Introduction

Overview

In 2022 there was a substantial rise in the number of Palestinian terrorist attacks against Israel. Eighty-six significant attacks\(^1\) were carried out, up from 54 in 2021, 40 in 2020, 34 in 2019 and 55 in 2018; 16 of the attacks were carried out inside Israeli territory (one in 2021). **31 Israelis were killed** (25 civilians and six members of the security forces). One Border Police fighter was killed in an operational activity in Samaria. In 2021 three civilians were killed. **Sixteen terrorist attacks were carried out inside Israel.** There were 46 shooting attacks (the most deadly form of attack) during the year, 54% of the total number (12 in 2021). **There were 25 stabbing attacks, 29% of the total** (30 in 2021). Seven were vehicular ramming attacks and four were combined attacks. In addition, according to official sources, there were about 3,000 instances of rock-throwing (about 7,600 according to the IDF) and about 500 instances of Molotov cocktail-throwing (about 1,200 according to the IDF).\(^2\)

One round of fighting was conducted in the Gaza Strip, Operation Breaking Dawn, in August 2022. During the Operation 946 rockets and mortar shells hit Israeli territory. Eleven rockets were fired from the Gaza Strip before the Operation and two after, a total of 959 rockets and mortar shells. **Therefore, with the exception of Operation Breaking Dawn, the annual trend was towards a decrease in rocket attacks.** The number of terrorist attacks from the Gaza Strip targeting the Israeli communities near the border security fence also declined significantly, and there were almost no instances of the so-called

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\(^1\) A significant attack is defined by the ITIC as one involving shooting, stabbing, a vehicular ramming attack, the use of IEDs, or a combination of the above. Stones and Molotov cocktails thrown by Palestinians are not included, nor are shooting attacks targeting IDF forces during counterterrorism activities in Judea and Samaria.

\(^2\) The discrepancy in the numbers is the result of the IDF’s inclusion of attacks carried out during counterterrorism activities.
"controlled violence" (return marches, IED and incendiary balloon launching, night harassment unit activities).

- In 2022 there was a substantial increase in what the Palestinian Authority (PA) refers to as "peaceful popular resistance" [popular terrorism]. Most of the attacks were carried out by lone terrorists or local networks. The attacks included throwing rocks and Molotov cocktails, shootings, stabbings, vehicular rammings and combinations of two or more of the above. The Palestinian leadership, headed by Mahmoud Abbas, encouraged the "popular resistance," did not condemn or criticize it and praised the terrorists, including when Israeli civilians were killed and wounded.

- The wave of current wave of terrorism began in effect in March 2022 with a series of attacks inside Israel (two of them carried out by operatives affiliated with ISIS), and continued after Operation Wave Breaker. The objective of the Operation, which focused on Jenin and Nablus in northern Samaria, was to destroy the networks' military-terrorist capabilities and prevent further attacks, and in effect it continues to this day. Dozens of terrorist operatives have been killed, attacks in Judea and Samaria have increased, and concern exists regarding more attacks, including inside Israel.

- Several new aspects of terrorist activity in Judea and Samaria surfaced in 2022:
  - The wave of attacks and Israeli security force counterterrorism activities led to the growth of a new type of local network consisting of armed Palestinian terrorist operatives, independent or members of organizations. They do not take orders either from the established terrorist organizations or the PA's security services. They include the Lion’s Den network and the Nablus Battalion in Nablus and the Jenin Battalion, which was initially composed of operatives from the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) military-terrorist wing and which is based in Jenin. In addition, networks which were virtually inactive in recent years were reactivated. The most prominent is the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades (AAMB), until recently affiliated with Fatah. While it does have Fatah

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3 For further information see the January 17, 2018 bulletin, "The PLO’s Central Council and Mahmoud Abbas call for the continuation and strengthening of [so-called] "peaceful popular resistance" [i.e., popular terrorism]."

4 For further information about the Jenin Battalion, see the July 4, 2022, bulletin, "The Jenin Battalion: a non-aligned organization of terrorists operating against the Israeli security forces."
operatives, its new identity is generic and it is mostly composed of armed squads which operate independently, with no central leadership or hierarchy.\(^5\)

Unlike previous years, when most terrorist operatives were lone wolves without organizational identity, this past year many have **affiliated themselves with the new networks**, evident by the claims of responsibility issued by the various organizations and networks. In a number of instances more than one organization or network has claimed responsibility for an attack.

An examination of the terrorist operatives in the new networks revealed many were the sons of PA security service operatives, including high-ranking officers, or security services operatives who were also active in the networks. In addition, many PA security service operatives are former terrorists who were integrated into the services through various arrangements.

The types and methods used in the terrorist attacks also changed. There was a relative decline in the number of stabbing attacks, which were the most prevalent type of attack in previous years and were carried out by lone terrorists. There was a substantial rise in the number of shooting attacks, which accounted for more than half of the attacks carried out in 2022: a total of 46 shooting attacks were carried out, 54% of the total number, up from 12 in 2021, when they made up 22% of the total. The change was apparently a direct result of the formation of the established and quasi-established networks, which provide a framework for terrorist operatives and allow them to carry out fairly complex attacks which demand preparation and the acquisition of weapons.

The number of attacks and attempted attacks inside Israel also **rose significantly**. This past year **16 terrorist attacks were carried out inside Israeli territory**, four of them in Jerusalem, compared with one in 2021 and three in 2020.

Three terrorist attacks were carried out on behalf of global jihad organizations, one each in Beersheba, Hadera and Jerusalem. The attack in Hadera was carried out by two ISIS operatives and for which ISIS claimed responsibility; the organization listed it in its annual summary of attacks. The other two attacks were apparently inspired by ISIS' ideology. **All of the terrorists had Israeli ID cards.**

\(^5\) For further information see the October 30, 2022, bulletin, "'Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades' – a generic name for the armed squads of Palestinian terrorists currently active in Judea and Samaria."
The terrorist attacks were also deadlier than in previous years. **In 2022 31 Israelis were killed (25 civilians and six members of the security forces), up from four in 2021 and three in 2020.**

**This past year the PA's support for terrorist operatives continued and increased, including attacks in which Israelis were killed.** The PA gave political and media [propaganda] support to popular terrorism, members of the Palestinian leadership paid condolences calls to the families of terrorists who were killed, the PA continued paying generous stipends to terrorists imprisoned in Israel and to the families of shaheeds and prisoners, paid to rebuild the houses of terrorists demolished by the Israeli security forces, glorified the terrorists and their attacks, including in the Palestinian formal and informal education systems, presented awards and plaques, etc. The PA completely ignored the presence of its security personnel or their sons among the terrorist operatives. No action was taken against them and nothing was said when their parents openly supported the attacks. Rather, Mahmoud Abbas called the families to offer condolences and members of the Palestinian leadership visited the mourning tents. On occasion formal military funerals were held for terrorists.

**In the meantime, incitement to attack Israel continues in the Palestinian social networks, strongly influencing the younger generation.** Young and adolescent Palestinians are exposed to posts and pictures encouraging violence, justifying terrorist attacks and praising those who carry them out. The most popular platforms are WhatsApp and Telegram, while videos are uploaded to Instagram and TikTok, which are especially popular with the younger generation, and for many almost the exclusive source of information. Clear evidence for the trend towards increasing incitement was provided by a public opinion poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, whose December 2022 poll showed that 55% of respondents answered that a return to the "armed struggle" [terrorist attacks] was necessary, and 72% supported the establishment of the various local armed groups. However, apparently support for terrorism was not translated into broad enlistment and remained only digital.⁶

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⁶ For further information about the poll, see the January 9, 2023, bulletin, "Palestinian public opinion poll reveals increase in support for armed terrorist attacks against Israel and attacks inside Israeli territory."
During 2022 there was a substantial rise in the number of terrorist attacks. A total of 86 significant attacks were carried out, up from 54 in 2021. This past year the PA included shooting attacks in its definition of "peaceful popular resistance." As opposed to past years, when most of the attacks were carried out by lone terrorists with no organizational affiliation, this past year many were carried out by network operatives. The attacks also became more deadly, with 31 Israelis killed in 2022, four in 2021.

This past year shootings were the most common form of attack. There were 46 during the year, 54% of the total number (12 in 2021, five in 2020). There were 25 stabbing attacks, 29% of the total (30 in 2021, 19 in 2020). Seven were vehicular ramming attacks, 8% of the total (eight in 2021) and four were combined attacks. In addition, according to official sources, there were 3,075 instances of rock-throwing (7,589 according to the IDF spokesman) and 525 instances of Molotov cocktail-throwing (1,286 according to the IDF spokesman). The discrepancy in the numbers is apparently caused by the IDF’s inclusion of instances of rock and Molotov cocktail-throwing during clashes between Israeli security forces and the Palestinian population during counterterrorism activities, riot dispersal, etc.

Palestinian popular terrorism was accompanied by an increase in nationalist violence on the part of Jewish settlers against Palestinians.
The Gaza Strip

- **In 2022 Israeli territory was hit by 959 rocket and mortar shells fired from the Gaza Strip, 946 of them in August** during Operation Breaking Dawn. The Operation was relatively short and targeted the PIJ in the Gaza Strip, which was planning to attack Israel because of events in Judea and Samaria. As opposed to Operation Guardian of the Walls in May 2021, there was no violence from Judea and Samaria or Israeli Arabs.

- **Activity in the Gaza Strip:**
  - Discounting the rockets and mortar shells fired during the Operation, 13 rockets were fired during the year, 11 before the Operation and two after. Most of them were fired by groups collectively known as "rogue organizations" and for which no claim of responsibility was issued.
  - Along the border, only isolated clashes with IDF forces were recorded.
  - There were no popular terrorism activities, no return marches, balloon launchings or night harassment unit activities.
Hamas, the PIJ and other organizations continued fomenting unrest in Judea and Samaria and encouraging local residents to carry out terrorist attacks. At the same time, the organizations were careful to preserve relative calm in the Gaza Strip, for which Hamas' policies were criticized.

The decline of terrorist activity in the Gaza Strip was most likely the result of Hamas policies to improve the local economic situation – although naturally not at the expense of its military buildup – and insofar as was possible, to avoid another round of fighting with Israel. Yahya al-Sinwar, head of the Hamas political bureau in the Gaza Strip, claimed the movement's order of priorities focused on civilian conditions and a military buildup in preparation for a future round of combat with Israel. The PIJ in the Gaza Strip was relatively restrained during the year, as opposed to its activities in Judea and Samaria, especially in Jenin.

However, the relative quiet in the Gaza Strip is fragile, because Hamas and the PIJ repeatedly threaten that unusual events in Judea and Samaria, especially in Jerusalem, difficulties in transferring aid funds to the Gaza Strip and the worsening of the conditions of the security prisoners in Israeli jails would provide an excuse to renew and/or escalate rocket fire and other terrorist activities.

