Agreement for Collecting Weapons from Hamas and the Other Armed Organizations in the Gaza Strip – Significance and Reactions

Dr. Igal Shiri

Overview^[1]

• On July 31, 2026, the American president and the Board of Peace announced they had reached an agreement with Hamas on a road map for implementing the second phase of the ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip. The agreement was formulated after about six months of rounds of negotiations between Hamas, the other armed factions and the mediators, which focused primarily on the issue of disarmament.
• According to the updated road map, Israel, Hamas and the other armed factions will cease military operations in the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian administration committee will assume responsibility, the international stabilization force will deploy throughout the Strip, and a supervisory committee will verify implementation of the first phase. Hamas and the armed factions will transfer their heavy weapons, weapons depots, production facilities and tunnels to the responsibility of the Palestinian administration committee, which will store and supervise them, as will the weapons of the Israel-backed militias. However, possession of [so-called] “personal weapons” will be permitted.
• It was further determined that the IDF would complete a gradual withdrawal from the Gaza Strip according to a timetable to be agreed upon, subject to implementation of the disarmament clause.
• Hamas confirmed that the movement had accepted the proposal, but linked implementation of relinquishing its weapons to the IDF’s withdrawal and the dismantling of the militias, the entry of the administration committee and the deployment of the international force, as well as the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip and progress toward the establishment of a Palestinian state. A senior Hamas figure claimed they had been “flexible” to end the aggression, but added that the movement would continue to work to “liberate” the land from the “occupation” on all fronts.
• The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) said it had not yet accepted the agreement and was holding consultations with Hamas and the other “organizations.”
• In The Amit Terrorism and Intelligence Research Institute assessment, the new agreement is not sufficiently clear and, based on what has been published so far, does not ensure the disarmament of Hamas and the other Palestinian armed factions. They are not relinquishing their heavy weapons and other military infrastructure but are merely storing them, with the possibility of future use in the event of a political crisis, the collapse of the national committee, the withdrawal of the international stabilization force or a forcible Hamas armed takeover of the storage facilities, as occurred when Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip in 2007. In addition, it is unclear whether there will be a complete inventory of the production facilities, tunnels and other infrastructure and whether they will be dismantled and/or completely destroyed under effective and practical supervision that does not rely solely on Qatar and Turkey, which have close ties with Hamas. The current framework also does not clarify whether the transfer of the weapons will take place before the IDF withdrawal begins, as Hamas demands, or whether disarmament will be a condition for the withdrawal, in accordance with Israel’s position.
• Another problem is the retention of “personal weapons.” Requiring registration and licensing does not ensure the complete dismantling of the military wings or entirely prevent terrorist operatives and current members of the Hamas police from remaining armed, especially if they are integrated into the new security forces in the Gaza Strip. The framework also does not determine the fate of the commanders of the military wings and other terrorist operatives, including those involved in the atrocities of the October 7, 2023 invasion and massacre, or whether they will be required to leave the Gaza Strip. Hamas’ declaration that it will continue to work to “liberate all of the land from the occupation on all fronts” makes clear that the movement is not abandoning its jihad against Israel and views the agreement, if implemented, as only another phase that will enable it to reorganize for the purpose of raising resources, rebuilding its strength and preparing for a future confrontation.
• The agreement, based on what is known so far, also imposes restrictions on the IDF’s use of force and its ability to deal with immediate or emerging threats, since it does not explicitly address Israel’s right to act in self-defense, but only requires it to withdraw from the Gaza Strip in accordance with steps taken by Hamas, and therefore my limit IDF activity.

