1. Home

All posts by Admin

Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah and Lebanon (February 9-16, 2026)

Published:
Na'im Qassem (al-Manar, February 9, 2026)

Na'im Qassem (al-Manar, February 9, 2026)

An angry Lebanese person responds to a report about

An angry Lebanese person responds to a report about "Zionist settlers who planted trees in Kharaj Yaroun" asking how it was possible "to remain silent," criticizing the helplessness of the Lebanese state and presenting the event as an infringement on Lebanese sovereignty (al-Liwaa, February 14, 2026)

Aoun with Iran's outgoing ambassador (X account of the Lebanese presidency, February 11, 2026)

Aoun with Iran's outgoing ambassador (X account of the Lebanese presidency, February 11, 2026)

Hezbollah's election campaign begins in the town of al-Jiyeh (Lebanon Debate, February 13, 2026)
The meeting initiated by Toward Salvation (Lebanon Debate, February 11, 2026)

The meeting initiated by Toward Salvation (Lebanon Debate, February 11, 2026)

Overview[1]
  • In south Lebanon the IDF continued attacking Hezbollah targets and eliminated two of the organization’s terrorist operatives, part of enforcing the ceasefire agreement from November 2024 and preventing Hezbollah’s renewed military-terrorist build-up. Several terrorist operatives from the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) were eliminated in the Beqa’a Valley near the border with Syria.
  • Hezbollah continued criticizing the Lebanese regime because of the ongoing Israeli attacks and the plan to disarm the organization. The organization’s secretary general, Na’im Qassem, called on the government not to yield to Western pressure and to rely on the capabilities of the “resistance.”
  • Lebanon’s prime minister and army commander held meetings with foreign officials in preparation for the international conference to support the Lebanese security forces which will be held in Paris in early March 2026.
  • The commander of the United States Central Command praised the Lebanese army for exposing another giant Hezbollah tunnel in south Lebanon.
  • Hezbollah launched its campaign for the general parliamentary elections to be held this coming spring and agreed with the Amal Movement on full coordination.
  • Hezbollah’s secretary general announced that the organization would pay rent for three months for anyone whose house was damaged in the fighting with Israel, however residents in Shi’ite areas protested there was no long-term commitment and raised claims of unequal distribution of payments.
  • The United States Treasury imposed sanctions on a Lebanese company converting Hezbollah’s gold reserves into liquid assets for the organization’s reconstruction.
Israel-Hezbollah Tensions
The IDF
  • The IDF continued attacking Hezbollah targets to enforce the November 2024 ceasefire agreement and prevent Hezbollah from renewing its military-terrorist buildup and replenishing its arsenal. The forces attacked weapons depots and rocket launchers in various areas in south Lebanon and eliminated a Hezbollah terrorist involved in reconstructing military facilities. PIJ terrorist operatives were eliminated in an attack on a vehicle in the Beqa’a Valley near the border with Syria (IDF spokesperson, February 9–16, 2026).
Hezbollah
  • Hezbollah condemned the recent Israeli attacks in south Lebanon, calling them a “dangerous escalation” and a transition to a phased ground incursion, “abductions” and direct attacks on “civilians.” The organization called on the government to abandon its “policy of silence,” take deterrent political and legal measures, and assume full responsibility for protecting citizens (Lebanon Debate, February 9, 2026).
  • Hezbollah’s secretary general, Na’im Qassem, gave a speech at the inauguration of a medical center in Hadath in south Lebanon, claiming that the main threat was “Israeli aggression” and only “strength, unity and resistance” ensured the state’s sovereignty, not political measures or international pressure. He opposed the demands to disarm, calling them an American-Israeli move. He noted Hezbollah’s alliance with Amal, denied any rift with Lebanon’s president, Joseph Aoun and praised the visit of Prime Minister Nawaf Salam to south Lebanon (al-Manar, February 9, 2026).
Na'im Qassem (al-Manar, February 9, 2026)
Na’im Qassem (al-Manar, February 9, 2026)
  • Senior Hezbollah figures continued to criticize the Lebanese regime for the Israeli attacks and the plan to disarm the organization:[2]
    • At a ceremony held by Hezbollah and its scouting movement, the Imam al-Mahdi Scouts, former minister Mustafa Bayram gave reserved support for Prime Minister Salam’s visit to the south of the country, while demanding a shift from words to action and assertive diplomacy regarding Israel. He said priority should be given to a strong and well-equipped state and army, but in the absence of state capability, the people “will defend themselves,” representing the “resistance”[3] as a social culture and not merely a party framework. He praised the army commander, accused the United States of complicity in the “escalation” and of attempting to sow internal division, and said Hezbollah adhered to its bargaining chips and calculated patience until the appropriate time for dialogue on a national security strategy (al-Diyar, February 9, 2026).
    • The acting chairman of Hezbollah’s executive council, Ali Damoush, criticized the conduct of the state and claimed that Lebanon was collapsing under the “continued aggression and lack of state responsibility,” both in defense and in citizen welfare. In a Friday sermon in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia, he said that after the ceasefire agreement, responsibility had been handed to the state within a “new national equation,” but it had not met public expectations and allowed Israel to continue attacks, hold positions and prevent residents from returning. He represented the “resistance” as the most important factor deterring Israel and as a legitimate right anchored in national identity, and warned against widening the gap between the state and its people. Regionally, he linked the Lebanese arena to a broader struggle against the United States and Israel, claiming that the focus on Iran was an attack on the “resistance axis”[4] and that any attempt to impose war on it would meet “firm resolve” (Lebanese News Agency, February 13, 2026).
An angry Lebanese person responds to a report about "Zionist settlers who planted trees in Kharaj Yaroun" asking how it was possible "to remain silent," criticizing the helplessness of the Lebanese state and presenting the event as an infringement on Lebanese sovereignty (al-Liwaa, February 14, 2026)
An angry Lebanese person responds to a report about “Zionist settlers who planted trees in Kharaj Yaroun” asking how it was possible “to remain silent,” criticizing the helplessness of the Lebanese state and presenting the event as an infringement on Lebanese sovereignty (al-Liwaa, February 14, 2026)
  • Claims were made that Hezbollah was maneuvering politically to gain time, similar to its strategies in the military arena, i.e., concealment, deception and delay until conditions were more favorable. According to the report, Hezbollah coordinated with Iran, and both were absorbing military and political pressure with renewed preparedness and by creating the appearance of internal change. There were hints of a possibility of regulating the weapons issue in a way which would leave them in warehouses under some supervisory mechanism, alongside personal changes in the leadership and the highlighting of figures with a more political orientation. Reportedly the move was intended to prevent a possible Israeli attack and to postpone decisions regarding implementation of the plan to limit weapons north of the Litani River (al-Jumhuriya, February 14, 2026).[5]
The Lebanese Government
  • Lebanon’s prime minister, Nawaf Salam, met with the UN special coordinator for Lebanon, Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert, to discuss the work of the ceasefire monitoring committee, preparations for the March 5, 2026 Paris conference to support the Lebanese army, and the period after UNIFIL’s mandate ends in December of this year (X account of Lebanon’s prime minister, February 11, 2026).
  • Lebanon’s prime minister, Nawaf Salam, met on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference with the chairman of Yemen’s presidential leadership council, Dr. Rashad al-Alimi, with Kuwait’s prime minister, Sheikh Ahmad Abdullah al-Ahmad al-Sabah and with the prime minister of the Netherlands, Dick Schoof. They praised Lebanon’s efforts at reconstruction and to apply its sovereignty, and said they supported the Lebanese army (Lebanese News Agency, February 13–14, 2026).
  • Lebanon’s president, Joseph Aoun, hosted the outgoing Iranian ambassador, Mojtaba Amani, at a farewell meeting (X account of the Lebanese presidency, February 11, 2026).
Aoun with Iran's outgoing ambassador (X account of the Lebanese presidency, February 11, 2026)
Aoun with Iran’s outgoing ambassador (X account of the Lebanese presidency, February 11, 2026)
  • According to reports, Egypt’s president, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, was acting with the United States president for Lebanon’s reconstruction and to strengthen the army even before Hezbollah was fully disarmed, attempting to rely on the flexibility shown by the American administration toward Hamas in Gaza. Reportedly, President Aoun was optimistic because during meetings held by the army commander, Rodolph Haykal, in Washington, no binding schedules were set for completing the state’s monopoly north of the Litani River, seen in Beirut as additional room to maneuver (al-Diyar, February 13, 2026).
The Lebanese Army
  • The commander of United States Central Command (CENTCOM), Admiral Brad Cooper, congratulated the Lebanese army on exposing another giant Hezbollah tunnel, the second within two months. He said dismantling facilities used for storing ammunition, missiles and UAVs by non-state actors contributed to stability and security in Lebanon and the region (X account of CENTCOM, February 9, 2026). His statement was published after a “senior American official” revealed that United States intelligence had assisted the Lebanese army in locating a large cache of weapons in a warehouse in al-Khalousiyeh in south Lebanon.
  • The commander of the Lebanese army, General Rodolph Haykal, visited Saudi Arabia at the invitation of the Saudi Arabian chief of staff and participated in an international security exhibition. Haykal met with the Saudi army commander to discuss expanding military cooperation, given the security challenges in Lebanon and in connection with the international support conference for the army to be held in Paris on March 5, 2026. They noted the importance of strengthening the military institution as a stabilizing factor responsible for applying state sovereignty, combating terrorism and preventing smuggling (X account of the Lebanese army, February 10, 2026).
The meeting between Haykal and the chief of staff of the Saudi Arabian army (X account of the Lebanese army, February 10, 2026)
The meeting between Haykal and the chief of staff of the Saudi Arabian army
(X account of the Lebanese army, February 10, 2026)
  • The Lebanese army closed several illegal crossings on the border with Syria in the northern Beqa’a Valley. The move was meant to heighten security along the land borders, given the concern over the smuggling of weapons, drugs and various goods, and amid internal and external pressure to strengthen state control in the border areas (Lebanese army website, February 12, 2026).
UNIFIL
  • UNIFIL spokesperson Kandice Ardiel said the force was planning to gradually reduce its presence in Lebanon after its mandate ended in December of this year, and to complete the withdrawal of most of its components by mid-2027, with full departure by its end. Accordingly, transferring positions and equipment to the Lebanese authorities will begin, after which the force will carry out only limited tasks, focusing on protecting UN personnel and managing a safe exit (Agence France-Presse, February 10, 2026).
Disarming Hezbollah
The Lebanese Army Deploys for the Second Phase
  • Reportedly, at the present time, the second phase of the army’s plan to limit weapons will remain only at the level of review. The army commander, General Rodolph Haykal, is expected to present a report regarding the transition from activity south of the Litani River to the area north of the Litani River as far as the Awali River, but without specifying specific areas or schedules. Meanwhile, a “senior source” said no substantive decisions were expected regarding beginning the phase north of the Litani River, since conditions were not yet ripe because the first phase south of the Litani River had not been completed, as Israel still held points in the field and the addition of new positions would limit limited the army’s deployment (al-Diyar and al-Jumhuriya, February 14, 2026).
  • According to a different report, Haykal was expected to tell the government that implementing the second phase required significant strengthening of the army’s capabilities, both in manpower and equipment. “American military sources” said that in addition to Hezbollah’s refusal to cooperate, there were large gaps in the army’s deployment, and only about 3,000 soldiers were stationed north of the Litani River, compared to about 10,000 soldiers to its south (Nidaa’ al-Watan, February 16, 2026).
  • The minister of information, Paul Morcos, said the government would decide regarding the second phase of the plan for state sovereignty and to limit weapons, which would apply to the area north of the Litani River. He said there would be no confrontation between the Lebanese army and Hezbollah, adding that the objectives were state sovereignty and stability (Nidaa’ al-Watan, February 11, 2026).
  • In preparation for the government meeting, the Lebanese army reported on a series of security actions in the area of Taria in Baalbek, which included raids on homes and confiscation of weapons, as well as the arrest of two suspects in possession of ammunition. The measures were part of expanding the army’s enforcement activity in areas identified with Hezbollah’s support base, and showed determination to implement the principle of exclusivity of weapons in practice (MTV Lebanon, February 16, 2026).
Hezbollah’s Position
  • Hezbollah secretary general, Na’im Qassem, said the Lebanese state should not stand against Hezbollah but rather rely on it. In a speech commemorating senior Hezbollah figure Ali Salhab, Qassem said if the state wanted to strengthen and reconstruct itself it should benefit from the capabilities of the “resistance” as an experienced and willing security pillar, and not yield to Western pressure to disarm. Qassem said no one had the right to dictate that Lebanon weaken its “defensive capabilities,” and any concession required a national consensus which did not exist. He again presented the tripart motto of “the army, the people and the resistance” as the basis for the state’s future (al-Madan, February 10, 2026).
  • The deputy head of Hezbollah’s political council, Mahmoud Qamati, again represented disarmament as an American–Israeli demand, and argued that whoever believed understandings with Israel could “superficially” be reached ignored the fact of “ongoing occupation.” He claimed Lebanon would be an “occupied” state as long as Israel held territory and 13 disputed points along the border, and therefore the “resistance” remained “legitimate,” both under the Lebanese constitution and under international law (al-Jazeera, February 11, 2026).
Hezbollah’s Opponents
  • The minister of emigrants from the Christian Lebanese Forces Party, Kamal Shehadeh, said control of the borders and full application of sovereignty were Lebanon’s duty, not as a concession to Israel or the international community, but as basic sovereign policy. He added that despite Israel’s military strength, neither the Lebanese army nor Hezbollah had stopped the attacks, and said Hezbollah’s involvement in the war alongside the Gaza Strip had brought destruction to south Lebanon without creating effective deterrence (al-Arabiya, February 9, 2026).
  • The political bureau of the Christian Lebanese Phalanges Party publicly supported the Lebanese army and its efforts for exclusivity of weapons in the hands of the state, while calling for mobilizing international support before the army assistance conference to be held in Paris on March 5, 2026. The bureau demanded that the government accelerate implementation of limiting weapons north of the Litani River and dismantle Hezbollah’s military[-terrorist] array throughout Lebanese territory, particularly before the general elections in the spring. The party also praised the prime minister’s visit to the south and presented the reception he received as an expression of residents’ support for applying state sovereignty (Nidaa’ al-Watan, February 11, 2026).
  • Former Lebanese prime minister and leader of the al-Mustaqbal (Future) Party, Saad al-Hariri, spoke at the ceremony marking 21 years since the assassination of his father, former prime minister Rafic al-Hariri. He called for full implementation of the Taif Agreement[6] and for limiting weapons to the hands of the state, alongside abolishing political sectarianism and rejecting any attempt to lead the country into sectarian confrontation (Lebanon24, February 14, 2026).
  • In his speech at the Hariri memorial, Lebanese Parliament member from the Phalanges Party, Nadim al-Gemayel, called for an end to illegal weapons in Lebanon, which he said had been a central factor leading to the assassination of the former prime minister. He said the weapons of the Lebanese state had to be the sole and exclusive protector of all its citizens, and supported a state monopoly on force. He also linked the struggle against non-state weapons to the realization of al-Hariri’s vision, which sought to anchor an entire community within a sovereign state framework, at a time when Lebanon faced significant political and strategic shifts (Lebanon24, February 14, 2026).
Challenges for Hezbollah
Preparing for the General Elections in Lebanon
  • Hezbollah began its campaign for the general elections scheduled for this coming spring, with at an event in the town of al-Jiyeh whose slogan was, “Your vote… loyalty to them.” Former minister Mustafa Bayram called for electoral mobilization and said participation in the elections and raising voter turnout were central to the struggle for the character of the Shi’ite and national arenas. He represented the contest as a “value-based mission” of ideological commitment and not only of tactical considerations, hinting at rival attempts “to distance the public” from the ballot boxes (Lebanon Debate, February 13, 2026).
Hezbollah's election campaign begins in the town of al-Jiyeh (Lebanon Debate, February 13, 2026)
Hezbollah’s election campaign begins in the town of al-Jiyeh
(Lebanon Debate, February 13, 2026)
  • “Hezbollah and Amal sources” said despite reports of tension, the alliance between the two organizations remained stable and was a “strategic anchor.” They said that although there were disagreements on specific political issues, full coordination continued, in both the composition of the government and distribution of portfolios and in preparation for the parliamentary elections, viewed as an existential test for Shi’ite representation. A joint monitoring committee had been appointed since both aspired to preserve the achievements of the 2022 elections and their control of a full parliamentary bloc (al-Diyar, February 11, 2026).
  • A Shi’ite political event was held in Beirut when more than 500 participants from different areas of Lebanon arrived at a meeting convened by the group called Toward Salvation. Beyond the scope of participation, the organized, public nature of the discourse was prominent, calling for strengthening the idea of the state, partnership in decision-making and avoiding being drawn into repeated wars. While at this stage it did not constitute a direct electoral challenge to the existing power structure led by Hezbollah and the Amal Movement, the event reflected an attempt to break the political monopoly within the Shi’ite environment and to open an alternative space for discourse (Lebanon Debate, February 11, 2026).
The meeting initiated by Toward Salvation (Lebanon Debate, February 11, 2026)
The meeting initiated by Toward Salvation (Lebanon Debate, February 11, 2026)
Reconstructing Lebanon
  • Hezbollah secretary general, Na’im Qassem, announced that the organization would pay rent for the months of February, March and April 2026 to anyone whose house had been destroyed during the fighting with Israel or determined to be unfit for habitation, and to those still unable to return to their houses. He said care for shelter should be the state’s responsibility, but due to its limitations Hezbollah saw itself as responsible for finding a way to assist, since they were not prepared to stand aside and watch (al-Manar, February 10, 2026). However, residents in Shi’ite areas did not hide their dissatisfaction with the lack of commitment to longer-term assistance, and expressed anger over the unfair distribution of previous payments. For example, a resident of the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia admitted that they did not know if what had been paid was the full grant or only a partial payment or arrangement, as they had not received official notification (al-Sharq al-Awsat, February 12, 2026).
  • Hassan Fadlallah, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, said reconstruction was a national issue which should be removed from political context. He placed primary responsibility on the government for full implementation of its commitments to housing and infrastructure. He said Hezbollah had already funded housing for tens of thousands of families and was now advancing budget allocations for reconstruction, especially the payment of rent, restoration of buildings and facilities and the reconstruction of houses which had been destroyed, mainly in villages along the border line. He said delays resulted not only from a lack of resources but also from external political pressure, adding that the organization would continue to exert pressure in the governmental and parliamentary arena until the deadlock had been broken (al-Diyar, February 11, 2026).
  • Under the shadow of the continued distress in the border areas, graffiti were sprayed on the municipality building in the town of al-Taybeh calling for housing assistance “without favoritism.” The mayor called it an individual act which did not reflect organized protest or a political message, but rather the release of growing economic distress. The event, although isolated, reflected the cumulative emotional fatigue of whose who lived on the confrontation line in south Lebanon, who suffered delays in reconstruction, damage to livelihoods and a feeling of ongoing neglect (Lebanon Debate, February 10, 2026).
  • According to reports, there has been a significant increase in rental prices in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia, after the destruction of about 99,610 housing units during the fighting and the continuation of security threats. According to a survey, rents currently ranged between $300 and $600 and even more, high relative to the official minimum wage of about $312 and to the dire economic situation. Interviewees said the prices did not correspond to income levels, to the cost of living and to the security uncertainty, and they changed sharply according to the degree of tension and fear of escalation (al-Akhbar, February 14, 2026).
International Activity against Hezbollah
  • The United States Treasury Department continued to take action against Hezbollah’s finances with sanctions to block its sources of funding. The Department exposed the activity of a gold trading company established by al-Qard al-Hasan, Hezbollah’s financial arm, which had received a governmental license in Lebanon, whose objective was to convert the organization’s gold reserves into liquid assets that could be realized for Hezbollah’s reconstruction. One of the company’s owners, Muhammad Nayef Majed, was added to the sanctions list. Sanctions were also imposed on a Russian citizen working in a company linked to Hezbollah together with Ali Kasir, a member of Hezbollah’s financial team based in Iran. The two were involved in projects to procure weapons from Russia and to sell goods to obtain profits for the organization. Sanctions were also imposed on a company based in Turkey engaged in exporting fertilizer from Iran to Turkey under the guise of cargo that had departed from Oman, on another company based in Turkey and its vessel involved in the export, and on a company based in Panama and its vessel where the fertilizer had been loaded. The United States Secretary of the Treasury said the United States would take action to disconnect Hezbollah from the global financial system, and noted that the organization continued “to masquerade as a civilian organization” to ensure its cash flow (United States Treasury, February 10, 2026).
  • Hezbollah’s daily al-Akhbar criticized Kuwait’s decision on February 8, 2026 to add eight Lebanese hospitals to its terrorist list and accused it of escalating a “regional–international siege” against Hezbollah’s support base. According to the paper, it was a political measure, reflecting alignment with Saudi Arabia and the UAE and intended to attack financial support sources and social facilities identified with the “resistance.” “Sources” opined that the decision had been American-inspired and it signaled an expansion of pressure to the health and civilian services sectors beyond the military and financial spheres. Hospital administrations and the association of hospital owners expressed surprise and claimed that no prior notification had been received from Kuwait, while the Lebanese ministry of health claimed it had not received advance warning (al-Akhbar, February 9, 2026).
The Palestinians in Lebanon
  • A Palestinian delegation headed by Yasser Mahmoud Abbas, the son of the chairman of the Palestinian Authority (PA), Mahmoud Abbas, and the Palestinian ambassador to Lebanon, Muhammad al-Asaad, met with Lebanese Parliament member Neemat Frem to discuss regional developments and Lebanese–Palestinian relations. The delegation members presented the PA’s position supporting the transfer of Palestinian weapons in Lebanon to the hands of the state and said the practical implementation of the decision had already begun. It was further noted that the PA supported the application of Lebanese state sovereignty over its entire territory and opposed any attempt at permanent settlement or naturalization of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. Frem welcomed the move and called for accelerating mechanisms for transferring weapons in all the camps, while strengthening the concept of the state and its authority. He also mentioned additional Palestinian initiatives, including promoting the voluntary return of about 25,000 Palestinians who had arrived from Syria, adding that the work of the joint committees would be continued to improve refugee living conditions while preserving Lebanese sovereignty and the rule of law (Lebanese News Agency, February 14, 2026).

