October 6, 2008

Jerusalem as a focus for terrorist attacks: increase in terrorist activity in Jerusalem and in the involvement of East Jerusalem residents

1 Based on Israel Security Agency data and an analysis by the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center.
1. In 2008 there has been a **significant increase in the number of terrorist attacks carried out in Jerusalem** with the involvement of East Jerusalem Palestinian residents. The **increase is particularly conspicuous** in view of the general decrease in terrorist attacks in other arenas of the confrontation: the lull arrangement has been in effect in the Gaza Strip since June 2008, there has been a significant decrease in suicide bombing terrorism in Israel originating from Judea and Samaria (thanks to the effective Israeli security service counterterrorism activities and the construction of the security fence. In addition, the Israel-Lebanese border has been quiet since the end of the second Lebanon war.

2. Eight conspicuous terrorist attacks using vehicles have been carried out in Jerusalem since the beginning of the year, shootings and stabbings (See **Appendix I**). Four of them were mass-casualty attacks, all carried out within the past half year, aiming to kill as many Israeli civilians as possible. **Three of them involved vehicles** (two front-loaders and a BMW) and were carried out in crowded locations in the center of the city. There was also a shooting attack carried out by a Palestinian terrorist who entered Yeshivat Mercaz Ha’rav with an assault rifle. **Eleven** Israeli civilians were killed in the four mass-casualty attacks and **95** were wounded. In the other attacks **two** Israeli civilians were killed and **five** were wounded, **bringing the total of Israelis killed and wounded in Jerusalem to 13 and 100, respectively.**

3. **The common denominator of some of the terrorist attacks was that they were carried out by lone Palestinian terrorists, all of whom were East Jerusalem residents.** That indicates a **change** in the involvement of East Jerusalem residents compared with their involvement in the Palestinian terrorist campaign (the **intifada**). In the past, East Jerusalem residents served as escorts and in general aided and abetted attacks orchestrated by the terrorist organizations operating from the Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria. In most cases they involved in collecting information and transporting terrorists to the sites of the attacks. They did that exploiting their regular Israeli identification cards which enabled them to move freely through the road blocks and enter Jewish West Jerusalem. For example, East Jerusalem residents were involved in the attempted suicide bombing attack at the Kafit Café in July 2004, carried out by a Hamas cell from Hebron, in both collecting information and driving the suicide bomber to the café.

4. **The pattern of the lone terrorist was particularly obvious in the four mass-casualty attacks of the past six months.** Israel Security Agency investigations showed that the four **acted on their own initiative**, without the direction of external terrorist
groups. There were certain similarities between the terrorists, although they had no known contacts with one another: they all came from southeast Jerusalem (Jabel Mukabir, Sur Bahr, Um Tuba), had no known association with any terrorist organization, had not been involved in terrorism in the past but did have criminal records. Their motives are still unclear. Alongside the nationalist motive and possibly Islamic religious sentiments, they may have had personal motives which made them decide to carry out the attacks. The four were ready to sacrifice their lives (or at least to entertain the possibility of being killed), and in fact all four were killed.

5. Since all four operated alone, their modus operandi was different from that of attacks planned by organized groups. The modus operandi was relatively simple, simpler than what is involved in a suicide bombing attack. The attacks involving vehicles did not require advance planning, training, religious brainwashing, manufacturing or acquiring weapons, collecting exact intelligence and preparing a “will” for the media. The weapons are easily-obtained vehicles and the targets were simply passersby who happened to be on crowded streets in the center of Jerusalem. The difference was that the attack at Yeshivat Merkaz Ha’rav required far more planning, collecting information beforehand and logistic preparations.

6. However, lone attacks are not the only types of terrorist attacks carried out in Jerusalem. There is still intensive activity carried out by local, independent cells, whose members are East Jerusalem residents with Israeli identity cards (See Appendix III for information about a recently-uncovered cell). The cells are organized according to a common religion-based ideology with no connection to the terrorist organizations. They plan and carry out terrorist attacks, exploiting their Israeli identity cards and freedom of movement to find sites in the city.

