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IDF Announces Operational Control of the Ali al-Taher Ridge –Reactions in Lebanon and Iran

Published: 10/09/2026

Strikes on the Ali al-Taher Ridge (Akhbar al-Yawm Agency, September 9, 2026)

Ihab Hamadeh (al-Manar, September 1, 2026)

Full document in PDF format

Yuval Rosenberg

Overview^[1]

On September 3, 2026, the IDF announced that it had achieved operational control of the strategic Ali al-Taher Ridge in south Lebanon and cleared the tunnels used by Hezbollah.
The Lebanese government reinforced the deployment of army forces in the city of al-Nabatieh, near the Ali al-Taher Ridge, in an effort to prevent Israeli activity in the area, but did not state the action was part of implementing the state’s monopoly on weapons.
Hezbollah did not officially respond to the IDF announcement, but senior organization figures claimed Israel was exaggerating the importance of the ridge. Commentary in the Lebanese media claimed the organization’s silence resulted from Hezbollah’s reluctance to undermine the “resistance” narrative and from its concern that transferring the Ali al-Taher Ridge to the Lebanese army would lead to demands to evacuate other Hezbollah sites north of the Litani River.
The Iranian regime did not relate to the Israeli announcement despite its earlier threats to respond if the IDF operated extensively on the Ali al-Taher Ridge. Conservative media outlets acknowledged the strategic importance of the ridge while attempting to downplay the significance of the event for Hezbollah.
Hezbollah’s political and media opponents criticized its rejection of the proposal to transfer its facility on the Ali al-Taher Ridge to the Lebanese army and challenged the organization’s argument that it was capable of defending Lebanese territory. Local residents and business owners in al-Nabatieh, one of Hezbollah’s strongholds in south Lebanon, signed a statement condemning Hezbollah for handing the area over to the “enemy.”
In Amit Institute assessment, the events on the Ali al-Taher Ridge illustrate the dilemma facing Hezbollah, which is required to reconcile its continued independent control of military infrastructure with its claim that its weapons protect Lebanese sovereignty. If Israel attempts to advance toward other strategic Hezbollah sites north of the Litani River, increased domestic pressure may be exerted on the organization to change its position and transfer the facilities to state sovereignty. However, in all probability Hezbollah can be expected to continue to reject what it perceives as a precedent for the gradual dismantling of its infrastructure under Israeli-American pressure.
The developments on the Ali al-Taher Ridge also pose a dilemma for the Lebanese leadership. On the one hand, the Israeli announcement requires the presidency and the government to oppose the move and relate to it as an infringement of state sovereignty. On the other, the very fact that a military facility not under state control operated in the area strengthens the argument that restoring state authority in the south cannot be limited to demanding an Israeli withdrawal, but requires establishing the Lebanese army’s exclusive control over weapons and territory.

IDF Control of the Ali al-Taher Ridge^[2]

The Ali al-Taher Ridge, which rises to approximately 600 meters above sea level, is located north of the Litani River and Beaufort Castle and overlooks extensive areas that include the city of al-Nabatieh, the village of Tebnine, the al-Tuffah region and Jabal al-Rihan. Its strategic location provides observation and fire command of those areas, as well as control of major transportation routes connecting the coastal area, al-Nabatieh, the Beqa’a Valley, Tyre and Marjayoun.

The Ali al-Taher Ridge and its surroundings (Google Maps)

According to the IDF, a major strategic underground Hezbollah facility operated on the Ali al-Taher Ridge, serving as the main headquarters of Hezbollah’s Badr Unit, which directs the organization’s military activity north of the Litani River. Beginning in June 2026, after the IDF took control of the Beaufort Ridge and its network of tunnels, IDF activity focused on the Ali al-Taher Ridge. That included air and artillery strikes to eliminate terrorists identified in the area, prevent the escape of trapped terrorists and the transfer of assistance to the underground compound, and destroy Hezbollah infrastructure.
On September 3, 2026, the IDF announced it had completed clearing two Hezbollah tunnels on the Ali al-Taher Ridge in the security zone in south Lebanon, adding that the forces had achieved operational control of the area above and below ground. Hezbollah operatives were eliminated and others fled, and the tunnels were found to contain operations rooms, weapons storage rooms and facilities for extended stays. According to the IDF, the facility had been built over two decades, planned and funded by Iran (IDF spokesperson, September 3, 2026).

Strikes on the Ali al-Taher Ridge (Akhbar al-Yawm Agency, September 9, 2026)

The Lebanese Government

In recent weeks, in an effort to halt the Israeli attacks, advance direct negotiations with Israel and implement the June 2026 framework agreement, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun proposed that Hezbollah terrorists evacuate the Ali al-Taher Ridge and Lebanese army forces enter and take control of the site. The proposal was supported by the Americans and by Nabih Berri, speaker of the Lebanese Parliament and a Hezbollah ally, but the Lebanese army had reservations and demanded guarantees that Israel would not enter the site to verify the dismantling of the infrastructure.
The Lebanese government did not formally relate to the IDF announcement. However, Lebanese Deputy Prime Minister Tarek Mitri said the objective of the proposal to transfer the facilities on the ridge and control of the site to the Lebanese army was to prevent a large-scale Israeli operation in the area, but “reaching understandings had encountered difficulties” (Lebanese News Agency, September 6, 2026).
A source familiar with the Israel-Lebanon negotiations said Hezbollah had surprised the Lebanese leadership because it had passed up an opportunity to transfer the ridge to the Lebanese army and thereby give the Lebanese delegation an advantage for the next round of negotiations with Israel. However, according to the source, Hezbollah was more interested in redeploying and ensuring its continued possession of weapons north of the Litani River (al-Sharq al-Awsat, September 6, 2026).
Control of the Ali al-Taher Ridge enables the IDF to increase military pressure on the al-Nabatieh area, one of the largest cities in south Lebanon and a major Hezbollah stronghold north of the Litani River. Concerned about an Israeli move, sources said the Lebanese army had begun expanding its deployment in the city and the surrounding area, following instructions from President Aoun and army commander Rodolphe Haykal, in coordination with Prime Minister Nawaf Salam. However, the purpose of the move was reportedly to strengthen the security presence and prevent further escalation, not to begin disarmament or turn al-Nabatieh into a demilitarized zone (al-Madan, September 8, 2026; Nidaa al-Watan, September 9, 2026).
The Lebanese army sought to refute claims about the absence of a state presence in the area. The army command stated that its units were deployed in all areas of the south where there was no Israeli presence, particularly in the al-Nabatieh region, and following the recent developments it had reinforced its missions in several locations to reassure local residents (Lebanese army X account, September 8, 2026).

Lebanese army patrol in al-Nabatieh (Bint Jbeil News X account, September 9, 2026)

A source close to the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) said Israeli control of the ridge was a blow to Hezbollah’s defensive array and ability to exploit the terrain for command, concealment and operational [military] activity. He added that politically it exposed the limitations of the organization’s claim that it was the only force capable of defending Lebanon against Israel. Sources close to the Pentagon said the Lebanese army’s inability to deploy at the site illustrated the state’s difficulty in restoring its sovereignty. According to the source, the American objective should be neither continued Hezbollah control nor Israeli control without a time limit, but rather the deployment of the Lebanese army at the site, with practical international assistance and the establishment of a credible verification mechanism (Nidaa al-Watan, September 7, 2026).

Hezbollah’s Stance

In recent weeks, Hezbollah claimed the Ali al-Taher Ridge would not fall through surrender, but only after “steadfastness and resistance.”^{^[3]} The organization rejected President Aoun’s proposal to withdraw from the ridge in favor of the Lebanese army and said the issue was not the fate of a single military post, but the establishment of an “equation” regarding all Lebanese territory, and that evacuating the ridge would lead Israel to demand the evacuation of other “resistance” sites, including north of the Litani River and in the Beqa’a Valley (al-Akhbar, August 29, 2026).
Hezbollah did not directly respond to the IDF announcement, but senior organization figures and those close to it tried to downplay the significance of the loss of the ridge:
- Mahmoud Qamati, Hezbollah political council deputy chairman, claimed the organization was “steadfast and resisting” on the ridge and warned that any Israeli advance would be met accordingly. He tried to downplay the significance of the Israeli announcement, claiming they were only “secondary tunnels” (Radio Monte Carlo, September 6, 2026).
- Ihab Hamadeh, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, said he doubted the Israeli announcement was credible because of the continued attacks and shelling in the area. He claimed Israel had not issued photographs confirming the capture of the ridge or the logistical weapons claimed to have been there, and wondered how some of the Hezbollah “fighters”^{^[4]} who had been trapped had escaped if Israel maintained a tight siege from the air and the ground. He claimed Israel was representing the Ali al-Taher “hill” as Hezbollah’s last stronghold so Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu could exploit it in the upcoming Israeli elections. He added that Israeli control of the “hill” was not a military disaster nor the end of the road, adding that Hezbollah had displayed a “legendary stand” on the ridge, but warned there were red lines regarding continued IDF activity; he did not elaborate (Sputnik Radio, September 4, 2026).

Ihab Hamadeh (al-Manar, September 1, 2026)

- Messages conveyed through Hezbollah’s affiliated media outlets claimed Israel was exaggerating the importance of the Ali al-Taher Ridge and the infrastructure damaged or brought under its control consisted mainly of “administrative and logistical facilities,” the loss of which did not affect the core of Hezbollah’s military array north of the Litani River (Asas Media, September 9, 2026).
- Hezbollah-affiliated al-Akhbar editor Ibrahim al-Amin claimed that the Israeli operation was part of a military-political move to increase pressure on Hezbollah and the state without expanding the hostilities. He said Hezbollah did not intend to surrender to the American attempt to bring about the transfer of the posts in the area to the army, lest that be used to increase pressure on its infrastructure and create a confrontation between the Lebanese army and the “resistance”^{^[5]} (al-Akhbar, September 8, 2026).
Sources close to Hezbollah claimed its silence was a “deliberate policy of operational ambiguity,” alleging that since mid-June 2026, Hezbollah had not publicly dealt with events in order to keep information about its activity and intentions from Israel. The sources claimed the fighting in the area had not yet ended and Israel had not achieved all its objectives at the site (al-Joumhouria, September 9, 2026).
According to another report, Hezbollah has been unclear about the Ali al-Taher Ridge for the past three months, but implicitly questioned the Israeli narrative and did not provide descriptions of the facility at the site. According to sources, the term “operational control” did not necessarily indicate full, continuous, permanent control of the entire ridge. However, they did confirm that Israel had taken control of a facility in the eastern part of the site approximately a month earlier and claimed the objective of issuing documentation from it was to create the impression that Israel controlled the entire ridge (al-Nashra, September 4, 2026).
According to commentator retired Brigadier General Mohammad al-Husseini, a former senior Lebanese army officer claimed Hezbollah had not transferred the ridge to the Lebanese army not only because of its strategic location, but its main reason had been the possibility that it would set a precedent for other sites and areas of the organization’s operations. He said the issue was not only south Lebanon but rather all the areas of confrontation of the “resistance axis,”^{^[6]} and that there was “a single regional equation of pressure and deterrence” which included the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al-Mandab Strait alongside the Ali al-Taher Ridge, and therefore the loss of the ridge was a blow to the equation. According to al-Husseini, the public supporting Hezbollah would have perceived transferring the ridge to the Lebanese army as a retreat, even though it would be implementing state sovereignty, and therefore the organization sought to preserve its image as a “resistance force” (al-Nashra, September 7, 2026).
Lebanese commentator Ibrahim Bayram wrote that Hezbollah’s silence following the Israeli announcement increased the embarrassment, questions and concern even among the organization’s supporters, who were left without knowing the status of the site. He said the explanation Hezbollah gave was that the silence was intended to avoid compliance with the Israeli narrative and to wait until a fuller picture could be presented. According to his narrative, the campaign at the site had not yet ended, the organization’s operatives had managed for months to withstand Israeli attacks, and even after the announcement Israel had not proved it had achieved full control of the entire ridge and its facilities. However, he noted that Hezbollah’s not presenting a public version of an event of such importance put it in the difficult position of having to explain itself to its supporters (Lebanon 24, September 7, 2026).

The Iranian Position

According to claims, during the campaign for the Ali al-Taher Ridge, commanders and operatives of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards were trapped at the site alongside Hezbollah “fighters.” The Iranian leadership reportedly told the Hezbollah leadership that it would not abandon the organization, and sources close to Hezbollah were quoted as saying that they were counting on Iranian intervention if Israel tried to capture the ridge (al-Sharq al-Awsat, August 19-20, 2026).
A few hours before the Israeli announcement, Iran reportedly warned the United States through Oman that it would respond to a large-scale Israeli move to take control of the Ali al-Taher Ridge. A White House official denied the report (al-Madan, September 3, 2026).
A source familiar with the negotiations between Lebanon and Israel claimed Hezbollah could not have evacuated the Ali al-Taher Ridge without consulting the Iranian leadership, given Tehran’s threat to act on Hezbollah’s behalf if Israel attacked the site, and therefore the assessment was that Iran had given the organization a green light to leave the ridge (al-Sharq al-Awsat, September 6, 2026).
The Iranian authorities did not relate to Israel’s announcement regarding control of the ridge. However, conservative media outlets tried to downplay its significance, although they noted that Lebanon remained at the top of the agenda with regard to the ongoing confrontation with the United States:
- The Raja News website, which is affiliated with the radical wing in Iran, called for an Iranian response following the IDF takeover of the Ali al-Taher Ridge. An op-ed piece called the area, which provides a full view of south Lebanon and the roads leading to the border, an ideal point for launching missiles and UAVs at the “occupied territories,” adding that it linked the south Lebanon front to the rear. Hezbollah’s tunnel network and underground command center turned the area into a strategic base, control of which could continuously threaten northern Israel. The website noted that an end to the military confrontations in south Lebanon had been a condition for progress in the negotiations between Iran and the United States, and the gap between politicians’ statements and the situation on the ground showed that the agreement, which was presented as a document indicating the defeat of the United States, had in practice become a means of buying time for the “Zionist regime” for it to continue weakening the “resistance axis” before the next “comprehensive war” with Iran. Now, after the “enemy’s real plan” had been exposed, and in view of the “Zionist regime’s” advance on the Ali al-Taher Ridge and the fall of the area, Iran was expected to respond beyond statements and condemnations on X (Twitter). According to the article, such a response was required as a reminder that Lebanon was a “red line” in the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy and “military equations “(Raja News, September 4, 2026).
- An op-ed piece on the Farda News website stated that Hezbollah was concerned by developments on the Ali al-Taher Ridge but also feared Israeli military pressure would become a new political-military rule in Lebanon. Israel would declare a particular point a threat, attack it, the United States would pressure Beirut to evacuate it and finally the “resistance” would hand the position over to the Lebanese army to end the attacks. Should that happen, Ali al-Taher would not be the last demand and Israeli security demands would expand to areas beyond the recognized arrangements in south Lebanon. Therefore, the dispute was over the right to determine the rules of engagement and not merely over control of the ridge. According to the website, with regard both to Lebanon and the confrontation between Iran and the United States, no alternative to war and “resistance” had yet been presented. An alternative should be presented and a plan showing how military achievements could be translated into political achievements should be made clear (Farda News, September 5, 2026).
- The radical daily Kayhan reported that Israel’s attempt to boast of its control of the Ali al-Taher Ridge did not indicate Hezbollah’s defeat. In an article examining Hezbollah’s development and growing strength since the 1980s, commentator Saadollah Zarei wrote that Hezbollah’s entry into the campaign alongside Iran had exposed it to greater hostility from the “American-Zionist front,” including from its opponents in Lebanon and Arab states in the Persian Gulf. Despite the Iran-United States and Israel-Lebanon ceasefires, Hezbollah was subjected to daily IDF bombardment. Nevertheless, Israel had not achieved its declared objective of eliminating the organization and was forced to inflate the importance of the destruction of “a particular village or the capture of a hill,” while the Israeli government was concerned about the results of the elections in Israel “because of its military failures.” According to Zarei, while Iran’s military attacks on the main regional American military bases had dealt severe blows to the administration and while the United States military was unable to end Iran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz, the Israeli military was inflating the importance of the capture of “a hill in Lebanon,” when even its actual capture was still uncertain. Moreover, even if Israel had achieved something during the five-month confrontation with Hezbollah, it might lose it within a few days (Kayhan, September 5, 2026).