[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications.
[2] See the February 2026 ITIC report, Rising Tensions between Hezbollah and the Lebanese Government
[3] Promotion of efforts to destroy the State of Israel.
[4] Iran, Hezbollah, the Palestinian terrorist organizations, the Houthis in Yemen and the Shi'ite militias in Iraq.
[5] See the February 2026 ITIC report, The Reorganization of Hezbollah Leadership and the Resignation of Wafiq Safa
[6] The Taif Agreement, also known as the National Reconciliation Charter, was signed on October 22, 1989 in Taif, Saudi Arabia and symbolizes the end of the Lebanese civil war that began in 1975. ↑

Related Articles

Rising Tensions between Hezbollah and the Lebanese Government

The Reorganization of Hezbollah Leadership and the Resignation of Wafiq Safa

IDF Announces Operational Control of the Ali al-Taher Ridge –Reactions in Lebanon and Iran

Spotlight on Terrorism – January 2026

Published:
Tabet and Awad's

Tabet and Awad's "ID card" (IDF spokesperson, January 9, 2026)

Al-Houli's

Al-Houli's "ID card" (IDF spokesperson, January 17, 2026)

Al-Khatib an al-Rahman's

Al-Khatib an al-Rahman's "ID cards" (IDF spokesperson, January 17, 2026)

Death notices for the Mujahideen Brigades terrorist operatives.

Death notices for the Mujahideen Brigades terrorist operatives.

Death notices for the terrorists killed in Judea and Samaria (Telegram channel of the Mujahideen Brigades, January 16–17, 2026)

Death notices for the terrorists killed in Judea and Samaria (Telegram channel of the Mujahideen Brigades, January 16–17, 2026)

Abu al-Sabah (Quds Agency, January 24, 2026)

Abu al-Sabah (Quds Agency, January 24, 2026)

Overview [1]

  • During January 2026, the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip remained in force, while counterterrorism operations continued in Judea and Samaria. The ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah continued, despite IDF attacks on Hezbollah targets.
  • The Gaza Strip: The ceasefire that went into effect on October 10, 2025 continued. IDF forces attacked suspects who crossed the Yellow Line and eliminated terrorist operatives in response to ceasefire violations. The body of the last murdered Israeli hostage, held in the Gaza Strip since the October 7, 2023 terrorist attack and massacre, was returned, after which the transition to the second stage of the ceasefire agreement was announced. No rockets were launched into Israeli territory.
  • Israel, Judea and Samaria: There was one terrorist attack, with no casualties. Israeli security forces continued counterterrorism operations throughout Judea and Samaria, during which wanted individuals and terrorist operatives who attacked IDF forces or planned attacks were eliminated and weapons were located.
  • Lebanon: The IDF continued attacks on Hezbollah attempts to violate the understandings of the November 27, 2024 ceasefire and on the organization’s reconstruction efforts. Nineteen Hezbollah terrorist operatives were eliminated.
  • Syria: IDF forces continued to operate in southern Syria.
  • The Houthis: The Houthis did not attack Israel or ocean-going vessels, in accordance with their plan not to attack once the Gaza Strip War ended. However, they threatened to resume attacks following alleged “Israeli violations” in the Gaza Strip and in Lebanon, and threatened to attack Israeli targets in Somaliland in the Horn of Africa.
  • Terrorism abroad: An attack on the Israeli embassy in Azerbaijan was prevented.
The IDF
  • During January 2026, IDF forces continued operating within the Yellow Line (the area under IDF control) in the Gaza Strip, in accordance with the ceasefire agreement. They eliminated terrorists who crossed the Yellow Line, posed a threat or violated the ceasefire, and destroyed weapons and tunnels located within the Yellow Line. On January 26, Israeli security forces returned the body of police Master Sgt. Ran Guaili, the last murdered Israeli hostage held in the Gaza Strip since the Hamas terrorist attack and massacre on October 7, 2023, after locating it in a cemetery in the al-Shuja’iyya neighborhood of Gaza City. The American administration then announced the start of the second stage of the ceasefire agreement.[2] IDF forces also prevented weapons from being smuggled into the Gaza Strip through the Egyptian border. (IDF spokesperson, January 31–1, 2026). The more significant terrorist eliminations were the following:
    • On January 8, in response to an attempted rocket launch targeting Israeli territory, Kamal Abd al-Rahman Muhammad Awad, who headed the anti-tank array in Hamas’ Khan Yunis Brigade, and Ahmed Thabet, who ran a weapons production workshop, were eliminated. An attempt was made to eliminate Ahmed Abd al-Fattah Saeed Majdalawi, a nukhba operative from the al-Nuseirat Battalion who participated in the attack on the Nova party during the October 7, 2023 terrorist attack and massacre (IDF spokesperson, January 9, 2026). “Sources in Hamas” stated that a tent belonging to a prominent field commander in the Khan Yunis Brigade was attacked, and he was wounded, along with four fatalities. In an attack on a tent in al-Mawasi area in Khan Yunis, Kamal Awad, commander of the anti-tank unit of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades in the sector, was eliminated, and another person survived an attack in the Khan Yunis district. Ibrahim Sabih, a prominent nukhba operative in the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, was killed in an attack on a caravan near the Abu Hussein school in the Jabalia refugee camp. He and his nukhba commander were the targets of the attack (al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 9, 2026).
Tabet and Awad's "ID card" (IDF spokesperson, January 9, 2026)
Tabet and Awad’s “ID card” (IDF spokesperson, January 9, 2026)
    • On January 12, Hamas’ ministry of interior announced that the head of the criminal investigations department in the Khan Yunis police, Mahmoud Ahmed al-Astal, 40 years old, was killed in the al-Mawasi area by gunfire from a passing vehicle carrying several “agents of the occupation.” They claimed it was part of a continued effort to attack operatives of the security forces after more than 2,700 members of the ministry had been killed during the war in the Gaza Strip, about 15% of its total manpower (Telegram channel of Hamas’ ministry of interior and national security, January 12, 2026). Hussam al-Astal, leader of a militia operating in the Kizan al-Najjar area in the Khan Yunis district, which is under Israeli control, claimed responsibility for the assassination. In a video published on his Facebook page, he claimed the assassination was part of a “campaign against senior Hamas figures” and threatened to continue attacking movement operatives. He called on families in Khan Yunis to disown their sons affiliated with Hamas and warned they would be killed. He noted that the operation had been carried out outside the Yellow Line in the al-Mawasi area in Khan Yunis, and declared that “what is coming will be greater and there will be many surprises” (Hussam al-Astal’s Facebook page, January 12, 2026). The National Gathering of Palestinian Tribes, Clans and Families condemned the assassination and called it a “cowardly act and a blatant violation of national, religious and human values which reflects base criminal behavior” (Shehab Agency, January 12, 2026).
Mahmoud Ahmed al-Astal (al-Risalah, January 12, 2026
Mahmoud Ahmed al-Astal (al-Risalah, January 12, 2026)
    • On January 15, in response to shots fired at an IDF armored vehicle in the Rafah area, Muhammad Hamed Muhammad al-Houli, Hamas’ operations department commander in the central camps, was eliminated. He was a key figure in the brigade, directed terrorists who killed an Israeli civilian at the Nahal Oz Checkpoint in February 1995 and helped prepare the October 7, 2023 terrorist attack and massacre (IDF spokesperson, January 17, 2026). A “Palestinian source” said Muhammad al-Houli was killed in an attack on his home in Deir al-Balah, was among the most prominent commanders of Hamas’ military wing and had survived previous elimination attempts (Al Jazeera, January 15, 2026). According to reports, al-Houli, aka Abu Fuad, headed the unit responsible for border security in the Gaza Strip for the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades (Telegram channel al-Nuseirat Camp Mubasher, January 15, 2026).
Al-Houli's "ID card" (IDF spokesperson, January 17, 2026)     Death notice for Muhammad al-Houli (Facebook page of "Dr. Hamed Maher al-Houli, January 15, 2026).
Right: Death notice for Muhammad al-Houli (Facebook page of “Dr. Hamed Maher al-Houli, January 15, 2026). Left: Al-Houli’s “ID card” (IDF spokesperson, January 17, 2026)
    • The response attacks also eliminated Ashraf Adnan Muhammad al-Khatib, who commanded the rocket and missile array in the central camps’ sector of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and Saeed Khaled Ali Abd al-Rahman, who was chief sniper in Hamas’ Deir al-Balah Battalion in the central camps (IDF spokesperson, January 17, 2026). Palestinian media confirmed that Ashraf al-Khatib, a commander in the PIJ’s military wing, was killed in an attack in the al-Nuseirat refugee camp (Shehab Agency, January 15, 2026).
Al-Khatib an al-Rahman's "ID cards" (IDF spokesperson, January 17, 2026)
Al-Khatib an al-Rahman’s “ID cards” (IDF spokesperson, January 17, 2026)
    • On January 16, the Mujahideen Brigades issued a poster of the organization’s fatalities during the war, headed by the organization’s leaders Asad Atiya Abu Sharia and Omar Atiya Abu Sharia. The following day, the organization also issued a poster with three operatives who were killed outside the Gaza Strip, including Ahmed al-Aqabi, an Israeli Bedouin from Hura who carried out the shooting and stabbing attack at the Beersheba central bus station in which a Border Police fighter was killed in October 2024 (Telegram channel of the Mujahideen Brigades, January 16–17, 2026).
Death notices for the terrorists killed in Judea and Samaria (Telegram channel of the Mujahideen Brigades, January 16–17, 2026)     Death notices for the Mujahideen Brigades terrorist operatives.
Right: Death notices for the Mujahideen Brigades terrorist operatives. Left: Death notices for the terrorists killed in Judea and Samaria (Telegram channel of the Mujahideen Brigades, January 16–17, 2026)
    • On January 20, Hamas’ military wing confirmed the death of Muhammad Ali Abu Hussein, aka Abu Hussein, who was military intelligence commander of the Rafah Brigade. He died on December 13, 2025, about ten days after being wounded in an Israeli attack on the al-Mawasi area of Khan Yunis in response to a Hamas ceasefire violation. According to a video issued by the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, Abu Hussein, 55 years old, joined the military wing at a young age. He was also seen reading his will and photographed with former Rafah Brigade commander Ra’ed al-Attar, eliminated in Operation Protective Edge in August 2014, and former Rafah Brigade commander Muhammad Shabana, eliminated in May 2025 (Telegram channel of the Izz al-Din al- Qassam Brigades, January 20, 2026).
Abu Hussein reads his will (Telegram channel of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, January 20, 2026)      Death notice issued for Abu Hussein.
Right: Death notice issued for Abu Hussein. Left: Abu Hussein reads his will
(Telegram channel of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, January 20, 2026)
    • On January 21, IDF forces attacked a vehicle belonging to the Egyptian committee operating in the Gaza Strip while it was documenting aid activity and filming refugee camps in the Netzarim area in the central Strip. According to reports, “journalists” Abd al-Raouf Saeed Shaat, Muhammad Salah Qashta and Anas Abdallah Ghneim, who worked with the Egyptian committee and several media outlets, were killed in the attack (Quds Agency and the Hamas government information office in the Strip, January 21, 2026). The spokesman of the Egyptian committee claimed the “Zionists” had targeted the three and stated that they would continue humanitarian work despite the attacks on the teams (al-Aqsa channel, January 21, 2026). The IDF spokesperson responded that several suspects had operated a Hamas UAV in an area, threatening IDF forces, and were attacked following the required chain of authorization (IDF spokesperson, January 21, 2026).
Death notice, right to left, Ghneim, Shaat and Qashta (Quds Agency, January 21, 2026)
Death notice, right to left, Ghneim, Shaat and Qashta (Quds Agency, January 21, 2026)
    • On January 30, eight Hamas terrorists were seen exiting a tunnel in eastern Rafah. Three were eliminated and another, a commander in the eastern Rafah Battalion of Hamas’ military wing, was captured (IDF spokesperson, January 30, 2026). Ghassan al-Dahini, head of the Popular Forces militia operating in Rafah under Israeli auspices, said the militia’s counterterrorism department had captured Adham Atallah al-Akar, who commanded a company in Hamas’ military wing and also served as an officer in the Hamas police force (Facebook page of the Popular Forces, January 30, 2026).
    • On January 30–31, in response to Hamas’ ceasefire violation, the IDF attacked commanders and terrorists from Hamas and the PIJ (IDF spokesperson, January 31, 2026). Hamas’ ministry of interior and national security said police officers Rami Riyad al-Mabih, Muhammad Mustafa Kaloub, Nujoud Youssef al-Madhoun, Mahmoud Muhammad Shanar and Riyad Nafez al-Dalu had been killed in an attack on the Sheikh Radwan police station in Gaza City (Telegram channel of Hamas’ Ministry of Interior, January 31, 2026). It was also reported that Nujoud al-Madhoun, head of the women’s police at the station, was killed in the attack (Telegram channel al-Bureij News, January 31, 2026). Another reported fatality was Hamas military wing operative Osama Shareem, son of Taysir Shareem, who headed a section in Hamas’ weapons production headquarters and was eliminated in July 2025 (X account of Jusur News, January 31, 2026, Telegram channel al-Sayyad, January 31, 2026).
    • The Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades, the military wing of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), announced that the “heroic fighter” Hazem Rabhi Hamad Abu Hadid, aka Abu al-Nimr, was killed in an attack on al-Mawasi in Khan Yunis on January 31. He was called “a hero of the commando unit” and a “fierce defender” of the Palestinian people and the Arab nation, and “represented the model of a committed, non-compromising fighter.” It was further noted that he was born in April 1986 to a family of “fighters who raised him on the principles of struggle and revolution,” that he joined the PFLP in 2012 and two years later joined its military wing and participated in the Loyalty to the Martyrs campaign (Operation Protective Edge) in 2014 and the Sword of Jerusalem campaign (Operation Guardian of the Walls) in 2021 until the October 7, 2023 battle (Telegram channel of the Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades, February 8, 2026).
PFLP death notice for Abu Hadid (Telegram channel of the Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades, February 8, 2026)
PFLP death notice for Abu Hadid
(Telegram channel of the Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades, February 8, 2026)
  • In January 2026 it was reported that senior terrorist operatives also died of natural causes:
    • On January 16, it was reported that “commander” Ahmed Fakhri Shabir, aka Abu Ratib, military media commander in Hamas’ Khan Yunis Brigade and one of the founders of the military media array, died of illness (Telegram channel of Jenin refugee camp 24 hours, January 16, 2026).
Death notice for Shabir (Abu Osama 02's Instagram channel, January 17, 2026)
Death notice for Shabir (Abu Osama 02’s Instagram channel, January 17, 2026)
    • On January 22, the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades announced the death of “the martyr field commander” Rabi’ Jihad Hamad, aka Abu Jihad, who was a commander in the organization’s northern Gaza Brigade and died “of natural causes” on January 15, 2026 (Telegram channel of the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, January 22, 2026).
Death notice for Jihad Hamad (Telegram channel of the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, January 22, 2026)
Death notice for Jihad Hamad
(Telegram channel of the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, January 22, 2026)
    • On January 24, Hamas announced the death of the “civil commander and Islamic scholar,” Dr. Atta Allah Abu al-Sabah, aka Abu Alaa, a member of the movement’s political bureau, who died at the age of 78. He had been minister of culture and minister for prisoners’ affairs, a scholar, poet and writer and had dedicated his life to the “national cause” and to defending the “Palestinian national project” (Telegram channel of Hamas, January 24, 2026).
Abu al-Sabah (Quds Agency, January 24, 2026)
Abu al-Sabah (Quds Agency, January 24, 2026)
Rocket fire[3]
  • in January 2026 no rockets were fired at Israel from the Gaza Strip.
Monthly Distribution of Rocket Fire

