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Ad Hoc Studies

IDF Operation in Beit Jinn amid Efforts to Promote Terrorism Against Israel in Southern Syria

On the night of November 27-28, 2025, IDF fighters operated in the village of Beit Jinn in southern Syria as part of an arrest operation against Al-Jama’ah al-Islamiyya terrorist operatives who were planning attacks against IDF forces and Israeli territory. In the ensuing exchange of fire, six IDF soldiers were wounded and about 20 terrorist operatives were eliminated; Al-Jama’ah al-Islamiyya is a Sunni Islamist movement that is the offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood in Lebanon. The movement has a close ideological connection with Hamas and cooperates with Hezbollah, and its military wing operatives took part in the campaign against Israel in Lebanon after the October 7, 2023 attack. After the incident in Beit Jinn, the movement denied any involvement and claimed that it operates only in Lebanon; The Syrian regime condemned the “aggression” in Beit Jinn and called it a “war crime.” Senior regime officials accused Israel of wanting to destabilize the country and stressed that the “civilians” would defend themselves “by all means”; The exposure of the terrorist infrastructure in Beit Jinn indicates a renewed establishment of terrorist elements affiliated with Iran and its proxies in southern Syria. In the ITIC’s assessment, the continuation of Israeli counterterrorism activity against terrorist threats in southern Syria, alongside the Syrian regime’s inability to impose its authority on the various elements operating in the area due to the Israeli demand to demilitarize the area, may lead to continued attempts by armed organizations to establish themselves and carry out attacks against IDF forces and Israeli territory.
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Hamas’ Battle for Hearts and Minds after the Ceasefire Agreement in the Gaza Strip

After previous rounds of fighting conducted by Hamas, the movement made sure to promote a "victory narrative" and to emphasize its achievements, usually through ostentatious public ceremonies, such as those held for the release of the Israeli hostages during the ceasefire that between January and March 2025; However, since the ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip went into effect on October 10, 2025, Hamas has used other media tactics, showing relative restraint and without unequivocal claims of "victory."; An examination of the Hamas' narrative promoted by its spokesmen and its affiliated media indicates an ongoing effort to market a series of achievements, including the shock generated in Israel by the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre and the damage caused to Israel’s international standing, Hamas’ survival as a governing and military presence in the Strip, Israel’s failure to disarm the "resistance," the release of Palestinian prisoners who had murdered Israelis and the new regional era initiated by Yahya al-Sinwar; In ITIC assessment, Hamas' relatively moderate and cautious media products are the result of its desire to tiptoe through this period, which is sensitive for it, while continuing to wage a narrative offensive for three reasons: one, strengthening civilian and security governance in the Strip before progressing to the next stages of the ceasefire agreement. According to public statements made by senior Hamas figures they want to move forward, but it is still unclear to what extent that will be translated into action on the ground, at least in the foreseeable future. Two, the movement’s desire to prevent a confrontation with the states supervising the implementation of the agreement. Three, Hamas’ understanding that after two years of war, the dire humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip is incompatible with "victory celebrations," which could damage its image at a time when it has to struggle for its existence in general and for its future as a controlling and influential actor in the Gaza Strip in particular.
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UN Security Council Resolution 2803 for the Future of the Gaza Strip – Positions of Power Actors

On November 17, 2025, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 2803, which adopts the 20-point American plan for a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and for "the day after."; The resolution endorses the establishment of a Board of Peace which will temporarily administer the Gaza Strip until control is transferred to the Palestinian Authority. It also approves the establishment of an international stabilization force, which will operate alongside a vetted Palestinian police force, in coordination with Israel and Egypt, to ensure the demilitarization of the Strip and the disarmament of "armed groups."; The resolution does not include an explicit commitment to a Palestinian state, but expresses hope for the creation of a "credible pathway" to Palestinian self-determination if the Palestinian Authority implements the required reforms; Hamas and the other terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip rejected the resolution and warned that any international force that arrived in the Gaza Strip would be considered an "occupying force" if it attempted to disarm them. Iran and the Houthis subscribed to Hamas' position and claimed that the resolution was intended to serve Israeli objectives. The Palestinian Authority, however welcomed the resolution and expressed readiness to assume full responsibility for the Gaza Strip; In ITIC assessment, despite the importance of the Security Council resolution as an outline for a course for "the day after" in Gaza which includes full demilitarization and a stable, non-Hamas rule, it is a declarative step and it is unclear whether it can be implemented. In all probability, the refusal of Hamas and the other terrorist organizations to disarm, and the threat that they will regard the international force as an "occupying force," will increase friction between them and the foreign forces arriving in the Strip and lead to violent clashes which might also affect IDF forces. In addition, the uncertainty regarding the Palestinian Authority's ability to fully and credibly implement the required reforms and the absence of agreements between Hamas and Fatah regarding the identity of the technocratic management committee, alongside the inherent difficulty in establishing effective control and supervision over the Palestinian population, will create a vacuum in governance which will allow Hamas to continue securing its security and civilian governance in the Strip.
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Iran Assists Hezbollah’s Post-Ceasefire Reconstruction