Criticism of Hezbollah

Hezbollah’s opponents said the “development” at Ali al-Taher illustrated the price of the unending existence of an independent “military authority” not subordinate to the state. The criticism focused on Hezbollah’s refusal to accept President Aoun’s proposal and transfer the ridge to the Lebanese army, alongside questions regarding the organization’s claim that it led the “resistance” against Israel:
- Fouad Makhzoumi, a member of the Lebanese Parliament and an opponent of Hezbollah, said that if the reports of the fall of the ridge were correct, Hezbollah had prevented the Lebanese army from deploying there, despite President Aoun’s initiative, but had failed to prevent Israel from entering it (Fouad Makhzoumi’s X account, September 5, 2026). Lebanese Forces Party chairman Samir Geagea also criticized the fact that the area had not been handed over to the Lebanese army before the IDF entered (Lebanese News Agency, September 6, 2026).
- Asaad Dergham, a member of the Lebanese Parliament from the Strong Lebanon faction, claimed that the absence of a response from the organization to the developments at Ali al-Taher reiterated the question of whether its decision-making was Lebanese. He said it had become clear that Hezbollah’s decisions were part of Iranian strategy and the organization’s “equations” collapsed when they conflicted with external interests (MTV Lebanon, September 8, 2026).
- Ali al-Amin, editor-in-chief of the Janoubia website, said the development at Ali al-Taher was further evidence of the erosion of Hezbollah’s “military” role against Israel. He said in practice it had lost the hill militarily even before the Israeli announcement, whose timing was chosen out of political considerations, while Hezbollah’s silence and its shifting of responsibility to the state did not provide an answer to the question of what had happened. Al-Amin claimed that Hezbollah’s weapons had morphed from “resistance” to internal since they could no longer harm Israel, and in view of the current situation the Lebanese state had to strengthen its presence and sovereignty on the ground instead of continuing to rely on “resistance” slogans (al-Janoubia, September 7, 2026).
- According to an article in the daily al-Liwaa, while Hezbollah sought to preserve its status and “resistance” facilities and assets, Israel continued to destroy villages, displace residents and expand its activity in the south on the grounds of its need to act against the organization’s infrastructure. The article questioned why residents of the area were required to pay the price for Hezbollah’s decision to establish a military presence at Ali al-Taher, and related to the event as part of broader criticism of the concept of “resistance,” which was no longer able to protect the south and enabled Israel to use the organization’s military presence as justification for continuing its activity (al-Liwaa, September 9, 2026).
- Lebanese political commentator Maarouf al-Daouq said Hezbollah’s silence after the Israeli announcement and its intensified criticism of the president and the government did not conceal the military failure or the price of the decision not to hand over the post. He said the event undermined the arguments justifying Hezbollah’s continued possession of weapons outside state control and gave Israel a new bargaining chip in the negotiations (al-Liwaa, September 9, 2026).
- Prof. Hilal Khashan of the American University of Beirut said the Israeli takeover showed the failure of Hezbollah’s concept and claimed that the organization had in practice chosen to hand the site, which he called a “symbol of its pride,” over to Israel rather than transfer it to the Lebanese army. He said it reflected the erosion of Hezbollah’s military capability against Israel and strengthened the argument that the role of its weapons was increasingly being reduced to the internal Lebanese arena (al-Sharq al-Awsat, September 7, 2026).
Unusual criticism also came from the Shi’ite public in south Lebanon. “The Second Nabatieh Appeal,” signed by hundreds of people from all walks of life from the city and the surrounding area, claimed that what had happened at Ali al-Taher could not simply be ignored. When it had been possible to transfer the site to the responsibility of the state and the Lebanese army, Hezbollah had rejected the idea, and “the land that was not handed over to the state at the appropriate time ended up in the hands of the enemy.” The signatories demanded the deployment of the army in al-Nabatieh and its surroundings, the state’s assumption of full responsibility for the security of the area and the restriction of declarations of war and peace to its legitimate institutions (MTV Lebanon, September 8, 2026).
Social media were also critical of Hezbollah and Iran, which was portrayed as having abandoned the organization despite its threats to take action against Israel. The Lebanese “No to the Iranian Occupation” channel (10,500 followers on X) published cartoons and AI videos showing Iranian Majlis [Parliament] Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf stabbing a Hezbollah fighter in the back; Revolutionary Guards commander Ahmad Vahidi pushing Hezbollah secretary general Na’im Qassem off a cliff; and Na’im Qassem giving Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Minister Katz a tour of the facility at Ali al-Taher after refusing to allow the Lebanese army to enter it (“No to the Iranian Occupation” X account, September 6-7, 2026).

Anti-Hezbollah and anti-Iran cartoons and videos
(No to the Iranian Occupation” X account, September 6-7, 2026)

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^[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the Amit Institute's daily updates as well as its other publications
^[2] See the August 2026 Amit Institute report, Dismantling the Hezbollah Infrastructure at the Ali Taher Ridge to Advance the Ceasefire Agreement.
^[3] Intransigence and terrorist attacks.
^[4] Terrorist operatives.
^[5] Hezbollah and the other terrorist organizations operating in Lebanon.
^[6] Iran, Hezbollah, the Palestinian terrorist organizations, the Houthis in Yemen and the Shi'ite militias in Iraq.

Iranian Majles Speaker meets with the Hamas delegation (ISNA, September 2, 2026)

Mohsen Rezaei (snn.ir, September 6, 2026)

Mojtaba Amani (snn.ir, September 5, 2026)

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Key Trends

Senior Iranian officials stressed Tehran’s continued support for the liberation of “Palestine.”
Iran seeks to downplay the significance of the IDF’s takeover of the Ali al-Taher Ridge in southern Lebanon.

Highlights^[1]

A senior Hamas delegation visited Tehran and met with the Iranian Majles Speaker and Foreign Minister.
Iranian reactions to the IDF’s takeover of the Ali al-Taher Ridge in Lebanon reflected recognition of the ridge’s strategic importance, alongside an attempt to downplay the significance of the event for Hezbollah.
The Iraqi government has reportedly tightened restrictions on visits to Baghdad by senior Iranian security officials in response to the recent visits to the country by the Qods Force Commander.

Iranian Involvement in the Palestinian Arena

Majles Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf met with Basem Naim, a member of Hamas’ political bureau and the official in charge of the movement’s Arab and Islamic relations. Qalibaf noted that if the day comes when Iran ceases its struggle, in its various forms, against the United States and the “Zionist regime,” it will be the day of defeat. He added that under the first clause of the memorandum of understanding with the United States, Tehran stressed the need to end the war against Iran and its allies in the “Resistance Front.” Naim stressed that the Palestinians’ struggle against the “Zionist regime” has continued uninterrupted and will continue “until the remnants of this regime are erased from the land of Palestine” (ISNA, September 2, 2026).

Iranian Majles Speaker meets with the Hamas delegation (ISNA, September 2, 2026)

During his visit to Tehran, Naim also met with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and briefed him on the latest developments in the Palestinian arena. Araghchi stressed Iran’s support for the liberation of “Palestine” and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital. He noted that the Islamic Republic would continue to support the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people in international forums, including meetings of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS, as well as the upcoming session of the UN General Assembly (Iranian Foreign Ministry Telegram channel, September 2, 2026).
Foreign Minister Araghchi spoke with the new Secretary-General of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed, and discussed regional developments and the challenges facing the Muslim world, particularly “the continuation of the aggression and crimes of the Zionist regime in Palestine and Lebanon.” He stressed the need for resolute support for the rights of the peoples of “Palestine” and Lebanon and for the Islamic countries to adopt a unified and effective position in view of those developments (Mehr, September 8, 2026).

Iranian Involvement in Lebanon

Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council Mohsen Rezaei addressed the latest developments in Lebanon and said that no war consists of an uninterrupted series of victories or defeats and that wars are characterized by ups and downs. He stressed that Hezbollah has always had the upper hand in Lebanon. Rezaei said that although Israel had managed to take control of parts of Lebanon, Lebanon would raise its head again and deal Israel severe and painful blows that would leave nothing of it. According to him, Lebanon is not like the Gaza Strip, which can be besieged from all four sides, because Lebanon has a hinterland (snn.ir, September 6, 2026).

Mohsen Rezaei (snn.ir, September 6, 2026)

The Raja News website, which is affiliated with Iran’s hardline camp, called for an Iranian response following the IDF takeover of the Ali al-Taher Ridge in southern Lebanon. A commentary article stated that Hezbollah’s network of tunnels and underground command center had turned the area into a strategic base, control of which could maintain a continuous threat to northern Israel. The website stressed that the cessation of military confrontations in southern Lebanon had been a condition for progress in the negotiations between Iran and the United States. According to the website, the stark gap between politicians’ statements and the reality on the ground illustrates more than ever that the agreement, which had been presented as a document attesting to the defeat of the United States, had in practice become a means of buying time for the “Zionist regime,” enabling it to continue weakening the Axis of Resistance in preparation for the next all-out war with Iran. Now that the “enemy’s” intentions behind the memorandum of understanding have been exposed, and in view of the “Zionist regime’s” advance on the Ali al-Taher Ridge and the fall of the strategic area, Iran is expected to respond in a manner that goes beyond statements and condemnations on Twitter. According to the article, such a response is necessary to serve as a reminder that Lebanon is a “red line” in the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy and military equations (Raja News, September 4, 2026).
The hardline daily Kayhan stressed that Israel’s attempt to emphasize its control of the Ali al-Taher Ridge does not indicate Hezbollah’s defeat. In an article examining Hezbollah’s development and military buildup since the 1980s, commentator Saadollah Zarei wrote that Hezbollah’s entry into the campaign alongside Iran had exposed it to greater hostility from the “American-Zionist front,” including from its opponents within Lebanon and from Arab countries in the Persian Gulf. Despite the ceasefires between Iran and the United States and between Israel and Lebanon, the organization had been subjected to daily IDF strikes. Nevertheless, Israel has not achieved its declared objective of eliminating the organization and is forced to exaggerate the significance of the destruction of a particular village or the capture of a hill, while the Israeli government is concerned about the results of the elections in Israel because of its military failures. According to Zarei, while Iran’s military attacks on the main US military bases in the region have dealt severe blows to the Trump administration, and while the US military has been unable to end Iran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz, the Israeli military is exaggerating the significance of capturing a hill in Lebanon, when even the fact of its capture and the manner in which it occurred remain unclear (Kayhan, September 5, 2026).
Former Iranian Ambassador to Lebanon Mojtaba Amani said that Hezbollah is not entering into a confrontation with Israel to demonstrate the futility of negotiations between Lebanon and the “Zionist regime.” He noted that Israel seeks to undermine the Iranian deterrence equation regarding Beirut and the Dahiyeh, which he claimed has thus far prevented Israel and Prime Minister Netanyahu from attacking those areas. According to Amani, the situation has weakened Netanyahu both on the battlefield and within Israel (snn.ir, September 5, 2026).

Mojtaba Amani (snn.ir, September 5, 2026)

Iranian Involvement in Iraq

“Iraqi sources” reported that the Iraqi government had decided to prohibit the “independent coordination” of visits to the country by senior Iranian officials holding military or security positions. According to the directive, any visit by a senior Iranian official for the purpose of security or economic coordination requires prior written approval from the Iraqi Prime Minister. According to the “sources,” the secret directive, which was first published in July 2026, was renewed following the two most recent visits to Iraq by IRGC Qods Force Commander Esmail Qaani. Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaydi ordered that every request for a visit to the country by an Iranian commander be discussed by the Council of Ministers. Once the visit has been approved, the Iranian official will be informed through political and diplomatic channels that he must refrain from interfering in Iraq’s internal affairs, harming any neighboring country, or involving Iraq in any regional or international issue. In addition, the visit will be restricted to the Iraqi government’s official headquarters in Baghdad, and no additional meetings at other locations will be permitted (al-Modon, September 6, 2026).

The Pro-Iranian Militias in Iraq

Akram al-Kaabi, Secretary-General of the Nujaba Movement, claimed that the desire of US President Donald Trump, whom he called “the fool,” to achieve a victory in Iraq after failing to achieve one in Iran is an illusion. According to al-Kaabi, Trump’s colonial ambitions will not be realized in Iraq, and he should know that the militias are awaiting September 30, 2026 (the date for the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq), fully prepared and eager to wage the “decisive battle against the occupation forces” if they renege on their commitments to a complete withdrawal. Al-Kaabi further claimed that this “victory” (the American withdrawal) had been achieved solely thanks to the forceful actions of the “Islamic Resistance in Iraq.” In conclusion, al-Kaabi threatened that if even one soldier remained after the deadline for the withdrawal, “we will not allow him to return safely” (Akram al-Kaabi’s X account, September 2, 2026).
Abu Alaa al-Wala’i, Secretary-General of Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, stressed that “regulating weapons” would be carried out only in return for “full and comprehensive sovereignty” and that anything else is unacceptable (Abu Alaa al-Wala’i’s X account, September 6, 2026).