Background

• The American 20-point plan for the future of the Gaza Strip presented in late September 2025 served as the basis for the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas, which went into effect on October 10, 2025. Under the agreement, IDF forces redeployed within the Gaza Strip, the living Israeli hostages were released in exchange for the release of hundreds of Palestinian prisoners held in Israel and Hamas began returning the bodies of the murdered hostages. According to the plan, as part of the second phase of implementing the agreement, which is still to be negotiated indirectly between Israel and Hamas, Hamas and the other armed factions would have no role in governing the Gaza Strip and all military, terrorist and offensive infrastructure, including tunnels and weapons production facilities, would be destroyed and not rebuilt. The Gaza Strip would be demilitarized under the supervision of independent inspectors.^[2]
• On November 17, 2025, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 2803, which endorsed the American plan and called for its full implementation. The resolution established a temporary international stabilization force to operate alongside a trained and vetted Palestinian police force, in coordination and cooperation with Israel and Egypt. It stated that the force’s mission would be to assist in securing the borders, stabilizing the security environment to ensure demilitarization, including the destruction of military, terrorist and offensive infrastructure and preventing its reconstruction, and the permanent disarmament of non-state “armed groups;” protecting civilians and humanitarian operations; training and supporting Palestinian police forces; and coordinating security for humanitarian corridors. It further stated that once the international force had established control and stability on the ground, the IDF would withdraw from the Gaza Strip in accordance with standards, benchmarks and timetables linked to disarmament, as agreed upon by the IDF, the stabilization force, the guarantor states of the agreement and the United States. The IDF would be permitted to maintain a limited security presence until the Gaza Strip was considered secure against the renewal of the terrorist threat.^[3]
• In mid-January 2026, the American administration announced the launch of the second phase of the ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip. However, Hamas and the other armed factions rejected the demand that they disarm, although they hinted at a willingness to freeze or suspend the use of their weapons during a prolonged ceasefire. They called their arms an “internal Palestinian issue” and said they intended to retain the weapons of the “resistance”^[4] to defend themselves against Israel until the establishment of a Palestinian state. Meanwhile, Hamas continued its military buildup and the reorganization of its military wing.^[5]
• At the end of April 2026, to advance the negotiations,^[6] Nikolay Mladenov, representative of the Board of Peace, and the mediators presented a 15-point road map for the second phase. The main provisions included the following (al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 28, 2026; al-Akhbar, April 30, 2026):
  • Israel will complete its withdrawal in phases to the Gaza Strip border according to an agreed timetable, subject to verifiable progress in the weapons collection process.
  • Weapons collection will be carried out according to a gradual and agreed timetable, under which the weapons will be transferred to the national committee for the administration of the Gaza Strip. All armed organizations will participate in the collection of weapons. The national committee will have exclusive authority to register weapons, issue and revoke licenses and collect unlicensed weapons. The surrender of personal weapons will take place only in parallel with the surrender of the militias’ weapons, while ensuring appropriate security conditions and that the police are able to guarantee personal security.
  • The international stabilization force will be deployed between areas controlled by the IDF and areas under the control of the national committee. The force will not engage in policing activities but will be authorized to support and protect weapons-collection operations and humanitarian activities.

► Mladenov subsequently presented the updated framework of the 15-point road map, whose main elements were implementing the existing commitments, including the entry of humanitarian aid; ending the involvement of terrorist organizations in the administration of the Gaza Strip; establishing the principle of “one authority, one law, one weapon,” under which only official Palestinian institutions would be permitted to govern the Gaza Strip and bear arms, while all terrorist organizations would cease their activities; the establishment of a civilian police force; gradual Palestinian-led disarmament under international supervision; deployment of the temporary international stabilization force to separate the Israeli and Palestinian forces while assisting in the implementation of the agreement and protecting humanitarian aid; the gradual withdrawal of IDF forces according to a timetable linked to verification of the disarmament process and the deployment of the stabilization force; and reconstruction, which would proceed only after effective civilian control and disarmament had been ensured (Nikolay Mladenov’s X account, May 21, 2026).

