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The Meir Amit Intelligence and
Terrorism Information Center

The Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab World and Islamic Communities in Western Europe¹



The emblem of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. The white circle is imprinted with the movement's militant motto: "Allah is our objective, the prophet [Muhammad] is our leader, the Qur'an is our law, jihad is our way, death for the sake of Allah is our most exalted aspiration." Despite its belligerent motto, the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan has shown a great degree of pragmatism and has been an opposition the Hashemite regime can tolerate, so far even after the regional uprisings.

¹Supplement and update for the June 19, 2011 ITIC study of the Muslim Brotherhood, "The Muslim Brotherhood is an Islamic mass movement whose worldview is based on the belief that "Islam is the solution" and on the stated aim of establishing a world order (a caliphate) based on Islamic religious law (Shariah) on the ruins of Western liberalism..." at http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/ipc_e174.pdf.

Overview

General Remarks

1. This study updates and supplements the ITIC's June 2011 study of the Muslim Brotherhood. It examines the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and other Arab countries in the wake of the past year's regional uprisings. It deals with the nature of the movement in each country, its relations with the various regimes and evaluates its chances of exploiting regional unrest to its own ends. It also examines the Muslim Brotherhood's branches in Western European countries and the implications of its activity for both internal European affairs and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

2. In the various Arab countries, the behavior of the Muslim Brotherhood has been influenced by the basic tension between the movement's ultimate goal of establishing a state run according to Islamic law (Sharia'h) and **the need to exhibit a certain degree of pragmatism and flexibility in relation to the movement's need to adapt itself to the social and political conditions of each country**. Thus **it cannot be regarded as uniform throughout the Arab world for it is run differently in each country**, according to local circumstances and constraints. However, **there are connections and common learning within the movement** in Egypt and other countries in the Middle East and around the globe.

3. The **Muslim Brotherhood's ideology** is based on the worldview of "Islam as the solution" for every individual, social and political problem. Instituting a comprehensive "Muslim world order" will be possible, according to the movement and its founders, by means of a long-term process of multiple stages. It will, through education, begin with the new Muslim individual, progress to his family, from his family to society at large and from there to the new Muslim world order. Attaining political power includes winning elections and forming a state run according to Islamic law, the liberation of countries of Islam from a foreign yoke, uniting them into one Islamic entity, and spreading Islamic values around the globe on the ruins of the liberal West. **How to implement the ideology is subject to broad interpretation**, and there are pragmatic, conservative and extremist factions within the movement.

4. The Muslim Brotherhood is the most well-organized political force in Egypt today. It also has a broad socio-economic system (the *da'wah*), built up over the years as a function of the movement's fundamental ideology. **Once Mubarak's regime was overthrown, the Muslim Brotherhood found itself in a forward position from which to attain power** than for others who participated in the protests in Tahrir Square, as can be seen by its success in two of the three election rounds for the People's Assembly.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt

5. The **Muslim Brotherhood** was founded in Egypt by **Hassan al-Banna** in the **early 20th century**. Over the years **it grew to become the biggest and best-established of the Muslim Brotherhood movements in the Middle East and beyond, and one of the central movements of political Islam.**

6. **The success of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is rooted in a combination of ideology, politics and social work.** Ideologically, it is perceived as an authentic response to the hegemony of "Western occupation," and attracted its following from among people who had been disappointed by other ideologies. It also **found a foothold in the educated urban middle class using its vast socio-economic system, the *da'wah*, to win the battle for hearts and minds. It focused on responding to the problems of the ordinary man in the street through its broad social welfare programs, which included education and health care, along with preaching in its network of mosques.** They often supplanted dysfunctional state institutions and **became an effective social network for the dissemination of the Muslim Brotherhood's religious and political ideas.**

7. **The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is hostile to Israel because of its fundamental ideology.** The movement regards all the land of Palestine as an Islamic endowment (*waqf*), **rejects the State of Israel's right to exist, promotes an uncompromising jihad against Israel, and absolutely rejects peace treaties and normalization with Israel.** In addition, it is consistently anti-Semitic and spreads anti-Semitism, either rooted in Islam or based on *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*. Publicly, however, it sometimes represents itself as moderate and pragmatic because it considers its image in the international community as important.



The front cover of the 1988 Hamas charter, published by the Hamas movement in Qalqilya in 2004 and in force to this day. The picture is Ahmed Yassin, responsible for the charter's final formulation.



A quotation from Hassan al-Banna, Muslim Brotherhood founder, at the beginning of the charter: "Israel will arise and continue to exist until Islam wipes it out as it wiped out what went before..."

The quotation from Hassan al-Banna.

8. The Muslim Brotherhood opposes Al-Qaeda's global terrorism, but supports violent actions carried out by Islamic networks against the Western "occupations" of Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. As for the use of terrorism in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, it support terrorism as employed by Hamas, its Palestinian branch. Both inside and outside Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood maintains close relations with Hamas and provides it with political, propaganda and financial support.