Monthly Distribution of Rocket Fire

Annual Distribution of Rocket Hits
Annual Distribution of Rocket Hits
* Distribution for 2024 begins in May
Terrorist Attacks
  • During January 2026, there was one terrorist attack (six attacks in December):
  • Stabbing attack at the Tunnel Checkpoint: On January 28, Border Police fighters saw a Palestinian suspect who approached the Tunnel Checkpoint connecting Gush Etzion and Jerusalem. During the inspection, the suspect pulled out a knife and attempted to stab the security personnel, who shot and killed him. There were no Israeli casualties (Police spokesperson, January 28, 2026). The ministry of health in Ramallah reported that Qusai Maher Khalayqa, 28 years old, from the town of al-Shuyukh north of Hebron, was killed at the Tunnel Checkpoint (Quds Agency, January 28, 2026). Hamas issued a death notice for him, calling him a “shaheed of Palestine,” rather than “the mujahid shaheed” as usually written for the deaths of terrorists who carry out attacks. According to the notice he was killed by “occupation fire” at the Tunnel Checkpoint, “allegedly during an attempt to carry out a stabbing attack” (Telegram channel of Hamas in Judea and Samaria, January 28, 2026).
Hamas death notice for Khalayqa (Hamas Telegram channel in Judea and Samaria, January 28, 2026)
Hamas death notice for Khalayqa
(Hamas Telegram channel in Judea and Samaria, January 28, 2026)
Significant Terrorist Attacks, 2026[4]

Significant Terrorist Attacks, 2026

Distribution of Significant Terrorist Attacks over the Past Decade

Distribution of Significant Terrorist Attacks over the Past Decade

Counterterrorism
  • During January 2026, Israeli security forces continued routine counterterrorism activity throughout Judea and Samaria, including a week-long operation in the Jabal Johar neighborhood in Hebron. Terrorists who threw rocks and Molotov cocktails were eliminated, wanted individuals and suspects involved in terrorist activity and planning attacks were detained, and weapons, explosive devices and lathes were seized, as well as funds intended to finance terrorist activity and incitement. An IDF soldier was wounded by gunfire during an operation in Nablus. The security forces sealed and demolished the homes of attack perpetrators and prevented weapons from being smuggled into Judea and Samaria along the Jordanian border (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, January 1–31, 2026:
    • On January 1, IDF fighters who were lying in ambush on a central route near the village of Lubban al-Sharqiya opened fire at terrorists who threw rocks at them. One of the terrorists was shot and killed (IDF spokesperson, January 1, 2026). The Palestinian Authority (PA) general authority for civil affairs reported that Khattab Muhammad Sharhan Daraghmeh, 26 years old, from Lubban al-Sharqiya, was killed by “occupation” fire (Quds Agency, January 1, 2026). Hamas issued a death notice for the “shaheed of Palestine,” Khattab Muhammad Daraghmeh (Telegram channel of Hamas in Judea and Samaria, January 1, 2026).
Hamas death notice for Daraghmeh (Telegram channel of Hamas in Judea and Samaria, January 1, 2026)
Hamas death notice for Daraghmeh
(Telegram channel of Hamas in Judea and Samaria, January 1, 2026)
    • On January 16, IDF forces arrived in the village of al-Mughayyir near Ramallah following a report that terrorists had thrown rocks at Israeli civilians and blocked the access road. Upon arrival the fighters were shot at; no casualties were reported. Dozens of terrorists threw rocks at the fighters and one ran forward carrying a rock. The fighters shot into the air and then shot and killed him (IDF spokesperson, January 16, 2026). Palestinian media reported the death of Muhammad Saad Naasan, 14 years old, in the village of al-Mughayyir, northeast of Ramallah (Quds Agency, January 16, 2026). Hamas issued a death notice for the “shaheed of Palestine,” Muhammad Naasan (Telegram channel of Hamas in Judea and Samaria, January 16, 2026).
Hamas death notice for Naasan (Telegram channel of Hamas in Judea and Samaria, January 16, 2026)
Hamas death notice for Naasan
(Telegram channel of Hamas in Judea and Samaria, January 16, 2026)
    • On January 21, Israeli security forces operating in the village of Shuweika detained the terrorist Fadi Behti, who was a bomb-maker for the terrorist network in Tulkarm (Police spokesperson, IDF spokesperson and Israeli Security Agency spokesperson, January 21, 2026). Palestinian media reported that a special military force had detained the “young” Fadi Jaroun in a raid in the Shuweika neighborhood in northern Tulkarm (Quds Agency, January 17, 2026).
    • On January 27, a terrorist threw a Molotov cocktail at IDF forces operating in the town of al-Zaharia near Hebron; he was shot and killed. The forces also shot at a terrorist who was throwing rocks (IDF spokesperson, January 28, 2026). The ministry of health in Ramallah reported the death of Muhammad Raja Nasrallah, 20 years old, after he was wounded by “occupation” fire in the town of al-Zaharia, south of Hebron. He and another young man were reportedly shot during a “raid” on the town, he was hit in the abdomen and evacuated in critical condition to the hospital, where his death was declared (Shehab Agency, January 27, 2026). Hamas issued a death notice for the “shaheed of Palestine,” Muhammad Raja Nasrallah (Telegram channel of Hamas in Judea and Samaria, January 28, 2026).
Hamas death notice for Nasrallah (Telegram channel of Hamas in Judea and Samaria, January 28, 2026)
Hamas death notice for Nasrallah
(Telegram channel of Hamas in Judea and Samaria, January 28, 2026)
  • During January 2026, security forces also prevented terrorist activity within the State of Israel:
    • On January 8, an indictment was filed for a 15-year-old, a resident of the north, who was detained by the Israel Security Agency (ISA) and Israel Police following suspicion that he had been in contact with terrorist elements. The investigation revealed that he had pledged loyalty to ISIS, and instructions for manufacturing an explosive belt were found in his possession. In contact with elements affiliated with the organization abroad, he prepared himself to carry out an attack. The investigation further revealed that he expressed support for past attacks on the State of Israel and wanted its destruction. He also participated in extremist discourse regarding members of other religions, including Christians and Muslims who did not share his extremist worldview (Telegram channel of the Israel Police spokesperson, January 8, 2026).
  • During January 2026, IDF forces continued attacking Hezbollah targets in south Lebanon in violation of the ceasefire agreement of November 27, 2024, the reconstruction of its military capabilities and the renewal of its arsenal. The attacks were carried out south of the Litani River, despite the Lebanese army’s announcement of the completion of the first stage of the plan to establish the state’s monopoly on weapons,[5] as well as north of the Litani and in the Beqa’a Valley. Aerial attacks targeted Radwan Force training locations and Hezbollah terrorist operatives, weapons depots above and below ground, many of which were hidden in civilian areas, sites for the production of weapons, launch sites and launchers and other military equipment, and ground forces destroyed structures used by Hezbollah in communities near the border. The forces attacked Hamas military facilities in the Sidon area. According to reports, 19 Hezbollah operatives were eliminated, including operatives engaged in rebuilding facilities, an operative who headed a weapons smuggling network, a liaison in the village of Yanouh and operatives in the artillery array (IDF spokesperson, January 1–31, 2026). Social media accounts and Hezbollah media channels issued notices for the deaths of 16 Hezbollah operatives in Israeli attacks, one of whom belonged to Hezbollah’s Islamic Health Organization (Telegram channels Balagh and south Lebanon – Watching the Enemy and Lebanese media, January 1–31, 2026):[6]
    • Rabi’ Muhammad Ali Jaber, aka al-Sheikh Zulfiqar, from al-Nabatieh, resident of Yater.
    • Ali Hussein Rizq, aka Ali Fahed, from Houla. He belonged to Hezbollah’s Islamic Health Organization.
    • Abbas Hussein Mahmoud, aka Jawad, from Deir Kifa.
    • Muhammad Wasim Faqih, aka Mahdi, an engineer from Kafr Dounine.
    • Hussein Abdi al-Ridha Hamzeh, aka Kamil, a lawyer from al-Jmijma
    • Alaa’ Hussein Hourani, aka Jawad Ali, from al-Tiri, a resident of Bnaafoul.
    • Muhammad Adel al-Saghir, aka Osama, from Bint Jbeil.
    • Walid Hussein Aliq, aka Ali, from Zotar al-Sharqiyah.
    • Muhammad Baker Youssef Awadheh, aka Jaafar, from al-Sharqiyah.
    • Al-Hajj Ahmed Hussein Salami, aka Abu Ali, from Yanouh, resident of al-Bazouriyeh.
    • Muhammad Ali Zreik, aka Abu Hassan, from al-Khiam.
    • Jawad Rassin Basma, aka Amir, from al-Bazouriyeh.
    • Muhammad Hadi al-Husseini, aka Abu Zainab, from Arzon.
    • Sheikh Ali Abd al-Hassan Nur al-Din, aka al-Sheikh Amin, from Jouaiyya.
    • Samer Alaa’ Khatit, from al-Dweir (no Hezbollah notice was issued).
    • Ahmed Abd al-Nabi Ramadan, from al-Dweir, an Egyptian citizen (no Hezbollah notice was issued).
    • Hussein Ahmed al-Mardina, aka Sha‘er, from al-Sha’itiya.
    • Muhammad Ahmed Youssef, aka Patras, from Riyaq in the Beqa’a Valley, resident of Siddiqine.
    • Ahmed Hassan Faqih, aka Sadiq, from Rab Thalathin.
The Hezbollah fatalities (Telegram channels of Balagh and South Lebanon – Watching the Enemy, and Lebanese media, January 1–31, 2026)
The Hezbollah fatalities (Telegram channels of Balagh and South Lebanon – Watching the Enemy, and Lebanese media, January 1–31, 2026)

  • Syrian media outlets reported “incursions” by “Israeli occupation forces” into villages in the rural areas of the Quneitra and Daraa provinces, the establishment of checkpoints and the detention of residents, as well as several incidents of artillery fire in various areas in southern Syria (SANA, the Syrian Arab News Agency and the Syrian Observatory, January 1–31, 2026).
  • During January 2026, the Houthis did not attack Israeli territory or vessels, following their policy since the beginning of the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip on October 10, 2025. However, senior Houthi officials threatened to renew the attacks if there were Israeli “violations” of the ceasefire or if fighting between Israel and Hamas resumed. In addition, they threatened to attack Israel in response to IDF activity against Hezbollah, to attack Israeli targets in response to the recognition of Somaliland’s independence,[7] and to resume their offensive activity on vessels if the United States attacked Iran.[8]
  • On January 27, Azerbaijan’s State Security Service revealed that three suspects, citizens of the country, were arrested on suspicion of planning a terrorist attack on a foreign embassy in Baku due to “religious hostility.” According to the statement, the suspects, Guliyev Ilgar Ilham Oglu, 26 years old, aka Abu Zar al-Muhajir; Piriyev Amin Elshad Oglu, 20 years old, aka Abdu Rashid; and Alizada Elvin Sanan Oglu, 20 years old, aka Abdu Rahman al-Azeri, established criminal ties with ISIS’s Khorasan Province branch, which operates in Central Asia, and obtained means intended to be used as weapons to carry out the attack, but were arrested by security agents near the embassy (Azerbaijan State Security Service website, January 27, 2026). Israeli media reported that the attack had been planned on the Israeli Embassy in Baku and that the arrest had taken place several months earlier (Israeli media, January 27, 2026).