**Annual Distribution of Rockets Launched from the Gaza Strip**

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Monthly Distribution of Rockets and Mortar Shells 2022

694 rockets and mortar shells fired during Operation Breaking Dawn.
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**The Northern Arena**
Terrorism in Judea, Samaria and East Jerusalem

Overview

Beginning in March 2022 there was a sharp rise in popular terrorism ("popular resistance") attacks in Judea, Samaria and east Jerusalem, as well as a marked rise in the number of attacks carried out inside Israel, what the PA calls the "peaceful popular resistance," a term invented by Mahmoud Abbas to describe Palestinian violence and terrorism. The so-called "popular resistance" is a strategy developed by Fatah and the PA to "struggle" against Israel and includes stabbing, vehicular ramming and shooting attacks. The last year saw a sharp rise in the number of attacks, a trend which began in 2020. A total of 86 significant attacks were carried out, up from 54 in 2021.

Palestinian terrorist attacks killed 31 Israelis in 2022, 25 civilians and six members of the security forces. One Border Police fighter was killed in counterterrorism activities.

The Palestinian leadership and spokesmen continued encouraging popular terrorism, what they refer to as "peaceful popular resistance." It includes hard core and often fatal violence, and is not, as Palestinian leadership rhetoric claims, or as the PA represents it to the West, in any way "peaceful." The "peaceful popular resistance" is characterized by terrorist attacks carried out by lone wolves or local networks and includes the throwing of rocks and Molotov cocktails, shootings, stabbings, vehicular rammings, and combinations of two or more of the above. This past year saw the formation of local, quasi-established networks whose operatives were behind most of the attacks.

The PA supports "popular resistance" attacks and systematically does nothing to condemn, including when they wound or kill Israelis. The PA praises the terrorist operatives and gives their families special treatment, including financial support. This past year Hamas and the PIJ strengthened their position in the Palestinian public as "the defenders of Jerusalem, the sites holy to Islam and the residents of east Jerusalem." At the same time, Hamas' participation in carrying out terrorist attacks was minimal compared to the PIJ and the local networks (the Lion's Den network, the Jenin Battalion, the Nablus Battalion and the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades), which carried out the majority of the attacks and clashed with Israeli security forces.

7 A significant attack is defined by the ITIC as one involving shooting, stabbing, a vehicular attack, the use of IEDs, or a combination of the above. Stones and Molotov cocktails thrown by Palestinians are not included.
The official Palestinian media either ignored the attacks entirely or reported the bare minimum of information and half truths. Often, especially when a terrorist was killed, the media issued false claims of the cause of death ("traffic accident" instead of "vehicular ramming attack", "execution" instead of "killed while shooting at Israeli soldiers," etc.), systematically accusing Israel of "executing" innocent Palestinian civilians and repeatedly calling on the international community to investigate and "protect the Palestinians." In most cases the denials continued even after the circumstances and motives for the attack had been exposed or affiliation with a terrorist organization’s military-terrorist wing had been established.

In the meantime, the PA continues to foster a "shaheed culture" and promote terrorism. It provides political and media support [propaganda campaigns] for popular terrorism and intensive PA media coverage for the topic of the terrorists imprisoned in Israel, relating to them as heroes and role models and glorifying them in both its formal and informal education systems. It pays generous stipends to terrorists in Israeli jails and provides financial aid to the families of shaheeds and prisoners and pays to rebuild the houses of terrorists demolished by the Israeli security forces. Members of the Palestinian and Fatah leaderships attend terrorists' funerals and pay condolence and other calls to the houses of the families of shaheeds, the families are presented with awards, and Mahmoud Abbas calls the families of terrorists who were killed or imprisoned.

The Palestinian terrorists receive sympathy and support from the public and their attacks are widely praised, especially on the social networks. In December 2022 a Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research public opinion poll found that 55% of respondents thought the "armed resistance" [terrorist attacks] should be resumed and 70% supported the formation of the local networks. However, the support does not seem to have been translated into actual enlistment in attacks and apparently remains digital.

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For further information see the weekly Spotlight on Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict bulletins.
Annual Distribution of Significant Popular Terrorism Attacks

Monthly Distribution of Terrorist Attacks, 2022
Types of Attacks
Overview

This past year the most prevalent type of significant attack was the shooting attack, while in the past stabbing attacks were most common. In 2022 there were 46 shooting attacks, 54% of the total number, up from 12 in 2021. There were 25 stabbing attacks, 29% of the total, down from 30 in 2021. Vehicular ramming attacks made up 8% of the total and there were four combined attacks,\(^9\) plus more than 3,000 instances of rock-throwing and 500 of Molotov cocktail-throwing.

\(^9\) The statistics do not include violence during Israeli security force activities, incidents of rock- or Molotov cocktail-throwing, but do include shooting attacks and the use of IEDs, but the ITIC does not have statistical data regarding them.
Distribution of Types of Attacks, 2022

- Stabbings: 25 (29%)
- Vehicular rammings: 7 (8%)
- Shootings: 46 (54%)
- Combined attacks: 4 (5%)
- IEDs: 2 (2%)
- Other: 2 (2%)

Distribution of Types of Attacks, 2021

- Stabbings: 30
- Shootings: 12
- Vehicular rammings: 8
- Combined attacks: 3
- Other: 1
### Various Types of Terrorist Attacks, Annual Percentages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Vehicular attacks</th>
<th>Stabbing attacks</th>
<th>Shooting attacks</th>
<th>Combined attacks</th>
<th>Other</th>
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### Shooting attacks

#### Overview

- In most cases light arms are used, standard or improvised, from ambush or in the open, targeting a single individual or a group, drive-by shootings and sniper fire. For the most part shooting attacks are not spontaneous or attacks of opportunity since they need preparation: acquiring a weapon, training, collecting intelligence, planning a time and place, etc. Because of their relative complexity they usually involve more than one terrorist. In many instances the shooter can leave the scene immediately and on occasion carry out another attack. This past year most of the shooting attacks were carried out by operatives from the new armed local networks. **Generally speaking the PA and Fatah do not publicly consider shooting attacks aspects of the "popular resistance."** Nevertheless, the PA and Fatah do not condemn the shooters, rather they praise and support them.

- **During 2022 there was a marked rise in the number of shooting attacks. There were 46, up from 12 in 2021, and they made up 54% of the total number,** killing 15 Israelis (three in 2021).

- Three shooting attacks were carried out inside Israeli territory, one each in Hadera, Bnei Brak and Tel Aviv. In Kafr Qassem an armed terrorist tried but could not fire his weapon. The most common targets in Judea and Samaria were IDF vehicles, posts and concentrations of

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10 The IDF spokesman reported 285 shooting attacks in 2022, but the figure includes shots fired at Israeli security force during counterterrorism activities, which are not always reported or counted.
soldiers. Civilian buses and taxis were also attacked. A number of targets were attacked more than once, among the Gilboa Crossing and the settlement of Shaked. Only some of the attacks were included in the statistics.

Annual Distribution of Shooting Attacks

Monthly Distribution of Shooting Attacks, 2022
Prominent shooting attacks

On the evening of March 27, 2022, two terrorists drove to Herbert Samuel Street in the central Israeli city of Hadera. They exited the vehicle armed with hand guns and shot two Border Police fighters standing at a bus stop, taking their weapons and using them to continue shooting. Two other individuals were wounded. Undercover Border Police fighters who happened to be at the scene exchanged fire with the terrorists, killing them. Two of the undercover fighters were wounded in the exchange of fire (Israel Police Force spokesman's unit, March 28, 2022). A large quantity of weapons was found in the terrorists' possession.

The terrorists at the scene of the attack (CCTV, March 27, 2022).

For further information see the weekly Spotlight on Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict bulletins.
On **March 29, 2022**, a **Palestinian armed with an M-16 assault rifle** drove to Bnei Brak in central Israel, where he went on a killing spree. On Jabotinsky Street he entered and exited an apartment house. He then entered the building next door, where two stores were located. When he found them empty, he cocked his gun and went out into the street, shooting at a child riding a bicycle and a passerby, missing both times. He walked to a nearby street and shot out windows. He then shot and killed two people standing near a grocery store. After that he shot and killed a man driving a car. He then came face to face with two policemen on a motorcycle who had been dispatched to the site. In the ensuing exchange of fire one of the policemen and the terrorist were shot and killed. Five Israelis were killed in the attack, four civilians and one policeman (Israeli media, March 30, 2022).

![The one of the sites of the terrorist attack in Bnei Brak](image)

On the evening of **April 7, 2022**, a Palestinian armed with a handgun went to a crowded bar on Dizengoff Street in Tel Aviv. He shot at bar patrons from point-blank range, killing two and mortally wounded a third, who died in a hospital, and wounded six others, three of them seriously. He then fled the scene. Early the following morning he was located near a mosque in Jaffa, **where he was shot and killed in an exchange of fire with Israeli security forces**.

On **March 17, 2022**, during a routine Israeli security force operation in the Aqraba area, southeast of Nablus, Palestinians shot at the soldiers. There were no Israeli casualties. The initial investigation indicated that the shots had been fired from an improvised Carlo machine gun. During pursuit of the shooters more shots were fired at the forces, who returned fire (IDF spokesman, March 17, 2022).

On **April 29, 2022**, two armed Palestinians drove to the guard post at the western entrance of Ariel, shot a guard to death and fled the scene (IDF spokesman, April 29, 2022).
On July 28, 2022, three armed Palestinians drove to one of the entrances to Nablus. One of them exited the vehicle and shot at the guard post manned by IDF soldiers, who returned fire, killing him. Another vehicle arrived, took the terrorist's weapon and drove away (IDF spokesman's Twitter account, July 28, 2022).

On the night of August 14, 2022, a Palestinian shot at a bus and other vehicles driving near the Tower of David in east Jerusalem, not far from the Western Wall. Nine Israelis were wounded, three of them critically (Israel Police Force spokesman’s unit, August 14, 2022).
On August 20, 2022, shots were fired from Silwad at a crowded armored Israeli bus en route from Jerusalem to Ariel. No casualties were reported. The shooter escaped (IDF spokesman and the spokesperson for the Benjamin Regional Council, August 20, 2022).

On September 4, 2022, three Palestinian terrorist operatives shot from ambush at an Israeli bus carrying soldiers in the northern Jordan Valley. Driving a pickup, they waited for the bus, pulled out behind it and followed it for a few minutes, passed it, sprayed it with accelerant from a container in the bed of the pickup and threw a Molotov cocktail, stopped in front of the bus to prevent it from driving away and opened fire. The bus driver pulled over to the side of the road and the soldiers on board returned fire. Five soldiers were injured and the civilian driver was critically wounded (Israeli media, September 4, 2022). The terrorists drove away but the accelerant ignited and the pickup caught fire.
On September 13, 2022, shots were fired at Israeli defense ministry engineering equipment operating near the Jalameh Crossing in the Jenin region. No casualties were reported; the equipment was damaged. Thirty shell casings were found (Israeli media, September 13, 2022).

On September 15, 2022, the yeshiva at the settlement of Carmel, southeast of Hebron, was attacked. One Israeli was wounded (IDF spokesman, September 15, 2022).
On **October 2, 2022**, an Israeli bus and taxi were attacked with gunfire between Bayt Furiq and Alon Moreh, east of Nablus. The taxi driver was wounded (IDF spokesman, October 2, 2022).