9. The Muslim Brotherhood is not monolithic, it has pragmatic and moderate elements, including those which genuinely seek to combine pragmatism, real democracy and political tolerance with Islam. However, in our assessment, the combined weight of those elements, at least at this stage, is less than that of the more conservative and radical elements. That can clearly be seen by the appointment of conservative Mohammed Badie to the highest position of General Guide.



Mohammed Badie, the Muslim Brotherhood's General Guide (Photo from the Muslim Brotherhood website).

10. After Mubarak was overthrown, the Muslim Brotherhood, which had been outlawed by his regime, became a legitimate political force and the best organized one in the country. It won a sweeping victory in the first two of three rounds of elections for seats in the People's Assembly (the lower house in the Egyptian parliament): according to the reports, the Muslim Brotherhood-backed Freedom and Justice party won 40% of the votes in the first round and 47% in the second. The Salafist El-Nour party, with its rigid, radical, ultra-conservative ideology, won 20% of both the first and second rounds. On the other hand, the liberal parties which participated in the protests in Tahrir Square were roundly defeated.

11. The Muslim Brotherhood's success in the elections **may present it with a dilemma**, whether to unite with the Salafist parties or not. In our assessment, at this stage the movement might find it preferable to dissociate themselves from Salafists, despite its victory at the polls. It might preserve its moderate front, attempt to form a coalition with the secular parties and collaborate tactically with the army to create checks and balances and share power within government institutions. It would do that **without losing sight of its long-term goals** by relying on its strength in parliament, which would allow it to influence the nature of the constitution and use that in turn to influence relations between religion and state and the status of the army in the governmental system.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Other Arab Countries

12. **By the 1930s and '40s branches of the Muslim Brotherhood were being formed in other countries in the Arab world.** One of the most prominent was in **Syria**, at the time considered second in size only to the Egyptian branch. Branches were founded and grew in **Jordan, Algeria, Sudan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and the Gulf States; Hamas was established as the branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Palestinian arena.** An analysis of how the movement operates in those countries and what the relations are between its branches and the regimes shows that **they vary from country to country** and are influenced by and **adapt to local societal and politician conditions, including national, sectarian, and religious conditions.**

13. Following its worldview, which stresses all-pervading societal changes, and in view of the strict line it takes against the various regimes, in most of the Arab states the **Muslim Brotherhood has**

focused on constructing its social infrastructure (the *da'wah*) and winning the battle for hearts and minds, demonstrating a considerable degree of pragmatism and the willingness to restrain itself in the face of persecution to ensure its long-term survival. In several countries it **has integrated into political institutions**, in most cases as a tolerated opposition and in others even as a collaborator in joint political challenges. In two exceptional cases, **Syria** and the **Palestinian Authority**, the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas (the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood) **were involved in violent actions against the regime.** In Syria in 1982 that involvement failed, while in the Palestinian Authority in 2007 Hamas was successful and took control of the Gaza Strip.

14. In **Jordan**, for example, the Muslim Brotherhood was not traditionally a significant opposition force and did not seriously threaten the Hashemite regime, and at various times was even included in the governmental system. In **Sudan** the movement has enjoyed periods of incorporation into the government and wielding political influence as well as periods of persecution and oppression. In **Algeria** the movement eventually became part of the government of President Bouteflika. In **Saudi Arabia** the regime gave Muslim Brotherhood activists political asylum but has reservations about it. In **Qatar** the movement has government support and in **Kuwait** they have been incorporated into the parliament. In **Tunisia** the Al-Nahda party, affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, was persecuted by the government until it won the elections after the Jasmine Revolution.

15. In **Syria**, on the other hand, the Muslim Brotherhood headed the 1982 uprising against the Hafez al-Assad regime, which broke out in the Syrian town of Hama and was brutally suppressed. The movement was subsequently outlawed and for the most part continued its activities outside Syria. Today it participates in the uprising against Bashar Assad, part of a broad coalition of opponents to his regime. In the **Palestinian Authority** Hamas, the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, participated in the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council elections, but later, in June 2007, **it a series of violent military maneuvers it overthrew Fatah and the Palestinian Authority and took political and security control of the Gaza Strip.** To this day, the case of the Gaza Strip is an exceptional example of the establishment of a governmental entity by a movement affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood which took power by means of a military coup d'état.

