Ad Hoc Studies

Reactions to Hezbollah’s Attack in Retaliation for the Killing of Fuad Shukr

On August 25, 2024, Hezbollah claimed responsibility for a combined rocket-UAV attack on military targets in Israel in retaliation for the killing of Fuad Shukr, the organization's military commander, in an Israeli targeted attack in Beirut on July 30, 2024. Hezbollah claimed the attack had achieved its goals. Earlier, a hundred Israeli Air Force fighter jets carried out a pre-emptive strike against thousands of Hezbollah rocket and missile launchers in south Lebanon which were aimed at northern and central Israel; Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah secretary general, claimed 340 rockets had been fired at IDF bases in northern Israel, after which a large number of UAVs were launched deep into Israeli territory, hitting an aerial defense base and an intelligence base. He added that if the results were not "satisfactory" Hezbollah "reserved the right" to carry out further attacks; Contrary to Nasrallah's claim, the aerial defense and intelligence bases were not attacked. Israel's aerial defense forces, the Israeli Air Force and the Israeli Navy intercepted most of the rocket and UAV launches. One IDF soldier was killed and two were injured by an interceptor explosion near a Navy ship. A woman was injured by shrapnel in Acre and extensive property damage was caused; Iran and the "resistance axis" organizations, including Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, praised Hezbollah for the attack on Israel; Social media users in Lebanon and the Arab world mocked Hezbollah's attack; Hezbollah made an effort to establish the false narrative that the IDF's preemptive attack was unsuccessful, did not cause significant damage to the organization, and claimed success in hitting important targets in Israel. That was because Hezbollah wanted to justify its activities to the citizens of Lebanon, hide the extent of the damage caused to the organization by the preemptive attack, and possibly because the extent of the damage had not yet been fully calculated; In ITIC assessment , after Hezbollah finishes retaliating for the death of Fuad Shukr, its attacks on the northern border will continue according to the organization's initial use of force and "equations," which includes proactive fire near the border and reactive fire further away with varying extent, depending on the strength and nature of the IDF's proactive activity.
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Hezbollah Issues Video of Its Imad 4 Underground Facility: Reactions and Implications

On August 16, 2024, Hezbollah released a video of "Imad 4," an underground facility for storing precision missiles and heavy rockets, claiming it missiles could hit any target in Israel, from the north to Eilat; Hezbollah-affiliated media outlets affiliated with Hezbollah stated the objective of the video was to inform Israel of Hezbollah's accurate long-range missile capabilities, the extent of the organization's fortified underground system, and to warn Israel not to start an all-out war; Lebanese opposition politicians, social activists and journalists criticized Hezbollah after the video was released, claiming it was mostly based on artificial intelligence and accusing Hezbollah of making all of Lebanon a target for the Israeli attacks; Revealing the facility underscored Hezbollah's perception of the importance of its tunnel system for storing weapons, protecting terrorist operatives, fighting and attacking Israel; In ITIC assessment, the video was released for purposes of psychological warfare to glorify its military capability and deter Israel from escalation and initiating an all-out war. Releasing the video during negotiations for a ceasefire in the war in the Gaza Strip may be regarded as part of Hezbollah's "support front" for Hamas and an attempt to put pressure on Israel to accept Hamas' demands.
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Internal Lebanese criticism of Hezbollah in the wake of its escalation and the threat of war

Since Hezbollah began attacking Israel on October 8, 2023, there has been internal criticism in Lebanon of the organization's decision to fight against Israel, claiming it was "supporting" the Gaza Strip. The murder of 12 children and teenagers by a rocket fired by Hezbollah at Majdal Shams on July 27, 2024, and its threats to respond "strongly" to Israel's elimination of Fuad Shukr, its military commander, in Beirut on July 31, 2024, increased the Lebanese public's fear that the situation would deteriorate from border fighting in south Lebanon into an all-out war; Public criticism comes mainly from a handful of politicians and media figures, most of them Christians known to oppose Hezbollah. They accuse Hezbollah of acting contrary to the national interest and endangering the lives of the Lebanese by fighting an unnecessary war for the sake of Iran; More sharp criticism against Hezbollah appears on social networks, where posts call the organization "terrorist" and express public support for the death of Hezbollah secretary general Hassan Nasrallah. Some public criticism has also appeared in the form of signs opposing the war, but no one accepted responsibility for them; Criticism of Hezbollah is also reflected in the reception received by the Shi'ites who fled the Hezbollah stronghold in south Beirut in fear of Israeli attacks; Hassan Nasrallah warned it played into Israel's hands and called on those who did not support the organization "not to stab the 'resistance' in the back." Despite the response, apparently so far the criticism has not had a significant impact on the decisions Hezbollah makes.
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The terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip exploit the civilian infrastructure for terrorist activities