7. Alongside the independent local activity of East Jerusalem residents, whether lone terrorists or organized cells, operational collaboration continues between them and the terrorist organizations in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip, although to a lesser degree than in the past. In recent months there has been a new trend toward one or a group of East Jerusalem residents aiding and abetting terrorist organizations outside the city, although their main activities are forming local networks and carrying out independent attacks. The collaboration of East Jerusalem residents is of great importance to the terrorist organizations because of their Israeli identity cards and because they are very familiar with the territory and the Jewish population. Those are advantages at every stage of planning and carrying out attacks.

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2 However, at least in the attacks involving vehicles, it is not inconceivable that the first attack provided motivated the others.
a terrorist attack, from choosing the target and collecting information to acquiring weapons and escorting the terrorist to the site.

**Prevention and exposure**

8. Lone local East Jerusalem terrorists acting independently are a security challenge for the Israeli counterterrorist forces. However, several attacks have been prevented and terrorist cells in Jerusalem have been exposed after an attack by intensive Israeli security force activities. In 2008 (as of September 22) **104** East Jerusalem Palestinians were detained, compared with **37** in all of 2007. That is the largest number of detentions carried out in any year of the Palestinian terrorist campaign, and an additional indication of both the increase of terrorism in Jerusalem and the counterterrorism efforts made to thwart it.

**Palestinians detained throughout the terrorist campaign**

9. The Israeli security forces were successful in preventing a series of terrorist attacks planned for Jerusalem and to expose the terrorist cells which carried out some of them. Among the attacks prevented were a **number of planned suicide bombing and other types of attacks** (some of them at advanced stages of preparation). They included assassinations of senior Israeli figures, planting bombs, abductions and stabbings (For information on attacks prevented since 2007, see Appendix II).

10. Noteworthy was the exposure of a terrorist cell which carried out two
shooting attacks in Jerusalem in 2008, killing two Border Policemen and wounding two others (January 24, an attack at the entrance to the Shuafat refugee camp; and July 11, an attack at the Lions Gate). The same cell was in the advanced stages of planning other shooting attacks, an abduction and the assassination of a high-ranking police officer. It was headed by Muhammad Adnan Abu Sneina, a resident of the Jerusalem village of Anata, who studied religious Islamic law at the Abu Dis University, was a devout Muslim and held extremist views. He is the son of a Fatah terrorist sentenced to life imprisonment for killing Israelis and released in 1985 as part of the Jibril prisoner-exchange deal (for the exposure of the cell see Appendix III).

Responses in the Gaza Strip and the Palestinian Authority

11. The Palestinian terrorist organizations refrained from publicly claiming responsibility for the mass-casualty attacks. However, the terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip, especially Hamas, praised the attacks and condemned the steps taken by Israel. Hamas spokesmen said that the attacks in Jerusalem were “the natural response” to Israel's actions against the Palestinians, and that they proved that the “Palestinian resistance” [i.e., terrorism] continue in Judea and Samaria despite the restrictions placed on it by Israel and the PA security services.

Hamas spokesman Sami Abu Zuhri as he appeared on Al-Aqsa TV, July 2: The attacks in Jerusalem are “the natural outcome of the Israeli crimes against our people in the West Bank.”

12. Sources in the PA made a half-hearted attempt to condemn the mass-casualty attacks in Jerusalem: after the attack at Yeshivat Merkaz Ha’rav, Abu Mazen issued a short statement linking it to Israeli activity against the Palestinians, saying that he “objected to any activity which harmed civilians, Palestinians or Israelis” (Syrian News Agency, March 6). In

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3 Responsibility for the attack at Yeshivat Merkaz Ha’rav and the attacks using vehicles was claimed by an network calling itself “Imad Moughnieh Squad of the Free Sons of the Galilee,” which in our assessment had no connection to the attacks.
the same spirit, after the attack on July 2, **Saeb Erikat**, head of the PLO negotiations department, after the front-loader terrorist attack said he deplored it and that the PA condemned any attack on civilian targets, “whether Israeli or Palestinian” (AP, July 2, 2008).