16. As a precautionary measure **to avoid administrative responsibility and involvement in daily politics, in most of the Arab states the Muslim Brotherhood has established political parties affiliated with it as a front for their political activities:** In the recent elections in **Egypt** the movement operated through the Freedom and Justice party; in **Jordan** it established the Islamic Action Front; in **Algeria** it established the Movement for the Society of Peace; in **Sudan** it established the Islamic Charter Front and later the National Islamic Front; in **Lebanon** it is affiliated with an organization called Al-Jamaa al-Islamiya; in **Morocco** with the Moroccan Justice and Growth party; in **Tunisia** with the Al-Nahda party, which was persecuted by the authorities until the Jasmine

Revolution, after which it won the elections and is now the country's main political power; and in **Kuwait** it established the Islamic Constitution Movement. In **Saudi Arabia** the Muslim Brotherhood was not permitted to establish a political party. In **Syria** the movement preserved its identity as the Muslim Brotherhood, but this past year its leader expressed his readiness to turn it into a political party.

The Muslim Brotherhood in the Wake of the Regional Uprisings

17. While the **Muslim Brotherhood did not play a dominant or central role in the dramatic events which rocked the Arab world throughout 2011, it would seem to have profited most from the changes which occurred in several Arab countries. It would seem that the various Muslim Brotherhood movements exploited the historic moment to translate their social strength into significant political power, while keeping a low profile. Their tactics are currently circumspect, they play down or hide their extremist ideology, present a moderate face to the Western world, are politically correct with the media and join other protest groups whose ideologies are different from theirs.**

18. In certain instances, the movement **has joined a broader coalition of political or social opposition forces, along with groups of young or left-leaning liberals who participated in the protests.** However, later on, if and when the protests mature into significant socio-political changes, **the Muslim Brotherhood may abandon its current discretion and will not hesitate to confront its protest partners. Under such conditions it will attempt to become a legitimate political force, widely visible, seeking to impose its Islamist agenda and become the dominant force among the regimes and societies in the various Arab states.**

19. In some of the Arab states, following the regional uprisings, **the Muslim Brotherhood is undergoing the transition from persecuted or tolerated opposition movement to an important political force which may become an active partner in the newly-forming political systems.** There are signs in several countries that the process has already begun. In **Egypt** the Muslim Brotherhood had turned into an important, legitimate political force and won two of the first three rounds for seats in the parliament (40% of the seats in the first round and 47% in the second, as noted above). In **Tunisia** the Al-Nahda party, whose activity had previously been forbidden, has, after winning 40% of the parliamentary votes, become a major political force. In **Morocco** the Justice and Development party won the largest number of seats in the parliamentary election, 107 of 395, or 27%, and became the major opposition party. In other Arab countries, where the struggle is still going on, the Muslim Brotherhood has joined protest groups, both those seeking to overthrow the regime and completely change the political system, such as Syria, and at this stage those seeking to change the system from within, such as Jordan.

20. The recent regional uprisings have also influenced the **Palestinian arena: Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt have publicly grown closer and strengthened their ties.** Throughout 2011 the Hamas leadership in the Gaza Strip met with high-ranking Muslim Brotherhood officials in Cairo, which Hamas regards as a way of obtaining leverage with the Egyptian army and government as well as improving its position with regard to Fatah and the Arab world.² Another example of the influence of the regional uprisings is the ongoing Hamas exodus from Damascus and its leadership's removal to other locations.³



Khaled Mashaal (right), head of Hamas' political bureau, and Mohammed Badie, the Muslim Brotherhood's General Guide, meet in Cairo, August 10, 2011 (Janobiyat.com website)

The Muslim Brotherhood in Europe

21. The main catalyst for the expansion of the Muslim Brotherhood beyond the borders of Egypt, including to Europe, was **Egyptian President Nasser's suppression of the movement in 1954.** Large, well organized groups of Muslim Brotherhood members **fled in the 1950s to Saudi Arabia and Qatar.** A third, less cohesive group, fled to **the United States and various European countries, especially West Germany.** Today the movement claims it has a presence in **more than 80 countries around the globe.**⁴

22. In Germany the movement first took root in local Muslim communities and then spread to university campuses and among leftists members of the opposition. **In the following decades it gradually established itself in other European countries and spread radical Islam to the West and became, in effect, the representative of the Muslim immigrant communities. It is noteworthy that the various organizations, networks and activists in Europe are**

²For further information see the November 20, 2011 bulletin "A high-level delegation of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood recently held a first-of-its-kind visit to the Gaza Strip, following up on meetings with top Hamas officials held in Cairo..." at http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/ipc_e242.pdf.

³For further information see the December 11, 2011 bulletin "Hamas evacuates its Syrian external headquarters: overview and initial analysis" at http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/ipc_e249.pdf.

⁴Udi Rosen, "Mapping the Organizational Sources of the Global Delegitimization Campaign against Israel in the UK," website of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 2010, page 12.

generally careful to deny their affiliation to the movement, especially after the events of September 11, 2001.

23. With the financial support of the Gulf States (which continues to this day) **the Muslim Brotherhood extended the *da'wah* network in Europe and the United States** by establishing banks, mosques, research centers, Islam facilities, and social and educational institutions. They all disseminate the movement's radical political Islam to the local Muslim communities. **The most prominent centers in Europe with direct or indirect ties to the Muslim Brotherhood are in Britain, Germany (especially Munich⁵) and France**, and include the **German Islamic Society** (Islamische Gemeinschaft Deutschlands, IGD), the British **Union of Islamic Organizations** and the **Muslim Association of Britain (MAB)**.

