Ad Hoc Studies

UN Security Council Resolution 2803 for the Future of the Gaza Strip – Positions of Power Actors

On November 17, 2025, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 2803, which adopts the 20-point American plan for a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and for "the day after."; The resolution endorses the establishment of a Board of Peace which will temporarily administer the Gaza Strip until control is transferred to the Palestinian Authority. It also approves the establishment of an international stabilization force, which will operate alongside a vetted Palestinian police force, in coordination with Israel and Egypt, to ensure the demilitarization of the Strip and the disarmament of "armed groups."; The resolution does not include an explicit commitment to a Palestinian state, but expresses hope for the creation of a "credible pathway" to Palestinian self-determination if the Palestinian Authority implements the required reforms; Hamas and the other terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip rejected the resolution and warned that any international force that arrived in the Gaza Strip would be considered an "occupying force" if it attempted to disarm them. Iran and the Houthis subscribed to Hamas' position and claimed that the resolution was intended to serve Israeli objectives. The Palestinian Authority, however welcomed the resolution and expressed readiness to assume full responsibility for the Gaza Strip; In ITIC assessment, despite the importance of the Security Council resolution as an outline for a course for "the day after" in Gaza which includes full demilitarization and a stable, non-Hamas rule, it is a declarative step and it is unclear whether it can be implemented. In all probability, the refusal of Hamas and the other terrorist organizations to disarm, and the threat that they will regard the international force as an "occupying force," will increase friction between them and the foreign forces arriving in the Strip and lead to violent clashes which might also affect IDF forces. In addition, the uncertainty regarding the Palestinian Authority's ability to fully and credibly implement the required reforms and the absence of agreements between Hamas and Fatah regarding the identity of the technocratic management committee, alongside the inherent difficulty in establishing effective control and supervision over the Palestinian population, will create a vacuum in governance which will allow Hamas to continue securing its security and civilian governance in the Strip. Read more...

Iran Assists Hezbollah’s Post-Ceasefire Reconstruction

The United States Treasury Department reported that Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) had transferred approximately $1 billion to Hezbollah since the beginning of the year to reconstruct the organization's military capabilities in the wake of the war against Israel. Since the war ended in late November 2024, Iran has also continued to smuggle weapons to the organization and interfere with the Lebanese government's efforts to disarm Hezbollah. As a result, a senior American delegation urged the Lebanese leadership to accelerate action against the sources of Hezbollah's funding; The fall of the Assad regime in Syria in December 2024 and the flight ban imposed by the Lebanese government on Iran since February 2025 disrupted the land and air routes used by Iran to transfer weapons, technological assistance and funds to Hezbollah. Iran and Hezbollah subsequently found other avenues, including smuggling through Turkey and Iraq, by sea and through currency-exchange agencies. They also continue to rely on smuggling networks along the Syria-Lebanon border, despite Syrian and IDF efforts to block them; The Iranian embassy in Beirut denied the information provided by the American government, but throughout the war in the Gaza Strip and after the ceasefire Iranian officials made clear that they continue to support Hezbollah, as they do other members of the "resistance axis." Hezbollah secretary general Na'im Qassem also publicly thanked Iran for its "massive" assistance; The American disclosure of the financial aid transferred by the IRGC to Hezbollah, along with the exposure of smuggling methods, showed that Iran and Hezbollah had found ways to overcome the challenges of geopolitical changes in Lebanon and the Middle East since the ceasefire in late November 2024, and how difficult it was to dent the 40-year cooperation between Tehran and the Lebanese organization. In all probability Iran will continue to support and fund Hezbollah's military and civil reconstruction in order to preserve its status within the Shi'ite community and in Lebanon, and to prevent Israel and the Lebanese authorities from weakening or neutralizing Iran's most important strategic arm in the Middle East. The absence of more decisive action by the international community in general and by the Lebanese government in particular, to eliminate Hezbollah's funding sources and block smuggling routes, will allow Iran and Hezbollah to continue transferring funds and weapons with little disruption. Read more...

The Palestinian Authority prepares to administer the Gaza Strip after the war

Hamas' violent takeover of the Gaza Strip in 2007 created a schism, the first of its kind, between the Palestinian Authority (PA) government in Judea and Samaria and the Hamas government in the Strip, initiating a continuing hostility between the sides despite attempts at reconciliation; The war that broke out with Hamas' attack and massacre of Israelis on October 7, 2023 provided the PA with an opportunity to reiterate its position that after the war, it should regain control of the Strip to create a geographic and political unity with Judea and Samaria ahead of the establishment of a Palestinian state. Senior PA figures stressed the position anew after the ceasefire that went into effect in the Gaza Strip in October 2025, and presented their own plans for the reconstruction of the Strip. Egypt and Qatar expressed support for the PA's position; Hamas voiced its reservations about the PA's return to the Gaza Strip, despite the movement's declaration that it would relinquish control of the Strip. However, after talks between senior Hamas and PA figures in Cairo, Hamas began to moderate its position and publicly support the appointment of a PA government minister to head the future Palestinian committee to administer the Strip. The most-heard name to head the committee is Dr. Amjad Abu Ramadan, the PA minister of health and former mayor of Gaza; In ITIC assessment, the PA can be expected to play a significant role in the committee for administering the Strip, despite Israel's public opposition and American ambiguity, as part of the understanding being formed by Fatah and Hamas, which seeks to demonstrate that it complies with the ceasefire terms. However, in all probability the dispute over the disarmament of Hamas and other "resistance" factions will continue, given Hamas' refusal to disarm, directly opposed to the PA position that it should hold a monopoly on weapons. Therefore, in ITIC assessment, the tension between Hamas and the PA will most likely persist and make it difficult to find a political solution which would enable progress in the efforts to rehabilitate the Strip. Read more...

