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Spotlight on Iran

January 7-14, 2026 Editor: Dr. Raz Zimmt
Araghchi's visit to Nasrallah's tomb (Iranian Foreign Ministry Telegram channel, January 8, 2026)

Araghchi's visit to Nasrallah's tomb (Iranian Foreign Ministry Telegram channel, January 8, 2026)

Araghchi's meeting with the Lebanese president (Iranian Foreign Ministry Telegram channel, January 9, 2026)

Araghchi's meeting with the Lebanese president (Iranian Foreign Ministry Telegram channel, January 9, 2026)

Meeting of the Iranian and Omani foreign ministers (Tasnim, January 11, 2026)

Meeting of the Iranian and Omani foreign ministers (Tasnim, January 11, 2026)

The Iraqi National Security Advisor meets with the Iranian military attaché (Tasnim, January 7, 2026)

The Iraqi National Security Advisor meets with the Iranian military attaché (Tasnim, January 7, 2026)

Highlights[1]
  • Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi visited Lebanon and met with senior state officials and the Hezbollah secretary-general. He stressed the need to confront the ongoing IDF attacks in Lebanon and expressed Iran’s support for Lebanon’s sovereignty and for expanding cooperation between the two countries.
  • Araghchi called on the Syrian government to refrain from moving closer to Israel amid the renewed security talks between the two countries.
  • The leader of Kata’ib Hezbollah stated that the group has a “religious and moral duty” to stand by Iran and warned the United States that a war against Iran “is not a picnic.”
Iran and the Lebanese Arena
  • Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi arrived in Lebanon on January 8, 2026, amid tensions between the two countries and pressure on Hezbollah to disarm. Upon his arrival, Araghchi stated that the main purpose of his visit was to hold talks with senior Lebanese officials regarding regional developments and the challenges facing Lebanon and the region. He noted that the region is facing severe challenges and that the threats emanating from the “Zionist regime” have never been as serious as they are today. He further stressed that areas of Lebanese territory are still under Israeli “occupation” and that over the past year, Israel has repeatedly “violated” the ceasefire. He added that Iran is holding consultations with all countries in the region and that another objective of his visit is to promote relations between the two countries. According to him, trade volume between Iran and Lebanon exceeded $110 million over the past year, and Tehran seeks to expand ties with Beirut based on mutual respect and shared interests (snn.ir, January 8, 2026). The following are the main points of the visit (Iranian Foreign Ministry Telegram channel, January 8–9, 2026):
  • On the first day, Araghchi met with the Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Islamic Shiite Council in Lebanon, Sheikh Ali al-Khatib. Araghchi noted the historic role of the Shiites in Lebanon and stressed the importance of the council in promoting national unity in the country. Regional developments were also discussed, as well as the need to continue efforts to maintain security and stability in the region in the face of the “ongoing aggression of the Zionist regime.”
  • In his meeting with the Lebanese Minister of Economy and Trade, Amer Bisat, the two discussed ways to strengthen cooperation between the two countries in the fields of economy, trade, tourism, agriculture, science, and culture. Araghchi noted that renewing the activity of the Iran–Lebanon Joint Economic Committee would provide a foundation for strengthening bilateral trade relations and emphasized the importance of convening the committee as soon as possible.
  • Araghchi later visited the tomb of former Hezbollah secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah. He stressed Iran’s support for Lebanon’s independence, territorial integrity, and its natural right to “resist” and defend itself against the “occupation and aggression of the Zionist regime.” He added that Iran seeks to strengthen and expand its relations with Lebanon in all fields within the framework of the shared interests of the two peoples (Iranian Foreign Ministry Telegram channel, January 8, 2026).
Araghchi's visit to Nasrallah's tomb (Iranian Foreign Ministry Telegram channel, January 8, 2026)
Araghchi’s visit to Nasrallah’s tomb (Iranian Foreign Ministry Telegram channel, January 8, 2026)
  • On the second day of the visit, Araghchi met with his Lebanese counterpart, Youssef Rajji, and discussed bilateral relations. Araghchi stressed the need to strengthen consultations with Lebanon at all levels, based on mutual respect and shared interests, in light of the unprecedented threats to peace and security in the region posed by the “Zionist regime.” He also emphasized the need to preserve Lebanon’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity in the face of the “aggression of the Zionist regime” and destructive foreign interference. He added that decision-making regarding Lebanon’s domestic affairs and foreign policy is an internal Lebanese matter that should be determined on the basis of understanding and national dialogue among the relevant elements of Lebanese society.
  • In his meeting with Lebanese President Joseph Aoun, Araghchi stressed Iran’s commitment to expanding relations with Lebanon in all fields. He reiterated Iran’s position of respect for Lebanon’s national sovereignty and unity, referred to the continued “occupation” and repeated “violations” by Israel, and emphasized Iran’s support for Lebanon in defending its sovereignty and stability. He also met with Prime Minister Nawaf Salam; Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri; and Lebanon’s Sunni Mufti, Sheikh Abd al-Latif Derian. In his meeting with Hezbollah secretary-general Naim Qassem, Araghchi also stressed Tehran’s readiness to strengthen its ties with Beirut (Al-Manar, January 9, 2026).
Araghchi's meeting with the Lebanese president (Iranian Foreign Ministry Telegram channel, January 9, 2026)
Araghchi’s meeting with the Lebanese president
(Iranian Foreign Ministry Telegram channel, January 9, 2026)
Iran and the Palestinian Arena
  • Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi met in Tehran with his Omani counterpart, Badr bin Hamad al-Busaidi. According to an Iranian Foreign Ministry statement, the two also discussed developments related to “occupied Palestine,” the continuation of the “genocide perpetrated by the Zionist regime in the Gaza Strip,” and the need for serious action by the international community and regional countries to stop the “crimes” against the Palestinian people (Tasnim, January 11, 2026).
Meeting of the Iranian and Omani foreign ministers (Tasnim, January 11, 2026)
Meeting of the Iranian and Omani foreign ministers (Tasnim, January 11, 2026)
Iran and the Militias amid Developments in Syria
  • In a press conference in Lebanon, Araghchi addressed reports regarding progress in talks between Syria and Israel. He stated that it is important for Syrian officials to understand that the “Zionist regime” does not seek stability or calm in Syria and that any move toward rapprochement with Israel would help it achieve its malicious objectives in the country. He added that Iran supports Syria’s national unity and independence, opposes any move to partition the country, and demands an end to the “occupation” of Syrian territories (Tasnim, January 9, 2026).
  • The Islamic Resistance Front in Syria – Possessors of Might (Uli al-Baas, or UAB) issued a “strong condemnation” of the “dubious alliances of the de facto authority (the Syrian regime) with the Zionist enemy.” In its statement, the organization accused the regime of “blatant betrayal” of the rights of the Syrian people and their hopes for a free and secure future. It further stated that it would maintain a firm stance against a regime that “sells the homeland in losing deals” and that it would not allow the Zionist enemy or such “treacherous regimes” to achieve their colonial objectives. The organization added that it would continue to act to liberate Syria from the hands of these “puppet regimes” (Islamic Resistance Front in Syria Telegram channel, January 7, 2026).
Iran and the Iraqi Arena
  • Iran’s military attaché in Baghdad, Majid Gholipour, met with Iraq’s National Security Advisor, Qassem al-Araji. They discussed ways to continue cooperation in the fields of border control, prevention of smuggling, and maintaining security and stability in the region. At the same time, Iran’s ambassador to Baghdad, Mohammad Kazem Al-e Sadeq, conveyed a message from Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi to Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein (Tasnim, January 7, 2026).
The Iraqi National Security Advisor meets with the Iranian military attaché (Tasnim, January 7, 2026)
The Iraqi National Security Advisor meets with the Iranian military attaché (Tasnim, January 7, 2026)
  • Al-Araji also held a phone conversation with Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani, during which he stressed the need to prevent attempts by terrorist groups to infiltrate across the border between the two countries. It was reported that the two discussed regional developments and focused on the importance of monitoring the shared border and strengthening coordination and cooperation (Iraqi News Agency, January 13, 2026).
Militias’ support for the Iranian regime
  • The secretary-general of Kata’ib Hezbollah, Abu Hussein al-Hamidawi, made it clear to the Iranian regime and its Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, that the militia stands by them in light of the protests against the regime. He added that the “head of the front of falsehood” continues preparations to attack Tehran and that, therefore, a “religious and moral duty” requires standing by the Iranian people. Al-Hamidawi also warned the United States that “a war against Iran is not a picnic – once the fire is ignited, it will not be extinguished” (Kata’ib Hezbollah Telegram channel, January 12, 2026).
  • In this context, a “prominent leader among the Iraqi militias” stated that Iraq would take part in any action imposed on the “Axis of Resistance” and would act based on the “unity of purpose against the American occupation and the Israeli entity.” According to him, what is happening in Iran is part of an American-Israeli game aimed at “igniting the internal situation in Iran.” The “leader” stressed that attempts to weaken the regime are a “losing gamble” and that Iran is a resilient state (Al-Akhbar, January 12, 2026).

[1]The weekly study includes the activities of Iran, the Shiite militias in Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen.

Spotlight on Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (January 6-13, 2026)

Demonstration against UNRWA in the Gaza Strip (Shehab Agency, January 7, 2026)

Demonstration against UNRWA in the Gaza Strip (Shehab Agency, January 7, 2026)

Al-Sheikh and Mladenov (Wafa, January 9, 2026)

Al-Sheikh and Mladenov (Wafa, January 9, 2026)

The burning school in Jalud by Jewish settlers (Ramallah News, January 9, 2026)

News, January 9, 2026)

Abu Mazen and the Chinese special envoy (Wafa, January 7, 2026)

Abu Mazen and the Chinese special envoy (Wafa, January 7, 2026)

