeshkian’s messages of support for the leaders of the pro-Iranian axis as an expression of his commitment to them. Read more...

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