The flags of the five main Iranian-affiliated terrorist organizations of the Islamic Resistance in Bahrain (al-Abdal website, January 3, 2020)
Overview
- Iran has been a permanent threat to the stability of the Bahraini regime since the country declared independence. Iran’s fundamental antagonism is based on a combination of geopolitics, history and the Iranian regime’s regional interests: Bahrain is located in the heart of the Persian Gulf, where Iran seeks hegemony; the American army’s largest naval base in the Persian Gulf is in Manama, the capital of Bahrain (where the Fifth Fleet is anchored); and Bahrain’s internal politics are based on a Sunni minority ruling a Shi’ite majority which mostly has an Iranian orientation. Moreover, Iran has historically aspired to annex Bahrain, claiming Bahrain is its “14th province,” and claiming to have `historical references.
- Since the fall of the Shah in 1979 and the establishment of the Islamic revolutionary regime, Bahrain has been a prime target for Iranian terrorism, subversion and the export of the Islamic Revolution’s ideology. Some of Bahrain’s Shi’ite population supported the Islamic Revolution and were inspired to establish revolutionary organizations oriented towards Iran. In 1981 the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain (IFLB) unsuccessfully attempted a coup in Bahrain. More than 70 Shi’ite operatives were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment and many of them fled to Iran, from where they continued their subversive activities against the Bahraini regime.
- Since the failure of the coup there have been several waves of riots in Bahrain, accompanied by terrorist attacks which were directed by and received support from Iran in the form of money, weapons, training and propaganda. Over the past decades the intensity of the riots and terrorism has had ups and downs, influenced particularly by the effective preventive activities of the Bahrain security forces and support from Arab allies, especially Saudi Arabia (Bahrain’s main political backer).
- The waves of Shi’ite protests and terrorist activities in recent years were the following:
- The 1990s: Iran conducted extensive subversion activities through Hezbollah-Bahrain, the IFLB’s military wing. They peaked in the capital city of Manama in March 1996 with a wave of riots and attacks that destroyed property, including by burning hotels and stores, and killed dozens of civilians. The violence was accompanied by Iranian radio broadcasts calling for civil disobedience. The Bahraini security forces detained 44 Hezbollah-Bahrain operatives, who confessed they had been trained by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in Iran and by Hezbollah in Lebanon.
- The first decade of the 21st century: After having been exposed, the Iranians focused their subversion on supporting Shi’ite political organizations. Several organizations were established, the most prominent of which was the al-Wefaq National Islamic Society. Its leader was Ayatollah Isa Ahmed Qassim, Bahrain’s senior Shi’ite cleric. He lives in Iran, from where he orchestrates incitement and subversive activities. The political organizations participated in Bahrain’s parliamentary elections, but eventually some of them disintegrated or their representatives resigned.
- 2011, the year of the Middle Eastern regional upheaval (the “Arab Spring”): Among the wave of protests that engulfed the Arab world were the large Shi’ite protests in Bahrain (February 2011), where demonstrators called for the overthrow of the al-Khalifa monarchy. The Bahraini security forces, supported by Bahrain’s Arab allies, suppressed the protests. In March 2011 the Peninsula Shield Force (PSF), an Arab military force dominated by Saudi Arabia, was called to Bahrain’s aid. The Force entered Bahrain with 1,200 soldiers from Saudi Arabia, 800 from the UAE and nominal forces from Kuwait and Qatar. The entrance of the forces was a watershed moment influencing the relations between the Saudi Arabian-led Sunni world and the Iranian-led Shi’ites.
- Between 2001 and 2017:
- Iran regarded the entrance of the PSF into Bahrain as a threat to its regional interests that demanded a response. However, the Iranians abstained from a military response and preferred instead, as usual, to increase their subversive and terrorist activities against the Bahraini regime through proxy organizations. The most prominent was the al-Mukhtar Brigades; others were the Popular Resistance Brigades, the al-Ashtar Brigades, the Wa’ad Allah Brigades and the Thaer Allah Brigades.
- The organizations carried out hundreds of terrorist attacks in Bahrain, most of them in the Shi’ite regions in the northern and eastern parts of the country. Their operatives received support from Iran, Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Iranian-proxy Iraqi Shi’ite militias. They usually attacked road blocks, police stations, military convoys, police patrol cars, jails and infrastructure facilities. The attacks peaked in 2017 but tapered off and almost stopped in 2018. In ITIC assessment, the attacks were ended by the intensive counterterrorism activity of the Bahraini security forces, which detained hundreds of operatives, seized weapons and exposed the connections between the terrorist organizations and Iran. In April 2019, 169 terrorist operatives of the aforementioned organizations were sentenced to long prison terms.
