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Spotlight on Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (February 24-March 3, 2026)

Armed terrorist operatives in Rafah (IDF spokesperson, February 27, 2026)

Armed terrorist operatives in Rafah (IDF spokesperson, February 27, 2026)

Flotilla press conference (IHH X account, February 25, 2026)

Flotilla press conference (IHH X account, February 25, 2026)

Azzam al-Ahmad (Quds Agency, February 24, 2026)

Azzam al-Ahmad (Quds Agency, February 24, 2026)

  • IDF forces continued operations within the Yellow Line in the Gaza Strip to locate and destroy weapons and terrorist infrastructure. The forces eliminated terrorist operatives who attempted to approach the forces and attacked in response to violations of the ceasefire agreement.
  • Hamas reportedly smuggled essential materials by sea, enabling it to manufacture dozens of rockets.
  • Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) condemned the Israeli-American war against Iran and the elimination of Iranian leader Ali Khamenei, but said they would not intervene due to the consequences of the Gaza Strip War. According to reports, the Iranian-backed Palestinian terrorist organizations fear complete collapse because of the economic pressure on Tehran.
  • Israel closed the crossings to the Gaza Strip because of the state of emergency inside the country, but stressed that there was sufficient humanitarian aid in the Strip. Sharp price increases of basic commodities were reported in the markets of Gaza.
  • The Turkish IHH said a flotilla of more than 100 vessels carrying thousands of activists was expected to depart in April 2026 for the Gaza Strip to “break the siege,” along with the dispatch of land convoys.
  • A member of the American mediation team said the administration was preparing a proposal for the “gradual disarmament” of Hamas, adding that employees in the Hamas administration would be integrated into the new governing mechanisms under the Palestinian technocrat committee for the management of the Gaza Strip.
  • The secretary of the PLO Executive Committee said he opposed disarming Hamas or designating it as a terrorist organization, calling the October 7, 2023 terrorist attack and massacre a “strategic mistake” [sic].
The IDF
  • IDF forces continued operations within the Yellow Line and attacked in various areas of the Strip. The forces located weapons, destroyed terrorist infrastructure above and below ground and eliminated terrorist operatives who remained in the area, approached the line or attempted to cross it to attack the fighters. Armed terrorists seen exiting tunnels in eastern Rafah were eliminated and designated as violating the ceasefire agreement (IDF spokesperson, February 24-March 3, 2026).
Armed terrorist operatives in Rafah (IDF spokesperson, February 27, 2026)
Armed terrorist operatives in Rafah (IDF spokesperson, February 27, 2026)
  • The Hamas police claimed that three policemen were killed in an attack on a police post in western Khan Yunis, while one policeman was killed and another wounded in an attack on a police checkpoint at the entrance to the al-Bureij refugee camp (Palinfo, February 27, 2026; Hamas police Telegram channel, February 27, 2026; al-Ayyam, February 28, 2026). Palestinian sources said the IDF continued carrying out extensive earthworks and demolishing residential buildings in the Bani Suheila area, east of Khan Yunis, to expand the area of the Yellow Line (Shehab, February 24, 2026).
Hamas’ Military Buildup[2]
  • Reportedly, Hamas shifted to smuggling materials from Egypt by sea to renew the production of rockets. According to information received from a foreign intelligence organization operating in the Strip, Hamas uses containers with their weight adjusted to move them below the surface of the water, based on the assessment that it helps them evade radar. According to the report, the smugglers throw the equipment into the sea about nine kilometers off the coast of al-Sheikh Zuweid in the northern Sinai Peninsula, and the current brings the containers to the shores of Deir al-Balah and Khan Yunis within approximately 12 hours. According to the source, the operation is managed by several cells operating in the Sinai Peninsula, in the maritime space and in the Gaza Strip, while UAVs are launched at the Israel-Egypt border as a diversion to occupy IDF monitoring systems, allowing Hamas to smuggle materials into the Strip for its rocket array (Israeli TV Kan News X account, February 23, 2026; Kan website, February 24, 2026). It was subsequently stated by sources in the Strip that Hamas had manufactured dozens of rockets using the smuggled materials, production that takes place in several decentralized workshops in Deir al-Balah and Gaza City. It was further stated that Hamas also transferred some of the rockets to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) (Kan News X account, February 26, 2026). In response, Hamas claimed that the accusations were completely baseless, especially since Israeli naval forces control the entire sea of the Gaza Strip, and their sole purpose is to give IDF forces a green light to attack new targets in the Gaza Strip. They further noted that the “resistance”[3] had the “right” to preserve all its weapons to confront any “new aggression,” adding that the leadership of the military wing was currently focused on reorganizing the ranks while preparing to “confront attacks” (al-Sharq al-Awsat, February 24, 2026).
The Terrorist Organizations in the Gaza Strip and the War on Iran
  • The Palestinian terrorist organizations, led by Hamas and the PIJ, expressed their full support for Iran, claiming the objective of the war was to advance the vision of “Greater Israel.” They condemned the elimination of Iran’s leader Khamenei and praised him for his support of the “resistance.” However, the organizations claimed that they would not join the fighting alongside Iran because of the consequences of the Gaza Strip War.[4]
  • Before the outbreak of the war, field commanders and operatives in Iranian-funded Palestinian terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip, including the PIJ, the Popular Resistance Committees and the Mujahideen Brigades, did not hide their fear of complete collapse from a growing economic crisis caused by sanctions imposed on Iran. One source noted that the average payment for each member declined to sums of 200-400 shekels (about $65 to $130) every 60 or 70 days, compared to 800 to 2,000 shekels (about $260 to $646) every month or every 40 days for prominent members and operatives before the war. According to the source, payments to commanders also declined to no more than 1,000 shekels (about $323) every two months or more, compared to more than 3,000 shekels (about $970) almost every month before the war. A source in one of the small terrorist organizations said they had received nothing for more than three months, and relied on donations that arrived intermittently from other sources to distribute 200 shekels to each operative. According to sources in the PIJ, the depletion of resources affected the organization’s “charitable associations,” and allocations to other “humanitarian institutions” were reduced, forcing them to operate at a minimal level, despite their direct ties to the Iranian regime. According to sources in the organization, the PIJ is facing an unprecedented economic crisis both in the Gaza Strip and abroad, especially in Lebanon due to the blows inflicted on Hezbollah, and in Syria, where it has weakened significantly since the collapse of the Bashar al-Assad regime. According to sources in the field, some operatives were forced to seek ordinary jobs to support their families despite Israel’s pursuit of them, although they claimed that only a few had abandoned “security measures” under the economic pressure (al-Sharq al-Awsat, February 26, 2026).
The Impact of the War in Iran on the Situation in the Gaza Strip
  • The Israeli Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) stated that due to the war against Iran that began on February 28, 2026 and in light of the missile threat and the declaration of a state of emergency and public restrictions in Israel, all crossings to the Gaza Strip would be closed to prevent risk to human life. He noted that the crossings would be opened as soon as the security situation allowed, however he stressed that since the beginning of the ceasefire a quantity of humanitarian aid four times greater than the nutritional needs of the residents of the Strip had been brought in, therefore the existing stocks inside the Strip were expected to suffice for the foreseeable future (COGAT X account, March 2, 2026). The World Central Kitchen warned that if the crossings remained closed, it will be forced to stop meal distribution on March 5, 2026 because it had no surplus meals waiting in warehouses (World Central Kitchen website, March 1, 2026).
  • With the outbreak of the war in Iran, markets and shops in the Strip reported a large volume of customers and a high demand for basic commodities, especially flour, cooking oil, rice and sugar. At the same time, market traders raised prices by more than 300% while ignoring pleas from citizens, dignitaries and officials not to do so. Gazans said they rushed to purchase basic commodities because they feared Israel would close the crossings again (al-Ayyam, March 1, 2026). Hussam al-Houthi, acting chairman of the Gaza Chamber of Commerce, stocks of food and clothing in the Gaza Strip were sufficient for at least six months, and therefore there was no need for panic or price increases. He called for the firm, immediate punishment of rogue traders who exploited the situation (alresala.net, February 28, 2026).
  • The Rada force of Hamas’ “resistance security” announced it had deployed in the markets to monitor prices (Telegram channel of the Rada force, February 28, 2026). The Hamas ministry of the interior and national security announced that the supply investigations department of the police, in cooperation with teams from the ministry of economy, had begun extensive deployment and patrols in markets and businesses throughout the Strip to monitor product availability and prices and to prevent hoarding and price gouging (Telegram channel of the Hamas police, February 28, 2026).
  • Before the outbreak of the war in Iran, the chairman of the Gaza Bakeries Association, Abd al-Nasser al-Ajrami, announced the renewal of the contract with the World Food Programme (WFP) to fund the sale of subsidized bread in Gaza for an additional six months, starting March 1, 2026. He said the mechanism for selling subsidized bread would remain the same, it would be possible to return some bakeries to commercial activity by integrating additional bakeries which would operate in the private sector, receive fuel for operation, purchase flour themselves, and produce and sell bread at a price different from subsidized bread. He said a loaf of subsidized bread cost three shekels (a little less than $1), while higher quality, non-subsidized commercial bread would cost seven shekels (about $2.25). He also said there was no shortage of bread during Ramadan. Twelve bakeries operate in Gaza City and the northern district of the Strip, and 25 in the Khan Yunis district and the central Gaza Strip (Safa, February 26, 2026).
  • The Palestinian Red Crescent announced the launch of a logistical operation to transport essential medical supplies from its central warehouses in Judea and Samaria to the Gaza Strip via the Kerem Shalom crossing. Five trucks left Judea and Samaria carrying 111 pallets containing 3,284,684 units of medicines and medical solutions, and subsequently four more trucks departed carrying 83 pallets of medicines funded by the European Union and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, stored in World Health Organization warehouses (Facebook page of the Palestinian Red Crescent, February 23, 2026).
The Aid Organizations
  • The Supreme Court of Israel issued a temporary injunction allowing international aid organizations to continue operating in the Gaza Strip and in Judea and Samaria, following a petition by 17 organizations against a decision by the Government of Israel to revoke their operating licenses due to their refusal to comply with new rules set by the government. According to the report, Israel announced that until March 1, 2026, it would prevent the activity of 37 organizations on the grounds of failure to comply with requirements to register employee details, sources of funding and activities, while the organizations argued that the requirements were intrusive and arbitrary, and prohibiting their activity would harm the supply of aid. The injunction preserves the existing situation and does not require the organizations to leave, and it will remain in effect until a court ruling at a date yet to be determined (al-Quds al-Arabi, February 27, 2026).
International Activity to “Break the Siege”
  • The Turkish organizers of the so-called Freedom and Resilience Flotilla announced today they were planning to dispatch a flotilla of 100-200 vessels to the Gaza Strip from Spain and other countries on April 12, 2026. The organizers, led by the Turkish IHH, the anti-Israeli organization which was behind the Mavi Marmara flotilla in 2010 and outlawed in Israel and other countries,[5] stated that they expected the participation of “thousands of activists” from 150 countries, and in addition to humanitarian aid, they would attempt to bring medical personnel, educators, ecological construction experts, lawyers and war crimes investigators. The head of IHH, Bulent Yildirim, said that in addition to the maritime flotilla, they planned to dispatch land convoys to the Rafah crossing at the same time. He expressed confidence that the vessels would “disrupt the order established after World War 2,” adding, “We will mobilize the squares and the Mediterranean and we will break the siege from land and sea.” The press conference was rife with anti-Israel incitement. Salman Asmarer, president of the Association of Industrialists and Businessmen of the New World, said, “The free peoples of the world will defeat the Zionists. We will not stop until ‘Palestine’ and al-Aqsa Mosque are ‘liberated’ and a free ‘Palestine’ is established (IHH website, February 25, 2026).
Flotilla press conference (IHH X account, February 25, 2026)
Flotilla press conference (IHH X account, February 25, 2026)
The Ceasefire Agreement
  • Reportedly, a Palestinian contracting company from Gaza called Masoud & Ali Contracting Co (MACC) received, through intermediaries, a contract funded by the UAE to establish a temporary residential complex near Rafah for tens of thousands of displaced persons, in an area currently under Israeli military control. According to the report, MACC is to work with two Egyptian companies, and the plan includes the construction of multi-story caravans on an area of approximately 74 dunams (about 18 acres) (Reuters, February 25, 2026).
  • The Palestinian-American mediator Bashara Bahbah said Washington was preparing a proposal for disarming Hamas and it would be presented to the movement in the near future. He said it was a proposal for “gradual disarmament” which would begin with heavy weapons and a Hamas declaration of its commitment not to develop, manufacture or smuggle weapons. The plan will also address the issue of tunnels and afterward the personal weapons that Hamas seeks to keep in the possession of its [terrorist] operatives for “self-defense.” Bahbah said a proposal was also being discussed for amnesty for Hamas [terrorist] operatives who surrendered their weapons and declared they would not “fight.” The possibility exists of integrating some of them into the future Palestinian police forces, but only after screening and verifying they will be loyal to the local Palestinian forces and not to any other entity. Bahbah also noted that the first contingent of international stabilization forces was expected to arrive at the beginning of April 2026, with each force having responsibility for a specific geographic sector (al-Sharq al-Awsat, February 25, 2026).
  • The PIJ deputy secretary general, Muhammad al-Hindi, criticized the Board of Peace in Washington, calling it a “theatrical show” which did not prevent Israel from continuing the war in the Gaza Strip despite the declaration of a ceasefire in accordance with the American plan, adding that the American president wanted to control the future of the Strip, “Palestine” and the Middle East. He said the mediators’ role had ended with the completion of negotiations on the prisoner exchange deal. Regarding the international stabilization force, he accused the Americans of seeking to deploy it to occupy the Strip, and the Palestinians had no choice but to endure and cling to their land to overcome the crisis (Arabi21, February 24, 2026).
The National Committee for Managing Gaza
  • Bahbah said the technocrat committee for managing the Gaza Strip would enter along with the stabilization forces because it required security and protection. He added that the connection between Hamas and the committee was superficial and noted that there were points of disagreement which were subject to negotiation, the most important of which was the integration of Hamas policemen into the new security forces. He said there were about 40,000 employees in the Hamas administration and not everyone who worked with the movement believed in its ideology or was loyal to it. He said deciding whom to absorb lay with the committee, but it could be possible to reemploy people who had previously worked in the Gaza Strip (al-Sharq al-Awsat, February 25, 2026).
  • A source in the national committee for managing Gaza said the committee was not yet active on the ground because its members had not received permission from Israel to enter the Strip, despite assurances that chairman Ali Shaath received from Nikolay Mladenov, the high commissioner for the Strip on behalf of the Board of Peace. A Palestinian diplomatic source said the committee also did not respond to requests by many foreign ambassadors and diplomats in Cairo to meet with Shaath and the committee members due to restrictions imposed by Nikolay Mladenov, as part of the American plan to keep all communication regarding projects in the Strip and their implementation in the hands of senior American officials and Mladenov. Regarding the Palestinian liaison office, which was recently established to serve as a channel of communication between the Palestinian Authority and the Board of Peace, the diplomatic source said that it is headed by PA Prime Minister Muhammad Mustafa, and included two ministers, one of whom was the minister of interior. He said the liaison office began operating immediately upon its establishment (al-Quds al-Arabi, February 26, 2026).
Counterterrorism Activities
  • Israeli security forces continued extensive counterterrorism activity throughout Judea and Samaria, especially in light of the war in Iran (IDF spokesperson, March 1, 2026). The forces detained wanted persons and suspects in terrorist activity, including six suspected of planning to carry out an attack in the immediate future. A Palestinian who was photographed celebrating the sight of missiles launched from Iran at Israel was also detained (Israel Police Arabic Facebook page, March 1, 2026). A suspect in an attempted vehicular attack targeting policemen near the Tunnels Checkpoint turned himself in to security forces (IDF spokesperson, February 24, 2026).
Friction between Settlers and Palestinians
  • Masked Israeli civilians attacked Palestinians and Israeli civilians in the village of Qusra in the Nablus area, injuring two Israelis (IDF spokesperson, February 27, 2026). Additional incidents of violence were reported in the villages of Jalud, al-Dik near Salfit, Idhna near Tarqumia, and al-Maniya in the Bethlehem area (Palestinian media, February 27, 2026).
  • The ministry of health in Ramallah reported two Palestinian brothers killed and three additional residents wounded after Israeli settlers opened fire at residents and buildings in the village of Qaryut, south of Nablus (Wafa, March 2, 2026). The IDF condemned the incident and stated that the event was under investigation; the Israel Police also opened an investigation (Israeli media, March 2, 2026).
  • The secretary of the PLO Executive Committee, Azzam al-Ahmad, claimed the American administration’s demand that the PA carry out reforms as a condition for receiving a role in the Gaza Strip was intended to sideline the Palestinians in general, and to prevent Hamas from having a role in particular. The PLO rejected the demand on the grounds that Hamas was “part of the national fabric.” He added that there was an ongoing dialogue with Hamas for it to join the PLO, and discourse on disarming it or designating it as a terrorist organization was unacceptable. He firmly rejected interference in the school curricula, particularly demands to remove “Palestine,” the map and the flag, and claimed they were “artificial reforms” whose objective was to buy time. He also said that under the current American administration it would be difficult to advance a two-state solution, just as the president had failed in the past to impose the Deal of the Century. Regarding the Hamas terrorist attack and massacre on October 7, 2023, al-Ahmad claimed it was a “strategic mistake” [sic] which caused “enormous damage” to the Gaza Strip and to the Palestinians, and rejected the claim that the attack had returned the Palestinian issue to negotiations. He also noted that a clause included in the municipal elections law, which required candidates to commit to the PLO program and to recognize Israel, was removed after it was defined as a “mistake,” since local councils dealt with services and not with political activity (al-Shorouk, February 23, 2026).[6]
Azzam al-Ahmad (Quds Agency, February 24, 2026)
Azzam al-Ahmad (Quds Agency, February 24, 2026)
  • The deputy chairman of the PA, Hussein al-Sheikh, held talks with the foreign ministers of Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the UAE, Bahrain and Kuwait, during which he said the Palestinian leadership rejected the Iranian attacks on Arab countries, and expressed full solidarity and support for every step taken to safeguard their security and sovereignty. The PA issued a statement condemning the Iranian attacks on Arab states, calling them a violation of the UN Charter and the principles of international law. At the same time, PA chairman Mahmoud Abbas demanded an emergency meeting of Arab foreign ministers be convened and a discussion in the Security Council in light of what he called dangerous challenges threatening the Middle East and the sovereignty of regional states (Wafa, February 28, 2026).