The Houthis in Yemen

Houthi Deputy Foreign Minister Abdulwahid Abu Ras addressed the warming relations between the United States and Somaliland and claimed that the American military presence in Somalia is part of the activities of the “Israeli enemy” and represents the combined activity of the “arms of Zionism.” Abu Ras claimed that the Americans and Israelis are working to tear Somalia apart by creating internal conflicts and promoting calls for entities to secede from the Somali state. In addition, Abu Ras stressed the Houthis’ position in support of Somalia’s security and stability and their view that any presence of American and Israeli military bases poses a threat to Somalia, the Horn of Africa, and the entire region (Houthi Foreign Ministry Telegram channel, September 7, 2026).
Houthi military spokesman Yahya Saree announced that the Houthi armed forces had carried out a “large-scale and high-quality operation” in Saudi territory, during which facilities belonging to the Aramco oil company were attacked in Abha, Najran, the Jazan Economic City, and the Khamis Mushait Air Base was attacked. According to Saree, the attacks were carried out using dozens of ballistic missiles and drones, and the targets were struck accurately, causing considerable damage (Yahya Saree’s Telegram channel, September 8, 2026). Saudi-led coalition spokesman Turki al-Maliki reported that 73 civilians, including women and children, had been wounded because of the Houthi attacks and that the attacks constitute a blatant violation of Saudi sovereignty and a direct threat to the security of its citizens and residents. Al-Maliki stressed that the coalition would take all necessary “operational measures” to deter the Houthis and confront their “hostile approach” (Saudi-led coalition forces X account, September 8, 2026).

Militias in Syria

The Islamic Resistance Front in Syria – Possessors of Might (Uli al-Ba’s, UAB) released a video purportedly documenting movements of IDF vehicles and soldiers in the Syrian Golan Heights under the title “Feel your heads, for what is coming shows no mercy” (Islamic Resistance Front in Syria Telegram channel, September 6, 2026).

Screenshot from the video (Islamic Resistance Front in Syria Telegram channel, September 6, 2026)

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^[1] The weekly study includes the activities of Iran, the Shiite militias in Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen.

Spotlight on Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (September 1-8, 2026)

Published: 09/09/2026

The world disregards the Israeli attacks (Facebook page of Alaa al-Laqta, in-house Hamas cartoonist, September 2, 2026)

Hamas delegation meets with the Iranian foreign minister (Hamas website, September 3, 2026)

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Overview [1]

Terrorists opened fire at IDF forces and an IDF engineering vehicle hit an IED in the northern Gaza Strip. There were no Israeli casualties and the IDF responded with attacks on Hamas facilities. Terrorist operatives from Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) who approached IDF forces at the Yellow Line or were involved in planning terrorist attacks were eliminated.
A Hamas spokesman warned that Israeli ministers’ calls for encouraging emigration from the Gaza Strip were a “dangerous development.”
A Hamas delegation visited Iran and called for pressure to be exerted on Israel to implement the ceasefire agreement and withdraw from the Gaza Strip.
A new international flotilla to the Gaza Strip is supposed to set sail in October 2026.
There were two stabbings, one in the Old City of Jerusalem and the other at a farm in Samaria; an Israeli civilian was critically wounded. The Israeli security forces detained terrorist cells which were planning attacks and located a rocket in a village in northern Samaria. Two Israeli Arabs from the Galilee were accused of supporting ISIS.
A Fatah figure said that in his opinion the Palestinian elections would not be held in November 2026. Hamas figures spoke with representatives of the Palestinian terrorist organizations to formulate a common position ahead of the elections.

The Fighting in the Gaza Strip

he IDF

This past week, Hamas escalated its attacks on IDF forces in the Gaza Strip. In the northern Gaza Strip, terrorist operatives opened fire at IDF forces east of the Yellow Line and an IDF engineering vehicle went over an IED near the Yellow Line. In response, the IDF attacked Hamas facilities in various areas of the Gaza Strip, eliminating three terrorists who approached them near the Yellow Line and eliminated Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) terrorists who were involved in planning terrorist attacks and posed a threat (IDF spokesperson, September 1-8, 2026).
On September 1, 2026, the Israeli security forces detained the head of Hamas internal security in the Gaza Strip, Muin al-‘Arabid, who was responsible for the security of senior Hamas figures, consolidating Hamas control in the northern Gaza Strip, concealing hostages held by Hamas after the October 7, 2023 massacre, and combating militias opposed to Hamas (IDF spokesperson, Israel Security Agency spokesperson and Israeli media, September 1, 2026). Sources in Hamas said members of the Israel Security Agency (ISA) posed as representatives of an international aid organization and recruited Palestinians, including women, who set up sales stalls and were used to collect information and monitor al-‘Arabid and his surroundings, apparently without knowing the full purpose of the activity. On the day of the operation, members of the force mingled with Gazans in the area. When al-‘Arabid left his home, the forces opened fire, which was returned, and al-‘Arabid’s wife was killed, while members of his family and security guards were wounded. Al-‘Arabid tried to escape through the rear of the house but encountered another force, was wounded and taken captive (al-Sharq al-Awsat, September 4, 2026).
According to reports, Kamal Adwan Hospital in the Beit Lahia Project in the northern Gaza Strip was evacuated after it came under direct fire from IDF combat vehicles that advanced beyond the Yellow Line (al-Araby al-Jadeed, September 3, 2026). The hospital administration announced the suspension of operations at the hospital for one day because of the advance of IDF forces near the hospital (Kamal Adwan Hospital Facebook page, September 3, 2026).

The world disregards the Israeli attacks (Facebook page of Alaa al-Laqta, in-house Hamas cartoonist, September 2, 2026)

Negotiations for the Second Phase of the Ceasefire Agreement

Hamas spokesman Hazem Qassem criticized Israeli Defense Minister Katz and National Security Minister Ben Gvir who called for encouraging residents to emigrate from the Gaza Strip, and said the increase in such statements by Israeli government ministers was a “dangerous development.” He said they showed Israel had not abandoned its plans to uproot the Gazans and they also explained Israel’s actions in the Gaza Strip as an attempt to impose “harsh living conditions” which would lead to displacement (Hamas website, September 4, 2026). Mike Huckabee, the American ambassador to Israel, said anyone who volunteered to leave the Gaza Strip should be allowed to do so, but there was no Israeli or American plan for the Gazans’ forced displacement (Reuters, September 5, 2026).
Hazem Qassem also criticized the Board of Peace, which related to an article from The New York Times noting that only the removal of Hamas would help the Gaza Strip recover. Qassem claimed that the article had reported unsubstantiated information and unfair positions against the Palestinian people and the “resistance.”^[2] He said the Board of Peace should maintain balanced and objective discourse and not issue material that could harm any Palestinian party or adopt Israel’s narratives. He called on the Board of Peace and its representative, Nikolay Mladenov, to focus their efforts on the Board’s basic tasks, especially consolidating the ceasefire, working to halt Israeli “violations,” ensuring the flow of humanitarian aid and monitoring the implementation of the agreements (Hamas website, September 5, 2026). Bassem Na’im, a member of the Hamas political bureau, said that if the Board of Peace wanted to contribute to peace and stability in the region, it should act neutrally and in accordance with international decisions and resolutions. According to him, the Board was trying to conceal its failure to successfully pressure Netanyahu by blaming Hamas (Bassem Na’im’s Telegram channel, September 6, 2026).
An American official said the administration was dissatisfied with Israel for not providing the guarantees required to establish a new police force in the Gaza Strip. He said establishing such a force was necessary for a new security system which would operate independently of Hamas. He added that Israel did not meet its commitments to allow the entry of materials required for several reconstruction projects in the Gaza Strip. He further claimed that some Israeli attacks exceeded the bounds of the right to self-defense and led to “insecurity” in the Gaza Strip (CBS News, September 7, 2026).

The Gaza Strip

The Civilian Situation in the Gaza Strip

The Palestinian water authority reported that the sewage system in the Gaza Strip was collapsing, with approximately 55,000 cubic meters of untreated sewage discharged daily, approximately 40,000 cubic meters of it directly into the sea and approximately 15,000 cubic meters seeping into the environment through cesspits and leaks in the sewage network. The five main wastewater treatment facilities were inoperative, and only 18 of 74 pumping stations were partially operative, while the proportion of the population connected to an operational sewage system had fallen from more than 85% to about 45%. The water authority warned of the risks to public health, groundwater and the environment and called for the provision of fuel, pumps, generators, spare parts and heavy equipment to maintain the system (Wafa, September 2, 2026).
Ramiz Alakbarov, UN deputy coordinator for the Middle East peace process and humanitarian coordinator for the Palestinian territories, visited the Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani Hospital for Rehabilitation and Prosthetics in the Gaza Strip. He was received by the hospital director and representatives of the Qatari Committee for the Reconstruction of the Gaza Strip. They discussed the challenges delaying the continuing provision of the hospital’s services and reviewed the difficulties related to bringing supplies and medical equipment through the crossings. Alakbarov said the UN would continue its efforts and coordination to make it easier to bring in the required medical and logistical supplies (Hamad Hospital website, September 3, 2026).
Hamas-affiliated commentators criticized the plan of an Israeli nonprofit organization to open a clinic in a displaced persons camp in al-Mawasi in the southern Gaza Strip. Wissam Afifa^[3] wrote that anyone who wanted to help Gaza could do so better through independent and impartial humanitarian organizations (Wissam Afifa’s X account, September 4, 2026). Iyad al-Qara^[4] warned of the danger inherent in turning humanitarian aid into a tool for “whitewashing the image of the occupation” and presenting Israel as part of the solution, instead of accusing it of the [alleged] “crimes and violations” it had committed against the Palestinians (Palestine Online, September 5, 2026).
Hamas alleged that Israel was trying to obscure evidence of “crimes” committed in the Gaza Strip by removing, crushing and transferring rubble which, it claimed, contained the bodies of “thousands” of missing persons and physical evidence. Hamas claimed that disturbing the sites violated international decisions and the International Court of Justice ruling regarding the preservation of evidence (Hamas Telegram channel, September 7, 2026).

Civilian Governance

An armed Hamas force reportedly opened fire at residents near al-Shafi’i Mosque in the Khan Yunis refugee camp, wounding several and abducting others (Hamza al-Masri’s Telegram channel, September 3, 2026). A Hamas-affiliated channel denied the report and claimed “drug dealers” had opened fire at a police force and a confrontation developed at the site (Khalik Wa’i Telegram channel, September 3, 2026). The Khan Yunis district police later said that a narcotics force had raided a drug distribution den in the Khan Yunis camp area. The force came under direct attack and faced an attempt to provoke a disturbance at the site while carrying out its mission, causing the police to respond, as a result of which two civilians were wounded. The police stressed that they would continue pursuing drug dealers and maintain public order and would not tolerate attempts to provoke chaos or block roads (Shehab, September 5, 2026).

Military Governance

It was reported that after the Israeli security forces detained Hamas internal security official Muin al-‘Arabid, three Israeli “agents,” including a woman, were detained. The three had reportedly posed as an international aid organization to facilitate movement in the area and the collection of information. According to the preliminary interrogations, the “agents” said that the special force had arrived at the scene of the operation only a few hours before its cover was exposed and had not previously been present there (al-Akhres Telegram channel, September 3, 2026). A Hamas source said that at least 36 people had been detained on suspicion of collaborating with Israel following the abduction (al-Sharq al-Awsat, September 4, 2026).
The PIJ’s military wing claimed its operatives had foiled an attempt by a militia collaborating with Israel to abduct an operative of the organization in the al-Qarara area north of Khan Yunis. According to the statement, the militia operated with the assistance of Israeli UAVs, and the attempt was foiled after an exchange of fire developed at close range. It was further reported that members of the militia killed the intended abduction target, an operative in the al-Qarara Battalion of the Khan Yunis Brigade (Jerusalem Brigades Telegram channel, September 4, 2026).

New Flotilla to the Gaza Strip

The International Committee for Breaking the Siege on Gaza, which is part of the Freedom Flotilla Coalition, announced the resumption of international maritime activity to “support the Gaza Strip” and a plan to reach its shores in October 2026. The new mission reportedly included voyages from port to port across Europe to mobilize public support and exert political pressure to end the “blockade.” After the Handala 2 sailed to Norway, Sweden and Denmark in June and July 2026, the Kate sailed from Bristol to ports in Ireland, Germany and France. The next stops will be Spain, Portugal and Italy before the vessels continue to the Gaza Strip (International Committee for Breaking the Siege on Gaza Facebook page, September 4, 2026).

**The Kate (International Committee for Breaking the Siege on Gaza Facebook page, August 29, 2026)**

Hamas in the International Arena

A Hamas delegation headed by Bassem Na’im, a member of the Hamas political bureau and head of the movement’s Arab and Islamic relations office, met in Iran with Majlis [Parliament] Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. They discussed developments in the Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria and east Jerusalem and presented the understandings reached with the mediators and representatives of the Board of Peace regarding the roadmap for the second phase of the agreement. Hamas declared its commitment to the understandings and called for pressure on Israel to implement them, including a full withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the beginning of reconstruction. The Iranians noted their continued support for the Palestinians and briefed the delegation on developments in the confrontation between Iran and the United States and on the roadmap agreed upon for ending it (Hamas website, September 3, 2026).

Hamas delegation meets with the Iranian foreign minister (Hamas website, September 3, 2026)

Israel, Judea and Samaria

Terrorist Attacks

Stabbing in the Old City of Jerusalem: Before dawn on September 4, 2026a Palestinian terrorist from Beit Hanina north of Jerusalem went to the Damascus Gate in the Old City and tried to stab civilians. When Israeli security forces approached him, he tried to stab one of the fighters; he was shot and killed. There were no civilian or security force casualties (Israel Police spokesperson and Israeli media, September 4, 2026).
Stabbing in Samaria: On September 7, 2026, a Palestinian terrorist drove to the Maoz Yehuda farm in Samaria and stabbed an Israeli resident several times, critically wounding him. Israeli security forces launched a manhunt for the terrorist, who fled the scene by car. More than an hour later, he was located in the town of Qabalan, where he tried to stab the fighters; he was shot and killed (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, September 7, 2026).

