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Ad Hoc Studies

Agreement for Collecting Weapons from Hamas and the Other Armed Organizations in the Gaza Strip – Significance and Reactions

The American president and the Board of Peace announced they had reached an agreement with Hamas on a road map for implementing the second phase of the ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip; Hamas and the armed factions will transfer their heavy weapons, weapons depots, production facilities and tunnels to the responsibility of the Palestinian administration committee, which will store and supervise them; A senior Hamas figure claimed they had been "flexible", but added that the movement would continue to work to "liberate" the land from the "occupation" on all fronts; In The Amit Terrorism and Intelligence Research Institute assessment, the new agreement is not sufficiently clear and, based on what has been published so far, does not ensure the disarmament of Hamas and the other Palestinian armed factions; The framework also does not determine the fate of the commanders of the military wings and other terrorist operatives; The agreement also imposes restrictions on the IDF's use of force and its ability to deal with immediate or emerging threats.
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Yahya Sinwar’s Plan for the Invasion of Israel, as Detailed in a Hamas Document

In October 2025, the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center published a Hamas document brought back from the Gaza Strip by the IDF, handwritten by Yahya al-Sinwar, head of the Hamas political bureau in the Gaza Strip. Dated August 24, 2022, it contained precise instructions for the opening of the "decisive campaign" to destroy Israel, from the deception phase in the weeks preceding the attack through the invasion of Israeli territory and instructions for documenting the atrocities committed against civilians and soldiers, as occurred during the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre; Another document written by al-Sinwar on the same day presented the plan to invade Israel in greater detail, including the rapid seizure of 25 junctions and more than 220 communities, kibbutzim, "small and large" cities and military installations. To that end he estimated that a force of ten thousand "well-trained fighters" would be required; The document included instructions to "expel the settlers," primarily women and children, and to take men between the ages of 17 and 50 hostage; The propaganda to sway international public opinion is noted in the captured document through instructions to represent the attack as a "humanitarian" event to implement the Palestinian "right of return" narrative with the slogan, "We are returning to our homes"; Al-Sinwar said the attack would surprise the "enemy" but he was prepared for Israel to use every means at its disposal to respond, including a "nuclear bomb." He added that would be "a battle of life or death"; The document included an outline for a slide show entitled "The Liberation of Southern Palestine," although the slides themselves were not found; The document gives a detailed description of an organized operational plan, inclusive to the level of the operatives in the squads responsible for breaching the border fence, a plan which had been devised more than a year before it was actually carried out in the October 7, 2023 invasion and massacre; The two documents also reflect al-Sinwar's high confidence in Hamas' ability to lead the campaign independently during its opening stages, although he hoped the surprise created by the attack would encourage other fronts to join the fighting. 
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The Israel-Lebanon Framework Agreement: Insights and Responses

On June 26, 2026, at the conclusion of the fifth round of direct negotiations between Lebanon and Israel in the United States, the ambassadors of the two countries signed a framework agreement in the presence of the United States secretary of state. Its main provisions are: Mutual recognition by each state of the other's sovereignty and a commitment to continue negotiations to end the state of war and establish peace, gradual Israeli withdrawal from pilot areas in south Lebanon, into which the Lebanese army will enter to dismantle all non-state armed groups and enforce the state's sovereignty. The IDF withdrawal will be completed only after the dismantling of the groups and their infrastructure has been officially verified; Hezbollah and its allies rejected the framework agreement outright, claiming it was "surrender," undermined Lebanon's sovereignty and could lead to civil war; Hezbollah's opponents praised the agreement and said they were confident it would reduce Hezbollah and Iran's influence over decision-making in the country; In Amit Institute assessment, the signing of the framework agreement marks a turning point in the Lebanese arena, since for the first time the Lebanese leadership has presented a political framework linking an Israeli withdrawal to the expansion of state sovereignty and the disarmament of Hezbollah; The framework agreement will be tested by Lebanon's ability to put into practice the provisions concerning the state's control over the country's security. The Lebanese government faces the challenge of asserting its authority without sliding into a violent confrontation with the Shi'ite camp. Hezbollah faces the challenges of preserving its status as the leading extra-state military and political force and of preventing Iran from being pushed out of Lebanon. 
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The American-Iran Memorandum of Understanding: Ceasefire in Lebanon and the Reactions of the Resistance Axis