  • IDF forces continued operating within the Yellow Line in the Gaza Strip, locating and destroying facilities and weapons, and eliminating terrorists who attempted to attack the soldiers. Following a failed rocket launch and other violations by Hamas, the IDF attacked terrorist facilities throughout the Strip and eliminated operatives from Hamas and other terrorist organizations. The Hamas military wing renewed its searches for the last murdered Israeli hostage in the Strip.
  • There was anger among Palestinians over UNRWA’s decision to fire hundreds of employees who were forced to leave the Gaza Strip during the war. The agency was accused of “supporting the occupation’s plans.”
  • An anti-Hamas militia operating within the Yellow Line claimed responsibility for killing a Khan Yunis police official and threatened to continue attacking Hamas operatives.
  • Reportedly, elections for head of the Hamas political bureau were postponed because of the focus on negotiations for the second phase of the ceasefire agreement and in light of disagreements within the movement’s leadership in the Gaza Strip.
  • In preparation for announcing the members of the Peace Council and the technocrat committee which will manage the Gaza Strip, Hamas reiterated that it would dismantle its governing bodies. Fatah warned Hamas against attempting to prevent Palestinian Authority representation on the new administrative committee.
  • Israeli security forces continued extensive counterterrorism activity in Judea and Samaria; an IDF soldier was wounded by gunfire in Nablus.
  • Palestinian Authority chairman Mahmoud Abbas said the current year would be “the year of Palestinian democracy,” with local and general elections and strengthening the rule of law.
The IDF
  • IDF forces continued operating within the Yellow Line (territory under IDF control) in the Gaza Strip and eliminated terrorists who approached the line or attempted to cross it to attack the forces. The forces destroyed terrorist facilities and located a launcher with two rockets in the Jabalia refugee camp in the northern Strip. Following ceasefire violations by Hamas, including a failed rocket launch from the Gaza City at Israeli territory, the IDF attacked terrorist facilities and sites for the production and storage of weapons, and eliminated operatives from Hamas and other terrorist organizations, including the head of the Hamas anti-tank missile array and the head of a weapons-production workshop (IDF spokesperson, January 6–13, 2026).
The loaded rocket launcher in Jabalia (IDF spokesperson, January 8–9, 2026)    Trajectory of the failed launch.
Right: Trajectory of the failed launch. Left: The loaded rocket launcher in Jabalia
(IDF spokesperson, January 8–9, 2026)
  • The Hamas government media information office claimed that from the time the ceasefire went into effect on October 10, 2025 and January 9, 2026, Israel [allegedly] “violated” the agreement 1,193 times, leading to 484 fatalities, 1,206 wounded, and 50 “illegal” detentions. That [allegedly] included 384 incidents of shooting at civilians, 66 incursions of military vehicles into populated areas, 551 attacks and harm to civilians and their homes, and 192 incidents of destruction and demolition of buildings (Telegram channel of the Hamas government media information office, January 9, 2026).
  • “Palestinian sources” reported that Hamas complained to the mediators and ceasefire guarantor states about Israel’s continued “violations” of the agreement and warned that Israel’s targeted killings carried out on “false pretexts” could lead to the agreement’s collapse (aljazeera.net, January 9, 2026). “An Egyptian source familiar with the mediation efforts” said that an “angry message” had been received from the Hamas military wing, according to which “the fighters’ patience may run out” (al-Araby al-Jadeed, January 11, 2026).
The Last Murdered Israeli Hostage
  • Operatives from the Hamas military wing, accompanied by a Red Cross team, renewed searches in the al-Zeitoun neighborhood of Gaza City for the body of Ran Gvili, the last murdered Israeli hostage held in the Gaza Strip. “A Hamas source” told Agence France-Presse that the searches had been halted over the past two weeks because of weather conditions. Hamas spokesperson Hazem Qassem claimed that the movement continued to meet its commitments under the ceasefire agreement and was working around the clock to complete the “prisoner” exchanges despite the Israeli presence and the destruction in the Strip (Telegram channel of al-Risalah, January 7, 2026).
The Situation in the Gaza Strip
  • Hamas continued to promote its propaganda of damage to the public health system in the Gaza Strip:
    • The director of al-Shifa Medical Center in Gaza City, Mohammed Abu Salmiya, claimed that hospitals were operating at more than 150% capacity due to an [alleged] almost complete shortage of medications and medical supplies. He claimed that about 50% of nephrology patients had died because of a shortage of more than 70% of medications, and cancer patients were also suffering from a similar shortage (aljazeera.net, January 6, 2026).
    • The head of the pediatrics and maternity department at the Nasser Medical Complex in Khan Yunis reported an increase in congenital birth defects and premature births, with low birth weight caused by maternal malnutrition, lack of essential supplements, and the impact of contaminated water and smoke from burning wood (Telegram channel of journalist Isma’il Abu Omar, January 9, 2026).
    • A senior official in the Hamas Ministry of Health in the Strip, Dr. Ahed Samour, said no flu deaths had been recorded, although several patients were hospitalized in intensive care. He added that the ministry was unable to provide annual flu vaccinations to at-risk groups, including patients, the elderly and children, and noted that the ministry of health in Ramallah had 12,000 doses of flu vaccine, which Israel was [allegedly] preventing from delivery to the Strip (Safa, January 7, 2026).
    • The Hamas government media information office claimed that hospitals and water and sewage infrastructure were nearly paralyzed, and shortages of food, medications, water and fuel were worsening. It further claimed that more than 127,000 tents were unusable, affecting more than 1.5 million displaced persons (Telegram channel of the Hamas government media information office, January 9, 2026).
  • The spokesperson for civil defense in the Gaza Strip, Mahmoud Bassal, said that extracting bodies from the rubble was “very complex,” and he estimated that there were about 9,000 bodies under the rubble, while the teams had extremely limited heavy equipment, including two small excavators supplied by the Red Cross. He claimed that without urgent assistance, recovery of the bodies could take years (Shehab, January 5, 2026). The commander of Civil Defense in Gaza District, Raed al-Dahshan, estimated the number of bodies at close to 10,000 and noted that about 350 had been recovered so far (Palestine Online, January 8, 2026).
  • The director general of the Hamas government media information office, Isma’il al-Thawabta, claimed that more than 80,000 Gazans had requested to return to the Strip from abroad. He accused Israel of preventing the opening of the Rafah Crossing in both directions because it sought “displacement” from the Strip (aljazeera.net, January 6, 2026).
  • According to reports, UNRWA fired hundreds of Gazan employees who were outside the Strip during the war after they were forced to leave due to the strikes or “forced evacuation.” UNRWA said the measure was the result of a severe financial crisis which made it difficult for the agency to meet its obligations. According to “Palestinian sources,” more than 622 employees were fired at one time, including experienced teachers (al-Risalah, January 7, 2026). Teachers’ unions and UNRWA employee unions in the Strip, as well as the PLO, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), condemned UNRWA and called for it reverse the dismissals. It was also claimed that the decision “supported the occupation’s plans to damage UNRWA and undermine its role” (Wafa and Safa agencies and Telegram channels of Hamas and PIJ, January 7, 2026).
Demonstration against UNRWA in the Gaza Strip (Shehab Agency, January 7, 2026)
Demonstration against UNRWA in the Gaza Strip (Shehab Agency, January 7, 2026)
Civilian Governance
  • The Gaza City municipality reported that it was continuing rainwater drainage in several areas of the city to reduce damage, especially in low-lying areas where water collected. The municipality said it was operating under difficult conditions and suffering from a suffocating financial crisis which prevented it from paying salaries, as well as shortages of equipment and tools. It ultimately called on Gazans to exercise caution, stay away from buildings and objects that could collapse, maintain cleanliness and avoid dumping waste in streets and gathering areas to keep it out of drainage systems and prevent it from causing flooding and sewage overflow (Telegram channel of journalist Saed al-Suwairki, RT correspondent in Gaza, January 9, 2026).
  • Journalist Islam Badr claimed that a senior official in the Hamas ministry of the interior told him that starting from the morning of January 11, 2026, green ID cards would be issued. He said the ID card was official, exactly as issued before the war, and through the same mechanism (Facebook page Rafah.Cross. News, January 10, 2026). Another internet user claimed that the ministry had begun issuing green ID cards and that some people had received them, but no official announcement had yet been published by the ministry. He showed a photo of an ID card dated 10/01/2026 as proof of his claim (Telegram channel of Assistance of the World Food Programme and UNRWA in “Palestine,” January 10 and 12, 2026).
People waiting in line near the interior ministry office at the Abu Khadra Mosque junction in Gaza City to submit ID applications (Telegram channel Assistance of the World Food Programme and UNRWA in "Palestine," January 10 and 12, 2026)    The ID card issued on January 10, 2026.
Right: The ID card issued on January 10, 2026. Left: People waiting in line near the interior ministry office at the Abu Khadra Mosque junction in Gaza City to submit ID applications (Telegram channel Assistance of the World Food Programme and UNRWA in “Palestine,” January 10 and 12, 2026)
Security Governance
  • The Association of Palestinian Tribes and Clans in the Gaza Strip announced that after the extension granted to “collaborators belonging to militias supported by the occupation” to recant and surrender had expired, and as Hamas security bodies had already begun taking action against detainees from such groups, it was offering to mediate with the authorities in the Strip to regularize their status and close the files of those who wanted to repent. According to the announcement, the arrangement would be possible on the condition that they surrendered themselves to recognized mukhtars and notables or contacted them to coordinate the procedure (Safa Agency, January 7, 2026).
  • “Sources in Hamas and among Gazans” reported that several weeks ago the Hamas security forces began summoning social media activists living in the Strip as part of an investigation into the misuse of donations intended for Gazans. According to some of those summoned, the accusations were directed mainly at members of a group known as “the entrepreneurs” (al-mubadirun), social media influencers with thousands of followers who were active during the war and collected donations from Palestinians abroad and other sources to transfer to the displaced. “A source close to the investigation” added that the probe would also include heads of charities and others who collected donations from unknown sources, in light of suspicious external signs of enrichment and doubts regarding how the funds were spent (al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 6, 2026).
  • The Hamas ministry of the interior stated that on January 12, 2026, in the al-Mawasi area, the head of the criminal investigations department of the Khan Yunis police, muqaddam (lieutenant colonel) Mahmoud Ahmed al-Astal, was killed by gunfire from a passing vehicle carrying several “agents of the occupation.” The ministry also claimed the assassination was an attempt to spread chaos and continue the IDF’s targeting of commanders and operatives of the security mechanisms and police, after more than 2,700 of them had been killed during the war, constituting 15% of the ministry’s manpower (Telegram channel of the Hamas ministry of the interior and national security, January 12, 2026). Hussam al-Astal, leader of a militia operating in the Qizan al-Najjar area of Khan Yunis District, which is under Israeli control, claimed responsibility for the assassination, which was carried out outside the Yellow Line, and stated that it was part of a “campaign against senior Hamas figures.” Al-Astal threatened to continue attacking Hamas operatives and declared that “what is coming is greater and the surprises will be many” (Facebook page of Hussam al-Astal, January 12, 2026).
  • According to reports, Hamas gunmen killed Karam Fares al-Danaf, 14 years old, in Deir al-Balah in the central Gaza Strip after firing at his family’s car while he was inside (Telegram channel Jusoor News Gaza, January 12, 2026).
International Activity to Lift the “Siege”
  • The organizers of the Global Sumud (Steadfastness) Flotilla submitted a request to the Egyptian government to allow the passage of a humanitarian land convoy to the Gaza Strip via the Rafah Crossing. Reportedly, the convoy is attempting to enter Egypt through the crossing on the Libyan border and then continue safely through Egyptian territory toward the Strip’s border (Telegram channel of journalist Abu Joud, January 8, 2026).
"Will Egypt respond? The al-Sumud fleet demands facilitation of a humanitarian convoy to Gaza" (Telegram channel of journalist Abu Joud, January 8, 2026)
“Will Egypt respond? The al-Sumud fleet demands facilitation of a humanitarian convoy to Gaza” (Telegram channel of journalist Abu Joud, January 8, 2026)
  • “Senior Hamas officials” said the movement decided to postpone the elections for head of the general political bureau, which were scheduled to take place during the first ten days of January 2026; no new date has been set, but “they could take place at any moment.” “One source” attributed the postponement to security and political circumstances and to the Hamas preoccupation with negotiations on moving to the second phase of the ceasefire, with intensified efforts on the issue by the mediators. “Additional sources” said the elections were postponed for other reasons, including disagreements which had intensified in recent days due to strong opposition voiced by most leadership levels, administrative bodies and others, to the internal arrangements that recently took place in the Gaza leadership under the leadership of Ali al-Amoudi (al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 11, 2026).
  • “A senior American official” confirmed that Bulgarian diplomat Nikolay Mladenov, who served as the UN special coordinator for the Middle East peace process from 2015 to 2020, was the American administration’s choice for the position of director of day-to-day affairs on the ground of the Peace Council (AP, January 9, 2026). In response, senior Hamas official Mahmoud Mardawi claimed that Mladenov’s name had not been formally presented to them and said the primary test was conduct on the ground and they rejected any form of external trusteeship (Al Jazeera Mubasher YouTube channel, January 10, 2026).
  • American mediator Bishara Bahbah, a businessman of Palestinian origin, said the United States, Britain, Germany, Italy, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt would participate in the Peace Council with the participation of heads of state or prime ministers, and added that there was talk of adding the president of the International Monetary Fund, the president of the World Bank, and another figure heading an international institution to the Council. He said he expected the Peace Council to convene on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum meetings in Davos in the third week of January 2026. Regarding names for the committee to manage the Gaza Strip, Bahbah said that the names were not yet precisely known, and all that could be said was that the people nominated for the committee were from the Strip, whether they currently lived there or were of Gazan origin. Regarding Hamas’ status and its potential exit from the political arena, Bahbah said the central issue was Israel and the United States’ demand that Hamas disarm, and he acknowledged that there were currently no mechanisms or negotiations on this matter. He said Hamas would not agree to disarm without explicit guarantees that would prevent Israel from violating the agreement (al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 10, 2026).
  • Senior Hamas official Mohammed Nazzal said that the movement had submitted a list of 40 names to the authorities in Egypt from which the administrators of the technocratic committee to manage the Strip would be chosen (Al Jazeera, January 12, 2026). Hamas spokesperson Hazem Qassem called for expediting the establishment of the technocrat committee and added that Hamas had a clear decision to dissolve the governing bodies managing affairs in the Gaza Strip and transfer them to the committee. He claimed Hamas would facilitate the committee in its role and the success of its work (Telegram channel of Hazem Qassem, January 10, 2026).
  • In preparation for the publication of the names of the committee members, public disputes between Hamas and Fatah resurfaced. Fatah spokesperson in the Gaza Strip, Munther al-Hayek, warned that if Hamas agreed to establish a technocrat committee without representation of the Palestinian Authority, it would lead to division and prevent cooperation among the “factions.”[2] He demanded that Hamas representatives meet with the mediators in Egypt and declare that they would not agree to a committee which was not subordinate to the Palestinian Authority. He added that international control over the Gaza Strip would also create a separation between the Strip and Judea and Samaria (Sama Agency, January 12, 2026). Hamas spokesperson Hazem Qassem called on the Palestinian Authority leadership to respond to the “positive positions” presented by the movement to reach internal Palestinian arrangements and progress toward national consensus. He said that no Palestinian party benefitted from the current situation and added that the Palestinian Authority leadership was mistaken if it believed it could benefit from the disaster in the Gaza Strip (Telegram channel of Hazem Qassem, January 12, 2026).
  • Deputy secretary general of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Muhammad al-Hindi, accused the “occupation” of delaying the establishment of the technocrat committee. He said Israel refused to involve the Palestinian Authority in managing the Strip and was exploiting the first phase of the agreement to “eliminate senior figures and entrench its occupation.” He added that the “resistance”[3] was an inseparable part of the Palestinian people and could not be eliminated (Al Jazeera, January 12, 2026).
  • Hamas political bureau member Bassem Na’im said the American plan to end the war in the Gaza Strip had stalled due to Prime Minister Netanyahu’s determination “to evade his commitments and escalate in order to sabotage the agreement and return to fighting.” Na’im claimed that the “resistance” had met all its commitments under the agreement, as allegedly attested by the mediators and the Americans themselves, and was prepared to conduct itself “in a positive and constructive manner” with the next steps of the plan (Telegram channel of Bassem Na’im , January 9, 2026).
Involvement of the Palestinian Authority in the Gaza Strip
  • At the opening of the 13th session of the Revolutionary Council, Palestinian Authority chairman Abu Mazen stated that implementing the second phase of the American plan for the Gaza Strip had to begin, including full Israeli withdrawal, an end to Hamas rule, and the establishment of a Palestinian transitional committee to manage the Strip that would be subordinate to the Palestinian government, while claiming that the Gaza Strip was an integral part of the “Palestinian state” (Wafa, January 9, 2026).
  • Deputy chairman of the Palestinian Authority, Hussein al-Sheikh, met in Ramallah with Nikolay Mladenov. Al-Sheikh reiterated the need to implement the second phase of the American plan and the importance of maintaining an institutional link between the Strip and the Palestinian Authority in Judea and Samaria. He added that alongside advancing the plan in the Gaza Strip, tax revenues had to be released and unilateral measures in Judea and Samaria had to stop, including “settler terrorism” and settlement expansion (Wafa, January 9, 2026).
Al-Sheikh and Mladenov (Wafa, January 9, 2026)
Al-Sheikh and Mladenov (Wafa, January 9, 2026)
Counterterrorist Activity
  • This past week Israeli security forces continued counterterrorist activity throughout Judea and Samaria. The forces detained wanted individuals and suspects involved in terrorism, including a terrorist cell from the Hebron area which was planning to carry out an attack in the immediate future and Palestinians suspected of throwing rocks. Lathes for manufacturing weapons and military equipment used for terrorist activity were seized, along with thousands of shekels for financing terrorist activity. The forces also detained a Hamas terrorist suspected of shooting and wounding an IDF soldier during an activity in Nablus and eliminated a terrorist who threw Molotov cocktails. At Bir Zeit University, Israeli security forces clashed with hundreds of Palestinian who attempted to hold a terrorism-supporting event (IDF spokesperson, January 6–13, 2026).
Friction between Palestinians and Settlers
  • This past week there were several violent incidents between Israeli settlers and Palestinians. Dozens of masked Israelis vandalized property near the settlement of Shavei Shomron, set Palestinian vehicles on fire and attacked a Palestinian who was inside one of the vehicles; two Palestinians were wounded. IDF forces detained three suspects (IDF spokesperson, January 8, 2026). In the village of Bazaria, near Nablus, Jewish settlers burned six vehicles and spray-painted racist slogans on the walls of several homes (al-Araby al-Jadeed, January 9, 2026). Settlers burned down the school building in Jalud (Ramallah News, January 9, 2026).
The burning school in Jalud by Jewish settlers (Ramallah News, January 9, 2026)        The burning school in Jalud by Jewish settlers (Ramallah News, January 9, 2026)
The burning school in Jalud by Jewish settlers (Ramallah News, January 9, 2026)
  • In response to the incidents, a leaflet calling on Palestinians to burn Israeli settlers was circulated on Palestinian social media (Telegram channel Palestine News Network, January 9, 2026).
"They burned schools in the village of Jalud, they burned cars in the village of Bazaria; we will burn them before they steal our land and our property" (Telegram channel Palestine News Network, January 9, 2026)
“They burned schools in the village of Jalud, they burned cars in the village of Bazaria; we will burn them before they steal our land and our property” (Telegram channel Palestine News Network, January 9, 2026)
Diplomatic Activity
  • PA chairman Abu Mazen met in Ramallah with the Chinese envoy to the Middle East, Zhai Jun, and thanked him for the humanitarian assistance China provides to the Palestinians. Abu Mazen welcomed the invitation from Chinese President Xi Jinping to participate in the Arab–Chinese summit to be held in Beijing in June 2026 and noted the importance of continuing international efforts to end the “occupation” and achieve independence for a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital (Wafa, January 7, 2026).
Abu Mazen and the Chinese special envoy (Wafa, January 7, 2026)
Abu Mazen and the Chinese special envoy (Wafa, January 7, 2026)
  • In his opening address to the 13th session of the Revolutionary Council at the “presidential” headquarters in Ramallah, Abu Mazen declared that 2026 would be “the year of Palestinian democracy,” claiming that it would be devoted to promoting reforms and preparing for elections: local elections in April, a Fatah conference and elections for the Palestinian National Council later in the year, followed by general elections. He said elections would be held in the Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria, and East Jerusalem as a single unit, and at the same time presented a reform plan to strengthen the rule of law and good governance, increase transparency and accountability, and fortify the separation of powers, including updating election laws and the political parties’ law (al-Arabi al-Jadeed, January 9, 2026).
The Palestinian Authority Security Forces
  • Hamas claimed that the PA security forces in Judea and Samaria, especially in Jenin, had increased political arrests of leaders, activists, students and other groups, which, according to the PA, were escalating internal tension during a sensitive period. According to Hamas, the arrests served Israel by harming opponents, elected officials, and critical voices, at a time when Judea and Samaria were dealing with “escalation, settlement expansion, annexation and displacement, as well as daily attacks by settlers [allegedly].” Hamas warned against the continuation of the policy and called for an immediate halt to all political arrests, the release of all detainees held for their opinions and national affiliation, and directing efforts toward confronting Israel instead of “internal persecution” (Hamas Telegram channel, January 10, 2026).