• Hamas and the other Palestinian armed factions responded positively to Mladenov’s framework but presented their own demands, which were the implementation of the first phase, including the entry of the national committee for the administration of Gaza into the Gaza Strip and implementation of the humanitarian protocol with increased aid entering the Strip; recognition of the Palestinian right to self-determination and statehood; linking any weapons arrangement to a full Israeli withdrawal, international guarantees and a resolution of the detainees issue; the complete dismantling of the armed militias supported by Israel; and ensuring that any arrangement in the Gaza Strip would conform to Palestinian Authority law and strengthen the national consensus (al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 30-May 1, 2026; al-Araby al-Jadeed, May 1, 2026).
• The main point of disagreement in the talks between Hamas, the other armed factions and the mediators concerned Article 8 of the road map, which deals with disarmament:
  • The Palestinians reportedly agreed in principle to disarmament, or alternatively demanded that the weapons not be handed over to Israel or to any non-Palestinian entity, but instead be transferred gradually to an agreed Palestinian body for storage and the suspension of their use. The armed factions conditioned the process on an Israeli withdrawal, implementation of the humanitarian arrangements, reconstruction of the Gaza Strip, dismantling rival armed groups and the entry of the Palestinian administration committee into Gaza (Asharq al-Awsat, June 8, 2026; Shehab Agency, June 8, 2026).
  • The armed factions reportedly accepted “in principle” the formula of “one authority, one law, one weapon,” but conditioned its implementation on a national consensus and completion of the first phase, including the dismantling of armed groups they claimed were supported by Israel. It was further proposed that the Gaza administration committee register and regulate personal weapons through licensing, incentives for surrendering weapons and assistance programs (Huna al-Haqiqa Telegram channel, June 15, 2026). Sources familiar with the negotiations added that Hamas and the other armed factions had agreed to the gradual surrender of weapons over a period of six months, paralleling a full Israeli withdrawal. Under the proposal, a Palestinian committee composed of representatives of the armed factions would manage the process and the weapons would remain under the supervision of a local Palestinian authority. The armed factions did not object to the Gaza administration committee collecting and supervising the weapons or coordinating with the international stabilization force, but rejected disarmament in accordance with Israel’s demands (al-Akhbar, June 16, 2026).
  • A Palestinian source who participated in the talks in Cairo said Nikolay Mladenov had rejected the armed factions’ wording for Article 8 but agreed to remove the term “resistance infrastructure.” The alternative wording specified the items to be regulated, including tunnels, warehouses, vehicles, training compounds, personal weapons, uniforms and medical facilities (aljazeera.net, June 18, 2026; Hazem Qassem’s Telegram channel, June 18, 2026). A Hamas source stated that, under the proposal, heavy weapons would be collected and stored, while light personal weapons would either be transferred to the security forces of the administration committee or regulated through licensing (al-Quds al-Arabi, June 19, 2026).
  • Sources in Hamas and the other armed factions participating in the negotiations stated that Hamas had agreed to the centralization, collection and storage of heavy weapons instead of disarmament, while discussion of light personal weapons would be postponed to a later stage. Hamas also removed the term “dismantling infrastructure,” which includes tunnels, weapons depots and weapons production workshops. It was further reported that the transfer of heavy weapons represented the maximum concession agreed to by the movement’s leadership and the other armed factions, and they refused to hand over the military infrastructure to the international stabilization force (al-Quds al-Arabi, June 30, 2026; al-Sharq al-Awsat, July 1, 2026; al-Sharq website, July 2, 2026).
  • At the conclusion of the negotiations held in Cairo between July 8 and 15, 2026, it was reported that Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) had rejected Mladenov’s wording, which called for the centralization, collection and storage of heavy weapons and “resistance infrastructure”^[7] and the suspension of their use. Hamas further demanded that before implementation of the agreement, the militias cooperating with Israel be dismantled and their members “prosecuted under Palestinian law” (al-Quds al-Arabi, July 16, 2026; aljazeera.net, July 16, 2026).
• Also in dispute during the negotiations was the status of the public administration employees of the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip under the Palestinian national committee that would assume responsibility for governing the Strip.^[8] Following the July 8-15, 2026 talks, agreement was reportedly reached to retain the current government employees in their positions, preserve their rights and maintain the government’s obligations toward them (al-Quds al-Arabi, July 16, 2026; aljazeera.net, July 16, 2026).
• On July 26, 2026, the Israeli Security Cabinet approved the legal framework which would allow the entry into the Gaza Strip of the international stabilization force, which is expected to include about 200 security personnel from friendly countries, including Uganda and Morocco. They will be deployed in areas not under Israeli control, subject to Israeli approval for each unit. The objective of the force is to assist in stabilizing the Gaza Strip, its demilitarization and the transfer of responsibility to a temporary Palestinian administration through the national committee for the administration of Gaza. However, no date has been set for the force’s deployment (Israeli media, July 26, 2026). Board of Peace representative Nikolay Mladenov welcomed the decision and called it key to implementing the American plan (Reuters, July 26, 2026).