[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications.
[2] See the February 2026 ITIC report, Hamas Deploys to Recover and Retain Its Military Strength and Influence over the Gaza Stri
[3] The Palestinian terrorist organizations operating in the Gaza Strip.
[4] See the March 2026 ITIC report, "The Resistance Axis Reacts to the Israel-United States War against Iran and the Elimination of Ali Khamenei."
[5] See the October 2025 ITIC report, The Turkish IHH, which led the Mavi Marmara flotilla, operates in the Gaza Strip and is involved in its reconstruction
[6] Nevertheless, the requirement appears in the municipal elections law as published on the website of the Palestinian Central Elections Commission. https://www.elections.ps/Portals/0/Local%20Elections%20Law%202025%20as%20amended%202026%20EN%20.pdf

Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah and Lebanon (February 23 – March 2, 2026)

The meeting in preparation for the international conference (Lebanese army X account, February 26, 2026)

The meeting in preparation for the international conference (Lebanese army X account, February 26, 2026)

Rajji:

Rajji: "The government wants to reform, fight corruption, liberate the land, extend sovereignty and limit weapons..." Mario Bassil [a well-known Lebanese comedy actor]: "And what, you don't also want to cure lepers and raise the dead?!" (al-Joumhouria, February 25, 2026)

Overview[1]
  • On the night of March 1, 2026, Hezbollah fired rockets at northern Israel, announcing that it was a response to the elimination of Iran’s leader Khamenei and to the Israeli strikes in Lebanon. The IDF responded by attacking Hezbollah targets and the elimination of senior figures in the organization in south Lebanon and the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in Beirut.
  • In response to the rocket fire, the Lebanese government banned Hezbollah’s military and security activities and limited it to politics. Prime Minister Salam instructed the army to accelerate the disarmament of Hezbollah north of the Litani River “by all means.” Reportedly, Speaker of Parliament Berri is preparing to remove political cover from Hezbollah because of the rocket fire.
  • Before Hezbollah entered the war, it condemned the Israeli and American strikes in Iran and the elimination of Khamenei but did not explicitly say it would attack Israel. The Lebanese leadership tried to persuade Hezbollah not to intervene in the Israel-America war on Iran out of concern of a broad Israeli response against Lebanon.
  • Before the war broke out on February 28, 2026, the IDF continued attacks in south Lebanon, targeting Hezbollah’s military assets as part of the effort to enforce the November 2024 ceasefire agreement and prevent the organization’s renewed military buildup and possible preparations to attack Israel. The IDF attacked Radwan Force camps, launch positions and tunnels.
  • Due to the regional developments, the conference in support of the Lebanese army scheduled to convene in Paris on March 5, 2026 will be postponed to April 2026.
  • Reportedly, the former head of Hezbollah’s coordination and liaison unit, Wafiq Safa, was appointed assistant to the head of the political council.