[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications.
[2] Terrorist organizations.
[3] The Palestinian terrorist organizations.

Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah and Lebanon (January 5-12, 2026)

President Aoun during an interview (al-Jadeed, January 11, 2026)

President Aoun during an interview (al-Jadeed, January 11, 2026)

Lacroix visits south Lebanon (UNIFIL Telegram channel, January 6, 2026)

Lacroix visits south Lebanon (UNIFIL Telegram channel, January 6, 2026)

Aoun with the Iranian delegation (X account of the Lebanese presidency, January 9, 2026)

Aoun with the Iranian delegation (X account of the Lebanese presidency, January 9, 2026)

Araghchi visits Nasrallah's grave (Tasnim, January 8, 2026)

Araghchi visits Nasrallah's grave (Tasnim, January 8, 2026)

"Hezbollah's weapons will destroy Hezbollah's operatives like ravenous animals!" Netanyahu, who stands at the head of the Lebanese people against Hezbollah, says, "It's over" (X account of Saer Sabil, January 7, 2026)

DR-3 cruise missiles discovered in a Hezbollah warehouse.

DR-3 cruise missiles discovered in a Hezbollah warehouse.

Overview[1]
  • The IDF continued attacking Hezbollah targets in south Lebanon and in the Beqa’a Valley to enforce the ceasefire agreement of November 2024 and to prevent the organization’s renewed military buildup. The forces attacked weapons depots above and below ground, launch sites and launchers, and eliminated five Hezbollah operatives. Hamas military sites in south Lebanon were also attacked.
  • Aoun, the Lebanese president, maintained “cautious optimism” and said the risk of a large-scale war had been almost completely eliminated despite the continued Israeli attacks, noting that reaching understandings with Israel would be a significant step toward peace.
  • The Lebanese army announced it had achieved “operational control” in the area south of the Litani River as part of the first phase of achieving a state monopoly on weapons, but the government has still not set timetables for the continued disarmament of Hezbollah. The Lebanese foreign minister claimed the Lebanese army would be capable of confronting Hezbollah if necessary.
  • The Iranian foreign minister visited Lebanon and met with the country’s leadership and with Hezbollah’s secretary general. He said Iran wanted to strengthen bilateral economic and political ties and claimed that Tehran supported Hezbollah as a “resistance” organization but did not interfere in Lebanon’s internal affairs.
  • A member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament said an American attack on Iran would lead to wide-scale regional escalation.
  • According to reports, mid-level Hezbollah officials have begun moving their families and assets out of Lebanon, mainly to Latin America.
Israel-Hezbollah Tensions
The IDF
  • This past week the IDF continued attacking Hezbollah targets to enforce the November 2024 ceasefire agreement and prevent Hezbollah’s renewed military buildup. In south Lebanon and in the Beqa’a Valley the forces attacked Hezbollah weapons depots above and below ground, launch sites and launchers, military structures and engineering equipment used to rehabilitate military facilities. Five Hezbollah operatives were eliminated, including two operatives from the organization’s aerial unit (127) (IDF spokesperson, January 5–12, 2026). Lebanese media reported five fatalities and at least five wounded in the Israeli attacks (al-Nashra, January 5–12, 2026). Media outlets identified with Hezbollah reported five operatives killed, one of whom was a member of the Bint Jbeil municipal council (Telegram channels South Lebanon – Watching the Enemy and Balaa’, January 5–12, 2026).
  • “Sources in Lebanon” claimed that the Lebanese leadership had been notified that if Israel launched a campaign against Hezbollah, it would focus aerial attacks on military facilities and carry out limited ground operations, but no large-scale invasion, avoiding harm to state institutions and providing safe corridors for civilians, as long as the Lebanese government did not intervene on the organization’s behalf. Harsher messages were reportedly conveyed to the political echelon in Beirut, warning that Israel was preparing large-scale attacks, especially if Hezbollah intervened in a possible confrontation between Israel and Iran. According to the “sources,” the messages were not “media intimidation” but rather serious strategic warnings intended to make it clear that time was running out for Hezbollah and its refusal to relinquish its strategic capabilities significantly increased the likelihood of imminent escalation (Nidaa’ al-Watan, January 6 and 12, 2026).
Hezbollah
  • According to the Hezbollah block in the Lebanese Parliament, the State of Lebanon, the people, the army and the “resistance”[2] had honored their commitments to the November 2024 ceasefire agreement south of the Litani River. Hezbollah said that responsibility now lay with the government, whose duty it was to pressure Israel to meet its commitments (foremost by halting the attacks and withdrawing fully from the territories it “occupied”) while not making concessions which could encourage the “enemy” to continue exerting pressure. The bloc called on all Lebanese to unite around a single position against the “occupation” and warned against sowing internal division. At the same time, it criticized the United States, claiming that its regional policy undermined international order and brought the region closer to chaos (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, January 8, 2026).
  • “Security sources in Lebanon” claimed that Hezbollah had begun a covert redeployment of forces and strategic weapons, based on the assumption that a broad confrontation with Israel was approaching and to be able to respond after absorbing a first attack. The measure, reportedly taken following information about American backing for an Israeli attack, includes transferring elite units, missiles and advanced weapons to mountainous hinterland areas north of the Litani River, and concealing sensitive assets to reduce damage in an opening blow (Aram News, September 6, 2026).
The Lebanese Government
  • Lebanese President Joseph Aoun claimed the wave of Israeli attacks on January 5–6, 2026, on Hezbollah and Hamas targets was meant to undermine international efforts to contain escalation. He said that the timing of the attacks, on the eve of the meeting of the ceasefire oversight committee, raised questions about Israel’s intentions. He said that Lebanon was cooperating with the international community and the Lebanese army was taking thorough, decisive action to disarm Hezbollah south of the Litani River (X account of the Lebanese presidency, January 6, 2026).
  • In an interview marking one year in office, Aoun again expressed “cautious optimism,” saying that the risk of a large-scale war or an Israeli ground invasion had largely been eliminated, although the attacks might continue for a long time. He said Lebanese efforts were currently focused on formulating a security agreement, Israeli withdrawal, the cessation of hostilities, the return of Lebanese prisoners held in Israel and a solution to the border issue. He said that would be a significant step toward peace, but “peace is a state of non-belligerence” and Israel need not fear for the security of its northern communities (Telegram channel of the Lebanese presidency and LBCI, January 11, 2026).
President Aoun during an interview (al-Jadeed, January 11, 2026)
President Aoun during an interview (al-Jadeed, January 11, 2026)
  • Lebanon’s foreign minister, Joseph Rajji, said Lebanon was still officially in a state of war with Israel. Interviewed by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, he said normalization with Israel was a taboo subject in Lebanon and public calls to discuss peace were marginal, and the same applied to economic cooperation promoted by Israeli actors (al-Nahar, January 7, 2026).
The Lebanese Army
  • “Sources in Egypt and Lebanon” reported that as part of increasing bilateral military cooperation, dozens of Egyptian military advisors were sent to Lebanon over the past two months. According to the “sources,” Egypt is assisting the Lebanese army in upgrading its intelligence capabilities and is examining the transfer of weapons, armored vehicles and aerial defense systems. They said the objective was to strengthen Lebanese state institutions through the army, not to provide direct assistance in disarming Hezbollah (The National, January 6, 2026).
UNIFIL
  • Lebanese President Joseph Aoun met with the UN undersecretary general for peace operations, Jean-Pierre Lacroix, and told him that Lebanon welcomed any country willing to deploy in south Lebanon following the completion of UNIFIL’s withdrawal at the end of its mandate in late 2026, and to operate according to an agreement defining its activity alongside the Lebanese army (X account of the Lebanese presidency, January 7, 2026). Aoun also said the number of Lebanese army forces in the south was expected to gradually increase to more than 10,000 soldiers and officers. He claimed completion of the army’s deployment to the southern border was delayed by Israel’s continued hold on occupied areas and its failure to comply with the agreement, and said the Lebanese army was carrying out its missions south of the Litani River, adding that Israeli and internal claims regarding its failure were unfounded (Lebanese National News Agency, January 7, 2026).
  • During his visit to Lebanon, Lacroix toured south Lebanon with the UNIFIL command and visited the force’s positions along the Blue Line (UNIFIL Telegram channel, January 6, 2026).
Lacroix visits south Lebanon (UNIFIL Telegram channel, January 6, 2026)
Lacroix visits south Lebanon (UNIFIL Telegram channel, January 6, 2026)
The Iranian Foreign Minister Visits Lebanon
  • Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi visited Lebanon and met with state leaders and with Hezbollah, with discussions focusing on strengthening economic and political ties between the countries and discussing regional security challenges:
  • Lebanese President Joseph Aoun told Araghchi that Lebanon was interested in developing relations with Iran, including economic and trade relations, but on the basis of mutual respect and non-interference in Lebanon’s internal affairs. Araghchi said Tehran supported Lebanon’s independence and sovereignty over all its territory and its desire to strengthen bilateral relations (X account of the Lebanese presidency, January 9, 2026).
Aoun with the Iranian delegation (X account of the Lebanese presidency, January 9, 2026)
Aoun with the Iranian delegation (X account of the
 Lebanese presidency, January 9, 2026)
  • Lebanese Foreign Minister Joseph Rajji welcomed relations with Iran but called for directing all assistance to the state and its institutions, and said exclusivity of weapons and decisions regarding war and peace had to rest solely with the state. He called on Iran to help shape a new approach to the issue of Hezbollah’s weapons and noted that Lebanon’s reconstruction was being delayed because donor states conditioned their aid on progress in disarming Hezbollah. Araghchi said Iran sought relations with Lebanon based on mutual respect and sovereignty, supported its unity and did not interfere in its decisions, and responsibility for Lebanon’s defense lay with its government. He claimed Iran supported Hezbollah as a “resistance” organization[3] but left decisions regarding Lebanon to the Lebanese (MTV, January 9, 2026).
  • Hezbollah secretary general Na’im Qassem told Araghchi that Israel and the United States were guilty of continuing “aggression” and “violations” of the November 2024 ceasefire agreement, despite his claim that Lebanon had fulfilled its obligations south of the Litani River. Qassem added that Hezbollah would continue to cooperate with the Lebanese state and army in the “struggle” against Israel. Araghchi noted Iran’s desire to strengthen ties with Lebanon and said the objective of the economic delegation accompanying him was to expand cooperation in various fields (al-Manar, January 9, 2026). Araghchi also visited the burial site of former Hezbollah secretary general Hassan Nasrallah (Tasnim, January 8, 2026).
Araghchi visits Nasrallah's grave (Tasnim, January 8, 2026)
Araghchi visits Nasrallah’s grave (Tasnim, January 8, 2026)
  • “Sources” reported that security services at Beirut airport prevented the Iranian delegation accompanying Foreign Minister Araghchi from bringing four suitcases into the country and returned them to the aircraft (al-Jadeed, January 9, 2026).
  • The leader of the Christian Phalange Party, Sami Gemayel, spoke out against the Iranian foreign minister’s visit, saying that Iranian rhetoric regarding Lebanon was blatantly hypocritical. While Araghchi publicly spoke of “shared interests” and equal relations, in practice Tehran continued to treat Lebanon as a satellite state and a regional bargaining chip. He added that the gap between Iranian rhetoric and behavior indicated its disregard for Lebanese sovereignty and cast a shadow over the visit itself, which was perceived as carrying out a political agenda that went beyond the outwardly “conciliatory” messages (X account of Sami Gemayel, January 9, 2026).
Challenges for Hezbollah[4]