[1] This document complements and summarizes the data presented in the information Center's weekly reviews, including Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah and Lebanon, Spotlight on Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and Spotlight on Iran and the Shi'ite Axis. The monthly summary has been published every month since September 2024 and serves as a database of terrorist activity against the State of Israel. Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications.
[2] See the January 2026 ITIC report, The committee of Technocrats Who Will Manage the Gaza Strip
[3] For detailed information about attacks on terrorist operatives and facilities inside civilian compounds, see the Information Center's weekly Spotlight on Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Using civilian facilities such as schools and hospitals for terrorist purposes is common among the terrorist organizations operating in the Gaza Strip, especially Hamas. The organizations exploit the results of the IDF attacks for propaganda and incitement, exaggerating the number of casualties, making claims of significant harm to civilians, and, in most cases, concealing the identities of the operatives targeted.
[4] Significant attacks are defined by the Information Center as shooting, stabbing, ramming and explosive device attacks, or combined attacks. They do not include stone-throwing or Molotov cocktail incidents. The data also do not include shooting incidents targeting IDF forces during counterterrorism operations in Judea and Samaria.
[5] See the January 2026 ITIC report, The Completion of the First Phase of Hezbollah’s Disarmament
[6] For further information about IDF activity to counteract Hezbollah violations of the ceasefire, see the weekly reports, "Spotlight on Terrorism – Hezbollah and Lebanon."
[7] For further information, see the weekly reports, "Spotlight on Iran and the Shi'ite Axis"
[8] See the February 2026 ITIC report, Threats by Axis of Resistance Organizations amid Tensions between the United States and Iran

Related Articles

Threats by Axis of Resistance Organizations amid Tensions between the United States and Iran

The Completion of the First Phase of Hezbollah’s Disarmament

The committee of Technocrats Who Will Manage the Gaza Strip

IDF Announces Operational Control of the Ali al-Taher Ridge –Reactions in Lebanon and Iran

The Reorganization of Hezbollah Leadership and the Resignation of Wafiq Safa

Published:
Na'im Qassem struggles to reassemble the Hezbollah's puzzle (Elaph, February 12, 2026)

Na'im Qassem struggles to reassemble the Hezbollah's puzzle (Elaph, February 12, 2026)

Ali Reda with Safa (X account of journalist Ali Reda, February 7, 2026)

Ali Reda with Safa (X account of journalist Ali Reda, February 7, 2026)

Wafiq Safa interviewed about his acquaintance with Nasrallah (al-Mayadeen, February 18, 2026)

Wafiq Safa interviewed about his acquaintance with Nasrallah (al-Mayadeen, February 18, 2026)

Safa meets with UN special coordinator for Lebanon, Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert (al-Akhbar, May 30, 2025)

Safa meets with UN special coordinator for Lebanon, Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert (al-Akhbar, May 30, 2025)

Yuval Rosenberg
Overview[1]
  • The Israel-Lebanon-Hezbollah War ended in November 2024, and since then Hezbollah has been reorganizing to repair the damage it suffered, including to the top leadership, and to adapt to Na’im Qassem as the new secretary general.
  • Alongside reports of disputes and power struggles between the “pragmatic” figures led by Qassem, and the proponents of an extremist approach, senior organization figures claimed that Hezbollah had recovered and rebuilt the leadership structure, adapting it to the continued Israeli targeted killings as part of enforcement actions, and preparations for a new war.
  • According to reports, at the beginning of February 2026, Hezbollah’s leadership accepted the resignation of Wafiq Safa, who had headed the Coordination and Liaison Unit since 1987 and was considered close to Hassan Nasrallah and one of the most prominent and influential figures in the organization’s top leadership. Media commentaries opined that he resigned because of his disputes with Qassem, but also noted that the move was part of the secretary general’s efforts to reorganize Hezbollah’s hierarchy by tightening his control over the organization’s media, and political and “security” forces, while relying on figures loyal to himself and with lower media prominence, in order to reduce the risk of being targeted by Israel.
  • In ITIC assessment, the termination of Wafiq Safa’s role was intended to stabilize Hezbollah’s leadership, reduce the vulnerability of senior figures and consolidate the secretary general’s control after the profound shock undergone by the organization. However, concentrating authority in the secretary general’s office and weakening veteran power centers may awake latent frictions and undermine internal balances. The success of the move will be partially measured by the organization’s ability to preserve cohesion, prevent further intelligence leaks and redefine Hezbollah’s relations with the Lebanese state without relinquishing its core principles.
Reorganization Since the End of the War with Israel
  • During the war against Israel, which lasted from October 8, 2023 to November 27, 2024, and especially between September 23, 2024 and the ceasefire, Hezbollah lost thousands of terrorist operatives, including dozens of senior leadership and command figures, foremost among them secretary general Hassan Nasrallah, his designated successor, chairman of the Executive Council Hashem Safi al-Din, and the organization’s military commander, Fuad Shukr. Since the ceasefire, within the framework of enforcement activity, the IDF eliminated hundreds of Hezbollah terrorist operatives and commanders, the most prominent of whom was the organization’s acting chief of staff, Ali Haytham Tabataba’i, who was eliminated in November 2025.[2]
  • At the end of October 2024, after the elimination of Nasrallah, Hezbollah announced that the Shura Council had chosen Sheikh Na’im Qassem, who had served as deputy secretary general since 1991, as the new secretary general.[3] After the ceasefire other senior positions were filled, including Ali Damoush, who was appointed head of Hezbollah’s Executive Council. and Youssef al-Zein, who was put in charge of communications, although in most cases no official announcements were issued.
  • Outwardly, senior Hezbollah figures, mainly members of Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, continued to represent the organization as having recovered from the severe blows it had sustained and claimed that it had rebuilt all levels of its leadership and military structures. For example, Ali Fayyad, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, claimed that the organization had a new secret military structure, with younger and more dynamic leadership, renewed separation between the military wing and the political wing and shortening of command chains. However, “sources in the organization” admitted that panic and chaos were still evident near the leadership and that impacted the command fabric (Le Figaro, October 18, 2025).
  • Meanwhile, independent and opposition claimed there were serious disputes and power struggles between rival factions at the top of the organization:
    • Power struggles were reported between the hawks, who also opposed Qassem’s leadership despite his de facto appointment by Iran, and the doves, who sought to operate according to the current situation on the ground, including the government’s decision to implement a state monopoly on weapons. As a result, three rival camps were formed in the leadership: one, the moderate camp led by Qassem, which expressed commitment to the ceasefire and to the organization’s remaining within the government of Nawaf Salam, but also opposed disarmament; two, the camp led by the head of the Coordination and Liaison Unit, Wafiq Safa, and deputy head of the Political Council Mahmoud Qamati, who promoted were extremist and threatened the Lebanese government, and three, the camp led Fadlallah, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, who linked disarmament to Israeli withdrawal from five positions in south Lebanon, the return of Lebanese detainees held in Israel and the reconstruction of south Lebanon. Reportedly, all mediation attempts between the camps failed and “knowledgeable political sources ” said Hezbollah was disintegrating and unable to make decisions (Hona Lebanon, October 21, 2025).
    • After the elimination of Tabataba’i, a struggle reportedly began between senior Hezbollah figures identified with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and senior figures in Hezbollah’s second and third level leadership who wanted to increase their representation in the organization’s military leadership. It was also noted that field ranks, especially in south Lebanon and the Beqa’a Valley, were angry at the leadership because they were subjected to daily attacks and their families did not receive compensation, while the leadership was seen as detached and enjoying resources and not making even a symbolic response to Israel. According to the “source,” for that reason even Hezbollah’s support base was mocking the organization and claiming it was finished, and claiming that there was no one in its ranks who could replace those killed in Israeli strikes (Eram News, November 24, 2025).
    • “Sources close to Hezbollah” said the top of the organization’s leadership was coping with internal tensions. Reportedly, there were also power struggles within the Shura Council which were influenced by the split between pragmatic and conservative currents in Iran, creating paralysis in major decision-making and casting doubt on the current leadership’s ability to impose consensus. One example was the delay in the appointment of Hezbollah’s parliamentary faction chairman, Muhammad Raad, as deputy secretary general of the organization, a delay perceived as a sign of hesitation by secretary general Qassem and pressures from conservative currents opposing leadership renewal, particularly the appointment of a political figure who was not a cleric. “Sources” opined that completion of the appointment, if it occurred, would begin a struggle for the leadership of Hezbollah’s parliamentary faction and increase internal turmoil (Janoubia, December 16, 2025).
    • It was further reported that Qassem was trying to strengthen his control and promote a more moderate approach, including to the issue of Hezbollah’s weapons, but was facing opposition from the extremist faction, which is committed to preserving and reconstructing the organization’s military capability. It was also reported that he was making extensive appointments to the military and security forces to preserve his standing (al-Jarida, December 17, 2025).
    • In the assessment of “sources close to Hezbollah,” the organization is at a crossroads, juggling the hawks and the “pragmatists” and dealing with internal and external pressures regarding the weapons issue and the status of the state. There is reportedly criticism of Qassem’s leadership because Hezbollah has failed to resolve the displaced people’s crisis, ceased compensation to families of those killed and shown poor economic management. Despite calls to replace Qassem, there is concern that such a move would widen the split, while continuation of his leadership might accelerate the erosion of the organization’s public legitimacy (Eram News, December 17 and 19, 2025).
Na'im Qassem struggles to reassemble the Hezbollah's puzzle (Elaph, February 12, 2026)
Na’im Qassem struggles to reassemble the Hezbollah’s puzzle (Elaph, February 12, 2026)
The Resignation of Wafiq Safa
  • On February 6, 2026, it was reported that Wafiq Safa submitted his resignation as head of Hezbollah’s Liaison and Coordination Unit, an unusual and unprecedented move for the organization’s security forces.[4] According to “various sources,” he resigned because of disputes with the organization’s secretary general, Na’im Qassem, and with Shura Council member and parliamentary faction chairman Muhammad Raad, over the reduction of his powers and his deviation from the organization leadership’s decisions, for example by encouraging protests regarding the restrictions of weapons. “Sources” noted that Safa submitted his resignation some time ago, but Hezbollah’s leadership accepted it only after he insisted. The powers of the Liaison Unit were transferred to Hussein Abdallah, close to Qassem and former security chief in south Lebanon, while Ahmed Mahna, who was Raad’s assistant, was put in charge of contacts with the state and external actors (Reuters, al-Hadath, al-Jadeed, February 6, 2026; al-Quds al-Arabi February 8, 2026). Hezbollah did not publish a statement regarding Safa’s resignation.
  • According to commentaries in the media, Safa’s resignation from the position he had held since 1987 was apparently part of a broad organizational move by Hezbollah’s upper echelons, intended to entrench the hierarchy under Na’im Qassem and centralize decision-making in his hands, while appointing figures with lower media prominence, alongside an attempt to reduce friction with state institutions:
    • Safa’s resignation was not a dismissal, but rather a move of reorganization and restoration of control within Hezbollah’s upper echelons alongside reducing power centers which had developed over the years around veteran figures, and adapting the organizational structure to a post-war situation of high security sensitivity, internal political erosion and the need to avoid direct friction with state institutions. However, Safa’s remaining within the senior organizational echelon and his receiving new tasks indicate the leadership’s desire to preserve his experience and standing, while changing his arena of activity and reducing his public exposure. The timing of the “official announcement” was intended to present the move as a controlled process of the distribution of functions in response to regional and international pressures and not as a sign of internal crisis (Lebanon 24, February 7, 2026). Journalist Ali Reda from Hezbollah’s al-Manar channel published a picture of himself alongside Safa in his new office and wrote: “Relax, he only changed offices, but he is still sitting in your heart” (X account of journalist Ali Reda, February 7, 2026).
Ali Reda with Safa (X account of journalist Ali Reda, February 7, 2026)
Ali Reda with Safa (X account of journalist Ali Reda, February 7, 2026)
    • Safa’s responsibilities were split into three: security responsibility went to Hussein Abdallah, institutional coordination to Dr. Ahmed Mahna and management of political contacts to a dedicated department. Reportedly, that reflected the transition from centralization, relying on a single key figure, to decentralization and caution intended to reduce personal vulnerability and restore hierarchical control to the leadership center (RED TV, February 9, 2026).
    • “Knowledgeable Lebanese sources” said Safa’s resignation was only the visible tip of a broader reshuffling following the war with Israel, with a growing concentration of decision-making in the office of secretary general Qassem. Unlike the Nasrallah period, in which the Executive Council functioned as a kind of “internal government,” Qassem seeks to connect all party institutions directly to the general secretariat and tighten hierarchical control over the media, and political and military forces. In addition, there are more “civilian” political figures within the decision-making circle, at the expense of the religious dominance which characterized Nasrallah’s leadership, and of figures who worked alongside Qassem in the Islamic Dawah Party and the Islamic Committees before he joined Hezbollah upon its establishment. Muhammad Raad, head of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, is expected to be appointed as Qassem’s deputy after the parliamentary elections in the spring, while Muhammad Fneish, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, will lead the Executive Council with Ali Damoush responsible for its operational and executive roles. Media will be consolidated under Ibrahim Mousawi, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament who operates in full, direct coordination with the organization’s leadership. Moreover, “sources” noted that after the Liaison and Coordination Unit had also fulfilled political and media roles under Safa, it would now again be limited only to security and technical coordination with the Lebanese security forces, and all political decisions and contacts would be handled solely by the political leadership, especially secretary general Qassem, bloc chairman Raad or Qassem’s political aide, Hussein Khalil (al-Sharq al-Awsat, February 7, 2026).
    • The Liaison and Coordination Unit was re-subordinated to the Political Bureau and will operate as a “coordination unit” in the narrow sense only. Reportedly, the move was politically supervised by secretary general Qassem and militarily by figures close to the Qods Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and its objective was to return the unit to technical missions and strip it of any independent political, legal or security authority. That ended its status as a parallel power center, and control over sensitive files was transferred to Hezbollah’s senior political and security echelon (Asas Media, February 11, 2026).
    • Another commentary linked Safa’s resignation to a process of renewed preparation and organizational “slate-cleaning,” whose objective was compartmentalization, secrecy and reducing the public visibility of senior security figures as lessons learned from the exposure of cover and protection networks. Given the growing international and internal demands to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1701 and to leave weapons exclusively in the hands of the state, it was noted that Hezbollah’s leadership might decide that figures identified with the previous era were no longer suitable for managing the next stage, which required “less provocative faces” and a fundamentally different pattern of action (Middle East Online, February 6, 2026).
    • Editor of the Janoubia website, Ali al-Amin, said Hezbollah’s upper echelons were being reorganized because Na’im Qassem wanted a team which would operate according to his vision, thereby changing the leadership which had surrounded Nasrallah. Therefore, Qassem is taking steps to avoid previous mistakes by tightening control over political, media and security functioning (Al-Hurra, February 10, 2026).
    • According to another report, Hezbollah’s reorganization also relies on internal investigations conducted following the war and the eliminations of the leadership, to close security and organizational breaches. “Sources” noted that in addition to rebuilding decision-making mechanisms, the organization’s leadership sought to come to terms with Lebanese state institutions and prepare the ground for dialogue in response to the regional and American pressure directed at Iran. Wafiq Safa’s demotion was presented not only as an internal move, but also as an attempt to reduce image-based and political friction with state mechanisms (Anatolia Agency, February 8, 2026).
Appendix: Profile of Wafiq Safa
  • For years, Wafiq Safa was considered a central, influential figure in Hezbollah’s security forces, with direct access to the top leadership. His unique status, as someone with ties to Lebanese security forces and high public exposure, made him both an organizational asset and a vulnerable figure in an era of growing intelligence and operational pressure.
Wafiq Safa interviewed about his acquaintance with Nasrallah (al-Mayadeen, February 18, 2026)
Wafiq Safa interviewed about his acquaintance with Nasrallah (al-Mayadeen, February 18, 2026)
  • Safa joined Hezbollah in 1984 and in 1987 was appointed to head the Security Committee, which later became the Liaison and Coordination Unit. Although ostensibly he dealt with internal security disputes or with other actors, Safa gradually became the leading figure in Hezbollah’s contacts with Lebanese state institutions, security forces, the judicial system and international actors (al-Arabiya, October 10, 2024, al-Sharq al-Awsat, February 7, 2026). His sense of power was illustrated in September 2021, when he reportedly threatened Tareq Bitar, the judge investigating the 2020 Beirut port explosion, telling him that Hezbollah “would remove him from office” if he continued to “politicize” the investigation (CNN, September 23, 2021).[5]
Safa meets with UN special coordinator for Lebanon, Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert (al-Akhbar, May 30, 2025)
Safa meets with UN special coordinator for Lebanon, Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert
(al-Akhbar, May 30, 2025)
  • Safa controlled a network of aides in the customs authority and in oversight mechanisms at Beirut airport and the city’s seaport, which enabled the Hezbollah to smuggle funds and equipment (al-Hadath, April 8, 2025). However, at the beginning of 2025, the Nawaf Salam government tightened its control over the international airport and the port of Beirut and identified employees linked to Hezbollah, which weakened Safa’s ability to continue operating without disruption.
  • In July 2019, the United States Treasury Department placed Safa on its sanctions list of terrorist operatives. According to the Department’s statement, as head of Hezbollah’s security forces Safa exploited Lebanon’s ports and border crossings to smuggle goods, drugs and weapons and to facilitate travel for Hezbollah operatives. It was further stated that he had ties to Hezbollah partners and to the organization’s financiers (United States Treasury Department website, July 9, 2019).
  • Safa also led the negotiations that resulted in the return of Israeli soldiers abducted by Hezbollah, a deal in January 2004 to return the bodies of three IDF soldiers abducted from Har Dov in October 2000 and an Israeli civilian who was abducted in October 2000 in exchange for the release of Palestinian and Lebanese terrorists, and the deal in July 2008 in which the bodies of two IDF soldiers abducted in July 2006 were returned in exchange for the release of prisoners and the bodies of Hezbollah terrorists. Safa himself oversaw the transfer of the bodies of the two soldiers to UNIFIL personnel (al-Arabiya, October 10, 2024, Middle East Online, February 6, 2026).
  • On October 10, 2024, according to reports, Israel attacked Beirut. Wafiq Safa reportedly was the target of the attack and was seriously wounded (Sky News Arabic, al-Hadath and Israeli media, October 11, 2024). However, “sources in Hezbollah” said that the attempted elimination failed and that Safa had not been present at the targets which were attacked (al-Mayadeen and al-Manar, October 10, 2024). Immediately after the announcement of the ceasefire on November 27, 2024, Safa was the first senior Hezbollah figure to appear in public, arriving at the site of Nasrallah’s elimination in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia (LBCI, November 27, 2024).
Wafiq Safa in his first appearance after the start of the ceasefire (LBCI, November 27, 2024)
Wafiq Safa in his first appearance after the start of the ceasefire (LBCI, November 27, 2024)
  • On September 25, 2025, Safa arrived at the Beirut Corniche opposite Raouche Rock when Hezbollah staged a display for the anniversary of Nasrallah’s elimination, during which images of the former secretary general and his designated successor Hashem Safi al-Din were projected onto the rock, contrary to a government ban. Clashes also developed at the site between Lebanese army soldiers and demonstrators who waved Hezbollah flags and pictures of the organization’s leaders while calling for the “resistance”[6] to continue (al-‘Ahed, al-Mayadeen and al-Joumhouria, September 25, 2025).
  • Safa was also a dominant figure in Hezbollah’s contacts with the army leadership during the efforts of the Lebanese government to advance the state’s monopoly on weapons and disarm Hezbollah and other terrorist organizations. A few days before the government’s decision on the disarmament plan, he met with the commander of the Lebanese army, Rodolph Haykal (al-Jadeed, July 31, 2025). The two also spoke hours after Haykal announced before the ministers the actual completion of the first stage of the demilitarization plan south of the Litani River at the beginning of January 2026, when Safa arrived at the funeral of the army commander’s mother-in-law (Telegram channel Noon News, January 10, 2026).