According to the memorandum of understanding (MOU) between Iran and the United States, both countries and their allies will cease military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon, and Lebanon's territorial integrity and sovereignty will be guaranteed. With the start of direct negotiations between the United States and Iran on the final agreement, a "de-escalation" cell in Lebanon was agreed on, without Israeli participation; Hezbollah praised the MOU, representing it as an expression of Iran's commitment to defending the country and ensuring the continuation of Hezbollah's activities in Lebanon; Lebanese President and Prime Minister felt obligated to welcome Iran's insistence on including the issue of a ceasefire in Lebanon in the MOU, but said their commitment to the direct talks with Israel as the primary way to ensure the country's stability; In Amit Institute assessment, the MOU provided a following wind for Hezbollah's senior leadership, given their perception that Iran could enforce its positions on the United States by leveraging the Strait of Hormuz. The demand for a full Israeli withdrawal, together with the absence of any mention of Hezbollah or a demand for its disarmament provided the organization's leadership with a tool for continuing its campaign against the government in Beirut, which seeks to reduce Hezbollah's influence. Meanwhile the determination of President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam to advance negotiations with Israel, along with American backing for the position, is expected to continue fueling tensions in Lebanon's internal political arena, and to motivate Iran to use the leverage it now possesses over the United States to advance Hezbollah's interests in Lebanon.
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Criticism of Hezbollah Increases among the Shi’ites in Lebanon

The heavy human and economic costs of the renewed hostilities started by Hezbollah on March 2, 2026, which come while the Shi'ite community is still recovering from the consequences of Hezbollah's previous hostilities in "support of the Gaza Strip", have intensified signs of dissatisfaction in Hezbollah's centers of power and support, with a shift from a discourse of "resistance, return and reconstruction" to one of economic and social survival; That has been reflected by criticism of the continued fighting and a loss of confidence in Hezbollah's ability to provide an adequate response to the cumulative cost of the war. Support also appears to be growing for political solutions and for strengthening the role and status of the state; The growing frustration has led to the emergence of a Shi'ite search for an ideological alternative to Hezbollah, based on loyalty to the Lebanese state, strengthening its institutions and prioritizing reconstruction and development over the continued involvement of the community in military confrontations; At this stage there are no particular signs of a collapse in Hezbollah's Shi'ite support base or the emergence of an organized political alternative with a real ability to challenge its status. However, the accumulation of destruction, displacement, economic hardship and growing criticism of Iran is creating a broader critical space than has been seen in recent years. In Amit Institute assessment, if the fighting in Lebanon continues and the reconstruction of the state is delayed, such processes may evolve from limited deterioration of the organization's standing to a more significant political and social challenge for Hezbollah and the Shi'ite community.
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Hezbollah’s Campaign against the Lebanese Government

The tension between the Lebanese government and Hezbollah has intensified in recent months because of the organization's decision to violate the ceasefire and renew the hostilities against Israel, and because of the current direct negotiations between Lebanon and Israel under American auspices; Despite Hezbollah's protests and firm public opposition to the government's decisions to outlaw the organization's military wing and its commitment to continuing the talks with Israel, President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam remain determined to pursue the policy; As a result, senior Hezbollah figures and organization-affiliated media outlets have increasingly sought to undermine the legitimacy of the president and prime minister's actions. They claim the government's actions sabotage Lebanon's interests, betray the idea of "the resistance," and call the two "agents serving the American-Zionist project."; In Amit Institute assessment, the growing number of voices within Hezbollah challenging the legitimacy of the government in Beirut reflect the organization's weakness within Lebanon's political system and its inability to influence government decisions and prevent moves it perceives as contrary to its interests, as it had done for decades. That lays the groundwork for actions that go beyond political discourse, and could materialize as "popular" efforts to topple or paralyze the government or as the targeted use of force against key leadership figures to deter a change in the government's policy opposing Hezbollah's activities.
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