Disarmament

  • On January 8, 2026, the army commander told the government that the objectives of the first phase had been achieved. He said the army had successfully established control south of the Litani River “in an effective and tangible manner,” except for areas remaining under “Israeli occupation.” It was reported that ministers opposed to Hezbollah demanded timetables, while ministers from Hezbollah and Amal conditioned progress on halting Israeli “violations.” The government instructed the army to prepare a plan for disarmament north of the Litani River, but no schedule was set. Hezbollah avoided directly relating to the army’s announcement but reiterated its position that Lebanon in general and the organization in particular had fully implemented the ceasefire agreement and Israel had to honor its commitments.[5]
  • The Lebanese foreign minister, Joseph Rajji, accused Hezbollah of “lying or not knowing how to read” because of its threat of civil war if the Lebanese army continued disarming the organization north of the Litani River. According to him, the warnings were an overt attempt to blackmail the Lebanese government. Rajji said Hezbollah was trying to buy time in order to reorganize its ranks and maintain its dominance in the country. He also claimed that the Lebanese army was capable of confronting Hezbollah militarily, if necessary (al-Nahar, January 7, 2026).
"Hezbollah's weapons will destroy Hezbollah's operatives like ravenous animals!" Netanyahu, who stands at the head of the Lebanese people against Hezbollah, says, "It's over" (X account of Saer Sabil, January 7, 2026)
“Hezbollah’s weapons will destroy Hezbollah’s operatives like ravenous animals!” Netanyahu, who stands at the head of the Lebanese people against Hezbollah, says, “It’s over” (X account of Saer Sabil, January 7, 2026)
  • On the eve of the cabinet meeting, Lebanese media published photographs from an underground Hezbollah facility in south Lebanon, extending hundreds of meters between Kafra and Siddiqine, south of the Litani River, which army forces entered in late December 2025. Large quantities of ammunition and advanced equipment were discovered at the site, including old Soviet-model reconnaissance UAVs used for intelligence collection and several dismantled DR-3 cruise missiles of Russian manufacture. According to reports, the forces are still neutralizing the facility and it is estimated that the work will continue for another week (al-Jadeed, January 7, 2026). Experts noted that the size of the facility, its structure and interior point to a central storage and distribution site rather than a routine warehouse. According to “military sources,” the exposure of the site dovetailed with data presented by the Lebanese army on the detection of tunnels, weapons depots and a wide deployment of forces in the south, illustrating that the process of dismantling armed infrastructure south of the Litani River was progressing, but what has been revealed to the Lebanese public is only the tip of the iceberg (al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 10, 2026). Hezbollah-affiliated media outlets quickly downplayed the significance of the exposure and claimed that it was an old facility dating back to the Second Lebanon War in 2006. Hezbollah claimed that “resistance is not measured by a facility that received a new name or gained media attention, and it does not tremble because of a photograph in a room that tries to cause chaos, because resistance is a way of life” (Telegram channel South Lebanon – Watching the Enemy, January 7, 2026). Reportedly, the Lebanese army arrested the soldier who took the photographs as well as another soldier who appeared in them. The arrest was allegedly prompted by a public furor and claims of “dishonoring the resistance” (al-Akhbar, January 7, 2026).
a Lebanese soldier next to ammunition crates in the warehouse (al-Jadeed, January 7, 2026)      DR-3 cruise missiles discovered in a Hezbollah warehouse.
Right: DR-3 cruise missiles discovered in a Hezbollah warehouse. Left: a Lebanese soldier next to ammunition crates in the warehouse (al-Jadeed, January 7, 2026)
  • According to reports, while Egypt, France and Arab countries are working to restrain Hezbollah’s capabilities, Turkey views the organization’s weapons from a different strategic perspective, derived from its broader confrontation with Israel and efforts to establish an Israeli–Greek–Cypriot axis. According to the report, Turkey is trying to increase cooperation with Iran, and direct communication channels between the Turkish embassy in Beirut and Hezbollah’s leadership have also been recorded, indicating a Turkish willingness to dialogue directly with the organization and examine the issue of its weapons not merely as an internal Lebanese problem, but as a component of the regional balance of power vis-à-vis Israel (al-Diyar, January 10, 2026).
The Challenge of Hezbollah’s Reconstruction
  • “Sources in Lebanon” reported that Hezbollah was reorganizing its command, control and internal security structures as part of preparations for a future confrontation with Israel and efforts to reduce its vulnerability to targeted killings and intelligence penetration. The organization is replacing well-known command figures with anonymous commanders, canceling or merging units and adopting a more decentralized, covert, compartmentalized structure, including deep changes in the liaison and coordination unit and a reduction in the importance and influence of the head of the liaison and coordination unit, Wafiq Safa. Meanwhile, increasing erosion is being recorded among the mid-level ranks which bear an operational, organizational and social burden, a situation the leadership is trying to contain but which is perceived as an indicator of increasing internal sensitivity (Aram News, January 9, 2026; al-Madan, January 7, 2026).
  • In addition, “sources” pointed to the fact that in recent months, mid-level and financial figures in Hezbollah have begun moving their families and assets out of Lebanon, mainly to destinations in Latin America, using old networks, alternative citizenships and shell companies. Beyond the economic aspect, the move has distinct propaganda and political significance, reflecting some operatives’ lack of confidence in the resilience of the Lebanese arena, and creating a gap between the rhetoric of sacrifice, and confrontation and personal conduct aimed at securing escape routes in the event of broad escalation or internal collapse (al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 8, 2026).
The Challenge of Civilian Rehabilitation
  • Reportedly, Hezbollah secretary general Na’im Qassem ordered an internal investigation to examine failures and restore confidence in the organization following residents’ claims of inequality in the distribution of compensation and the slow reconstruction of damages in south Lebanon villages, the Beqa’a Valley and the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia. The measure reflects recognition at the leadership level that failures in managing compensation and rehabilitation could become politically and socially explosive, especially at the current time marked by erosion, public pressure and preparation for a possible confrontation (al-Madan, January 7, 2026).
Hezbollah–Iran Relations
  • Given the American threats to take action against Iran if the protests against the regime are suppressed, Hassan Ezzeddine, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, warned that any American attack on Iran would lead to wide-scale regional escalation and create a volatile situation of unpredictable consequences. He accused the United States of aggressive conduct and contempt for international law, claiming it was a bully and used force, but would not achieve its objectives. He stressed Iran’s resilience and its ability to cope with pressures and crises, and represented it as the anchor of the “resistance axis”[6] and a defender of the Shi’ite community and oppressed peoples in the region (Telegram channel Balaa’ Media, January 10, 2026).
  • An analytical article on the current relationship between Iran and Hezbollah noted the ambiguity and lack of uniformity at the top of the Iranian leadership regarding Hezbollah’s future and its role in Lebanon. According to the article, the envoy of Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, Ali Hassan Khalil, was sent to Tehran to clarify “guidelines for the next phase,” given the confusion and contradictions within Hezbollah itself, which has lost its unity and now operates through several power centers with conflicting agendas. In Khalil’s meetings in Tehran, a sharp gap reportedly emerged between the Iranian political echelon, which emphasizes restraint, preservation of Hezbollah’s strength and avoidance of escalation in light of negotiations with the United States, and the Revolutionary Guards, who push for rehabilitating militarycapabilities and renewed confrontation with Israel, arguing that only force deters Israel and the United States, and opposing talk of restraint. According to the article, Khalil returned to Lebanon without answers, reinforcing Hezbollah’s confusion and strategic embarrassment (al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 8, 2026).
The Palestinians in Lebanon
  • The IDF attacked sites for the production of weapons and other Hamas military facilities in south Lebanon, including in the Sidon area (IDF spokesperson, January 5, 2026). In response, a “senior Hamas official” claimed that Israel was using “false pretexts” regarding the existence of the movement’s military facilities in Lebanon to justify the continuation of its military operations in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon (al-Jazeera, January 5, 2026).

[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications.
[2] Hezbollah and the other terrorist organizations operating in Lebanon.
[3] Terrorist organization intent on destroying the State of Israel.
[4] See the December 2025 ITIC report, Hezbollah: One Year After the Ceasefire.
[5] See the January 2026 ITIC report, "The Completion of the First Phase of Hezbollah's Disarmament."
[6] Iran, Hezbollah, the Palestinian terrorist organizations, the Houthis in Yemen and the Shi'ite militias in Iraq.

The Completion of the First Phase of Hezbollah’s Disarmament

Lebanese army commander Haykal presents the report at the cabinet meeting (Facebook page of the Lebanese presidency, January 8, 2026)

Lebanese army commander Haykal presents the report at the cabinet meeting (Facebook page of the Lebanese presidency, January 8, 2026)

Disarmament south of the Litani River: a Lebanese soldier entering a tunnel in south Lebanon, with challenges awaiting (al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 9, 2026)

Disarmament south of the Litani River: a Lebanese soldier entering a tunnel in south Lebanon, with challenges awaiting (al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 9, 2026)

Prime Minister Salam (MTV Lebanon X account, January 8, 2026)

Prime Minister Salam (MTV Lebanon X account, January 8, 2026)

Rajji meets with Araghchi (X account of Youssef Rajji, January 9, 2026)

Rajji meets with Araghchi (X account of Youssef Rajji, January 9, 2026)