Counterterrorism

This past week, the Israeli security forces continued extensive counterterrorism activities in Judea and Samaria, detaining more than ten wanted persons and questioning dozens of suspects in an operation conducted in Nablus and the surrounding villages. More than 30 lathes used to manufacture weapons were destroyed and weapons, handguns and ammunition were confiscated; five terrorists who planned to attack civilians and security forces were detained in the town of Qabatiya, and weapons and other means of combat were found in their homes. In a counterterrorism operation in the village of Aqaba in northern Samaria, a Hamas terrorist network of ten operatives who were promoting terrorist attacks on Israeli civilians was detained. A rocket without a launcher was located and destroyed and numerous weapons and explosives were found; during activity in villages in the Nablus area, a terrorist who tried to attack the forces was eliminated and terrorists who planned attacks and dealt arms were detained (IDF spokesperson, September 4-8, 2026). The Jerusalem district of the Palestinian Authority reported that “occupation” forces had imposed a “siege” on the town of Anata and the Shuafat refugee camp in northeast Jerusalem and detained approximately 100 people; as a result, all schools and businesses were closed (Palestinian Media Center, September 8, 2026).
An indictment was filed against an Israeli Arab from the Galilee who said he identified with ISIS and had viewed instructional material on combat, the use of weapons and the manufacture of missiles and drones for terrorist purposes (Israel Police spokesperson, September 2, 2026). Another indictment was filed against a 19-year-old Israeli Arab from the Galilee who expressed solidarity with ISIS, viewed material about the organization and swore allegiance to it (Israel Police spokesperson and ISA spokesperson, September 7, 2026).

Settler-Palestinian Friction

The Palestinians reported that three local residents were killed by IDF fire in confrontations caused by Jewish settlers’ entering Palestinian villages:
- The ministry of health in Ramallah reported that two young Palestinians had been killed by IDF fire in the village of al-Mughayyir, northeast of Ramallah. According to the head of the village council, the incident began after Jewish settlers tried to steal sheep, and following a confrontation, IDF forces entered the village and opened fire at local residents (al-Sharq al-Awsat, September 3, 2026). However, the IDF reported that it had secured the entry of police officers and an Israeli civilian into the village to enable the return of sheep belonging to Israelis, and during the activity the Palestinians rioted, throwing rocks and concrete blocks at them, and the forces fired at the instigators (IDF spokesperson, September 2, 2026). Hamas confirmed that the two fatalities were members of its organization (Hamas Telegram channel in Judea and Samaria, September 3, 2026).
- Palestinian sources reported that a young Palestinian was shot in the head and died and two others were wounded during an attack attributed to Jewish rioters in the village of Hajjah, east of Qalqilya (al-Mayadeen, September 7, 2026). The IDF reported that Israeli security forces removed Israeli civilians who had entered the village following a report of a confrontation between them and Palestinians. Subsequently, a riot developed with Palestinians throwing rocks at the fighters, who responded by firing into the air and then at the instigators (IDF spokesperson, September 7, 2026).

The Palestinian Authority (PA)

PA Prime Minister Mohammad Mustafa met with Japanese assistant foreign minister for Gaza reconstruction Takeshi Okubo to discuss relief, recovery and reconstruction efforts in the Gaza Strip. Takeshi related Japan’s activities in health, education, water and sanitation, employment, social protection, removal of explosive remnants and municipal services. Mustafa said reconstruction activity should be coordinated with the Palestinian government and in accordance with its recovery and reconstruction plan. In addition, he briefed Okubo the economic and social situation in Judea and Samaria, which he attributed to Israeli measures, violence by Jewish rioters, delays in transferring tax revenues and restrictions on movement. He called on Japan and the international community to exert pressure on Israel and assist the Palestinian government, including in preparations for holding the upcoming general elections (Wafa, September 3, 2026).
The Board of Peace categorically denied the report, allegedly based on statements by Jeremy Greenstock, Britain’s ambassador to the UN from 1998 to 2003, claiming that Tony Blair, the British prime minister at the time and currently a senior Board official, had recently been sent by the Board to ask the PA to replace every mention of the word “Palestine” in Palestinian textbooks with the Jewish term “Samaria” [sic]. According to Greenstock, Blair tried to pressure the PA but the demand was rejected by Mahmoud Abbas (Middle East Eye, September 2, 2026; Board of Peace X account, September 3, 2026).

The Palestinian General Elections

Jibril Rajoub, secretary of the Fatah Central Committee, said it would not be possible to hold the elections in November 2026 because there were still issues that had to be dealt with before the official decree could be issued. He added that a comprehensive national dialogue had to be held before moving forward toward elections and only elections and a democratic process would determine who would govern “Palestine” (Quds News Agency, September 7, 2026).
Senior Hamas figures held talks with representatives of Palestinian terrorist organizations in an effort to promote a common position ahead of the elections:
- Husam Badran, a member of the Hamas political bureau and head of the national relations office, spoke by telephone with Salem Atallah, secretary general of the Palestinian Mujahideen Movement, about developments in the Palestinian arena and the upcoming elections for the Legislative Council and the Palestinian National Council. They called for broader participation by the “organizations” and political forces in the elections, opposed the appointment of representatives instead of their election and discussed the establishment of a Palestinian national alliance (Hamas Telegram channel in Judea and Samaria, September 2, 2026). Badran also spoke with Hassan Mahmoud Abu Halima, secretary general of the Palestinian al-Ahrar Movement. They noted the need to broaden the participation of Palestinian “organizations, forces and figures” in the elections and opposed the appointment of representatives. They also discussed the establishment of the Palestinian national alliance as a framework for coordination among the forces and “organizations” ahead of the elections (Hamas Telegram channel in Judea and Samaria, September 3, 2026).
- Meeting in Beirut, representatives of Hamas and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) called for dialogue and broad national agreement on the elections, strengthening partnership among the organizations and integrating all the forces into PLO institutions. They also discussed the situation in the Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria, called for expanding the “popular resistance”^[5] and discussed the situation of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and the continuation of UNRWA activity (Hamas Telegram channel in Judea and Samaria, September 2, 2026).
- The central leadership of the Alliance of Palestinian Forces held a meeting in Beirut attended by senior Hamas figure Ali Baraka representing political bureau head Khalil al-Hayya. The participants called for elections to the Legislative Council, the PA presidency and the Palestinian National Council with the participation of all the organizations, and opposed the exclusion of the “resistance forces.”^[6] They supported the establishment of a broad Palestinian national alliance and said they would establish monitoring committees outside the Palestinian territories to promote Palestinian participation in the elections for the National Council (Hamas Telegram channel in Judea and Samaria, September 3, 2026).
- A Hamas delegation met in Beirut with representatives affiliated with Muhammad Dahlan’s party. They called for an end to the fighting and implementation of the understandings and demanded democratic elections to the Palestinian National Council without appointments or exclusion. They said they supported the continuation of UNRWA activity and agreed to work to establish a unified Palestinian leadership in Lebanon (Hamas website, September 5, 2026).

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^[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications.
^[2] The terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip actively working to destroy the State of Israel.
^[3] Wissam Afifa is a Hamas media figure. He was formerly the director of Hamas' al-Aqsa media network and before editor-in-chief of the movement's magazine al-Risalah.
^[4] Iyad al-Qara was formerly editor-in-chief of Hamas' daily newspaper Filastin.
^[5] Terrorist attacks on Israeli civilians and soldiers.
^[6] Palestinian terrorist organizations.

Spotlight on Terrorism: Hezbollah and Lebanon (August 31-September 7, 2026)

Published: 08/09/2026

Aoun (right) with the American ambassador to Lebanon (X account of the Lebanese presidency, September 4, 2026)

Red Cross convoy with the released Lebanese (Nidaa al-Watan, September 4, 2026)

The caption reads, "Was achieving unity and peace too great a dream?" Berri called the Lebanese army, civilian peace and national unity "red lines" (al-Liwaa, September 1, 2026)

The Ali al-Taher Ridge as a focal point of the regional struggle: the intersecting interests of Lebanon, Israel, Iran, the United States and Hezbollah (al-Joumhouria, September 4, 2026)

The Wa Ta'awanu Association distributes aid in Zawtar al-Gharbiyeh (al-Manar, September 4, 2026)

Haykal with the king of Jordan (Lebanese army X account, September 1, 2026)

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Efforts were made to continue direct negotiations between Lebanon and Israel.
The rift between Hezbollah and senior officials in the Lebanese government and army is growing.
Hezbollah was dealt a severe blow as the IDF takes control of the Ali al-Taher Ridge.
Hezbollah relies on a younger command echelon following the elimination of its veteran leadership.

Overview^[1]

Israel released five Lebanese prisoners to promote direct bilateral negotiations despite the continuing dispute over the framework agreement and the pilot zones.
Direct negotiations with Israel and the Lebanese government’s plan for a state monopoly on weapons have caused a rift between the Hezbollah leadership and the president’s office and army command. Parliament speaker and Amal leader Nabih Berri has criticized Hezbollah for not including him in its decisions.
The IDF gained operational control of the Ali al-Taher Ridge. Hezbollah’s opponents criticized the organization for not transferring the facilities and assets on the ridge to the Lebanese army, but instead abandoned them to Israel.
The IDF attacked Hezbollah infrastructure, including weapons depots, after explosive UAVs were launched at IDF forces; there were no Israeli casualties. In Lebanon, more than 20 people were reported killed in the attacks, including Hezbollah terrorist operatives.
Hezbollah now relies on young operatives who were trained for command positions because of the elimination of veteran commanders. Hezbollah has reportedly begun transferring some of its weapons to dozens of small sites, including private properties, to reduce their exposure to attacks and searches.
Senior Hezbollah figures said they were proud of the alliance with Iran and confident the Lebanese issue was Tehran’s top priority in its negotiations with the United States.
The EU is considering establishing a new civilian-military mission in Lebanon after UNIFIL’s mandate ends, while France and Italy are promoting a framework for an international presence under UN auspices.
Fatah and other PLO organizations continued handing over weapons to the Lebanese army, while Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad currently remain outside the process.

Direct Negotiations and the Israel-Lebanon Framework Agreement

Direct Negotiations

Israel returned the first five detainees to Lebanon. According to the announcement, the five, who were transferred with the assistance of the Red Cross, are civilians who were not involved in terrorist activity. The United States called the move an initial gesture of mutual goodwill which could serve as a basis for including other civilian issues in the discussions. The five were reportedly released as Lebanese assisted in the search for the remains of Lebanese Jews who disappeared during the Civil War, after Israel provided Lebanon with information regarding possible burial locations (Nidaa al-Watan, September 4, 2026; al-Akhbar and al-Sharq al-Awsat, September 5, 2026). Lebanese deputy prime minister Tarek Mitri said the release reflected American pressure on Israel for flexibility in the negotiations, adding that chances for another round of talks in mid-September or shortly thereafter had increased (Lebanese News Agency, September 6, 2026).

**Red Cross convoy with the released Lebanese (Nidaa al-Watan, September 4, 2026)**

The eighth round of direct negotiations between Lebanon and Israel is reportedly set for Rome on September 15 and 16, 2026. The decision was made after Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu met with the American ambassadors to Lebanon and Israel, who are involved in the mediation. However, the Lebanese presidency confirmed that preparations were underway for the next round but did not provide an official date (al-Joumhouria, September 2, 2026; Lebanese presidency X account, September 4, 2026).
Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam discussed preparations for the next round with the American ambassador to Lebanon, Michel Issa. Aoun said the release of the detainees was the first step in implementing the memorandum of understanding with Israel, while Salam reiterated that Lebanon wanted a full Israeli withdrawal and the extension of state authority throughout the country (X accounts of the Lebanese presidency and Lebanese prime minister’s office, September 4, 2026).

Aoun (right) with the American ambassador to Lebanon
(X account of the Lebanese presidency, September 4, 2026)

Nabih Berri, speaker of the Lebanese Parliament and head of the Amal movement, reiterated his opposition to the framework agreement and the current format of the negotiations with Israel, particularly the pilot zones, stating that so far the talks had not ended the fighting. According to Lebanese sources, Berri believes that continued negotiations should be contingent on guarantees and Israeli measures on the ground. His position was criticized in Washington, where it was argued that the Lebanese government was the legitimate party to conduct the negotiations and expanding the authority of the state and the army and disarming Hezbollah were conditions for progress toward an arrangement. Despite the differences between him and President Aoun, who continues to support the negotiations, Berri said he was not planning to end relations with him (Lebanese News Agency, August 31, 2026; al-Nahar, September 1, 2026; al-Nashra and Nidaa al-Watan, September 3, 2026).

**The caption reads, “Was achieving unity and peace too great a dream?” Berri called the Lebanese army, civilian peace and national unity “red lines” (al-Liwaa, September 1, 2026)**

According to Western diplomatic sources, the United States may increase pressure on Hezbollah because of its weapons, citing the difficulties in implementing the framework agreement. According to the sources, Washington views disarming Hezbollah as a key condition for full implementation of the agreement and a full Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon. The sources noted the remarks of the American ambassador to Lebanon, Michel Issa, who said that as long as Hezbollah did not disarm it would be difficult for Washington to demand that Israel meet the requirements of the agreement (al-Joumhouria, September 3, 2026).

The Pilot Zones

Reportedly, establishing a monitoring system in areas to be transferred to Lebanese army control is under consideration. The system would combine technological means and intelligence, and operate through the Military Coordination Group for Lebanon (MCG4L). Information about the presence of armed Hezbollah terrorist operatives or military infrastructure would be conveyed through the coordination and verification mechanism rather than as a direct Israeli instruction to the Lebanese army; the army would verify the information and decide how to act. Meanwhile, no agreement has been reached on the identity of the international party which would participate in verification. Italy is reluctant to assume responsibility for leading it, the United States and Israel reportedly oppose a French or Spanish role, and the possibility of including Azerbaijan faces opposition from Hezbollah. The head of the MCG4L, General Joseph Clearfield, said establishing the verification mechanism could make it possible to expand the pilot zones to areas under Israeli control (Erem News and al-Sharq al-Awsat, September 1, 2026).
The United States reportedly conveyed Israeli reservations about the Lebanese army’s performance in the south to the army command, along with demands to expand searches for weapons beyond the pilot zones. The army command said Israel had not yet fully withdrawn from the areas where the army was supposed to deploy and that some of the Israeli demands “exceeded the existing understandings.” According to a Lebanese source, the army does not intend to take additional steps so long as Israel does not take corresponding withdrawal measures (al-Akhbar, September 4, 2026).