The Road Map

The Agreement

• On July 28, 2026, a senior Hamas delegation arrived in Cairo for another round of talks with the mediators. Hamas sources stated that regarding the issue of weapons, the delegation was expected to be “flexible” to make it possible to implement the first phase and transition to the second phase. It was also reported that the delegation would propose the establishment of a legal committee to address the status of Hamas government employees to ensure them “fair and satisfactory solutions” (al-Akhbar, July 29, 2026).
• On the night of July 30, 2026, the Americans announced that the Board of Peace had reached an agreement on the complete disarmament of Hamas and the other “armed groups”^[9] in the Gaza Strip. They added that the agreement represented a significant step toward governance of the Gaza Strip by a new Palestinian government which would work in close cooperation with the Board of Peace and the Gaza Strip would no longer serve as a base for terrorist attacks against Israel. Reportedly, the agreement would be implemented in carefully structured phases. Upon completion of the disarmament, Israeli forces would withdraw, and the international stabilization force would work with a new Palestinian police force to assume responsibility for Gaza’s security for its residents and its neighbors (Truth Social, July 31, 2026).

• The Board of Peace, together with the mediators, Egypt, Qatar, Turkey and the United States, announced Hamas had agreed to a detailed road map for the next phases of the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip after months of negotiations. Additionally, for the first time, according to reports, Hamas had formally committed to an action plan to relinquish all its weapons, after which Israel would withdraw from the Gaza Strip. The statement said the focus was now on implementation, during which the Gaza administration committee would soon begin a gradual transition to full control, supported by the international stabilization force, while accelerating the rule of law, security and humanitarian improvements in the Gaza Strip. The Board of Peace also published the road map, whose main provisions were the following (Board of Peace X account, July 31, 2026):
  • All parties reaffirm their commitment to the American plan and to UN Security Council Resolution 2803.
  • Israel will complete all its remaining commitments under the agreement without delay, particularly the cessation of all military operations in the Gaza Strip. Hamas and the other organizations will also cease all military operations.
  • The timetable and implementation mechanisms will be determined within 14 days after the parties approve the road map. The Palestinian administration committee will then enter the Gaza Strip and begin assuming responsibility. The supervisory committee, composed of representatives of the mediators, the Board of Peace and the stabilization force, will verify implementation of the first phase by Israel and Hamas before the transition to the second phase.
  • Hamas and the [armed] organizations agree to transfer all civilian and security authority to the administration committee and will allow it to operate independently, without interfering in its decisions.
  • The administration committee will preserve the continuity of government institutions and public services. All public-sector employees will receive equal and fair treatment, and those whose services are terminated or who retire during the transition period will receive all their legal entitlements under Palestinian law.
  • The Gaza Strip will be governed in accordance with the principle of “one authority, one law, one weapon. ”
  • Newly-trained police officers will be integrated into the existing policing “mechanisms” in the Gaza Strip. All police officers currently serving in the Gaza Strip will undergo a comprehensive vetting process, and those found unsuitable will be transferred to alternative civilian positions or retired without reduction of their financial benefits. All police weapons will be transferred to the authority of the administration committee.
  • The transfer of heavy weapons, “military” production sites, weapons depots and tunnels will begin after completion of the remaining commitments under the agreement, the entry of the administration committee and the deployment of the international stabilization force. That will be linked to the Israeli withdrawal, which will take place in phases from the areas under Israeli control, and to the dismantling of the armed militias [supported by Israel]. No weapons will be transferred to Israel or to non-Palestinian entities, and the process will be verified by the supervisory committee with the support of the international stabilization force. Only the administration committee will possess, store and control weapons in the Gaza Strip. Implementation of the plan will create appropriate conditions for a credible path toward Palestinian independence and the establishment of a state.