Overview[1]
  • On January 8, 2026, the commander of the Lebanese army, Rodolph Haykal, informed the Lebanese government that the first phase of the state’s monopoly on weapons had been successfully implemented south of the Litani River except for areas under IDF control.
  • The government ministers opposed to Hezbollah demanded a schedule for continuing disarmament, while Hezbollah and Amal ministers conditioned progress on halting Israeli “violations.” The government instructed the army to prepare a plan for disarmament north of the Litani River, but no schedule was set.
  • Hezbollah did not directly relate to the army’s announcement, reiterating its position that Lebanon in general and the organization in particular had fully implemented the ceasefire agreement, and Israel had to honor its commitments.
  • Lebanon’s president, prime minister and parliament speaker welcomed the announcement, noting that the army had to be provided with the tools required for its missions. Prime Minister Salam said the role of the “resistance” had ended with Israel’s withdrawal from south Lebanon in 2000, and that today only the state and the army defended Lebanon.
  • Hezbollah’s political opponents were dissatisfied with the delay in disarming the organization, noting that made it difficult for the country to rehabilitate itself after the war. The Lebanese foreign minister met in Beirut with the Iranian foreign minister and made it clear to him that Hezbollah had to disarm in accordance with the government decision.
  • Lebanon is apparently taking a time-out in implementing the state’s monopoly on weapons. The first phase, south of the Litani River, is being represented as an achievement, but with no decision to move northward and an attempt to buy time with the argument that first Israel has to end its “violations” of the ceasefire agreement. In ITIC assessment, in the foreseeable future the army will expand its deployment in south Lebanon and make preparations for disarmament north of the Litani River, but without a binding schedule because of Hezbollah’s lack of cooperation. In all probability, transitioning to the second phase will remain a declarative goal, dependent mainly on Israeli and international pressure and on an internal political consensus which has yet to ripen.
The Lebanese Army Statement
  • In early August 2025, the Lebanese government instructed the army to prepare a plan to disarm and dismantle all “militias,”[2] including Hezbollah, by the end of 2025, in order to realize the vision of the state’s monopoly on weapons, as declared by President Joseph Aoun in his inaugural speech on January 9, 2025, and as set out in the basic guidelines of the Nawaf Salam government in February 2025[3]
  • In early September 2025, the Lebanese government adopted army commander Rodolph Haykal’s five-phase plan: first, completion of the army’s disarmament work in the area south of the Litani River; second, disarming the area between the Litani River and the Awali River; third, Beirut and its surrounding areas; fourth, the Beqa’a Valley region; and fifth, ensuring the state’s monopoly on weapons throughout all of Lebanon.[4]
  • Although in theory the government decision related to disarming the entire country, in practice, during the first phase the Lebanese army focused solely on the area south of the Litani River. Each month, the army commander submitted a progress report, with the goal of completing the mission by the end of 2025. The army reported locating and confiscating weapons, sealing tunnels and blocking arms-smuggling routes. UNIFIL also reported that its forces had identified more than 360 weapons depots in south Lebanon, which were transferred to the Lebanese army (al-Araby al-Jadeed, November 27, 2025).[5]
  • On January 8, 2026, the army commander told the government that the objectives of the first phase had been achieved. He said the army had successfully established control south of the Litani River “in an effective and tangible manner,” except for areas remaining under “Israeli occupation” (Lebanese army X account, January 8, 2026):
    • The army focused on expanding its operational presence in the specific area and continues with the aim of preventing “armed groups” from fully restoring their military capabilities.
    • The army will continue to deal with tunnels and remaining weapons in the area and in its assessment the disarmament program has reached an advanced stage.
    • The “ongoing Israeli aggression” in Lebanon, including “violations” of the November 2024 ceasefire agreement and the continued “occupation” of parts of the country, damages the army’s ability to implement the plan, particularly concentrating all weapons in the hands of the state and establishing its control in the south. The army claimed that limits its freedom of action and prevents access to certain areas.
    • The transfer of military aid promised to Lebanon has been delayed, directly impacting the pace of carrying out the required actions.
    • The army is committed to taking full responsibility for security and stability in the country, especially south of the Litani River, and in coordination with the other Lebanese security forces. The army is acting in accordance with the state’s decision to restore security to and prevent military action in south Lebanon, as part of consolidating its sovereignty over all its territory.
  • “Government sources” said that Haykal presented data on the quantity and types of weapons and ammunition confiscated, including in Palestinian refugee camps, and on facilities now under army control. He also noted that movement to and from Palestinian refugee camps south of the Litani River is under army supervision. He reported that the army had closed more than 70 illegal sites along the border with Syria and created the conditions for implementing government ministries’ programs in south Lebanon (al-Diyar, January 8, 2026).
Lebanese army commander Haykal presents the report at the cabinet meeting (Facebook page of the Lebanese presidency, January 8, 2026)
Lebanese army commander Haykal presents the report at the cabinet meeting
(Facebook page of the Lebanese presidency, January 8, 2026)
  • Lebanon’s minister of information, Paul Morcos, said ministers had been briefed on the Lebanese army’s proposal for disarming Hezbollah and praised the army’s efforts in the area south of the Litani River, with emphasis on establishing practical control. He also praised the army’s activity north of the Litani River, including efforts to contain and take control of weapons, prevent drug smuggling at the borders, and strengthen the fight against terrorism. He said the government noted the need to continue implementing the plan and to accelerate its execution as far as possible, noting that the government had instructed a plan to be prepared for the area north of the Litani River. He said the plan would be presented part of the army’s next monthly report to the government, expected to take place in February 2026 (al-Nashra, January 8, 2026).
  • “Sources” said that the meeting had been previously coordinated by President Joseph Aoun, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and army commander Haykal, and had ended without unusual confrontation, but also without a decision for expanding the activity. Ministers from Amal and Hezbollah adhered to the position that Lebanon had fulfilled its part of the agreement, adding that UN Security Council Resolution 1701 required disarmament only south of the Litani River, and conditioned progress on Israeli withdrawal and the cessation of strikes. Ministers from the Lebanese Forces and the Phalanges demanded a definite schedule for disarmament throughout the country by the end of March 2026. President Aoun blocked setting target dates, called for a “realistic” approach and instructed the army to prepare a plan for north of the Litani River, but without an immediate operational commitment, while keeping the issue in a state of “cautious postponement” (al-Akhbar, January 9, 2026).
  • Subsequently, “sources in Lebanon” described the status of the disarmament plan for north of the Litani River as “neither married nor divorced,” that is, not full disarmament but rather a “containment” to buy time. The “sources” reported that after the dispute at the meeting between ministers from the Lebanese Forces and ministers from Hezbollah and Amal, the army was instructed to an assessment on the “control of weapons” north of the Litani River, without a timetable and without a decision in principle on disarmament. Thus, the meeting concluded leaving the issue of disarmament north of the Litani River hanging, not a decision but a “calculated postponement” (al-Diyar, January 8, 2026).
  • According to a critical article on the Janoubia website, the Lebanese army was careful not to expand the boundaries of the discussion beyond south of the Litani River, and north of the Litani River was not mentioned. The term “south of the Litani River” appeared three times, but the army did not speak of full control, instead referring to “completing the handling of unexploded ordnance and tunnels… in order to establish control,” reflecting a process not yet completed and no decisive outcome. The statement made do with mentioning a “general and comprehensive assessment” which would serve as the basis for the next steps, without specifying a second phase, schedules or a geographic area. Hezbollah itself was not mentioned, the reference was to “armed groups” in general terms. In practice, the first phase was defined as deployment, the securing and handling of ordnance and tunnels south of the Litani River only, while the next phase remained vague and without a public commitment to expand, but only a promise to act “gradually, in coordination and in accordance with the national interest,” emphasizing caution, postponement and avoidance of a clear political decision (Janoubia, January 8, 2026).
Disarmament south of the Litani River: a Lebanese soldier entering a tunnel in south Lebanon, with challenges awaiting (al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 9, 2026)
Disarmament south of the Litani River: a Lebanese soldier entering a tunnel in south Lebanon, with challenges awaiting (al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 9, 2026)
  • The Israeli Prime Minister’s Office rejected the Lebanese army announcement of success in demilitarizing the south of the country, stating that the efforts by the Lebanese government and army were “an encouraging beginning, but are far from sufficient.” It further noted that Hezbollah continued to rearm and reconstruct its military-terrorist facilities with Iranian support (Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, January 8, 2026). In the assessment of “political sources in Lebanon,” the IDF will continue to exert pressure on the ground, even after the Lebanese army announcement regarding the completion of the first phase of disarmament. The “sources” noted that the United States and Israel were exerting pressure on Lebanon to set a time limit for completing Hezbollah’s disarmament (Nidaa’ al-Watan, January 7, 2026).
Hezbollah
  • Hezbollah did not formally respond to the Lebanese army announcement, but organization spokesmen continued to argume that the ceasefire agreement pertained only to disarmament south of the Litani River, and therefore the organization had fulfilled its obligations, while accusing Israel of “violations” of the agreement and emphasizing the continued importance of the “resistance:”[6]
    • According to the Hezbollah bloc in the Lebanese Parliament, the State of Lebanon, the people, the army and the “resistance,” had fulfilled their obligations south of the Litani River as stated in the November 2024 ceasefire agreement. The statement issed by the bloc said the government now had to force Israel to fulfill its part, first and foremost by halting attacks and fully withdrawing from the territories it “occupied,” while avoiding concessions which could encourage the “enemy” to continue exerting pressure. The bloc called on all Lebanese to unite around a single position against the “occupation” and warned against the sowing of internal division. The bloc also criticized the United States, claiming its regional policy undermined international order and brought the region closer to chaos (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, January 8, 2026). “Lebanese government sources” interpreted the omission of Hezbollah’s weapons from the bloc’s statement as an attempt to signal to President Aoun a cautious readiness to renew dialogue, ahead of a future discussion on expanding the plan north of the Litani River to the Awali River (al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 9, 2026).
    • Ali al-Miqdad, member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, reiterated the position, claiming that the “resistance,” with the army and the people, would continue to defend Lebanon’s sovereignty (Lebanon Debate, January 10, 2026).
    • Lebanese Health Minister Rakan Nasser al-Din, also a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, opposed the cabinet’s final wording. He said priority should be given to the liberation of the “occupied territories” and the release of Lebanese prisoners held by Israel (Janoubia, January 8, 2026).
  • According to a report by al-Manar correspondent Mona Takhini, after the cabinet meeting army commander Haykal attended his mother-in-law’s funeral. Among those offering condolences was Hezbollah’s head of the Liaison and Coordination Unit, Wafiq Safa, who conveyed condolences on behalf of the organization’s leadership. According to Takhini, Safa and Haykal discussed the atmosphere during the cabinet meeting as well as the army’s plans ahead of the next cabinet discussion in early February and the implementation of the next phase, taking into account the army’s approach that “upholds Lebanon’s sovereignty and the demand for achievements in the Lebanese national interest” (Nun News Telegram channel, January 10, 2026).
  • Ali Shaib, al-Manar’s Hezbollah-affiliated correspondent in south Lebanon, criticized the wording of the Lebanese army statement, claiming it was undignified to refer to the “resistance” as “armed groups.” According to Shaib, that was a dangerous distortion of the national discourse, one that disrespected the memory of the martyrs, the wounded and the prisoners, and contradicted the principle of the “right to resist occupation.” He argued that the mere use of the term was more serious than Israeli strikes and “violations,” and there had to be a return to a unifying narrative that recognized the “resistance” as part of Lebanon’s legitimate defense (Ali Shaib Telegram channel, South News, January 8, 2026).
The Lebanese Government
  • Lebanese president Joseph Aoun expressed full support for the Lebanese army statement and said the army’s deployment was meant to limit the possession of weapons exclusively to the state and to strengthen the principle that decisions regarding war or peace rested solely with the constitutional institutions. He said a full Israeli withdrawal, honoring the ceasefire and the release of Lebanese prisoners were essential conditions for realizing state sovereignty and ensuring the return of displaced residents to south Lebanon. He noted Lebanon’s commitment to the agreement to halt hostilities and called on the international community to assist Lebanon in implementing the agreement and preventing weapons from reaching any party in the country other than the official armed forces. He said urgent action was needed to strengthen the capabilities of the Lebanese army to enable it to carry out its missions and to ensure that all parties adhered to ending violations and refrained from any action that could undermine stability (Lebanese presidency X account, January 8, 2026).
  • On another occasion, Aoun said the principle of exclusive state control over weapons was an internal Lebanese demand, not an external one, and one of the foundations of state-building. He said “operational control,” as declared by the army commander, meant the army was capable of preventing any military activity in the area or could intervene to prevent it, and even if it did not locate all the tunnels or weapons depots, it could still prevent any “armed group” from entering south Lebanon and turning it into an area for launching military operations. He added that the goal was to continue implementing the decision to have a monopoly on weapons, including among the Palestinians, but added that there had to be a “realistic and rational” approach to the army’s ability to carry out such complex missions (X account of the Lebanese Presidency, January 11, 2026).
  • Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam praised the completion of the first phase of the plan and noted the need to reinforce the Lebanese army logistically and strengthen its capabilities as soon as possible before implementing the next phase. He said returning residents to their homes was the top priority, and to that end the government would work to accelerate reconstruction in the south in the coming weeks, following parliamentary approval of a loan from the World Bank (al-Nashra, January 8, 2026). Reportedly, during the meeting Salam called on ministers to reaffirm previous government decisions, particularly the army’s plan to disarm Hezbollah (MTV, January 8, 2026).
Prime Minister Salam (MTV Lebanon X account, January 8, 2026)
Prime Minister Salam (MTV Lebanon X account, January 8, 2026)
  • Subsequently, Salam said the role of the “resistance” had ended in 2000 with the IDF’s withdrawal from south Lebanon, and today the institutions of the state and the Lebanese army alone defended the country. He said decisions regarding war and peace had to remain in the hands of the state, and the principle of exclusive control over weapons was meant to protect all Lebanese citizens and was not directed against any specific party. He noted that Haykal had stated that for the first time the Lebanese army had full control of the area south of the Litani River, and added that Lebanon was working to hold an international conference in support of the army in Paris in February 2026, to strengthen its capabilities to implement the weapons limitation plan (MTV, January 9, 2026).
  • Nabih Berri, speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, head of the Amal Movement and close to Hezbollah, supported the Lebanese army statement, claiming that the army’s achievements could have been more significant were it not for the continued Israeli presence in parts of the country and the obstacles it posed to the army’s freedom of action. Berri noted that Israeli strikes in south Lebanon, including attacks on UNIFIL forces, endangered the implementation of Resolution 1701 and undermined the ability to realize it in practice (NBN, January 8, 2026).
  • According to “several government sources,” the objective of all the senior Lebanese government figures was to inform the international community regarding full adoption of the army’s plan and its reinforcement ahead of future stages, particularly toward a possible move north of the Litani River (al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 9, 2026).
Hezbollah’s Opponents
  • According to reports, ministers at the cabinet meeting from the Lebanese Forces party, which opposes Hezbollah, demanded a three-month timeframe for implementing the plan to disarm Hezbollah, but President Aoun said the matter was subject to the army’s discretion and “such actions cannot be bound by time tables” (MTV, January 8, 2026).
  • Justice Minister Adel Nassar, representing the Christian Phalanges party, said that all stages of the Lebanese army plan had been approved and its implementation had to be accelerated. He said his reservations were the result of his desire to speed up implementation, and the army’s initial report on the start of implementation north of the Litani River was expected to be presented in early March 2026. Industry Minister Joe Issa El Khoury of the Lebanese Forces said the existence of illegal weapons continued to delay Lebanon’s progress because of “regional developments,” claiming the army alone could not complete its mission unless the “armed actors”[7] were willing to hand over their weapons to the state (Janoubia, January 8, 2026).
  • “Sources” said that Lebanese Foreign Minister Youssef Rajji of the Lebanese Forces told the Iranian foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, that negotiations between a state and an “armed organization” were unacceptable, the decision had been made and Hezbollah had to hand over its weapons. He added that Hezbollah’s weapons did not protect Lebanon and noted that other “resistance” movements had handed over their weapons when the state made a sovereign decision on the matter (al-Hadath, January 9, 2026).
Rajji meets with Araghchi (X account of Youssef Rajji, January 9, 2026)
Rajji meets with Araghchi (X account of Youssef Rajji, January 9, 2026)
  • Leader of the Lebanese Forces party Samir Geagea noted the need to disarm illegal “militias”[8] as a basic condition for establishing a Lebanese state and ensuring the future of the Lebanese people (Sky News Arabic, January 8, 2026).
  • Journalist and politician Charles Jabbour, head of the media department of the Lebanese Forces party, said Hezbollah’s weapons were constitutionally and internationally illegitimate, and under the constitution, international resolutions and the ceasefire agreement, they should have been handed over in 1991. He said it was not in dispute that the weapons did not benefit Lebanon, not in the south, not in the nort, and not in any other area, and that the only determining principle was that there had to be no weapons outside the framework of the Lebanese army. Jabbour added that the concept of “resistance” had to end, and argued that any “armed actor” operating after 1991 violated the constitution and was “an Iranian proxy as part of a subversive project,” not a legitimate “resistance” movement (X account of Charles Jabbour, January 8, 2026).
  • The Free Lebanon Front welcomed the completion of the first phase of the operation and called the activities south of the Litani River “a decisive step in implementing the ceasefire with Israel.” It praised the Lebanese army for its efforts “despite limited resources,” and called for the immediate start of the second phase north of the Litani River, to enable full deployment of the army along the southern border, strengthen state sovereignty and remove any justification for continued Israeli presence and for the activity of “armed actors” outside the state (Janoubia, January 10, 2026).
International Reactions
  • The UN special coordinator for Lebanon, Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert, said it was good to see the Lebanese army confirm they had achieved control south of the Litani River, calling it ” undeniable progress” but adding that there was still “challenging work.” She called it a milestone demonstrating commitment and strengthening the role of the committee established following the November 2024 agreement (X account of the UN special coordinator for Lebanon, January 8, 2026).

