Ad Hoc Studies

The Doctrine of Dr. Mahmoud al-Zahar, Hamas’ “Expert on Jewish Affairs”

Antisemitism has been at the core of Hamas' ideology since its establishment in 1988, reflected both in the Hamas Charter (1988) and in the movement's education system; One of the leading representatives of Hamas' antisemitism is Dr. Mahmoud al-Zahar, one of the movement's founders and its senior spokesmen, who is Hamas' self-styled "expert on Jewish affairs." Over the years, he has referred to the Jews in his writings and statements using antisemitic motifs to justify the need to expel the Jews from "Palestine."; The book Hatred of the Jews – A Historical Legacy, which al-Zahar published in 2020 and copies of which were found by IDF forces during the war in the Gaza Strip, summarizes the core elements of his antisemitic doctrine. He described the Jews as a base, greedy, immoral, cruel, corrupt and treacherous, using blood libels and conspiracies based on The Protocols of the Elders of Zion; Al-Zahar also justified the Holocaust, while claiming that close ties existed between Nazi Germany and the "Zionists," stemming from their "identical interests."; Since Hamas is aware that making antisemitic remarks harms it in the international arena, the movement seeks to downplay its views when dealing with foreigners, especially Western foreigners. A document the IDF brought back from the Gaza Strip had instructions for the "Palestinian spokesperson in the world," one of which was a prohibition against the use of anti-Jewish expressions and an emphasis on the struggle against the "Zionist occupier" and not against Judaism or the Jews; Despite the attempt to market a different face to the international community, the doctrine presented by Mahmoud al-Zahar over the years, and published only in Arabic, is evidence of the Hamas leadership's antisemitism. It dehumanizes Jews and provided inspiration for the atrocities committed during the Hamas terrorist attack and massacre on October 7, 2023. Read more...

How Hamas perceived Israel’s rounds of deterrence, according to a document found in the Gaza Strip

A document prepared by the center for military and strategic studies of Hamas' military wing, dated September 9, 2023, which was brought back from the Gaza Strip by the IDF during the war, analyzed Israeli policy regarding the rounds of fighting in the Gaza Strip since Hamas seized control in 2006; According to the document, for many years Israel relied on a strategy of preemptive strike, but the strengthening of the "resistance" movements led by Hamas and Hezbollah, which could obstruct Israeli capabilities, led Israel to shift to short rounds of fighting of limited intensity; In the assessment of the document's authors, since Israel failed to achieve its objectives in Operation Cast Lead, foremost of which was overthrowing Hamas rule, it moved to presenting vague objectives alongside a focus on managing the conflict and preserving deterrence, with the objective of weakening Hamas without defeating it; Operation Guardian of the Walls in May 2021 is defined as a formative event in which Hamas deviated from the pattern of the previous rounds by linking the Gaza Strip to events in Jerusalem, Judea and Samaria and by rousing Israeli Arabs to "resistance."; In the authors' assessment, Israel did not abandon the idea of a preemptive strike, particularly given the failure of Operation Guardian of the Walls, but was not in a position to build a new equation of deterrence. Therefore, it focused on conflict management, risk management and neutralizing threats. Accordingly, the recommendation to the Hamas leadership was to prepare for a new opening strike which would trigger another round of fighting, but also to initiate an unexpected confrontation that would break the recurring pattern and make Israel's leadership uncertain; In ITIC assessment, the study is part of the effort by Hamas' intelligence apparatuses to provide the movement's top decision-makers with a full strategic understanding of Israel's perception and conduct, at a time when they were in the final stages of planning the decisive attack against Israel. The picture emerging from the study, according to which Israel is not interested in overthrowing Hamas rule and is focused on limited rounds with known outcomes, together with the recommendation by the document's authors to act in an unexpected manner, confirmed al-Sinwar and Deif's confidence that the attack and massacre would be successful, and which were carried out on October 7, 2023, less than a month after the document was written. Read more...

Iranian Activity in East Africa: A Growing Threat to Israeli and Western Interests

For years Iran has been working to advance diplomatic, economic and military objectives in East Africa as part of a strategy to position itself as a regional power, use the region to expand its geo-strategic influence and turn East Africa into a logistical backyard serving its efforts to build its network of terrorist proxy organizations; In recent years Iran renewed its relations with Djibouti and Sudan and tightened its ties with Ethiopia. That enabled Iran to expand its regional presence with the export of advanced weapons to conflict zones in East Africa, especially the civil war in Sudan; The ongoing relations between Iran and al-Shabaab, an al-Qaeda-affiliated Somalian terrorist organization, have made them middlemen in Iran's chain of proxies: The Houthis transfer Iranian weapons to al-Shabaab in the Horn of Africa, and al-Shabaab allows Tehran to use the ports under its control to smuggle weapons to the Houthis; In ITIC assessment, Iran's expanding presence in East Africa is a growing threat to Israeli interests because of Iran's ability to use the smuggling routes for weapons from Sudan to the Gaza Strip. Iran may also use the weapons it sends to conflict zones in East Africa and its official missions there to promote terrorist plots against Israeli targets in Africa. In addition, the threat to vital American and Western interests is increased by giving Iran the ability to attack shipping lanes in the Red Sea and through its dangerous proximity to the main American base in Djibouti. Read more...

