Ad Hoc Studies

Internal Lebanese criticism of Hezbollah in the wake of its escalation and the threat of war

Since Hezbollah began attacking Israel on October 8, 2023, there has been internal criticism in Lebanon of the organization's decision to fight against Israel, claiming it was "supporting" the Gaza Strip. The murder of 12 children and teenagers by a rocket fired by Hezbollah at Majdal Shams on July 27, 2024, and its threats to respond "strongly" to Israel's elimination of Fuad Shukr, its military commander, in Beirut on July 31, 2024, increased the Lebanese public's fear that the situation would deteriorate from border fighting in south Lebanon into an all-out war; Public criticism comes mainly from a handful of politicians and media figures, most of them Christians known to oppose Hezbollah. They accuse Hezbollah of acting contrary to the national interest and endangering the lives of the Lebanese by fighting an unnecessary war for the sake of Iran; More sharp criticism against Hezbollah appears on social networks, where posts call the organization "terrorist" and express public support for the death of Hezbollah secretary general Hassan Nasrallah. Some public criticism has also appeared in the form of signs opposing the war, but no one accepted responsibility for them; Criticism of Hezbollah is also reflected in the reception received by the Shi'ites who fled the Hezbollah stronghold in south Beirut in fear of Israeli attacks; Hassan Nasrallah warned it played into Israel's hands and called on those who did not support the organization "not to stab the 'resistance' in the back." Despite the response, apparently so far the criticism has not had a significant impact on the decisions Hezbollah makes. Read more...

The terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip exploit the civilian infrastructure for terrorist activities

On August 10, 2024, the Israeli Air Force attacked the headquarters of Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in the al-Tabi'in school complex in Gaza City. Despite false Hamas claims of intentional IDF attacks on civilians, the IDF spokesperson reported that Hamas had turned schools, where civilians took shelter, into command and control centers, sites for storing weapons and carrying out terrorist activities against IDF forces in the Gaza Strip and against the territory of the State of Israel; Since the beginning of the war on October 7, 2023, a substantial amount of evidence has accumulated about the use the terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip, especially Hamas, make of civilian facilities and the civilian population for the purpose of waging war; The ongoing fighting and the expansion of the IDF's activity to areas such as Rafah and Khan Yunis caused the terrorist organizations to forfeit military assets, and the use civilian facilities gained momentum, as did carrying out terrorist activity from within the population. The terrorist organizations use UNRWA facilities, shelters and humanitarian areas where displaced residents are located for terrorist activities; The strategy of constructing terrorist assets within the civilian space, which constitutes a war crime and a crime against humanity, enables the terrorist organizations to reduce damage to themselves, knowing they will have a kind of immunity from IDF operations, including counterterrorist activities, since insofar as is possible the IDF will not harm civilians or attack institutions such as hospitals, schools and civilian shelter areas. The strategy also enables the terrorist organizations to spread incitement and false propaganda as part of their regional and international battle for hearts and minds by representing Israel as attacking civilian institutions and innocent civilians. Read more...

Yahya al-Sinwar Named Head of Hamas Political Bureau: Reactions and Significance

On August 6, 2024, Hamas announced that Yahya al-Sinwar, head of the Hamas political bureau in the Gaza Strip, had been unanimously chosen as the movement's new head following the elimination in Tehran of Isma'il Haniyeh, its former head, which was attributed to Israel. Hamas represented al-Sinwar's appointment as indicating Hamas' strength and national unity; In the Palestinian arena, al-Sinwar's appointment was welcomed. Jibril al-Rajoub, secretary of Fatah's Central Committee, called al-Sinwar a "pragmatic, realistic, logical person; Iran and the "resistance axis" congratulated al-Sinwar and called it a blow to Israel, which had not been able to significantly damage Hamas since the beginning of the war; Al-Sinwar, one of the leaders of Hamas' military wing, spent more than 20 years in an Israeli prison until his release in 2011 as part of the Gilad Shalit exchange deal. He became the most influential person in Hamas, with connections in both the movement's military and political wings. Since 2017 he has been the head of the Hamas movement in the Gaza Strip, and, with Muhammed Deif, the commander of Hamas' military wing who was killed in July 2024, planned and orchestrated the terrorist attack and massacre on October 7, 2023; In ITIC assessment, appointing Yahya al-Sinwar writes finish to the separation of "internal" and "external" Hamas and concentrates complete control in the hands of al-Sinwar, who will remain the decisive factor in the negotiations for the end of the war in the Gaza Strip and the release of the hostages. Since al-Sinwar has not been seen in public since the beginning of the war and is hiding in the tunnels in the Gaza Strip, apparently there is no continuous communication with him. He is therefore expected to rely on those in the "external" leadership who are loyal to him to promote negotiations and manage Hamas' relations with Iran and the "resistance axis." Read more...