13. In certain instances the PA spokesman and media tried to minimize the significance of the mass-casualty attacks using vehicles on the grounds that they were “traffic accidents.” That was particularly obvious after the last attack (September 22, 2008).

   i) **Abu Alaa**, the chief Palestinian negotiator, told the Israeli paper Yedioth Ahronoth on September 26 that the attack was a “traffic accident” caused by a “spoiled child,” who was unconnected to politics or any organization. He added that the Israeli leadership had to learn a lesson from the “events,” saying that East Jerusalem residents suffered from problems of unemployment, education and a lack of entertainment: “Salah al-Din street goes to sleep at seven in the evening while Ben Yehuda street [one of Jerusalem’s main thoroughfares] is still partying. That leads to frustration and the sporadic activities of lone individuals.” He said that was in addition to the sensitivity of the problem of Al-Aqsa [mosque], the cause of the outbreak of the second intifada. Therefore, “if Israel does not use sensitivity in dealing with the problems, using logic and common sense, there will be more actions carried out by lone individuals.”

   ii) On September 24 the daily newspaper **Al-Quds** devoted its editorial to the terrorist attack in Jerusalem, agreeing with the terrorist’s father that it was not necessarily a terrorist attack per se and that it might have been a traffic accident. It said that people ought not to rush to call such events of people getting run over attacks before they were examined in depth.

   iii) **Adnan al-Husseini**, governor of the Jerusalem district for the PA, claimed that there was a great deal of tension within the East Jerusalem population because of threats of vengeance and the demands for extreme steps made in the wake of the last events.” Their greatest fears was for their ability to work in West Jerusalem and freedom of movement. He said that measures taken by Israel were contrary to international law but had not met with a serious response (Al-Hayat Al-Jadeeda, September 24).
14. According to data provided by Israel's Central Statistics Bureau (June 1, 2008), there are **226,000 Palestinians** living in Greater Jerusalem, most of them Muslims. They hold Israeli identity cards and are entitled to work and live in Israel, and receive social services according to the national insurance and health laws. They are entitled to vote in Jerusalem's municipal elections, although in general they boycott them, so in effect they have no representation in the city council.

15. The construction of the security fence and the buffer zone (so far uncompleted) would seem at first glance to have separated the residents of East Jerusalem from those of Judea and Samaria. However, no such separation actually exists. There is close daily contact between them, even though the security fence makes it more clumsy. The educational system of the city’s residents is Palestinian and the focus of their identity is national-Palestinian, and sometimes even radical-Islamic (See below). The meeting between East Jerusalem residents and Israel’s system of administration does not lead them to identify with Israel, but sometimes quite the opposite, and is a source of frustration bound up with of national, religious, economic, social and personal reasons.
16. With the construction of the security fence, a kind of administrative vacuum was created in East Jerusalem. The strength of the PA within the various neighborhoods lessened while Israeli control, with everything that implied, did not strike roots. With regard to security, Israeli capabilities for counterterrorist activities, the war on terrorism and issues of criminality in general are limited, both in comparison to what they are within Israel and within Judea and Samaria (where during the past year the PA has carried out security activities against Hamas and the other terrorist organizations).