Hezbollah Joins the War and the Lebanese Government Bans Its Military Activity

Hezbollah
  • On the night of March 1, 2026, Hezbollah fired rockets at northern Israel (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, March 2, 2026). Hezbollah stated it had attacked the “missile defense base Mishmar HaCarmel south of the ‘occupied city of Haifa’ ” with a barrage of precision missiles and a swarm of UAVs. Hezbollah claimed it was a response to the spilling of the “pure blood” of Khamenei “by the criminal Zionist enemy,” in defense of Lebanon [sic] and the people and in response to the ongoing Israeli “aggression.” It was further stated that the leadership of the “resistance”[2] had long said the continuing “aggression” and the killing of leaders, youths and residents “grants us the right to defend ourselves and respond at the appropriate time and place.” Hezbollah also claimed it was a “legitimate defensive [sic] response” and placed responsibility on the Lebanese leadership and the parties involved to put an end to the “Israeli-American aggression” against Lebanon (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, March 2, 2026).
The IDF
  • In response to the rocket fire from Lebanon, the IDF eliminated senior figures in the organization, attacked Hezbollah targets in south Lebanon and in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in Beirut, including headquarters, weapons depots, facilities of the economic wing al-Qard al-Hasan and other infrastructure. Hussein Makled, head of Hezbollah’s intelligence headquarters, was eliminated (IDF spokesperson, March 2, 2026). Israeli Minister of Defense Israel Katz said Hezbollah secretary general Na’im Qassem had been pressured by Iran to join the war, adding he was now a target for elimination (Israeli media, March 2, 2026). The Lebanese ministry of health reported that at least 31 Lebanese had been killed and 149 wounded in the Israeli strikes (al-Akhbar, March 2, 2026). According to unverified information, the head of Hezbollah’s parliamentary faction, Muhammad Raad, was eliminated, who was reportedly supposed to be appointed deputy secretary general of Hezbollah (al-Hadath, March 2, 2026).
  • The IDF issued evacuation notices for dozens of villages in south Lebanon and in the western Beqa’a Valley and warned residents that attacks on Hezbollah targets were expected to continue, including on facilities located near civilian areas (IDF Arabic spokesperson X account, March 2, 2026). In the wake of the attacks and the evacuation notices, long convoys of Lebanese vehicles were photographed leaving the villages in south Lebanon and the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in Beirut in an attempt to move to areas considered safer (Beirut Time X account, March 2, 2026).
Traffic jams in south Lebanon (Right: X account of the Phalange Party, March 2, 2026. Left: Facebook page of the Upper Chouf region, March 2, 2026)     Traffic jams in south Lebanon (Right: X account of the Phalange Party, March 2, 2026. Left: Facebook page of the Upper Chouf region, March 2, 2026)
Traffic jams in south Lebanon (Right: X account of the Phalange Party, March 2, 2026. Left: Facebook page of the Upper Chouf region, March 2, 2026)
The Lebanese Government
  • The Lebanese leadership condemned the rocket fire but did not explicitly refer to Hezbollah:
    • The president of Lebanon, Joseph Aoun, said the rocket fire from Lebanese territory was detrimental to the state’s efforts to distance Lebanon from regional military confrontations and from the predicted repercussions. He called for logical, responsible conduct which made the national interest the top priority. Aoun also condemned the Israeli strikes in Lebanon and added that those who ignored the calls to preserve security and stability were the ones who would bear responsibility, adding that the state would not allow it to happen again (Nidaa al-Watan, March 2, 2026).
    • The prime minister of Lebanon, Nawaf Salam, condemned the rocket fire, calling it “irresponsible and suspicious,” endangering the stability of the state and providing Israel with a pretext to continue its attacks. He said he would not allow Lebanon to be dragged into further confrontations, and declared that the government would take measures against those responsible and preserve the security of the citizens (Nawaf Salam’s X account, March 2, 2026).
    • The Lebanese army announced it had deployed units in the area from which the rockets were reportedly fired to clarify circumstances and investigate the details of the event (Lebanon 24, March 2, 2026).
  • However, after an ad hoc government session chaired by President Aoun, Prime Minister Salam said they had decided to ban all Hezbollah military and security activities and to permit only the organization’s political activity to ensure that the state had the exclusive authority to decide on war and peace. He also demanded that Hezbollah hand over its weapons to the state and instructed the Lebanese army command to immediately implement the plan to limit weapons, especially north of the Litani River, using “all means.” Salam added that the government condemned the rocket fire, which violated the desire to keep Lebanon from being dragged into the regional war, negated government decisions and disrespected the will of the majority of the Lebanese. He also called on the states that guarantee the ceasefire agreement to obtain an Israeli commitment to stop the attacks and implement the agreement, and noted the government’s readiness to renew negotiations with civilian representation and international sponsorship (al-Nashra, March 2, 2026).
  • The Lebanese minister of information, Paul Morcos, stated that during the meeting President Aoun said that whoever fired rockets bore the responsibility for his actions and did not take into account the interests of his people and the security of his environment. He said Aoun had accepted Salam’s request to convene the meeting so that all ministers would share responsibility for making the decision. Morcos added that Salam said firing rockets and launching UAVs violated the state’s position regarding the decision on war and peace and it was no longer possible to ignore the identity of the responsible party, adding that the threat of civil war no longer made an impression on anyone and the majority of the Lebanese supported the government’s position. According to Morcos, Salam said they did not want a confrontation with Hezbollah, but were not prepared to accept rocket fire from Lebanon or the threat of civil war (VDL News, March 2026).
  • Sources close to Nabih Berri, speaker of the Lebanese Parliament and leader of the Amal Movement, and considered an ally of Hezbollah, said he was shocked by Hezbollah’s behavior. They said Berri had decided to support the position of the Lebanese state and was moving toward removing the political cover he granted Hezbollah. However, no official statement on the matter was issued by Berri or the Amal Movement (al-Hadath, March 2, 2026).
Hezbollah’s Opponents
  • During the government meeting, ministers from the Christian Lebanese Forces Party called to vote that all state institutions considered Hezbollah an illegal organization because of the risk it posed to the state and to take all legal and administrative measures against those responsible for decisions that broke the law and against entities connected to them (Nidaa al-Watan, March 2, 2026).
  • Former Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri said Hezbollah’s firing rockets from Lebanese territory was irresponsible, exposed the Lebanese to risks and dragged the country into war. He said he supported the Lebanese state and its legitimate institutions, noting that the time had come for Hezbollah understand that Lebanon was a homeland for all its citizens, not a battlefield for settling the accounts of foreigners and their agendas (Saad Hariri’s X account, March 2, 2026).
The Positions of Hezbollah and the Lebanese Government before Hezbollah Joined the War
  • Before Hezbollah joined the war, it said it fully supported Iran because of the American and Israeli attacks which began on February 28, 2026 and condemned the elimination of Iran’s leader Khamenei. However, the organization’s senior figures did not explicitly threaten Israel, although during the First Iran-Israel War in June 2025, Hezbollah had warned of “disastrous consequences” in the event of an attack on Khamenei:[3]
    • Hezbollah called the American-Israeli strikes against Iran a “dangerous escalation and a violation of international law and the UN Charter.” The organization said the strikes would strengthen Iran and its determination, declared full solidarity with it and called on the regional states to stand against the “aggression” while warning that the United States and Israel would fail to achieve their objectives (al-Akhbar, February 28, 2026).
    • Hezbollah’s secretary general, Na’im Qassem, issued a statement about the “great and blessed martyrdom of our leader and our guardian,” Iran’s leader Ali al-Khamenei, and called the attack “a mark of shame on the forehead of humanity.” He said Hezbollah and the “Islamic resistance”[4] in Lebanon would continue the same path with “unshakable determination,” would fulfill their duty to confront the “aggression” and would not abandon the “field of honor and resistance” (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, March 1, 2026).
    • The deputy head of Hezbollah’s political council, Mahmoud Qamati, claimed the organization could not remain neutral, but how it would react would depend on developments and on the leadership of Hezbollah’s military wing, which would determine what best served Lebanon and the region (Al Jazeera Mubasher, March 1, 2026).
  • The Lebanese leadership did not hide its concern over Hezbollah’s intervention in the war, which would lead to an Israeli response not limited only to the organization’s targets, and tried to persuade Hezbollah to exercise restraint, warning against dragging the country into new “adventures” after the damage caused during Hezbollah’s “support” for the Gaza Strip. The president of Lebanon, Joseph Aoun, noted the need to prevent any repercussions which would harm Lebanon and its citizens. He called for a high level of preparedness and the coordination of all constitutional authorities and relevant bodies, noting that the situation was sensitive and required full commitment to national responsibility and placing the interests of Lebanon and the Lebanese above any other consideration.
  • Political and security sources pointed to movements of Hamas operatives in Lebanon during recent weeks, carried out in coordination with or with the backing of Hezbollah, raising concern over a possible escalation that would drag the country into a “support war” for Iran in the event of an American-Iranian confrontation. The Palestinian terrorist organizations in Lebanon, including Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), would attack Israel from Lebanese territory while Hezbollah would initially try to distance itself from the event and represent any response on its part as exclusively defensive. Such a scenario would allow Hezbollah to avoid direct responsibility toward the Lebanese public, but in practice could lead to Lebanon’s integration into a broad regional war without the state itself having control over its course or its consequences (Nidaa al-Watan, February 23, 2026).
Events in Lebanon before the Escalation of February 28, 2026
IDF Activity against Hezbollah
  • The IDF continued attacking Hezbollah terrorist targets as part of the effort to enforce the November 2024 ceasefire agreement and prevent Hezbollah’s renewed military buildup. The forces attacked eight military camps used for storing weapons and for training the Radwan Force in the Baalbek area in the Beqa’a Valley, and launch positions and tunnels used by Hezbollah in south Lebanon (IDF spokesperson, February 23-March 2, 2026).
  • According to claims, Hezbollah’s security and military center of gravity is in the Beqa’a Valley, which it considers safer than the south, while adapting its combat doctrine to increasing reliance on UAVs and precision rocket fire. According to the report, the organization rejected demands by the state and mediators to hand over UAVs, long-range and precision missiles, most of which are located in the Beqa’a Valley (Nidaa al-Watan, February 23, 2026).
  • Reportedly, the elimination of Hezbollah commanders in strikes in the Beqa’a Valley on February 20, 2026 led to raising the alert level and a significant tightening of security procedures within the organization, including reducing the movements of operatives and recruiting additional forces out of concern over further strikes. A source close to the organization noted that despite the intelligence risk, there were senior figures who continued actions which could be dangerous, including the use of mobile phones and relatively visible movement, which required changing places of residence and increased caution, especially during the month of Ramadan (Nidaa al-Watan, February 27, 2026).
The Ceasefire Monitoring Committee
  • On February 24, 2026, the ceasefire monitoring committee held a meeting in Naqoura for the first time since December 19, 2025. No civilians attended, only officers from the Lebanese army, the IDF, the United States, France and the UNIFIL commander. Sources stated the meeting was formal only, without a substantive change in the situation (al-Akhbar, February 24, 2026). A diplomatic source noted that the objective of limiting the committee’s authority to the issue of the ceasefire was to prevent a slide into direct negotiations with Israel and to reduce the significance of the Lebanese initiative to add civilians to the committee. According to him, the Israeli refusal, with American backing, to limit the talks only to the issue of the ceasefire led to the exclusion of civilians from the committee. Meanwhile, a proposal is being advanced for direct contacts at the ministerial level and above outside the framework of the committee, in order to accelerate agreement (al-Liwaa, February 23, 2026).
The Lebanese Security Forces
  • The Lebanese army reported that IDF forces opened fire at a new observation post in the Sarda-Marjayoun area, north of Ghajar on the border with Israel. According to the report, the army command instructed its forces to remain at the post and reinforce it, and to respond to the sources of gunfire, while the army operated in coordination with the ceasefire monitoring committee and UNIFIL (Lebanese army X account, February 24, 2026).
  • According to military sources, the Lebanese army erected 25 positions in south Lebanon, some of them near points held by the IDF, for surveillance and to prevent Israel from incursions into Lebanese territory. They added that the positions were being erected in coordination with the committee supervising the ceasefire in Lebanon, and with the close accompaniment of UNIFIL (al-Jadeed, February 25, 2026). It was later reported that the Lebanese army had erected seven new positions in Yaroun, Maroun al-Ras, Aitaroun and Meis al-Jabal to reinforce its presence and deployment along the border with Israel and as part of a plan to deal with IDF incursions into border communities. According to the report, the army plans to establish five additional positions soon (Malchak, February 27, 2026).
  • The war with Iran led France to announce that the Paris conference in support of the Lebanese army and security forces had been postponed from March 5, 2026 to April 2026, reflecting the need to protect Lebanon’s stability and strengthen its institutions and sovereignty (al-Akhbar, March 2, 2026). Before the postponement was announced preparations for the conference continued, alongside assessments that expanding assistance to the Lebanese security forces would be linked to tangible progress in implementing the exclusivity of arms and presenting a timetable for the second phase north of the Litani River:
    • Diplomatic sources said some states were reserved about granting significant additional assistance to the army and security forces, mainly because of the delay in completing the issue of the state’s exclusivity of weapons and dissatisfaction with the progress of the second phase north of the Litani River. However, the sources said Arab support, especially from Qatar, and Western support, mainly from the United States, was expected to continue in its current format both before and after the conference (al-Liwaa, February 23, 2026).
    • The commander of the Lebanese army, General Rodolph Haykal, and the commander of the internal security forces, Major General Raed Abdullah, participated in the meeting in Cairo to prepare for the Paris conference. According to reports, Lebanon presented the army’s needs and the stages of implementing state sovereignty over all its territory, alongside the operational challenges it faced. The participants praised the army’s performance and said they were committed to strengthening its logistical and operational capabilities, noting that Lebanon’s stability was central to regional stability. On the sidelines of the meeting, Haykal held talks with the Egyptian minister of defense and ranking Egyptian army officials, focusing on regional developments and increasing military cooperation (Lebanese army X account, February 26, 2026).
The meeting in preparation for the international conference (Lebanese army X account, February 26, 2026)
The meeting in preparation for the international conference
(Lebanese army X account, February 26, 2026)
    • Sources familiar with the details claimed that the absence of the American ambassador to Lebanon, Michel Issa, from the meeting in Cairo was not only caused by technical issues, but reflected American dissatisfaction with the failure to set a timetable for the second phase of arms exclusivity north of the Litani River. According to the report, Washington considered sending a political-military delegation, but cancelling participation was an indirect message of protest in the wake of an assessment that the army was avoiding commitment to a timetable and sought to link its progress to securing early support at the Paris conference (al-Akhbar, February 26, 2026).
UNIFIL
  • UNIFIL announced it would continue to support the deployment of the Lebanese army in the south of the country, noting that the deployment of forces at 165 positions since the ceasefire was a significant step toward strengthening state sovereignty and improving local security, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1701. To strengthen Lebanese security institutions, UNIFIL transferred two buses to the internal security forces and 32 vehicles, as well as information technology equipment to the general directorate of general security (Nidaa al-Watan, February 25, 2026; Lebanon Debate, February 26, 2026).
Disarming Hezbollah
  • In remarks marking one year since receiving the Lebanese Parliament’s vote of confidence in his government, Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam noted the government’s commitment to the state’s exclusivity of arms. He said the Lebanese army had completed the first phase south of the Litani River, adding that the second phase was expected to be carried out within approximately four months, subject to continued international assistance (Nidaa al-Watan, February 25, 2026; Akhbar al-Youm, February 26, 2026).
  • Lebanese Foreign Minister Youssef Rajji gave a speech at the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva in which he related to the extension of state sovereignty over the country’s entire territory, collecting illegal weapons and their restriction to legitimate forces, alongside institutional reforms and economic recovery. He called on the international community to exert pressure on Israel to implement Resolution 1701 and the 2024 ceasefire agreement, and to support the Lebanese army, including through the planned conference in Paris, to strengthen its ability to limit the weapons of non-governmental groups (al-Markazia, February 24, 2026). In response, the president of the al-Khiyam Center for Rehabilitation of Victims of Torture, Muhammad Safa, called for Rajji’s dismissal, claiming he ignored the issue of Lebanese prisoners in Israel and did not place it at the top of the international agenda. He also attacked Rajji’s call for Hezbollah to hand over its weapons and claimed that by doing so he created an improper equivalence between “the executioner and the victim,” instead of demanding the release of detainees or allowing Red Cross visits (al-Akhbar, February 24, 2026).
Rajji: "The government wants to reform, fight corruption, liberate the land, extend sovereignty and limit weapons..." Mario Bassil [a well-known Lebanese comedy actor]: "And what, you don't also want to cure lepers and raise the dead?!" (al-Joumhouria, February 25, 2026)
Rajji: “The government wants to reform, fight corruption, liberate the land, extend sovereignty and limit weapons…” Mario Bassil [a well-known Lebanese comedy actor]: “And what, you don’t also want to cure lepers and raise the dead?!” (al-Joumhouria, February 25, 2026)
  • Foreign Minister Rajji also met with the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Dmitry Liubinsky on the sidelines in Geneva. He demanded the cessation of Israeli strikes and the withdrawal of its forces from the points under its control, and again publicly emphasized the government’s commitment to the principle of exclusivity of arms in the hands of legitimate military institutions, in accordance with the government decision of August 5, 2025, the 1989 Taif Agreement and international resolutions. Rajji explicitly called on Hezbollah to hand over its weapons, claiming that the state was prepared to assume full sovereign responsibility over its entire territory (Lebanon 24, February 23, 2026).
  • The Christian Phalange Party called for swift, decisive action by the legitimate security forces to dismantle Hezbollah’s military and security apparatus throughout the country, adding that the lack of state authority deployment damaged the integrity of elections and political freedom of action. It noted that any substantive change in the governing system was conditional upon the state’s exclusivity over weapons and over the decision on war and peace (al-Madan, February 24, 2026).
Reorganization in Hezbollah’s Leadership
  • According to reports, Hezbollah’s leadership appointed Wafiq Safa as assistant to the head of the organization’s political council[5] after he finished serving as head of Hezbollah’s coordination and liaison unit.[6] It was noted that the appointment of Safa, who has been considered a veteran, influential figure in Hezbollah’s security-political coordination apparatus for nearly four decades, indicated a strengthening of the organization’s organizational-political dimension and its intention to increase control and coordination in the arena of internal and external Lebanese relations (al-Jadeed, February 23, 2026).
Reconstructing Lebanon
  • Meeting with a delegation from the council of the village of Rmeish, near the border with Israel, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun said that “the steadfastness of the residents of the south on their land gave the strongest meaning to connection with the land as a value and identity.” Aoun said it was the state’s duty to provide all components of resilience, and reconstruction of the area was waiting for economic support (Lebanese Presidency X account, February 26, 2026).
  • The minister of the environment, Tamara al-Zein, said environmental damage caused to Lebanon by the war with Israel exceeded $440 million, and that more than 8,700 hectares of green areas (about 21,500 acres) had been damaged. She said a comprehensive professional report had been prepared in cooperation with the National Council for Scientific Research (CNRS) to document and assess the damage (al-Diyar, February 24, 2026).
The Palestinians in Lebanon
  • Palestinian sources expressed concern at the inclusion of Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon in the Israeli “target bank,” following the strike on the headquarters of the Joint Palestinian Force in the Ain al-Hilweh camp on February 20, 2026. Dr. Ayman Shannaa, in charge of national relations for Hamas in Lebanon, claimed that the expansion of the circle of strikes reflected messages for the “resistance” organizations and an attempt to exert pressure on their support base, but was not expected to change the positions of the Lebanese and Palestinians who supported the “resistance” (al-Nashra, February 23, 2026). The IDF stated that the structure which was attacked was a Hamas headquarters for planning attacks on IDF forces and the State of Israel.
  • Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam met with the chairman of the parliamentary foreign affairs committee, Fadi Allamah and committee members, and with the chairman of the Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee. The funding crisis of UNRWA and other UN agencies was raised at the meeting, and its implications for Lebanon, which hosts approximately 200,000 to 230,000 Palestinian refugees. Committee members warned of an expected 20% to 40% cut in agency budgets, and claimed that Lebanon was among the most vulnerable countries in light of the double humanitarian burden of Palestinian and Syrian refugees, as well as UNIFIL obligations (Lebanese Prime Minister X account, February 25, 2026).

[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications.
[2] Hezbollah and the other terrorist organizations operating in Lebanon.
[3] See the March 2026 ITIC report, "The Resistance Axis Reacts to the Israel-United States War against Iran and the Elimination of Ali Khameni"
[4] Hezbollah and the other terrorist organizations operating in Lebanon.
[5] The political council, headed by Ibrahim Amin al-Sayyid, serves as an advisory body to the secretary general and to the Shura Council and concentrates the management of the organization’s political relations apparatus in the internal Lebanese arena, including with Islamic, nationalist and Christian parties, vis-à-vis the Palestinian organizations and within Arab and international interfaces.
[6] See the February 2026 ITIC report, The Reorganization of Hezbollah Leadership and the Resignation of Wafiq Safa.

The Resistance Axis Reacts to the Israel-US War against Iran and the Elimination of Ali Khamenei

Khamenei and other Iranian official eliminated (IDF spokesperson, March 1, 2026)

Khamenei and other Iranian official eliminated (IDF spokesperson, March 1, 2026)

Hezbollah supporters at a rally in support of Iran in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in Beirut (al-Manar, March 1, 2026)

Hezbollah supporters at a rally in support of Iran in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in Beirut (al-Manar, March 1, 2026)

Cartoon by Alaa al-Laqta, Hamas’ house cartoonist: the war against Iran as an expression of

Cartoon by Alaa al-Laqta, Hamas’ house cartoonist: the war against Iran as an expression of "Greater Israel "(Alaa al-Laqta’s Instagram account, February 28, 2026)

A mass demonstration in Sana'a in support of Iran (al-Masirah, March 1, 2026)

A mass demonstration in Sana'a in support of Iran (al-Masirah, March 1, 2026)

Saraya Awliya al-Dam operatives in a video before the launch of rockets (Militia's Telegram channel, March 1, 2026)

Saraya Awliya al-Dam operatives in a video before the launch of rockets (Militia's Telegram channel, March 1, 2026)