On August 10, 2024, the Israeli Air Force attacked the headquarters of Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in the al-Tabi'in school complex in Gaza City. Despite false Hamas claims of intentional IDF attacks on civilians, the IDF spokesperson reported that Hamas had turned schools, where civilians took shelter, into command and control centers, sites for storing weapons and carrying out terrorist activities against IDF forces in the Gaza Strip and against the territory of the State of Israel; Since the beginning of the war on October 7, 2023, a substantial amount of evidence has accumulated about the use the terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip, especially Hamas, make of civilian facilities and the civilian population for the purpose of waging war; The ongoing fighting and the expansion of the IDF's activity to areas such as Rafah and Khan Yunis caused the terrorist organizations to forfeit military assets, and the use civilian facilities gained momentum, as did carrying out terrorist activity from within the population. The terrorist organizations use UNRWA facilities, shelters and humanitarian areas where displaced residents are located for terrorist activities; The strategy of constructing terrorist assets within the civilian space, which constitutes a war crime and a crime against humanity, enables the terrorist organizations to reduce damage to themselves, knowing they will have a kind of immunity from IDF operations, including counterterrorist activities, since insofar as is possible the IDF will not harm civilians or attack institutions such as hospitals, schools and civilian shelter areas. The strategy also enables the terrorist organizations to spread incitement and false propaganda as part of their regional and international battle for hearts and minds by representing Israel as attacking civilian institutions and innocent civilians.
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Yahya al-Sinwar Named Head of Hamas Political Bureau: Reactions and Significance

On August 6, 2024, Hamas announced that Yahya al-Sinwar, head of the Hamas political bureau in the Gaza Strip, had been unanimously chosen as the movement's new head following the elimination in Tehran of Isma'il Haniyeh, its former head, which was attributed to Israel. Hamas represented al-Sinwar's appointment as indicating Hamas' strength and national unity; In the Palestinian arena, al-Sinwar's appointment was welcomed. Jibril al-Rajoub, secretary of Fatah's Central Committee, called al-Sinwar a "pragmatic, realistic, logical person; Iran and the "resistance axis" congratulated al-Sinwar and called it a blow to Israel, which had not been able to significantly damage Hamas since the beginning of the war; Al-Sinwar, one of the leaders of Hamas' military wing, spent more than 20 years in an Israeli prison until his release in 2011 as part of the Gilad Shalit exchange deal. He became the most influential person in Hamas, with connections in both the movement's military and political wings. Since 2017 he has been the head of the Hamas movement in the Gaza Strip, and, with Muhammed Deif, the commander of Hamas' military wing who was killed in July 2024, planned and orchestrated the terrorist attack and massacre on October 7, 2023; In ITIC assessment, appointing Yahya al-Sinwar writes finish to the separation of "internal" and "external" Hamas and concentrates complete control in the hands of al-Sinwar, who will remain the decisive factor in the negotiations for the end of the war in the Gaza Strip and the release of the hostages. Since al-Sinwar has not been seen in public since the beginning of the war and is hiding in the tunnels in the Gaza Strip, apparently there is no continuous communication with him. He is therefore expected to rely on those in the "external" leadership who are loyal to him to promote negotiations and manage Hamas' relations with Iran and the "resistance axis."
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Cooperation between the Shi’ite militias in Iraq and the Houthis in Yemen

The cooperation between the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq and the Houthis in Yemen has intensified in recent weeks, as reflected in announcements of joint UAV and cruise missile attacks on Israel "in support of the Palestinians" and in response to Israel's [alleged] "massacres" in the Strip Gaza; Between June 6, 2024 and August 4, 2024, the Iraqi militias and the Houthis announced 12 joint attacks on Israel, most of them involving UAVs and some involving cruise missiles. Apart from one incident in which the IDF confirmed the interception of a UAV, there has been no practical verification of the other claims of responsibility; The increasing cooperation between the Shi'ite militias in Iraq and the Houthis in Yemen is part of the concept of the "unity of the arenas" against Israel promoted by the Iranian regime, especially since the beginning of the war in the Gaza Strip; In ITIC assessment, following the Israeli attack on the Houthi-controlled port city of al-Hudaydah in Yemen, carried out in response to the Houthis' ongoing attacks against Israel and the launching of the UAV that exploded in Tel Aviv, the cooperation between the Houthis and the Iraqi militias is expected to increase and escalate. It is also expected to be reflected in the "resistance axis" response to the killing of Isma'il Haniyeh, head of Hamas' political bureau in Tehran, attributed to Israel, and in response to Israel's elimination of Fuad Shukr, Hezbollah's most senior military commander, in Beirut.
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