17. Within the administrative vacuum pockets of local power, hostile to Israel, flourish. They include the Palestinian terrorist organizations, radical Islamic networks and criminal elements. For example, in the eastern sections of Jerusalem Hamas has increased its activity, especially through its civilian infrastructure, the da'wah. The radical Islamic Liberation Party also has a strong foothold in East Jerusalem, even though it does not have a military-terrorist wing. Moreover, the Internet and email enable radical Islamic ideologies to trickle in, and make it possible to transmit operational instructions from headquarters beyond Jerusalem, including from Al-Qaeda and the global jihad networks. In addition, East Jerusalem is home to a vast amount of criminal activity which sometimes supports terrorist activity, including arms dealing. Some of the sections of the city have turned into hothouses for terrorism and various extremist elements. One is the Shuafat refugee camp, some of which is located beyond the security fence and from which came some of the operatives of the recently-exposed cell responsible for the killing of the two Border Policemen (See Appendix III).

18. The strengthening of radical Islam among East Jerusalem residents is part of a widespread trend in the PA-administered territories and in general in the Arab-Muslim world. The sources and carriers of religious extremism in East Jerusalem are many and varied: the mosques in East Jerusalem, sermons delivered by senior clerics (including those in the PA), and the radical Islamic ideology spread by television and the Internet. The radical Islamic ideological to which East Jerusalem residents are exposed includes the concepts of “liberation of Palestine” through personal jihad as the obligation of every Muslim, an ideology propounded by Abdallah Azzam, a Palestinian who until his death was Osama bin Laden’s spiritual mentor. Exposure to such an ideology is liable to motivate East Jerusalem residents to “do something,” to attack Jews even without the impetus, instructions and support of the established terrorist organizations.4

4 For further information about East Jerusalem residents’ planning terrorist attacks following Internet contacts with Al-Qaeda, see July 21, 2008 date Bulletin entitled “The Israel security forces recently detained six Israeli and East Jerusalem Arabs, some of them students” at http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/ct_e002.pdf.
The East Jerusalem neighborhoods from which terrorists came in 2008.

Basic map of greater East Jerusalem (Wikipedia October 2008)

**Jerusalem as a focal point for propaganda and incitement**

19. Many organizations, institutions and individuals in the PA, Israel and the Arab-Muslim world exploit the powder keg-like sensitivity of the issue of Jerusalem to flood the residents of East Jerusalem (and Palestinians in general) with non-stop **anti-Israeli propaganda and incitement** and to stir up their emotions. Among the offenders who try to make political capital of the charged issue are the PA, Hamas, the northern faction of the Islamic Movement in Israel (headed by Ra'ed Salah), and terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah.⁵

20. Propaganda and incitement regarding Jerusalem are heard constantly, but occasionally there are surges following civilian, political or religious events, for example, the earthworks

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⁵ Iran also makes extensive use of the call to “liberate Jerusalem,” and initiated International Jerusalem Day, which takes place every year in the Arab and Muslim world on the last Friday of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.
undertaken to reinforce the Mugrabim ramp in Jerusalem\(^6\) and the period before the Annapolis meeting. During the recent Muslim holy month of Ramadan (this past September) such a surge was conspicuous, participated in by clerics in the PA, Muslim and sometimes non-Muslim, and the Palestinian media, and the Hamas administration in the Gaza Strip. As in the past, Israel was \textbf{falsely accused} of trying to destroy Al-Aqsa mosque and replace it with The Jewish Temple.

21. The following are examples of anti-Israeli propaganda and incitement spread during Ramadan:

i) **Sheikh Muhammad Hussein**, \textit{the Mufti of Jerusalem and the PA}, warned against opening a new synagogue in the Old City near the Al-Aqsa mosque (September 22). He said the synagogue was connected to a series of tunnels under Al-Aqsa, which would enable Jewish extremists to invade the mosque at any time. He claimed the synagogue was part of a plan to rebuild The Jewish Temple on the ruins of Al-Aqsa mosque, which would ignite the region and turn it into a volcano.

ii) **Sheikh Ikrima Sabri**, head sermonizer at Al-Aqsa mosque and notorious inciter against Israel, gave a sermon on the first Friday of Ramadan. In it he warned of a “Jewish Jerusalem” and the destruction of all Islamic religious symbols (referring to the construction of a new synagogue in the Old City). He said Muslims would not give up any one of their rights in the mosques on the Temple Mount and their holy city.

