1. Home
  2. Publications
  3. Ad Hoc Studies

Ad Hoc Studies

The Resistance Axis Reacts to the Israel-US War against Iran and the Elimination of Ali Khamenei

On February 28, 2026, Israel and the United States launched a combined preemptive strike against Iran, attacking dozens of military, security and government targets across the country. Iran’s leader, Ali Khamenei, commanders of the army and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Khamenei's senior advisors and dozens of other officials were killed in the strikes; Iran confirmed the deaths of Khamenei and the others and announced the establishment of a temporary leadership council. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps launched Operation True Promise 4, launching missiles and UAVs at Israel and American bases and vessels across the Middle East; The resistance axis organizations in Lebanon, the Palestinian arena, Yemen, Iraq and Syria condemned the attack and claimed its objective was to support the vision of a "Greater Israel." They issued mourning notices for Khamenei’s death, stating his decades-long support for the "resistance" and said they would continue their activity against the "Zionist enemy"; On the night of March 1, 2026, Hezbollah fired rockets at northern Israel and claimed it was in response to the elimination of Khamenei, after the organization had previously threatened it would retaliate if Iran’s leader were attacked. Hezbollah intervened despite the fact that the Lebanese leadership had exerted pressure on it in an attempt to prevent the country from being dragged into external conflicts; Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) said they would not open a support front for Iran because of the damage done in the Gaza Strip War and the Houthis have not yet announced a renewal of attacks against Israel and against vessels in the Red Sea. Pro-Iranian militias in Iraq claimed responsibility for launching UAVs at American bases in the Kurdish region in the north of the country and Baghdad following strikes on militia bases which killed at least six operatives; In ITIC assessment, Hezbollah’s response was the result of Iranian pressure, despite the calls in Lebanon that it not respond. However, its commitment to Iran outweighed its loyalty to Lebanon and led to an extensive, forceful Israeli response. So far the Houthis have not responded but may join the fighting, although their considerations differ from those of Hezbollah.
Read more...

Iran Efforts to Circumvent the Sanctions by Smuggling Oil

Iran’s security forces, especially the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, use the sale of oil to finance their activities and those of their proxy terrorist organizations in the Middle East; In September 2025, the UN Security Council activated the snapback mechanism, which reinstated the sanctions which had been lifted under the 2015 nuclear agreement because of Tehran’s failure to meet its international obligations following the Iran-Israel War and the strike on its nuclear facilities; In an attempt to circumvent American and international sanctions, Iran operates a complex network of intermediaries, front companies and a ghost fleet of oil tankers. At the center stands Sepehr Energy Jahan, which serves as a front company for Iran’s armed forces and has been under American sanctions since November 2023; A cyberattack on the company’s servers and a massive leak of internal documents provided evidence of how Sepehr Energy Jahan conducts its illegal activity, exposing a long list of participating front companies, oil tankers and business partners. The documents also show that China remains Iran’s primary oil consumer despite international sanctions; In ITIC assessment, until the mechanisms activating the snapback restrictions go into effect, Iran will advance covert sanction-evasion activity, within which Sepehr Energy Jahan and its CEO Majid Azami play a central role, while continuing its prohibited business relationship with governmental elements in China.
Read more...

Hamas Deploys to Recover and Retain Its Military Strength and Influence over the Gaza Strip

According to the second phase of the ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip, Hamas will transfer authority in the Gaza Strip to a Palestinian technocrat committee, and the movement and all other armed terrorist organizations will disarm. In practice, the start of the new administration committee's practical activity has been delayed. It has not yet entered the Strip and Hamas is exploiting its absence to consolidate its civilian and security governance, accompanied by a public refusal to disarm the "resistance"; The Israeli security establishment has said that since the ceasefire went into effect in October 2025, Hamas has accelerated its economic and military buildup. It is relying on locally produced weapons and smuggling weapons from Egypt using UAVs, and filling its coffers by taxing the entry of humanitarian aid trucks and smuggling cigarettes and other goods, which generate millions of shekels in revenue. In addition, thousands of new operatives have been recruited and trained and infrastructures serving security needs have been rehabilitated; In ITIC assessment, although Hamas ostensibly claims it is prepared to relinquish control in favor of the new technocrat administration dictated by the United States and the mediators, it is building a network which will enable it to remain significant and an influential power factor on "the day after" and do everything in its power complicate its disarmament. To that end, it is strengthening its military arrays by producing and smuggling weapons, recruiting and training new operatives and renewing its facilities, some of which operate in civilian buildings. It is also integrating its operatives into the civilian mechanisms and security forces of the technocrat committee. In addition, a future opening of the Rafah Crossing for the transfer of goods will in all probability again make it possible for Hamas to smuggle in materials to assist its military reconstruction. As long as nothing is done to halt Hamas' military buildup and disarm the movement along with the establishment of an effective alternative administration in the Gaza Strip which has active international support and no Hamas personnel, the movement will remain an active threat to IDF forces and to the State of Israel.
Read more...