Hezbollah’s Position

Hezbollah opposed continuing direct negotiations with Israel and accused President Aoun of acting contrary to constitutional principles because of his desire to end the state of conflict between the countries:
- The Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament claimed the Lebanese authority’s gamble had failed and the enemy used the framework agreement for all matters related to life in the occupied territories. The faction demanded the Lebanese government end the direct negotiations because they only exacerbated the national crisis. It also criticized President Aoun’s seeking to end the hostility toward Israel and claimed he disregarded the national pact because hostility toward Israel was a constitutional principle rooted in the Taif Agreement and legal sources (Loyalty to the Resistance bloc website, September 3, 2026).
- Hezbollah said that despite its importance, the release of the five Lebanese held by Israel did not justify continuing the negotiations as long as the attacks and the Israeli presence in the south continued (Hezbollah combat information Telegram channel, September 5, 2026).
- Ibrahim al-Moussawi, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, criticized a draft resolution on solidarity with the Lebanese republic submitted by the Lebanese foreign ministry to the Arab League council of foreign ministers for discussion. He objected to three paragraphs which he claimed undermined the national consensus established in the Taif Agreement and the legitimacy of the “resistance”^{^[2]} against Israel, and called on the Arab League states to express reservations about the wording (al-Manar, September 4, 2026).
- Hezbollah said it demanded continued reliance on the November 27, 2024 ceasefire agreement and opposed establishing new security and political arrangements under the framework agreement. Hezbollah said it did not consider itself bound by the results of the direct negotiations if they included measures detrimental to its weapons or status, even if they had Lebanese authority approval. According to claims, their position is coordinated with Parliament Speaker Berri (al-Diyar, September 1, 2026).
President Aoun is determined to continue the negotiations, and sources noted no progress had been made in contacts between the presidential office and Hezbollah, and a return to direct dialogue between the sides is not immediately expected (al-Liwaa, September 3, 2026). According to a report, meetings between Hezbollah and Lebanese army officials have ceased over the issue of a state monopoly on weapons. Figures in Hezbollah’s “security” forces no longer visit army headquarters and the security clearances of party officials have been revoked. However, contacts for local coordination continue at the field level between military intelligence officers and organization operatives, mainly in south Lebanon and the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in Beirut (al-Nahar, September 1, 2026).
Tensions were reported with the Amal movement, Hezbollah’s Shi’ite ally. According to a source, the movement’s chairman, Nabih Berri, is dissatisfied with Hezbollah’s conduct and the situation in the south, amid claims that the organization does not include him in all its military and regional decisions and his ability to influence them has diminished. The source noted tension between Amal and Hezbollah supporters in some villages in the south because of the destruction and the effects of the fighting, but claimed it did not mean a rift between Berri and Hezbollah or that Amal planned to dissolve its alliance with the organization (Erem News, September 4, 2026).
On the other hand, a Hezbollah delegation headed by political council deputy chairman Mahmoud Qamati met with Free Patriotic Movement chairman Gebran Bassil for the first time in almost a year, one in a series of meetings the organization is holding with political parties and figures. They discussed the state monopoly on weapons, negotiations with Israel and the situation in the south. The mutual assessment was that the resumption of dialogue was positive but did not constitute a renewal of the alliance, and the dispute over Hezbollah’s weapons and “security” strategy remained unchanged (al-Diyar, September 5, 2026).
Reportedly, the possibility of direct dialogue between Hezbollah and the United States is stalled and the organization regards Nabih Berri as the channel for contacts concerning the south, while watching developments in the negotiations between Iran and the United States (al-Diyar, September 5, 2026).

Opposition to Hezbollah

Fouad Makhzoumi, a member of the Lebanese Parliament and an opponent of Hezbollah, said he supported President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam and the framework agreement, which he called as way to end the war, restore sovereignty and begin reconstruction. He said weapons and declarations of war and peace should be solely in the hands of the state, along with a full Israeli withdrawal (Lebanese prime minister’s office X account, September 4, 2026).
The Kataeb Party and the Lebanese Democrat coalition said they supported continuing the negotiations and the framework agreement and called for transferring responsibility for weapons and declarations of war and peace to the state. They said it was necessary to restore sovereignty, achieve an Israeli withdrawal, enable the displaced residents to return and rebuild the country (al-Diyar, September 1, 2026; Nidaa al-Watan, September 5, 2026).
Lebanese Forces Party chairman Samir Geagea said the framework agreement was the only available opportunity to end the current fighting and the cycle of wars on the southern border. He said a key condition for the success of the agreement was dismantling the “military and security” groups which operated outside the state, especially Hezbollah, and called on the organization to surrender its weapons and on the state to take practical measures if it did not (Lebanese News Agency, September 6, 2026).

The Security Situation in South Lebanon

The IDF Takes Control of the Ali al-Taher Ridge^[3]

The IDF announced it had completed clearing two Hezbollah tunnels on the Ali al-Taher Ridge in the security zone in south Lebanon and stated the forces had operational control of the area above and below ground. According to the announcement, Hezbollah operatives were eliminated while others fled; rooms for planning military operations, for storing weapons, and infrastructure for extended stays were found. The IDF said the compound had been built over two decades, planned and funded by Iran (IDF spokesperson, September 3, 2026).
Lebanese Deputy Prime Minister Tarek Mitri said the Lebanese president’s proposal, which received the support of Parliament Speaker Berri, to transfer the facilities on the ridge and control of the site to the Lebanese army, was intended to prevent a large-scale Israeli operation, but efforts to reach understandings encountered difficulties (Lebanese News Agency, September 6, 2026).
A source familiar with the negotiations between Lebanon and Israel said Hezbollah could not have evacuated the Ali al-Taher Ridge without consulting the Iranian leadership, given Tehran’s threat to act on Hezbollah’s behalf if Israel attacked the site, and therefore Iran had given the organization the green light to leave. The source said Hezbollah had surprised the Lebanese leadership because the organization had forfeited an opportunity to transfer the ridge to the Lebanese army and thereby give the Lebanese delegation an advantage ahead of the next round of negotiations with Israel, but added that Hezbollah had wanted to redeploy and ensure its continued hold on weapons north of the Litani River (al-Sharq al-Awsat, September 6, 2026).
Fouad Makhzoumi, a member of the Lebanese Parliament and an opponent of Hezbollah, said that if the reports about the fall of the ridge were correct, Hezbollah had prevented the Lebanese army’s deployment at the site but had failed to prevent Israel from entering it (Fouad Makhzoumi’s X account, September 5, 2026). Lebanese Forces Party chairman Samir Geagea also criticized the fact that the area had not been handed over to the Lebanese army before the IDF entered it (Lebanese News Agency, September 6, 2026).
Before the Israeli announcement, Iran reportedly warned the United States through Oman that it would respond to a large-scale Israeli move to take control of the Ali al-Taher Ridge. A White House official denied the report, while Hezbollah stated that a such large-scale Israeli operation would be considered a return to all-out war (al-Madan, September 3, 2026).

**The Ali al-Taher Ridge as a focal point of the regional struggle: the intersecting interests of Lebanon, Israel, Iran, the United States and Hezbollah (al-Joumhouria, September 4, 2026)**

The IDF

IDF forces continued operations in the security zone in south Lebanon targeting Hezbollah infrastructure, locating and destroying anti-tank missiles, RPGs, launchers, explosive devices and other weapons, as well as organization assets concealed within civilian facilities. In response to three incidents in which explosive UAVs were launched at IDF forces, causing no casualties, the IDF attacked Hezbollah facilities, terrorist operatives and weapons depots in the al-Nabatieh area and other areas in south Lebanon, including a Hezbollah headquarters operating in a building formerly used as a hospital (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, August 31-September 7, 2026).^{^[4]} IDF forces simultaneously blew up 15 tunnels between the Beaufort (al-Shaqif) area and the Ali al-Taher Ridge (MTV Lebanon, September 6, 2026).

Blowing up tunnels (MTV Lebanon, September 6, 2026)

The Lebanese ministry of health and civil defense reported at least 23 people killed, including children, and more than 50 wounded in Israeli attacks in south Lebanon during the week, including ten people killed in attacks in Kafr Rumman. The ministry condemned the attack on the building used by al-Ghandour Hospital in al-Nabatieh al-Fawqa, calling it a violation of international humanitarian agreements. According to the announcement, the hospital had been forced to cease operations approximately two months earlier because of Israeli attacks in the al-Nabatieh area (al-Nashra and al-Mayadeen, September 4-7, 2026). According to Hezbollah-affiliated channels, some of those killed were organization operatives (Hezbollah in the Field Telegram channel, September 4 to 7, 2026). A large number of residents fled from Deir al-Zahrani the IDF’s Arabic-language spokesperson issued a warning before an attack on a local building (al-Nahar, September 7, 2026).
According to the Hezbollah-affiliated daily al-Akhbar, between the signing of the framework agreement on June 26 and August 31, 2026, at least 655 incidents of Israeli military activity were documented in south Lebanon, including 190 airstrikes and 225 operations involving the demolition and destruction of houses and buildings, as well as artillery fire, tank fire and other operations. Most of the activity during was in al-Nabatieh al-Fawqa and al-Mansouri (al-Akhbar, September 1, 2026).

Challenges Facing Hezbollah

Preserving and Reconstructing Military Capabilities

Following the damage to Hezbollah’s veteran commanders, the organization is filling military and security command positions with operatives from a younger generation. Hezbollah-affiliated commentator Qassem Qassir said commanders in their 30s and 40s, who were trained in advance for command positions, currently managed some of the military and “security” activity. The secretary general of Iran’s national security council, Mohsen Rezaei, also claimed two new generations of commanders had emerged and Hezbollah had preserved its command capability (al-Sharq al-Awsat, August 31, 2026).
According to a Lebanese source, Hezbollah has begun transferring some of its weapons, ammunition and military equipment from known depots and military sites to dozens of smaller sites, including private properties, farms and commercial warehouses owned or managed by parties close to the organization. It is not a complete evacuation of the main depots, but rather the dispersal of some of the weapon stockpiles, mainly light weapons, ammunition, portable missiles and military equipment, to reduce their exposure to attacks and searches, including in the pilot zones (Erem News, September 4, 2026).

Hezbollah and Iran

Hussein al-Hajj Hassan, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, said the organization had decided to join the fighting in 2026 after 15 months during which the state had failed to implement the November 2024 ceasefire agreement. He said Hezbollah had consequently become part of an Iranian-led regional “equation.” He said the organization was proud of its alliance with Tehran and its reliance on Iran’s power, and did not intend to relinquish its sources of strength (al-Joumhouria, September 5, 2026).
Hassan Ezzeddine, also a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, admitted the organization was having difficulty restoring the deterrent capability it had before October 2023, although he claimed it still halted the expansion of Israeli activity. He represented Iran as the main actor capable of changing the situation in Lebanon and claimed the Lebanese issue was Tehran’s top priority in its contacts with the United States (al-Joumhouria, September 1–2, 2026).
An American intelligence source said Washington suspected elements in Lebanese general security had granted Hezbollah concessions at Beirut airport and the port and helped Iranian operatives obtain Lebanese documents. According to the source, Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps personnel moved into and out of Lebanon and in some cases the identities of Lebanese citizens are being investigated, including people who are no longer alive, whose names were used to issue documents to Iranian operatives. Cases in which Iranians passed through the airport and land crossings using Lebanese documents are also under investigation (al-Hadath, September 2, 2026).

Finances

With the pressure on Hezbollah’s financial apparatus, in recent months the organization has reportedly increased its purchases of gold bullion and transferred it to storage as a financial reserve outside the banking system (Erem News, September 2, 2026).
The al-Qard al-Hassan Association, Hezbollah’s financial arm, is reportedly reopening branches damaged in Israeli attacks, and in some cases operating without identifying signage. In Tyre, the opening of a planned branch was canceled following opposition from residents and business owners (Nidaa al-Watan, September 1, 2026; al-Diyar, September 5, 2026).
According to Lebanese sources, concern over the expansion of American sanctions on networks assisting Hezbollah is growing among politicians, businesspeople and bodies identified with the pro-Hezbollah camp. Some of them have begun reassessing their financial and business ties and reducing their public identification with the organization’s positions out of concern they could be included in sanctions (Nidaa al-Watan, September 4, 2026).

Reconstruction

Hezbollah and its affiliated bodies continue operating aid networks in villages in the south. According to a Lebanese security source, the organization expanded the distribution of financial aid, food and medicine as well as its involvement in recording war damage and assisting families (Erem News, August 31, 2026). At the same time, the Wa Ta’awanu Association distributed household equipment in Zawtar al-Gharbiyeh, which is part of the pilot zones, including refrigerators, washing machines and water tanks, with the aim of helping residents remain in their villages and encouraging other residents to return (al-Manar, September 4, 2026).^{^[5]}

The Wa Ta’awanu Association distributes aid in Zawtar al-Gharbiyeh
(al-Manar, September 4, 2026)

However, criticism of Hezbollah and the bodies providing aid to the population was reported among some residents of towns in the south. According to a local source, residents complained about the limited presence of senior organization officials and the lack of direct follow-up regarding their needs, while there were claims of favoritism and personal connections in the distribution of some aid funds (Lebanon24, September 2, 2026).
A Lebanese political source said Hezbollah and the Amal movement were trying to preserve the role of institutions in which they had influence in managing compensation, reconstruction and social-service funds, especially the council of the south, because of the new government mechanisms to manage some reconstruction funds under centralized supervision. As part of the 2026 budget discussions, the transfer of approximately $90 million from the reserve to the council of the south was approved, while the World Bank began financing $250 million under a separate government reconstruction program based on oversight and transparency mechanisms (Erem News, September 3, 2026).

Hezbollah and Syria

It was recently reported that several meetings had been held by Hezbollah representatives and representatives of the new Syrian government, with Turkish mediation. They agreed to establish a technical committee to coordinate movements on both sides of the border and discussed issues concerning the dead, prisoners, wounded and missing persons. The committee operated for more than three months, but meetings have since ceased, although according to the report the Syrian government continued to convey positive messages regarding turning over a new leaf in relations with Hezbollah (al-Diyar, September 2, 2026).
Lebanese security forces arrested five Lebanese and Syrians on suspicion of membership in a network of loyalists of the former Assad regime which transferred operatives from Syria to Lebanon and train them. According to legal and security sources, 50 operatives were transferred in small groups through north Lebanon, and some underwent training in operating explosive devices and UAVs in the Beqa’a Valley area. The investigation is examining whether operatives linked to Hezbollah gave network members training and protection and if an association based in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia gave some of them financial assistance. Hezbollah denied any connection to the network or its training activities (al-Madan, al-Nahar, Lebanon Debate and Hezbollah’s combat information channel, September 2, 2026; Nidaa al-Watan, September 3, 2026; Lebanon Debate, September 4, 2026).