iii) **Sheikh Taysir al-Tamimi**, president of the Sharia courts in the PA, called Israel’s restrictions on worshippers coming to the mosques on Temple Mount “a crime.” He called upon the residents to try to reach them. **Jamal Bawatna**, PA minister of religious endowments, accused Israel of preventing young people from entering the mosques on the Temple Mount. He claimed that it was part of Israel’s policy to turn Jerusalem into a Jewish city (while ignoring the security considerations behind the Israeli restrictions). In addition, the Palestinian spokesmen and media ignored or minimized the value of the easing of restrictions implemented by Israel during Ramadan regarding prayers on the Temple Mount.\(^7\)

iv) **Atallah Hanna**, \textit{Archbishop of the Greek Orthodox Church in Jerusalem}, warned against the (nonexistent) Israel threats to damage Al-Aqsa mosque, claiming the

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\(^6\) For further information see our February 8, 2007 Bulletin entitled “A Palestinian disinformation campaign led by Hamas claims renovation work done at the Mugrabim ramp in Jerusalem is an Israeli attempt to destroy Al-Aqsa mosque” at \url{http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/mugrabim.pdf}.

\(^7\) On the first Friday of Ramadan 70,000 Muslims came to the mosques, 120,000 on the second Friday and 130,000 on the third Friday.
threats followed the closing of the Al-Aqsa Foundation. That, he said, was part of a hostile and provocative Israeli plan to attack Muslim sensibilities.

v) During its weekly meeting on September 23, the Hamas administration in the Gaza Strip called upon all the Arab and Muslim countries to support the Palestinian government and people to strengthen their stance in Jerusalem and to guard Al-Aqsa mosque. The mosque, according to the Hamas call, was endangered by a “genuine conspiracy” which was plotting to destroy it and erect the (Jewish) Temple on the ruins.

22. The continuing propaganda and incitement from senior religious figures of the PA and the Palestinian terrorist organizations, using Islamic and nationalist themes and spreading disinformation about Israel, falls on fertile ground, both in East Jerusalem and the PA in general. In our assessment, it can encourage potential terrorists to carry out attacks, and create an popular atmosphere which supports them.

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8 For further information see our August 28, 2008 Bulletin entitled “Financing terrorism: The Al-Aqsa Foundation, based in Umm al-Fahm and belonging to the northern branch of the Islamic Movement in Israel, was closed down due to its cooperation with Hamas's civilian infrastructure in Jerusalem” at http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/financing_e001.pdf.

The link to The Protocols of the Elders of Zion.
1. **May 26, 2007** – Armed with guns, two Palestinian terrorists, residents of Jabel Mukabir, went on foot to the roadblock at Sheikh Saad (in southeast Jerusalem), and opened fire on the security personnel stationed there. A Border Police force returned their fire; a Border Policeman and security guard were wounded. The two terrorists were killed, as was a Palestinian passerby.

2. **January 24, 2008** – A shooting attack was carried out at the Ras Hamis barricade at the entrance to the Shuafat refugee camp, north of Jerusalem. Two terrorists approached on camp's northern entrance on foot, shot at the Border Policemen stationed there and fled. Policeman Rami Zohari was killed and a Border Policewoman was wounded.

3. **March 6, 2008** – A Palestinian terrorist armed with a Kalashnikov assault rifle carried out a mass-casualty attack at Yeshivat Merkaz Ha'rav, killing eight students and wounding ten, three of them critically and one seriously. The terrorist was a resident of **Jabel Mukabir**, southeast of Jerusalem.\(^9\) He had been a chauffeur and had an Israeli identity card.