24. **The Muslim Brotherhood seeks to turn Islam into the dominant force on the Continent within Europe's multicultural society, as part of the overall vision of the Islamic world conquest.** In the past, Yousef al-Qardawi, a senior Sunni Muslim authority affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, reiterated his faith that Islam would eventually take over Europe although, he said, but **not by war**.⁶ He said, "This means that Islam will return to Europe as a conqueror and victor, after having been expelled from it twice," qualifying his statement by saying, **"I maintain that the conquest this time will not be by the sword but by preaching and ideology."**⁷

25. The same theme appeared in Risalat al-Ikhwan, the Muslim Brotherhood organ printed in Britain, whose front cover showed a map of the world with a quotation from movement founder Hassan al-Banna underneath reading **"Our mission is to rule the world,"** but later, apparently as of 2003, the words "is to rule the world" were removed, in our assessment, because the Muslim Brotherhood was afraid of possible legal issues after September 11, 2001.

The Position of Muslim Brotherhood in Europe on Terrorism

26. **The Muslim Brotherhood opposes Al-Qaeda's ideology and its activists do not directly involve themselves in terrorist attacks against Western countries or Israel. The movement also opposes radical Shi'ite Islam as spread by Iran.** Therefore, generally speaking, the European countries do not regard the Muslim Brotherhood as a security risk and thus allow them to operate within the Muslim communities. Their position is completely different for

⁵For a long time the center the Muslim Brotherhood's activities was in Munich.

⁶Udi Rosen, "Mapping the Organizational Sources."

⁷MEMRI, December 6, 2002, Special Dispatch 447, <http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/774.htm>.

networks belonging to Al-Qaeda and the global jihad, which are targeted by the security services of various Western countries.

27. However, the **movement disseminates toxic propaganda against the West and its values, helping to segregate the Muslim population from local society**. The constant preaching makes it hard for the various Muslim communities to mingle with the indigenous societies in the countries in which they live and to internalize and West's liberal, democratic values. Moreover, **young people throughout Europe who have been exposed to the movement's radical Islamic ideology form a potential reservoir from which global jihad networks can recruit operatives (jihadization)**. Thus, in recent years there has been a rise in the number of terrorists with Western citizenship who at some point in their lives were educated in institutions affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood's *da'wah* or who underwent radical Islamization through the Internet, **until they eventually abandoned the basic ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood and turned to the way of the global jihad**.

The Position of Muslim Brotherhood in Europe on Israel

28. **The Muslim Brotherhood in Europe** (as well as in the Arab countries) **is fundamentally hostile to Israel**, rejects its right to exist, supports Hamas, denies the legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority, rejects the peace process and Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and rejects any and all signs of normalization between Israel and the Arab states (especially Egypt and Jordan). The branches of the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe adapt the movement's fundamental ideology, according to which Palestine [including the State of Israel] is land belonging to the Muslim endowment (*waqf*) and an Islamic Palestinian state has to be built on it, to which the refugees who left in 1948 will return within the framework of the so-called "right of return."

29. The **Muslim Brotherhood in Europe plays a key role in the campaign being waged to delegitimize Israel** and seeks to spread its basic positions to the European public, **sometimes in a softened form by using catchwords familiar and acceptable to Western ears**. **It participates in anti-Israeli and pro-Hamas propaganda projects** (such as flotillas and convoys to the Gaza Strip), is involved in anti-Israeli propaganda activities in various countries and **participates in the BDS campaign to boycott Israel, its products, its culture and its leaders**. In addition, it plays an important role in **collecting money for Hamas** through its participation in the Union of Good, a network of funds and foundations around the world headed by Sheikh Yousef al-Qardawi.

30. The Muslim Brotherhood conducts its anti-Israeli activities in collaboration with extreme leftist networks and activists hostile to Israel (called by the media the "red-green alliance"), and with human rights and social organizations. At the same time, activists belonging to Islamic networks in Europe affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood maintain ongoing relations with other branches and

with the movement's leaders in the Middle East, especially Yousef al-Qardawi, who lives in Qatar, and the Muslim Brotherhood leadership in Egypt.

