1. Home
  2. Publications
  3. Ad Hoc Studies

Ad Hoc Studies

Muhammad Dahlan and His Possible Involvement in “The Day After” in the Gaza Strip

In attempts to find a party to manage the Gaza Strip "the day after," the name of Muhammad Dahlan, a senior Fatah figure in exile in the UAE, has occasionally come up as a potential candidate oversee Gaza's administration after the war, at least temporarily. In September 2024, the Fatah leadership under Mahmoud Abbas decided to promote a reconciliation initiative with Dahlan and other ousted Fatah members; Dahlan's name emerged prominently due to his involvement in Gaza during the war through UAE humanitarian aid efforts and his political connections with various Gaza figures, including Yahya al-Sinwar, who was head of the Hamas political bureau until he was killed in October 2024; Muhammad Dahlan himself has denied the reports, claiming he refuses to take on any security, governmental or executive role and was solely focused on humanitarian aid activities; Born in Khan Yunis in the Gaza Strip, Dahlan was a prominent figure in the "middle generation" of Fatah leadership. Following the Oslo Accords and the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) he held senior roles, including head of the preventive security forces in Gaza and minister of civilian affairs. As part of his role he engaged in political and security discussions with Israeli officials, but after the outbreak of the second intifada his name was mentioned in connection with to terrorist activities against Israel; In 2011, Dahlan was expelled from Fatah over claims he attempted to overthrow PA chairman Mahmoud Abbas. He relocated to the UAE, becoming a close advisor to President Muhammad bin Zayed. Meanwhile he worked to maintain his status within the PA through political alliances and by strengthening ties with Hamas in Gaza; In ITIC assessment, reconciliation talks between Fatah and Dahlan can be expected to continue, as they serve both sides. For the PA, they represent an opportunity to draw closer to the UAE and Gulf States, which were expected to play a central role in Gaza's reconstruction after the war. For Dahlan, the process helps strengthen his standing within the PA as a potential leader after the Mahmoud Abbas era, especially if Marwan Barghouti remains imprisoned in Israel during negotiations with Hamas over the release of the hostages. Dahlan also has the advantage of not currently being associated with the PA leadership and was recognized as a prominent rival to Mahmoud Abbas and the leadership, which was widely perceived as corrupt by the public.
Read more...

Captured Documents Show Iranian Support for Hamas in the Gaza Strip

Iran has been Hamas' primary strategic supporter since 2014, providing military equipment and training as well as financial aid amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars for the movement's leadership and its military wing. Senior Hamas figures have also publicly thanked Tehran for providing weapons enabling attacks deep inside Israeli territory; Hamas documents captured by IDF forces during the Gaza Strip War offer a glimpse into the extent of Iranian penetration of Hamas as part of constructing the "resistance axis" against Israel. In addition to supporting Hamas' military activities, Iran supports other Gazan terrorist organizations and funds civilian, educational and cultural initiatives; The documents also provide new information on Iran's involvement in Hamas' preparations for the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre, including coordination with Hezbollah and Hamas deployment in the Lebanese arena; The documents reveal a strategic Iranian process to gain a foothold and exert influence over Hamas in particular and the Gaza Strip in general. Iran carried out the process by means of extensive funding, partially directed towards civilian programs, strengthening Shi'a within the Sunni society in Gaza (and influencing Hamas' decision-making by controlling financial sources and the significant procuring of weapons.
Read more...

Antisemitism in the Arab-Muslim World during the Gaza Strip War

The Hamas terrorist attack on October 7, 2023, and the outbreak of the Gaza Strip War ignited the largest wave of antisemitism and hatred of Jews worldwide since the end of World War Two. That hatred is reflected in the Arab-Muslim world, from the Iranian-led resistance axis, with terrorist organizations like Hamas and the Houthis, to the so-called "moderate" Sunni countries such as Turkey and Qatar; In the Arab-Muslim world, antisemitism inundates newspaper articles and cartoons, statements by influential religious and political leaders, and the social media, where posters explicitly call for attacks on Jews. They use a combination of anti-Jewish themes from traditional Islamic texts and classic European antisemitic motifs, such as those in the Protocols of the Elders of Zion; The unprecedented Hamas terrorist attack and massacre on October 7, 2023, marked the first time that Hamas' deeply ingrained hatred of Israel and the Jews was so fully and brutally understood and brought to bear; The objectives of this study are to explain the historical and religious roots of antisemitism in the Islamic world, identify significant centers which spread antisemitism today, and show how antisemitic propaganda tries to define the Jews. We use a precise definition of antisemitism as it refers the alleged collective negative traits of Jews, both in terms of their perceived spiritual and physical characteristics; In ITIC assessment, as long as the war in the Gaza Strip continues and as long as the Palestinians continue accusing Israel of committing "genocide," Islamic antisemitism will carry on in high gear, as has been the case since October 7, 2023. Although antisemitism in the Arab-Muslim world has mainly remained in the media and on social networks, the pro-Palestinian riots carried out for the most part by Muslims in the Netherlands on November 7, 2024, in which Israeli soccer fans were attacked, suggest that Islamic antisemitism may lead to more acts of violence as the war continues. However, ending the war in Gaza does not guarantee a decrease in Islamic antisemitism. The narrative promoted by Hamas and the Palestinians surrounding the Gaza Strip War and its aftermath may keep antisemitism at high levels even after a ceasefire.
Read more...

