Ad Hoc Studies

The pro-Iranian Militias in Iraq: Characteristics of their Activity since the Beginning of Iron Swords War

On November 2, 2023, pro-Iranian militias in Iraq began attacking Israel under the name “Islamic Resistance in Iraq.” The attacks have been intended to support Hamas in the Gaza Strip, based on the concept of “unity of arenas” promoted by Iran through its proxies in the Middle East, including Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen. To that end, a joint operations room of the “axis of resistance” was established, under Iranian supervision; So far, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq has issued 242 claims of responsibility for attacks against more than 285 targets in Israel, mostly using drones and several cruise missiles. In addition, 12 attacks were carried out in cooperation with the Houthis in Yemen. More than half of the attacks targeted sites in Eilat, the Golan Heights, and Haifa. Drones launched from Iraq have caused the deaths of two IDF soldiers, injuries to several soldiers and civilians, and property damage. However, the vast majority of the launches did not penetrate Israeli territory; In the ITIC’s assessment, as long as the fighting in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon continues, the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq are expected to persist in their attacks against Israel as part of the “support front” of the “axis of resistance,” in an attempt to achieve a psychological victory with a significant strike on Israeli territory and to solidify their standing among the pro-Iranian proxies in the Middle East. In the ITIC’s assessment, if there is further escalation in the direct conflict between Iran and Israel, Tehran may instruct the militias to intensify their attacks against Israel and against American targets in the Middle East and may even provide them with more advanced weapons. In addition, if Iran directly attacks Israel again, the Iraqi militias may take part in the attack under Iran’s guidance and coordination. Read more...

Sheikh Na’im Qassem, Hezbollah’s Newly – Appointed Secretary General

On October 29, 2024, Hezbollah announced that the Shura Council had appointed Sheikh Na'im Qassem as the organization's new secretary general, replacing Hassan Nasrallah, who was killed in an Israeli strike on Beirut on September 27, 2024. In his first speech Qassem pledged to continue in Nasrallah's path and said Hezbollah would end the current war against Israel only on its own terms; Qassem is one of Hezbollah's founders and has served as the deputy secretary general since 1991. However, he has no military training and is considered the organization's chief ideologue, focusing on Hezbollah's political and social aspects; One of Hezbollah's most important spokesmen, in his books and public statements he has justified the "resistance" against Israel and denied its right to exist. He has also admitted that Hezbollah operates according to directives from Iran; Qassem was not considered the leading candidate to replace Hassan Nasrallah, but he was appointed by default after the elimination of Hashem Safi al-Din, the head of Hezbollah's Executive Council, who had been marked as Nasrallah's designated successor. In ITIC assessment, the objective of appointing Na'im Qassem was to represent continuity within the organization's leadership during ongoing combat with Israel, with Hezbollah likely to choose a permanent secretary general after a lasting ceasefire has been achieved. Despite Qassem’s long role in Hezbollah, his lack of military experience means Iran can be expected to oversee Hezbollah’s fighting by means of representatives from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps and its Qods Force, and to influence Hezbollah's combat against Israel and decisions regarding a potential ceasefire. Read more...