On **October 8, 2022**, during a routine IDF activity at the Shuafat Crossing, north of Jerusalem, shots were fired at the fighters. The shooter fled to the Shuafat refugee camp. A **female soldier was mortally wounded and later died**, and a security guard was critically wounded (IDF spokesman's Twitter account, October 9, 2022). On **October 19, 2022**, the same Palestinian armed with a handgun drove to the entrance to Ma'aleh Adumim and opened fire at the civilian guards securing the site. The terrorist was killed in the exchange of fire; one of the guards was injured (Ynet, October 19, 2022). It was later discovered that the dead terrorist was **Uday al-Tamimi**, who carried out the shooting attack at the Shuafat Crossing; Israeli security forces had been searching for him for 11 days.

On **October 11, 2022**, a Palestinian terrorist carried out a drive-by shooting targeting an IDF force in the Shavei Shomron area, **killing an IDF soldier**.
On the evening of October 14, 2022, during the Succoth holiday, shots were fired at the settlement of Beit El, northeast of Ramallah. Two armed Palestinian terrorists opened fire and an Israeli sitting outside was wounded by shrapnel.

On October 29, 2022, shots were at a father and son who had gone shopping at a Palestinian store between Hebron and Qiryat Arba. The father was mortally wounded and later died, the son incurred superficial wounds. The terrorist also shot at the emergency rescue team called to the site, critically wounding a volunteer paramedic. A security guard at the site shot and killed the terrorist. Three Israelis were wounded.

On November 10, 2022, shots were fired at the Gilboa Crossing, north of Jenin. The structure was hit (Israeli defense ministry spokesman’s unit, November 10, 2022). On November 17, 2022, shots were fired at the Gilboa Crossing again; no Israeli casualties were reported (Israeli defense ministry spokesman's unit, November 17, 2022).

During 2022 the settlement of Shaked, west of Nablus, was attacked by gunfire five times. No casualties were reported; several buildings were hit. IDF forces searched the area for suspects (IDF spokesman).

**Shooting attacks – prevention**

During the year the Israeli security forces prevented a number of shooting attacks, some of which were planned for inside Israel:

- On August 20, 2022, three Palestinian women from Nablus aroused the suspicions of a security guard at the Eliahu Crossing south of Qalqilya. A search of their vehicle revealed an improvised weapon and suicide notes. They apparently intended to shoot the guards at the Crossing (Israeli Ministry of Defense spokesman's unit, August 20, 2022).

![The weapon found in the vehicle](image-url)
On September 8, 2022, a man aroused the suspicions of Border Police fighters in Jaffa's Clock Square and he was detained. Interrogation revealed he was from Nablus and was in Israel illegally, armed with a Carlo improvised machinegun, ammunition and two pipe bombs full of nails. He said he had come to kill soldiers (Israel Police Force spokesman's unit, September 8, 2022).

Right: The weapons found in the Palestinian's possession (Israel Police Force Facebook page, September 8, 2022). Left: Headband reading "Lion's Den" (Israel Police Force Twitter account, September 8, 2022).

**Stabbing attacks**

**Overview**

- Until 2022 stabbing attacks were the most prevalent form of popular terrorism. They were generally carried out by lone terrorists with no network or Palestinian terrorist organization affiliation, sometimes by women. Such attacks are easy to carry out and do not require planning and in most cases are carried out using weapons found in every home, such as knives, screwdrivers and scissors, or axes, meat cleavers, or any sharp instrument. Stabbing attacks also have drawbacks, in that the number of victims is generally small compared to shooting or vehicular ramming attacks, and the chances that the terrorist will be harmed or killed, or that they attack will be prevented, are fairly large.

- In 2022 the number of stabbing attacks declined compared to 2021, with 25 carried out; 30 in 2021 and 19 in 2020. Stabbing attacks accounted for 29% of the total number, down from 56% in 2021. Eight were carried out inside Israeli territory, three of them in Jerusalem. However, they were more lethal, killing 11 Israeli civilians during the year. The worst attack was carried out, exceptionally by two terrorists who killed four people in the city of Elad on the evening of Independence Day.
Many stabbing attacks were prevented during the year when terrorists were stopped by Israeli security forces, who searched vehicles and individuals at crossings or road blocks and found knives or other sharp instruments.

Annual Distribution of Stabbing Attacks

Monthly Distribution of Stabbing Attacks, 2022
The deadliest stabbing attack was carried out in the city of Elad, northeast of Ben-Gurion International Airport, on May 5, 2022, the evening of Independence Day, by two terrorists from a village near Jenin who employed a knife and an axe. They killed four civilians and wounded four, two of them critically. They began after being given a ride to the city by an Elad resident, first killing the driver, then two others, and then wounded four. They escaped through a hole in the fence around the city and entered a nearby forest, at which point all trace of them disappeared. Sixty hours later they were found.

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**Prominent stabbing attacks**

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**For further information see the weekly Spotlight on Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict bulletins.**

**For further information see the May 9, 2022 bulletin, "Terrorist attack in Elad Three Israeli civilians killed and four wounded. Hamas again praises and encourages terrorist attacks in Judea and Samaria while preserving relative calm in the Gaza Strip."**
On January 17, 2022, there was an attempted stabbing attack near the Gush Etzion Junction. A Palestinian passenger exited a vehicle armed with a knife, ran towards soldiers and civilians who were waiting for a bus and tried to stab one of the soldiers, who shot and killed him. The driver escaped in the vehicle (IDF spokesman, January 17, 2022).

Before dawn on March 6, 2022, a Palestinian from east Jerusalem went to the Lions' Gate, northeast of the Old City, armed with a knife. He attacked police stationed at the site, who shot and killed him. Two policemen were wounded (Israel Police Force Twitter account, March 6, 2022).
On **March 7, 2022**, a Palestinian armed with a knife went from the Temple Mount to the area of the Cotton Merchants’ Gate in the Old City, and attacked police stationed at the site, who shot and killed him. Two policemen were wounded (Israel Police Force spokesman's unit, March 7, 2022).

On **March 19, 2022**, a young Palestinian armed with a knife stabbed an Israeli **at the corner of David Remez and Hebron Streets in West Jerusalem**. The Israeli was evacuated to a hospital. The stabber was shot and seriously wounded (Israel Police Force spokesman's unit, March 19, 2022).

At 9:10 in the morning on **March 31, 2022**, a Palestinian armed with a screwdriver got on a bus near Naveh Daniel in Gush Etzion, and stabbed a passenger. An armed civilian passenger shot and killed him (IDF spokesman, March 31, 2022).

On the morning of **April 12, 2022**, an officer in the Israeli police force was stabbed at a construction site in Ashqelon. He was on duty at the time and examining a Palestinian from
Hebron who had roused his suspicions. During the security check the Palestinian took out a knife and stabbed the policeman, who shot and killed him (Israel Police Force spokesman’s unit, April 12, 2022).

Right: The knife used in the attack in Ashqelon (Israel Police Force spokesman's unit, April 12, 2022). Left: The screwdriver used in the attack in Gush Etzion (Israel Police Force spokesman’s unit, March 13, 2022).

► On the afternoon of April 15, 2022, a father from Haifa reported that his 15 year-old daughter was planning an attack in Jerusalem. In the meantime, a man was reported wounded in an attack in a Haifa park. Police arriving at the scene found a young woman holding a knife; she was detained (Israel Police Force spokesman's unit, April 15, 2022).

► On May 17, 2022, a Palestinian armed with a knife ran at soldiers securing the Hawwara area, south of Nablus. He was shot and wounded (IDF spokesman, May 17, 2022).

► On July 19, 2022, a Palestinian passenger on a bus in the Ramot neighborhood of Jerusalem stabbed a Jewish passenger with a screwdriver. The driver stopped the bus and everyone got off. A civilian passerby who realized what was happening shot and wounded the Palestinian. A passenger was seriously wounded and evacuated to a hospital.

► On September 2, 2022, a Palestinian armed with a knife hidden in a prayer rug went to an IDF post at the Bayt A’innon Junction near Kiryat Arba, where he stabbed and seriously wounded a soldier. Another soldier at the post shot and killed the Palestinian (Rescue Without Borders in Judea and Samaria, September 2, 2022).
On October 2, 2022, a young Palestinian woman from Nablus went to visit her brother, an administrative detainee in the Rimon Prison. During a security check she attacked and wounded a woman guard with half a pair of scissors. The guard and an officer overcame her (Israeli Security Agency spokesman’s unit, October 2, 2022).

On October 22, 2022, near French Hill in Jerusalem, a Palestinian stabbed an Israeli man in the back, critically wounding him. The Palestinian then fled. Forces arriving at the scene closed the area and began looking for the stabber. He was found by a policeman in a soccer field near Sheikh Jarrah, about a kilometer from the site of the attack, and threatened the policeman with the knife. He was shot and wounded (Israel Police Force Twitter account, October 22, 2022).
The knife used in the attack near French Hill

(Israel Police Force Twitter account, October 22, 2022).

On October 25, 2022, a Palestinian went to the region of Funduq, a village east of Qalqilya, and stabbed and critically wounded an Israeli who had just left a store. The Palestinian then fled. The Israeli called for assistance and IDF forces gave him first aid, and then evacuated him to a hospital, where he later succumbed to his wounds. Several hours later the terrorist was detained and taken for interrogation (IDF spokesman Telegram channel, October 25, 2022).

On the morning of November 3, 2022, a Palestinian armed with a knife walked from the Damascus Gate to the Muslim Quarter of east Jerusalem, where he aroused the suspicions of police forces and Border Police fighters stationed at the site. Halted for a security check, he took out the knife and stabbed a policeman. He was shot and killed; three policemen were wounded (Israel Police Force Twitter account, November 3, 2023).

Stabbing attacks – prevention

Many stabbing attacks were prevented by the Israeli security forces in 2022, generally during security checks at the crossings, where knives were found. Examples:

- On April 6, 2022, three Palestinians from Nablus were checked by Border Police fighters in the Old City of Jerusalem. One of them had a knife and it fell on the ground as he was being examine (Israel Police Force spokesman’s unit, April 6, 2022).
- On May 13, 2022, a Palestinian from Tulkarm was detained in Tzur Yitzhak, east of Kfar Saba. A knife and suicide note were found in his possession. During interrogation he admitted he was planning a stabbing attack to revenge the death of his brother, who had died in a traffic accident nearby (Israel Police Force spokesman’s unit, May 14, 2022).
- On the night of May 15, 2022, police at the Tapuah Junction halted a suspicious Palestinian vehicle. An axe and a suicide note were found in the driver’s possession.
During interrogation he said he had driven around looking for Israelis standing alone whom he could kill to avenge the death of his friends.


On June 2, 2022, policemen on the Temple Mount saw a Palestinian who aroused their suspicions. A knife was found in his possession. Interrogation revealed he had planned to enter the Temple Mount compound for World Jerusalem Day and carry out a stabbing attack (Israel Police Force spokesman's unit, June 2, 2022).

On August 27, 2022, Crossing Authority security guards detained a suspicious Palestinian at the Reihan Crossing west of Jenin. A knife was found in his possession (Israeli Ministry of Defense spokesman’s unit, August 27, 2022).