  • Personal weapons may be retained in accordance with Palestinian law. The administration committee will be the only body authorized to register weapons and issue or revoke licenses.
  • The militias will be disarmed and their weapons stored under the authority of the administration committee according to an agreed timetable. Members of the militias will not be integrated into the Gaza Strip’s security or police forces.
  • The international stabilization force will deploy throughout the Gaza Strip to separate the IDF from the areas controlled by the administration committee. The force will not carry out policing duties but will supervise implementation of the agreement, train the Palestinian police and ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip.
  • IDF forces will complete a gradual withdrawal from the Gaza Strip according to an agreed timetable, subject to implementation of the disarmament clause. No one will be compelled to leave the Gaza Strip [i.e., migration will not be promoted]. Thus the current wording may limit the IDF’s foil to thwart immediate or emerging threats, since it does not explicitly address Israel’s right to act in self-defense.
  • Reconstruction of the Gaza Strip and the allocation of the necessary resources will be carried out in accordance with a plan and timetable to be formulated and supervised by the Board of Peace and the administration committee.
• An Egyptian source stated that under the security arrangements, there was agreement to dismantle the “rival armed groups” established in the Gaza Strip and collect their weapons. Implementation of the agreement is expected to proceed gradually during a preliminary 14-day period, during which Israel will halt its strikes and increase the volume of humanitarian aid. Under the arrangements, up to 600 aid trucks per day, including at least 50 fuel trucks, are expected to enter the Gaza Strip, along with materials for the reconstruction of hospitals, schools and infrastructure (al-Jazeera Mubasher, August 1, 2026).
• Qatar’s foreign ministry stated that Qatar’s Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, spoke with the chairman of Hamas’ political bureau, Khalil al-Hayya, and welcomed the movement’s agreement to the road map. He said he hoped the understandings would end the “suffering” in Gaza, adding that the international community had to pressure Israel to fulfill its commitments and allow implementation of the framework. Meanwhile, UN Secretary General António Guterres called on Israel and Hamas to move from declarations to practical implementation (al-Jazeera Mubasher, July 31, 2026).

Hamas’ Reactions

• Hamas spokesman Hazem Qassem confirmed that the movement had accepted the mediators’ proposal for completing the phases of the ceasefire agreement and said the decision expressed Hamas’ commitment to the interests and rights of the Palestinian people (Hazem Qassem’s Telegram channel, July 29 and 31, 2026).
• Hamas said it had responded positively to the mediators’ proposals and agreed to include the issue of heavy weapons in the agreement, but made it conditional upon the cessation of attacks, the IDF’s withdrawal, the entry of the national committee for the administration of Gaza, the deployment of an international force, the dismantling of the armed groups it claimed were supported by Israel, the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip and the guarantee of a path toward a Palestinian state (Hamas Telegram channel, July 31, 2026).
• Senior Hamas figure and member of the negotiating delegation Ghazi Hamad called the framework an “integrated package” which included a ceasefire, an Israeli withdrawal, humanitarian aid, reconstruction, a new administration and security arrangements. He claimed it referred to the “organized storage of the weapons” under the supervision of the national committee and other parties, without Israeli involvement, adding that implementation of all the arrangements, including those concerning the tunnels and heavy weapons, depended on a timetable for the withdrawal of the “occupation forces.” He said Hamas had accepted the framework after six months of negotiations, despite its reservations, because of the situation in the Gaza Strip, but the agreement did not mean they had abandoned their “political [sic] positions.” He said Hamas agreed to transfer the administration of the Gaza Strip to an independent committee but had every intention to continue operating as a “political movement.” He said that under no circumstances would Hamas relinquish its “national project”^[10] or its national duties to liberate the land from the “occupation,” establish a Palestinian state and continue to work “on all fronts” (al-Arabiya and al-Sharq TV, July 31, 2026).