The Gaza Strip Following the Killing of Yasser Abu Shabab

On December 4, 2025, the death of Yasser Abu Shabab was reported. He headed the Popular Forces, a militia in Rafah which receives Israeli support and is considered Hamas' most prominent rival in the Gaza Strip. According to the militia, he was killed while trying to resolve a family dispute and it denied Hamas' claim of responsibility for the elimination of Abu Shabab, the most senior wanted operative in the Strip; Abu Shabab's deputy, Ghassan al-Dahini, was appointed the militia's new commander and said they would continue the campaign against Hamas. Leaders of other militias in the Strip that had cooperated with Abu Shabab also said they were committed to continuing in his path; In areas of the Strip under Hamas control, Abu Shabab's death was celebrated with the distribution of pastry and candy. Hamas and the "resistance factions" claimed his death would be the fate of every "collaborator with the occupation." Hamas' ministry of the interior announced that it was granting all "collaborators" a ten-day period for "repentance" to turn themselves in; In ITIC assessment, Abu Shabab's death will encourage Hamas to consolidate its security governance in the Gaza Strip, and may affect the motivation of some operatives of the Popular Forces and other militias opposed to Hamas. However, the genuine fear of Hamas revenge and the execution of anyone who turns himself in, despite Hamas' promises of "leniency," is expected to deter many operatives from surrendering to the "resistance." In ITIC assessment, the militias will continue to operate as long as Israel controls the area of the Yellow Line and provides them with room to maneuver, and as long as there is a chance that international pressure will force Hamas to disarm, even though Hamas will seek to disrupt the militias' activity and attack their operatives, especially militia leaders. Read more...

IDF Operation in Beit Jinn amid Efforts to Promote Terrorism Against Israel in Southern Syria

On the night of November 27-28, 2025, IDF fighters operated in the village of Beit Jinn in southern Syria as part of an arrest operation against Al-Jama’ah al-Islamiyya terrorist operatives who were planning attacks against IDF forces and Israeli territory. In the ensuing exchange of fire, six IDF soldiers were wounded and about 20 terrorist operatives were eliminated; Al-Jama’ah al-Islamiyya is a Sunni Islamist movement that is the offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood in Lebanon. The movement has a close ideological connection with Hamas and cooperates with Hezbollah, and its military wing operatives took part in the campaign against Israel in Lebanon after the October 7, 2023 attack. After the incident in Beit Jinn, the movement denied any involvement and claimed that it operates only in Lebanon; The Syrian regime condemned the “aggression” in Beit Jinn and called it a “war crime.” Senior regime officials accused Israel of wanting to destabilize the country and stressed that the “civilians” would defend themselves “by all means”; The exposure of the terrorist infrastructure in Beit Jinn indicates a renewed establishment of terrorist elements affiliated with Iran and its proxies in southern Syria. In the ITIC’s assessment, the continuation of Israeli counterterrorism activity against terrorist threats in southern Syria, alongside the Syrian regime’s inability to impose its authority on the various elements operating in the area due to the Israeli demand to demilitarize the area, may lead to continued attempts by armed organizations to establish themselves and carry out attacks against IDF forces and Israeli territory. Read more...

Hamas’ Battle for Hearts and Minds after the Ceasefire Agreement in the Gaza Strip

After previous rounds of fighting conducted by Hamas, the movement made sure to promote a "victory narrative" and to emphasize its achievements, usually through ostentatious public ceremonies, such as those held for the release of the Israeli hostages during the ceasefire that between January and March 2025; However, since the ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip went into effect on October 10, 2025, Hamas has used other media tactics, showing relative restraint and without unequivocal claims of "victory."; An examination of the Hamas' narrative promoted by its spokesmen and its affiliated media indicates an ongoing effort to market a series of achievements, including the shock generated in Israel by the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre and the damage caused to Israel’s international standing, Hamas’ survival as a governing and military presence in the Strip, Israel’s failure to disarm the "resistance," the release of Palestinian prisoners who had murdered Israelis and the new regional era initiated by Yahya al-Sinwar; In ITIC assessment, Hamas' relatively moderate and cautious media products are the result of its desire to tiptoe through this period, which is sensitive for it, while continuing to wage a narrative offensive for three reasons: one, strengthening civilian and security governance in the Strip before progressing to the next stages of the ceasefire agreement. According to public statements made by senior Hamas figures they want to move forward, but it is still unclear to what extent that will be translated into action on the ground, at least in the foreseeable future. Two, the movement’s desire to prevent a confrontation with the states supervising the implementation of the agreement. Three, Hamas’ understanding that after two years of war, the dire humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip is incompatible with "victory celebrations," which could damage its image at a time when it has to struggle for its existence in general and for its future as a controlling and influential actor in the Gaza Strip in particular. Read more...

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