Overview[1]
  • On February 28, 2026, Israel and the United States launched a combined preemptive strike against Iran, attacking dozens of military, security and government targets across the country. Iran’s leader, Ali Khamenei, commanders of the army and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Khamenei’s senior advisors and dozens of other officials were killed in the strikes.
  • Iran confirmed the deaths of Khamenei and the others and announced the establishment of a temporary leadership council. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps launched Operation True Promise 4, launching missiles and UAVs at Israel and American bases and vessels across the Middle East.
  • The resistance axis organizations in Lebanon, the Palestinian arena, Yemen, Iraq and Syria condemned the attack and claimed its objective was to support the vision of a “Greater Israel.” They issued mourning notices for Khamenei’s death, stating his decades-long support for the “resistance” and said they would continue their activity against the “Zionist enemy.”
  • On the night of March 1, 2026, Hezbollah fired rockets at northern Israel and claimed it was in response to the elimination of Khamenei, after the organization had previously threatened it would retaliate if Iran’s leader were attacked. Hezbollah intervened despite the fact that the Lebanese leadership had exerted pressure on it in an attempt to prevent the country from being dragged into external conflicts.
  • Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) said they would not open a support front for Iran because of the damage done in the Gaza Strip War and the Houthis have not yet announced a renewal of attacks against Israel and against vessels in the Red Sea. Pro-Iranian militias in Iraq claimed responsibility for launching UAVs at American bases in the Kurdish region in the north of the country and Baghdad following strikes on militia bases which killed at least six operatives.
  • In ITIC assessment, Hezbollah’s response was the result of Iranian pressure, despite the calls in Lebanon that it not respond. However, its commitment to Iran outweighed its loyalty to Lebanon and led to an extensive, forceful Israeli response. So far the Houthis have not responded but may join the fighting, although their considerations differ from those of Hezbollah.
The Israel-United States War against Iran
  • On the morning February 28, 2026, Israeli time, Israel and the United States launched a combined preemptive strike against Iran, attacking dozens of military, security and government targets in Tehran and across the Islamic Republic (Israeli and American media, February 28-March 1, 2026). The president of the United States said that since the negotiations were deadlocked, the objectives of Operation Epic Fury were to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, disrupt its ballistic missile program and prevent Iran from posing a threat to the United States. An additional objective was to create the conditions which would enable the Iranian people to overthrow the regime (White House website, February 28, 2026).
  • Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said the objective of Operation Roaring Lion was to remove the existential threat posed by Iran, and called on the Iranian public to take to the streets and overthrow the regime (prime minister’s office website, February 28, 2026). The IDF spokesperson confirmed that the strikes had eliminated dozens of officials, led by the leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei; the minister of defense, Aziz Nasir-Zadeh; the leader’s advisor for security affairs and secretary of the Defense Council, Ali Shamkhani; the chief of staff of the Iranian army, Abdolrahim Mousavi; the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, Mohammad Pakpour; the head of the office of the leader of Iran, Mohammad Shirazi (IDF spokesperson, February 28-March 1, 2026).
Khamenei and other Iranian official eliminated (IDF spokesperson, March 1, 2026)
Khamenei and other Iranian official eliminated (IDF spokesperson, March 1, 2026)
  • Iran confirmed the deaths of Khamenei, Shamkhani, Pakpour and others. The head of the Supreme National Security Council, Ali Larijani, announced the establishment of a temporary leadership of the president, the head of the judiciary and one of the members of the constitutional council until the election of a new leader, and the president, Masoud Pezeshkian, announced that the leadership council had begun its work. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps declared the launch of Operation True Promise 4 and claimed responsibility for launching missiles and UAVs at Israel and American bases and vessels in the Gulf States, including Qatar, Bahrain and the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Oman (which mediated the indirect talks between the United States and Iran), as well as for closing the Strait of Hormuz (Iranian media, February 28-March 1, 2026).
Responses from the Organizations Belonging to the “Resistance Axis”
Hezbollah
  • On the night of March 1, 2026, Hezbollah fired rockets at northern Israel (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, March 2, 2026). Hezbollah reported it had attacked the “missile defense base Mishmar HaCarmel south of the ‘occupied’ city of Haifa with a barrage of precision missiles and a swarm of UAVs.” Hezbollah claimed it was a response to the spilling of the “pure blood” of Khamenei “by the criminal Zionist enemy,” in defense of Lebanon and the people and in response to the ongoing Israeli “aggression.” Hezbollah further stated that the leadership of the “resistance”[2] had long said that continuing the “aggression” and killing leaders and Lebanese civilians “grants us the right to defend ourselves and respond at the appropriate time and place.” Hezbollah called the attacks a “legitimate defensive response” and placed responsibility on the Lebanese leadership and the parties involved to put an end to the “Israeli-American aggression” against Lebanon (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, March 2, 2026). In response, the IDF attacked Hezbollah targets in south Lebanon and in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in Beirut, eliminating senior figures in the organization, and attacking headquarters, weapons depots and other military facilities (IDF spokesperson, March 2, 2026).
  • Before Hezbollah joined the war it had expressed full support for Iran in view of the American and Israeli strikes and condemned the elimination of Iran’s leader, Ali Khamenei, while stating it would continue the path of the “resistance.” During the First Iran-Israel War in June 2025 Hezbollah had warned of “disastrous consequences” in the event of an attack on Khamenei,[3] although the initial statements did not include explicit threats of a response against Israel:
    • Hezbollah condemned the American-Israeli attack on Iran, calling it “dangerous escalation and a violation of international law and the UN Charter.” The organization accused Israel of “treacherous aggression” which came after months of American-“Zionist” threats to subdue Iran, deny it the right to develop “civilian nuclear capabilities and defensive missile capabilities,” claiming it reflected an “arrogant, hegemonic policy to undermine the stability of the region and impose a regional order by force.” It was further alleged that the confrontation did not concern the nuclear program, but was rather result of Western refusal to accept the existence of a strong, sovereign independent regional state. Hezbollah claimed the attacks would strengthen Iran and its determination, declared full solidarity and called on the regional states to stand against “the aggression,” warning that the United States and Israel would fail to achieve their objectives (al-Akhbar, February 28, 2026).
    • Hezbollah secretary general Na’im Qassem issued a statement regarding “the great and blessed martyrdom of our leader and guardian, Imam al-Sayyid Ali al-Khamenei.” He called the strike the “pinnacle of crime,” a “mark of shame on the forehead of humanity.” He said that alongside mourning and sorrow, he felt pride and honor that Khamenei had died during Ramadan, having achieved a great victory and honor. He claimed Khamenei had left behind “tens of millions” of “the faithful” who would continue in his path and work for the “liberation of ‘Palestine’ and Jerusalem.” Qassem said Hezbollah and the Islamic “resistance” in Lebanon and all those who supported Khomeini’s ideology would continue with “unshakable determination” and would not accept humiliation. He added that they would fulfill their duty to confront “the aggression” and would not abandon the field of “honor and resistance,” but did not threaten a response (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, March 1, 2026).
    • A Hezbollah figure said the organization was on the alert and closely monitoring the military-political developments following the strikes on Iran. He said any future position would come from a comprehensive, evolving assessment of the events (al-Diyar, February 28, 2026).
Hezbollah supporters at a rally in support of Iran in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in Beirut (al-Manar, March 1, 2026)
Hezbollah supporters at a rally in support of Iran in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in Beirut
(al-Manar, March 1, 2026)
    • Hezbollah reportedly raised its level of preparedness to the maximum and was closely monitoring developments, concerned that Israel would simultaneously open a front against Lebanon. It was also claimed that Western information which reached Lebanon indicated that an Israeli strike was a reasonable possibility, and Israel had been given an American green light to act during the war on Iran or after it. Also mentioned were series of Israeli strikes on towns and villages in south Lebanon directed against Hezbollah tunnels and other infrastructure used to attack Israel (al-Madan, February 28, 2026).
  • Given the possibility of Hezbollah’s intervention in the war and concern that an Israeli response would not be limited to the organization’s targets, the Lebanese leadership tried to persuade Hezbollah to exercise restraint and warned against dragging the country into new “adventures” after the severe damage caused by Hezbollah’s “support” for the Gaza Strip:
    • The president of Lebanon, Joseph Aoun, noted the need to prevent repercussions which would harm Lebanon and its citizens. He called for maintaining a high level of preparedness and coordination by all constitutional authorities and relevant bodies, adding that the situation was sensitive and required a full commitment to national responsibility, placing the interests of Lebanon and the Lebanese above any other consideration. He said keeping Lebanon away from the repercussions of external conflicts and preserving its sovereignty, security and stability were the supreme objectives, and called for strengthening internal solidarity and uniting efforts to deal with emerging challenges. He said the state, with all its institutions, would continue to serve as the central, exclusive authority for ensuring security and stability and for protecting all citizens and Lebanese territory (al-Akhbar, February 28, 2026).
    • The prime minister of Lebanon, Nawaf Salam, called on all Lebanese to act wisely and patriotically, to place the interest of the state above any other consideration, and not to allow Lebanon to be dragged into “adventures” that threatened its security and unity (Nawaf Salam’s X account, February 28, 2026).
    • Sources close to the speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, Nabih Berri, said he had warned Hezbollah’s leadership not to drag Lebanon into another military confrontation, noting that the state, particularly the Shi’ite community, was no longer capable of bearing the consequences of a new war. According to the sources, Berri hinted that a continuation of Hezbollah’s policy of escalation could lead him to reconsider his political relations with it and to withdraw his support (Radio Voice of Lebanon, February 23, 2026).
    • An official source said President Aoun had consulted with Berri, Salam and other officials, emphasizing the need to neutralize Lebanon from the confrontation after the strikes on Iran. According to the source, the president had been informed that Hezbollah would not become involved. A speech by Na’im Qassem, which had been scheduled for February 28, 2026, was postponed, perceived as indicating there was no immediate intent to escalate. However, it was noted that the situation remained unclear, since the Hezbollah leadership has not yet guaranteed it would not open a front in the south, and the messages of calm contradicted the complexity of the internal and external arenas (al-Sharq al-Awsat, February 28, 2026).
    • According to reports, contacts were held by the Lebanese and Hezbollah leaderships to prevent the organization from becoming involved in the war. Meanwhile, Beirut received international warnings according to which a deterioration into a military confrontation would lead to widespread destruction in Lebanon. It was further noted that with the outbreak of the war in Iran, the Hezbollah leadership had disappeared from the public arena pending clarification of the results of the first strike on Iranian figures. According to official sources, efforts were made to persuade the organization not to get involved, and Hezbollah said it would not intervene in the first days because Iran did not currently require assistance, assuming the war would be short, like the First Iran-Israel War. However, a scenario of prolonged escalation or an attempt to overthrow the regime in Iran could change Hezbollah’s considerations (al-Madan website, February 28, 2026).
    • Subsequently, diplomatic sources reported that the three heads of the Lebanese government had received messages from the international community, according to which any attack from Lebanese territory, regardless of the perpetrator, would be considered the responsibility of the Lebanese state. Hezbollah reportedly received direct messages through various channels stating that the room for military maneuver had been reduced to zero, and that any involvement in the regional confrontation would be met with a severe response exceeding pinpoint strikes. It was further noted that the strikes in south Lebanon and the Beqa’a Valley were not regarded as isolated events, but as part of a broader equation that distinguished between the organization’s continued political integration in the state system and direct harm to its military and security infrastructure. According to the report, the distinction between the political and military wings still existed in international discourse, but it was defined as fragile and entirely dependent on refraining from escalation (Asas Media, March 1, 2026).
    • The Lebanese army and security forces began taking steps to prevent the country from becoming a secondary arena of confrontation within the war. Government sources reported that security measures had been increased around several embassies, especially the American embassy, which also took measures to protect diplomats and staff. Security was reinforced at the Hamat air base following Iranian threats to strike regional American targets. However, it was noted that the measures were precautionary and not necessarily an indication of an immediate threat. On the military level, the Lebanese army and UNIFIL forces reportedly reinforced their patrols and deployments along the border and in areas north and south of the Litani River (Lebanon 24, March 1, 2026).
The Palestinian Terrorist Organizations
  • The Palestinian terrorist organizations, led by Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), expressed full support for Iran, claiming the objective of the American-Israeli attack was to advance the vision of a “Greater Israel.” They condemned the elimination of Khamenei and praised him for his support of the “resistance.” However, the organizations said they would not join the fighting alongside Iran in view of the effects of the war in the Gaza Strip:
    • Hamas expressed solidarity with Iran in the face of “the aggression.” It called on the Arab-Muslim nation to unite and show solidarity in order to foil the move and its objectives, which it claimed were meant to reshape the region in accordance with Israel’s aspiration to establish a “Greater Israel” at the expense of Arab-Muslim lands and the interests of the peoples of the region (Hamas Telegram channel, February 28, 2026; Telegram channel of Hamas spokesperson Hazem Qassem, February 28, 2026).
    • The Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas’ military wing, gave its full support to Iran and its people, reportedly the result of its support for “Palestine” and the “resistance.” The military wing said it supported the Iranian “response” and had confidence that Iran’s armed forces and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps could inflict heavy losses on the attackers, claiming Israel had failed to “break Gaza’s will” for two years and therefore would also fail against Iran. They called on the peoples of the region to stand with Iran against American and “Zionist” policy. According to the Izz al-Din Brigades, “It is a jihad of victory or martyrdom” (Hamas Telegram channel in Judea and Samaria, March 1, 2026).
Cartoon by Alaa al-Laqta, Hamas’ house cartoonist: the war against Iran as an expression of "Greater Israel "(Alaa al-Laqta’s Instagram account, February 28, 2026)