On September 11, 2022, Border Police fighters at the al-Jib Crossing, northwest of Jerusalem, halted a Palestinian woman holding a knife and walking towards the Crossing in the vehicle lane (Israel Police Force spokesman’s unit, September 11, 2022).
Right: The knife found in the possession of the Palestinian at the entrance to the Temple Mount compound (Israel Police Force spokesman's unit, June 2, 2022). Left: The knife carried by the woman at the al-Jib Crossing (Israel Police Force spokesman's unit, September 11, 2022).

On October 25, 2022, Israeli security forces at the Qalandiya Crossing saw a suspicious Palestinian holding a bag and walking towards them in the vehicle lane. They called on him to halt and when they approached him he tried to run away but was apprehended and threw the bag on the ground. It was found to contain a knife. During interrogation he admitted he was planning a stabbing attack (Israel Police Force spokesman's unit, October 25, 2022).

The knife found in the Palestinian's possession (Israel Police Force spokesman's unit, Qalandiya Crossing, October 25, 2022).

Vehicular ramming attacks

Overview

Vehicular ramming attacks are one form of what the PA calls the "peaceful popular resistance." Usually only the driver is present. Most of the attacks are spontaneous and do not require previous preparation, which makes them difficult to prevent. Among the main
targets are concentrations of Israeli security forces securing roads or crossings. Occasionally knives and/or guns were found in the vehicles used in the attacks, which may indicate plans to carry out combined attacks (see below). Vehicular ramming attacks have the potential to be mass-casualty attacks, and the chances of the terrorist surviving the attack are relatively high.

**Seven vehicular ramming attacks were carried out in 2022, eight in 2021 and six in 2020.**
In 2022 they all targeted concentrations of Israeli security forces or IDF soldiers waiting for buses. Two civilians were killed in the attacks.

**Annual Distribution of Vehicular Ramming Attacks**
Prominent vehicular ramming attacks\textsuperscript{14}

- On January 11, 2022, a Palestinian drove to the Halamish region, northwest of Ramallah. He sped towards a group of IDF fighters securing the road and rammed into one of them. He was apprehended (IDF spokesman, January 11, 2022).

\textsuperscript{14} For further information see the weekly Spotlight on Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict bulletins.
On March 7, 2022, Border Police fighters operating in Silat al-Harithiya, northwest of Jenin, saw a vehicle speeding towards them which subsequently hit their armored vehicle. Two Border Police fighters were injured and the vehicle was damaged. The Palestinian, suspected of carrying out a vehicular ramming attack, was detained (Israel Police Force spokesman's unit, March 7, 2022).

The terrorist’s vehicle (Israel Police Force spokesman's unit, March 8, 2022).

On September 24, 2022, during a routine Israeli security force operation near Havat Gilad, east of Qalqilya, the forces saw a suspicious vehicle which sped towards and tried to ram into them. He driver was shot and killed; a policeman was injured (IDF spokesman, September 24, 2023).

The scene of the attack (Ma’an, September 24, 2022).

On the night of October 2, 2022, Israeli security forces operated in the Jilazoun refugee camp, near Ramallah, to detain a wanted Palestinian. As they forces left the camp three Palestinians drove their vehicles at the forces, who responded with gunfire, killing two of the drivers (Israeli media, October 3, 2023).

On October 30, 2022, a Palestinian rammed into a group of soldiers waiting for a bus at the Nebi Musa Junction, east of Jerusalem. He then drove towards another group of soldiers at
the Almog Junction. He was shot and killed. Five soldiers were injured in the attacks (IDF Twitter account, October 30, 2022).

Scenes from the two vehicular ramming attacks (Shehab Twitter account, October 30, 2022).

On **November 29, 2022**, a Palestinian rammed into a female IDF soldier near the settlement of Kokhav Yaakov, southeast of Ramallah, seriously injuring her. He drove away towards Ofra. When he saw a police roadblock in front of him he made a U-turn and continued towards Givat Asaf. He was chased by police who shot and killed him. His vehicle hit a guard rail and found to contain a knife (Israeli media, November 29, 2022).

The vehicle involved in the attack (QudsN Twitter account, November 29, 2023).

**IED attacks**

During 2022 there were two instances of IEDs used to attacks specific targets. IEDs were also thrown at Israeli vehicles driving on the roads in Judea and Samaria and at Israeli forces during operational activities. Many IED attacks were prevented because the devices were found before they exploded. According to official sources, 116 IEDs were placed but the lack of a systematic database made it impossible to include them in this report. **The most prominent IED attack was the virtually simultaneous detonation of two devices in west Jerusalem, in which two Israelis were killed, an attack inspired by ISIS.** The IDF spokesman did not include them in his summary of terrorist attacks for 2022.
IED attacks

At around seven o’clock on the morning of November 23, 2022, an IED exploded at a bus stop in Jerusalem at the exit to Tel Aviv. About half an hour later another IED exploded at the Ramot Junction in northern Jerusalem. The first explosion killed a 15 year-old Israeli yeshiva student and wounded a man who later died (Israeli media, November 23, 2022). On November 27, 2022, the Israeli security forces revealed information about the terrorist responsible for the attack. He was from east Jerusalem and had no previous security charges, worked alone and was inspired by ISIS’s Salafist-jihadist ideology, although he was not affiliated with the organization.


On September 4, 2022, an IED was thrown at an IDF post near the village of Nebi Saleh, northwest of Ramallah. Four soldiers were wounded by shrapnel (IDF spokesman, September 4, 2022).

Combined attacks

Attacks of two or more types (vehicular ramming and stabbing attack, stabbing and shooting attack, etc.) are referred to as combined attacks. Despite their relative complexity many are carried out by lone terrorists. During 2022 there were four combined attacks, up from three in 2021. They all included vehicular ramming attacks, three with stabbing attacks and one with a shooting attack. Two were carried out inside Israeli territory, one in Beersheba and the other in Kafr Qassem.

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15 For further information see the weekly Spotlight on Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict bulletins.
16 For further information see the November 28, 2022 bulletin, “Palestinian reactions to the double terrorist attack in Jerusalem (November 23, 2022).”
17 For further information see the weekly Spotlight on Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict bulletins.
The combined stabbing attacks were the following:

**Stabbing and vehicular ramming attack:** On March 22, 2022, a Bedouin drove to a gas station on the Hebron-Beersheba road, exited the vehicle and stabbed a man at the site. He drove on towards Beersheba and stopped at a crowded shopping mall, exited the vehicle and stabbed two more people, reentered the vehicle and drove away in the wrong lane, hitting and killing a man riding a motorcycle. When he exited the vehicle again he was shot and killed by two armed civilians. He killed four Israelis, two men and two women, and wounded two women (Israeli media, March 22, 2022).

**Stabbing and vehicular ramming attack:** On November 2, 2022, a Palestinian drove his vehicle to the Israeli side of the Maccabi Crossing, west of Ramallah, where he tried to run over an IDF officer. He exited the vehicle armed with an axe and attacked and critically wounded the officer, who shot and killed him (IDF spokesman's Twitter account, November 2, 2022).

![The site of the attack at the Maccabi Crossing (CCTV picture, November 2, 2022).](image)

**Stabbing and vehicular ramming attack:** On November 15, 2022, a Palestinian went to the entrance of the Ariel industrial zone and stabbed two Israelis to death. He hijacked an Israeli vehicle at the gas station and began driving, swerving onto the shoulder of the road to hit and kill an Israeli civilian. He exited the vehicle and stabbed and critically wounded another civilian. A civilian driving on the road saw the incident and stopped to help. The terrorist hijacked his vehicle and drove until he saw an IDF post. When he saw soldiers he made a U-turn, drove in the wrong lane and hit another vehicle. In the ensuing traffic jam he exited the vehicle and tried to escape on foot. Soldiers and civilians shot and killed him (Ynet, November 15, 2022)
Shooting and vehicular ramming attack: On December 23, 2022, a resident of Kafr Qassem called for police assistance to settle an incident of domestic violence. When the police arrived the resident exited his house holding a gun and tried to shoot the policemen, but the safety catch was still engaged. He threw rocks and Molotov cocktails at the police and then entered his vehicle and drove in reverse to ram into them. Three policemen were injured. More police were dispatched to the site, one of whom shot and killed the terrorist (Israel Police Force Facebook page, December 23, 2022).

Other attacks

Hammer attack: On September 8, 2022, a Palestinian armed with a hammer attacked a soldier at an IDF post near the village of Baytin, northeast of Ramallah. Another soldier at the site shot and killed him. A knife was found on the terrorist’s body. The soldier who had been attacked was evacuated for medical treatment (IDF spokesman, September 8, 2022).
Right: The hammer used to attack the IDF soldier. Left: The knife found in the terrorist's possession (IDF spokesman, September 8, 2022).

- **Israeli woman killed in Holon**: On September 20, 2022, the body of a woman was found near her home in the central Israeli city of Holon. Investigation revealed she had been bludgeoned to death by a Palestinian motivated by nationalist sentiments. The following day his body was found in Tel Aviv; he had committed suicide (Ynet, September 20 and 21, 2022).

- **Synagogue torched**: On November 15, 2022, the Mitzpe Ziv synagogue in Hebron was torched (Israel Fire and Rescue Services spokesman's unit, November 15, 2022).
Incidence of rock-throwing\textsuperscript{18}

During 2022 there was a marked rise in the incidence of rock-throwing. According to official sources, there were 3,075 incidents, up from 1,691 in 2021. According to IDF statistics, there were 7,589 incidents, which includes rocks thrown during riots and clashes with Israeli security forces and during counterterrorism activities. In addition, not every incident is reported, so there were scores if not hundreds more. This past year the focal points for rock-throwing were Gush Etzion, north of Hebron, east of Qalqilya, northeast of Ramallah and the area around Nablus.

Rocks, as well as Molotov cocktails, are thrown at Israeli vehicles driving on the roads in Judea and Samaria on a daily basis, and are one of the most prevalent components of the "peaceful popular resistance" [popular terrorism]. Rock-throwers are generally young, often children and adolescents who are not terrorist organization operatives but rather influenced by the general atmosphere of anti-Israeli incitement. Throwing rocks is easy because the material is readily available and no planning is necessary. Even preparing Molotov cocktails is relatively simple.

The ITIC does not categorize the throwing of rocks or Molotov cocktails as "significant attacks." Most incidents do not cause bodily harm. However, in certain instances Israelis were seriously injured and in the past killed.\textsuperscript{19} Beyond the danger of loss of life, throwing

\textsuperscript{18} Given the lack of a national database, the ITIC does not systematically chronicle incidents in which rocks, Molotov cocktails and bottles of paint are thrown and relies mainly on security sources. Prominent attacks are reported in the weekly Spotlight on Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict bulletins.

\textsuperscript{19} On September 14, 2015, an Israeli civilian was killed when rocks were thrown at his vehicle near the Arnona neighborhood in southern Jerusalem. The attack led to a heart attack which caused him to lose control of this vehicle. He swerved and hit a pole. He was pronounced dead at the hospital. Two female passengers in the vehicle at the time were wounded (Ynet, September 14, 2015).
objects at vehicles on the roads disrupts daily life in Judea and Samaria, undermines the personal security of local residents, makes it difficult for the Israeli security forces and sometimes the rescue forces to carry out their routine operations.