The Elimination of Yahya al-Sinwar, Head of Hamas: Reactions and Insights

On October 17, 2024, the IDF spokesperson announced that Yahya al-Sinwar, head of Hamas' political bureau, had been killed in an encounter with IDF forces while he was hiding in a building in Rafah. The IDF spokesperson reported that al-Sinwar's identity became clear only after his body was discovered and that it had not been a targeted killing; Only a day later did Hamas confirm the death of al-Sinwar, who was appointed head of the political bureau at the beginning of September 2024 after the elimination of Isma'il Haniyeh. The movement's announcements praised al-Sinwar's role in leading Operation al-Aqsa Flood (the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre) and his death in a clash with IDF forces, adding that they would continue their "resistance" and would not change their conditions for ending the war in the Gaza Strip and releasing the hostages; The Palestinian Authority and the other Palestinian terrorist organizations condemned the killing, stating he was a symbol of the "resistance" and claiming he had been killed while facing the "enemy"; Iran and the rest of the "resistance axis" stated that al-Sinwar was a "fighter" and a symbol of the "resistance," and promised to continue their support for the Palestinian "resistance." Hamas and "resistance axis" supporters on the social networks praised al-Sinwar as having stood up to the "enemy" until the last minute, while Hamas opponents did not hide their satisfaction at his death; In ITIC assessment, his death might increase the importance of the "external" leadership in Qatar, but it is possible that Hamas will not reveal the name of the new leader to make it difficult for Israel to eliminate him or exert pressure on him in the negotiations. In ITIC assessment, al-Sinwar's brother, Muhammad al-Sinwar, is expected to fill his place in the leadership of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, both at the "political" and the military level. In ITIC assessment, in the near future the Hamas leadership will not change its positions regarding negotiations to end the war in the Gaza Strip, which are demands for a complete halt to the fighting, a complete withdrawal of IDF forces from the Strip, and the release of Palestinian prisoners from Israeli prisons, especially the prisoners with blood on their hands, in exchange for the release of the hostages. However, if the "external" Hamas leadership becomes the dominant actor, it may be possible to exert sufficient pressure to achieve flexibility regarding the details of the deal and the future leadership in the Gaza Strip. Read more...

Israeli Attack in Beirut Eliminates Hassan Nasrallah

On September 27, 2024, the IDF eliminated Hassan Nasrallah, secretary general of Hezbollah, in an attack on the organization's headquarters under a residential building in the southern suburb of Beirut. Other senior Hezbollah terrorists were killed, including Ali Karaki, commander of the "southern front."; Hezbollah confirmed the death of Nasrallah, nicknamed "Master of the Resistance," calling him "one of its greatest leaders," and its leadership promised to continue the jihad in support of the Gaza Strip and in the "defense of Lebanon". Meanwhile, Hezbollah continued attacking Israel, mostly civilian targets, but did not link the attacks to Nasrallah's death. At this stage, Hezbollah continues attacking and expanding its firing range; The Hezbollah-affiliated media outlets reported that Hezbollah would not stop attacking Israel as part of the "front supporting the Gaza Strip"; Senior Iranian figures condemned the killing of Nasrallah, saying they stood with Hezbollah and Lebanon, but did not threaten a direct military response, although they are probably considering one. Other organizations in the "resistance axis" expressed condolences on Nasrallah's death and praised his role in "the struggle" against Israel. The pro-Iranian militias in Iraq intensified their attacks on Israel; Lebanese politicians eulogized Nasrallah. Opponents of Hezbollah in Lebanon and across the Middle East took to the social media to rejoice; In ITIC assessment, eliminating Nasrallah and the Hezbollah senior military leadership in recent weeks, along with the IDF's ongoing and increasing damage to the organization's chain of command and its military and strategic capabilities throughout Lebanon, has damaged Hezbollah's ability to carry out intensive attacks on Israel, at least in the short term. However, field-level commanders will try to attack more distant targets in Israeli territory, including the greater Tel Aviv area and strategic sites; Nasrallah's most probable successor is Hashem Safi al-Din, the chairman of Hezbollah's Executive Council, who is close to Iran. Apparently Hezbollah will reorganize its ranks with Iranian coordination and assistance and will continue fighting against Israel, partly for survival, and will continue to connect its fighting to the fighting in the Gaza Strip. Hezbollah may also seek to intensify the fighting and expand its firing range after Nasrallah's funeral to exact a price from Israel and be able to present a "victory narrative," and may attack an Israeli target abroad; In ITIC assessment, any Hezbollah decision regarding a coordinated and extensive response, independently or in coordination with the other "resistance axis" organizations, depends on Iran, which has to process events and prepare accordingly, while trying to avoid a regional war; In ITIC assessment, Nasrallah's absence, after 32 years as leader of Hezbollah, can have far-reaching consequences throughout the Middle East. For Lebanon, it can mean an opportunity for the government and military to reinstate their authority (with international assistance) in south Lebanon. It may also have an impact on Lebanon's political system, after Hezbollah prevented the country from electing a new president for more than a year. In the Gaza Strip, it might influence Yahya al-Sinwar, head of the Hamas political bureau in the Gaza Strip, to reach an agreement for a ceasefire and release the hostages. Read more...