The Reorganization of Hezbollah Leadership and the Resignation of Wafiq Safa

The Israel-Hezbollah War ended in November 2024, and since then Hezbollah has been reorganizing to repair the damage it suffered, including to the top leadership, and to adapt to Na'im Qassem as the new secretary general; Alongside reports of disputes and power struggles between the "pragmatic" figures led by Qassem, and the proponents of an extremist approach, senior organization figures claimed that Hezbollah had recovered and rebuilt the leadership structure, adapting it to the continued Israeli targeted killings as part of enforcement actions, and preparations for a new war; According to reports, at the beginning of February 2026, Hezbollah's leadership accepted the resignation of Wafiq Safa, who had headed the Coordination and Liaison Unit since 1987 and was considered close to Hassan Nasrallah and one of the most prominent and influential figures in the organization's top leadership. Media commentaries opined that he resigned because of his disputes with Qassem, but also noted that the move was part of the secretary general's efforts to reorganize Hezbollah's hierarchy by tightening his control over the organization's media, and political and "security" forces, while relying on figures loyal to himself and with lower media prominence, in order to reduce the risk of being targeted by Israel; In ITIC assessment, the termination of Wafiq Safa's role was intended to stabilize Hezbollah's leadership, reduce the vulnerability of senior figures and consolidate the secretary general's control after the profound shock undergone by the organization. However, concentrating authority in the secretary general's office and weakening veteran power centers may awake latent frictions and undermine internal balances. The success of the move will be partially measured by the organization's ability to preserve cohesion, prevent further intelligence leaks and redefine Hezbollah's relations with the Lebanese state without relinquishing its core principles.
Read more...

Rising Tensions between Hezbollah and the Lebanese Government

Since the ceasefire agreement went into effect at the end of November 2024, Hezbollah has criticized Lebanese government institutions, claiming they are not doing enough to stop Israeli "aggression" and "violations" of the agreement; In recent weeks, Hezbollah has become increasingly angry at the intention of the government and the army to continue disarmament north of the Litani River and because a civilian representative was appointed to the talks with Israel. Statements by President Aoun and other Lebanese officials regarding the end of the role of the "resistance" have also angered Hezbollah; Hezbollah, led by secretary general Na'im Qassem, has escalated his rhetoric against the president and the government and accused state institutions of failing to safeguard Lebanon's sovereignty and the Shi'ite community, while stating that the "resistance" will not surrender and is prepared for confrontation. Hezbollah-affiliated media outlets joined the campaign against the government and questioned the legitimacy of President Aoun, accusing him of acting in the interests of the United States and Israel; Attempts were made to reduce tensions, including meetings between President Aoun and his aides and members of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament; In ITIC assessment, Lebanon is in transition from managed political tension to an open and prolonged struggle. As long as no significant regional change occurs, especially regarding Iran, in all probably friction and tension will continue. The government will proceed cautiously in extending its authority north of the Litani River, and Hezbollah will block measures perceived as attacking the core of its power, without letting the situation deteriorate into a broad internal Lebanese crisis. 
Read more...

Threats by Axis of Resistance Organizations amid Tensions between the United States and Iran

Amid the wave of protests in Iran and the exchange of threats between Iran, the United States, and Israel, members of the Axis of Resistance issued statements and threats of their own. Reports also indicate that some are preparing for a possible confrontation. The scope and intensity of their responses will depend, among other factors, on the nature of any US attack and the targets struck. However, the considerations guiding the Axis members are not uniform.
Read more...

Previous years bulletins

20262025202420232022202120202019201820172015201420132012201120102009