Annual Distribution of the Incidence of Rock-Throwing

- On occasion rocks are thrown from passing cars, which increases the force of the hit. Rocks and Molotov cocktails target mainly the following:
  - **Israeli security forces** engaged in operational activities in the cities and villages in Judea and Samaria and in the neighborhoods of east Jerusalem or during Palestinian riots and demonstrations.
  - **Israeli security force positions**, posts and roadblocks in Judea and Samaria.
  - **Israeli private vehicles driving on the roads** in Judea and Samaria.
  - **Public vehicles**, such as buses carrying children and ambulances.
  - **Jewish settlements** in Judea, Samaria and east Jerusalem and neighborhoods and houses where Jews live.

- Examples of the danger inherent in rock-throwing and the damage caused:

Injured hand and damage done to the vehicle by a rock thrown north of Kiryat Arba (Rescue Without Borders in Judea and Samaria, July 2, 2022).

Right: Truck windshield broken by a rock near Hable, south of Qalqilya (Rescue Without Borders in Judea and Samaria, February 6, 2022). Left: Bus windshield shattered by a rock in Gush Etzion (Ma’aleh Amos security unit, March 20, 2022).


Israeli bus attacked with rocks thrown by Palestinians near the Western Wall (Twitter account of photojournalist Hassan Aslih, April 17, 2022).
incidence Molotov cocktails and bottles of paint thrown at Israeli vehicles

In addition to throwing rocks, the many incidents of throwing Molotov cocktails and bottles of paint are also part of what the PA calls "peaceful popular resistance." Bottles are filled with accelerant, gasoline or paint, accessible and easily prepared. Like rocks, they are mostly thrown at Israel vehicles. Sometimes they are thrown at IDF posts or the fences of settlements in Judea and Samaria. Molotov cocktails often cause fires. In a decision handed down in June 2016 the Israeli Supreme Court noted the danger inherent in throwing Molotov cocktails at vehicles, equating it with the use of firearms which can cost lives. The Court also imposed punishment for preparing Molotov cocktails (June 20, 2016).
According to official sources, in 2022 there were 525 incidents of Molotov cocktails and/or paint bottles, up from 349 in 2021. According to the IDF spokesman, there were 1,268 incidents, a figure which apparently includes the incidence in demonstrations, riots and operational activities. In addition, many such attacks go unreported.

Notice on the Hamas website following Molotov cocktail attacks against IDF posts with the objective of encouraging more. The Arabic reads, "Burn your enemies."

Annual Distribution of Molotov Cocktails

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<th>Year</th>
<th>Incidents</th>
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</table>
Incidents involving Molotov cocktails

On September 10 and 11, 2022, there were several incidents in which Molotov cocktails were thrown, including three on the road from Hebron to Kiryat Arba, five at vehicles on the road between the al-Khader Junction and Beitar, west of Bethlehem, and at the guard post at the entrance to Bayt Ummar (Rescue Without Borders in Judea and Samaria, September 10 and 11, 2022).

Molotov cocktails thrown at Israeli vehicles on the Gush Etzion-Hebron road burn on the ground (Rescue Without Borders in Judea and Samaria, March 14, 2022).

IDF activities to counter Palestinians throwing rocks and Molotov cocktails

This past year a policy of no tolerance continued against Palestinians who threw rocks and Molotov cocktails. The Israeli security forces carried out ambushes and detentions in locations frequently used for attacks, and occasionally used live fire. On December 19, 2021, the IDF updated the orders for opening fire. The new orders enabled IDF soldiers to shoot at Palestinians throwing rocks and Molotov cocktails even if they were trying to run away. However, the shots have to be fired immediately after or very close to the incident (Israeli media, December 19, 2021). Apparently in most instances the measure is not effective because the attacks take place in crowded areas which make it easy for the terrorists to escape. In addition, the proliferation of arenas in which the forces have to operate makes it difficult to counter the attacks.
In 2022 the focal points of popular terrorism shifted to Nablus and Jenin, where Israeli security forces carried out intensive counterterrorism activities. There was also a rise in the number of attacks inside Israel. The main areas of terrorist activity were the following:

- **Northern Samaria, especially around Nablus and Jenin:** Thirty-three terrorist attacks were carried out, 23 in the Nablus area and ten near Jenin. The concentration of terrorist attacks in the area was caused by the Israeli security forces’ intensive activities as part of Operation Wave Breaker, which led to extensive friction between the forces and local terrorist operatives. The establishment of the local networks (the Jenin Battalion, the Nablus Battalion, the AAMB Battalion) also contributed to the rise in the number of terrorist attacks. A rise in attacks in the Nablus area was noted as far back as 2021.

- **The greater Jerusalem area:** Unlike previous years, when the greater Jerusalem area was the preferred region for terrorist attacks, this past year it was less central, although several attacks were carried out in west Jerusalem. In 2022 there were a total of 15 terrorist attacks in the greater Jerusalem area, four in neighborhoods in the west: one IED and three stabbing attacks.

- **Israel:** This past year there was a sharp rise in the number of terrorist attacks inside Israeli territory, 16 in total. Three were inspired by ISIS and most were in the large cities of Beersheba, Hadera, Tel Aviv and Jerusalem.

- **In and around Hebron:** Seven attacks were carried out. For years the Jewish and Palestinian populations of Hebron have lived uneasily with each other and the region is a target for terrorist attacks. The Israeli security forces also prevented many attacks, mostly stabbing attacks, by finding knives in the possession of Palestinians at the roadblocks in the city and at the entrance to the Cave of the Patriarchs.
Focal Points for Terrorist Attacks, 2022

In 2022 the number of terrorist attacks inside Israel rose sharply after in recent years there had been almost none, a total of 16, up from one in 2021. Four were in Jerusalem, and three, one each in Beersheba, Hadera and west Jerusalem were inspired by the global jihad.

Attacks inside Israel

- In 2022 the number of terrorist attacks inside Israel rose sharply after in recent years there had been almost none, a total of 16, up from one in 2021. Four were in Jerusalem, and three, one each in Beersheba, Hadera and west Jerusalem were inspired by the global jihad.
Nineteen Israelis were killed in the attacks, 16 civilians and three members of the Israeli security forces.

The attacks inside Israel were the following:

**Beersheba, March 22, 2022:** A Bedouin from Hura in the Negev drove to a gas station in Beersheba, exited his vehicle and stabbed a Israeli civilian to death. From there he drove to a crowded shopping mall in the center of the city, where he stabbed two more civilians. Escaping from the scene of the attack he hit a motorcycle, killing its rider. When he exited his vehicle again, armed with a knife, two civilians shot and killed him. **He killed four civilians, two women and two men, and wounded two women** (Israeli media, March 22, 2022). The attack was inspired by ISIS.

![Terrorist Muhammad Abu al-Qi'an armed with a knife (Dunia al-Watan, March 22, 2022).](image)

**Hadera, evening of March 27, 2022:** Two terrorists drove to Herbert Samuel Street in Hadera, exited the vehicle armed with handguns and shot and killed two Border Police fighters; two civilians were wounded. The terrorists took the Border Police fighters’ guns and used them to continue shooting. Fighters from the Border Police Undercover Unit who happened to be at the location exchanged fire with the terrorists, killing them. **Two Border Police fighters were killed and five were injured** (Israel Police Force spokesman’s unit, March 28, 2022). The terrorists were Israeli Arabs affiliated with the global jihad.

**Bnei Brak, March 29, 2022:** A Palestinian armed with an assault rifle drove to Bnei Brak and shot at a child riding a bicycle and a passerby, missing both. He walked to a nearby street and shot out windows; seeing two people standing nearby he shot and killed them. Then he shot and killed the driver of a moving vehicle. He turned a corner, shot at a man pushing a baby carriage and ran down another street where he came
upon two policemen who had been dispatched to the site. One of the policemen and the terrorist were killed in the ensuing gunfight. A total of five Israelis were killed, four civilians and one policeman (Israeli media, March 30, 2022).

Tel Aviv, evening of April 7, 2022: A Palestinian armed with a handgun went to a crowded pub on Dizengoff Street in Tel Aviv and shot at people sitting at tables outside, killing two and mortally wounding one, who later died in a hospital. He wounded six others, three of them critically, and then fled. The next morning he was found near a mosque in Jaffa, and shot and killed in an exchange of fire with the Israeli security forces who had located him.

Ashqelon, morning of April 12, 2022: A police officer carried out a security check of a suspicious Palestinian at a construction site, and during the examination the Palestinian took out a knife and wounded him. The police officer shot and killed him. Investigation revealed the Palestinian was 40 years old and came from Hebron (Israel Police Force spokesman's unit, April 12, 2022).
Haifa, afternoon of April 15, 2022: A father reported that his 15 year-old daughter was planning an attack in Jerusalem. In the meantime a report was received of a stabbing attack in a park in Haifa in which a civilian was wounded. Arriving at the scene police found a girl holding a knife and detained her (Israel Police Force spokesman's unit, April 15, 2022).

Kafr Qassem, before dawn on December 23, 2022: A resident of the village called the police for assistance in dealing with an issue of domestic violence. When the police arrived he exited his house holding a gun intending to shoot but the safety catch was engaged. He then threw Molotov cocktails and rocks at the police, after which he got into his vehicle and drove in reverse in an attempt to ram into them. Three policemen were injured.

Jerusalem, morning of November 23, 2022, double IED attack: An IED exploded at the bus stop at the exit from Jerusalem to Tel Aviv, and about half an hour later another IED exploded at the Ramot Junction in northern Jerusalem. A 15 year-old yeshiva student was killed in the first explosion and another civilian was wounded and died a few days later. Twenty civilians were wounded, some of them critically. According to Israeli security sources, the devices were placed inside backpacks left at the sites and detonated by remote control, and judging by the nature of the devices they came from the same source (Israeli media, November 23, 2022). It was later discovered that the attacks were carried out by an ISIS-inspired resident of east Jerusalem.

The Lethality of the Attacks

In 2022 there was also a sharp rise in the number of people killed in terrorist attacks: 31, up from three in 2021. Twenty-five were civilians and six were members of the Israeli security forces, and one Border Police fighter was killed on May 13, 2022, during an operational activity in the Burqin region. Twenty Israelis were killed on attacks carried out inside Israel, 17 of them civilians and three members of the security forces.

For further information see the November 29, 2022 bulletin, “Palestinian reactions to the double terrorist attack in Jerusalem (November 23, 2022).”
Of the 86 terrorist attacks carried out in 2022, the ITIC has information about 58 attacks carried out by 64 terrorist operatives. Regarding the others the ITIC has no information about their identity (terrorists who were detained about whom no information was related or who managed to escape from the scene of the attack and have not yet been caught). Twenty-eight attacks, primarily shooting attacks, have not been solved.