[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications.
[2] Terrorist organizations.
[3] See the August 2025 ITIC report, Lebanese Government Decides to Disarm Hezbollah – Positions of Power Actors
[4] See the August 2025 ITIC report, Implementation of the Lebanese Army’s Plan to Disarm Hezbollah: Status Report
[5] See the ITIC weekly reports, "Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah and Lebanon."
[6] Terrorism and violence targeting Israel.
[7] Hezbollah and the other terrorist organizations operating in Lebanon.
[8] Terrorist organizations.

Jihad Activity under the al-Sharaa Regime in Syria, a Potential Threat to Israel

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (Akhbar al-Muslimeen, April 29, 2019)

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (Akhbar al-Muslimeen, April 29, 2019)

Al-Julani (center) announces the establishment of Jabhat Fath al-Sham (al-Jazeera, July 28, 2016)

Al-Julani (center) announces the establishment of Jabhat Fath al-Sham (al-Jazeera, July 28, 2016)

The attack at Mar Elias Church in Damascus (al-Jazeera X account, June 23, 2025).

The attack at Mar Elias Church in Damascus (al-Jazeera X account, June 23, 2025).

The attack in Palmyra (al-Jazeera, December 14, 2025)

The attack in Palmyra (al-Jazeera, December 14, 2025)

Weapons seized during an operation to detain an ISIS operative in southern Syria (IDF spokesperson, December 20, 2025)

Weapons seized during an operation to detain an ISIS operative in southern Syria (IDF spokesperson, December 20, 2025)

Weapons seized during an operation to detain an ISIS operative in southern Syria (IDF spokesperson, December 20, 2025)

Weapons seized during an operation to detain an ISIS operative in southern Syria (IDF spokesperson, December 20, 2025)

Matan Daniel
Overview[1]
  • The overthrow of the Assad regime in December 2024 and the rise of the new government led by Ahmed al-Sharaa (Abu Muhammad al-Julani) changed the map of Salafi-jihadist terrorism in Syria.
  • Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (the strongest of the jihadist organizations which opposed the Assad regime) disbanded, along with its affiliated militias, which helped bring down the previous regime. Their operatives were integrated into the security forces of the new government, including foreign jihad fighters.
  • A few jihad organizations which had cooperated with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham opposed the pragmatic positions of the new government and refused to integrate into its ranks. The most prominent example is the Saraya Ansar al-Sunna, which attacked the security forces and Alawite civilians.
  • The regime change in Syria and the absence of a governmental or security presence across large parts of the country provided ISIS with an opportunity to reorganize and establish itself in the Syrian desert in the east of the country and to expand its activity into populated areas near Damascus and the regions of Aleppo, Homs and southern Syria. However, Syria’s joining the United States-led international coalition helped reduce the number of the organization’s attacks during 2025.
  • Despite the hostile positions of the Salafi-jihadist organizations still active in Syria toward Israel, they have not attacked IDF forces deployed in southern Syria or against Israeli territory. However, the detention of an ISIS operative in southern Syria indicated the potential threat.
  • In ITIC assessment, the growing cooperation between the Syrian regime and the international coalition will make the situation on the ground harder for ISIS, even though the organization will continue its efforts to establish itself in areas where the regime’s control remains weak, such as the Syrian desert, and to attack Syrian security forces and civilian localities. Other jihad organizations opposing the regime may also attempt to undermine the stability of the al-Sharaa government. Given that the extra-establishment jihadist elements are focused on the internal Syrian arena, their desire to harm IDF forces or Israeli territory is in all probability a lower priority, although they may try to build facilities in southern Syria that would enable them to threaten Israeli interests in the future.
The Jihad Organizations in Syria Prior to the Fall of the Assad Regime[2]
  • The Syrian civil war, which began in 2011, led to the rise of many rebel organizations that fought against the forces of the Assad regime. Salafi-jihadist groups stood out among them, and from 2013 onward they took the lead in the fighting against the regime and its allies.
  • With the outbreak of the civil war, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, leader of the al-Qaeda-affiliated Islamic State of Iraq, sent a team of seven men to establish a local force to advance the interests of Iraqi jihad groups in Syria. The force was headed by Abu Muhammad al-Julani, the nom de guerre of Ahmed al-Sharaa, and in January 2012 he announced the establishment of Jabhat al-Nusra li-Ahl al-Sham (Support Front for the People of the Levant) and declared war on the Assad regime. Within a short time, Jabhat al-Nusra became one of the most prominent organizations opposing the regime in Syria. The organization took control of extensive areas and inflicted significant damage on Syrian regime forces, forged alliances with local organizations and succeeded in recruiting many operatives.
  • In April 2013, al-Baghdadi unilaterally announced the subordination of Jabhat al-Nusra to the Islamic State of Iraq and the establishment of a joint organization called the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Al-Julani viewed the move as detrimental to his efforts to promote ties with rebel organizations in Syria without highlighting his jihadist ideology. In response, he declared allegiance to al-Qaeda and its leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, who out Jabhat al-Nusra al-Qaeda’s local branch in Syria.
  • During 2013–2014, relations between the two organizations deteriorated amid disagreements over activity in Syria, until al-Qaeda withdrew its support from al-Baghdadi’s organization and recognized Jabhat al-Nusra, under the leadership of Abu Muhammad al-Julani, as its representative in the country. About a year later, in 2014, declared the establishment of a global caliphate called the Islamic State and proclaimed himself its caliph.
  • ISIS exploited the chaos in Syria to expand rapidly, capturing vast areas in the northern and eastern parts of the country. In June 2014, by creating the caliphate, he split the Salafi-jihadist arena between ISIS and al-Qaeda. The city of Raqqa in northeastern Syria, which ISIS captured from Jabhat al-Nusra and a coalition of jihad organizations in January 2014, became the capital of the new caliphate, which also extended over large areas of northern Iraq.
  • ISIS imposed a violent, extreme rule in the areas it controlled, including the systematic terrorism of civilians, ethnic cleansing, public executions and the destruction of heritage sites, while simultaneously fighting the Assad regime, other rebel organizations, including Jabhat al-Nusra, and Kurdish forces. However, in 2017, the organization suffered crushing military defeats at the hands of the United States-led international coalition and local forces, and lost its territorial control with the fall of Raqqa in October 2017 and the death of its leader al-Baghdadi two years later.[3] Nevertheless, ISIS continued operating in Syria as a guerrilla organization, mainly in the desert area in the east of the country and through terrorist cells, carrying out attacks, assassinations and attempts to undermine security stability.[4]
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (Akhbar al-Muslimeen, April 29, 2019)
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (Akhbar al-Muslimeen, April 29, 2019)
  • As ISIS-related developments continued, so did the activity of jihad organizations in Syria, with al-Julani consolidating his status as the leading figure. In July 2016, after receiving al-Zawahiri’s blessing to break away from al-Qaeda to allow Jabhat al-Nusra to focus on the campaign in Syria and merge with local Islamic organizations, al-Sharaa appeared publicly for the first time and announced he was cutting ties with al-Qaeda and establishing Jabhat Fath al-Sham (Conquest of the Levant Front). In January 2017, he announced the establishment of a new organization, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, a merger of Jabhat Fath al-Sham with four other prominent rebel organizations (the Nour al-Din al-Zenki Movement, Liwa al-Haqq, Jabhat Ansar al-Din and Jaysh al-Sunna). The move led to al-Julani’s final break with al-Qaeda, as some supporters of the hardline jihadist approach left the new unified organization and established the Hurras al-Din organization, which became al-Qaeda’s branch in Syria.[5]
Al-Julani (center) announces the establishment of Jabhat Fath al-Sham
 (al-Jazeera, July 28, 2016)
Al-Julani (center) announces the establishment of Jabhat Fath al-Sham
(al-Jazeera, July 28, 2016)
  • Under al-Julani’s leadership, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham became the dominant organization in the Turkish-backed enclave established in the Idlib area in northwestern Syria, part of efforts to end the civil war. The organization established civilian-administrative facilities under the supervision of the Syrian Salvation Government, and issued identity cards. Although al-Julani sought to impose the spirit of Islamic sharia, he did not enforce sharia law and even promised rights to minorities and women. He also presented his image as a moderate to the international arena, including wearing Western civilian dress and denying ties to al-Qaeda and global terrorism. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham also took action to improve its military capabilities, establishing a unified command and 12 brigades numbering thousands of fighters, and developing weapons systems, including UAVs, guided missiles and shells.[6]
  • In 2019, the al-Fath al-Mubin operations room was opened in Idlib to manage and coordinate the rebels’ military activity. Alongside Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, factions operating with Turkish guidance and support participated in the operations room, as did the Ahrar al-Sham organization (Free Men of the Levant), which was established in 2011, when four Islamic organizations opposed to the Assad regime merged and worked to establish an Islamic state in Syria.
  • On November 27, 2024, the al-Fath al-Mubin operations room, the pro-Turkish Syrian National Army and the southern operations room (which included Druze tribes and local opposition forces in southern Syria) launched Operation Deterrence of Aggression against Syrian army forces of the Assad regime and their allies in northwestern Syria. Within a few days, they took control of Aleppo, Hama and Homs, and on the night of December 7, 2024, the rebels captured Damascus. The Syrian Ministry of Defense then announced that Assad’s regime had fallen.[7]
Jihad Organizations in Syria in the al-Sharaa’s Regime
  • During Operation Deterrence of Aggression, and especially after the fall of the Assad regime, al-Julani positioned himself as the strongest leader in Syria, and to project an image of pragmatism, reverted to his original name, Ahmed al-Sharaa, and declared that there was no reason to fear the new government. He used the governance model of the Salvation Government from Idlib as the basis for a temporary Syrian government and established committees to deal with civilian matters in the various provinces, including garbage collection, electricity supply, and the provision of water and food to civilians.
  • In the period following the fall of the regime, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and organizations operating alongside it integrated into the institutions of the new government, and senior figures from the rebel ranks were appointed to key positions, including prime minister, defense minister, foreign minister and provincial governors. The armed organizations in Syria which had worked with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham to overthrow the Assad regime agreed to dissolve all armed organizations and unite them under the ministry of defense.
  • On January 29, 2025, the Victory Conference of the Syrian Revolution was held, attended by figures from the new government and representatives of the armed factions which had participated in the campaigns leading to the fall of the Assad regime. Official changes to the Syrian governance structure were announced: the former regime’s army and intelligence and security apparatuses would be dismantled and the Syrian army would be rebuilt on national foundations. All military factions and revolutionary, political and civilian bodies would be dismantled and integrated into state institutions. Approximately 18 armed militias led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, including Ahrar al-Sham, Jaysh al-Ahrar and militias within the pro-Turkish Syrian National Army, announced that they were disbanding. As part of the reorganization, senior figures from jihad organizations were appointed to key positions in the new security forces, and foreign jihad fighters were integrated into the military framework (Institute for the Study of War, November 14, 2025; Reuters, June 2, 2025).[8]
Non-State Jihad Organizations
  • However, not all armed groups operating under the framework of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham disbanded and integrated into the mechanisms of the new regime. An organization called Saraya Ansar al-Sunna, led by Abu Aisha al-Shami, withdrew from the framework in January 2025 because it opposed al-Sharaa’s the conciliatory rhetoric to Shi’ites, Alawites and supporters of the former regime. The organization began issuing statements about assassinations it hadcarried out of figures affiliated with the Assad regime, as well as attacks on the inclusive policies of the new government.
  • Beyond the online profile of Saraya Ansar al-Sunna, which presented the organization as Salafi-jihadist, very little information was revealed, and there was speculation as to whether or not it existed or was actually a virtual initiative of actors affiliated with ISIS. Nevertheless, despite its ideological proximity to ISIS, the organization denied that it maintained ties with the group, though it did not rule out such ties in the future (al-Araby al-Jadeed, February 14, 2025; Washington Institute, June 25, 2025).
  • One of the senior figures in Saraya Ansar al-Sunna, Abu al-Fath al-Shami, stated that the organization, which had been founded covertly in Idlib prior to the regime change, had ended its secrecy to publicly distance itself from the government of al-Sharaa’, whom al-Shami described as an “unreliable tyrant.” He said there were operatives in the organization who had defected from al-Sharaa’s regime, defectors from other militias and civilians who joined the group. He said the organization did not currently see a need to confront the military forces of the new regime, despite having declared them infidels, and was focusing on attacking Alawites, Druze, Shi’ites and Kurdish forces in northeastern Syria (al-Nahar, May 21, 2025).
  • That manifested itself on June 22, 2025, when a suicide bomber opened fire inside the Mar Elias Church in Damascus before detonating his explosive belt, killing at least 25 and wounding dozens. The Syrian regime was quick to accuse ISIS of responsibility, but two days later Saraya Ansar al-Sunna published a statement on its Telegram channel claiming responsibility (Syrian Television, June 24, 2025; BBC Arabic, June 24, 2025).
  • On December 26, 2025, the organization, stating it had not acted alone, claimed responsibility for an attack on an Alawite mosque in Homs, where an explosive device was detonated, killing eight people and wounding 18. The organization stated that the attack had targeted members of the Alawite sect and threatened that its attacks “would continue to escalate and be directed against all infidels” (al-Watan, December 26, 2025; al-Arabiya, December 26, 2025; RT, December 26, 2025). Even now, about a year after declaring itself an independent organization, very little is known about Saraya Ansar al-Sunna, its organizational framework or the number of its operatives.
The attack at the Alawite mosque in Homs (SANA, December 26, 2025)     The attack at Mar Elias Church in Damascus (al-Jazeera X account, June 23, 2025).
Right: The attack at Mar Elias Church in Damascus (al-Jazeera X account, June 23, 2025).
Left: The attack at the Alawite mosque in Homs (SANA, December 26, 2025)
  • In October 2025, security forces of the new regime operated in a displaced persons camp near the town of Harem in the Idlib area against operatives of Firqat al-Ghurabaa’ (Group of Strangers), an organization based on French-speaking jihadists led by Omar Diaby (the nom de guerre of Omar Omsen), a French criminal of Senegalese origin who became a preacher and had been in Syria since 2013. The regime took action against Diaby after he was accused of attempting to kidnap a girl, and when he refused to surrender a firefight broke out. However, shortly thereafter a ceasefire agreement was reached, under which heavy weapons were removed from the camp, security forces were allowed to enter and legal proceedings against Diaby were agreed upon (France 24, October 23, 2025).
ISIS
  • The capture of Damascus and the fall of the Assad regime raised concerns that ISIS would exploit the governmental and security vacuum created to recover and reorganize. As the rebels took control of Damascus, the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that air forces, including strategic bombers, had carried out precision strikes targeting more than 75 known ISIS camps and operatives in central Syria. CENTCOM said the actions were meant to ensure that ISIS could not exploit the situation in Syria and reorganize (CENTCOM X account, December 8, 2024).
  • In the first weeks of its existence, the al-Sharaa regime focused on consolidating its power and control and directed its operations mainly against elements that had belonged to or remained loyal to the Assad regime. That gave ISIS the opportunity to strengthen itself and reorganize, particularly in the desert region in eastern Syria, where the regime’s presence was sparse (al-Arabiya, December 19, 2024; Levant 24, February 19, 2025). However, the United States continued to take action against the organization, attacking from the air in the months following the fall of the Assad regime and inflicting heavy losses on the organization (CENTCOM X account, December 16, 2024; December 20, 2024; December 24, 2024; July 17, 2025; July 25, 2025; August 21, 2025; September 19, 2025).
  • During 2025, ISIS continued to establish itself in the Syrian desert but also expanded its activity into populated areas near Damascus and the regions of Aleppo, Homs and southern Syria, operating small, mobile cells and strengthening smuggling networks to facilitate movement. In addition, the organization sought to incite sectarian tensions and conducted multilingual campaigns to discredit the al-Sharaa regime, while recruiting local and foreign operatives and former regime soldiers. According to UN data, from January to July 2025 ISIS attacked more than 90 times across the country, directing most of its attention to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northeastern Syria, where approximately 400 ISIS fighters remained active, while the organization continued efforts to target detention centers and critical infrastructure operated by Kurdish forces (UN Security Council, July 24, 2025).
  • In November 2025, Syria officially joined the United States-led international coalition against ISIS, after the new government had already cooperated with the coalition unofficially since the fall of the Assad regime (New York Times, November 12, 2025). The Syrian security forces intensified their activity against ISIS, both independently and in cooperation with CENTCOM. During December 2025, reports included the arrest of the organization’s leader in Damascus, Taher al-Zoabi, the seizure of weapons shipments intended for ISIS cells, and the prevention of a plot to carry out suicide attacks during New Year’s celebrations (Telegram channel of the Syrian Ministry of Interior and Syrian media, December 31–January 1, 2026).
  • On December 13, 2025, two American soldiers and an American civilian interpreter were killed, and three American soldiers were wounded in an ambush near the city of Palmyra in central Syria (CENTCOM X account, December 13, 2025). ISIS did not claim responsibility and security officials in Syria claimed that the attacker belonged to Syrian security forces (Reuters, December 13, 2025). However, the American president attributed the attack to ISIS and stated that the American response would be “very fierce revenge” (Truth Social, December 13, 2025). On December 19, 2025, American forces, in cooperation with the Jordanian army, attacked more than 70 ISIS targets at several locations across Syria using fighter jets, attack helicopters, and artillery (CENTCOM X account, December 19, 2025). On December 30, 2025, CENTCOM reported that its forces and partner forces had killed or captured approximately 25 ISIS operatives since December 19, 2025, and destroyed four ISIS weapons depots (CENTCOM X account, December 30, 2025).
  • On January 3, 2026, Britain and France carried out a joint strike on an underground ISIS facility in the Palmyra area in Syria using guided munitions to damage or destroy several tunnels providing access to the facility. Reportedly, the targeted facility had probably been used to store weapons and explosives (UK government website, January 3, 2026).
The attack in Palmyra (al-Jazeera, December 14, 2025)
The attack in Palmyra (al-Jazeera, December 14, 2025)
  • With the stabilization of the new regime and the increased effectiveness of its security forces, together with the activity of additional forces such as Kurds in northeastern Syria and the American-led coalition, a decline was recorded in the number of ISIS attacks. Overall, ISIS was responsible for approximately 550–580 attacks and incidents in Syria in 2025, compared to 692 attacks and incidents in the previous year, most of which took place while the Assad regime was still in power (Syria Weekly, December 31, 2025).
The Jihad Threat Against Israel
  • Immediately following the fall of the Assad regime, IDF forces took control of the buffer zone in the Golan Heights and seized control of the Syrian Hermon to demilitarize southern Syria of armed forces belonging to the new Syrian regime and other armed organizations. Since then, IDF forces have conducted routine activity in the buffer zone, as well as in the Quneitra and Daraa districts, to prevent potential terrorist activity against Israeli territory.
  • Since the rise of the new regime, there have been several attempts to attack IDF forces and Israeli territory. However, the attempts were made primarily by elements affiliated with the “resistance axis,”[9] led by the Islamic Resistance Front in Syria – the Men of Valor. The IDF also detained or eliminated terrorist operatives affiliated with the Qods Force, Hamas, or al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya (the Lebanese Muslim Brotherhood affiliate, close to Hamas).[10]
  • Although no direct activity by Salafi-jihadist organizations against Israeli forces or Israeli territory has been identified, the potential threat still exists:
  • On February 26, 2025, ISIS issued a video of Syrian operatives threatening to attack Israel following statements by Prime Minister Netanyahu regarding the demilitarization of parts of southern Syria. The video showed three masked, armed spokesmen wearing ISIS flags, who said, “My message is to the dog Netanyahu. Listen, son of the infidels. By Allah, your annihilation is near. We will not stop fighting until our armies reach Bayt al-Maqdis [Jerusalem]” (Israel Hayom, February 26, 2025).
  • IDF forces operating in the buffer zone in southern Syria detained a suspect who, according to the IDF spokesperson, was handled by ISIS. During the detention weapons also located and seized (IDF spokesperson, December 20, 2025).
Weapons seized during an operation to detain an ISIS operative in southern Syria
 (IDF spokesperson, December 20, 2025)     Weapons seized during an operation to detain an ISIS operative in southern Syria
 (IDF spokesperson, December 20, 2025)
Weapons seized during an operation to detain an ISIS operative in southern Syria
(IDF spokesperson, December 20, 2025)
  • Syrian ministry of interior forces eliminated Muhammad Shahada, aka Abu Omar Shaddad, who was a senior ISIS figure in Syria and served as the governor of the Hauran region in southern Syria. The announcement stated that he posed a “direct threat” to the security of the region and to the safety of residents (Telegram channel of the Syrian ministry of interior, December 25, 2025).
  1. Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications.