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\(^9\) For further information see our March 9, 2008 Bulletin entitled “Terrorist shooting at Yeshivat Mercaz Ha'Rav in Jerusalem leaves eight students dead” at [http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/ct_090308e.pdf](http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/ct_090308e.pdf).
4. **March 18, 2008** - A Palestinian stabbed the head rabbi of the Ateret Cohanim Yeshiva in the Old City. The attack took place near the Damascus Gate; the terrorist fled the scene.

5. **July 2, 2008** - During the afternoon hours a Palestinian, a resident of **Sur Bahr** in southeast Jerusalem, carried out a mass-casualty attack on a crowded Jerusalem street using a front loader he took from a construction site. He raced along one of Jerusalem’s main streets, plowing into vehicles and pedestrians. After a short time a policeman, security guard and off-duty soldier killed him. Three Israelis were killed and about 40 wounded, most of them not seriously.¹⁰

![The front loader used in the attack (Israeli Government Press Office, July 2, 2008).](http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/ct_030708e.pdf)

6. **July 11, 2008** - A Palestinian terrorist went to the Lions Gate, near the Muslim cemetery, and opened fire on two policemen. One was critically wounded and died 12 days later (July 23); the other was seriously wounded. The attacker fled the scene.

7. **July 22, 2008** - A Palestinian terrorist from **Um Tuba**, in southeast Jerusalem, took a front loader from a construction site in the Jerusalem section of Yemin Moshe and drove it at great speed along a main street, ramming into a number of vehicles along the way. An armed civilian shot him but he continued driving, hitting vehicles and a bus. After about 250 meters (about 275 yards) a Border Policeman shot and killed him. Twenty-eight people were injured, one of them critically.¹¹


8. **September 22, 2008** - At approximately 23:00 at night a Palestinian terrorist from **Jabel Mukabir** drove a black BMW to the center of the city. He deliberately drove up onto the pavement at great speed, into a group of Israelis and then rammed into a wall. Seventeen people were wounded, including a group of 14 IDF soldiers, three seriously. The soldiers’ officer shot and killed the terrorist.
Appendix II

Terrorist attacks prevented in the Jerusalem region since the beginning of 2007\textsuperscript{12}

1. **February 2007** - A suicide bombing attack planned to be carried out by a Palestinian from Silwan holding an Israeli identity card was prevented.

2. **April 2007** - Two residents of Sur Bahr planned to carry out a suicide bombing attack. The attack was prevented.

3. **September 2007** - A terrorist cell from Um Tuba, southeast of Jerusalem, was captured. Its operatives planned to carry out a series of attacks including a suicide bombing attack, planting IEDs, infiltrating a terrorist into Israeli territory and assassinating Israeli public figures.\textsuperscript{13}

4. **October 2007** - A terrorist cell from Jabel Mukabir was captured. Its operatives planned to carry out an abduction and assassinate an Israeli minister living in Jerusalem. It had already murdered a village resident suspected of collaboration with Israel.

5. **February 2008** - A suicide bombing attack planned by residents of the Old City in Jerusalem was prevented.

6. **April 2008** - A terrorist attack at the Ramat Rahel hotel and a stabbing at Armon Hanatziv\textsuperscript{14} were prevented.

7. **January-May 2008** - A Jerusalem terrorist cell was exposed which was setting up an Al-Qaeda network, had enlisted operatives and planned a series of attacks. One of them was an attack on important figures in a helicopter landing at the Hebrew University.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{12} According to ISA data

\textsuperscript{13} For further information see our November 6, 2007 Bulletin entitled “Three Arab residents of East Jerusalem were recently indicted for planning terrorist attacks for the Palestinian Islamic Jihad” at http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/ct6nov07e.pdf.

\textsuperscript{14} The Palace of the British Mandate High Commissioner

\textsuperscript{15} For further information see our July 21, 2008 Bulletin entitled “The Israel security forces recently detained six Israeli and East Jerusalem Arabs, some of them students” at http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/ct_e002.pdf.
Appendix III

Exposure of a terrorist cell of East Jerusalem residents who carried out two shooting attacks

1. A combined ISA-Israeli Police action exposed a seven-man terrorist cell, six of whom were East Jerusalem residents with Israeli identity cards. In 2008 the cell carried out two shooting attacks in Jerusalem, killing two Border Policemen and wounding two others.