Cartoon by Alaa al-Laqta, Hamas’ house cartoonist: the war against Iran as an expression of “Greater Israel “(Alaa al-Laqta’s Instagram account, February 28, 2026)
    • The PIJ condemned the American-Israeli strike on Iran, calling it a “dangerous escalation” whose objective was to reshape the Middle East in favor of Israel, damage the Palestinian cause and impose Israeli hegemony. The PIJ noted Iran’s right to self-defense, and called on the peoples of the region and Palestinians to rally and unite. The PIJ later issued a mourning notice for the deaths of Iran’s leader, Ali Khamenei, and other figures in “a strike which constitutes a war crime.” The PIJ called him “a leader who defended the honor of the nation and supported ‘Palestine’ and al-Aqsa” (PIJ Telegram channel, March 1, 2026).
    • The Jerusalem Brigades, the PIJ’s military wing, issued a mourning notice for the death of “the shaheed of ‘Palestine,’ ” Khamenei, who was “an exceptional leader on the path to Jerusalem, “and of the other “martyred leaders.” According to the PIJ, Khamenei’s life was full of faith, awareness and revolutionary zeal, and he died a shaheed in the nation’s “most difficult battle.” It was further noted that Khamenei had expressed an unwavering position toward “Palestine,” had supported the “resistance,” provided weapons and had been “present” in every battle and round of fighting. The Jerusalem Brigades added that killing leaders was futile and claimed Iran was “stronger and more resilient,” while the “resistance movements”[4] continued the struggle to “humiliate the attackers” (Jerusalem Brigades Telegram channel, March 1, 2026).
PIJ military wing death notice for Khamenei (Jerusalem Brigades Telegram channel, March 1, 2026)
PIJ military wing death notice for Khamenei
(Jerusalem Brigades Telegram channel, March 1, 2026)
    • Senior Hamas and PIJ figures said that in light of the broad American and Israeli attack on Iran, no additional step beyond support and solidarity was required from the Gaza Strip at this stage, since Iran could defend itself and inflict severe blows on Israel if the “confrontation” continued. Sources in the terrorist organizations claimed that the Iranian leadership appreciated their position and did not seek to burden them after two years of a difficult war in the Gaza Strip. They further noted that the “resistance” in the Gaza Strip had nothing to offer beyond political and moral support, since it “had been destroyed and was exhausted.” The sources added that there would be no organized attacks on Israel from the Gaza Strip due to its shortage of capabilities and medium- and long-range rockets after the loss of assets during the war, and also lest such a move provide Israel with a pretext for targeted strikes on commanders and operatives. It was also reported that Hamas’ security forces and the “restraint forces” of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades were deployed more extensively in various areas, with the almost complete disappearance of prominent operatives and the tightening of security measures out of fear of Israeli targeted killings (al-Sharq al-Awsat, February 28, 2026).
    • The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) strongly condemned the “American-Zionist” attack on Iran and declared full support for Iran, its leadership, people and army. The PFLP claimed it was a move led by Washington and Israel as part of a “colonial policy” to control regional resources, especially oil, and reshape the political map in favor of American-“Zionist” interests, while attempting to break the ‘”resistance axis.”[5] The organization claimed the strike violated the UN Charter and international law, and Iran had the right to “respond by all means.” The PFLP called on “liberation forces” and activists worldwide to show solidarity, intensify protests, build an international front against the war and work to bring war criminals from Washington and Tel Aviv to justice (Telegram channel of the PFLP central information department, February 28, 2026).
    • In another statement, the PFLP mourned the death of the “great leader,” Ali Khamenei, calling his death a loss for the global “resistance” forces “seeking to break American hegemony and destroy the Zionist project.” The organization described him as a “revolutionary fighter” who had “dedicated his life to the front lines [sic] of the confrontation against expansion and domination.” However, said the PFLP, the will of the peoples to resist and defend sovereignty and honor was only increasing, and Iran was moving forward and overcoming the tragedy. The organization added that the effective way to confront imperialist and “Zionist arrogance” was by strengthening coordination among the “liberation” forces (PFLP Telegram channel, March 1, 2026).
A PFLP notice mourning Khamenei's death (PFLP Telegram channel, March 1, 2026)
A PFLP notice mourning Khamenei’s death (PFLP Telegram channel, March 1, 2026)
    • The Palestinian Mujahideen Movement and its military wing, the Mujahideen Brigades, expressed its condolences for the “martyrdom” of Khamenei. It praised his contribution to jihad and the “resistance” and his continued support for the Palestinians and their “struggle,” calling “resistance” the “effective way to restore rights.” It added that targeted killings would not break the spirit of the peoples or provide Israel and its supporters with security, but would increase determination to continue the “struggle” until “liberation and honor” (Palestine Mujahideen Brigades Telegram channel, March 1, 2026).
The Houthis
  • The Houthi leadership issued statements of support for Iran and its attacks on Israel and American bases, and condemned the elimination of Khamenei. However, the Houthis did not renew attacks on vessels in the Red Sea or renew launching missiles and UAVs at Israel:
    • The Houthi leader, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, called the American-Israeli aggression against Iran “unjustified,” claiming its objective was to enable the “Zionist enemy” to control the region under the guise of changing the Middle East as part of its “Greater Israel” plan. He said the entire Islamic world should stand alongside Iran to stop the “aggression,” adding that the Houthis fully supported Iran, which was waging the struggle of the entire Islamic nation, and they were fully prepared for any development. He claimed the Iranian strikes on American Middle East bases were a “legitimate right” and not an attack on the states in which they were located, since it was from those bases that it was itself attacked. He called on the masses to take to the streets to show support for the Iranian people (al-Masirah, February 28, 2026).
A mass demonstration in Sana'a in support of Iran (al-Masirah, March 1, 2026)
A mass demonstration in Sana’a in support of Iran (al-Masirah, March 1, 2026)
    • The Houthi supreme political council condemned the “American-Israeli aggression” against Iran and claimed its objective was to break the “deterrence equation.” The council expressed full, unwavering solidarity with Iran, its leadership, government and people. According to the statement, the “aggression” was another step in the “American-Israeli project” to subjugate the Middle East and enable Israeli hegemony. The council added that escalation would not make Israel secure and its expansion would only lead to a broader confrontation and escalate the “resistance” (Houthi combat information X account, February 28, 2026). The council sent its condolences to the Iranian people and government on the death of Khamenei, claiming his death would only strengthen the determination of the Iranian people and jihad would continue without a pause. It said the “crime” of the United States and Israel would increase the steadfastness and determination of the [Islamic] faithful to confront “tyrants and oppressors” (Saba, March 1, 2026).
    • The Houthi political bureau affirmed the solidarity of the Yemeni people with the Iranian people, leadership, army and government. According to the bureau, the “aggression” against Iran was caused by its support for the Palestinians, and was not directed only against Iran but against the entire region to shape “the new Middle East.” The bureau claimed that Iran would remain a model of strength, determination, steadfastness and generosity as it has been for more than forty years (Houthi combat information X account, February 28, 2026). On another occasion, the bureau called Khamenei “a symbol of unwavering devotion in his struggle against the axis of evil, arrogance and tyranny led by the United States” (Houthi combat information Telegram channel, March 1, 2026).
    • Mohammad Ali al-Houthi, a member of the Houthi supreme political council, called on the Arab-Muslim peoples to support Iran, which was waging the battle of the entire nation against “Israeli-American tyranny.” He welcomed the “legitimate” Iranian strikes on Israel and the American bases, and claimed the Houthis were prepared for any scenario (Mohammad Ali al-Houthi’s X account, February 28, 2026).
The Pro-Iranian Militias in Iraq
  • Reportedly, the pro-Iranian Shi’ite militias in Iraq were also targeted, but no formal statement was published by Israel or the United States regarding strikes. On February 28, two deaths were reported in a strike on the Jurf al-Nasr base, south of Baghdad, which belongs to the Popular Mobilization Forces, the umbrella organization of the militias. The Hezbollah Brigades in Iraq confirmed two militia operatives were killed. On March 1, the Popular Mobilization Forces confirmed that four of its operatives had been killed in another strike in Diyala province, northeast of Baghdad, and that at least eight others were wounded. It was later reported that a headquarters of the Hezbollah Brigades in the al-Qa’im area in western Iraq was struck and that the Jurf al-Nasr base was struck again, and the Hezbollah Brigades published the names of five operatives who were killed (al-Arabiya, March 1-2, 2026; Sabereen News, March 2, 2026).
  • However, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq stated that on February 28, 2026, its forces had used dozens of UAVs to attack 16 American bases in Iraq and other Middle Eastern countries (Baghdad Today, March 1, 2026). The Saraya Awliya al-Dam, which is considered a front group with ties to Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, claimed responsibility for launching UAVs at American bases in Erbil, the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan and for launching a missile at the Victoria Base at Baghdad International Airport (Saraya Awliya al-Dam Telegram channel, March 1-2, 2026).(Saraya Awliya al-Dam Telegram channel, March 1-2, 2026).
Saraya Awliya al-Dam operatives in a video before the launch of rockets (Militia's Telegram channel, March 1, 2026)
Saraya Awliya al-Dam operatives in a video before the launch of rockets
(Militia’s Telegram channel, March 1, 2026)
  • The militias in Iraq also condemned the American-Israeli strikes in Iran and the strikes on Popular Mobilization Forces bases, and issued mourning notices for the deaths of Khamenei and senior officials of the Iranian regime:
    • The Hezbollah Brigades declared that the war ignited by “the criminal American president who represents the forces of falsehood, the allies of the Zionist entity,” was against the “forces of truth, the nation of Muhammad.” The Brigades called it the “moment of reckoning,” with no room for neutrality, adding that the enemy had to be dragged into a war of attrition which would cause it suffering wherever it was, and there could be no American presence left in the region, especially in Iraq. The militia claimed it would attack American bases in retaliation for the deaths of the two operatives in the Jurf al-Nasr attack, and called on the “resistance fighters”[6] in “Palestine,” Lebanon and Syria to take revenge on the “criminals,” settle accounts with them and penetrate into the heart of the “Zionist entity” (Hezbollah Brigades Telegram channel, February 28, 2026).
    • The al-Nujaba Movement called for a “sacred campaign” of fighting and steadfastness. The militia called it a “sacred duty” because of fatwas calling for jihad if the center of Islam in Iran were exposed to danger from the “axis of evil and satanism” (al-Nujaba Movement Telegram channel, February 28, 2026). The militia’s secretary general, Akram al-Kaabi, said the American president would be held accountable and punished for his tyranny and obstinacy, calling him a “toy” in the hands of Netanyahu. Al-Kaabi said the militia would not remain neutral, but would “shake the ground beneath its enemies, will not abandon its alliance and will not compromise on its honor” (al-Nujaba Movement Telegram channel, February 28, 2026).
    • The Sarhat al-Quds Brigades, a front group militia of the al-Nujaba Movement, said what was yet to come would be greater and more severe, claiming there were precise weapons that had not yet entered service. It issued a video of the launch of three UAVs which it claimed were directed at American and Israeli targets (Sarhat al-Quds Brigades Telegram channel, February 28, 2026).
    • The Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq militia condemned the “American-Israeli aggression” which “threatens regional and global peace and security,” and said it would support Iran and was prepared to contribute to prevent the continuation of the aggression and to spare the peoples of the region the horrors of wars and destruction. It called the strike on the Jurf al-Nasr camp “aggression which must be confronted and prevented from recurring,” and called on the Iraqi government to fulfill its national and moral duty to defend Iraq’s sovereignty and preserve its security and stability (Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq Telegram channel, February 28, 2026). The militia’s secretary general, Qais al-Khazali, said “the shaheed Khamenei fought against the tyrants and despots of the era, and the enemies of Allah” (Qais al-Khazali’s X account, March 1, 2026).
    • Saraya Awliya al-Dam, which is considered a front group militia and maintains ties with Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, announced that it had raised its level of alert from the first moment of the “Zionist-American aggression” to support Iran. The militia claimed its operatives had their fingers on the trigger and were ready to fire at all American military installations in Iraq and beyond because they were “legitimate targets” [sic]. The militia claimed the “jihad fighters” would determine how the campaign ended, and they would “fight under Khamenei’s banner to the last drop of blood” (Saraya Awliya al-Dam Telegram channel, February 28, 2026).
    • The chairman of the Popular Mobilization Forces, Faleh al-Fayyadh, mourned Khamenei’s death, the result of “Zionist-American aggression.” He said the strike was directed not only at a leader but at a senior religious and political position in an attempt to break the people’s will and silence the voice of the “resistance” (Popular Mobilization Forces Telegram channel, March 1, 2026).
    • The Sayyid al-Shuhadaa Brigades expressed its condolences for Khamenei’s death and claimed that the “sin” committed by the “Zionist-American occupation” [sic] would be punished and have “no secure foothold in the region.” It called on “fighters” to prepare for a long campaign to defend Islam and avenge the killers of the leader of the Muslims (Sayyid al-Shuhadaa Brigades Telegram channel, March 1, 2026).
The Militias in Syria
  • The Islamic Resistance Front in Syria – Men of Valor condemned the “Zionist aggression” against Iran, calling it a serious escalation which threatened regional security and stability and exposed the “expansionist project” of the “occupation entity.” It claimed that an attack on Iran was an attack on every Arab-Muslim state and declared its full support for Iran and its “legitimate right to defend its sovereignty and security in accordance with international laws and conventions.” It called on the Arab-Muslim nation to stand as one against the “Zionist strikes” and to foil the plots seeking to “dismantle the region” (Islamic Resistance Front in Syria Telegram channel, February 28, 2026). The organization issued a mourning notice for Khamenei, who “left a mark on the path of resistance and defense of principles.” According to the notice, “messages of martyred leaders do not die but live in the conscience of the nation and the path of truth and ‘resistance’ for which they gave their lives continues generation after generation.” The organization said confrontation with the enemy was not a choice but a religious duty, and called for preparation for the anticipated confrontation (Islamic Resistance Front in Syria Telegram channel, March 1, 2026).
  • An unknown organization called Hay’at Ansar al-Tawhid claimed its fighters in the rural area of Daraa in southern Syria had used eight Grad rockets to attack “occupation entity” positions as part of the “revenge of the free peoples of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip” attack. The statement claimed the attack was response to the “crimes of the occupier” and had breached the security belt established to prevent attacks along the borders, and threatened more severe retribution. However, there was no direct reference to the Israeli-American attack on Iran (Misdar Mas’oul X account, March 1, 2026). The IDF spokesperson did not confirm strikes on army positions.