An analysis of the facts regarding terrorists for whom the ITIC does have information revealed the following:

- **Gender**: 94% of the attacks were carried out by men and 6% by women (four in number), most of whom carried out stabbing attacks. In addition, many women were apprehended before they could attack when their weapons (knives for the most part) were discovered in security checks. In an exceptional incident, three Palestinian women from Nablus were detained at the Eliahu Crossing, south of Qalqilya, with an improvised machine gun and suicide notes in their vehicle. They were apparently planning a shooting attack (Israeli Ministry of Defense spokesman's unit, August 20, 2022).
Gender Distribution of Palestinian Terrorists

Organizational affiliation: Unlike previous years, when most of the attacks were carried out by lone terrorists, this past year most belonged to local organizations or networks and not to the familiar established terrorist organizations. Of the 64 terrorists whose identity is known to the ITIC, the organizational affiliation of 34 is known. Fourteen belonged to the AAMB, six to the Lion’s Den network, six to Hamas, two the Nablus Battalion and one to the Jenin Battalion. Four, as noted, had ISIS affiliation.

Distribution of the Terrorists' Organizational Affiliation, 2022
**Age:** Most of the terrorists were relatively young. Of the 42 for whom we have information, 24 were between the ages of 13 and 25, 13 between 13 and 20 and 11 between 21 and 25. Their young age may indicate the frustration of the younger generation and their susceptibility to the influence of the social networks.

**Distribution of the Terrorists' Ages, 2022**

**Distribution of the Terrorists' Ages, 2021**
Residence: The ITIC has information about the residences of 51 of the terrorists, who came from many different locations: six came from Jerusalem, five from Nablus, four from Jenin and three from Hebron. They did not always carry out attacks near where they lived.

**Distribution of Terrorists' Place of Residence, 2022**

Other Violence

Public disturbances

- In addition to popular terrorism attacks, this past year demonstrations, protests, public disturbances, riots and clashes with Israeli security forces continued in Judea, Samaria and east Jerusalem. Most of the confrontations were the result of friction with Israeli security forces during events such as Jewish worshippers entering the Temple Mount compound or the Tomb of Joseph in Nablus, the demolishing of terrorists' houses or Israeli security force counterterrorism activities. Some of the confrontations occurred during organized demonstrations and protest marches. A large number of Palestinians were killed in the riots, especially during Israeli security forces counterterrorism activities in northern Samaria.
Despite the increase in local friction, the Palestinian response to leadership calls to participate in protests, whether routine (the weekly protests) or prepared ad hoc (anniversaries, "days of rage") continued to be relatively poor. Many events had turnouts of only a few dozen participants. The weekly protests at the traditional sites of Bila'in and Ni'lin were weak and without exceptional event.

The small number of specific protests, mainly dealing with religious events and/or sites holy to Islam, drew smaller crowds. During the year events for Ramadan and related to Sheikh Jarrah in east Jerusalem had significant turnouts.

Friction points

The Tomb of Joseph in Nablus\textsuperscript{21} was one of the most frequent sites for friction this past year, primarily because of the tension in the area generated by Israeli security force counterterrorism activities. The clashes focused on the visits of Jewish worshippers to the Tomb and were directed against the Jews and the security forces who secured them as they entered the site. The Tomb was torched and vandalized several times.

The Muslim religious month of Ramadan was also a period of friction and mounting tension. It began in April along with Passover and Easter. Clashes increased between Israeli security forces and Palestinians in east Jerusalem and al-Aqsa mosque, but did not reach the seriousness of 2021, which led to Operation Guardian of the Walls. This past year most of the

\textsuperscript{21} The Tomb of Joseph is a structure located in the southeastern part of Nablus where, according to tradition, the tomb of Joseph, son on Yaakov, is located. In Judaism it is considered the burial place of a holy man. According to Oslo Accords B in 1995, after the Palestinians recognized the Jewish nature of the tomb and its importance to Jews, the site was determined an Israeli security enclave within Area A, which is under full Palestinian control. Visits to the site are possible only with IDF authorization and IDF force escort.
clashes were the result of Palestinian efforts to keep Jews from entering the Temple Mount compound. Despite the events Israel did not close the compound to Muslims who came to pray and allowed the prayers to be held regularly.

During Ramadan the area around the Damascus Gate in east Jerusalem was a focal point for clashes between young Palestinians and Israeli security forces. Palestinians gathered every evening, but unlike the previous year tensions were lower and events were less violent.

Right: Muslims at the prayers of the third Friday of Ramadan, 2022 (Twitter account of photojournalist Hassan Aslih, April 22, 2022). Left: Palestinians wave Hamas flags on the Temple Mount (Paldf Twitter account, April 22, 2023).

The Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood in east Jerusalem was also focal point for clashes, following the attempt to evacuate the Arab residents. It led to tension and violent confrontations between the Jewish and Arab residents and the Arabs and the Israeli security forces. The Sheikh Jarrah events enraged the Palestinians and led Hamas to threaten escalation (Hamas Telegram channel, February 14, 2022).
The Flag March, held in Jerusalem on May 29, 2022, is a traditional event held annually on Israel's Jerusalem Day. Despite the tension on the ground and the fact that the Flag March in 2021 was an excuse for the Palestinians to increase escalation (leading to Operation Guardian of the Walls), the Israeli minister of the interior allowed the Flag March to pass through the Damascus Gate and the Muslim neighborhoods in east Jerusalem. The Palestinian organizations issued threats and warned of the consequences of holding the Flag March and the presence of Jews on the Temple Mount, however, almost no exceptional events were recorded. There were clashes in east Jerusalem and a number of other locations in Judea and Samaria between Israeli security forces and Palestinians, but they were relatively limited.
Jewish settler violence against Palestinians

During 2022 a number of violent incidents of Jewish settlers against Palestinians were recorded in Judea and Samaria. For example, in January 2022 several Palestinian vehicles were torched near Burin in the Nablus area (Israel Police Force spokesman's unit for the Judea and Samaria district, January 22, 2022). Palestinian vehicles were damaged in the village of Qiram north of the Ariel area (Israel Police Force spokesman's unit for the Judea and Samaria district, January 23, 2022), and vehicles and stores were damaged in Hawwara (Israel Police Force spokesman's unit for the Judea and Samaria district, January 24, 2022). There were also incidents of violence in Homes (March 14, 2022) and the al-Bireh industrial zone (March 22, 2022), etc.

Windows of Palestinian vehicle smashed in Hawwara (Paldf Twitter account, January 24, 2022).
Left: Spray-painted Palestinian vehicle (Shehab Twitter account, January 23, 2022).

Israeli Security Force Counterterrorism Activities

Overview

The increase in terrorist attacks led to a significant increase in Israeli security force counterterrorism activities. According to reports from the IDF spokesman, in 2022 there were 3,266 administrative detentions and 2,672 suspects were detained for terrorist activities. In addition, the Israeli security forces seized 493 weapons, closed 14 workshops for the manufacture of weapons and confiscated funds for financing terrorist attacks totaling 796,514 shekels (about $231,000).

Most of the security force activities were concentrated in Operation Wave Breaker, which began at the end of March 2022 after a series of terrorist attacks carried out by Palestinians and Israeli Arabs inside Israel. During the Operation, which has not yet ended, the Israeli security forces raided Palestinian terrorist targets and detained wanted Palestinians in Judea.
and Samaria, primarily in northern Samaria, where Nablus and Jenin are located. In a number of locations Palestinians rioted, and sometimes armed Palestinians waited for the Israeli forces and opened fire at them.

![Image of Israeli security forces counterterrorism activity in Nablus](al-Hayat al-Jadeeda Facebook page, April 11, 2022).

**Weapons seized during counterterrorism activities**
(Israel Police Force spokesman’s unit, January 31, 2022).

**Preventing arms smuggling**

- In 2022 Israeli security forces also prevented large quantities of weapons and ammunition from being smuggled into the country, mostly along the Jordanian border. Some of the weapons were found at the crossings between Israel and the PA territories. Many of them were intended for use in terrorist attacks.
Exposing terrorist squads

This past year Israeli security forces exposed a large number of terrorist networks, thereby preventing terrorist attacks. Many of the terrorist squads were directed by operatives from the Gaza Strip and abroad. The Israeli security forces carried out the following actions:

◆ **Exposure of a terrorist squad of east Jerusalem residents:** At the beginning of April 2022 a network was exposed of east Jerusalem residents who were planning various attacks against Israel. The planned attacks included shooting at Israeli targets and assassinating public figures, among them Itamar Ben-Gvir. They also planned to abduct IDF soldiers. The squad was headed by a Hamas terrorist operative who lived in east Jerusalem. He was also planning, along with a Hamas operative who lived in the Abu Tor neighborhood, a shooting or suicide bombing attack in Jerusalem (Israeli Security Agency spokesman’s unit, May 24, 2022).

◆ **Preventing the PIJ from establishing a terrorist network in Judea and Samaria:** The network planned to attack Israeli targets. The Israeli security forces detained seven Palestinians, residents of Jenin and the surrounding villages. During interrogation they
revealed they had been recruited by a PIJ operative from Rafah who dealt with finding and recruiting terrorist operatives via the Palestinian social networks. One of the operatives detained was a 40 year-old woman from Jalameh, near Jenin, a mother of four, who in the past had been imprisoned for planning to carry out a suicide bombing attack (Israeli Security Agency spokesman’s unit, May 25, 2022).

♦ Preventing the formation of a student terrorist network: A network of Hamas operatives who were students at Birzeit University, was exposed. Interrogation of the suspects revealed they were in contact with senior Hamas figures in Turkey and the Gaza Strip, and had smuggled money from Turkey to Gaza. From there the money was transferred to Ramallah with the help of Palestinians who could enter Israel either for humanitarian reasons or for work.

♦ In September, the detention of a number of Palestinians, Hamas operatives in Hebron and Nablus, who were involved in planning attacks against Israeli civilians and members of the security forces. The Palestinians had been recruited through the social networks by a resident of the Nuseirat refugee camp in the central Gaza Strip.

♦ On October 12, 2022, the completion of the investigation of four suspects from the Qalqilya and Tubas regions who were in contact with a Hamas operative from the Gaza Strip and were planning to shoot at various Israeli targets. Weapons were found in their possession as well as funds for financing terrorist attacks; the money had been transferred to them by Hamas (Israeli Security Agency spokesman’s unit, October 12, 2022).

Palestinian fatalities

The rise in the Palestinian organizations' terrorist activities led to an increase in Israeli security force counterterrorism activities, which in turn led to a significant rise in the number of Palestinians killed during the year. According to reports issued by the Israeli Security Agency, during the year 154 Palestinians were killed, 130 of them involved in terrorist activity (Ynet, December 9, 2023). It was the largest number of Palestinians killed in the past seven years.  

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22 For further information Palestinian fatalities, see the July 23, 2022 bulletin,” Most of the Palestinians killed in Judea and Samaria since January 1, 2022, who died during Israeli security force counterterrorism activities were terrorist operatives,” and subsequent weekly bulletins.
Overview

Throughout 2022 the Gaza Strip was relatively quiet, the most obvious manifestation of which was the sharp decline in rockets and mortar shells launched at Israel. In August 2022 there was a single, short round of escalation which targeted the PIJ. During the fighting 946 rockets and mortar shells landed in Israeli territory; during the rest of the year 13 rockets were fired at Israel. The decline in rocket fire was accompanied by a decline in the number of terrorist attacks carried out from the Gaza Strip and in the number of riots, violent demonstrations and launching of IED and incendiary balloons. The relative quiet was for the most part the outcome of Hamas' practical considerations and order of priorities. Hamas controls the Gaza Strip and at the current time does not want to be dragged into another round of fighting inside the Gaza Strip, while at the same time encouraging terrorist attacks in Judea and Samaria. Yahya al-Sinwar, head of the Hamas political bureau in the Gaza Strip, related to Hamas' priorities in a speech for the anniversary of the movement's founding, a response to criticism of Hamas for not operating in Judea and Samaria. He said they were focusing on dealing with the civilian situation and a military buildup in preparation for future combat with Israel (Hamas website, December 14, 2022).