The Structure of This Study

31. The study includes the following sections:

1) Overview

2) The Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab countries

1. Egypt
2. Syria
3. Jordan
4. Algeria
5. Sudan
6. Saudi Arabia
7. The United Arab Emirates
8. Lebanon
9. Morocco
10. Tunisia

3) The Muslim Brotherhood in Europe

1. Establishing the Muslim Brotherhood
2. The Muslim Brotherhood's umbrella networks
3. Muslim Brotherhood activity in Turkey
4. Britain as a center for Muslim Brotherhood activity
5. London as the Muslim Brotherhood's media center

The Muslim Brotherhood in Arab World

The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt⁸

32. Following the uprisings in the Arab world and since the overthrow of the Mubarak regime, **the status of the Muslim Brotherhood has risen significantly both in Egypt and with the international community**. Since its founding in 1928 it had been persecuted by various regimes and considered their principal rival, but **today it is a legitimate political power**.

33. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt **underwent a number of important stages in its development**, during which its ideology and methods changed.

1) **1928-1954: Defining its structure and direction** and establishing its position in society.

2) **1954-1970: Isolation and confrontation with Nasser's regime** and a serious schism in the movement ideology between radicals and pragmatists (the mainstream Muslim Brotherhood).

3) **1970-early 1990s: Relative political openness within the Egyptian regime**, the departure of the more radical factions and the beginning of integration into the political system.

4) **Middle 1990s to January 2011: Increasing repression by the Mubarak regime** and tensions and uncertainty within the movement regarding its identity (religious-social movement vs. political party).

5) **From January 2011: Evolution into a legitimate political power** and integration into the governmental system of the "new Egypt."

34. Today, although the movement did not lead the protests which eventually toppled the Mubarak regime, **it made the greatest amount of political capital from the changes** and emerged as the organized, experienced force within the internal political arena. That was made clear by the recent **parliamentary elections**, the first important stage in turning rule over to an elected civilian leadership. In the first round of the elections, the Freedom and Justice party, the Muslim

⁸A more comprehensive report about the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt than the one issued in June 2011, which can be found at http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/ipc_e174.pdf.

Brotherhood's political wing, received 40% of the votes. According to initial media reports, it received 47% in the second round.

35. **Moreover, its status also improved in the trade and student unions. It identified the democratization of Egypt as a historic opportunity to translate its strength as a social organization into significant political power.** It seeks a position of strength in the administration (the parliament and government), **which will enable it to promote its vision of turning the country into an state governed according to Islamic religious law and to influence policy.** Therefore it insists that **the future parliament be the dominant factor in formulating the country's new constitution.** They intend to use the new constitution to influence the relations between religion and state and to limit the status of the army in the governmental system.

36. To that end, the movement **represents itself as moderate and pragmatic**, especially with reference to its commitment to the values of democracy, religious freedom and equal rights, **while veiling its true intentions.** In addition, while **it distances itself from the more extremist Islamist elements, such as the Salafists, it joins forces with liberal, secular elements** (such as the Tomorrow Party), including the coalition slate running with it for parliament. **It also glosses over its fundamental attitude toward Israel, which is a complete rejection of the right of the State of Israel to exist**, and instead publicly adopts the more moderate approach common to most of its political partners, which **opposes all forms of normalization with Israel and calls for the peace treaty between the two countries to be reexamined.**

37. In effect, **whether because of its success in allying fears or in recognition of its growing power, the international community** (including the United States and the European Union) **has become more interested in improving relations and opening lines of communication with it.** That is apparently in preparation for the day after the elections, when the movement is expected to fill an important role in the Egyptian governmental system. **In addition, there has also been a significant improvement in the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's relations with affiliated movements in Jordan, Turkey (the ruling AKP party) and Hamas in the Gaza Strip.**

Important Figures in the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood Leadership

38. Dr Mohammed Badie al-Majid Sami

1) **Role: General Guide** (as of January 2010)

2) **Personal history:** Born 1943 in Al-Mahallah al-Kubra, married and father of three, son-in-law of the fifth general guide, Mustafa Mashhur. PhD. in veterinary medicine from Zagazig University, lectured at the universities of Asyut and Zagazig, chaired the general veterinarians' trade union.

3) **Movement involvement:** Member since the early 1960s, member of the Guidance Office since 1966, and of the Global Guidance Office since 2007. Arrested and sentenced to prison several times for movement activity between 1965 and 2008, the last during municipal elections.

4) **Ideology:** Initially influenced by Sayyid Qutb. Considered a prominent representative of the movement's conservative school of thought.

5) **Additional information:** Lackluster, careful leader without vision or charisma, elected as a compromise between the movement's power players.



39. Dr. Khairat al-Shater

1) **Role: Deputy General Guide.** Considered the movement's "financial brain" and main fundraiser.

2) **Personal history:** Born 1950 in Dakahlia, married to sister of Guidance Office member Mahmoud Ghazlan; his daughter is married to Ghazlan's son. Holds a BA in engineering from Alexandria University and a diploma in liberal arts from Al-Shams University, as well as a diploma in Islamic studies. Holds a PhD in computer studies from London University. In addition, he has worked in commerce and been on the board of directors of several companies and banks. He owns more



than ten companies and his personal fortune is estimated at 100 million Egyptian pounds (about \$16,600,000).⁹

3) **Movement involvement:** Officially joined the Muslim Brotherhood in 1974 but participated in Islamic activities as early as 1967 (may have initially been a follower of Nasser). Member of the Guidance Office since 1995. Detained a number of times starting in 1968, in 1995 for five years, and in 2007 for four years on charges of financing terrorism and laundering money.