The pro-Iranian Militias in Iraq: Characteristics of their Activity since the Beginning of Iron Swords War

On November 2, 2023, pro-Iranian militias in Iraq began attacking Israel under the name “Islamic Resistance in Iraq.” The attacks have been intended to support Hamas in the Gaza Strip, based on the concept of “unity of arenas” promoted by Iran through its proxies in the Middle East, including Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen. To that end, a joint operations room of the “axis of resistance” was established, under Iranian supervision; So far, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq has issued 242 claims of responsibility for attacks against more than 285 targets in Israel, mostly using drones and several cruise missiles. In addition, 12 attacks were carried out in cooperation with the Houthis in Yemen. More than half of the attacks targeted sites in Eilat, the Golan Heights, and Haifa. Drones launched from Iraq have caused the deaths of two IDF soldiers, injuries to several soldiers and civilians, and property damage. However, the vast majority of the launches did not penetrate Israeli territory; In the ITIC’s assessment, as long as the fighting in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon continues, the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq are expected to persist in their attacks against Israel as part of the “support front” of the “axis of resistance,” in an attempt to achieve a psychological victory with a significant strike on Israeli territory and to solidify their standing among the pro-Iranian proxies in the Middle East. In the ITIC’s assessment, if there is further escalation in the direct conflict between Iran and Israel, Tehran may instruct the militias to intensify their attacks against Israel and against American targets in the Middle East and may even provide them with more advanced weapons. In addition, if Iran directly attacks Israel again, the Iraqi militias may take part in the attack under Iran’s guidance and coordination.
Read more...

Sheikh Na’im Qassem, Hezbollah’s Newly – Appointed Secretary General

On October 29, 2024, Hezbollah announced that the Shura Council had appointed Sheikh Na'im Qassem as the organization's new secretary general, replacing Hassan Nasrallah, who was killed in an Israeli strike on Beirut on September 27, 2024. In his first speech Qassem pledged to continue in Nasrallah's path and said Hezbollah would end the current war against Israel only on its own terms; Qassem is one of Hezbollah's founders and has served as the deputy secretary general since 1991. However, he has no military training and is considered the organization's chief ideologue, focusing on Hezbollah's political and social aspects; One of Hezbollah's most important spokesmen, in his books and public statements he has justified the "resistance" against Israel and denied its right to exist. He has also admitted that Hezbollah operates according to directives from Iran; Qassem was not considered the leading candidate to replace Hassan Nasrallah, but he was appointed by default after the elimination of Hashem Safi al-Din, the head of Hezbollah's Executive Council, who had been marked as Nasrallah's designated successor. In ITIC assessment, the objective of appointing Na'im Qassem was to represent continuity within the organization's leadership during ongoing combat with Israel, with Hezbollah likely to choose a permanent secretary general after a lasting ceasefire has been achieved. Despite Qassem’s long role in Hezbollah, his lack of military experience means Iran can be expected to oversee Hezbollah’s fighting by means of representatives from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps and its Qods Force, and to influence Hezbollah's combat against Israel and decisions regarding a potential ceasefire.
Read more...

The Elimination of Yahya al-Sinwar, Head of Hamas: Reactions and Insights

On October 17, 2024, the IDF spokesperson announced that Yahya al-Sinwar, head of Hamas' political bureau, had been killed in an encounter with IDF forces while he was hiding in a building in Rafah. The IDF spokesperson reported that al-Sinwar's identity became clear only after his body was discovered and that it had not been a targeted killing; Only a day later did Hamas confirm the death of al-Sinwar, who was appointed head of the political bureau at the beginning of September 2024 after the elimination of Isma'il Haniyeh. The movement's announcements praised al-Sinwar's role in leading Operation al-Aqsa Flood (the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre) and his death in a clash with IDF forces, adding that they would continue their "resistance" and would not change their conditions for ending the war in the Gaza Strip and releasing the hostages; The Palestinian Authority and the other Palestinian terrorist organizations condemned the killing, stating he was a symbol of the "resistance" and claiming he had been killed while facing the "enemy"; Iran and the rest of the "resistance axis" stated that al-Sinwar was a "fighter" and a symbol of the "resistance," and promised to continue their support for the Palestinian "resistance." Hamas and "resistance axis" supporters on the social networks praised al-Sinwar as having stood up to the "enemy" until the last minute, while Hamas opponents did not hide their satisfaction at his death; In ITIC assessment, his death might increase the importance of the "external" leadership in Qatar, but it is possible that Hamas will not reveal the name of the new leader to make it difficult for Israel to eliminate him or exert pressure on him in the negotiations. In ITIC assessment, al-Sinwar's brother, Muhammad al-Sinwar, is expected to fill his place in the leadership of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, both at the "political" and the military level. In ITIC assessment, in the near future the Hamas leadership will not change its positions regarding negotiations to end the war in the Gaza Strip, which are demands for a complete halt to the fighting, a complete withdrawal of IDF forces from the Strip, and the release of Palestinian prisoners from Israeli prisons, especially the prisoners with blood on their hands, in exchange for the release of the hostages. However, if the "external" Hamas leadership becomes the dominant actor, it may be possible to exert sufficient pressure to achieve flexibility regarding the details of the deal and the future leadership in the Gaza Strip.
Read more...

Previous years bulletins

20262025202420232022202120202019201820172015201420132012201120102009