The Lebanese Army

Preparations continue for the meeting in Paris before the international conference in support of the Lebanese army and internal security forces scheduled for September 17, 2026. President Aoun and Interior Minister Ahmad al-Hajjar discussed preparations for the meeting and mobilizing the support required to strengthen the capabilities of the security forces and extend state authority throughout Lebanese territory. Army commander Rodolphe Haykal visited Jordan, where King Abdullah II said he supported strengthening the army’s capabilities (Lebanese army X account, September 1, 2026; Lebanese presidency X account, September 2, 2026).

Haykal with the king of Jordan (Lebanese army X account, September 1, 2026)

UNIFIL

Lebanese President Joseph Aoun said his country wanted a continued UNIFIL presence in the south, but if extending the mandate was impossible, Lebanon would welcome the participation of countries which would support the army and the population of the south. He said contacts were underway to devise a legal framework which would make such an international presence possible after UNIFIL’s activity ended in December 2026 (Lebanese presidency’s X account, September 3, 2026).
The EU is considering establishing a new civilian-military mission in Lebanon after the end of UNIFIL, which would focus on advising, training and strengthening the capabilities of the Lebanese forces. EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said that more than ten member states were willing to allocate personnel and resources to the mission. According to Lebanese sources, it would not be a force which would undertake combat missions or military supervision, but rather would provide logistical assistance, training, equipment and mine clearance. Ireland has already announced its willingness to participate (al-Arabiya, September 1, 2026; al-Liwaa, September 3, 2026).
France and Italy are working to formulate a separate framework which would make an international presence in Lebanon under UN auspices possible after the end of UNIFIL’s mandate. A French diplomatic source said consultations were taking place with members of the Security Council, while UN Secretary General António Guterres proposed several alternatives for a continued international presence. No agreement has been reached on the nature, authority or composition of the mechanism (al-Arabiya, September 1, 2026).

The Civilian Situation in South Lebanon

The Lebanese ministry of health reported that from the beginning of the fighting on March 2, 2026 through September 6, 2026, 4,362 people had been killed and 12,378 wounded. Since October 8, 2023, when Hezbollah began its “support campaign” for the Gaza Strip, the cumulative number of people killed was 8,929 and the number of wounded was 30,614 (al-Nashra, September 6, 2026).
The Lebanese government continues measures to assist the displaced and enable residents of the south to return. Prime Minister Nawaf Salam met with representatives of several border villages and discussed residents’ needs and the conditions required for their return. President Joseph Aoun called on the council of the south to accelerate reconstruction and infrastructure projects and to act transparently in areas where security conditions permitted (Lebanese prime minister’s office X account, August 31-September 1; Lebanese presidency X account, September 3, 2026).
During a visit to al-Nabatieh, social affairs Minister Hanin al-Sayyed announced the third phase of the social safety net program, under which $14.3 million in assistance will be provided to approximately 128,600 families comprising approximately 426,000 people (al-Diyar, September 2, 2026).
The new school year begins on September 15, 2026, but 21,000 displaced residents reportedly remain in reception centers operating in schools, most of them residents of villages inside the Yellow Line. The Lebanese ministry of education devised a program in which schools used as reception centers would, if necessary, shift to remote learning or transfer their students to alternative buildings, while some of the reception centers would continue to operate (al-Diyar, September 1, 2026).
Mines and unexploded ordnance pose a risk to residents and delay the return to villages and reconstruction work in south Lebanon. According to the Lebanon mine action center, since October 2023, 14 people have been killed and 43 wounded by unexploded ordnance and mines in areas where survey and clearance operations have not yet been completed. Approximately half of the casualties were farmers and shepherds, and most of the incidents were recorded in the Bint Jbeil and Marjayoun districts, followed by Tyre and Hasbaya (al-Akhbar, September 5, 2026).
Hezbollah has begun to resume social activity. The “Proud Dahiyeh” festival opened in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia in Beirut, the first held since the war, with the participation of more than 200 exhibitors from Beirut, the south, the Beqa’a Valley and other areas in Lebanon (al-Madan and the Hezbollah parliamentary faction website, September 3, 2026).
the mechanism (al-Arabiya, September 1, 2026).

The Palestinians in Lebanon

Fatah and other PLO organizations transferred quantities of weapons and ammunition to the Lebanese army, including medium weapons. Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad have not yet joined the process. According to a Palestinian source, a decision regarding the weapons of the two organizations is also linked to Hezbollah’s position and the discussion regarding the future of its weapons (Lebanon24, September 3, 2026).
Representatives of Hezbollah and the so-called alliance of Palestinian forces, headed by Hamas’ political representative in the Tyre area, discussed the situation in the Palestinian refugee camps and developments in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories and noted the continuation of coordination between the Palestinian and Lebanese “resistance”^{^[6]} (Nidaa al-Watan, September 5, 2026).

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^[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the Amit Institute's daily updates as well as its other publications.
^[2] Hezbollah, Hamas and the other terrorist organizations operating to destroy the State of Israel.
^[3] See the August 2026 Amit Institute report, Dismantling the Hezbollah Infrastructure at the Ali Taher Ridge to Advance the Ceasefire Agreement.
^[4] Hezbollah does not issue claims of responsibility for launching explosive UAVs.
^[5] See the August 2026 Amit Institute report, Hezbollah in the Pilot Zones Disguised as Civilian Organizations.
^[6] Hezbollah, Hamas and the other terrorist organizations working to destroy the State of Israel.

Akhtari at the conference on “Palestine” in Tehran (Shafaqna, August 29, 2026)

Mohsen Rezaei (Al-Manar, August 27, 2026)

The Iranian Foreign Minister's meeting with Ali al-Khatib (Tasnim, August 29, 2026)

Amal Movement representative in Tehran (ISNA, August 31, 2026)

Iraqi Foreign Minister meets with Iranian ambassador to Baghdad (IRNA, August 30, 2026)

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Key Trends

Iran once again emphasized the linkage between ending the war in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip and a possible agreement with the United States.
Contacts between Iran and Iraq continue amid the crisis with the United States and the approaching expiration of the Iraqi ultimatum for the Shiite militias to disarm.
Security coordination between the Houthis and al-Qaeda’s branch in Somalia is intensifying.

Highlights^[1]

At a conference in Tehran, the secretary general of the Supreme Council of the World Assembly of Islamic Awakening expressed Iran’s support for resolving the Palestinian issue and eliminating “criminal Israel” through elections involving “all Palestinian residents.”
In an interview with Al-Manar, Supreme National Security Council Secretary Mohsen Rezaei emphasized Iran’s support for Lebanon and Hezbollah and its commitment to linking an end to the war in Lebanon with a future agreement with the United States.
The Iranian Foreign Minister met in Tehran with the vice president of the Supreme Shiite Islamic Council in Lebanon.
The Iraqi Foreign Minister met in Baghdad with the Iranian Ambassador to Iraq. The Ambassador conveyed a message from the Iranian Foreign Minister.
A pro-Iranian militia in Iraq presented conditions for relinquishing its weapons, including the complete withdrawal of the “American occupation” and of Kurdish and Turkish forces, as well as Iranian opposition organizations.
The Houthis and al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda’s branch in Somalia, have reportedly intensified their military cooperation in preparation for a possible Israeli presence in Somaliland.

Iranian Involvement in the Palestinian Arena

The Supreme Council of the World Assembly of Islamic Awakening convened in Tehran under the title “The Solution to the Palestinian Issue in the Thought of the Martyr Leader [Ali Khamenei].” The Assembly’s Secretary General, Mohammad Hassan Akhtari, said that the Palestinian issue is one of the central issues of the Islamic world and that the “poisonous tree of Israel” had been planted in the soil of “Palestine” as a result of an “imperialist crime by British policymakers,” which brought disgrace upon the Muslim people in that land. He noted that over the years, many meetings had been held between the Palestinians and Israel under US leadership, but none had produced results. He added that one of the United States’ plans had been to divide “Palestine” into two states, but that plan had also failed to materialize, and those who supported the two-state solution had so far failed to implement it. Akhtari stressed that Iran had presented a plan to resolve the Palestinian issue based on Khamenei’s thought and founded on “democratic principles.” According to him, Iran’s Supreme Leader proposed holding elections in “Palestine” with the participation of all its Palestinian residents, including Muslims, Christians, and Jews, so that they could choose their system of government and determine their future. According to Akhtari, the plan is the best solution for liberating “Palestine” and ending “the aggression and crimes of the Zionist regime,” and if implemented, “criminal Israel” would be eliminated, and the region would enjoy peace and calm (Shafaqna, August 29, 2026).

Akhtari at the conference on “Palestine” in Tehran (Shafaqna, August 29, 2026)

Iranian Involvement in Lebanon

Supreme National Security Council Secretary Mohsen Rezaei said in an interview with Hezbollah’s Al-Manar that Tehran views Lebanon’s security as part of the security of the entire West Asia region. He stressed that Iran would continue to support Lebanon with all its capabilities and resources. Rezaei praised the unity of the Lebanese people in confronting Israel and thanked Hezbollah Secretary General Sheikh Naim Qassem for leading the “resistance” under the current circumstances, as well as Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri for his role in the country’s political arena. He added that one of Tehran’s conditions for any understanding with the United States is an end to the war in the various arenas in West Asia, particularly in Lebanon. According to him, other conditions Iran has set for understandings with the United States include Israel’s withdrawal from the occupied territories in Lebanon, an end to the war in the Gaza Strip, and an end to Israeli attacks in Syria. Referring to military developments in Lebanon, Rezaei pointed to the damage Hezbollah had inflicted on Israel in recent months and stressed that Israel is no longer capable of advancing toward Beirut’s Dahiyeh or Beirut itself. He noted that Beirut’s Dahiyeh and Beirut itself are a red line for Iran and that Tehran is monitoring developments with the utmost seriousness. He stressed that Lebanese territory cannot be occupied or seized and that Israel would be forced to withdraw from the areas of Lebanese territory it had entered. Rezaei further claimed that Iran does not interfere in the details of Hezbollah’s military structure or in its operational decisions on the ground. According to him, Hezbollah currently has a skilled military cadre and new generations of young commanders capable of managing its affairs and making the necessary decisions. Rezaei also addressed developments in Syria and assessed that Syria is unlikely to join the campaign in Lebanon because its government is dealing with numerous problems (Al-Manar, August 27, 2026).

Mohsen Rezaei (Al-Manar, August 27, 2026)

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi met with the Vice President of the Supreme Shiite Islamic Council in Lebanon, Sheikh Ali al-Khatib, who briefed him on the situation in Lebanon and the south of the country. Araghchi stressed to the senior Shiite cleric that Iran stands by the Shiites in Lebanon (Tasnim, August 29, 2026).

The Iranian Foreign Minister’s meeting with Ali al-Khatib (Tasnim, August 29, 2026)

Amal Movement representative in Tehran Salah Fahs said in an extensive interview that relations between Amal and Iran are very good and that the movement has great confidence in the Islamic Republic and cooperates with it. He criticized the measures being taken by the Lebanese government toward Iran despite Iran’s support for Lebanon. Referring to the Lebanese government’s handling of the issue of the designated Iranian ambassador to Beirut, Fahs said that Amal opposes some of the measures taken toward him and that the issue had not been handled rationally from the outset (ISNA, August 31, 2026).

Amal Movement representative in Tehran (ISNA, August 31, 2026)

Iranian Involvement in Iraq

Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein met with Iranian Ambassador to Baghdad Mohammad Kazem Al-e Sadeq. The Ambassador conveyed to Hussein a message from Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and discussed with him the latest developments between Iran and the United States. The two stressed the importance of continuing diplomatic efforts to achieve peaceful solutions that would help reduce tensions and strengthen stability in the region (Iraqi News Agency, August 30, 2026).

Iraqi Foreign Minister meets with Iranian ambassador to Baghdad (IRNA, August 30, 2026)

Iraqi Minister of Communications Mustafa Jabbar Sanad arrived in Tehran and met with his Iranian counterpart, Seyyed Sattar Hashemi. Sanad attended an international technology and communications exhibition in Tehran and discussed with Hashemi the expansion of cooperation between the two countries in communications and technology (ISNA, August 31, 2026).

Pro-Iranian Militias in Iraq

Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada issued an official statement presenting its position on the issue of weapons held by the pro-Iranian militias. The militia stressed that the need for the “resistance” to possess weapons is not an unjustified luxury but rather stems from circumstances and requirements imposed by genuine challenges. Accordingly, the militia listed conditions for relinquishing its weapons: the complete withdrawal of the “American occupation” from Iraq, including the use of Iraqi airspace to attack another country; approval of the “Popular Mobilization Forces laws,” which would guarantee the rights of PMF members and regulate their activities; the extension of the Iraqi security forces’ full sovereignty over the entire territory and airspace of the country; the removal from Iraqi territory of Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) fighters, Turkish forces, and Iranian opposition organizations; and Iraqi economic and political independence and liberation from the “American hegemony” imposed on the country in those spheres (Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada Telegram channel, August 29, 2026).
“Several informed sources” reported that the United States had rejected a proposal by five pro-Iranian militias to freeze their military activity for two years instead of relinquishing their weapons and disbanding. According to the report, three of the five militias are Kata’ib Hezbollah, Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, and Harakat al-Nujaba, which adhere to a hardline stance toward the United States and are considered the closest to the Iranian regime (Rudaw, August 27, 2026).