The Reactions of Other Palestinian Armed Organizations

• A PIJ spokesman stated that media reports claiming an agreement had been reached between the Palestinian organizations and Israel were inaccurate and the movement had reservations regarding the text of the agreement which had been circulated (PIJ Telegram channel, July 31, 2026). A senior PIJ source rejected reports that the movement had agreed to surrender its weapons and claimed it was still consulting with the other organizations, including Hamas, while presenting its own demands. He added that the movement would not hand over its weapons to the Palestinian administration committee unless there was a complete and full IDF withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, the border crossings were opened, food and medical aid shipments were allowed in, the militias supported by Israel were dismantled and there was a complete cessation of attacks in the Gaza Strip (al-Sayyad Telegram channel, August 2, 2026).
• A Hamas delegation headed by the movement’s leader in Judea and Samaria, Zaher Jabarin, reportedly met in Cairo with a PIJ delegation headed by its secretary general, Ziyad al-Nakhalah. They reportedly noted their intention to make every effort to “protect the Palestinian people and restore their legitimate rights,” adding that Israel had to be compelled to stop all forms of attacks in the Gaza Strip, withdraw completely, begin steps to reconstruct the Strip, allow humanitarian aid to enter and permit the entry of the Gaza administration committee into the Strip. Al-Nakhalah also spoke with Khalil al-Hayya, the new chairman of the Hamas political bureau, and they agreed on the need to assist the Palestinian people (Hamas Telegram channel, August 1, 2026).
• The PFLP’s political bureau called for increased pressure on Israel to ensure implementation of the agreement. It demanded full implementation of the ceasefire, the opening of the border crossings, the entry of humanitarian aid and the immediate entry of the Palestinian administration committee into the Gaza Strip, while opposing external supervision. The PFLP also called for renewed Palestinian unity and the formulation of a “common national strategy” (Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades Telegram channel, July 30, 2026).
• Former senior Fatah figure Muhammad Dahlan said following Hamas’ and the other armed organizations’ agreement to accept the road map, the success of the agreement depended on Israel’s commitment to halt its attacks in the Gaza Strip. Initially, Dahlan claimed that American envoy Jared Kushner had said that Israel would stop its attacks in the Gaza Strip because of Hamas’ agreement to disarm. He later “corrected his statement,” saying Kushner had only said that he would work with Israel to bring about a halt to the attacks. Dahlan said he hoped the Gazans would be witness to the beginning of a new phase and called on all organizations to comply with the agreement, end military displays and refrain from any actions that could provide Israel with a pretext to undermine the agreement (Muhammad Dahlan’s Facebook page, August 2, 2026).

^[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC's daily updates as well as its other publications.
^[2] See the October 2025 ITIC report, The future of Hamas’ weapons and its efforts to rebuild the military wing.
^[3] See the November 2025 ITIC report, UN Security Council Resolution 2803 for the Future of the Gaza Strip – Positions of Power Actors
^[4] Terrorist organizations.
^[5] See the February 2026 ITIC report, Hamas Deploys to Recover and Retain Its Military Strength and Influence over the Gaza Strip.
^[5] See the ITIC (and after May 2026, Amit Institute) reports, "Spotlight on Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict."
^[7] All the assets and facilities the terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip use against Israel.
^[8] On July 6, 2026, the Hamas government media information in the Gaza Strip announced the dissolution of the government emergency committee as part of the preparations for transferring administrative authority to the Palestinian national committee for the administration of Gaza, headed by Ali Sha'at.
^[9] Terrorist organizations.
^[10] The destruction of the State of Israel.

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