- Between 2018 and 2020 Shi’ite protests declined, accompanied by a hiatus in terrorist organization activity. That was mainly because the Bahraini security forces successfully prevented the activities of the Iranian-backed terrorist organizations. However, the civil disobedience of the Shi’ites did not end. The Shi’ites remain basically hostile to the Bahraini regime and Iran enjoys the support of many of them. That was evidenced by Bahraini Shi’ite participation in World Jerusalem Day, an annual event initiated by Iran, where demonstrators chanted slogans in support of Iran.
- In September 2020 the Bahraini security forces exposed a terrorist network with the involvement of the al-Ashtar Brigades. The network was handled by Bahrainis who had fled to Iran and by the IRGC. The Bahraini operatives planned attacks on senior officials and on security and economic installations and facilities in Bahrain. The aim of the attacks was to avenge the American targeted killing of Qassem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC’s Qods Force. The announcement of the exposure was issued by the Bahraini ministry of the interior on September 20, 2020, a few days after the normalization of relations with Israel was declared. In ITIC assessment, the network had long been under surveillance and the timing of the exposure could have been linked to the normalization declaration, sending the message that security in Bahrain was under control.
- On September 15, 2020, normalization of Israel’s diplomatic and economic relations with the UAE and Bahrain was declared in Washington. Iran strongly condemned the normalization and the IRGC publicly threatened the rulers of Bahrain. Shi’ite protests were held in Bahrain between September 16 and 18, 2020. The Iranian-backed Shi’ite organizations said in a statement that they were eager to fight the “Zionist entity” and to resist aggression [i.e., the United States]. The Wa’ad Allah Brigades, one of the Iranian proxy organizations, announced the establishment of the [so-called] Martyrs of Jerusalem Brigades, which would resist “the Zionist presence in Bahrain.” Hundreds of Bahraini clerics (all or most of them probably Shi’ite) signed an open letter claiming that Islam forbade normalization of relations with Israel.
In ITIC assessment, the normalization agreement is liable to increase the motivation of Iran and its Shi’ite proxy organizations to turn the public threats into riots and attacks on the Bahraini regime to disrupt the implementation of the agreement. That may act as a catalyst for the renewal of Iranian-backed Shi’ite terrorist attacks in Bahrain after three years of relative quiet.
Contents
- Overview
- The Shi’ites in Bahrain – Basic Information
- Reasons for Iranian subversion of Iran
- The beginning of organized political and military Shi’ite groups in Bahrain
- Ayatollah Isa Ahmed Qassim
- Riots and an attempted coup in the 1980s and 1990s
- Establishment of Shi’ite political organizations (2001-2011)
- Shi’ite riots in response to the regional upheaval, 2011 (the “Arab Spring”)
- The entrance of the Peninsula Shield Force (2011)
- The establishment of Iranian Shi’ite proxy terrorist organizations
- Overview
- The most prominent Shi’ite terrorist organizations
- The al-Mukhtar Brigades
- The Popular Resistance Brigades
- The al-Ashtar Brigades
- The Wa’ad Allah Brigades
- The Thaer Allah Brigades
- Similarities between the methods of the Shi’ite terrorist organizations
- Examples of attacks, exposures and prevented attacks in Bahrain (2011-2017)
- Exposure of an Iranian-backed terrorist squad planning showcase attacks (November 2011)
- Iranian and Hezbollah involvement in a series of explosions in Manama (2012)
- Exposure of a terrorist squad planning to blow up the King Fahd Bridge connecting Bahrain to Saudi Arabia (2013)
- Intensive preventive activity in 2018
- Iranian and Hezbollah in Lebanon fingerprints on Shi’ite terrorist organizations in Bahrain
- Terrorist activity hiatus and a decline in the intensity of the Shi’ite population’s protests (2018-2020)
- Overview
- World Jerusalem Day events in Bahrain as a stage for Iranian messages
- Public announcement of the exposure of an Iranian-handled terrorist network in Bahrain (September 2020)
- Appendix: Initial reactions to the normalization of relations with Israel
- Overview
- Reactions from Bahraini Shi’ites
- Hezbollah in Lebanon
- Iran
