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Ad Hoc Studies

Houthi-Israel-United States Escalation, December 2024

Since the beginning of December 2024, Yahya Saria, the Houthi military spokesperson, claimed responsibility for 21 UAV and ballistic missile attacks on Israel, six of which were carried out in cooperation with the Islamic Resistance in Iraq. It was the highest monthly number of attacks since the beginning of the Gaza Strip War. Some of the missiles and UAVs caused significant damage in Israel; On December 19, 2024, in response to the increase in attacks, the Israeli Air Force conducted a third strike on Houthi targets in Yemen, targeting areas in Sanaa, the capital, for the first time. Among the targets attacked were power stations and fuel and oil tanks, with reports of nine fatalities; The Houthis also escalated attacks on American military and civilian vessels in the Red Sea while decreasing attacks against non-American vessels. The United States carried out airstrikes against command and control facilities and underground missile storage sites; The Houthi leader and senior officials announced that despite Israeli and American strikes, they would continue attacking Israel as part of their "support for the Palestinians," and would not stop until the war in the Gaza Strip ended; In ITIC assessment, the Houthis plan to intensify their attacks on Israel, including by introducing new weapons, to position themselves as the leading active front of the "resistance axis" in light of the ceasefire in Lebanon and the halt of attacks by pro-Iranian militias in Iraq. Although the Houthis connect the continuation of their attacks to the war in the Gaza Strip, they will most likely find other pretexts to continue their violent activities in order to maintain their external and internal standing. However, international cooperation led by the United States, combining economic and military pressure, including targeted strikes on the Houthis' military capabilities, could dampen their ability to maintain their activities over time.
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PA Security Forces Operate Against Armed Terrorists in the Jenin Refugee Camp

On December 14, 2024, the Palestinian Authority (PA) security forces launched a large-scale operation against armed terrorist operatives in the Jenin refugee camp, following orders from PA chairman Mahmoud Abbas. The forces clashed with the operatives, and the commander of a local Palestinian Islamic Jihad brigade was killed; A spokesperson for the security forces stated that the operation's goal was to liberate the refugee camp from the grip of criminals. He asserted that control over the camp had been achieved and that a car bomb meant for an attack on the forces had been neutralized. According to reports, some of the wanted terrorists surrendered to IDF forces; The operation followed a rise in tensions between the terrorist operatives and the PA security forces, the result of Israeli security force activities in Judea and Samaria since the beginning of the Gaza Strip War; The operation was also part of the PA's attempts to demonstrate governance and position itself as a ruling authority in the Gaza Strip in preparation for "the day after" the war. It was also an attempt to prevent an armed uprising similar to what overthrew the regime in Syria; Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) accused the PA of collaborating with Israel, and called on the security forces to cease their "persecutions" and join the "resistance" fighters; Despite the change in PA security forces' approach and their willingness to confront armed terrorist operatives, it is a complex challenge which will require long-term efforts. Since the beginning of the war, Iran has been attempting to ignite the Judea and Samaria front against Israel. In light of the blows sustained by the "resistance axis" in recent weeks, Tehran may intensify its efforts to encourage armed factions to escalate their activities against Israel and the PA, thus there is concern that the violence may spill over into other areas in Judea and Samaria.
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The Mood in Gaza on the First Anniversary of the Gaza Strip War

A year after the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack and massacre, and the outbreak of the Gaza Strip War, the Gazans' euphoria has been replaced by despair over the heavy destruction, the displacement from homes and the high death toll; The main criticism on Palestinian social networks in Gaza focuses on the hardships of life amid the ongoing war, uncertainty about the future, hunger, high food prices and difficulties in finding shelter and food; Considerable criticism is also directed at Hamas, particularly its "external" leaders who do not live in Gaza and are perceived as disconnected from the growing suffering of the residents. Since the death of Yahya al-Sinwar, head of the Hamas political bureau in the Gaza Strip, who was seen as the "architect" of the October 7, 2023 attack, Khaled Mashal, head of the "external" Hamas leadership, has become the primary target of Gazan anger; In addition to the criticism on social media, feelings of despair and anger toward Hamas are reflected in public opinion polls, which show low support for the possibility of Hamas' continuing to rule Gaza after the war, as well as low approval for the October 7 attack and the continuation of "armed resistance" against Israel; Despite criticism and frustration, there has not yet been a broad public protest against Hamas in Gaza, most probably because of fear of retaliation, especially in light of Hamas efforts to maintain its power on the ground, including through the Interior Ministry's Sahem Unit, which theoretically operates against looters and disorderly conduct. Despite internal criticism of the leadership in Gaza, Israel is still perceived as the primary enemy and is described as "cruel and genocidal." 
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The Rebel Attack in Syria: What does it mean for Israel?

On November 27, 2024, armed organizations opposing the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, led by the Islamic-jihadist organization Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, launched Operation Deterrence of Aggression Operation (Rad' al-Udwan) against Syrian army forces and their allies in northwestern Syria. On November 30, 2024, Turkish-sponsored rebel organizations Operation Dawn of Liberation initiated Operation “Dawn of Liberation” (Fajr al-Hurriya) in the Aleppo region, attacking Syrian regime forces and the Syrian Democratic Forces, a Kurdish-Arab militia supported by the United States. The rebels took control of Aleppo and Hama, as well as military bases, airfields and security facilities operating under the sponsorship of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Hezbollah; Iran and "resistance axis" organizations expressed support for the Syrian regime, making diplomatic efforts to calm the situation and deploying forces to Syria. Iran also accused the offensive of being an "Israeli-American conspiracy" whose objective was to weaken the "resistance axis." According to the rebels, they wanted to prevent Syrian regime forces from attacking the opposition enclave in northwestern Syria. They also noted that the "resistance axis" focus on fighting Israel and the withdrawal of Hezbollah forces from Syria to Lebanon were key factors in their considerations for initiating the offensive at this time; In ITIC assessment, although the rebels currently focus on fighting Assad's regime and its allies, and Islamic-jihadist takeover of advanced weaponry, including fighter jets, could pose a long-term threat to Israel. In addition, the increasing instability in Syria could trigger a new wave of displaced persons who might also move toward Israel's border. However, the rebels' offensive also poses a threat to Iran and the "resistance axis," which have used Syria as a route for transferring weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon and a location from which to attack Israel. The focus of Iran and the militias on fighting the rebels, who have also taken control of strategically important "resistance axis" sites, may hinder their ability to assist Hezbollah in the reconstruction process after the fighting against Israel.
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The Israel-Lebanon Ceasefire Agreement The Lebanese Point of View