4) **Ideology:** Leans toward the reformist school, but in practice sits on the fence between conservatives and reformists. Although popular with the movement's younger generation, he is said to be embraced by the old guard.

5) **Additional information:** Considered the movement's strongest and most influential figure and nicknamed the Iron Man because of his control over the movement's sources of money.

40. Dr. Mohammed Morsi

1) **Role:** Chairman of the Freedom and Justice party.

2) **Personal history:** Apparently born in the 1950s; headed the Department of Materials Engineering in the Engineering Faculty at Zagazig University.



3) **Movement involvement:** Member of the People's Assembly and chairman of the Muslim Brotherhood faction in the parliament (2000-2005).

4) **Ideology:** Apparently belongs to the reformist faction.

41. Dr. Issam al-Din Mohammed Hussein al-Aryan

1) **Role:** A deputy chairman of the Freedom and Justice party.

2) **Personal history:** Born 1954, in Giza. BA in medicine, diploma in law, diploma in Islamic law from Al-Azhar University. Founding member of Egyptian human rights organization.



⁹At the current rate of exchange, December 2011.

3) **Movement involvement:** Apparently joined in the 1970s. Helped found educational Islamic activities at Cairo University and other Egyptian universities. Was a member of the People's Assembly from 1987 to 1990 (representing the northern Cairo neighborhood of Imbaba). Helped spearhead the movement's political integration in the 1980s. Headed the political bureau was movement information chief. Detained and imprisoned a number of times (notably between 1995 and 2000, and for the last time three months in 2010).

4) **Ideology:** Reformist.

5) **Additional information:** Very active, influence member of the movement. Politically experienced, charismatic, knows how to position himself as a "fighter for democracy" in his dealings with the West, and was considered the movement's liaison with the United States, although he denies it.

6) **Recent remarks:** Following the victory of the Muslim Brotherhood in the first round of elections to the People's Assembly, he said his party was moderate and just, and claimed it wanted to institute the fundamentals of Islamic law in a fair way, respecting human rights and personal liberty. He also said he hoped that everyone would accept a democratic regime and claimed that his party respected people's choice of religion and lifestyles (Telephone conversation with AP, December 4, 2011).

42. **Dr. Mohamed Saad al-Katatni**

1) **Role: Secretary General of the Freedom and Justice party**

2) **Personal history:** Born 1952, holds a BA in liberal arts and a PhD in science, taught botany in the Faculty of Science at Al-Minya University. Member of Amnesty International, and the secretary general of the faculty guidance club at Al-Minya University since 1990.



3) **Movement involvement:** Co-founder of the inter-party, national faction and trade union coordinating committee. One of the leaders of the movement's political involvement. Member of the Guidance Office since June 2008. Serves as the movement's representative at international conferences outside Egypt.

4) **Ideology:** Important reformist figure.

5) **Additional information:** Active in many fields, especially politics.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria¹⁰



The emblem of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria: Crossed swords and the Qur'an, the Muslim Brotherhood logo under a map of Syria and the inscription "Tell people good things" (a quotation from the Qur'an, indicating the need to guide the faithful along the correct path in the spirit of the *da'wah* – preaching Islam, as stressed by Hassan al-Banna). While in Syria the Muslim Brotherhood was radicalized and took military action against the authorities, it is notable to find it stressing the *da'wah*.

43. The Muslim Brotherhood was established in Syria in 1945 by disciples of Hassan al-Banna. At first it focused on educational and societal activities (the *da'wah*). Most of its activity, at least until the early 1980s, **was concentrated in Homs and Hama**, two large Sunni cities in central Syria. It also had a presence in poorer neighborhoods in Damascus. **During the 1960s and 1970s its ideology was radicalized according to the doctrines of Sayyid Qutb**, thus, since 1972, the militant school of thought has dominated the movement, **calling for a jihad against the Syrian regime**.

44. **One of the most prominent founders was Mustafa al-Siba'i**, who taught Islamic law at the University of Damascus and was the Muslim Brotherhood's first Inspector General in Damascus.¹¹ **A disciple of Sayyid Qutb, he was one of the most important Muslim Brotherhood figures in Syria in the 1970s and 1980s**. He was arrested by the Syrian authorities for five years for advocating the overthrow of the Hafez Assad's (Alawite-run) regime and the establishment in Syria of a Sunni Islamic regime. In addition, from 1979 to 1987 **Said Hawa** was the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria. He exploited his time in jail to write books and formulate his ideology. He led the Muslim Brotherhood from 1979 to 1987.¹²

45. In the 1970s and early 1980s **the Muslim Brotherhood's campaign against the regime of Hafez Assad was characterized by violence and terrorism**. The campaign included the murder of members of the Syrian army and high-ranking Baath party activists. After a number of

¹⁰In preparing this section we referred to Israel Elad Altman, "Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement" (Washington: Hudson Institute, 2009), pp. 24-30.