  2. For further information, see the November 2014 report ITIC report, ISIS: Portrait of a Jihadi Terrorist Organization, the July 2016 report, ISIS: An Overview and Future Trends*, the November 2017 report, The Collapse of the Islamic State: What Comes Next?, the March 2019 report, Has ISIS Been Defeated? Overview and possible developments after the fall of ISIS’s enclave in the lower Euphrates Valley, the October 2019 report, The significance of the killing of ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (Initial assessment), and the December 2024 report, The Power Groups in Syria after the Fall of the Assad Regime.

  3. See the July 2016 ITIC report, ISIS: An Overview and Future Trends*, the November 2017 report, The Collapse of the Islamic State: What Comes Next?, the March 2019 report, Has ISIS Been Defeated? Overview and possible developments after the fall of ISIS’s enclave in the lower Euphrates Valley, and the October 2019 report, The significance of the killing of ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (Initial assessment).

  4. See the January 2021 ITIC report, ISIS’s current strategy: Relinquishing territorial control and focusing on intensifying local activity in the various provinces, mainly in Iraq, the January 2022 report, Summary of ISIS Activity around the Globe in 2021, the February 2023 report, Summary of ISIS Activity around the Globe in 2022, and the May 2024 report, Summary of ISIS Activity around the Globe in 2023

  5. See the March 2018 ITIC report, Split among Al-Qaeda’s supporters in Syria, in light of severe differences of opinion regarding the nature of the ties with Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri.

  6. See the ITIC report, Ahmed al-Sharaa, Syria’s New Leader: From Jihadist to Stateman?

  7. See the ITIC report, Spotlight on Syria (Following the Toppling of the Syrian Regime) – December 2-9 , 2024

  8. See the monthly ITIC reports, "Spotlight on terrorist – Syria."

  9. Iran, Hezbollah, the Palestinian terrorist organizations, the Houthis in Yemen and the Shi'ite militias in Iraq, all of whose objective is the destruction and elimination of the State of Israel.

  10. See the September 2025 ITIC report, Is South Syria a Terrorist Threat to Israel? The Islamic Resistance Front in Syria, a Test Case, and the December 2025 report, IDF Operation in Beit Jinn amid Efforts to Promote Terrorism Against Israel in Southern Syria, and the monthly ITIC summaries on terrorism against Israel.

Spotlight on Iran

December 31, 2025 – January 7, 2026 Editor: Dr. Raz Zimmt
The Iraqi President meets with Iran’s ambassador to Baghdad (ISNA, January 4, 2026)

The Iraqi President meets with Iran’s ambassador to Baghdad (ISNA, January 4, 2026)

The Iranian ambassador to Iraq meets with the incoming and outgoing speakers of the Iraqi parliament (ILNA, January 1, 2026)

The Iranian ambassador to Iraq meets with the incoming and outgoing speakers of the Iraqi parliament (ILNA, January 1, 2026)

Deputy Prime Minister Al-Rawishan (Saba, January 4, 2026)

Deputy Prime Minister Al-Rawishan (Saba, January 4, 2026)

Minister of Defense al-Atifi.

Minister of Defense al-Atifi.