Operation Northern Arrows: Reactions in Lebanon and Insights

On September 23, 2024, the IDF launched the Operation Northern Arrows and attacked thousands of Hezbollah terrorist targets in Lebanon from the air throughout the country, for the most part sites where weapons were hidden in civilian buildings and facilities. Senior Hezbollah commanders were attacked in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia, the southern suburb of Beirut, a Hezbollah stronghold; Hezbollah has carried out dozens of attacks on civilian and military targets in Israel, extending the range of its rocket and missile fire and using new weapons. For the first time, Hezbollah justified its attacks as "defending Lebanon" while continuing to "support" the Gaza Strip, its claim since the beginning of the fighting. Hezbollah attacked the Tel Aviv area with a ballistic missile for the first time; the missile was intercepted. Hezbollah reported that seven of its operatives were killed since the operation began, including Ibrahim Qubaisi, the head of Hezbollah's missile and rocket system. The pro-Iranian militias in Iraq also attacked Israel; Lebanese authorities reported that hundreds of Lebanese had died and hundreds of thousands had left their homes in south Lebanon and the Lebanon Valley after the IDF's threats to attack buildings where Hezbollah's weapons were stored. Hezbollah was criticized on the social media and accused of destroying Lebanon; In ITIC assessment, as long as no ceasefire has been reached, Hezbollah will continue its efforts to exert pressure on Israel to stop the attacks in Lebanon by attacking Israeli military and civilian targets, even at distances far from the border. Hezbollah is also determined to exhaust Israel as long as a ceasefire has not been reached in the Gaza Strip. It may also target Gush Dan again in response to the continuing targeted attacks on its senior terrorist operatives. However, in ITIC assessment, at this stage neither Hezbollah nor Iran wants to wage a total war against Israel, and Iran is working through diplomatic channels to bring an end to the fighting in Lebanon. If the IDF initiates a land maneuver Hezbollah may reconsider its options and escalate its attacks, along with the other organizations belonging to the "resistance axis." Read more...

Reactions to the Elimination of Ibrahim Aqil and the Top Command of the Radwan Force

On September 20, 2024, the IDF eliminated Ibrahim Aqil, the head of Hezbollah's military operations and commander of the elite Radwan Force, in an airstrike in the southern suburb of Beirut. The attack killed at least 14 other Radwan Force commanders, including Ahmed Mahmoud Wahhabi, the head of military training and part of the Force's top command. According to published information, they were holding a meeting to plan a ground attack on Israeli territory. According to the Lebanese ministry of health at least 50 people were killed in the attack; Hezbollah confirmed the death of Aqil, aka "the great jihad commander," the second senior Hezbollah official granted the title since the current conflict with Israel began in October 2023; Senior Hezbollah figures threatened "an appropriate retaliation" and added that Hezbollah would not stop its "support" for the Gaza Strip. Since Aqil's death Hezbollah has claimed responsibility for more than 20 attacks on targets in Israel, including expanding range of its attacks to the Jezreel Valley and the Haifa area. According to Hezbollah, the attacks were not retaliation for the death of Aqil; Iran and the "resistance axis" organizations condemned the Israeli attack on Beirut; In ITIC assessment, the attack on Aqil and the Radwan Force's top command, in addition to the exploding pagers and walkie-talkies, surprised Hezbollah and are regarded as Israel's deviation from the [Hezbollah-dictated] "rules of conflict" in place since October 8, 2023, and a crossing of red lines. In ITIC assessment, Hezbollah can be expected to react strongly, both by further extending the range of its attacks on Israeli territory and by the use of new weapons, and possibly even an attack on a sensitive military target. However, Hezbollah still does not want a total war, especially in view of the significant damage to its most senior military figures, and will try to make Israel return to the "equations" it has been trying to dictate since the beginning of the conflict, while continuing its "support" for the Gaza Strip. Nasrallah will probably also consider Iran's position regarding the nature and strength of the response, partly because at this time Iran also does not want a regional war which could also include a direct confrontation with Israel and the United States. In ITIC assessment, the other "resistance axis" organizations can be expected to increase their attempts to attack Israel in support of Hezbollah. Read more...

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