Annual Distribution of Rocket Hits
The ongoing decline and violence from the Gaza Strip is directly related to Hamas activities to rebuild the Gaza Strip, ensure financial support from Qatar, develop the infrastructure and crossings, and increase the fishing zone and the number of Gazans working in Israel. Generally speaking, Hamas has been successful in enforcing its policy on the PIJ, the second-largest terrorist organization in the Gaza Strip, and on the so-called "rogue organizations" (except for during Operation Breaking Dawn, which was initiated by the PIJ).

While ensuring quiet in the Gaza Strip, Hamas, and especially the PIJ, continue strengthening their positions in Judea, Samaria and Jerusalem, fomenting unrest and positioning themselves as the "defense of the sites holy to Islam" in Jerusalem. For purposes of recruitment propaganda, Muhammed Deif, the commander of Hamas' military-terrorist wing, has been turned into a symbol of the terrorism campaign against Israel, and Hamas supporters call for attacks in his name. In addition, Hamas and the PIJ customarily give public praise to terrorist attacks and glorify the attackers.

Rocket and Mortar Shell Fire from the Gaza Strip

Overview

In 2022 there was one short round of fighting (August 5 to 7, 2022), Operation Breaking Dawn, in August, of extreme escalation. During the Operation 946 rockets and mortar shells hit Israel; during the rest of the year there were 13, 11 before the Operation and two after.

With the exception of rockets fired during Operation Breaking Dawn, most of the rockets were short- and medium-range and targeted the Israeli communities near the Gaza Strip. They were fired by what are known as "rogue organizations" and no official claims of responsibility were made. Some of the rockets fell into the sea. On occasion the claim was made that they were not fired deliberately but by weather conditions. In some instances Hamas security forces detained the operatives who fired the rockets and there may have been instances when Hamas prevented rockets from being fired.
Monthly Distribution of Rockets and Mortar Shells from the Gaza Strip, 2022

Monthly Distribution of Rockets and Mortar Shells from the Gaza Strip, 2021
Operation Breaking Dawn

The relative quiet in the Gaza Strip was broken by Operation Breaking Dawn, which began on August 5 and ended on August 7, 2022. The excuse for the rocket fire which began the Operation was the Israeli security force detention of PIJ leader Bassem al-Sa'adi in the Jenin refugee camp. That led to the PIJ’s threats of rocket fire. On August 5, 2022, the IDF killed Taysir al-Jabari, the commander of PIJ’s military-terrorist wing in the northern Gaza Strip. The PIJ reacted with massive rocket and mortar fire at Israel.

During the next three days 1,175 rockets and mortar shells were fired at Israel, mostly by the PIJ; 946 fell inside Israeli territory and 97% were intercepted by the Iron Dome aerial defense system. About 200 rockets fell either into the sea or inside the Gaza Strip. Most of the rockets targeted the Israeli communities near the Gaza Strip border, although some were fired at the cities in central Israel and even at Jerusalem.

Israeli casualties: Seventy civilians were wounded by shrapnel or fell while running to protected areas. Most of the injuries were not serious. There was extensive property damage to homes in the southern Israeli city of Sderot and in the communities near the border, and to businesses in Sderot and Ashqelon. The rockets caused about 13 fires.

During the Operation Israel attacked PIJ terrorist targets 170 times. Among the targets were two high-ranking PIJ commanders and several members of the organization leadership, an attack tunnel, batteries of rockets and mortar shells, squads en route to firing rockets, weapons’ storehouses, facilities for the production of weapons and a facility of the organization’s naval force.
Palestinian casualties: The ministry of health in Gaza reported 45 Palestinian deaths, among them 16 children and three women, as well as 360 wounded, 150 of them children. Some of the women and children were victims of rocket launchings that misfired and fell inside the Gaza Strip\(^{23}\) (ministry of health in Gaza Facebook page, August 8, 2022). The Hamas administration claimed 1,764 buildings had been damaged and 18 completely destroyed (ministry of public works and housing in Gaza Facebook page, August 8, 2022).

Hamas did not participate in the round of fighting, which was conducted mostly by the PIJ. The Hamas leadership issued several vague open letters of support for the PIJ and encouraged Palestinians in Jerusalem and Israeli Arabs to fight. However, Hamas did not launch rockets from the Gaza Strip or use its terrorist capabilities, which are significantly higher than those of the PIJ.

Judea and Samaria: The attempts made by Hamas, the PIJ and other organizations to involve Palestinians in Judea and Samaria and Israeli Arabs in the fighting were not particularly successful, and relative quiet was maintained in both sectors. The entrance of about 2000 Jews into the Temple Mount for Tisha B’Av also passed without unusual incident.

\(^{23}\) For further information see the August 10, 2022 bulletin, "An examination of the names of the fatalities in Operation Breaking Dawn reveals that about half of them were terrorist operatives."
Pictures from a video issued by the PIJ's military-terrorist wing showing an "aerial defense" operative monitoring an Israeli plane in the skies over the southern Gaza Strip and firing an RPG at it (Jerusalem Brigades website, August 8, 2023).

Right: Israeli demolitions specialist removes a rocket that hit a factory in Ashqelon. Left: Israeli security forces at the site in Ashqelon (Israel Police Force spokesman's unit, August 7, 2022).

Other rocket fire

In addition to the rockets in August, 2022, 13 others were fired, 11 before the Operation and two after. Most of them were fired by so-called "rogue organizations:"

- On January 1, 2022 two rockets were fired and fell into the sea off the coast of Tel Aviv. Sirens were not sounded and the Iron Dome aerial defense system was not activated (IDF spokesman, January 1, 2022). No organization claimed responsibility. The joint operations room in the Gaza Strip claimed the rocket fire was triggered by "weather conditions" (Filastin al-A'an, January 1, 2022).

- On April 18, 2022, a rocket was fired at the communities near the Gaza Strip border and intercepted by the Iron Dome aerial defense system (IDF spokesman, April 18, 2022). In response Israeli Air Force aircraft attacked a Hamas workshop for the manufacture of weapons (IDF spokesman, April 19, 2022). In response Hamas terrorist operatives fired a Strela RPG at the aircraft (Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades Telegram channel, April 19, 2022).
On the evening of April 20, 2022, a rocket was fired at Sderot, causing damage to a residential dwelling.

On the evening of April 22, 2022, two rockets were fired at the communities near the Gaza Strip border. One exploded in an open area near the border security fence (IDF spokesman, April 22, 2022). The other fell inside the Gaza Strip in the northern Gaza Strip in the Beit Hanoun area. The Palestinians reported two wounded (Amad, January 22, 2023).

Before dawn on April 23, 2022, another rocket was fired at Israel, falling in an open area.

In the early morning hours of July 16, 2022, four rockets were fired from the Gaza Strip at Israel, two at Ashqelon. The Iron Dome aerial defense system intercepted one, the other fell in an open area. The IDF attacked the Gaza Strip in response, and during the attack two rockets were fired at Israeli communities to the northeast of the Gaza Strip. They fell in an open area. At the same time, machineguns were fired at communities near the Gaza Strip (IDF spokesman, July 16, 2022).
On the evening of November 3, 2022, four rockets were fired. One was intercepted by the Iron Dome aerial defense system and three fell inside the Gaza Strip (IDF spokesman’s Twitter account, November 3, 2022). No organization claimed responsibility.

On the evening of December 3, 2022, a rocket was launched from the Gaza Strip and fell in an open area near the northern Gaza Strip border. The Iron Dome aerial defense system was not employed and no casualties were reported (Israeli media, December 3, 2022).

**IDF responses**

In accordance with Israeli policy, which is generally to respond immediately to rocket fire, with aerial attacks or artillery fire a Hamas terrorist targets in the Gaza Strip, regardless of the organization responsible. The policy is based on Israel’s view of Hamas as in control of and responsible for everything that happens in the Gaza Strip. On occasion, in response, the attacking Israeli plane or civilian targets near the border are attacked.

Examples of Israeli responses are the following:

In response to rocket fire targeting Ashqelon on June 18, 2022, the Israeli Air Force attacked Hamas terrorist targets, including an observation post in the northern Gaza Strip near the border (IDF spokesman, June 19, 2022). After the attack machineguns were fired at an Israeli community near the border.
Attacks on Hamas terrorist targets (IDF spokesman, June 18, 2023).

Hamas observation post attacked (Paltoday, June 18, 2022).

In response to a rocket fired at Israeli communities northeast of the Gaza Strip, Israeli Air Force aircraft attacked a Hamas facility for the manufacture of weapons (IDF Twitter account, July 16, 2022).

Violence along the Gaza Strip border

In addition to rocket fire, there were a few clashes between Gazans and IDF forces along the border:

- **On January 3, 2022,** Palestinians in the southern Gaza Strip fired machineguns across the border at Israel. No casualties or damage were reported.

- **On February 9, 2022,** IDF forces identified three suspicious figures who crossed the border security fence in the southern Gaza Strip and reached the area of the barrier. They advanced towards an empty truck which was used for fence maintenance, set it on fire and returned to the Gaza Strip (IDF spokesman, February 9, 2022). A balloon launching squad claimed responsibility for setting fire to an IDF bulldozer on the Gaza Strip border (Shehab Telegram channel, February 9, 2022).

- **On the morning of July 19, 2022,** a bullet was found in the Israeli community of Netiv Ha'Asara, which had hit one of the buildings. Investigation revealed the bullet had been fired from the Gaza Strip (IDF spokesman, July 19, 2022).
On October 11, 2022, an IDF force identified a drone, apparently belonging to Hamas, flying towards the border in the northern Gaza Strip. It was intercepted near the border security fence (IDF spokesman's Twitter account, October 11, 2022).

The intercepted drone (IDF spokesman's Twitter account, October 11, 2022).

Attempts to infiltrate Israeli territory

On a number of occasions in 2022, Palestinians, either alone or in squads, attempted to infiltrate Israeli territory. Most of them were motivated by economic reasons and the situation in the Gaza Strip. Some of them were armed and planned terrorist attacks. They were apprehended by IDF forces and taken for interrogation; some were returned to the Gaza Strip. In addition to IDF activities to prevent infiltration, Hamas' restraint forces prevented Palestinians from entering Israel and on several occasions detained lone individuals or squads of Gazans who wanted to leave for economic reasons.

Balloon terrorism

During 2022 the activities of the IED and incendiary balloon launching squads stopped almost entirely, although Hamas and the other organizations consistently threatened to renew them in order to exert pressure on Israel. The attacks may have been stopped, at least partially, by Israel's 2021 policy to treat balloon launches as equally serious as rocket launches, and to respond in similar fashion by attacking a terrorist target, usually a Hamas terrorist target, in response to every balloon launching.