¹¹The title of the Muslim Brotherhood leader in Syria and other Arab countries is General Inspector (Al-murakab al-'aam) rather than General Guide (Al-murshid al-'aam) as it is in Egypt.

¹²With the exception of 1982-1984, when he worked for the Global Muslim Brotherhood.

years of violent clashes between the movement and the regime, **in 1982 the Assad regime dealt it a severe blow in the city of Hama, where massive Syrian army forces (including tanks and artillery) were deployed against civilians. According to unofficial estimates, between ten and twenty thousand people were killed and the city was seriously damaged, including the destruction of a large number of mosques.**



The destruction caused to Hama by the army's repression of the uprising (Left picture from the egyptianchronicles.blogspot.com website, right picture from the ihkwanwiki website, February 8, 2010).

46. The brutal repression of the movement led to its going underground and to an almost complete cessation of its activities in Syria, where to this day it is outlawed. Its leaders are active beyond Syrian borders, especially in London, Ankara and Aachen in Germany, but in many other European countries. In Aachen it was founded by **Issam al-Atar** and funded by **Youssef Nada** (who for years has been considered as the movement's principal financier).¹³

47. When Bashar Assad came to power in 2000 the movement recontacted the regime and hundreds of its activists were released from prison. However, the contacts soon ended and as of 2004 the movement has increased its efforts to convince the Syrian people and Western powers to overthrow the Syrian regime.



The website of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria (Ikhwansyria.com website)

48. Between 1996 and 2010 the Inspector General of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria was **Ali Sadr al-Bayanuni**, born in Aleppo, a lawyer. From 2000 he worked in London, where he

¹³Meforum.org website.

was friendly with Abd al-Halim Khadam (Syrian vice president under Hafez Assad and who sought political asylum in London in 2005, becoming one of the leaders of the Syrian opposition in exile). The two agreed on joint actions against the Bashar Assad regime but nothing came of them, among other reasons because after Operation Cast Lead (2009) the London office of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood announced it was suspending its anti-regime activities and turning its resources to supporting Hamas in the Gaza Strip. The announcement ended with an appeal to the Syrian regime "to reconcile with its people" so it could fulfill its "sacred duty to liberate the occupied land..." (Al-Quds, Kuwait, September 18, 2009).

49. In August 2010 an engineer named Muhammad Riyad al-Shaqfa was appointed Inspector General of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (Al-Masri Al-Yawm, August 13, 2011). He was born in 1944 in Hama, where his father was head of the local council of Islamic sages, and joined the Muslim Brotherhood in 1961. He studied at the University of Damascus and received a BA in civil engineering in 1968. In 1978 he was appointed to the Muslim Brotherhood's board of directors in Hama and the following year became chairman of the board. In 1983 he became a member of the movement's Syrian leadership. He apparently has a military background.¹⁴

50. In the early 1980s (possibly in the wake of the events in Hama) **al-Shaqfa lived in Iraq**. In 2003 in Baghdad an attempt was made on his life but he escaped with minor injuries. Since 2008 **he has lived in Yemen, and today also spends time in Turkey**.¹⁵ This past year he said he was prepared to turn the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria into a political party,¹⁶ as the movement had done in other Arab countries.



Ali Sadr al-Bayanuni, the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria's Inspector General between 1996 and 2010 (Picture from Al-Hiwar, the Muslim Brotherhood TV station in London, November 16, 2009)



Engineer Muhammad Riyad al-Shaqfa, the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria's Inspector General as of 2010 (Picture from the official Muslim Brotherhood website)

¹⁴Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, August 20, 2010)

¹⁵Sooryoon.net, September 15, 2010

¹⁶Ah00.wordpress.com

51. In February 2011, following the dramatic events in Tunisia and Egypt, **the Muslim Brotherhood initiated a media campaign against the Syrian regime**. It called for the end of the oppression of the Syrian people and strongly criticized the poverty, hunger and unemployment prevalent in Syria (Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, February 2, 2011). The Muslim Brotherhood is part of the coalition of Muslim organizations participating in the ongoing Syrian uprising to overthrow Bashar Assad.