2. The ISA interrogation revealed that the cell had planned other attacks, some of which were at their final stages and were supposed to be carried out in August 2008. Among them were the assassination of an officer of the Jerusalem district police, a shooting attack at a bus stop at the French Hill junction, a shooting attack against a police car on the road to the Dead Sea, a shooting attack at the Tel Romeida road block in Hebron (carried out in conjunction with operatives of a cell from Hebron) and the abduction of a civilian working for the security forces.

Further information

3. The cell operatives carried out two shooting attack, killing two Border Policemen and wounding two others:

i) **On January 24, 2008**, the cell attacked the Ras Hamis roadblock at the entrance of Shuafat. Involved were the leader of the cell, Muhammad Abu Sneina, and Muhammad Julani. The two drove to the roadblock, Julani stayed in the car as a lookout, and Abu Sneina got out, showed his Israeli identity card to the Border Policeman stationed there and went through. A short time later he returned and shot Border Policeman Rami Zohari at close range and severely wounded a Border Policewoman. He took Zohari’s weapon and fled in the car.

ii) **On July 11, 2008**, Abu Sneina and Louai Abu Nijme drove to the Lions Gate in the Old City of Jerusalem. Abu Sneina got out of the car, ran toward two policemen, shot them and escaped. One of them, David Shariki, died of his wounds two weeks later.

4. The head of the terrorist cell was **Muhammad Adnan Abu Sneina**, 21, a resident of the village of Anata in East Jerusalem. He held an Israeli identity card and worked in the Old City.

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16 According to ISA data
of Jerusalem. He is a devout, extremist Muslim. Until his arrest he studied Muslim law (the 
*sharia*) at the university in Abu Dis and continued with religious studies. He founded the
terrorist cell while at the university with the objective of attacking Israeli civilians, but was
unable to carry out his objective at the time. A year and half ago he revived the cell and
enlisted operatives to carry out terrorist attacks in Jerusalem. His father, Adnan Daoud Abu
Sneina, was a member of the Fatah terrorist cell which killed Israeli soldier Avraham Deutsch
near the Rockefeller Museum in 1978 and Yosef Moskovitch at Gat Shmanim in Jerusalem in
1979. He was detained in 1981 and sentenced to life imprisonment, but was released as part
of the **Jibril prisoner-exchange deal** in 1985.

5. The names of the other operatives are:

i) **Abd al-Karim Aouni Daoud Abu Sneina**, 19, a resident of the village of ‘Anata
and the Old City of Jerusalem; Israeli identity card.

ii) **Louai Abd al-Jabber Abd Al-Hamid Abu Nijme**, 23, a resident of the Shuafat
refugee camp in Jerusalem; Israeli identity card.

iii) **Muhammad Jemil Kamal Julani**, 21, a resident of the Shuafat refugee camp in
Jerusalem; Israeli identity card.

iv) **Muhammad Amin Daoud Abu Sneina**, 19, a resident of the villages of Silwan
and Anata; Israeli identity card.

v) **Osama Mazen Zaki Hadad**, 21, a resident of the village of Anata; Israeli identity
card.

vi) **Abd Al-Sami’ Yakub Abd al-Sami’ Shabane**, 21, a resident of the village of
Anata. He alone of the cell did not have an Israeli identity card.
The terrorist cell operatives:

Abd al-Karim Aouni
Daoud Abu Sneina

Louai Abd al-Jabber Abd
Al-Hamid Abu Nijme

Muhammad Jemil Kamal
Julani

Muhammad Amin
Daoud Abu Sneina

Osama Mazen Zaki Hadad

Abd Al-Sami’ Yakub Abd
al-Sami’ Shabane