[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications.
[2] See the May 2025 ITIC report, Challenges Faced by Hezbolla after the November 27, 2024 ceasfire and the December 2025 report, Hezbollah: One Year After the Ceasefire
[3] See the November 2024 ITIC report, Sheikh Na’im Qassem, Hezbollah’s Newly – Appointed Secretary General
[4] For further information about Wafiq Safa, see the Appendix.
[5] See the November 2025 ITIC report, Iran Assists Hezbollah’s Post-Ceasefire Reconstruction
[6] Anti-Israel terrorist attacks and violence in an effort to destroy the State of Israel.

Related Articles

Challenges Faced by Hezbolla after the November 27, 2024 ceasfire

Hezbollah: One Year After the Ceasefire

Sheikh Na’im Qassem, Hezbollah’s Newly – Appointed Secretary General

Iran Assists Hezbollah’s Post-Ceasefire Reconstruction

Rising Tensions between Hezbollah and the Lebanese Government

Published:
Na'im Qassem speaks out against the Lebanese government (Al Jazeera Mubasher, January 17, 2026)

Na'im Qassem speaks out against the Lebanese government (Al Jazeera Mubasher, January 17, 2026)

Hezbollah supporters at the rally in central Beirut. The sign at the right reads,

Hezbollah supporters at the rally in central Beirut. The sign at the right reads, "We will not abandon the weapons" (al-Madan, February 4, 2026)

The oath clashes with Qassem's speech and creates a political rift (al-Madan, January 28, 2026)

The oath clashes with Qassem's speech and creates a political rift (al-Madan, January 28, 2026)

Raad after his meeting with Aoun (al-Jadeed, February 4, 2026)

Raad after his meeting with Aoun (al-Jadeed, February 4, 2026)