On November 27, 2024, a ceasefire agreement between Israel and Lebanon went into effect, halting the fighting which broke out on October 8, 2023. According to the agreement, Israel will gradually withdraw its forces from south Lebanon over 60 days, while the Lebanese army will deploy its forces in south Lebanon and work to prevent armed organizations, primarily Hezbollah, from holding weapons or operating military facilities south of the Litani River. An American-led committee will oversee the implementation; Hezbollah is attempting to establish a narrative of victory, claiming that the fighting ended with an Israeli defeat, despite the heavy losses to the organization, including the killing of its secretary general Hassan Nasrallah and its military leadership. Na’im Qassem, the new secretary general, claimed it was a greater victory than the one in the 2006 war, adding that the organization was committed to cooperating with the Lebanese army to implement the agreement. A Hezbollah-affiliated journalist said Hezbollah would free its prisoners "by any means"; Immediately after the ceasefire, thousands of displaced persons began returning to their homes in south Lebanon, the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in Beirut, and the Beqa'a. However, the IDF and the Lebanese army warned them not to return to villages near the border, and the IDF opened fire on Lebanese attempting to return to south Lebanon. From Hezbollah's perspective, the return of the displaced to their homes in south Lebanon is another expression of victory, in contrast to Israelis, who cannot return to their homes along the border; Lebanon’s interim prime minister and other government officials said they would give the army all the necessary authority to implement the ceasefire agreement in south Lebanon. Nabih Berri, the speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, said that Lebanon had overcome "Israeli aggression"; Hezbollah’s political and social media opponents expressed wonder and criticized Hezbollah's declarations of victory, given the extensive destruction in Lebanon and the blows to the organization. They also expressed hope that the agreement would lead to Hezbollah’s disarmament and criticized the "resistance axis" for its claims of supporting Lebanon while not paying a price; In our assessment, Hezbollah will continue to promote and reiterate its victory narrative and adopt a policy of brinkmanship. Its operatives will attempt to challenge the implementation of the ceasefire until the planned withdrawal of IDF forces from south Lebanon by the end of January 2025. Even after the withdrawal, the Lebanese army will most likely be unable to enforce the ceasefire, prevent Hezbollah operatives from reaching south Lebanon or fully oversee the dismantling of Hezbollah’s infrastructure south of the Litani River, due to Hezbollah’s efforts to integrate its activities into the local population and the army’s desire to avoid direct confrontation with Hezbollah.
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Hamas and Hezbollah Activities in Europe: Germany as a Test Case

In November 2024, charges filed in Germany against four suspects affiliated with Hamas for operating weapons depots for Hamas in Europe and planning attacks on Israeli, Jewish and Western targets in Germany. In July 2024, the German ministry of the interior ordered the closure of the Islamic Center in Hamburg after evidence was found that for years it had served the interests of Iran and Hezbollah in the country; Both cases provide evidence of the continued presence of Hamas and Hezbollah in Europe in general and Germany in particular, despite efforts by authorities to limit or prevent their activities, especially following the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre in Israel; Germany, like other European countries, has always walked a fine line between counterterrorism, its commitment to absorbing immigrants and the protection of human rights. That was why for years if did not designate Hamas and Hezbollah as terrorist organizations or outlaw outlawing them, allowing their organizations and charities to raise funds for terrorist activities which also targeted German; In 2020, Germany ended the EU's arbitrary separation between Hezbollah’s military wing and its so-called political wing, and designated Hezbollah a terrorist organization. A similar move against Hamas was taken only in November 2023, although the movement as a whole had been designated a terrorist organization by the EU since 2014; An October 2024 report issued by Germany’s Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) warned that in addition to actions by individuals motivated by antisemitism, the escalation in the Middle East also posed a threat to Jewish and Israeli targets because of operational preparations by Iranian or Hezbollah proxies or by Hamas; In ITIC assessment, German law enforcement authorities will continue efforts to prevent Hamas and Hezbollah activities as part of a growing European effort to reduce the risk from Iranian proxies. However, the threat posed by Hamas and Hezbollah can be expected to remain high for Europe in general and for Germany in particular. The arrest of Hamas operatives and the exposure of weapons depots may indicate a change in the movement’s activities in Europe, which until now avoided carrying out attacks abroad and focused on fundraising and promoting its agenda within civilian social organizations. Hezbollah may also activate its network, which in all probability still exists in Germany, to attack Israeli and Jewish targets, either as revenge for the killing of Hassan Nasrallah and senior organization members or as part of a possible Iranian response to the Israeli strike on Iran in October 2024. Hamas and Hezbollah may also exploit the radicalization of Muslim immigrant communities in Europe, as demonstrated by the attack on Israeli soccer fans in Amsterdam in November 2024, to construct a support base which would help them spread their anti-Israeli and antisemitic agenda and even carry out attacks.
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