The Houthis in Yemen

It was reported that relations between the Houthis and al-Shabaab in Somalia, al-Qaeda’s branch in the Horn of Africa, have significantly intensified in recent years and that they are now engaged in broad cooperation that includes arms trafficking, joint training, and preparations for action against a potential Israeli presence in Somaliland. The report claimed that the Houthis fear that Israel could establish an operational platform in Somaliland that would enable it to monitor their activities and carry out attacks at short notice, given Somaliland’s proximity to Yemen. It was further reported that the Houthis had sent a four-member delegation to southern Somalia, where its members met with senior al-Shabaab officials to coordinate the activities of the two organizations to disrupt Israeli activity in the region in exchange for the transfer of advanced weapons from the Houthis and training for al-Shabaab operatives. According to a “US intelligence official,” at least one hundred al-Shabaab operatives had been sent to Yemen for training in the operation of advanced weapons, while another group of operatives sent to Yemen had been trained in operating drones. At the same time, Houthi instructors are reportedly being sent to Somalia to train al-Shabaab fighters in the country (Wall Street Journal, August 31, 2026).
The National Resistance organization, which is subordinate to the internationally recognized Yemeni government, announced that on August 24, 2026, its forces had intercepted and seized a vessel in the Red Sea that was carrying weapons and traveling from Iran to the Houthi-controlled area. According to the announcement, the vessel was carrying electronic components for assembling drones, including control systems, imaging technologies, and communications systems intended for drones (X account of the Yemeni Armed Forces Media Center and the December 2 website, August 30, 2026).
Houthi Deputy Foreign Minister Abdulwahid Abu Ras claimed that Israel continues its “aggression” while “violating” international agreements, with American support and amid the silence of the international community, which he claimed constitutes “complicity in the crimes of the Zionist enemy.” Abu Ras stressed the need to move from condemnations to practical measures that would stop the “enemy’s crimes” and called on the countries of the region to form an alliance to stop and eradicate the “Zionist enemy” (Houthi Foreign Ministry Telegram channel, August 28, 2026).
The Houthi Foreign Ministry warned Israel against “continuing to desecrate Al-Aqsa Mosque,” following Minister Ben-Gvir’s “storming” of the Temple Mount on August 31, 2026. According to the ministry, the “complete silence” of the Islamic countries encourages the continuation of such actions. However, the ministry claimed that the “enemy entity” would not succeed in achieving its “malicious objectives” and that an attack on Islamic holy sites is a red line that, if crossed, would have “severe, unforeseen consequences” (Houthi Foreign Ministry Telegram channel, September 1, 2026).

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^[1] The weekly study includes the activities of Iran, the Shiite militias in Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen.

Spotlight on Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (August 25 – September 1, 2026)

Published: 02/09/2026

The building attacked in the northern Gaza Strip (IDF spokesperson, August 26, 2026)

The caption reads, "After handing over the weapons;" the Arabic on the podium reads, "Netanyahu’s excuses," while he says, "We will withdraw from Gaza only after the kites are handed over" (Facebook page of Alaa al-Laqta, Hamas in-house cartoonist, August 28, 2026)

Shahin meets with the secretary general of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (Organization of Islamic Cooperation X account, August 27, 2026)

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Overview [1]

IDF forces eliminated 20 Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad commanders and terrorists, including operatives involved in the atrocities of the October 7, 2023 terrorist invasion and massacre, and attacked Hamas infrastructure near civilian facilities. The head of Hamas general intelligence was reportedly detained in an operation by Israeli forces and militias in Gaza City, despite Hamas claims that the operation had not been successful.
Following Israeli threats, the Board of Peace warned Hamas not to fly kites into Gaza border communities.
Board of Peace representative Nikolay Mladenov said preparations for the deployment of the international stabilization force in the Gaza Strip had been completed and Turkey would not participate in it.
Hamas forces continued their activity against the Israeli-supported militias.
“External” Hamas figures will not be candidates in the elections for the movement leadership in the Gaza Strip.
A terrorist operative who belonged to Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad was eliminated in an airstrike in Jenin.
A Palestinian Authority delegation discussed Israel’s [allegedly] “illegal measures” with the foreign ministers of Egypt and Jordan.
The Palestinian Islamic Jihad deputy secretary general said the organization would not propose candidates for the elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council but would support an agreed-on “national” list.

The Fighting in the Gaza Strip

The IDF

IDF forces continued destroying terrorist infrastructure and eliminating terrorists throughout the Gaza Strip. Twenty Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) commanders and terrorist operatives were eliminated, including operatives involved in the atrocities of the October 7, 2023 terrorist invasion and massacre and who held hostages in tunnels, and terrorist operatives who assisted in rebuilding the organizations’ military wings. A building in the northern Gaza Strip which Hamas used as an ambush point and weapons depot and which was located near a hospital and a school was destroyed (IDF spokesperson, August 25-September 1, 2026). Palestinian sources said that IDF activity included airstrikes, tank and artillery fire, UAVs, signal flares and demolitions, and that several Palestinians had been killed (al-Jazeera Ajel Telegram channel, August 25-29, 2026).

The building attacked in the northern Gaza Strip (IDF spokesperson, August 26, 2026)

On September 1, 2026, Hamas claimed an Israeli special force had attempted to abduct or assassinate a senior operative in the internal security apparatus in western Gaza City, but Hamas security forces foiled the attempt and exchanged fire with the force. Following the clash, Israeli aircraft attacked the area to enable the force to withdraw, and at least three people were reported killed and eight wounded (Quds and Shehab agencies, al-Sayyad Telegram channel, September 1, 2026). The Israeli defense minister said a senior Hamas terrorist had been detained and Israeli security sources said the head of the Hamas general intelligence had been detained in a joint operation conducted by Israeli security forces and militias supported by Israel (Israeli media, September 1, 2026). The IDF confirmed that several targets had been attacked to remove threats and there were no Israeli casualties (IDF spokesperson, September 1, 2026).
The Board of Peace warned Hamas not to fly kites after Israel threatened a forceful response. A senior Board official said all armed activities in the Gaza Strip, including flying kites, had to cease. He added that Israel had to adhere to the ceasefire and military operations could not go beyond responding to real and immediate threats. Reportedly, the Popular Committees, in coordination with Hamas, warned Gaza Strip residents not to allow their children to fly kites following the Israeli threat (Reuters in Arabic, August 25, 2026). Hamas political bureau member Bassem Naim reacted with anger, saying, “What a nerve! To appease Netanyahu, children’s innocent games are called armed activities!”^[2] (Bassem Naim’s Telegram channel, August 25, 2026).

The caption reads, “After handing over the weapons;” the Arabic on the podium reads, “Netanyahu’s excuses,” while he says, “We will withdraw from Gaza only after the kites are handed over” (Facebook page of Alaa al-Laqta, Hamas in-house cartoonist, August 28, 2026)

Hamas Rebuilds Its Military Capabilities

Palestinian sources said the Hamas military wing recently resumed training its naval commando forces. The Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades recruited new operatives and are using the experience of former operatives and surviving field commanders to resume military training for the naval commando forces. The training is limited to small groups, unlike the large-scale training held before the war, and consists of physical fitness exercises without actual military exercises (i24NEWS website, August 27, 2026). The Hamas-affiliated Khallik Wa’i channel claimed the report was baseless, adding that such activity was impossible in light of the IDF’s naval blockade and aerial surveillance along the Gaza coast (Khallik Wa’i Telegram channel, August 28, 2026).
Footage circulated from the Gaza Strip showed a drone arriving from the direction of the Egyptian border, landing in the Gaza Strip and releasing a cargo of drugs, reportedly. Sources in the Gaza Strip said drones were also used to smuggle weapons and other materials from Egypt and from the direction of the Negev, and organized networks linking parties outside the Strip with Gazan residents and families were behind the activity. Reportedly, the shortage of goods and the risks involved in smuggling have increased the prices of the cargoes and turned the activity into a lucrative industry. The report raised concern that Hamas could exploit the routes to rearm and rebuild damaged capabilities (N12, August 30, 2026).

Negotiations for the Second Phase of the Ceasefire Agreement

At the UN Security Council, Board of Peace representative Nikolay Mladenov warned that a resumption of the war in the Gaza Strip could bring the sides to a point of no return. He claimed Hamas and the “armed organizations”^[3] agreed for the first time to hand over all their weapons and transfer civilian and security authority to a transitional administration recognized by the UN. He said disarmament and the Israeli withdrawal would be effected gradually, reciprocally and based on performance rather than a timetable, with full verification. He said progress necessitated the deployment of the international stabilization force, Israel’s fulfillment of its commitments under the Sharm el-Sheikh agreement and Hamas compliance with its commitments. He criticized Israeli attacks not intended to remove immediate threats, claiming they delayed demilitarization and the transition to civilian administration, but added that the continued possession of weapons, tunnel activity and interference with convoys also postponed the process (Board of Peace X account, August 26, 2026; U.S. public radio [NPR] website, August 27, 2026).
Interviewed by Al Jazeera, Mladenov said the international stabilization force’s deployment and areas of operation had been determined and the first forces were expected to arrive in the Gaza Strip “soon.” He said a formal agreement had been reached with Morocco regarding its participation in the force, while Turkey would not participate. He warned that Israeli and/or Palestinian failure to comply with the roadmap could lead to the collapse of the ceasefire and undermine security and humanitarian arrangements, adding that a return to war would be devastating for both sides. He also said that commitments totaling $7 billion had been received for the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip, talks were being held with Israel on increasing humanitarian aid and the Board of Peace hoped the national committee would soon assume responsibility for administering the affairs of the Gaza Strip. (Al Jazeera, August 28, 2026).

The Gaza Strip

The Civilian Situation

Municipalities in the northern Gaza Strip warned of the consequences of the worsening water crisis [allegedly] caused by the Israeli blockade. Mazen al-Najjar, the mayor of Jabalia al-Nazla, said the issue of water had become one of the most serious challenges facing Gazans in the north, claiming that approximately 60% of the municipal generators were out of service, impairing the ability to operate water wells and sewage facilities (Shehab Agency, August 25, 2026). PIJ political bureau member Ali Abu Shahin condemned the Israeli attack on a water desalination facility near Shuhadaa al-Aqsa Hospital in Deir al-Balah (PIJ media information Telegram channel, August 24, 2026).
The Hamas ministry of national economy claimed there was an “imbalance” in the quantities of flour supplied to the Gaza Strip. It stated that monitoring the markets and imports through the border crossings during the recent period had revealed shortages and disruptions of flour supply chains and quantities. The ministry alleged that Israel’s procedures at the crossings did not permit sufficient quantities of flour to enter, causing a shortage, adding that the Gaza Strip’s daily flour requirement was 450 tons (Shehab Agency, August 26, 2026).
Despite a statement issued by the Israeli prime minister and defense minister that no directive had been given to open the Erez Crossing for the passage of goods, the German embassy in Tel Aviv published photographs of preparations to open the Beit Hanoun-Erez Crossing in the northern Gaza Strip (Ramallah News Facebook page, August 29, 2026).

Photographs from the installation of a truck-scanning facility purchased and donated by the German government for the Erez Crossing (German embassy in Israel Instagram account, August 21, 2026)

Civilian Governance

The Hamas ministry of education in the Gaza Strip announced that the opening of the school year in the Gaza Strip had been postponed to September 19, 2026. Teaching and administrative staff will begin the school year on September 16, 2026 (Gaza al-‘An Telegram channel, August 26, 2026).

Hamas Military Governance and Militia Activity

Ashraf al-Mansi’s Popular Army – Northern Forces militia reported that its special operatives had arrested three Hamas operatives after they sabotaged and blocked roads to disrupt the movement of the forces. The three are currently in custody and will be tried in accordance with the rules and procedures of the Popular Army (Aljayshalshaabi Facebook page, August 24, 2026).
Hamas “resistance security” claimed that an “Israeli agent” had turned himself in to the forces after being influenced by the published confessions of the agent who was involved in the elimination of the head of the military wing, Izz al-Din al-Haddad, in May 2026. The agent reportedly initiated contact with Israeli intelligence after responding on the al-Munasaq Facebook page of the Israeli Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and immediately received a telephone call from an Israeli intelligence officer (al-Akhres Telegram channel, August 27, 2026).
The Hamas Rada force reported that its operatives had ambushed collaborators with Israel in the al-Shuja’iyya neighborhood in eastern Gaza City. In the wake of the casualties, IDF artillery and fighter jets intervened to cover the collaborators’ retreat toward the camp of militia leader Rami Halas inside the Yellow Line (Rada force Telegram channel, August 27, 2026). According to other reports, an ambush was laid for about 40 fighters from Rami Halas’ militia. Eighteen of them escaped and 22 were allegedly killed, including Ghassan Mahdi Halas (Palestinian Press Network news website, August 25, 2026; Amsak Amil Telegram channel, August 26, 2026).
A Hamas-affiliated news website published a statement from a former operative in Ashraf al-Mansi’s Popular Army militia, which operates in the northern Gaza Strip, according to which fear, violence and humanitarian deterioration prevail in the area under its control. He claimed that the militia had taken over a school and turned it into a center of operations and hideout, and the militia was involved in violence, extortion, attacks and settling scores. It was further claimed that militia members used drugs and smoked cigarettes and al-Mansi and members of his family ruled the area by force of arms and made arbitrary decisions while threatening their opponents. According to the statement, the militia used individuals and families as human shields, prevented some of them from returning to their homes and created a sense of siege and fear of violent retaliation (Quds Press, August 26, 2026).

Elections for the Hamas Leadership

Hamas sources said members of the “external” political bureau had unanimously decided not to run for the Hamas leadership in the Gaza Strip, claiming that under the current circumstances it should remain in the hands of senior figures on the ground. They informed Shura council chairman Muhammad Isma’il Darwish of their willingness to accept the authority of the candidate chosen by consensus and to serve under him as part of the Gaza regional leadership. According to the sources, the decision is the result of the difficulty of managing the movement’s institutions remotely, communications restrictions and the security risks involved in maintaining contact with senior political and military figures in the Gaza Strip. Ali al-Amoudi, deputy Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip, who has played a central role in managing the movement’s activities since the resumption of fighting in March 2025, is considered the leading candidate for head of the political bureau in the Gaza Strip, and the elections are expected to take place in the near future (al-Akhbar, August 26, 2026).

Israel, Judea and Samaria

Counterterrorism

This past week IDF forces continued extensive counterterrorism activity in Judea and Samaria:
- Qais al-Bitawi, who was responsible for Hamas activity in a terrorist network dismantled in the Jenin refugee camp, was eliminated in an airstrike in Jenin. Two accomplices were eliminated with him, and a gun was found in their vehicle (IDF spokesperson, August 28, 2026). The Hamas military wing confirmed that al-Bitawi was a commander in the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades (Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades combat information Telegram channel, August 28, 2026). The PIJ military wing also claimed al-Bitawi belonged to its ranks and noted that the other two men killed also belonged to the Jerusalem Brigades (Jerusalem Brigades Telegram chanIn Nablus, a Palestinian terrorist operative suspected of attempting to attack Israeli civilians was detained. He had been wanted since he had been active in the Lions’ Den terrorist network in Nablus, which was effectively dismantled by the Israeli security forces in 2022. Another wanted Palestinian was detained in the Balata refugee camp in Nablus (Israel Police spokesperson and IDF spokesperson, August 31, 2026).
- In Nablus, a Palestinian terrorist operative suspected of attempting to attack Israeli civilians was detained. He had been wanted since he had been active in the Lions’ Den terrorist network in Nablus, which was effectively dismantled by the Israeli security forces in 2022. Another wanted Palestinian was detained in the Balata refugee camp in Nablus (Israel Police spokesperson and IDF spokesperson, August 31, 2026).
- Israeli security forces detained a Palestinian woman armed with a knife at the Ganot Junction in Samaria after receiving information that she planned to carry out a stabbing (IDF spokesperson, August 26, 2026).
A 16-year-old from the Galilee was charged with contacting an individual linked to ISIS, swearing allegiance to the organization and intending to attack Jewish police officers and soldiers on the Temple Mount. An indictment was filed for a 19-year-old Israeli Arab who swore allegiance to ISIS and planned to attack an IDF base in northern Israel (Israel Police spokesperson, August 28, 2026).