Overview[1]
  • Since the ceasefire agreement went into effect at the end of November 2024, Hezbollah has criticized Lebanese government institutions, claiming they are not doing enough to stop Israeli “aggression” and “violations” of the agreement.
  • In recent weeks, Hezbollah has become increasingly angry at the intention of the government and the army to continue disarmament north of the Litani River and because a civilian representative was appointed to the talks with Israel. Statements by President Aoun and other Lebanese officials regarding the end of the role of the “resistance” have also angered Hezbollah.
  • Hezbollah, led by secretary general Na’im Qassem, has escalated his rhetoric against the president and the government and accused state institutions of failing to safeguard Lebanon’s sovereignty and the Shi’ite community, while stating that the “resistance” will not surrender and is prepared for confrontation. Hezbollah-affiliated media outlets joined the campaign against the government and questioned the legitimacy of President Aoun, accusing him of acting in the interests of the United States and Israel.
  • Attempts were made to reduce tensions, including meetings between President Aoun and his aides and members of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament.
  • In ITIC assessment, Lebanon is in transition from managed political tension to an open and prolonged struggle. As long as no significant regional change occurs, especially regarding Iran, in all probably friction and tension will continue. The government will proceed cautiously in extending its authority north of the Litani River, and Hezbollah will block measures perceived as attacking the core of its power, without letting the situation deteriorate into a broad internal Lebanese crisis.
Why Tensions Are Rising
  • Since the ceasefire agreement went into effect at the end of November 2024, halting the fighting between Israel and Hezbollah which began on October 8, 2023, Hezbollah has shifted responsibility to Lebanese government institutions to ensure Israel stops its “aggression,” withdraws from the positions it holds in the south of the country and releases the Lebanese it still detains. Hezbollah is also dissatisfied with the government’s decision to implement a state monopoly over weapons, but claimed it was cooperating in the demilitarization of the area south of the Litani River.[2] However, several developments at the end of 2025 and the beginning of 2026 increased the focus of Hezbollah’s criticism:
    • On January 8, 2026, the commander of the Lebanese army, Rodolph Haykal, reported to the government in Beirut that the objectives of the first phase the state’s monopoly over weapons had been completed, and the army declared “genuine, effective” control south of the Litani River, except in areas where there was an Israeli presence. The government praised the army’s achievements and instructed it to prepare a plan for the next phase, control north of the Litani River, ahead of a discussion in February 2026.[3]
    • The IDF continued attacking Hezbollah terrorist targets, operatives and field commanders in south Lebanon and other areas as part of enforcing the November 2024 ceasefire agreement and to prevent Hezbollah from renewing its military capabilities and rebuilding its arsenal.[4]
    • At the beginning of December 2025, the president of Lebanon, Joseph Aoun, announced the appointment of Simon Karam, former Lebanese ambassador to the United States, to head the civilian delegation to talks with Israel in the oversight committee for the ceasefire agreement. Karam participated in two meetings with Israeli civilian representatives, but no progress was made.[5] Reportedly, the United States and Israel were interested in dismantling the oversight committee and moving to direct or indirect talks between Israel and Lebanon to advance a security agreement and an agreement on border demarcation, as well as the possibility of normalization between the countries.[6]
    • Meanwhile, members of the Lebanese leadership made statements which increased tensions with Hezbollah:
    • In an interview marking a year in office, President Aoun said they continued implementing the plan for a state monopoly over weapons throughout Lebanon. He said the presence of weapons had become a burden and it was time to act “rationally,” referring to Hezbollah representatives (Telegram channel of the Lebanese presidency, January 11, 2026). At the annual meeting of members of the diplomatic corps stationed in Lebanon, Aoun said the decision for the monopoly over weapons was an achievement unlike any the country had seen in 40 years (Lebanese News Agency, January 20, 2026).
    • The Lebanese foreign minister, Youssef Rajji, accused Hezbollah of having agreed to keep south Lebanon out of a confrontation only to buy time, hoping for a regional or international change which would allow it to recover and resume control over the state. He said the confrontation with Israel served Hezbollah as a pretext for keeping its weapons, and its true aspiration was renewed control over government institutions (al-Nashra, December 23, 2025). Rajji also said Hezbollah’s weapons no longer protected the Shi’ite community or Lebanon, and had become a burden. He stated that the ceasefire agreement with Israel required the organization to disarm and the demand for a state monopoly over weapons came from the Lebanese people themselves, since the continued existence of Hezbollah’s weapons provided Israel with grounds for continued attacks and paralyzed the political-economic system (Sky News Arabic, January 12, 2026).
Hezbollah and Its Supporters Escalate Their Rhetoric
  • The combination of the commitment to also ensure a state monopoly over weapons north of the Litani River, the Israeli attacks and the possibility of political negotiations between Israel and Lebanon inflamed the tensions and caused Hezbollah to sharpen its rhetoric. Its senior figures argued that the ceasefire agreement and UN Security Council Resolution 1701 stipulated that disarmament would be carried out only south of the Litani River, and accused state institutions of weakness in the face of Israeli “violations” and of “surrender” to foreign demands, while emphasizing that the “resistance”[7] would not surrender and was prepared for confrontation, even within Lebanon:
    • Hezbollah secretary general Na’im Qassem gave a speech attacking Lebanese state institutions and claimed they were not fulfilling their duty and or acting to deter “aggression.” He claimed Lebanon had not had national sovereignty for more than 13 months because [Israeli] “aggression” continued against Lebanon and against the UN force, and said the state had the responsibility to restore sovereignty. He warned that “everything has limits, and such a situation cannot continue indefinitely.” He added that Hezbollah had helped elect the president and the government and had not violated the ceasefire agreement, and said he hoped Lebanon’s leaders would “act wisely,” like Hezbollah [sic]. He also accused Foreign Minister Rajji of inciting civil war and acting against Lebanese interests, and demanded that the Lebanese government deal with “this malfunction” (al-Manar, January 17, 2026).
Na'im Qassem speaks out against the Lebanese government (Al Jazeera Mubasher, January 17, 2026)
Na’im Qassem speaks out against the Lebanese government
(Al Jazeera Mubasher, January 17, 2026)
    • Mahmoud Qamati, deputy head of Hezbollah’s political council, said that in any future confrontation the organization would take immediate defensive action without the need for consultations, and would defend Lebanon even if not deployed south of the Litani River. He claimed Hezbollah functioned as “ghosts” in the arena and would operate from wherever required. He rejected any demand for disarmament and claimed they did not sanctify the weapons themselves but their role in defending Lebanon, which he alleged faced “existential threats.” He called on the Arab states to support Hezbollah, claiming that the “resistance” was the first line of defense against Israel and its regional aspirations, and criticized American pressure to disarm while extensive military aid was being transferred to the Lebanese army (Lebanon On channel, December 18, 2025).
    • Hassan Fadlallah, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, represented the “resistance” as a force “rooted in the people and impossible to uproot.” He called the Lebanese regime “failing and helpless,” speaking of “dereliction of duty” and hinting at an internal “conspiracy,” reshaping the confrontation as not only a political dispute but a deep crisis of trust between the public and the state. Fadlallah challenged the concept of exclusive state control over weapons by claiming that during the period of the “resistance equations”[8] Israel did not dare to attack, whereas when responsibility was transferred to the state “everything changed,” saying the government had failed in defense and was therefore unable to demand reduction of the “resistance’s” power (al-‘Ahed, February 3, 2026).
    • Ali Fayyad, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, accused the Lebanese regime of confusion, hesitation and concessions without compensation, and claimed that Israel exploited the discourse of the “second phase” of the disarmament plan to establish a presence south of the Litani River and expand its attacks. Fayyad called the oversight mechanism for the ceasefire a “circus, lacking credibility,” operated by Israel and the United States, and demanded the authorities adopt a firm line, according to which Lebanon had fulfilled its commitments, while Israel had not (al-‘Ahed, February 2, 2026).
    • During budget discussions, Fayyad expressed concern and anger over what he called the “internal strangulation” of Hezbollah’s environment, and claimed that the minister of justice, the foreign minister and the central bank governor were applying economic and institutional pressure on the organization, and warned of deterioration into internal confrontation and possible civil war. According to “political sources,” the remarks reflected a direct warning from Hezbollah to senior state officials, claiming the existence of a coordinated “internal war” which, according to them, was being conducted in cooperation with American elements (al-Diyar, January 30, 2026). “Sources close to Hezbollah” claimed that the organization had information about a “roadmap” to attack its economic infrastructure, to the point of closing its affiliated financial institutions at sensitive times. They claimed the measures were timed with regional developments, and Hezbollah regarded them as unacceptable (al-Diyar, December 30, 2025).
  • Hezbollah also claimed that the position of the state leadership was directed not only against Hezbollah and the “resistance” but against the entire Shi’ite community in Lebanon. Such remarks should be viewed in the context of the general elections scheduled to take place in the spring of 2026, when Hezbollah will fight to preserve its power within the community:
    • Ihab Hamadeh, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, rejected claims that the weapons of the “resistance” were a burden on the Shi’ite community, claiming that such a description attacked “a fundamental component of Lebanese society.” He noted the contribution of the Shi’ites and the “resistance” to preserving Lebanon’s standing in the political arena, claiming that certain “internal elements” defined their political identity through confrontation with it. He criticized statements which he said did not benefit the institution of the presidency, adding that the president was required to represent all Lebanese society (al-Nashra, January 15, 2026).
    • In a Friday sermon, Mufti Ahmed Qabalan accused the state of abandoning the south, the Beqa’a Valley and the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia, and claimed a “systematic process to weaken the Shi’ite community” was being backed or carried out by an indifferent establishment (Lebanese News Agency, January 23, 2026).
    • The anti-government campaign also reached the streets and social media, with warnings from Hezbollah that if the pressures and “provocations” continued, internal unrest could develop and the government would have to face broad public protest (al-Diyar, January 30, 2025):
    • A small demonstration took place in central Beirut, during which signs critical of President Joseph Aoun were held. The demonstrators linked the internal dispute to the security escalation with Israel with pictures of evacuation orders and Israeli threats (Lebanon Debate, January 21, 2026).
    • Hezbollah held a mass rally in central Beirut whose theme was “All the homeland is resistance.” Deputy head of Hezbollah’s political council, Mahmoud Qamati, claimed the diversity of the crowd reflected cross-sectoral support for the “resistance” and warned against any internal concession regarding its weapons (al-Madan and al-‘Ahed, February 4, 2026).
Hezbollah supporters at the rally in central Beirut. The sign at the right reads, "We will not abandon the weapons" (al-Madan, February 4, 2026)
Hezbollah supporters at the rally in central Beirut. The sign at the right reads, “We will not abandon the weapons” (al-Madan, February 4, 2026)
    • Reportedly, Lebanese judicial authorities began proceedings against those who had insulted President Aoun, after Hezbollah supporters launched a campaign against the president on social media to criticize his support for a state monopoly over weapons and to protest Israeli attacks. “Sources” noted that the statements attacked the president and used offensive language and accusations which justified a legal investigation, even though the presidency itself did not file a complaint (Sawt Beirut International, January 23, 2026).
    • During a raid by the Lebanese army on wanted suspects in the border town of al-Qasr in the Hermel area, in the northern Beqa’a Valley near the border with Syria, a search was conducted at a center affiliated with Hezbollah and a military vehicle was confiscated. The raid was unprecedented, since for years Hezbollah compounds were considered outside the scope of direct state action. In response, voice messages were sent and “residents” blocked roads and prevented the army from taking the vehicle. The incident reflected a change in the pattern of confrontation: for the first time the civilian environment was positioned as a line of defense against the army, ignoring the organization’s responsibility and shifting the struggle into a framework of “community rights” rather than a direct clash between the state and Hezbollah. Thus, the tension is now also between the state and Hezbollah’s supporting environment, and not only with the organization itself (Nidaa’ al-Watan, February 2, 2026).
  • Hezbollah-affiliated media outlets enlisted in the campaign with critical statements and articles about dissatisfaction with the positions of state institutions toward the “resistance:”
    • Ali Shuaib, al-Manar correspondent in the south, attacked the wording of the Lebanese army’s statement regarding its having achieved the objectives of the first phase of the state monopoly over weapons and accused the army of attacking the “honor of the resistance” when it referred to it as “armed groups.” He called it “a dangerous distortion of the national discourse” which dishonored the memory of the shaheeds and prisoners and contradicted the principle of the “right to resist occupation” (Ali Shuaib Telegram channel – South News, January 8, 2026).
    • Hezbollah’s al-Manar channel claimed the gap between the official statements of the Lebanese state and the situation on the ground showed a lack of actual sovereignty. The channel said “the truth is what you see and not what you hear,” previously stated by former Hezbollah secretary general Hassan Nasrallah and recently adopted by President Aoun as well. The president’s using a saying identified with Hezbollah triggered criticism from the organization and its supporters, who interpreted it as a deviation from the “resistance” narrative and as retroactive approval of a policy perceived as trivializing the concept of sovereignty. It was further noted that if the state had indeed achieved a monopoly over weapons south of the Litani River, it had to exercise its responsibility and restore sovereignty and security by preventing Israeli attacks and violations, including by diplomacy (al-Manar, January 20, 2026).
    • Wissam al-Khalil, commentator for the Hezbollah’s daily al-Akhbar, published an article harshly critical of the Lebanese regime, and particularly of President Aoun. He noted that when Aoun was elected in January 2025, there had been quiet within the “resistance’s environment” but it had expected that the presidency would continue to reflect commitment to the legacy of struggle and the narrative of sacrifice, but that now the president was regarded as having violated an unwritten contract with his natural base of support. Al-Khalil said that throughout Aoun’s military service, until he headed the Lebanese army, he had expressed unequivocal positions in favor of the “resistance” and sovereignty, but the transition from uniform to the presidential seat was an “ideological betrayal,” since he used the discourse of the “resistance” as a means of personal advancement. Al-Khalil also accused Aoun of trying to dismantle the “resistance” and of promoting a policy which directly served Israeli and American interests, and therefore of being an active partner in an external effort to damage Lebanon. In his view, the state, which was supposed to protect its citizens, stood aside during “daily killing and destruction,” when the claim that “not a single shot was fired” from Lebanon since the ceasefire protected Israel, not Lebanon. Al-Khalil stated that the “resistance” would not “retreat,” even in the face of unified governmental and international forces, since its “struggle” was moral, popular and inevitable in the reality of a weak state (al-Akhbar, January 24, 2026).
The oath clashes with Qassem's speech and creates a political rift (al-Madan, January 28, 2026)
The oath clashes with Qassem’s speech and creates a political rift
(al-Madan, January 28, 2026)
    • Ibrahim al-Amin, the editor of Hezbollah’s daily al-Akhbar, wrote that President Aoun’s rhetoric against the “resistance” had “escalated suddenly,” due to his call to dismantle the “resistance’s” weapons in all parts of Lebanon with the slogan, “There is no need for resistance!” According to al-Amin, Aoun did not believe in meaningful relations with Hezbollah even before he was elected president, and he acknowledged that his appointment was the implementation of an “American-Saudi decision based on the results of the last Israeli war against Lebanon.” According to al-Amin, Aoun believed that the blow suffered by the “resistance” in the last war was greater than anyone expected, and therefore his only objective in talks with the “resistance” was to demand that it hand over its advanced weaponry, since that was consistent with current international demands. He also attacked Aoun for acquiescing to the American demand to hold civilian talks within the framework of the ceasefire oversight mechanism without receiving any compensation for the “concession,” thereby causing Israel to interpret it as progress toward political negotiations (al-Akhbar, February 9, 2026).
Attempts to Defuse the Situation
  • Alongside the public disputes and the escalation of Hezbollah’s rhetoric, efforts were also reported to calm tensions through direct contacts between Hezbollah representatives and the presidential palace:
    • President Aoun’s senior advisor, Brigadier General André Rahal, met with Ahmed Mahana, assistant to Mohammad Raad, head of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament. The meeting was reportedly an initial attempt to curb the rhetorical escalation and open a channel for dialogue between the presidential palace and Hezbollah, but also exposed the substantive gaps between the sides: while the presidency sought to establish a monopoly over security, Hezbollah rejected any definition of its weapons as “illegal” and insisted on the legitimacy of the “resistance” (Nidaa’ al-Watan, January 27, 2026). According to reports, both sides felt they were paying a political price and were on the defensive, while the real gap revolved around fundamental questions of sovereignty and security authority, and therefore prolonged crisis management was taking shape within a framework of forced coexistence, rather than a close solution (al-Jumhuriya, January 27, 2026).
    • It was claimed that Hezbollah’s leadership had decided to freeze scenarios of internal confrontation with the Lebanese state. According to “Lebanese sources,” instructions were circulated to restrain interactions with the presidency, the prime minister’s office and the Lebanese army, as the price of friction at the present time would outweigh any possible gain. The decision was made after prolonged discussions within the organization and was explained as a cold cost calculation, not as an ideological change or political arrangement. According to the report, Hezbollah’s leadership identified a change in the position of state institutions, which now operated from internal and external momentum to establish state sovereignty and advance the issue of disarmament, in a way that narrowed the room for maneuver that existed in the past. It was further stated that the organization distinguished between the southern arena, where calculated rules of engagement were maintained, and the internal arena, perceived as the most sensitive, and that moderating the tone toward the presidency and the government reflected a tactical shift of “forced containment” in a new internal situation (Aram News, January 30, 2026).
    • At the presidential palace, there was dissatisfaction over the statements of Hezbollah secretary general Na’im Qassem regarding the organization’s readiness to fight alongside Iran in the event of an attack by the United States or Israel, and therefore a planned meeting between President Aoun and the chairman of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, Mohammad Raad, was postponed (Nidaa’ al-Watan, January 29, 2026). After the meeting finally took place, Raad proposed internal unity and realism in view of the “sovereignty situation.” He noted Hezbollah’s readiness to reach understandings and cooperate with the state to achieve shared national goals, while emphasizing the state’s responsibility to defend sovereignty and provide it with assistance “when necessary.” Reportedly, the sides agreed to continue dialogue and consultations to formulate an agreed-upon methodology that would enable advancement of the goals in a short time and at a “minimal price,” while rejecting any form of foreign intervention or patronage (al-‘Ahed, February 4, 2026).
Raad after his meeting with Aoun (al-Jadeed, February 4, 2026)
Raad after his meeting with Aoun (al-Jadeed, February 4, 2026)

[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications.
[2] See the May 2025 ITIC report, Challenges Faced by Hezbolla after the November 27, 2024 ceasfire, and the December 2025 report, Hezbollah: One Year After the Ceasefire.
[3] See the January 2026 ITIC report, The Completion of the First Phase of Hezbollah’s Disarmament
[4] See the weekly ITIC reports, "Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah and Lebanon," and the monthly reports on terrorism in the various arenas.
[5] See the December 1-8 2025 and December 15-22 weekly ITIC reports, "Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah and Lebanon."
[6] See the weekly ITIC report, "Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah and Lebanon, January 20-26, 2026."
[7] Hezbollah and the other terrorist organizations operating in Lebanon.
[8] The period before the outbreak of the Israel-Lebanon war on October 8, 2023.

Related Articles

Challenges Faced by Hezbolla after the November 27, 2024 ceasfire

Hezbollah: One Year After the Ceasefire

The Completion of the First Phase of Hezbollah’s Disarmament

IDF Announces Operational Control of the Ali al-Taher Ridge –Reactions in Lebanon and Iran

Spotlight on Iran

February 4-11, 2026 Editor: Dr. Raz Zimmt
The Iranian foreign minister at the Al Jazeera Forum (Mehr, February 7, 2026)

The Iranian foreign minister at the Al Jazeera Forum (Mehr, February 7, 2026)

Ali-Akbar Velayati alongside Naim Qassem (IRNA, January 4, 2023)

Ali-Akbar Velayati alongside Naim Qassem (IRNA, January 4, 2023)

Demonstration in support of the Palestinians in Sana'a (Al-Masirah, February 6, 2026)

Demonstration in support of the Palestinians in Sana'a (Al-Masirah, February 6, 2026)

Larijani's meeting with the Houthi spokesman (ISNA, February 10, 2026)

Larijani's meeting with the Houthi spokesman (ISNA, February 10, 2026)