[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications.
[2] Hamas and the other terrorist organizations operating in Lebanon.
[3] See the June 2025 ITIC report, “Resistance Axis” Reactions to the Israel-Iran Military Conflict".
[4] Terrorist organizations.
[5] Iran, Hezbollah, the Palestinian terrorist organizations, the Houthis in Yemen and the Shi'ite militias in Iraq.
[6] Terrorist operatives.

Spotlight on Iran

February 18-25, 2026 Editor: Dr. Raz Zimmt
Ramazan Sharif (ISNA, February 23, 2026)

Ramazan Sharif (ISNA, February 23, 2026)

Abdul Wahid Abu Ras (IRNA, February 23, 2026)

Abdul Wahid Abu Ras (IRNA, February 23, 2026)

A screenshot from the video (Saraya Awliya al-Dam Telegram channel, February 19, 2026)

A screenshot from the video (Saraya Awliya al-Dam Telegram channel, February 19, 2026)

Highlights[1]
  • The chairman of Iran’s “Intifada and International Quds Day Headquarters” claimed that the view of the founder of the Islamic Revolution, who characterized Israel as a “cancerous tumor,” has now spread throughout the world and that the Palestinian issue has become the main issue on the international agenda.
  • Iran’s ambassador to Lebanon, Mojtaba Amani, concluded his term in Beirut and returned to Iran. Mohammad-Reza Raouf Sheibani was appointed to serve a second term as ambassador to Lebanon.
  • IRGC officers are reportedly leading Hezbollah’s preparations for the possibility of an Israeli attack and a US strike against Iran.
  • It was claimed that the senior Shiite cleric in Iraq, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, conveyed a message to the Iranian ambassador in Baghdad stating that in the event of a US strike resulting in harm to Iran’s Supreme Leader, he would issue a fatwa calling for jihad against US forces in Iraq.
  • The Houthi leadership condemned remarks by the US ambassador to Israel regarding “Greater Israel” and called on Muslim states to act jointly against the “existential threat.”
  • The Houthis have reportedly raised their level of alert in preparation for a possible US strike on Iran and are preparing to employ advanced weapons. A pro-Iranian Shiite militia in Iraq unveiled an underground facility containing drones.
Iran and the Palestinian Arena
  • Ramazan Sharif, chairman of Iran’s “Intifada and International Quds Day Headquarters,” stated that he believes the Iranian public will participate in International Quds Day marches, scheduled for the last Friday of Ramadan, with greater enthusiasm than in the past because they see themselves as part of the Palestinian people and the “resistance front” working to liberate Jerusalem. He added that the view of the founder of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who described the “Zionist regime” as a “cancer,” has now spread worldwide. According to him, global public opinion has come to recognize the “Zionist regime” as a “cancerous tumor.” Sharif claimed that anyone examining Israel’s capabilities acknowledges that it has failed to achieve any of its declared objectives and that Hamas still exists, and its leaders remain determined to liberate Jerusalem. He emphasized that, ahead of International Quds Day, increased activity can be observed around the Palestinian issue. According to Sharif, many efforts were made to sideline the Palestinian issue, but it has now become the central issue worldwide, representing Israel’s greatest failure. Referring to Israel’s alleged efforts to implement its “expansion plan from the Nile to the Euphrates,” Sharif claimed that although Israel continues to repeat this slogan, its main objective is to preserve the 27,000 square kilometers it has “occupied” (ISNA, February 23, 2026).
Ramazan Sharif (ISNA, February 23, 2026)
Ramazan Sharif (ISNA, February 23, 2026)
Iran and the Lebanese Arena
  • Iran’s ambassador to Lebanon, Mojtaba Amani, concluded his term in Beirut on February 19, 2026, and returned to Iran. He stated that the “inseparable spiritual bond with the great Lebanese people” would continue even after his departure. Referring to his injury in the pager attack in Lebanon on September 17, 2024, in which he lost an eye, Amani wrote that although he carries in his body the “scar of aggression committed by our enemy,” the scenes of Lebanon’s recovery strengthened his belief in the resilience of the proud Lebanese people. He noted that during his tenure, based on the spirit of the “golden triangle: army, people, and resistance,” he worked to strengthen relations with official, religious, political, and military actors, as well as diplomats and media figures, and with senior Lebanese officials, first and foremost among them former Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah. He also claimed to have promoted trade between Iran and Lebanon, implemented bilateral agreements, especially in the fields of health and culture, and advanced projects, particularly in the energy sector (Amani’s X account, February 19, 2026).
  • Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian appointed Mohammad-Reza Raouf Sheibani as Iran’s new ambassador to Lebanon. Sheibani previously served as ambassador to Lebanon (2005–2009) and has also served as ambassador to Syria, Tunisia, and Libya (Tehran Times, February 24, 2026).
The Iranian president and the incoming Iranian ambassador in Beirut (Tehran Times, February 24, 2026)
The Iranian president and the incoming Iranian ambassador in Beirut
(Tehran Times, February 24, 2026)
  • The Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Esmaeil Baghaei, strongly condemned IDF strikes in the Beqaa Valley and the Ein al-Hilweh Palestinian refugee camp near Sidon, in which eight Hezbollah operatives and two Hamas operatives were reportedly killed and dozens wounded. He emphasized the direct responsibility of the United States and France, as guarantors of the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah, for the “crimes committed by the Zionist regime,” and called for immediate action by the UN Security Council to halt the “military aggression of the Zionist regime” (ISNA, February 21, 2026).
  • “Sources close to Hezbollah” reported that IRGC officers are effectively leading the organization’s preparations for a possible Israeli attack in parallel with a potential US strike against Iran. According to the report, some officers previously served in Lebanon, while others recently arrived due to rising US-Iran tensions. They are reportedly not only involved in restoring Hezbollah’s capabilities but are directly supervising preparations, holding meetings with operatives and conveying operational directives, including to rocket units in the Beqaa Valley (Al-Arabiya, February 21, 2026).
Iran and the Iraqi Arena
  • “Iraqi sources” reported that Iran’s ambassador to Iraq, Mohammad Kazem Al-e Sadeq, recently met with a representative of senior Iraqi Shiite cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. According to the report, whose reliability is unclear, a message was conveyed stating that if the United States attacks Iran and the attack results in harm to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, al-Sistani would issue a fatwa calling for jihad against US forces stationed in Iraq (sarie.news, February 20, 2026).
The Houthis in Yemen
  • Houthi movement leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi warned in a speech marking Ramadan against Israeli harm to Islamic holy sites, particularly the al-Aqsa Mosque, following restrictions imposed on worshippers. He claimed that the objective is to destroy the mosque and replace it with a Jewish temple. He also condemned the “daily killing in Gaza, the destruction of buildings, starvation and siege, as well as serious violations in the West Bank and strikes in Lebanon.” Al-Houthi attacked statements by US Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee expressing support for the “Greater Israel” plan, claiming they reflect official US policy. He warned that such statements demonstrate that agreements such as the Oslo Accords – which are currently being violated – cannot be relied upon, and that the Muslim nation has no choice but to confront the “Israeli enemy” and strive for its elimination (Al-Masirah, February 22, 2026).
  • The Houthi political bureau strongly condemned what it described as “the bloody massacre carried out by the Zionist enemy against innocent civilians” in the Beqaa Valley in Lebanon, which “led to the deaths of dozens of people and the injury of many others, in blatant violation of all humanitarian values and international conventions.” According to the political bureau, the incident does not merely constitute a violation of Lebanese sovereignty but also establishes “new equations” regarding what it termed the “Greater Israel project and the new Middle East.” The political bureau further expressed solidarity with the Lebanese people in confronting the “Zionist aggression and the accompanying American and Western threats.” It also criticized remarks made by Ambassador Huckabee, accusing him of exposing American support for the “Zionist dreams of Jewish expansion at the expense of Palestine and the Arab states.” Accordingly, the political bureau called for coordinated action by the Arab and Islamic peoples against this initiative, which it described as “an existential threat to the entire Muslim nation” (Saba, February 22, 2026).
  • Houthi Deputy Foreign Minister Abdul Wahid Abu Ras also claimed that Huckabee’s remarks prove the US-Israel partnership in the “New Middle East and Greater Israel” plan. It was also claimed that the goal of the project is to “control the Arab space” and that the rulers and regimes in the region must move beyond statements and condemnations, which are the weapons of the weak, and instead take effective action to defeat “these criminal projects aimed at our region” (Saba, February 22, 2026).
Abdul Wahid Abu Ras (IRNA, February 23, 2026)
Abdul Wahid Abu Ras (IRNA, February 23, 2026)
Pro-Iranian Militias in Iraq
  • Qais al-Khazali, secretary-general of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, met with Abu Alaa al-Wala’i, secretary-general of Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada. The two emphasized the role of the “resistance” in safeguarding security and sovereignty, supporting the security forces, and rejecting foreign intervention. They stressed that defending the homeland and the holy sites is a top priority. They also discussed developments in the regional and international situation, particularly those related to the security and stability of the region, and Iraq in particular, emphasizing the importance of unity and preparedness to confront any potential “external aggression” (Qais al-Khazali’s X account, February 23, 2026).
Militias prepare for a confrontation between the United States and Iran[2]
  • It was reported that amid tensions between the United States and Iran, the Houthis announced an increase in the level of alert at public institutions as part of preparations for a possible attack. The announcement followed a special meeting of the movement’s emergency committee, chaired by incumbent Prime Minister Mohammed Muftah, during which ways to improve the preparedness of various institutions in the event of an attack or other emergency were discussed. In addition, it was reported that the Houthis have increased their readiness through military maneuvers in various governorates in Yemen, simulating American or Israeli attacks. It was further stated that in the event of an attack, the Houthis are expected to use, for the first time, advanced ballistic missiles and drones that have not yet been unveiled. According to reports, they also do not rule out resuming activity under the principle of the “unity of the arenas” (Al-Akhbar and Asharq al-Awsat, February 23, 2026).
  • A “senior source within the Iraqi Coordination Framework,” which includes elements representing the pro-Iranian militias, stated that there are disagreements among its member factions regarding the nature of the response should the United States attack Iran. According to him, four out of the seven factions in the organization announced that they would provide military assistance to Iran if it were attacked. The source further stated that there is an understanding among the factions that if a confrontation occurs, it is expected to be regional in scope and not confined to the borders of a single country (Al-Araby al-Jadeed, February 22, 2026).
  • The Saraya Awliya al-Dam militia, which is considered a front organization with ties to Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, released a video allegedly documenting an underground site in which militia operatives are seen standing alongside various types of drones (Saraya Awliya al-Dam Telegram channel, February 19, 2026). On January 16, 2026, the militia announced its readiness to operate alongside Iran if it were attacked.
A screenshot from the video (Saraya Awliya al-Dam Telegram channel, February 19, 2026)
A screenshot from the video (Saraya Awliya al-Dam Telegram channel, February 19, 2026)
  • The Sarkhat al-Quds Brigades militia, which is a front organization of the Nujaba movement, threatened that an American attack on Iran would be met with an immediate attack on American sites in Iraq and the region. According to the militia, it is in possession of long-range weapons that it has not yet revealed, which will be the main means of such an attack. In addition, it was claimed that an American attack on Iran would ignite an all-out war in the region, including Iraq, and that in such a confrontation, the militia would seek to remove the American occupation from Iraq “to the last meter” (Sarkhat al-Quds Brigades Telegram channel, February 22, 2026).
  • Abu Ali al-Askari, spokesman for Kata’ib Hezbollah, warned that the American readiness for an attack on Iran is increasing and may even develop into a ground operation from the Kurdistan Region in Iraq. Accordingly, al-Askari warned the Kurds in northern Iraq to “act rationally and not to be dragged into a military adventure” against Iran (Kata’ib Hezbollah Telegram channel, February 23, 2026).

[1] The weekly study includes the activities of Iran, the Shiite militias in Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen.
[2] For further information, see the ITIC's study from February 5, 2026, “Threats by Axis of Resistance Organizations amid Tensions between the United States and Iran

Spotlight on Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (February 17-24, 2026)

The new logo of the National Committee for the Management of Gaza (the Committee’s Facebook page, February 19, 2026)

The new logo of the National Committee for the Management of Gaza (the Committee’s Facebook page, February 19, 2026)

Al-Mughni, in the center with the keffiyeh, with the chairman of the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza and some of its members (Facebook page of the Supreme Authority for Tribal Affairs in the Southern Governorates, February 17, 2026)

Al-Mughni, in the center with the keffiyeh, with the chairman of the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza and some of its members (Facebook page of the Supreme Authority for Tribal Affairs in the Southern Governorates, February 17, 2026)

An iftar meal [the meal breaking the Ramadan fast] in the Jabalia refugee camp in the north of the Strip (Shehab Agency, February 18, 2026).

An iftar meal [the meal breaking the Ramadan fast] in the Jabalia refugee camp in the north of the Strip (Shehab Agency, February 18, 2026).

The market in the al-Zeitoun neighborhood in Gaza City (Facebook page of the al-Zeitoun neighborhood, February 22, 2026).

The market in the al-Zeitoun neighborhood in Gaza City (Facebook page of the al-Zeitoun neighborhood, February 22, 2026).

Khaled Mashal.

Khaled Mashal. (al-Sharq, February 17, 2026)

Khalil al-Hayya (al-Sharq, February 17, 2026)

Khalil al-Hayya (al-Sharq, February 17, 2026)

Families of prisoners and shaheeds at a demonstration in Nablus protesting the PA's decision to cut or stop their salaries (Quds News Network, February 17, 2026)

Families of prisoners and shaheeds at a demonstration in Nablus protesting the PA's decision to cut or stop their salaries (Quds News Network, February 17, 2026)