Activity of the night harassment units

During 2022 there were no night harassment unit operations.

The military buildup of the terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip

The Palestinian organizations in the Gaza Strip, especially Hamas and the PIJ, continued their military buildup, to both replenish the supplies used during the rounds of fighting and
to develop new weapons in preparation for the next confrontation with Israel. At the same time Hamas worked to promote the Gaza Strip's economy and preserve relative quiet along the border. The organizations held a series of military exercises, training with rocket fire or on the ground. Towards the end of the year the terrorist organizations' joint operations room held a large exercise. At least some of it was devoted to rocket fire, the use of drones and simulations of abducting IDF soldiers for use as bargaining chips to release Palestinian prisoners.

**Rocket-launching practice**

- Every few weeks the organizations fired rockets towards the sea, what they called "experiments" and improving and/or developing their rocket capabilities.

![Right: Picture from a rocket fire video (al-Arabiya TV Facebook page, July 23, 2022). Left: Rocket fire (Shams News Twitter account, November 7, 2022).]

**Military exercises**

- On December 28, 2022, the terrorist organizations' joint operations room held its third annual military exercise, called "Firm Support 3," near the border security fence in the northern Gaza Strip. Its intention, according to the organizers, was to test the operatives' response time and preparedness for an emergency and Israeli attack. Various tactical scenarios were enacted, including a simulated cross-border raid and abduction of an Israeli soldier (joint operations room Telegram channel, December 28, 2022).
On June 20, 2022, the PIJ's military-terrorist wing held an exercise which was called "Truth Speakers" and which lasted several days. The operatives, primarily those in artillery and rocket units, trained on the ground. PIJ spokesmen said the exercise was part of raising preparedness and preparation for future confrontations (Jerusalem Brigades' Telegram channel, June 19 and 20, 2022).

Continuous expansion and reinforcement of the terrorist infrastructure

The organizations continued expanding and reinforcing their terrorist infrastructures, including attack and command tunnels, many constructed in the midst of the civilian population. On July 27, 2022, the IDF spokesman published a list of Hamas terrorist sites operating in and near civilian locations, including a terrorist tunnel, the shaft of a tunnel near the Islamic University in Gaza City (whose route runs close to UNRWA headquarters), a site for the weapons repair and manufacture (located in a residential building about 55 meters from an UNRWA infirmary and 60 from the Shifaa Hospital), a terrorist tunnel in the al-Tufah neighborhood in Gaza City (which runs near an elementary school also used as a civilian
shelter in case of emergency), and a weapons storehouse inside a mosque in the heart of a civilian neighborhood (IDF spokesman, July 27, 2022).

The locations of Hamas terrorist sites (IDF spokesman's Twitter account, July 27, 2022).

- In August 2022 IDF forces exposed a Hamas terrorist tunnel in the northern Gaza Strip which crossed the border into Israeli territory. It led from Gaza City in the direction of Kibbutz Alumim (5 kilometers, about 3 miles from the border). It was an old tunnel which was attacked in Operation Guardian of the Walls in May 2021 was being rebuilt (IDF spokesman, August 15, 2022).
- Attempts to smuggle weapons in the Gaza Strip continued as well, and were prevented by the Israeli security forces:
  - On **February 7, 2022**, a Crossings Authority security examination at the Kerem Shalom Crossing found **more than 10,000 bullets and a handgun** apparently consigned to the terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip. The ammunition was hidden in a shipment of kitchen utensils (Israeli Ministry of Defense Facebook page, February 7, 2022).
Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz signed an order for the seizure of digital coins worth tens of thousands of dollars from 12 digital accounts of companies aiding money-changers in the Gaza Strip who were supporting Hamas, especially its military-terrorist wing and transferred tens of millions of dollars during the year. The defense minister designed the companies terrorist organizations (Israel’s National Headquarters on Terrorist Economic Counter-Terrorism, February 28, 2022).

On February 8, 2022, Israeli security forces prevented the smuggling of parts for the manufacture of weapons to the terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip. IDF forces detained three smugglers who tried to cross the border into Egypt's territorial waters. Interrogation revealed they had been sent by Hamas in the Gaza Strip to smuggle equipment to the Gaza Strip (IDF spokesman, May 11, 2022).

On the night of July 24, 2022, the Israeli Navy prevented smuggling from Egyptian Rafah by sinking the smugglers' boat. In IDF assessment the boat was carrying ammunition and anti-tank missiles for Hamas (IDF spokesman, July 24, 2022).

Measures to improve the conditions of the Gazan civilian population

In view of the relative quiet in the Gaza Strip, Israel allowed Gazans to leave the Gaza Strip for work and commerce in Israel. The quota was raised several times over the year, depending on Israel's security assessment, and today stands at about 20,000 entrance permits. During the year it was made clear again and again that the permits are given according to criteria and the security situation. Entrance into Israel is suspended after rocket attacks.
Prevention of terrorist attacks from the Gaza Strip

During the year several operatives were exposed who had been recruited and were being handled by Hamas terrorist operatives in the Gaza Strip. Some were from the Bedouin dispersal and some were Gazans who had humanitarian assistance or work permits for Israel:

- On **February 22, 2022**, a Palestinian from Qabatiya entered Israel with a permit for medical treatment and was detained. Interrogation revealed Hamas' military-terrorist wing had recruited him to its security forces, where he had been trained and participated in activities against Israel. He exploited his visits to Israel to recruit operatives and transmit information (Israeli Security Agency spokesman's unit, April 18, 2023).

- On **May 30, 2022**, a Bedouin from the village of Hura was detained after it became known he had been recruited by the Holy Fighters' Brigades network in the Gaza Strip and at its direction had collected intelligence information, taken pictures in Israel and stolen weapons, and had also volunteered for the IDF (spokesman of the State's Attorney, Southern District, and the Israeli Security Agency spokesman's unit, July 7, 2022).

- In **September 2022**, two Israeli citizens were detained, both from the Bedouin dispersal, who were in contact with a terrorist operative in the Gaza Strip. At the

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24 The Holy Fighters' Brigades is a network that split from Fatah's AAMB after becoming more extremist. In the past the network operated in the Gaza Strip with the knowledge and endorsement of Hamas, from which it received funding, training and military-terrorist support. In May 2012 a squad was exposed which was planning to abduct an Israeli civilian as a bargaining chip to release prisoners (Israeli Security Agency spokesman's unit, May 31, 2012).
operative’s direction they transferred funds. One of them was asked to carry out security missions and agreed to help transfer weapons to another operative (Israeli Security Agency spokesman’s unit, October 16, 2022).

In October 2022 a Gazan from Rafah with a work permit for Israel was detained after having been recruited by two relatives who belonged to the PIJ and who asked him to plant a bomb on a bus in Israel's south. Interrogation revealed he was an explosives expert and an operative in the Gaza Strip had trained him and was guiding him in the preparation of explosives. When he was in Israel he began acquiring the materials needed to assemble the IED (Israeli Security Agency website, November 24, 2022).

Preparations for the IED in progress (Israeli Security Agency website, November 24, 2022).

Counterterrorism activities abroad – Hamas attack prevented in the Philippines

The Philippine police force exposed a Hamas plan to establish a presence in the country to attack Israeli targets. According to the head of Philippine police intelligence, the plan was exposed following information received about contacts between a local resident and an individual described as head of Hamas' foreign relations department. According to the Philippine police, between 2016 and 2018 the local resident went to Malaysia several times and met with his contact, a Hamas operative, to discuss the possibility of attacking Israelis in the Philippines, in return for which he would be paid by Hamas. He received theoretical guidance in the preparation of bombs and was asked to recruit additional groups of local residents. The objectives were to attack Jews and Israeli legations and to issue propaganda videos. It was not the first time Hamas tried to operate in the Philippines. In January 2018 a Filipino chemist was detained. He knew how to manufacture explosives and was in close contact with Hamas. He was expelled to Turkey (PNP, February 15, 2022).
During 2022 there were several terrorist events on Israel's northern border, most of them attempts by Hezbollah to launch UAVs into Israeli territory. The events peaked when the Karish natural gas drilling rig began operations off Israel’s west coast near the northern border of Israel's territorial waters. Hezbollah tried to disrupt the negotiations between Israel and Lebanon regarding the economic water border and Hezbollah leaders claimed the organization was "prepared to use all means," including the use of "military force" [terrorist attacks], to prevent drilling for natural gas from continuing at the Karish field (al-Mayadeen, July 2, 2022).

The events on the border were accompanied by a Hezbollah propaganda campaign to glorify the organization's capabilities which, they claimed, had created a "new equation" with Israel, and to claim Israel was weak. Hezbollah also boasted of its "military" capabilities, especially the project to increase the accuracy of its rockets. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah gave a speech for Shaheed Memorial Day in which he claimed that for years Hezbollah had been able to replace its rockets with more accurate ones, which made it unnecessary for them to import rockets from Iran. He claimed the organization had begun manufacturing UAVs, so those also did not have to be imported from Iran (al-Mayadeen, February 16, 2022).

The more important events on the Lebanese border were the following:

- On February 18, 2022, a UAV was identified crossing the border from Lebanon into Israeli territory. IAF helicopters and places were immediately sent to intercept it, the Iron Dome aerial defense system was employed and the Home Front was alerted. After a few minutes the UAV returned to Lebanon. Hezbollah claimed responsibility for the launching it. Its "combat information" wing issued a report boasting it had launched a UAV, called a Husan, into the skies above northern Israel (al-Mayadeen, February 18, 2022).

25 Named for Husan Laqis, a Hezbollah operative who was responsible for manufacturing UAVs for the organization and who died in a targeted killing in 2013.
On July 2, 2022, Israel announced it had intercepted three Hezbollah UAVs a few dozen miles from the Karish oil rig (IDF spokesman, July 2, 2022). A number of hours later Hezbollah’s "information" unit announced that the Jamil Saqaf and Mahdi Yaghi26 squad had launched three UAVs of various sizes towards the Karish oil rig "disputed territory" to collect information (al-Mayadeen TV, July 2, 2022).

On July 18, 2022, IDF forces identified a UAV leaving Lebanese territory and entering Israeli territory. It was intercepted (IDF spokesman’s Twitter account, July 18, 2023).

Activities of other terrorist organizations in Lebanon

On the night of April 24, 2022, a rocket was fired at Israel from south Lebanon. It fell in an open area in the western Galilee (IDF spokesman, April 25, 2022). According to the Lebanese media, either one or two 122mm Grad rockets had been fired from the region between Qleileh and al-Maaliyeh, south of Tyre (MTV, al-Manar and al-Jadeed, April 25, 2022). No organization claimed responsibility for the rocket fire. In IDF assessment, Hamas operatives in south Lebanon were behind the rocket fire.

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26 Jamil Sakaf was one of the operatives who established Hezbollah’s aerial wing. He was killed in 1994 and for years Hezbollah kept the cause of his death secret. In 2014 Hezbollah revealed he was killed while training for a terrorist attack using a glider. Mahdi Yaghi was apparently killed while fighting in Syria in 2013.