The United States Treasury Department reported that Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) had transferred approximately $1 billion to Hezbollah since the beginning of the year to reconstruct the organization's military capabilities in the wake of the war against Israel. Since the war ended in late November 2024, Iran has also continued to smuggle weapons to the organization and interfere with the Lebanese government's efforts to disarm Hezbollah. As a result, a senior American delegation urged the Lebanese leadership to accelerate action against the sources of Hezbollah's funding; The fall of the Assad regime in Syria in December 2024 and the flight ban imposed by the Lebanese government on Iran since February 2025 disrupted the land and air routes used by Iran to transfer weapons, technological assistance and funds to Hezbollah. Iran and Hezbollah subsequently found other avenues, including smuggling through Turkey and Iraq, by sea and through currency-exchange agencies. They also continue to rely on smuggling networks along the Syria-Lebanon border, despite Syrian and IDF efforts to block them; The Iranian embassy in Beirut denied the information provided by the American government, but throughout the war in the Gaza Strip and after the ceasefire Iranian officials made clear that they continue to support Hezbollah, as they do other members of the "resistance axis." Hezbollah secretary general Na'im Qassem also publicly thanked Iran for its "massive" assistance; The American disclosure of the financial aid transferred by the IRGC to Hezbollah, along with the exposure of smuggling methods, showed that Iran and Hezbollah had found ways to overcome the challenges of geopolitical changes in Lebanon and the Middle East since the ceasefire in late November 2024, and how difficult it was to dent the 40-year cooperation between Tehran and the Lebanese organization. In all probability Iran will continue to support and fund Hezbollah's military and civil reconstruction in order to preserve its status within the Shi'ite community and in Lebanon, and to prevent Israel and the Lebanese authorities from weakening or neutralizing Iran's most important strategic arm in the Middle East. The absence of more decisive action by the international community in general and by the Lebanese government in particular, to eliminate Hezbollah's funding sources and block smuggling routes, will allow Iran and Hezbollah to continue transferring funds and weapons with little disruption.
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The Palestinian Authority prepares to administer the Gaza Strip after the war

Hamas' violent takeover of the Gaza Strip in 2007 created a schism, the first of its kind, between the Palestinian Authority (PA) government in Judea and Samaria and the Hamas government in the Strip, initiating a continuing hostility between the sides despite attempts at reconciliation; The war that broke out with Hamas' attack and massacre of Israelis on October 7, 2023 provided the PA with an opportunity to reiterate its position that after the war, it should regain control of the Strip to create a geographic and political unity with Judea and Samaria ahead of the establishment of a Palestinian state. Senior PA figures stressed the position anew after the ceasefire that went into effect in the Gaza Strip in October 2025, and presented their own plans for the reconstruction of the Strip. Egypt and Qatar expressed support for the PA's position; Hamas voiced its reservations about the PA's return to the Gaza Strip, despite the movement's declaration that it would relinquish control of the Strip. However, after talks between senior Hamas and PA figures in Cairo, Hamas began to moderate its position and publicly support the appointment of a PA government minister to head the future Palestinian committee to administer the Strip. The most-heard name to head the committee is Dr. Amjad Abu Ramadan, the PA minister of health and former mayor of Gaza; In ITIC assessment, the PA can be expected to play a significant role in the committee for administering the Strip, despite Israel's public opposition and American ambiguity, as part of the understanding being formed by Fatah and Hamas, which seeks to demonstrate that it complies with the ceasefire terms. However, in all probability the dispute over the disarmament of Hamas and other "resistance" factions will continue, given Hamas' refusal to disarm, directly opposed to the PA position that it should hold a monopoly on weapons. Therefore, in ITIC assessment, the tension between Hamas and the PA will most likely persist and make it difficult to find a political solution which would enable progress in the efforts to rehabilitate the Strip.
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Hezbollah’s defiance, the instability of the ceasefire andattempts to promote an Israeli-Lebanese dialogue

On November 6, 2025, Hezbollah published an open letter to the Lebanese leadership and public. It claimed it had abided by the November 27, 2024 ceasefire agreement and added that the objective of demanding that Hezbollah disarm and the Lebanese begin negotiations with Israel was to weaken Lebanon. It also insisted that it would not give up the "right to resist" and was not required to obey government directives on issues of war and peace. Hezbollah secretary general Na'im Qassem and other senior figures expressed similar positions; The letter was prompted by IDF attacks to enforce the ceasefire, targeting Hezbollah's reconstruction efforts and Radwan Force capabilities, amid reports of the organization’s rearmament. Israel and the United States also warned that if the Lebanese army did not accelerate Hezbollah’s disarmament, the attacks could intensify in quality and quantity; To prevent escalation and resolve the disputes between Israel and Lebanon, the United States and Egypt proposed holding bilateral negotiations. Lebanese president Aoun stated that Lebanon had no choice but to engage in dialogue with Israel; Nabih Berri, speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, and a Hezbollah ally, opposed direct negotiations; Hezbollah’s open letter was another expression the organization’s defiance of efforts to disarm it, after previously expressing vague willingness to discuss possibly disarming "under certain conditions." However, Hezbollah has not issued the Lebanese government an ultimatum or explicitly warned Israel, reflecting the organization's continued restraint despite the IDF attacks. In ITIC assessment, Hezbollah’s continued military buildup, the Lebanese army’s weakness in preventing it and the intensification of Israel’s measures could wear down the restraint shown by all actors since the beginning of the ceasefire and increase the risk of a serious escalation toward the end of 2025, the deadline set by the Lebanese government for disarming armed militias in the country, including Hezbollah.
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