Settler Terrorism

This past week incidents of violence by Jewish rioters against Palestinians in Judea and Samaria continued:
- Palestinian sources reported that Jewish rioters vandalized trees and crops, stole agricultural equipment and attempted to take control of a water well on an area of more than 100 dunams in the village of Burqa, east of Ramallah; in the Turmus Ayya area, land was reportedly being cultivated for the purpose of expanding Jewish communities and outposts in the area, and a four-dunam farm was vandalized; on the Araba plain, south of Jenin, fig trees were reportedly cut down, irrigation pipes were damaged and a fence was destroyed; in the Za’atara area, east of Bethlehem, 50 settlers positioned themselves in the area and provoked residents; in the village of Awarta, south of Nablus, hundreds of settlers accompanied by IDF forces entered a tomb located in the village and held religious ceremonies at Muslim holy sites (Wafa, August 28, 2026); in the Hebron area, Jewish rioters damaged homes, farmland and crops in the Yatta and Rihiya areas; reportedly, settlers brought their herds into the area adjacent to Palestinian residents’ homes in Khirbet Hummus in Masafer Yatta, south of Hebron (Quds Agency, August 29, 2026).
- Dozens of settlers attacked Palestinian homes in the village of Qusra, followed by a riot. The head of the Qusra council claimed IDF forces had prevented the evacuation of the wounded from a house which had been surrounded (Al Jazeera, August 29, 2026). In the village of al-Mughayyir, IDF forces shot live ammunition and tear gas canisters after a clash between Palestinians and Jewish rioters, and in Jalud dozens of Jewish rioters reportedly attacked a crew from an American news network (al-Jazeera Ajel Telegram channel, August 29-30, 2026).
In the village of Bazariya, northwest of Nablus, Jewish rioters set fire to a mosque and spray-painted racist slogans and threats (Palestinian Information Center, September 1, 2026).

Photographs from the burned mosque in Bazariya
(al-Jazeera Palestine, September 1, 2026)

The Palestinian Authority (PA)

International Activity

The PA foreign ministry organized a visit to the Qalandiya refugee camp for members of the accredited diplomatic corps to observe the destruction and its humanitarian consequences. The delegation visited the Qalandiya training center and schools, and during the visit Israel’s policy toward UNRWA and the measures it takes against the agency were discussed. Deputy foreign minister for political affairs Omar Awadallah said UNRWA could not be dispensed with, particularly at the present time and in light of the war in the Gaza Strip, adding that the International Court of Justice had ruled that the international community had to support the agency and that Israel had to respect UNRWA’s immunity, privileges and rights and not damage its facilities, because ultimately that was detrimental to the Palestinian refugees (Wafa, August 24, 2026).
Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty met with PA Vice President Hussein al-Sheikh, general intelligence chief and Fatah Central Committee member Majed Faraj and Palestinian National Council chairman Rawhi Fattouh to discuss developments in the Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria and efforts to “restore Palestinian unity.” Abdelatty reiterated Egypt’s opposition to all Israel’s “illegal” measures, which he said were meant to impose a new situation on the ground or undermine Palestinian “territorial unity.” He noted the need to preserve unity between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank and to create a “political horizon” which would lead to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with the June 4, 1967 borders and east Jerusalem as its capital (Egyptian foreign ministry Facebook page, August 25, 2026).
The senior Palestinian delegation arrived in Amman, where its members met with Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman al-Safadi to discuss the latest developments in the Palestinian territories and coordination between the PA and Jordan. They warned against the continuation of Israel’s “illegal” measures in Judea and Samaria, including settler terrorism, settlement expansion, land confiscation and the withholding of tax clearance revenues, measures allegedly leading the West Bank to an “explosion.” Al-Sheikh and al-Safadi condemned Israel’s activity against UNRWA and its institutions and the decision to build hundreds of new housing units as part of the E1 plan.^[4] They also noted the need to halt the “violations ” in Jerusalem and the importance of implementing the decisions of the ministerial meeting in support of Jerusalem and the holy sites, held in Jordan on August 8, 2026 (Wafa, August 25, 2026).
PA Foreign Minister Varsen Aghabekian Shahin participated in the 23^rd session of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, held in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. She called on the member states to take legal and practical measures against Israel, impose sanctions on the Israeli communities in Judea and Samaria and support full UN membership for “Palestine.” The member states were also asked to activate the organization’s financial safety net to help the PA cope with the freezing of tax clearance revenues. On the sidelines of the meeting, Shahin held meetings with the organization’s secretary general and with senior officials from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Senegal and Turkey (Wafa, August 27, 2026).

Shahin meets with the secretary general of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation
(Organization of Islamic Cooperation X account, August 27, 2026)

The PLO department of refugee affairs called on the Finnish government to reverse its decision not to renew its multi-year funding agreement with UNRWA, which expires at the end of 2026 and under which approximately €5 million is provided to the agency annually. Department head and PLO Executive Committee member Ahmad Abu Holi said the decision was inconsistent with Finland’s historic support for UNRWA and could exacerbate financial uncertainty and impair the continuation of services to refugees, particularly in the Gaza Strip (Wafa, August 28, 2026).

Palestinian General Elections

The Palestinian central elections commission announced it was conducting training programs and coordination meetings in the Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria in preparation for the local elections scheduled for November 28, 2026. It also reported that the commission had reopened its offices in the Gaza Strip, resumed its activities on the ground and held meetings with representatives of telecommunications companies to strengthen cooperation (Wafa, August 26, 2026).
Muhammad Shtayyeh, former Palestinian prime minister and a member of the Fatah Central Committee, met with a delegation from the European external relations commission to discuss preparations for sending an EU delegation to monitor the elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council. Shtayyeh called on the EU to pressure Israel to allow the elections to be held in the Gaza Strip and Jerusalem, and claiming that was an “essential step” toward rebuilding Palestinian institutions and political system. He said that although Israel had not yet approved the holding of the elections, the Palestinian leadership and Fatah wanted them to take place as scheduled (Wafa, August 27, 2026).
PIJ deputy secretary general Muhammad al-Hindi participated with Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) deputy secretary general Jamil Mazhar and Jamal Issa, political adviser to Hamas “external” leader Khaled Mashal, in a meeting of the Congress of Palestinians in Istanbul, which dealt with developments in the Palestinian arena, particularly the elections. Al-Hindi said that the elections in their current format did not address the aspirations of the Palestinian people and could damage their right to self-determination, therefore the PIJ demanded that the elections be postponed until a comprehensive national consensus could be reached on reforming the PLO and reforming its institutions. He said the PIJ participated in consultations with the other organizations to discuss ways of dealing with the PA’s decision to hold the elections. He said the PIJ would not propose its own candidates but would support a “national” list formed by consensus (Palestinian Media Institution [al-mu’assasa al-filastiniyya lil-i’lam] website, August 28, 2026; PIJ information bureau Telegram channel, August 28, 2026).
Senior Fatah figure Samih Khalaf said he doubted whether the elections would take place, particularly in the Gaza Strip, because of the lack of preparations, appointments and an agreed political plan, as well as the absence of understandings with Israel and the United States (al-Shaheed, August 29, 2026).
PFLP Central Committee member Muhammad al-Ghoul said that proposals to form a coalition had been received from the Fatah and Hamas leaderships and other Palestinian organizations, but no decision had been made regarding the format of participation in the upcoming Palestinian elections. He said internal consultations and talks with the organizations and other national elements were under way. He called for a national dialogue which would create the conditions for free elections and guarantee Palestinian rights, adding that the elections could not be regarded as a proper process without a political, legal and security environment which would enable them to succeed (Sawa News Agency, August 30, 2026).

Full document in PDF format

^[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications.
^[2] For background information, see the April and July 2018 ITIC reports, “Molotov kites” – a new means of causing damage to Israel as part of the violent demonstrations of the “Great Return March” and Institutionalizing arson terrorism: what began as a local initiative has been turned by Hamas into the leading modus operandi in its policy of controlled violence against Israel. Kites are launched under the central direction of Hamas’ military wing, and its operatives participate in the launchings.
^[3] Terrorist organizations.
^[4] The E1 (East 1) plan is a development project in Judea and Samaria designed to connect Jerusalem with the large Israeli settlement of Ma'ale Adumim.

Strikes on the Ali al-Taher Ridge (Akhbar al-Yawm Agency, September 9, 2026)

Ihab Hamadeh (al-Manar, September 1, 2026)

Yuval Rosenberg

Overview[1]

IDF Control of the Ali al-Taher Ridge[2]

The Ali al-Taher Ridge and its surroundings (Google Maps)

Strikes on the Ali al-Taher Ridge (Akhbar al-Yawm Agency, September 9, 2026)

The Lebanese Government

Lebanese army patrol in al-Nabatieh (Bint Jbeil News X account, September 9, 2026)

Hezbollah’s Stance

Ihab Hamadeh (al-Manar, September 1, 2026)

The Iranian Position

Criticism of Hezbollah

Anti-Hezbollah and anti-Iran cartoons and videos (No to the Iranian Occupation” X account, September 6-7, 2026)

Related Articles

Iranian Majles Speaker meets with the Hamas delegation (ISNA, September 2, 2026)

Mohsen Rezaei (snn.ir, September 6, 2026)

Mojtaba Amani (snn.ir, September 5, 2026)

Key Trends

Highlights[1]

Iranian Involvement in the Palestinian Arena

Iranian Majles Speaker meets with the Hamas delegation (ISNA, September 2, 2026)

Iranian Involvement in Lebanon

Mohsen Rezaei (snn.ir, September 6, 2026)

Mojtaba Amani (snn.ir, September 5, 2026)

Iranian Involvement in Iraq

The Pro-Iranian Militias in Iraq

The Houthis in Yemen

Militias in Syria

Screenshot from the video (Islamic Resistance Front in Syria Telegram channel, September 6, 2026)

Related Articles

The world disregards the Israeli attacks (Facebook page of Alaa al-Laqta, in-house Hamas cartoonist, September 2, 2026)

Hamas delegation meets with the Iranian foreign minister (Hamas website, September 3, 2026)

Trending

Overview [1]

The Fighting in the Gaza Strip

he IDF

The world disregards the Israeli attacks (Facebook page of Alaa al-Laqta, in-house Hamas cartoonist, September 2, 2026)

Negotiations for the Second Phase of the Ceasefire Agreement

The Gaza Strip

The Civilian Situation in the Gaza Strip

Civilian Governance

Military Governance

New Flotilla to the Gaza Strip

The Kate (International Committee for Breaking the Siege on Gaza Facebook page, August 29, 2026)

Hamas in the International Arena

Hamas delegation meets with the Iranian foreign minister (Hamas website, September 3, 2026)

Israel, Judea and Samaria

Terrorist Attacks

Counterterrorism

Settler-Palestinian Friction

The Palestinian Authority (PA)

The Palestinian General Elections

Related Articles

Aoun (right) with the American ambassador to Lebanon (X account of the Lebanese presidency, September 4, 2026)

Red Cross convoy with the released Lebanese (Nidaa al-Watan, September 4, 2026)

The caption reads, "Was achieving unity and peace too great a dream?" Berri called the Lebanese army, civilian peace and national unity "red lines" (al-Liwaa, September 1, 2026)

The Ali al-Taher Ridge as a focal point of the regional struggle: the intersecting interests of Lebanon, Israel, Iran, the United States and Hezbollah (al-Joumhouria, September 4, 2026)

The Wa Ta'awanu Association distributes aid in Zawtar al-Gharbiyeh (al-Manar, September 4, 2026)

Haykal with the king of Jordan (Lebanese army X account, September 1, 2026)

Trending

Overview[1]

Direct Negotiations and the Israel-Lebanon Framework Agreement

Direct Negotiations

Red Cross convoy with the released Lebanese (Nidaa al-Watan, September 4, 2026)

Aoun (right) with the American ambassador to Lebanon (X account of the Lebanese presidency, September 4, 2026)

The caption reads, “Was achieving unity and peace too great a dream?” Berri called the Lebanese army, civilian peace and national unity “red lines” (al-Liwaa, September 1, 2026)

The Pilot Zones

Hezbollah’s Position

Opposition to Hezbollah

The Security Situation in South Lebanon

The IDF Takes Control of the Ali al-Taher Ridge[3]

The Ali al-Taher Ridge as a focal point of the regional struggle: the intersecting interests of Lebanon, Israel, Iran, the United States and Hezbollah (al-Joumhouria, September 4, 2026)

The IDF

Blowing up tunnels (MTV Lebanon, September 6, 2026)

Challenges Facing Hezbollah

Preserving and Reconstructing Military Capabilities

Hezbollah and Iran

Finances

Reconstruction

Overview^[1]

IDF Control of the Ali al-Taher Ridge^[2]

Anti-Hezbollah and anti-Iran cartoons and videos
(No to the Iranian Occupation” X account, September 6-7, 2026)

Highlights^[1]

**The Kate (International Committee for Breaking the Siege on Gaza Facebook page, August 29, 2026)**

Overview^[1]

**Red Cross convoy with the released Lebanese (Nidaa al-Watan, September 4, 2026)**

Aoun (right) with the American ambassador to Lebanon
(X account of the Lebanese presidency, September 4, 2026)

**The caption reads, “Was achieving unity and peace too great a dream?” Berri called the Lebanese army, civilian peace and national unity “red lines” (al-Liwaa, September 1, 2026)**

The IDF Takes Control of the Ali al-Taher Ridge^[3]

**The Ali al-Taher Ridge as a focal point of the regional struggle: the intersecting interests of Lebanon, Israel, Iran, the United States and Hezbollah (al-Joumhouria, September 4, 2026)**

The Wa Ta’awanu Association distributes aid in Zawtar al-Gharbiyeh
(al-Manar, September 4, 2026)

Highlights^[1]