Cooperation between the Shi’ite militias in Iraq and the Houthis in Yemen

The cooperation between the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq and the Houthis in Yemen has intensified in recent weeks, as reflected in announcements of joint UAV and cruise missile attacks on Israel "in support of the Palestinians" and in response to Israel's [alleged] "massacres" in the Strip Gaza; Between June 6, 2024 and August 4, 2024, the Iraqi militias and the Houthis announced 12 joint attacks on Israel, most of them involving UAVs and some involving cruise missiles. Apart from one incident in which the IDF confirmed the interception of a UAV, there has been no practical verification of the other claims of responsibility; The increasing cooperation between the Shi'ite militias in Iraq and the Houthis in Yemen is part of the concept of the "unity of the arenas" against Israel promoted by the Iranian regime, especially since the beginning of the war in the Gaza Strip; In ITIC assessment, following the Israeli attack on the Houthi-controlled port city of al-Hudaydah in Yemen, carried out in response to the Houthis' ongoing attacks against Israel and the launching of the UAV that exploded in Tel Aviv, the cooperation between the Houthis and the Iraqi militias is expected to increase and escalate. It is also expected to be reflected in the "resistance axis" response to the killing of Isma'il Haniyeh, head of Hamas' political bureau in Tehran, attributed to Israel, and in response to Israel's elimination of Fuad Shukr, Hezbollah's most senior military commander, in Beirut. Read more...

Reactions to the Deaths of Fuad Shukr and Isma’il Haniyeh

In the southern suburb of Beirut on July 30, 2024, the IDF eliminated Fuad Shukr, Hezbollah's most senior military commander. The attack was carried out in response to a rocket fired by Hezbollah which hit the Druze village of Majdal Shams and killed 12 children and teenagers. Hezbollah confirmed the death of Shukr, stating that he was one of Hezbollah's founders and had led its military operations against Israel. Hezbollah secretary general Hassan Nasrallah stated that a new phase in the war had begun, claiming that revenge would; On July 31, 2024, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps and Hamas announced that Isma'il Haniyeh, head of Hamas' political bureau, had been killed in an attack on the building where he was staying in Tehran, having come to participate in the swearing-in of Masoud Pezeshkian, the new Iranian president. They claimed Israel was behind the attack. Israel did not claim responsibility. Hamas' military wing has threatened to retaliate. The Palestinian Authority (PA) and other Palestinian organizations issued; Iran's leaders made it clear that they would respond to Haniyeh's killing in Tehran; The "resistance axis" condemned Israel's elimination of Shukr in Beirut and the killing of Haniyeh in Tehran, and threatened to retaliate against Israel and the United States; there were condemnations in the Arab-Muslim world, concern of escalation was expressed in the international arena; In ITIC assessment, Hezbollah's response can be expected to exceed the parameters and the self-determined "equations" according to which it has operated from the beginning of the fighting. Hezbollah will most likely employ concentrated firepower, including the use of missiles and UAVs to attack military and civilian sites in northern Israel which so far have not been its targets, increasing the range of attacks on Israeli territory, possibly as far as the center of the country. Iran can also be expected to attack Israel with missiles and UAVs. Hamas will try to increase terrorist activity in Judea and Samaria and attack inside Israeli territory as well. In the short term, the elimination of Haniyeh may also affect efforts to reach a ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip and to release the hostages. Read more...

Reactions to the Hezbollah Rocket Attack on Majdal Shams

On July 27, 2024, Hezbollah launched a Falaq 1 rocket from south Lebanon at the Druze town of Majdal Shams in the northern Golan Heights. The rocket hit a soccer field and killed 12 children and teenagers, and injured more than 40 other people; Hezbollah initially claimed it had launched a rocket at the IDF base in the Hermon area, but then published a false statement denying any connection to the attack on Majdal Shams. In view of Israel's threats of a powerful response to the attack, Hezbollah warned it was prepared for a counterstrike, even if it led to an all-out war; In Lebanon, politicians avoided blaming Hezbollah. The Lebanese foreign minister proposed the establishment of an independent commission of inquiry to determine who was responsible for attacking Majdal Shams; Iran warned that an Israeli response could expand the arena of the war, and Syria accepted Hezbollah's claim that Israel was responsible for launching the rocket which hit Majdal Shams. The Druze community in Syria blamed Hezbollah and called for the organization to be punished; The international community condemned the attack on Majdal Shams. However, many of the condemnations avoided directly blaming Hezbollah for launching the rocket. Read more...

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