  • IDF forces continued activity within the Yellow Line in the Gaza Strip to locate and destroy weapons and terrorist infrastructure. An IDF soldier was killed by friendly fire in the south of the Strip.
  • It was reported that the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza was dissatisfied with Hamas’ appointment of new police commanders who had ties to the military wing.
  • According to Hamas sources, the movement was preparing to announce the new chairman of the political bureau, either Khaled Mashaal or Khalil al-Hayya, and the candidate selected would hold the position for one year only.
  • The American-led Board of Peace held its first meeting, during which promises for economic assistance worth tens of billions of dollars and for assistance in reconstructing the Strip were reported. Indonesia is expected to send 8,000 soldiers to participate in the international stabilization force.
  • The National Committee for the Administration of Gaza issued a notice recruiting police officers for the new order-keeping force and thousands of applications were reportedly received.
  • The Palestinian Authority established a liaison office which would operate with the high commissioner for the Gaza Strip on behalf of the Board of Peace.
  • IDF forces continued to operate within the Yellow Line while attacking in various areas in the Strip. The forces located weapons, destroyed terrorist infrastructure, including tunnels, and eliminated terrorists who approached the line or tried to cross it to attack the soldiers. An IDF soldier was killed by friendly fire in the south of the Gaza Strip. An unsuccessful attempt was made to drome-smuggle three M-16 rifles through the Egyptian border (IDF spokesperson, February 17–24, 2026).
  • On February 19, 2026, the first meeting of the Board of Peace for Gaza was held with the participation of leaders and senior representatives from member states. A series of benefits for the Gaza Strip were agreed upon, including a commitment for economic assistance for reconstruction. The United States pledged $10 billion, the UAE $1.2 billion, and Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, $1 billion each. Proposals were made for assistance in rehabilitating the health and education sectors and governmental institutions (Reuters, February 19, 2026). Hamas said holding the meeting while Israel continued its “violations” of the ceasefire agreement required the international community and the participants to take practical steps that would compel Israel to stop its actions, open crossings, allow humanitarian aid to enter without restrictions and immediately begin reconstruction (Hamas Telegram channel, February 19, 2026).
  • At the Board of Peace meeting, the commander of the international stabilization force for the Gaza Strip, Brigadier General Jasper Jeffers, said five states had promised to provide forces for the international stabilization force. They were Indonesia, which was expected to send 8,000 soldiers, Morocco, Kazakhstan, Kosovo and Albania, and in addition Egypt and Jordan said they would train police officers. He said deployment would begin in Rafah in the south of the Strip, where police officers would be trained, and later expand sector by sector. He said the long-term plan was to deploy about 20,000 soldiers within the force and to train about 12,000 police officers (White House website, February 19, 2026).
  • The Palestinian-American businessman Bashara Bahbah, who participates in contacts with Hamas, said the future of the Gaza Strip was still unclear because of the ambiguous nature of the Board of Peace’s implementation measures and the absence of effective Palestinian political representation in arrangements for the next phase. He said a 15-member technocrat committee had been established with a division of portfolios, but it did not have sufficient tools, authority or capabilities to carry out its tasks, and its members were in Cairo without a clear date of entry into the Strip or a defined modus operandi. He said that the absence of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the PLO from the Board of Peace turned the situation into a kind of mandate model, and noted that the PLO was the legitimate representative and the PA was its executive arm, and therefore had to be part of the framework. Regarding Hamas, Bahbah said the movement did not oppose an international force if it did not intervene inside the Strip, but the Board of Peace demanded disarmament, which he claimed Hamas had “expressed willingness to discuss,” however the movement had reportedly not yet received a clear plan (al-Mamlaka, February 21, 2026).
  • According to reports, the United States plans to establish a large military base in the south of the Gaza Strip, about 86.5 acres, intended for about 5,000 military personnel, which would serve as a future operational base for the international stabilization force. Reportedly, plans include the phased establishment of a fortified compound which would have armored watchtowers, barbed wire fencing, small arms training facilities and bunkers with ventilation systems (The Guardian, February 19, 2026).
The National Committee for the Administration of Gaza
  •  At the Board of Peace meeting, the chairman of the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza, Ali Shaath, said they were committed to achieving stability in the Gaza Strip and to reconstructing it, despite the difficult conditions. He said the Committee was working to improve the economic situation, restore basic services and restore security in the Strip through professional police forces, under one authority, one law and one weapon. According to him, 5,000 police officers were expected to be deployed in the Gaza Strip within 60 days (al-Jazeera Mubasher, February 19, 2026).
The new logo of the National Committee for the Management of Gaza (the Committee’s Facebook page, February 19, 2026)
The new logo of the National Committee for the Management of Gaza
(the Committee’s Facebook page, February 19, 2026)
  • The National Committee for the Administration of Gaza opened registration for the establishment of a police force in the Strip. According to the Committee’s announcement, registration was open to men and women residents aged 18–35, without a criminal record and in good physical condition. It was reported that about 2,000 Gazans registered in the first hours (Reuters, February 19, 2026). It was reported that Brigadier Jamal Abu al-Hassan, a retired officer in the Palestinian police from Khan Yunis, had left for Cairo and it was assuming that he would be the police commander in the Strip (Ahmed Said Facebook page, February 16, 2026; al-Akhbar, February 18, 2026).
  • The holder of the clan portfolio in the National Committee, Hassani al-Mughni, aka Abu Salman,[2] who also serves as chairman of the Supreme Authority for Tribal Affairs in the Southern Governorates,[3] said the committee would enter the Gaza Strip but the timing depended on what could be offered to the Gazans, since the Committee did not want to arrive empty-handed. He said he had attended a meeting in the Strip in which Hamas declared its full and absolute preparedness to hand over all headquarters, departments, documents and even the security mechanisms to the committee upon its entry into the Gaza Strip. He added that public sector employees affiliated with Hamas would return to their positions, but under Committee leadership and management, and according to the need for their services. Al-Mughni also claimed that the role of the militias and gangs operating under Israeli auspices would end once the IDF withdrew. He claimed members of the militias had no backing since their families had removed their protection, as their actions had severely damaged their families’ reputations and brought them shame (al-Shorouk, February 19, 2026). Ghassan al-Dahini, commander of the Popular Forces militia supported by Israel in east Rafah, published an arrest warrant issued by the militia’s supreme judicial committee for al-Mughni on charges of direct incitement to murder and affiliation with prohibited terrorist entities. Al-Dahini called on all activists at the border crossings to implement the warrant (Ghassan al-Dahini Facebook page, February 21, 2026).
Al-Mughni, in the center with the keffiyeh, with the chairman of the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza and some of its members (Facebook page of the Supreme Authority for Tribal Affairs in the Southern Governorates, February 17, 2026)
Al-Mughni, in the center with the keffiyeh, with the chairman of the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza and some of its members (Facebook page of the Supreme Authority for Tribal Affairs in the Southern Governorates, February 17, 2026)
Palestinian Authority (PA) Involvement in the Strip
  • Nikolay Mladenov, the high commissioner on behalf of the Board of Peace for the Strip, announced the establishment of a liaison office for the PA, which is supposed to create an official and orderly channel for communication and coordination between the office of the high commissioner and the PA. Mladenov said he expected to work with the liaison office to implement the American 20-point peace plan to promote a better future for the Gazans and the region (X account of Nikolay Mladenov, February 20, 2026). In response, the deputy chairman of the PA, Hussein al-Sheikh, wrote to Mladenov saying that the PA had established the liaison office headed by the PA prime minister, Muhammad Mustafa, and that the office was fully ready to carry out its duties (Ma’an, February 21, 2026).
Humanitarian Aid
  • The Israeli Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) reported that in the week ending February 21, 2026, 4,200 aid trucks entered the Gaza Strip in accordance with the ceasefire agreement. The trucks carried food, medical supplies and equipment, including tents and clothing (COGAT X account, February 22, 2026). Marwan Mihsin, deputy director of Hamas’ chamber of commerce in Gaza, accused Israel of coordinating the entry of goods into the Strip selectively, so that certain goods entered while others had almost disappeared. According to him, about 80 trucks carrying frozen products entered the Strip every week, but prices had not fallen to a “natural” level and the public’s purchasing power was very weak. He estimated that on average about 250–300 trucks entered daily, while the need was for 600 trucks per day, and added that there was no effective enforcement body addressing exploitation and price gouging in the markets (Radio Alam, February 19, 2026).
The Gaza Strip during Ramadan
  • With the beginning of the Muslim religious month of Ramadan, Gazans in the north of the Strip were dissatisfied and complained about how hot meals were distributed by organizations and charitable associations. They complained not only about the distribution method, which they claimed lacked professionalism, fairness and efficiency, but also about the timing of meal distribution, since while some charities began distributing meals, especially rice, before noon, others distributed them only minutes before sunset, which meant some Gazans did not benefit because they had already been forced to purchase food and prepare their own meals. They accused the organizations of not including them in various aid packages, especially food aid flowing to displaced persons camps in large quantities on an almost daily basis, to the extent that beneficiaries were selling it, and they demanded fairness in distribution (al-Ayyam, February 20, 2026).
The market in the al-Zeitoun neighborhood in Gaza City (Facebook page of the al-Zeitoun neighborhood, February 22, 2026).     An iftar meal [the meal breaking the Ramadan fast] in the Jabalia refugee camp in the north of the Strip (Shehab Agency, February 18, 2026).
Right: An iftar meal [the meal breaking the Ramadan fast] in the Jabalia refugee camp in the north of the Strip (Shehab Agency, February 18, 2026). Left: The market in the al-Zeitoun neighborhood in Gaza City (Facebook page of the al-Zeitoun neighborhood, February 22, 2026).
  • On February 18, 2026, Saudi Arabia launched a “humanitarian aid bridge” in honor of Ramadan for Gazans in the amount of $200 million (Facebook page of the al-Sharq channel dedicated to the Palestinian issue, February 19, 2026). The 81st Saudi Arabian aid plane for Gaza landed on February 21, 2026, at the El Arish airport in the northern Sinai Peninsula, bringing food packages and shelter kits (al-Sharq al-Awsat, February 21, 2026).
  • The Turkish singer Yildiz tribe announced that it would fund iftar meals for 12,000 fasting Gazans during Ramadan (Nablus News Telegram channel, February 23, 2026).
The Rafah Crossing
  • According to data from Hamas in the Gaza Strip, between February 2 and 18, 2026, 640 travelers left for Egypt through the Rafah Crossing and 508 entered and 26 instances of return or denial of passage were recorded. In total, 1,148 outgoing and returning travelers were recorded, out of 3,400 who were supposed to enter or leave during this period according to the agreement, that is, a rate of only about 33% (Telegram channel of the Hamas government media information office Hamas’ Government Media Office, February 19, 2026).
Civilian Governance
  • Hamas police announced they were carrying out their Ramadan plan for deployment and increased presence on the ground to regulate daily life and ease the lot of the Gazans. The deployment plan reportedly dealt with important locations, including markets, streets, major intersections and mosques, as well as with reinforcing the activity of the department investigating supplies in markets and shops to examine product availability and validity, monitor prices and prevent hoarding and exploitation. According to reports, the police would patrol daily near the locations, especially during the peak hours of late afternoon until before the iftar meal, and the number of traffic police would be reinforced to assist at intersections and at commercial areas to reduce congestion; intervention and order-maintenance forces would be deployed at central points (Telegram channel of the Hamas ministry of the interior, February 17, 2026). It was further reported that strict measures would be taken against traders and vendors manipulating prices, hoarding goods and exploiting Gazans during Ramadan (Telegram channel of the Hamas police force, February 20–22, 2026).
Security Governance
  • According to unverified reports, the militia of Hussam al-Astal, operating in eastern Khan Yunis with Israeli support, kidnapped the police commander of the Khan Yunis district, Osama Abu Anza (Facebook page of Ahmed Yussuf, February 19, 2026; Facebook page of Muhammad Abu Jiyab, February 19, 2026). It was further reported that Abu Anza was kidnapped from Nasser Hospital in Khan Yunis (Telegram channel of activist Hamza al-Masri, February 19, 2026; Facebook page of Ghassan al-Dahini, February 19, 2026). In response, the al-Akhres channel of Hamas “resistance security” quoted a security source denying the rumor of the kidnapping of a senior governmental official (al-Akhres Telegram channel, February 20, 2026). Hussam al-Astal claimed that his militia had taken control of the center of Khan Yunis and promised it would soon completely take over the city (Facebook page of Hussam al-Astal, February 18, 2026).
  • Two Palestinian sources “familiar with the details” stated that members of the Committee for Administering the Gaza Strip, the technocrat committee, were dissatisfied with Hamas because it had recently appointed five district police commanders, all linked to the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades [Hamas’ military wing]. They added that the movement had also appointed new senior officials in the ministry of the interior and national security and in the ministry of economy. In response, the director of the Hamas government media information office claimed they were “temporary appointments” to prevent an administrative vacuum and ensure essential services (Reuters, February 19, 2026).
  • Hamas announced that, in accordance with its internal regulations, the movement had completed its internal elections in the, the Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria and abroad, and had reached the final stage of selecting the chairman of the political bureau. The vote was between Hamas leader “abroad,” Khaled Mashaal, and the head of the bureau in the Gaza Strip, Khalil al-Hayya, and Hamas would publish a statement of the results once the chairman had been elected, most likely during Ramadan. Two Hamas sources stated that the next chairman would head Hamas’ political bureau for one year only, after which the movement would organize additional elections for its Shura frameworks and leadership for a new four-year term (Agence France-Presse, February 22, 2026).
 Khalil al-Hayya (al-Sharq, February 17, 2026)      Khaled Mashal.
Right: Khaled Mashal. Left: Khalil al-Hayya (al-Sharq, February 17, 2026)
Counterterrorism
  • Israeli security forces continued counterterrorist activities throughout Judea and Samaria, detaining more than 100 wanted persons and individuals suspected of terrorist activity, including terrorists involved in manufacturing explosives and carrying out attacks, weapons dealers and operatives from the Islamic Charity Association, an illegal organization which cooperates with Hamas. A terrorist who attempted to throw an explosive device at IDF forces in Beit Furiq was eliminated, weapons, explosives and equipment for manufacturing weapons were seized and tens of thousands of shekels designated for financing terrorist activity were confiscated. Two houses of terrorists who had participated in attacks in which Israelis were killed were demolished (IDF spokesperson, February 17–24, 2026).
  • The Israel Security Agency and Israel Police detained four Israeli citizens from the Galilee on suspicion that they had planned to shoot soldiers in the northern Israeli city of Karmiel. According to the indictment filed against them, they had undergone training and received instructions in preparation for the attack, including firearms training (ISA and Police spokesperson, February 23, 2026).
Friction between Palestinians and Settlers
  • According to reports, a 19-year-old Palestinian holding American citizenship was shot dead by a Jewish settler in the village of Mikhmas near Ramallah. Relatives of the deceased said settlers had raided the village to steal sheep and when local residents tried to prevent them, the settlers opened fire, killing the victim and injuring other residents (Reuters, February 19, 2026). Reportedly, in addition to the fatality, five Palestinians were injured in the incident, three of them by gunfire (Wafa, February 19, 2026).
  • According to reports, in the village of Tal, near Nablus, an attempt was made to set fire to the Abu Bakr al-Siddiq mosque, and racist graffiti were written on the walls of the building (Quds News Network, February 22, 2026).
  • Muntasir Abu Jalion, a Fatah activist deported to Egypt after being released from an Israeli prison, criticized the decision of PA chairman Mahmoud Abbas to cut off prisoners’ financial allotments, claiming it was mistaken and caused severe economic damage and hunger to families. He claimed the prisoners suffered from hunger inside the prisons and their families suffered outside prison from decisions made by the PA. He said the living conditions of released prisoners were “very difficult” in Judea and Samaria, in the Gaza Strip and in the places to which they had been deported, adding that they did not seek a confrontation with the PA, but its promises had not yet been fulfilled (Quds News Network, February 19, 2026).
Families of prisoners and shaheeds at a demonstration in Nablus protesting the PA's decision to cut or stop their salaries (Quds News Network, February 17, 2026)
Families of prisoners and shaheeds at a demonstration in Nablus protesting the PA’s decision to cut or stop their salaries (Quds News Network, February 17, 2026)

[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications.
[2] Al-Mughni, born in 1941 in the al-Shuja'iyya neighborhood in Gaza, joined the Fatah movement in 1968 and held a series of public positions. He expressed support for the "resistance," including "armed resistance," [terrorism] and argued that the Oslo Accords harmed the Fatah movement and shattered hopes for the establishment of a Palestinian state.
[3] A body established by "presidential" decree in 2012, its role is to resolve disputes and conduct reconciliation agreements between people in the Gaza Strip.

Iran Efforts to Circumvent the Sanctions by Smuggling Oil

Leaked documents (WikiIran, December 2025)

Leaked documents (WikiIran, December 2025)

Leaked documents (WikiIran, December 2025)

Leaked documents (WikiIran, December 2025)

Overview[1]
  • Iran’s security forces, especially the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, use the sale of oil to finance their activities and those of their proxy terrorist organizations in the Middle East.
  • In September 2025, the UN Security Council activated the snapback mechanism, which reinstated the sanctions which had been lifted under the 2015 nuclear agreement because of Tehran’s failure to meet its international obligations following the Iran-Israel War and the strike on its nuclear facilities.
  • In an attempt to circumvent American and international sanctions, Iran operates a complex network of intermediaries, front companies and a ghost fleet of oil tankers. At the center stands Sepehr Energy Jahan, which serves as a front company for Iran’s armed forces and has been under American sanctions since November 2023.
  • A cyberattack on the company’s servers and a massive leak of internal documents provided evidence of how Sepehr Energy Jahan conducts its illegal activity, exposing a long list of participating front companies, oil tankers and business partners. The documents also show that China remains Iran’s primary oil consumer despite international sanctions.
  • In ITIC assessment, until the mechanisms activating the snapback restrictions go into effect, Iran will advance covert sanction-evasion activity, within which Sepehr Energy Jahan and its CEO Majid Azami play a central role, while continuing its prohibited business relationship with governmental elements in China.
Background Information[2]
  • For more than four decades Iran has been considered the world’s largest state sponsor of terrorism, transferring hundreds of millions of dollars annually to a series of terrorist organizations across the Middle East, notably Hezbollah and Hamas, which serve as executive arms for advancing the Islamic Republic’s security and political interests.
  • To secure the budget required to finance Iran’s security activity in general and the terrorist activity of Iran’s proxies in the Middle East in particular, Iranian security forces, especially the Revolutionary Guards, rely on revenues from oil sales. The security forces receive allocations of oil and operate extensive and independent systems and networks, from loading it onto tankers and shipping it to sales destinations, primarily China, to laundering the funds received from the sale.
  • To prevent smuggling and restrain Iran’s aggressive regional foreign policy, over the years the United States imposed a long series of sanctions on Tehran, including on the energy sector. Between 2017 and 2021, the Republican administration exerted “maximum” economic and political pressure on Iran to force the regime in Tehran to accept a renewed nuclear agreement under terms favorable to the West, and to change Iran’s regional influence, its support for various Middle East terrorist organizations and its missile program. The most significant element of the maximum pressure policy was the imposition of substantial economic sanctions to paralyze Iran’s most important economic sectors, banking and oil. Between 2021 and 2015, under the Democratic administration, the sanctions were somewhat eased, but when the Republicans returned in January 2025, the administration renewed the maximum pressure policy.
  • The United States Treasury imposed sanctions on a series of vessels which belonged to the ghost fleet serving Iran’s illegal oil trade and on companies in Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and the Marshall Islands which assisted Iran (United States Treasury website, January 23, 2026; United States State Department website, February 6, 2026). In addition, American Navy forces seized the oil tanker Veronica III, which sailed in the Indian Ocean under the Panamanian flag, after the tanker had previously been declared as part of Iran’s ghost fleet by the Treasury Department (France24, February 15, 2026). Authorities in India reported that the coast guard seized three tankers which were under American sanctions and had sailed in the Indian Ocean toward China (Times of India, February 17, 2026).
  • In September 2025, the snapback mechanism was activated against Iran, reinstating the sanctions which had been removed under the 2015 nuclear agreement. The mechanism was triggered following a move by Germany, France and Britain (the E3 states), together with the United States, because of Iran’s refusal to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency after the Iran-Israel War (June 13–24, 2025) and the strike on the nuclear facilities by the United States in June 2025. Crippling international sanctions were reimposed on Iran’s financial sector, focusing on any factor related to the proliferation of technologies in order to prevent Tehran’s ability to initiate a military buildup and advance its nuclear project. The decision bound all UN member states and prohibited military cooperation with Iran, and had significant impact on the country’s energy and financial sectors (New York Times, September 27, 2025).
  • Sepehr Energy Jahan (SEJ), a front company whose CEO is Majid Azami and operated by the General Staff of Iran’s armed forces, is an important factor in Iran’s military build-up efforts, which use revenues from illegal oil exports. The company’s activity also assisted the internal security forces which were instrumental in the violent repression and mass killing of thousands of civilians during the protests that erupted in Iran in January 2026.
  • In November 2023, the company and its executives were added to the American sanctions list after it was determined that SEJ was a global network transporting Iranian oil and financing the Iranian armed forces. The campaign against the company gathered momentum after the current Republican administration took office in January 2025 and reactivated the maximum pressure policy. Beginning in February 2025, the company was subjected to several rounds of designations of its senior officials and its oil export infrastructure, with emphasis on tankers and companies which were taking part in prohibited financial activity (United States Treasury website, May 13, 2025; November 20, 2025; February 6, 2026).
List of designated parties linked to SEJ (United States Treasury website, February 6, 2026)
List of designated parties linked to SEJ (United States Treasury website, February 6, 2026)
  • During 2025 the company suffered a series of cyberattacks carried out by elements of the Iranian opposition. Extensive amounts of materials were leaked to the internet from the company’s email servers, exposing its business relations with tanker owners, cover companies and customers in China. On November 15, 2025, a large amount of information was leaked from the SEJ’s email servers, exposing prohibited operational and business activity, while circumventing Iran’s international commitments under the snapback mechanism.[3] Purchase contracts, a list of companies assisting the Iranian company and details of the names of the tankers which participated illegal oil shipments were exposed (WikiIran, December 2025).[4]

Leaked documents (WikiIran, December 2025)
Appendix: Companies Complicit in Supporting Sepehr Energy Jahan
Company Names

Company Name

Country

 

Sino Energy Trading FZE

SHARJAH UAE

 

APIICO (ALUED PRO–TECWNICAL INDEPENCENT INSPECTORS COMPANY)

   

MIMAS COMPANY LIMITED

KOWLOON, HONG KONG

 

QIANHE MARINE SERVICE (OMS)

LIBERIA

 

TRANS ARCTIC GLOBAL MARINE SERVICES PTE LTD

SINGAPORE

 

ZHEJIANG TONGMAO HOLDING CO.