Highlights[1]
  • The Iranian foreign minister accused Israel, in a speech at the Al Jazeera Forum in Qatar, of committing “war crimes” in the Gaza Strip. He called for practical action by the international community against Israel and for coordination among Islamic countries, Arab states, and Global South countries in support of the Palestinians.
  • At least six senior Iranian diplomats reportedly used their passports to transfer hundreds of millions of dollars to Hezbollah. One of the diplomats also accompanied the Iranian foreign minister during his recent visit to Beirut in January 2026.
  • The Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson accused Israel of using “toxic and chemical substances” in southern Lebanon.
  • In a letter of condolence following the death of the father of former Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, a senior advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader emphasized the importance of the “resistance” in Lebanon and Iran’s continued support for it.
  • The Iranian foreign minister stated that Iran supports Hezbollah but does not need it to defend itself against the United States and Israel.
  • The secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council met, during a visit to Oman, with the spokesman of the Houthis in Yemen.
  • It was reported that the Houthis are in “strategic isolation” as a result of contacts between the United States and Iran and the weakening of Hezbollah, which had supported them over the years.
  • IDF forces exposed a weapons depot belonging to al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya in southern Syria.
Iran and the Palestinian Arena
  • Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said in a speech at the Al Jazeera Forum in Qatar that a just solution of the Palestinian issue is a cornerstone for stable security in the region and the world. He noted that “Palestine” is not merely a humanitarian or regional issue but a test case of the international community’s commitment to the principles of international law. Referring to developments in the Gaza Strip, Araghchi said that what is taking place goes beyond a military confrontation and that the mass killing of civilians and the destruction of vital infrastructure constitute “international crimes, a blatant violation of basic humanitarian principles, and clear genocide.” He warned of the regional and global consequences of continuing to grant Israel immunity and stressed that replacing the logic of law with the logic of force poses a serious threat to global peace and stability. The Iranian minister emphasized the need for practical action by the international community against Israel and called for firm support for legal mechanisms, the imposition of targeted sanctions, including an arms embargo on Israel, and the outlining of a credible political horizon based on international law to realize the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination. According to him, ending the “occupation,” implementing the Palestinian refugees’ “right of return,” and establishing an independent and unified Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital are pillars of any just and sustainable solution to the Palestinian issue. He concluded by stressing the need for coordination among Islamic countries, Arab states, and Global South countries in order to effectively support the rights of the Palestinian people. He noted that lasting stability would be achieved only by bringing criminals to justice and curbing the hegemonic ambitions of the “Zionist regime” (Mehr, February 7, 2026).
The Iranian foreign minister at the Al Jazeera Forum (Mehr, February 7, 2026)
The Iranian foreign minister at the Al Jazeera Forum (Mehr, February 7, 2026)
  • Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian stated at the closing ceremony of the 43rd Islamic Republic Book of the Year Award that those who support “Palestine,” the oppressed, and those who have suffered injustice do so because they are human beings and must therefore act within human society to assist those facing hardship and remove their difficulties (Fars, February 8, 2026).
Iran and the Lebanese Arena
  • Iran International, an exile-based opposition media outlet, reported that at least six senior diplomats from Iran’s foreign ministry used their diplomatic passports to transport suitcases containing millions of dollars in cash on flights to Beirut for Hezbollah’s reconstruction. According to the report, one of the diplomats, Mohammad Ebrahim Taherian-Fard, former ambassador to Turkey and former Iranian government representative in Afghanistan, accompanied Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi during his visit to Beirut in early January 2026. Another senior official who reportedly transferred hundreds of millions of dollars to Hezbollah is Mohammad Reza Shirkhodaei, former consul general in Peshawar, Pakistan, who currently chairs the board of directors of a cooperative company involved in money laundering for the Iranian Foreign Ministry (Iran International, February 10, 2026).
  • Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei strongly condemned Israel’s continued military strikes in Lebanon. He noted that the “Zionist regime’s” use of weapons and “toxic and chemical substances” against agricultural lands in Lebanon is an unprecedented “war crime.” He added that, alongside environmental destruction and harm to Lebanese civilians’ health, the attacks target residents’ livelihoods and daily lives and require immediate action by the UN and its competent professional bodies to prosecute the “occupying regime.” He further stated that both the United States, as the main supporter of the “Zionist regime,” and France, due to what he described as continued inaction and tolerance in the face of “blatant violations” of the ceasefire, are considered partners in the “crimes of the occupying regime” and must bear responsibility for their consequences (Iranian Foreign Ministry Telegram account, February 9, 2026).
  • Ali Akbar Velayati, the Iranian Supreme Leader’s senior advisor for international affairs, sent a letter of condolence to Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem following the death of Abdel Karim Nasrallah, father of former Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah. In the letter, Velayati reviewed the historical development of ties between Lebanese Shiite clerics and Shiite Iran over centuries. He noted that the Shiites in Lebanon are the central pillar of the “resistance” and have established a firm barrier against the “Zionist regime.” According to him, the Lebanese public understands that without Hezbollah, the “Zionists” would have swallowed their country more easily than Syria. He added that the leadership of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei casts its shadow over the entire Islamic world – Shiites and Sunnis alike – and that his policy has ensured that Iran stands unequivocally alongside the oppressed peoples in Lebanon, “Palestine,” and Yemen. He stressed that Iran, which he described as the pillar of the “resistance,” is prepared to confront any external threat, particularly from the United States and Israel, and that victory will belong to the “resistance axis” (Tasnim, February 5, 2026).
Ali-Akbar Velayati alongside Naim Qassem (IRNA, January 4, 2023)
Ali-Akbar Velayati alongside Naim Qassem (IRNA, January 4, 2023)
  • Foreign Minister Araghchi stated that Hezbollah would decide whether to intervene in the event of a US attack on Iran. He emphasized that Iran supports the organization and that it, in turn, supports Iran, but Iran does not need anyone and can defend itself against the United States and the “Zionist regime” with the means at its disposal, as it demonstrated in the 12-day war in June 2025 (Al Jazeera, February 7, 2026).
Iran and the Iraqi Arena
  • Iran’s consul general in Basra, Ali Abedi, said the Iran-Iraq railway link will be completed on schedule. He noted that the Iraqi side, in cooperation with and under the supervision of the governor of Basra province, has shown special attention to removing local obstacles, many of which have already been removed. He added that approximately 35 kilometers remain from the Shalamcheh area in western Iran to the Basra railway station. According to him, mine-clearing operations along the route will be completed soon, and the project will be finalized within the designated timeframe (ISNA, February 10, 2026).
The Houthis in Yemen
  • “Yemeni military sources” reported that the Houthis have entered a stage of “strategic isolation” due to US–Iran contacts and the weakening of Hezbollah, which had long been an important factor in building Houthi capabilities and providing logistical and financial assistance. The sources also noted that regional developments have forced many Iranian and Lebanese experts and commanders to leave Yemen, deepening the Houthis’ isolation and reducing the support network on which they had relied in recent years. As a result, the Houthis have tightened their control over areas under their authority and adopted a more conservative economic policy. The sources warned that the situation may push the Houthis to seek ways to change the status quo, either by escalating in the Yemeni or regional arena to re-establish their presence. In addition, security arrangements around the movement’s leader, Abd al-Malik al-Houthi, have been tightened in a manner that isolates him from face-to-face meetings with the movement’s senior leadership and impairs its internal decision-making process. This development, in turn, is leading to a loss of confidence among both senior and lower-ranking figures in the movement’s ability to emerge from the crisis and to growing suspicions of collaboration with its enemies (Aram News, February 10, 2026).
  • “Sources within the Houthi security apparatus” reported that “American and Israeli intelligence activities” had been uncovered and that several “spy cells” had been foiled. According to them, this indicates American-Israeli intentions to launch “new aggression.” The report noted that in the past, American and Israeli attempts had been exposed to recruit Yemeni groups opposed to the Houthis in order to obtain intelligence information regarding Houthi activity and military preparedness (Al-Akhbar, February 7, 2026).
  • On February 5, 2026, the leader of the Houthi movement, Abd al-Malik al-Houthi, called on his supporters to hold a mass demonstration the following day in support of the Palestinian people, who are “suffering daily” from the actions of Israel, which “does not respect and violates every hour” the agreements it has signed. Al-Houthi stressed that through the mass turnout, the Yemeni people emphasize their support for the Palestinian people and their readiness for the next round of confrontation with Israel and its helpers and partners. In addition, al-Houthi said that the Yemeni people also emphasize their solidarity with Iran, Lebanon, and other countries in the face of “American and Zionist tyranny and arrogance” directed against the entire region and seeking to “enslave” the Islamic nation (Al-Masirah, February 5, 2026).
Demonstration in support of the Palestinians in Sana'a (Al-Masirah, February 6, 2026)
Demonstration in support of the Palestinians in Sana’a (Al-Masirah, February 6, 2026)
  • The Houthi Foreign Ministry warned against “schemes by the Israeli enemy entity in the West Bank” following decisions taken by the Israeli cabinet aimed at accelerating settlement activity in the West Bank. The ministry stated that it views these decisions as “a blatant violation of international law and the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.” It further noted that such decisions are intended to bring about Israeli control over the West Bank, expose Israel’s “aggressive intentions,” and threaten to undermine efforts to end the “aggression,” lift the “siege” imposed on the Gaza Strip, and “eliminate” the Palestinian cause. The ministry called on the Palestinian people to unite and adhere to the “resistance” in order to thwart “Israeli schemes” and restore their legitimate rights (Houthi Foreign Ministry Telegram channel, February 9, 2026).
Iran-Houthi relations
  • The secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, Ali Larijani, met in Oman with Houthi spokesman Mohammed Abd al-Salam. Iranian media did not provide details regarding the content of the meeting (ISNA, February 10, 2026).
Larijani's meeting with the Houthi spokesman (ISNA, February 10, 2026)
Larijani’s meeting with the Houthi spokesman (ISNA, February 10, 2026)
  • The head of the Houthis’ Supreme Political Council (SPC), Mahdi al-Mashat, sent a congratulatory message to Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian on the anniversary of the establishment of the Islamic Republic. Al-Mashat stated that Iran’s progress in all fields, particularly in the security and scientific spheres, arouses anger and concern among its enemies, and that this progress has been achieved thanks to decades of resilience in the face of US “sanctions and aggression.” Al-Mashat further stated that the Iranian people have made their voice heard over the years and continue to emphasize to Iran’s enemies their “unwavering support” for the Islamic Revolution. He stressed the Houthis’ support for the Iranian people in confronting the “conspiracies” directed against Iran and the region and expressed their expectation of strengthening relations between the sides in a manner that would serve both peoples (Mahdi al-Mashat’s X account, February 10, 2026).
The Militias in Syria
  • IDF forces located and destroyed a weapons depot belonging to the al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya organization, the Lebanese branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, in the village of Beit Jinn in southern Syria. Weapons, mines, and communications equipment were found at the site. In addition, a senior operative of the organization was detained by IDF forces in southern Lebanon in order to gather intelligence on al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya’s activities in Lebanon and Syria (IDF Spokesperson, February 9-10, 2026). In November 2025, six IDF soldiers were wounded in an exchange of fire in the village of Beit Jinn during an arrest operation against the organization’s operatives.[2]

[1] The weekly study includes the activities of Iran, the Shiite militias in Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen.
[2] For further details, see the ITIC's study from December 2, 2025, “IDF Operation in Beit Jinn amid Efforts to Promote Terrorism Against Israel in Southern Syria”

Related Articles

IDF Operation in Beit Jinn amid Efforts to Promote Terrorism Against Israel in Southern Syria

IDF Announces Operational Control of the Ali al-Taher Ridge –Reactions in Lebanon and Iran

Spotlight on Iran and the Shiite Axis (September 2-9, 2026)

Spotlight on Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (September 1-8, 2026)

Spotlight on Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (February 3-10, 2026)

Published:
Hamas terrorist operatives using an ambulance (COGAT Facebook page, February 6, 2026)

Hamas terrorist operatives using an ambulance (COGAT Facebook page, February 6, 2026)

Mortar shells and rockets found in UNRWA sacks (IDF spokesperson, February 3, 2026)

Mortar shells and rockets found in UNRWA sacks (IDF spokesperson, February 3, 2026)

Gazans returning to the Strip through the Rafah Crossing (al-Risalah, February 6, 2026).

Gazans returning to the Strip through the Rafah Crossing (al-Risalah, February 6, 2026).

Ambulances transporting patients to the Rafah Crossing ahead of departure for treatment in Egypt (Quds Agency, February 8, 2026)

Ambulances transporting patients to the Rafah Crossing ahead of departure for treatment in Egypt (Quds Agency, February 8, 2026)

Overview [1]