From a video by Kata’ib Hezbollah titled “Resistance is a right, and its weapons remain in the hands of its fighters” (Kata’ib Hezbollah Telegram channel, January 1, 2026)

From a video by Kata’ib Hezbollah titled “Resistance is a right, and its weapons remain in the hands of its fighters” (Kata’ib Hezbollah Telegram channel, January 1, 2026)

From a video by Kata’ib Hezbollah titled “Resistance is a right, and its weapons remain in the hands of its fighters” (Kata’ib Hezbollah Telegram channel, January 1, 2026)

From a video by Kata’ib Hezbollah titled “Resistance is a right, and its weapons remain in the hands of its fighters” (Kata’ib Hezbollah Telegram channel, January 1, 2026)

Highlights[1]
  • The Iranian ambassador to Beirut rejected claims recently voiced in Lebanon against Iran and Iran’s Supreme Leader, arguing that the intensified media campaign is based on false accusations and lies.
  • An Iranian commentary article claimed that Tehran seeks to strengthen Lebanon’s sovereignty rather than weaken the central government in Beirut, despite its support for Hezbollah.
  • Iran reportedly has tightened oversight of the transfer of funds to Hezbollah and is determining priorities in resource allocation.
  • The Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson criticized remarks by Syria’s finance minister regarding Damascus’ intention to demand compensation from Iran for damage incurred during the civil war and for Iran’s assistance to the Assad regime.
  • The commander of the IRGC’s Qods Force reportedly paid a secret visit to Baghdad to meet with senior pro-Iranian Shiite militia figures.
  • A senior Houthi official condemned the visit of Israel’s foreign minister to Somaliland and warned that any “Zionist” presence on Somali soil constitutes a military target.
  • Reports indicated that the Houthis carried out missile launches toward the sea in preparation for a new confrontation with Israel. “Yemeni security sources” said that Qods Force officers and senior Houthi officials discussed possible responses in the event of a new Israeli-American attack on Iran.
  • Iraq’s prime minister once again stressed the need to disarm the armed militias, but the militias’ Coordination Committee issued a counter-statement declaring that “the resistance’s weapons are sacred.”
Iran and the Lebanese Arena
  • Iran’s ambassador to Lebanon, Mojtaba Amani, said the organized and intensified media campaign currently being waged in Lebanon against the Islamic Republic, and particularly against Iran’s Supreme Leader, should be viewed as a collection of false accusations and lies claiming that Iran has been harmed, whereas in reality these are mere illusions and figments of imagination. Amani added that in forty days, Iran will mark the 47th anniversary of the victory of the Islamic Revolution and the establishment of the Islamic Republic, a regime whose downfall many had hoped for, but they passed away full of frustration and anger, without ever seeing their wish fulfilled. He emphasized that Iran is a strong and stable country, and that the experience of the past five decades has proven it is unaffected by plots, media hype, or propaganda wars, and continues on its blessed path without fear (Amani’s X account, January 1, 2026).
  • The Iranian ambassador to Beirut met with the head of the Chaldean Catholic community in Lebanon, Bishop Michel Kassarji, and conveyed his greetings to him on the occasion of Christmas (the ambassador’s X account, January 2, 2026).
Iran’s ambassador to Beirut and Bishop Kassarji (the ambassador’s X account, January 2, 2026)
Iran’s ambassador to Beirut and Bishop Kassarji (the ambassador’s X account, January 2, 2026)
  • A commentary article published by Iran’s Mehr News Agency argued that the recent political tensions between Iran and Lebanon should not be seen as reflecting a unified position of the Lebanese government. Much of the tension, it claimed, stems from statements made by Lebanese Foreign Minister Youssef Rajji, which reportedly encountered reservations even within the government itself. The article added that amplifying Rajji’s remarks in the media actually contributes to ignoring Hezbollah’s real weight within Lebanese society and erodes one of its most important sources of social support. It further stated that Iran seeks to strengthen Lebanon’s sovereignty rather than weaken the central government in Beirut, and that throughout the years in which Tehran stood alongside Hezbollah against external threats, it refrained from intervening in Lebanon’s internal political struggles or shaping the internal balance of power. Even in light of the recent tensions and statements by some Lebanese officials, Tehran’s response in recent weeks can be understood, including the positions and responses of Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, who stressed the need to respect Lebanon’s sovereignty (Mehr, January 4, 2026).
  • “Sources close to Hezbollah” said that a gradual but significant change is taking place in the organization’s relationship with Iran. Tehran, once an “open financier” for Hezbollah, has become a crisis manager that links the flow of funds primarily to priorities and strict oversight. According to these sources, recent discussions have focused less on the amount of money and more on what will be funded, what will be cut, and how the organization’s commitments will be restructured, in light of growing economic pressure in Iran. The organization was reportedly informed that the era of unconditional support has ended, and that any additional assistance will be contingent on cost-cutting, particularly in welfare and compensation, alongside demands for precise accounting and detailed implementation plans. Although the scope of assistance is estimated at around $900 million to $1 billion, less than Hezbollah’s demands, a large portion of rehabilitation and compensation needs remains unfunded. At the same time, Iranian involvement in management issues, resource allocation, and organizational structures has increased, based on the perception that Hezbollah has entered a phase of attrition and that harmful budgetary inflation must be curbed. Nevertheless, “sources close to the organization” stressed that the strategic relationship with Tehran remains stable, but within a “new equation”: less money, tighter oversight, and decisions aligned with Iran’s regional considerations (Aram News, December 31, 2025).
  • Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei strongly condemned IDF strikes in southern Lebanon and the Beqaa Valley, stating that damage to residential and industrial areas and urban infrastructure constitutes a “blatant violation” of the UN Charter and international law. He stressed the need to put the leaders of the “Zionist regime” on trial and punish them for committing “war crimes.” He also stressed the responsibility of the countries guaranteeing the ceasefire between Hezbollah and Israel to prevent Israel’s continued “violations” of the agreement, and called for more serious action by the international community, the UN, and regional states to confront the “aggression of the occupying regime” (Tasnim, January 6, 2026).
Iran and the Syrian Arena
  • Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei addressed remarks by Syria’s finance minister during his weekly press conference, according to which Syria would demand billions of dollars in compensation from Iran for killings, destruction of cities and infrastructure, and assistance provided to the Assad regime. Baghaei said there was no need to respond to every political statement that does not conform to international law, adding that financial claims should not change or be nullified due to a change in government or sovereignty. He added that even in cases where a state collapses, its economic claims and legal obligations do not disappear but are transferred to the state that replaces it (Fars, January 5, 2026).
Iran and the Iraqi Arena
  • “A source close to the IRGC” revealed that Qods Force commander Esmail Qaani paid a secret visit to Baghdad. According to the report, Qaani arrived on a private aircraft as part of a sudden visit that was not officially announced by Iraq or Iran. His visit reportedly includes meetings with political figures and senior leaders of pro-Iranian militias, intended to discuss the issue of foreign military presence in Iraq and arrangements for the next stage in the Iraqi and regional arenas. The meetings also focus on recent security developments, regulating relations between the militias and the Iraqi state, and the prospects for a settlement or de-escalation in the coming months (Baghdad Al-Youm, January 6, 2026).
  • Iran’s ambassador to Baghdad, Mohammad Kazem Al-e Sadeq, met with Iraqi President Abdul Latif Rashid, who stressed the importance of expanding bilateral relations and continued coordination to strengthen regional stability. They also discussed recent regional and international developments and emphasized the importance of cooperation between the two countries (ISNA, January 4, 2026).
The Iraqi President meets with Iran’s ambassador to Baghdad (ISNA, January 4, 2026)
The Iraqi President meets with Iran’s ambassador to Baghdad (ISNA, January 4, 2026)
  • The Iranian ambassador also met with Iraq’s incoming parliament speaker, Hebat al-Halbousi, and congratulated him on his election. The meeting took place in the presence of outgoing Speaker Mohammed al-Halbousi, and the participants discussed bilateral relations, ways to strengthen them, and regional developments (ILNA, January 1, 2026).
The Iranian ambassador to Iraq meets with the incoming and outgoing speakers of the Iraqi parliament (ILNA, January 1, 2026)
The Iranian ambassador to Iraq meets with the incoming and outgoing speakers of the Iraqi parliament (ILNA, January 1, 2026)
The Houthis in Yemen
  • Houthi Deputy Foreign Minister Abd al-Wahid Abu Ras condemned the visit of Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar to Somaliland, calling it a “blatant violation” of international law and an infringement on Somalia’s territorial integrity. He stressed that any presence of the “Zionist entity” on Somali soil constitutes a “red line” and a military target for Yemen’s armed forces. Abu Ras also called on Arab and Islamic states to firmly oppose “Zionist plans,” which he claimed threaten the security and stability of the entire region (Saba News Agency, January 6, 2026).
  • It was reported that Houthi forces held drills involving the launch of missiles toward the Red Sea as part of preparations for a possible renewed confrontation with Israel. According to the reports, a salvo of five missiles was launched for the first time, and in addition, a missile of a new type was launched (Telegram channel of journalist Abu Jud, January 6, 2026).
  • In this context, “well-informed Yemeni security sources” reported that secret high-level coordination talks were held between senior field officers of the Qods Force and senior Houthi military and security officials to discuss responses in the event of a direct Israeli-American attack on Tehran. According to the sources, the meetings produced operational conclusions indicating that the “axis of resistance” is moving from “verbal deterrence” to actual readiness and the establishment of joint monitoring rooms. It was noted that the talks began amid an assessment that the window of opportunity to prevent escalation is narrowing, and that prior to or alongside an attack on Iran, there would also be an attempt to neutralize Iran’s proxies, primarily Hezbollah, to prevent them from acting. In addition to the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, the possibility of expanding operations to vital points in the Horn of Africa was raised, while avoiding direct responsibility and maintaining plausible deniability (Aram News, January 6, 2026).  Houthi Chief of Staff Yusuf Hassan al-Madani sent condolences to Hamas and the Palestinians after Hamas’ military wing announced the deaths of five of its senior figures on December 29, 2025. Al-Madani said that “the Palestinian people, who produced this group of great leaders, will continue to produce many more,” adding that “no matter how the cruelty of the Zionist enemy intensifies, it is undoubtedly advancing toward its inevitable death and end.” He stressed that the Houthis would continue to assist and support the Palestinian people and their “resistance,” standing by them in every choice and on every battlefield until victory, full independence, and the expulsion of the last Zionist soldier from Palestinian land (Houthi movement Telegram channel, December 31, 2025).
Letter of condolence sent by the Houthi chief of staff (Telegram channel of the Houthi movement, December 31, 2025)
Letter of condolence sent by the Houthi chief of staff
(Telegram channel of the Houthi movement, December 31, 2025)
  • On January 1, 2026, the names of additional senior Houthi officials killed in a US strike in Yemen in March 2025 were revealed. Among them was Abd al-Malik al-Murtada, the Houthi representative in the “axis of resistance” joint operations room.[2]
The Houthi officials killed in March 2025. Top right: Abd al-Malik al-Murtada (ME24 X account, January 1, 2026)
The Houthi officials killed in March 2025. Top right: Abd al-Malik al-Murtada
(ME24 X account, January 1, 2026)
  • On January 4, 2026, a meeting of the Houthi government was held. Footage released by the official Houthi news agency showed Defense Minister Mohammad Nasser al-Atifi and Deputy Prime Minister Jalal al-Rawishan. This marked their first public appearance since reports that they were seriously wounded in an Israeli attack on a gathering of senior Houthi officials on August 28, 2025, in which the Houthi prime minister and many ministers were killed (Saba News Agency, January 4, 2026; Defense  Line, January 4, 2026).
Deputy Prime Minister Al-Rawishan (Saba, January 4, 2026)      Minister of Defense al-Atifi.
Right: Minister of Defense al-Atifi. Left: Deputy Prime Minister Al-Rawishan (Saba, January 4, 2026)
The Pro-Iranian Militias in Iraq
  • On January 4, 2026, an official ceremony was held in Baghdad to mark the sixth anniversary of the killing of former Qods Force commander Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, former leader of Kata’ib Hezbollah and deputy head of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani stressed in his speech that the decision to disarm armed militias is an internal one that will be made by broad parliamentary consensus. He also accused the “occupying Zionist entity” of attempting to drag Iraq into war and attack it starting on October 7, 2023 (INA, January 4, 2026). PMF Chairman Faleh al-Fayyadh said that cooperation between the PMF and the security forces has been and remains the foundation for safeguarding the state’s security, unity, and sovereignty, adding that “holding weapons in our hands is a strategic necessity given the military and technological superiority used to harm states” (PMF website, January 4, 2026).
  • On the occasion, the Coordination Committee of the Iraqi Shiite militias issued a statement clarifying that “the resistance’s weapons are sacred,” which it said serve as a tool to defend the state. The committee opposed any discussion of disarmament by external actors or even by the government until the state achieves full sovereignty and is freed from “occupation and its threats.” The statement was signed by Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, Ansar Allah al-Awfiya, and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, which announced in December 2025 their agreement to limit weapons to state control, as well as Kata’ib Hezbollah and Harakat al-Nujaba, which issued statements opposing disarmament (Telegram channel of the Coordination Committee, January 4, 2026). “A source close to the Iraqi militias” said the statement had been conveyed to senior political figures several days before its official publication, indicating the militias’ clear position regarding the next stage (Baghdad Today, January 6, 2026).
From a video by Kata’ib Hezbollah titled “Resistance is a right, and its weapons remain in the hands of its fighters” (Kata’ib Hezbollah Telegram channel, January 1, 2026)     From a video by Kata’ib Hezbollah titled “Resistance is a right, and its weapons remain in the hands of its fighters” (Kata’ib Hezbollah Telegram channel, January 1, 2026)
From a video by Kata’ib Hezbollah titled “Resistance is a right, and its weapons remain in the hands of its fighters” (Kata’ib Hezbollah Telegram channel, January 1, 2026)
  • A day later, however, Sanad al-Hamdany, director of the Al-Ahd network, the official media arm of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, denied any connection to the Coordination Committee’s statement (al-Hamdany’s X account, January 5, 2026). In another statement, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq reaffirmed its support for limiting weapons to the state in accordance with the constitution and without foreign interference. Marking the 105th anniversary of the Iraqi army, the militia said it is necessary to preserve Baghdad’s unity and strength and support state institutions, foremost among them the army and the PMF (Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq website, January 6, 2026).
The Militias in Syria
  • The Islamic Resistance Front in Syria – Possessors of Might (Uli al-Baas, or UAB) reported that it had reorganized its ranks and resumed activities following the December 2025 death of its leader, Rida al-Hussein Abu Jihad. The statement said that alongside “our national partners from the various factions on the front,” they continue to be determined and committed to the struggle and the “resistance,” under the leadership of Abu Mujahed, who was described as “the good friend of our martyred leader, Abu Jihad.” The organization emphasized that those who “sought to sow weakness among us by striking him instead united our ranks and strengthened our resolve” (Telegram channel of the Islamic Resistance Front in Syria, January 6, 2026).

[1] The weekly study includes the activities of Iran, the Shiite militias in Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen.
[2] For further details, see the ITIC periodic publication “Spotlight on Terrorism – December 2025”