OMAN

 

ESHA INC.

MAJURO,MARSHALL ISLANDS

 

GEMINI MARINE LIMITED

MAJURO,MARSHALL ISLANDS

 

HAMPTON FZE

SHARJAH, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

 

SEA POWER SHIPPING SERVICES L.L.C

SULTANATE OF OMAN

 

YAM SHIPPING INC

MARSHALL ISLANDS

 

East Ocean Shipping

Presumably CHINA or SINGAPORE

 

NSK (CHINA) Trading Co. Ltd

CHINA

 

ADARA SHIPPING COMPANY

   

MESTALLA TRADING LLC

DUBAI

 

QINGDAO HUIXINGYI PETROCHEMIC

QINGDAO AREA,(SHANDONG] PILOT FREE TRADE ZONE(A)

 

SHANDONG INDEPENDENT ENERGY TRADING DMCC

DUBAI, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

 

FULL STAR SHIPPING LINE

NORTH DISTRICT,QINGDAO,CHINA

 

DARA PETROLEUM FZE

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

 

KAWKAB SHIPPING INC.

MAJURO

MARSHALL ISLANDS

 

YILI International Trade Co. Limited

WAN CHAI HONG KONG

 

HONG KONG ZHONGTUO GROUP CO.

HONG KONG

 

LIBERIA MARITIME AUTHORITY

LIBERIA

 

NSK Dalian International Trading Co. Ltd

CHINA

 

TAVAN KAVNET (Could written as one word(

SHAHID BEHESHTI AVE., TEHRAN.

 

Guangdong Shouren Supply Chain Co.

CHINA

 

HECTAR SHIPPING INC.

PANAMA

 

QINGDAO LINKRICH INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING AGENCY CO.

GINGDAO,SKANDONG,CHINA

 

arangmas Shipping & Forwarding Sdn Bhd

MALAYSIA

 

YOUNG FOLKS INTERNATIONAL TRADING CO.

HONG KONG

 

UNAONE SHIP MANAGEMENT PVT LTD

INDIA

 

Calm Sea Light Horizons Shipping Agency

   

CCIC SINGAPORE PTE LTD

SINGAPORE

 

IBH Shipping Services Ltd.

   

LAVANDER SHIPPING LTD

BELIZE, CENTRAL AMERICA.

 

NYCITY SHIPMANAGEMENT CO.

CHINA

 

Shandong Shouguang Luqing Petrochemical CO. LTD

CHINA

 

XIAMEN HAOHE TRADING CO. LIMITED

Fujian ,CHINA

 

BLUE WIDE SHIPPING AGENCY LLC

UAE

 

Darya Rokh Negar (LLC) SHIPPING AGENCY CO.

IRAN

 

East Framline Limited

HONG KONG

 

ECLIPSE FZE TRADING COMPANY

UAE

 

EUCALYPTUS SHIPPING LTD

BELIZE CITY–BELIZE

 

F.S. Energy Trading (HONG KONG) Limited

HONG KONG

 

FAR EAST SHIPPING

CHINA / JAPAN

 

HAIJIE SHIPPING LIMITED

CHINA

 

Petro Center Product LLC

OMAN

 

Qingdao Port International Logistics Co.

CHINA

 

SEA HORIZON ENERGY TRADING FZE

UAE

 

SHANGHAI SUNRISE CREWING SERVICE CO.

CHINA

 

TECAN LIMITED

UK

 

USHBA SHIPPING LIMITED

CHINA

 

YAYSUN LTD

   

American Bureau of Shipping (ABS)

USA

 

Blue Gulf Shipping Services Co. Ltd.

IRAN

 

CALM GULF WAVE LIMITED

PAKISTAN

 

CARNATIONS SHIPPING LTD

BELIZE CITY–BELIZE

 

COCOROCO Goods Wholesalers PTE LTD

UK, SWITZERLAND, CANADA AND SINGAPORE, CHINA

 

DONGYING JIAYANG INTERNATIONAL LOGISTICS CO.

   

HOGC

CHINA

 

NINGBO YILI INTERNATIONAL TRADE CO.

CHINA

 

Persian Gulf Pilot Maritime Services Co.

Presumably IRAN

 

ROYAL OMAN POLICE

OMAN

 

SHANGHAI FOLLOWSEA SHIPPING CO.

CHINA

 

SHARP SHIPPING INC

Presumably UK

 

SHANDONG SHENWU ENERGY CO., LTD.

CHINA

 

Smart Desert International Oil L.L.C

Presumably DUBAI

 

TAIHONGFENG

CHINA

 

TFG MARINE PTE LTD

SINGAPORE

 

Tijari Precious Metal Sdn. Bhd.

MALAYSIA

 

KOBAN SHIPPING LLC

UAE

 

شرکت تو الزین فراز TU ALZAIN PARAZ

IRAN

 

AFAGH PARTO DENIZ ARAM

Presumably IRAN

 

American Steamship Owners Mutual Protection and Indemnity Association

USA

 

BANA GOSTAR KARANEH

IRAN

 

BESTLA COMPANY LIMITED

   

BETENSH GLOBAL INVESTMENT LIMITED

HONG KONG

 

Blue Venice Shipping Inc.

PANAMA

 

Citibank Group

UAE

 

Crescent Gas Corporation Limited (CGC)

UAE

 

Crescent National Gas Corporation Limited (CNGC)

UAE

 

Crescent Petroleum

UAE

 

CRS ENERGY PTE LTD

SINGAPORE

 

DOOSAN ENGINE CO

SOUTH KOREA

 

Energen Trading DMCC

UAE

 

Faith Enterprise Limited

REPUBLIC OF MARSHALL

ISLANDS

 

FARMER SHIPPING INC

PANAMA

 

Hamta International Group

IRAN

 

RN SHIP MANAGEMENT PVT

INDIA

 

ISATIS BRIGHT HORIZON SHIPPING

   

Khark Petrochemical Company

IRAN

 

LIHUAYI TRADING CO.

CHINA

 

Maritime Mutual Insurance Association (NZ) Limited

NEW ZEALAND

 

Ocean Seal Ship Management Limited

HONG KONG

 

Pertamina

Presumably SINGAPORE

 

Petro World Co W.L.L

BAHRAIN

 

PINNACLES SHIPPING-FZCO

Dubai

 

PT. ADHIGANA PRATAMA MULYA

Indonesia

 

PT. Aero Bara Jaya Pratama

Indonesia

 

QINGDAO HUIXINGY PETROCHEMICAL CO.LTD

CHINA

 

QINGDAO WINKEE PETROCHEMICAL CO.

CHINA

 

RED PEN TRADING LLC

UAE

 

SEAMASTER HONG KONG LIMITED

HONG KONG

 

ZuhalCakmakcioglu Mineral Division Coordinator SGS Limited

SWITZERLAND

 

Shandong Shengxing Chemical Co.

CHINA

 

SINDA OIL TRADING L.L.C

based in London

 

Sino Ocean Petroleum Capital Limited

HONG KONG and SHANGHAI

 

Tione Shipping Group Co.

SINGAPORE

 

UNITRANS AGENCY HONG KONG CO. LTD.

HONG KONG

 

VEGA INVESTMENT LTD

Presumably ENGLAND

 

Venus Shipping

SINGAPORE

 

VINTON REFINED OIL PRODUCTS TRADING L.L.C

UAE

 

Vision ship management

SINGAPORE

 

Waterfield Ship Management Services

India

 

HENGLI GENERAL TRADING LLC

UAE

 

WILISIN CO., LIMITED

HENNESSY ROAD WANCHAI HONG KONG

 

WILISIN CO., LIMITED

HONG KONG

 

WILISIN CO., LIMITED

HONG KONG

 

BEIJING ZHONGSHENGGUOTENG TRADING DEVELOPMENT CO.,LTD

BEIJING.P.R CHINA

 

BEIJING ZHONGSHENGGUOTENG TRADING DEVELOPMENT CO.,LTD

CHINA

 

LUAN BIRD SHIPPING SERVICE L.L.C

DUBAI, UAE

 

GROWTH TRADING CO.

Presumably CHINA or SINGAPORE

 

TIDA CO.,LIMITED

CHINA

 

XIN RUI JI TRADE CO LTD

CHINA

 

ONDEN GENERAL TRADING FZE

UAE

 

Poyoun Trad Co. Limited

CHINA

 

STAR ENERGY INTERNATIONAL LIMITED

KOWLOON, HONG KONG

 

STAR ENERGY INTERNATIONAL LIMITED

HONG KONG

 

TETIS GLOBAL FZE

UAE

 

GRAND QILIN OIL TRADING L.L.C

CHINA

 

WORTH SEEN ENERGY LIMITED

CHINA

 

MILEN TRADING CO. LIMITED

HONG KONG

 

KEMIKO INDUSTRIAL LIMITED

TUEN MUN, HONG KONG

 

KEMIKO INDUSTRIAL LIMITED

HONG KONG

 

KEMIKO INDUSTRIAL LIMITED

HONG KONG

 

KEMIKO INDUSTRIAL LIMITED

HONG KONG

 

Wan Li General Trading LLC

DUBAI, UAE

 

Wan Li General Trading LLC

DUBAI, UAE

 

YUAN JIAN GENERAL TRADING FZE

CHINA

 

SWANAL CO.

HONG KONG

 
Names of the Tankers

VSL NAME

IMO

FLAG

SANCTIONS

CURRENT NAME

VSL PREVIOUS NAMES

HENNA

9212929

Iran

YES

HENNA

IRAN HAMOON/HAMOON/ TAMAR/ HALISTIC

URGANE 1

9231901

PANAMA

YES

PINK SHUN

VENICE

DUNE

9569712

IRAN/

QESHM

YES

DUNE

DUSK

DESTINY

9177155

IRAN/

QESHM

YES

DESTINY

TENRYU/ ULYSSES1/ ELUNA

PETALIDI

9529475

LIBERIA

NO

PETALIDI

 

SOPHIA

9289477

GREECE

YES

M SOPHIA

 

RELIABLE WARRIOR

9753557

GREECE

NO

   

FLEVES

9597006

LIBERIA

NO

   

SARAK

9226968

IRAN

YES

SARAK

 

ELLA

9615092

ZANZIBAR

CAMEROON

YES

ELIN

MARIA

CHLOE

9173745

GUYANA

YES

CHLOE

SAVIOR/ EURO HOPE/ GENMAR HOPE

BIANCA JOYSEL

9196632

PANAMA

YES

BIANCA JOYSEL

ONRENSE

LIMAS

9254082

GUYANA

YES

LIMAS

GENE/ GENER8 ULYSSES/ GENMAR ULYSSES/ CRUDESTAR/ KOHANA

YUAN DONG HAI

9843338

CHINA

NO

YUAN DONG HAI

 

ATLANTIS II

9229362

BARBADOS

YES

 

ROAD/ SAINT NICHOLAI

RIVERSIDE

9412464

LIBERIA

NO

RIVERSIDE

 

OMEGA TRADER

9567659

 

NO

OMEGA TRADER

 

KALLISTA

9411965

PANAMA

NO

KALLISTA

 

SEAMAJESTY

9601223

MALTA

NO

SEAMAJESTY

 

MACKEREL

9234628

PANAMA

NO

MACKEREL

 

Sea Vibe

9416408

Liberia

NO

Sea Vibe

Tenacity

ADVANTAGE SWEET

9587192

MARSHALL

NO

ADVANTAGE SWEET

 

DHT CHINA

9315161

NARSHALL

NO

DHT CHINA

SAMCO CHINA

Luna prime

9174220

GUYANA

YES

PUYANG

 

CACTUS

9233210

PANAMA

NO

CACTUS

 

C. MIGHTY

9422158

PANAMA

NO

C. MIGHTY

 

TEXAS

9623685

MALTA

NO

TEXAS

 

ETERNAL PEACE

9259745

PANAMA

YES

ETERNAL PEACE

 

DIVIT

9194139

SAO TOME & PRINCIPE

COMOROS

YES

DIVIT

MERAKI

LILY

9222443

SAO TOME & PRINCIPE

YES

VOY

 

/SEA SOLIDARITY

URI / BOREAS

9248497

COMOROS

YES

URI

 

KASPER

9293143

PANAMA

ESWATINI

YES

KASPER

CLASSIC/ RIDGEBURY PALLAS/ CAPE BRINDISI

FELICITY

9183934

IRAN

YES

FELICITY

URAL/ LECOTHEA/ SEALANDER/ ORIENTAL

MISCA

9249312

PALAU

COMOROS

NO

IZOLA

A MELODY

XIDI

9294290

THAILAND

NO

KIRIN STAR

ASIAN PROGRESS III

SERENE I

9197832

CURACAO

YES

SERENE I

 

PHONIX

9198317

PANAMA

GUYANA

YES

PHONIX

LUNA LAKE (26/04/2023)

PACIFIC CHALLENGER (01/10/2019)

SIRI

9281683

PANAMA

COMOROS

YES

SIRI

CYBELE/ SMITI/ FORMOSA PETRO FOREVER/ ANTHEA

NEW PRIME

9799123

HONG KONG

NO

NEW PRIME

 

SOBAR

9221970

IRAN

YES

SOBAR

RISE DIGNITY, 2018, HS ALCINA

Daniel

9569683

IRAN

YES

Daniel

DEMOS (2013)

DIAMENS (2016)

DAN

9357729

IRAN/QESHM

YES

DAN

DADGAR JUSTICE DON

JADEAR

9283801

CURACAO

YES

NOVA

ACHELOUS/ AMORGOS/ KAI-EI/ EGRET

BESTLA

9295593

PANAMA

YES

BESTLA

SHALIMAR

CH BILLION

9276585

PANAMA

YES

CH BILLION

 

Seasky

9237412

SAN MARINO

YES

Seasky

HONTAO

TREND

9231509

BARBADOS

NO

TREND

MM STRENGTH

DOVER

9218466

IRAN

YES

DOVER

IRAN DAYLAM/ DAYLAM

SEVDA

9172040

IRAN

YES

SEVDA

ZEYDON/ SABITI

DIAMOND II

9218478

IRAN

YES

DIAMOND II

DIAMOND

MADESTAR

9289726

PANAMA

YES

MADESTAR

MADESTA

CETO

9305348

PANAMA

NO

CETO

 

PAROS

9296195

PANAMA

NO

PAROS

 

IZUMO

9249324

GUYANA

YES

IZUMO

CATHAY PHOENIX

YUAN QIU HU

9723590

CHINA

NO

YUAN QIU HU

 

YUAN SHAN HU

9417189

CHINA

NO

YUAN SHAN HU

 

 

[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications
[2] See the June 2025 ITIC report, Oil Exports, an Important Component of Iran’s Funding for Terrorism.
[3] For the leaked documents, see https://www.wikiran.org/leaks/sej2.
[4] For the names of the companies and their home countries, see the Appendix.