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Ad Hoc Studies

Considerable effort by Iran to emphasize the continued support for the “resistance front” following the election of President Pezeshkian

Following the election of Masoud Pezeshkian as president of Iran on July 5, 2024, there has been a marked effort by Iran to emphasize its commitment to continuing support for the “resistance front” it leads. This is apparently due to concerns among elements of the pro-Iranian axis in the region about the consequences of the election of the reformist-leaning president, especially in view of the ongoing Iranian-led regional campaign and the fear of a possible deterioration into an all-out confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah. There have been several expressions of the effort to demonstrate continuity in the policy of support for the pro-Iranian axis in the region: messages of support from the president-elect to senior members of the “resistance front; Qods Force commander Esmail Qaani’s visit to the region in recent days and his meetings with senior members of the “resistance front”; Iranian officials’ comments about continuity of regional policy based on the perception that strengthening the “resistance” is one of the permanent pillars of the Islamic Republic; commentaries in the conservative Iranian media presenting Pezeshkian’s messages of support for the leaders of the pro-Iranian axis as an expression of his commitment to them.
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Hezbollah’s Policy for the Use of Force against Israel

On October 8, 2023, a day after the start of the war in the Gaza Strip, Hezbollah joined the fighting, opening another front on Israel's northern border. Its objective was to demonstrate solidarity with and to "support" Hamas in its war against Israel and to oblige Israel to invest combat and other resources on the northern border at the expense of fighting in the Gaza Strip; Hezbollah's policy of using force is based on its so-called "deterrent equation" of proactive attacks, attacks in response to IDF offensive activity, attacks on important Israeli targets and increasing the range of attack in response to Israeli attacks on the organization's sensitive targets; During the fighting, Hezbollah adjusted the "equation" with gradual escalation when it felt Israeli attacks had become disproportionate, usually during an escalation in the war in the Gaza Strip or following the elimination of senior Hezbollah commanders. The escalation included the use of more advanced weapons, the larger barrages of rocket launches and longer-range attacks; Meanwhile, Hezbollah is trying to preserve its "deterrent equation" even in the face of expanding the conflict should Israel initiate a ground operation in south Lebanon and to the point of an all-out war between Israel and Hezbollah.
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Reactions to the targeted killing of the commander of Hezbollah’s Aziz Unit

On July 3, 2024, Hezbollah announced the death of Muhammad Naama Nasser, aka Hajj Abu Naama, killed in an Israeli airstrike which targeted his vehicle in south Lebanon. another Hezbollah operative was killed in the attack. The IDF spokesperson confirmed that the Israeli Air Force had attacked Nasser, who since 2016 had commanded Hezbollah's Aziz Unit, which is responsible for the western sector in south Lebanon; The organization's announcement called Nasser the "shaheed commander," only the third time since the beginning of the current conflict that Hezbollah awarded the title to one of its operatives; Hezbollah's responded to the killing with six attacks on military targets in northern Israel over two days. Two of the attacks, the most extensive since the start of the hostilities in October 2023, were simultaneous, with upwards of 200 rockets and more than 20 UAVs launched at IDF headquarters and bases in the Golan Heights, the Upper Galilee and the Western Galilee. An IDF soldier was killed, three civilians were injured and fires broke out in various areas; Senior Hezbollah figures said killing Abu Naama would not weaken the organization and or stop the "resistance".
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Reactions to the targeted killing of Taleb Sami Abdallah, commander of Hezbollah’s al-Nasr unit

On June 12, 2024, Hezbollah announced the death of Sami Taleb Abdallah, aka al-Hajj Abu Taleb, in an Israeli airstrike on a building in the town of Jwayya in south Lebanon. Three other Hezbollah operatives were killed in the attack. The IDF spokesperson confirmed that the Israeli Air Force had attacked Abdallah, who since 2016 had been in command of Hezbollah's al-Nasr unit, which operates in the eastern sector of south Lebanon; The Hezbollah announcement of his death referred to Abdallah as "the shaheed commander", an expression of his senior position. Hezbollah also published photos and videos of Abdallah, showing him with Hezbollah secretary general Hassan Nasrallah and the commanders of the Iranian Qods Force; The Hezbollah-affiliated media called the killing of Abdallah a "brutal and severe blow" to the organization. However, senior Hezbollah figures claimed his death would not change its commitment to "support" the Palestinians in the current conflict, adding that the organization would intensify its fighting against Israel; Hezbollah's response to the killing of Abdallah was a sharp increase in the attacks on Israeli territory, which lasted for several days. According to Hezbollah, part of its response was the most extensive attack it had carried out so far, including the launch of 30 UAVs and 150 rockets at IDF headquarters and bases in the Galilee and the Golan Heights. Two IDF soldiers and two civilians were injured and widespread fires broke out in Israel's northern region.
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Iran stresses the continued cohesion of the “resistance front” with its support following the deaths of the senior Iranian officials

The deaths of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and Iranian Foreign Minister Amir Hossein Abdollahian in a helicopter crash in northwestern Iran on May 19, 2024, provided the Islamic Republic and its regional proxies with an opportunity to demonstrate the cohesion of the “resistance front,” emphasize Tehran’s continued adherence to its strategy of supporting the pro-Iranian axis, and present continuity of its regional policy despite the sudden political upheaval. Over the past three years, Raisi and Abdollahian demonstrated considerable involvement in implementing Iranian foreign policy, including regional policy. This had been particularly evident since the outbreak of the war in the Gaza Strip in October 2023; The reactions in Iran to the deaths of Raisi and Abdollahian reflect the determination of the regime in Tehran to maintain its policy of support for the Iranian network of proxies and to continue promoting the concept of “convergence of arenas” in view of the ongoing campaign in the Gaza Strip; Nevertheless, the identity of the new president and foreign minister following the presidential elections could have some impact on Iranian policy, as well as on the reciprocal relations between the government and the Foreign Ministry and the other centers of power in Iran, including the Revolutionary Guards.
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Israel, Jews and Peace in Schoolbooks and Teachers’ Guides Used in UNRWA Schools in Judea, Samaria,East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip

The schoolbooks issued by the Palestinian Authority are mandatorily used in all schools in all areas of Judea, Samaria, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem, including UNRWA schools. The books surveyed here are of the latest edition and are used in the current school year. Teachers' guides were examined as well. They shed special light on the Palestinian Authority indoctrination process which is also applied in UNRWA schools. Following are selected examples, taken from schoolbooks and teachers' guides in use in UNRWA's school system, of de-Legitimization of the State of Israel's existence, demonization of Israel and the Jews, and absence of any advocacy for peace with Israel.
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