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The Palestinian Authority prepares to administer the Gaza Strip after the war

Hamas' violent takeover of the Gaza Strip in 2007 created a schism, the first of its kind, between the Palestinian Authority (PA) government in Judea and Samaria and the Hamas government in the Strip, initiating a continuing hostility between the sides despite attempts at reconciliation; The war that broke out with Hamas' attack and massacre of Israelis on October 7, 2023 provided the PA with an opportunity to reiterate its position that after the war, it should regain control of the Strip to create a geographic and political unity with Judea and Samaria ahead of the establishment of a Palestinian state. Senior PA figures stressed the position anew after the ceasefire that went into effect in the Gaza Strip in October 2025, and presented their own plans for the reconstruction of the Strip. Egypt and Qatar expressed support for the PA's position; Hamas voiced its reservations about the PA's return to the Gaza Strip, despite the movement's declaration that it would relinquish control of the Strip. However, after talks between senior Hamas and PA figures in Cairo, Hamas began to moderate its position and publicly support the appointment of a PA government minister to head the future Palestinian committee to administer the Strip. The most-heard name to head the committee is Dr. Amjad Abu Ramadan, the PA minister of health and former mayor of Gaza; In ITIC assessment, the PA can be expected to play a significant role in the committee for administering the Strip, despite Israel's public opposition and American ambiguity, as part of the understanding being formed by Fatah and Hamas, which seeks to demonstrate that it complies with the ceasefire terms. However, in all probability the dispute over the disarmament of Hamas and other "resistance" factions will continue, given Hamas' refusal to disarm, directly opposed to the PA position that it should hold a monopoly on weapons. Therefore, in ITIC assessment, the tension between Hamas and the PA will most likely persist and make it difficult to find a political solution which would enable progress in the efforts to rehabilitate the Strip.
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Hezbollah’s defiance, the instability of the ceasefire andattempts to promote an Israeli-Lebanese dialogue

On November 6, 2025, Hezbollah published an open letter to the Lebanese leadership and public. It claimed it had abided by the November 27, 2024 ceasefire agreement and added that the objective of demanding that Hezbollah disarm and the Lebanese begin negotiations with Israel was to weaken Lebanon. It also insisted that it would not give up the "right to resist" and was not required to obey government directives on issues of war and peace. Hezbollah secretary general Na'im Qassem and other senior figures expressed similar positions; The letter was prompted by IDF attacks to enforce the ceasefire, targeting Hezbollah's reconstruction efforts and Radwan Force capabilities, amid reports of the organization’s rearmament. Israel and the United States also warned that if the Lebanese army did not accelerate Hezbollah’s disarmament, the attacks could intensify in quality and quantity; To prevent escalation and resolve the disputes between Israel and Lebanon, the United States and Egypt proposed holding bilateral negotiations. Lebanese president Aoun stated that Lebanon had no choice but to engage in dialogue with Israel; Nabih Berri, speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, and a Hezbollah ally, opposed direct negotiations; Hezbollah’s open letter was another expression the organization’s defiance of efforts to disarm it, after previously expressing vague willingness to discuss possibly disarming "under certain conditions." However, Hezbollah has not issued the Lebanese government an ultimatum or explicitly warned Israel, reflecting the organization's continued restraint despite the IDF attacks. In ITIC assessment, Hezbollah’s continued military buildup, the Lebanese army’s weakness in preventing it and the intensification of Israel’s measures could wear down the restraint shown by all actors since the beginning of the ceasefire and increase the risk of a serious escalation toward the end of 2025, the deadline set by the Lebanese government for disarming armed militias in the country, including Hezbollah.
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Escalation of terrorist activity in Judea and Samaria Following the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip

Hamas' ambition was to turn Judea and Samaria into an arena for terrorism as part of the campaign to destroy Israel which began with the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre. However, the counterterrorism actions taken by the Israeli security forces, which included the detention and elimination of thousands of wanted persons and terrorist operatives and the seizure of weapons prevented a wave of terrorism from Judea and Samaria; Following the ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) began efforts to shift the center of the "resistance" to Judea and Samaria, encouraging attacks on Israeli security forces and settlers; Iran also continues its central role in efforts to turn Judea and Samaria into an active terrorist arena against Israel. A shipment of weapons from Iran was intercepted, which included powerful explosive charges and explosive-carrying drones; Qods Force operatives in Lebanon who were involved in the smuggling routes of weapons were eliminated; In ITIC assessment, after the ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian terrorist organizations, with Iranian assistance, will direct a significant portion of their activity to Judea and Samaria to justify their existence by continuing the "resistance." The terrorist organizations will also try to exploit the return of the Palestinian issue to the global stage and the regional and international involvement in the Gaza Strip within the framework of the ceasefire to create pressure on Israel, provoking attacks which could escalate Israel's response in Judea and Samaria. Moreover, the return of hundreds of terrorist operatives from Israeli jails to Judea and Samaria will intensify the activity of the terrorist organizations, which will exploit the knowledge and experience of the released prisoners and the cooperative networks they built in prison.
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Hamas activity to restore its civilian governance In the Gaza Strip after the ceasefire

The ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip on October 10, 2025, allowed Hamas to demonstrate governance and all facets of a return to normal life, despite the massive destruction and dismantling of the civilian infrastructure in the Strip caused by the war which began on October 7, 2023; Hamas deployed police and security forces in areas evacuated by the IDF to restore public order, along with a campaign against "collaborators" and those involved in criminal activity and price gouging. Hamas government mechanisms and local authorities began working to repair the damage in fields including health, education, welfare and transportation; In ITIC assessment, despite the severe blow to Hamas' civilian leadership and the destruction of civilian infrastructure in the Gaza Strip throughout the war, Hamas managed to quickly regain almost full control over the areas it held, activating government mechanisms and attempting to provide basic services, while also using force against the Gazans as a means of deterrence. Hamas understood that overt control of the Strip would deter the international community from transferring the funds required for reconstruction, delay the rebuilding of the Strip and could spark civilian unrest, and therefore signaled its willingness to transfer the civilian administration to a Palestinian technocratic government, while refusing to disarm. Nevertheless, Hamas' absolute control over government institutions and the provision of services, including at the local level, will leave it with significant influence, even if an alternative body is established to manage the Strip in accordance with the second stage of the American plan.
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Implementation of the Lebanese Army’s Plan to Disarm Hezbollah: Status Report

In early October 2025, the commander of the Lebanese Army presented the government in Beirut with the first report on the implementation of Hezbollah’s disarmament plan, in accordance with the government’s August 2025 decisions on the state’s arms monopoly. The report was reportedly claimed that the Army would be able to complete the demilitarization of the area south of the Litani River by the end of 2025, on condition that IDF forces leave southern Lebanon; “Sources” claimed that the Army only acts against sites that have been reported to UNIFIL and to the Ceasefire Monitoring Committee for fear of clashing with Hezbollah, which could lead to civil war; The Lebanese leadership expressed its commitment to the implementation of the state’s monopoly on weapons and blamed Israel for the delays in implementing the plan due to the continued attacks and the presence of IDF forces in five points in southern Lebanon; Hezbollah leaders made it clear that they oppose disarming the organization. Nevertheless, Hezbollah reportedly requested guarantees in exchange for giving up the weapons.; It was reported that US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack would arrive in Lebanon and warn the heads of state that they have one last chance to enter direct negotiations with Israel on a timetable for Hezbollah’s disarmament, or Lebanon will be left without external support. The US Special Envoy’s Deputy for the Middle East met with senior Lebanese leaders and asked them to work to prevent the restoration of Hezbollah’s military capabilities; In the ITIC’s assessment, the Lebanese Army will continue its operations to collect weapons from the terrorist organizations, focusing on Hezbollah, and to deploy its forces, mainly in areas south of the Litani, aiming to finish this by the end of 2025. On the other hand, in Hezbollah’s strongholds north of the Litani, in the Beqaa and Beirut, the Lebanese Army will find it difficult to disarm the organization for fear of a confrontation that could escalate into civil war; In the ITIC’s assessment, Hezbollah will also continue to publicly oppose its disarmament, but may agree to partial disarmament, mainly in the region south of the Litani, in exchange for appropriate guarantees. At the same time, the Lebanese government will continue its efforts to persuade the international community, especially the American administration, to increase pressure on Israel to reduce its attacks and withdraw its forces from positions in southern Lebanon, fully or partially, to help convince Hezbollah to show greater flexibility on disarmament. However, if the US administration intensifies its use of leverage, such as withholding funds for reconstruction aid or granting a free hand to Israeli action in Lebanon, the Lebanese government may change its cautious position regarding dealing with Hezbollah.
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Preparations for “the Day After” in the Gaza Strip: The Palestinian Organizations Meet in Cairo

On October 23 and 24, 2025, the Palestinian organizations met in Cairo at a conference sponsored by Egypt with Qatari and Turkish support, to formulate a unified Palestinian position, regarding the administration of the Gaza Strip and the disarmament of Hamas and other armed organizations in preparation for the next phase of the ceasefire. Most of the organizations sent representatives, including Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP): Fatah was not represented; According to the closing statement issued after the conference, the organizations agreed to continue the ceasefire, demanding the withdrawal of the IDF from the Gaza Strip, the lifting of the "siege," the opening of the crossings and the beginning of a reconstruction of the Strip. They agreed that the administration of the Strip would be transferred to a temporary committee of independent professionals in cooperation with Arab and international actors, along with an international committee for funding and supervision, and a temporary international force along the borders;  In addition to the conference, a meeting was held between a Hamas delegation, led by the head of the movement in the Gaza Strip, Khalil al-Hayya, and a delegation of the Palestinian Authority (PA), headed by the deputy chairman, Hussein al-Sheikh. The Egyptian intelligence chief also met separately with representatives of the organizations; Senior Hamas figures claimed the movement was committed to relinquishing control of the Gaza Strip and to reaching understandings with other Palestinian organizations regarding a joint vision for the ceasefire agreement, but would not state that Hamas was prepared to give up its weapons or to accept PA responsibility for the Strip. Fatah, however, said the PA had to assume responsibility for the Gaza Strip, including the administrative committee to be established to manage the territory and for maintaining security, and called on Hamas to act within the framework of the PLO; In ITIC assessment, the Palestinian organizations have realized that there is a narrow window of opportunity to form a national consensus and an interim framework acceptable to all sides, chiefly Hamas and Fatah. The outcome of the war and the pressure from the United States and the mediators have caused a cautious shift within Hamas toward relinquishing formal rule in favor of technocratic civil administration and elections, with the understanding that the proposed governance model, i.e., technocratic management under Arab and international oversight, would allow the movement to retain influence in the Strip. Hamas also understands that disarming would determine its fate, and in ITIC assessment, the movement will attempt to obscure and postpone the issue of disarmament within any future agreement. However, even if understandings are formally reached and the sides announce a joint decision without binding commitments or a practical plan for disarming the organizations, Israel will face a dilemma regarding the implementation of a full withdrawal, the opening of crossings and approval for Gaza's reconstruction.
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