  • The IDF continued its activity within the Yellow Line in the Gaza Strip, locating and destroying terrorist facilities and weapons, some of which were concealed in UNRWA sacks, and eliminating terrorists who attempted to attack the forces. In response to ceasefire violations, during which an IDF officer was seriously wounded, terrorist targets in the Strip were attacked and terrorist commanders and operatives were eliminated, including the commander of the North Gaza Brigade of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and terrorists who participated in the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre.
  • The Rafah Crossing was reopened in both directions for civilians and patients.
  • The spokesperson for the Hamas military wing threatened Gazans collaborating with Israel, while Hamas continued to exercise civilian and security governance in areas under its control, as the entry of members of the Palestinian technocratic committee into the Strip has been delayed.
  • Hamas leader “abroad” Khaled Mashal rejected the demand to disarm the “resistance” and reiterated the proposal for a hudna (extended ceasefire) of five to ten years. A PIJ spokesman also opposed disarming the organization and accused the United States of enabling Israel to continue “violating” the ceasefire agreement.
  • Pro-Palestinian activists announced their intention to launch a flotilla of 100 vessels at the end of March 2026 to “break the siege” of the Gaza Strip.
  • The Palestinian Authority ministry of education denied claims it had made substantial changes to the curriculum dealing with the core of the Palestinian narrative, rather claiming was adapting the education system to UNESCO standards as part of reforms.
The IDF
  • IDF forces continued activity within the Yellow Line (the area under IDF control) in the Gaza Strip, located weapons, some of which were concealed in UNRWA humanitarian aid sacks, destroyed terrorist facilities above and below ground and eliminated terrorists who approached the line or attempted to cross it to attack the forces. In the northern Gaza Strip, terrorist operatives shot at IDF forces in two separate incidents, and in one a reserve officer was seriously wounded. In Rafah, four terrorists who emerged from a tunnel and shot at IDF soldiers were eliminated. In response to violations of the ceasefire agreement, the IDF attacked Hamas terrorist facilities and eliminated senior operatives of Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), including the commander of the PIJ’s North Gaza Brigade and terrorists who participated in the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre (IDF spokesperson, February 10, 2026).
Mortar shells and rockets found in UNRWA sacks (IDF spokesperson, February 3, 2026)
Mortar shells and rockets found in UNRWA sacks (IDF spokesperson, February 3, 2026)
  • Reportedly, satellite images showed that the IDF had established a new base with military vehicles and field facilities for soldiers in open areas in Khan Yunis, near the Yellow Line (aljazeera.net, February 6, 2026). It was also claimed that Israel had begun extensive engineering works south of the city of Deir al-Balah in the central Gaza Strip. The army informed commercial transport companies to close the Kissufim Crossing, which was reopened last year, and to divert traffic to the Kerem Shalom Crossing in the southern Gaza Strip until completion of the engineering works (Quds Press, February 6, 2026).
Hamas’ Exploitation of Humanitarian Facilities for Terrorist Purposes[2]
  • The Israeli Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) exposed UAV footage of area within the Yellow Line which showed Hamas terrorist operatives using ambulances to transfer operatives and weapons from a hospital building to a school (COGAT Arabic Facebook page, February 6, 2026).
Hamas terrorist operatives using an ambulance (COGAT Facebook page, February 6, 2026)
Hamas terrorist operatives using an ambulance (COGAT Facebook page, February 6, 2026)
Opening the Rafah Crossing
  • On February 2, 2026, the Rafah Crossing was reopened in both directions after a long period during which it had been closed. Gazans who crossed through the terminal reported that the inspection process on the Egyptian side lasted for several hours and included stringent checks, and that after exiting the Crossing entry was permitted only subject to strict restrictions, including a ban on bringing in food, cleaning materials and perfumes. According to reports, the passage to the Israeli barrier was unaccompanied by international organizations, and some passengers were detained, interrogated and [allegedly] threatened (Facebook page of journalist Mazen al-Barim, February 5, 2026).
  • One returning Gazan claimed that she and three other women had been beaten, humiliated and required to undergo searches by members of the “Abu Shabab gang” (the Popular Forces militia) at the checkpoint in the Morag region (Telegram channel of Nuseirat News, February 3, 2026). However, the militia leader, Ghassan al-Dahini, published videos in which his militia members could be seen caring for the transport and security of returning Gazans and giving them food, and passengers said they had received excellent treatment from militia members (Ghassan al-Dahini’s Facebook page, February 4-5, 2026).
  • The transfer of patients to Egyptian territory through the Rafah Crossing also began. The Palestinian Red Crescent Society reported that on February 4, 2026, it had evacuated 15 patients and 31 travelling companions to Egypt in coordination with the World Health Organization and other international agencies. The organization’s spokesman, Raed al-Nams, said the patients had been evacuated for urgent medical treatment outside the Strip (Anadolu Agency, February 5, 2026). The director of the Medical Relief Society in the Gaza Strip, Bassam Zaqout, said so far activity at the Rafah Crossing had indicated that the number of those leaving was far smaller than agreed. He claimed passengers were forced to wait until the evening hours to know whether Israel would allow them to leave, and the daily number currently stood at about 15 to 25 patients and wounded. He added that all patients and wounded first arrived at hospitals in El Arish, and from there were transferred to hospitals in Egypt (Shehab Agency, February 5, 2026).
Ambulances transporting patients to the Rafah Crossing ahead of departure for treatment in Egypt (Quds Agency, February 8, 2026)      Gazans returning to the Strip through the Rafah Crossing (al-Risalah, February 6, 2026).
Right: Gazans returning to the Strip through the Rafah Crossing (al-Risalah, February 6, 2026). Left: Ambulances transporting patients to the Rafah Crossing ahead of departure for treatment in Egypt (Quds Agency, February 8, 2026)
  • The chairman of the Gaza Strip Administration Committee, Ali Shaath, toured the Egyptian side of the Rafah Crossing and examined the logistical preparations carried out by Egypt to facilitate the passage of Palestinians and allow the entry of humanitarian aid into the Strip. He said there was a significant improvement in logistical activity at the Crossing, adding that the Palestinian people were grateful to the Egyptian president and government (al-Qahira al-Ekhbariya, February 9, 2026).
The Situation in the Gaza Strip
  • The director of the Shifa Medical Center in Gaza, Muhammad Abu Salmiya, said thousands of Palestinians were still defined as missing. He claimed about 10,000 missing persons were under the rubble, and another 5,000 were missing and their fate was unknown (Quds Press, February 6, 2026). Zaher al-Wahidi, head of the health information unit of the Hamas ministry of health in Gaza, said the ministry had launched an online portal for reports of missing persons from families, and so far more than 3,000 reports had been received. Al-Wahidi said the ministry of health estimated about 9,500 bodies were under the rubble, and since the start of the ceasefire on October 10, 2025, only about 700 had been recovered. He said the ministry was working with the Red Cross, the ministries of social development and religious endowments, the National Committee for Missing Persons and the Palestinian Center for Human Rights to ensure documentation of every case and to inform Gazans as soon as information became available regarding the fate of their missing family members (al-Ayyam, February 8, 2026).
  • According to Gazans, the black market is fully operative even after most products and goods have become available in the markets. According to a report, the black market has recently focused on fuels and cooking gas, despite its price dropping from 600 shekels per kilogram (about $195) to about 50 shekels (about $16). A Gazan selling cooking gas on the black market said there was an enormous demand for his product since the quantities residents received were meager and stood at about eight kilograms every three months (al-Ayyam, February 7, 2026).
Security Governance
  • Abu Obeida, spokesman for the Hamas military wing, condemned residents who he claimed collaborated with the “occupation.” He said such “elements” operated only in areas under IDF control and under the protection of its tanks, and that “their treachery” was not courage but “a desperate attempt to prove themselves.” He warned that their punishment would be death and that even “the enemy” would not be able to protect them (Telegram channel of Abu Obeida, February 9, 2026).
  • Websites and social media channels affiliated with Hamas reported “successes” in the “struggle” against militias supported by Israel. Hamas security forces reportedly arrested an operative in the militia of Shuki Abu Nasira during a raid in the al-Nasr neighborhood in western Gaza City. Reportedly, cooperation with a “respected” Fatah activist was the key to capturing the operative (Palestinian Press Network, February 4, 2026; Amsak Amil Telegram channel, February 4, 2026). It was also reported that Riyad al-Shaqra, a prominent operative in the militia of Hussam al-Astal, was killed when “resistance operatives” ambushed militia members in the Khan Yunis district (Amsak Amil Telegram channel, February 7-8, 2026).
  • The Popular Forces militia in eastern Rafah under the command of Ghassan al-Dahini published names of Hamas operatives wanted by it for various crimes, including theft of funds from citizens, affiliation with Hamas, fundraising on its behalf and incitement (Ghassan al-Dahini’s Facebook page, February 2, 2026; Facebook page of the Mechanism to Combat Terrorism, February 5, 2026).
  • According to reports, operating under heavy fire, a force from Hamas’ Sahm Unit raided the homes of the al-Assar family in Khan Yunis, near a UNRWA clinic. Local residents were angered and in despair over what they described as violence by the Sahm Unit and called Hamas operatives “criminals,” “a gang,” “a mafia” and “spies.” They were also critical of the silence of the technocratic committee which is supposed to manage the Strip, complaining about its silence, and the sense that Hamas was returning and becoming stronger, and there was no effective factor restraining its conduct (Amin Abd’s Facebook page, February 4, 2026).
  • Al Jazeera aired a program prepared by investigative journalist Tamer al-Masahal, which dealt with the assassination of an officer in the Hamas internal security forces, Ahmed Zamzam, who was shot dead in December 2025 in the al-Maghazi refugee camp by “collaborators with Israel.” The investigation was based on interrogations and the confession of one of those involved in the assassination, Mahmoud al-Zein Abu Jaba (Hassanin), who was later executed. The program shows the alleged collaborator who killed Zamzam moving with a silenced pistol and filming equipment, backed by Israeli drones while speaking in real time with his Israeli “handler.” The Zamzam’s killing is also shown, followed by the arrest of the perpetrator (Al Jazeera, February 7, 2026; Telegram channel of Sahm Unit 103, February 6, 2026).
  • The Fatah movement in the northern Gaza Strip strongly condemned Hamas-issued summonses for interrogations of Fatah activists, after Hamas security forces summoned two activists to a “meeting” at internal security forces in Qasr al-Hakem (the Governor’s Palace) (Facebook page of Ouda Channel, February 8, 2026).
Civilian Governance
  • The Hamas ministry of social development announced the distribution of a cash grant of 500 shekels (about $160), part of the second phase of the We Are Your Support operation. Reportedly, the money is for families of Gazans who were detained during the war in the Gaza Strip and registered with international organizations. The money will be given to the prisoner’s wife or to each of his wives, if they are alive and in the Gaza Strip, or to his parents if they are alive and in the Gaza Strip. If the prisoner is unmarried, the money will be given to his parents, if they are alive and in the Gaza Strip. The ministry reported it had distributed more than 9.6 million shekels (about $3.1 million) to 19,306 widows of “shaheeds.” Funding for the payment came from money the committee to combat economic crimes confiscated since the ceasefire agreement went into effect, from merchants who had exploited Gazans’ needs during the war (Facebook page of the Hamas ministry of social development, February 8, 2026).
  • The Hamas ministry of the interior announced it had resumed issuing identity cards in all districts of the Strip (Telegram channel of the Hamas ministry of the interior and national security in the Strip, February 6, 2026).
  • The Hamas ministry of national economy announced that its consumer protection teams, in cooperation with the supply control investigation department, had closed nine currency exchange businesses in the Gaza City, Central Gaza Strip and Khan Yunis districts after they refused to accept banknotes. Reportedly, dozens of shop owners signed a commitment to comply with the demand and continue trading in banknotes (Facebook page of the ministry of national economy, February 4, 2026).
International Activity to Break the “Siege”
  • The organizers of the Global Sumud Flotilla[3] said they planned to gather a large flotilla which would attempt to breach the “siege” of the Gaza Strip and include about 100 vessels and 1,000 medical personnel from various countries. They held a press conference at the Nelson Mandela Foundation in Johannesburg, where they said that the first vessel was scheduled to depart on March 29, 2026, the day before Land Day, from several countries in the Mediterranean Sea, including Spain, Italy and Tunisia. They also plan to launch two land convoys, the Perseverance Convoy 2 from Algeria via Tunisia, Libya and Egypt to Rafah, and another which will depart from the Far East and pass through Russia, Iran, Pakistan and other countries. Mandela’s grandson called at the event to mobilize broad international support for the initiative, representing it as an action for “justice and human dignity” (Facebook page of the Global Sumud Flotilla and Shehab Agency, February 5, 2026).
  • At the 17th Al Jazeera Forum in Doha, chairman of Hamas “abroad,” Khaled Mashal, claimed that talk of disarming the “resistance”[4] was an attempt to turn the Palestinians into “easy prey” for Israel, which he said had all types of international weapons, adding that Israel wanted to take Palestinian weapons and give them to militias in the Gaza Strip. He said Hamas had proposed a hudna (ceasefire) of five to ten years, during which weapons would not be used or displayed. He also said that the “resistance” would continue as long as the “occupation” continued, claimed there was a “Zionist threat” to the existence of an Arab Islamic nation and Arabs and Muslims had to act together to persistently pursue and hound Israel to “establish its status as a pariah entity and a burden on security, stability and international interests” (Telegram channel of Hamas in Judea and Samaria, February 8, 2026).
Mashal at the Al Jazeera Forum (Al Jazeera, February 8, 2026)
Mashal at the Al Jazeera Forum (Al Jazeera, February 8, 2026)
  • PIJ spokesman Muhammad al-Hajj Musa claimed that the Israeli government was using escalation against the Palestinians and force for political survival in preparation for the Knesset elections. He claimed Israel kept the fronts in a state of turmoil because its only vision was “occupation and expansion,” it was aware of its failure to achieve its objectives in the Gaza Strip and south Lebanon, and was using “killing as deterrence.” He said mediation contacts were continuing, especially with Egypt, which he said was aware of what was happening, but stated that the main problem was the American position, which backed Israel and allowed it to continue its actions. Al-Hajj Musa added that Israel’s refusal to allow the entry of members of the technocratic committee for managing Gaza into the Strip, as well as the [alleged] difficulties it caused at the Rafah Crossing and its demand to dismantle the “resistance” forces,[5] were part of obstacles whose objective was to shape the second stage. Referring to the issue of disarmament, he claimed that “the weapons of the resistance guarantee the protection of the Palestinians,” and the PIJ refused to hand over its weapons or accept dictates, as any discussion on the issue was an internal Palestinian matter (al-Araby al-Jadeed, February 7, 2026). On another occasion, he accused Israel of failing to implement the agreement, and said the PIJ provided the mediators with periodic reports of the ongoing “violations.” He said the options before the “resistance” would remain “open” as long as the “occupation” did not cease its “violations,” and the PIJ would not stand idly by (Filastin al-Yawm channel, February 7, 2026).
The Technocratic Committee for Managing the Gaza Strip
  • A “Palestinian source” said that weeks ago, the Hamas leadership, together with other “factions,”[6] had told the Egyptian and American mediators of their objection to the appointment of Sami Nasman, who had been appointed security chief of the committee for managing the Gaza Strip. According to the “source,” the mediators said they would replace him as soon as possible (Quds Press, February 3, 2026).
  • “Knowledgeable sources” denied reports that the chairman of the Palestinian National Committee for managing the Gaza Strip and committee members would return to the Gaza Strip within a few days. According to the “sources,” the general situation in the Strip did not encourage the committee’s return and did not allow it to do it job, which focuses on easing civilian suffering and providing tangible aid services, at least in the initial stage. They noted that the committee’s current presence in Egypt was vital to facilitate communication and activity, and to conduct additional discussions and steps with various groups and individuals to ensure the committee’s success once it returned to the Strip. They said they were concerned that the committee would not be able to operate optimally due to the enormous restrictions and difficulties it faced as a result of the security situation, continued Israeli control over most of the Gaza Strip and the non-opening of the various crossings to allow the entry of aid. The “sources” also noted internal committee dissatisfaction because a circular issued by Hamas to employees currently working in government offices and departments in the Strip did not mention mechanisms compatible with the committee’s work in the next stage (al-Ayyam, February 6, 2026).
  • Political analyst Wissam Afifa[7] wrote an op-ed piece in which he said that the technocratic committee had not yet begun its work not only due to obstacles imposed by Israel, but also because of internal behind-the-scenes tensions related to the source of its political authority within the so-called American “Peace Council.” Instead of handling government portfolios as a single package, an approach of “selective management” was being considered, under which some portfolios would be transferred and dealt with while others would be neglected, the most important of which were sensitive issues such as the public sector employees’ file and economic rights. According to Afifa, such an approach was incompatible with the idea of a technocratic committee which was supposed to operate according to an overall institutional concept and through clear channels of communication with the existing official bodies in the Strip, rather than through a partial or selective approach. It was further claimed that Egypt had prepared for a comprehensive, simultaneous transfer of portfolios to prevent chaos, and therefore tension with Cairo was increasing, as it viewed fragmentation and selectivity as threats to the stability of the next stage. Thus, basic ambiguity remains regarding the committee’s authorities, who makes decisions in practice and where the fund for its operating budget is located (alresala.net, February 5, 2026).
Palestinian Authority (PA) Involvement in the Gaza Strip
  • Reportedly, 25 officers and soldiers from the “presidential guard” and the Palestinian police, headed by Brigadier General Ali Abu Ali, arrived in the city of El Arish in Egypt in preparation for operating the Rafah Crossing under PA supervision (Rafah.crossing Facebook page, February 5, 2026). It was further reported that the number of PA personnel present at the Rafah Crossing exceeded 70, including operatives from the “presidential” guard, general intelligence, the preventive security forces, the police and the national security forces (X account of journalist Abdelhamid Abdelatty, February 5, 2026).
Counterterrorism Activities
  • IDF forces continued counterterrorism activities throughout Judea and Samaria, detaining dozens of wanted individuals and suspects in terrorist activity, including Hamas and PIJ operatives involved in manufacturing explosive devices and trafficking in weapons. A Palestinian who threw rocks in Jericho was eliminated and various weapons were seized. The forces also demolished the home of the terrorist who killed an Israeli civilian at the Gush Etzion Junction. Along the Jordanian border, the forces prevented a UAV from smuggling in 12 pistols (IDF spokesperson, February 10-3, 2026).
  • The chairman of the PA, Mahmoud Abbas, met with King Abdullah II of Jordan to discuss developments in the Palestinian territories, regional and international issues and strengthening bilateral cooperation. They condemned Israeli measures which, they claimed, were intended to enlarge “annexation” in Judea and Samaria, expand Israeli settlements and “damage” Hebron and the Cave of the Patriarchs, and warned of their implications for regional stability, especially ahead of the month of Ramadan and in light of the sensitivity of the holy sites. Abbas urged the United States to renew affirmation of its commitment to halting “displacement and annexation,” and called to convene the Arab League, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the UN Security Council to mobilize international pressure and advance the principle of “one state, one law and one legitimate weapon,” while demanding that Hamas hand over its weapons (Wafa, February 9, 2026).
  • As part of a reform dictated to the PA under international pressure to stop payments to prisoners held in Israel, the PA reportedly began implementing a secret decision made several months ago, according to which there would be dismissals and salary cuts for released prisoners employed in the security forces, public institutions and PA ministries (Telegram channel of Nablus Jabal al-Nar, February 4, 2026).
  • “Sources in educational and national circles” in Judea and Samaria claimed that far-reaching changes were being made to the PA school curriculum following economic and political pressures from the European Union and other international groups. According to the claims, the updates relate to the core of the Palestinian narrative, including the removal of references to events and concepts such as Deir Yassin, the nakba, the refugees and the “resistance,” alongside new subjects in history, religion and politics which are perceived as aligned with an Israeli-Western conception of the conflict. Critics further claimed that the new content emphasized the role of Jews in regional history while significantly reducing discussion of “Palestine” prior to 1948, and that key figures were also removed (Facebook page of the Palestinian Press Network, February 5, 2026). In response, the PA ministry of education and higher education said that what was being circulated on social media regarding the Palestinian curriculum mainly concerned examples and evidence of changes that the “occupation” had carried out in the curriculum of schools in Jerusalem, as part of a policy to Judaize the city. It was further alleged that “media actors funded from abroad” deliberately attempted to conflate Palestine’s commitments to adapt the education system to UNESCO standards with the fabrication of examples which did not exist in the Palestinian curriculum (Facebook page of the PA ministry of education and higher education, February 7, 2026).
The Palestinian Security Forces
  • The commander of the Palestinian police, Major General Alam al-Saqqa, met with the senior leadership of the police liaison administration, and told them that monitoring attacks by Israeli settlers on Palestinian civilians and their property was a top priority. He said cases had to be handled seriously and responsibly, and legal files had be prepared to ensure the protection of the rights of those harmed and enable them to submit complaints to the relevant authorities in accordance with legal procedures (Facebook page of the Palestinian police, February 3, 2026).
  • Reportedly, the PA security forces detonated an explosive device in the town of Tammun in Tubas (Telegram channel of QudsN, February 3, 2026).
  • The mother of two PIJ terrorist operatives from the Jenin refugee camp who were eliminated by Israel in 2021 and 2024 claimed that the PA security forces had detained her remaining son while he was on his way to work. She added that during the incident, the son and his father had been violently assaulted (Telegram channel Filastin al-Aqsa, February 4, 2026).
  • Reportedly, a special force of the PA security forces “abducted” the released prisoner Muhammad Hassan from his home in the Nur Shams camp in Tulkarm, a day after he was released from prison in Israel (al-Shahed website, February 6, 2026).

[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications.
[2] sing civilian facilities, such as schools and hospitals, for military purposes is characteristic of the terrorist organizations operating in the Gaza Strip, especially Hamas. See the August 2024 ITIC report, The terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip exploit the civilian infrastructure for terrorist activities
[3] See the September 2025 ITIC report, The Global Sumud (“Perseverance”) Flotilla in the Service of Hamas
[4] Hamas and the other Palestinian terrorist organizations operating in the Gaza Strip.
[5] Terrorist organizations.
[6] Terrorist organizations.
[7] Hamas media individual, formerly director of the al-Aqsa communications network and before that the editor-in-chief of the Hamas magazine, al-Risalah.

Related Articles

The terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip exploit the civilian infrastructure for terrorist activities

The Global Sumud (“Perseverance”) Flotilla in the Service of Hamas

IDF Announces Operational Control of the Ali al-Taher Ridge –Reactions in Lebanon and Iran

Spotlight on Iran and the Shiite Axis (September 2-9, 2026)