Hezbollah’s defiance, the instability of the ceasefire andattempts to promote an Israeli-Lebanese dialogue

On November 6, 2025, Hezbollah published an open letter to the Lebanese leadership and public. It claimed it had abided by the November 27, 2024 ceasefire agreement and added that the objective of demanding that Hezbollah disarm and the Lebanese begin negotiations with Israel was to weaken Lebanon. It also insisted that it would not give up the "right to resist" and was not required to obey government directives on issues of war and peace. Hezbollah secretary general Na'im Qassem and other senior figures expressed similar positions; The letter was prompted by IDF attacks to enforce the ceasefire, targeting Hezbollah's reconstruction efforts and Radwan Force capabilities, amid reports of the organization’s rearmament. Israel and the United States also warned that if the Lebanese army did not accelerate Hezbollah’s disarmament, the attacks could intensify in quality and quantity; To prevent escalation and resolve the disputes between Israel and Lebanon, the United States and Egypt proposed holding bilateral negotiations. Lebanese president Aoun stated that Lebanon had no choice but to engage in dialogue with Israel; Nabih Berri, speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, and a Hezbollah ally, opposed direct negotiations; Hezbollah’s open letter was another expression the organization’s defiance of efforts to disarm it, after previously expressing vague willingness to discuss possibly disarming "under certain conditions." However, Hezbollah has not issued the Lebanese government an ultimatum or explicitly warned Israel, reflecting the organization's continued restraint despite the IDF attacks. In ITIC assessment, Hezbollah’s continued military buildup, the Lebanese army’s weakness in preventing it and the intensification of Israel’s measures could wear down the restraint shown by all actors since the beginning of the ceasefire and increase the risk of a serious escalation toward the end of 2025, the deadline set by the Lebanese government for disarming armed militias in the country, including Hezbollah. Read more...

Escalation of terrorist activity in Judea and Samaria Following the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip

Hamas' ambition was to turn Judea and Samaria into an arena for terrorism as part of the campaign to destroy Israel which began with the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre. However, the counterterrorism actions taken by the Israeli security forces, which included the detention and elimination of thousands of wanted persons and terrorist operatives and the seizure of weapons prevented a wave of terrorism from Judea and Samaria; Following the ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) began efforts to shift the center of the "resistance" to Judea and Samaria, encouraging attacks on Israeli security forces and settlers; Iran also continues its central role in efforts to turn Judea and Samaria into an active terrorist arena against Israel. A shipment of weapons from Iran was intercepted, which included powerful explosive charges and explosive-carrying drones; Qods Force operatives in Lebanon who were involved in the smuggling routes of weapons were eliminated; In ITIC assessment, after the ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian terrorist organizations, with Iranian assistance, will direct a significant portion of their activity to Judea and Samaria to justify their existence by continuing the "resistance." The terrorist organizations will also try to exploit the return of the Palestinian issue to the global stage and the regional and international involvement in the Gaza Strip within the framework of the ceasefire to create pressure on Israel, provoking attacks which could escalate Israel's response in Judea and Samaria. Moreover, the return of hundreds of terrorist operatives from Israeli jails to Judea and Samaria will intensify the activity of the terrorist organizations, which will exploit the knowledge and experience of the released prisoners and the cooperative networks they built in prison. Read more...

Hamas activity to restore its civilian governance In the Gaza Strip after the ceasefire

The ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip on October 10, 2025, allowed Hamas to demonstrate governance and all facets of a return to normal life, despite the massive destruction and dismantling of the civilian infrastructure in the Strip caused by the war which began on October 7, 2023; Hamas deployed police and security forces in areas evacuated by the IDF to restore public order, along with a campaign against "collaborators" and those involved in criminal activity and price gouging. Hamas government mechanisms and local authorities began working to repair the damage in fields including health, education, welfare and transportation; In ITIC assessment, despite the severe blow to Hamas' civilian leadership and the destruction of civilian infrastructure in the Gaza Strip throughout the war, Hamas managed to quickly regain almost full control over the areas it held, activating government mechanisms and attempting to provide basic services, while also using force against the Gazans as a means of deterrence. Hamas understood that overt control of the Strip would deter the international community from transferring the funds required for reconstruction, delay the rebuilding of the Strip and could spark civilian unrest, and therefore signaled its willingness to transfer the civilian administration to a Palestinian technocratic government, while refusing to disarm. Nevertheless, Hamas' absolute control over government institutions and the provision of services, including at the local level, will leave it with significant influence, even if an alternative body is established to manage the Strip in accordance with the second stage of the American plan. Read more...

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