52. **As the riots continued the Muslim Brotherhood began participating in various opposition committees in Europe**. Eventually it **joined the Syrian National Council**,¹⁷ headed by the liberal opposition figure **Dr. Burhan Ghalioun**, who lives in France. **Mohammed Farouk Tayfour**, Muhammad al-Shaqfa's deputy, is the movement representative in the council's executive committee. The Muslim Brotherhood may be using the Syrian National Council, which represents itself as democratic and liberal, to receive international recognition and eventually participate in the administration formed after the fall of Assad.¹⁸

53. Riyad al-Shaqfa, the inspector general of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, was interviewed by Al-Sharq Al-Awsat on December 5, 2011. He said he expected the Syrian regime to fall and that he would agree to Turkish military intervention, but not to other foreign intervention. He admitted that the Muslim Brotherhood was not based in Syria because of the law which made membership in the movement a capital crime.

54. He also claimed that the Muslim Brotherhood did not have ties to Hezbollah because Hezbollah and Iran took part in the oppression of the Syrian people. He said he knew that there were specialists from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in the Syrian operations room. Asked if the Muslim Brotherhood would adopt the Turkish model of government after the fall of Assad, he answered that he was in favor of the Turkish model rather than the Iranian. He claimed that the Muslim Brotherhood did not want to impose religious law on Syria but would legislate a constitution based on freedom, justice and equality, inspired by Islam.

55. In our assessment, because of the Sunni Islam hold on the people of Syria, despite the years of oppression, **the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria will play an important role in the protest movement against Assad's regime**. It will be done as part of the coalition of the regime's opponents it will want to join. In Syria as in other countries, at this stage the movement wants to represent itself as moderate, but that may change after the Syrian regime falls and it becomes an important political power.

¹⁷An umbrella organization of a number of opposition groups, among them liberals, Kurds, Muslim Brotherhood members, tribesmen and member of the local coordinating committees responsible for organizing demonstrations.

¹⁸A gathering called the National Rescue Conference was held by the Syrian opposition in Istanbul on July 15, 2011. Its organizers claimed that it was attended by representatives of all the opposition groups but in effect its tone was Islamic. Among the speakers was Ali Al-Bayanuni, the former inspector general of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan



The emblem of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. The inscription in the circle is the movement's motto: "Allah is our objective, the prophet [Muhammad] is our leader, the Qur'an is our law, jihad is our way and death for the sake of Allah is our most exalted aspiration."

Overview

56. **The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, whose members are both trans-Jordanian and Palestinian in origin, is the main opposition in the country, both in size and popular influence, and seriously challenges the Jordanian regime.** Like the movements in other Arab countries, **it considers social and economic issues as key to accumulating political clout and expanding its influence among the masses.** Since 1992 it operates as a political movement **through the Islamic Action Front (IAF)**, which has representation in parliament.

57. The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan is considered a legitimate opposition to the Hashemite regime. At various times, especially in the 1950s and 60s, it had close ties with the regime and was a faithful support in its struggle against the subversive activities carried out by the Nasserites and the national secular leftists. **Later there were ups and downs in the relations between the movement and the regime.** They worsened in recent years following the movement's radicalization. It became highly critical of the regime on issues of foreign affairs, especially the peace with Israel, and fought any manifestation of normalization with Israel.

58. Today the movement Jordan is divided into two factions, **extremists, most of whom are of Palestinian origin and support Hamas, and pragmatists, most of whom are Jordanian. The pragmatist faction acts as a brake on extremist trends, thus**

supporting the Jordanian regime. In recent years the extremists have been dominant, especially after **Hammam Sa'id**, who is of Palestinian origin, was chosen as inspector general, the highest post in the movement. After his appointment he expressed his support for Palestinian terrorism and called for the murder of Jews (See below).



"...Kill them [the Jews] in Palestine! Throw them out of Palestine!" Hammam Sa'id, Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan inspector general, during a march held in solidarity with the residents of the Gaza Strip (Hamas' Al-Aqsa TV, December 5, 2008).

59. The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan **plays an important role in the protest against the Hashemite regime**. So far the protest has been kept on the back burner and is mostly limited to Friday demonstrations, which are often attended by several thousand people. The movement is significant mainly in the capital city of Amman, and to a lesser degree in the northern part of the country (the county of Irbid). **It functions as one of the many protest groups opposing the regime**, among them leftists, Islamic groups which do not belong to the Muslim Brotherhood, liberals and pan-Arabists. In the south the Muslim Brotherhood joined protest groups composed of southern tribesmen.

60. **At this point** the Muslim Brotherhood and other protest groups demand **an internal reform of the Hashemite regime**. It does not call for the overthrow of the regime, rather it demands a **parliamentary monarchy** which would limit the power of the king and turn the government and the senate into elected, not appointed bodies.¹⁹ The Muslim Brotherhood also demands economic and social reforms, such as maintaining low and subsidized prices. It is willing to give the current government, headed by Awn al-Khasawneh, a chance, and has still not decided whether or not to participate in the 2012 elections to local authorities and the parliament.

¹⁹Al-Jazeera TV, February 28, 2011; Al-Ra'i, Qatar, November 29, 2011

Milestones in the History of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan²⁰

60. Unlike other Arab states, such as Egypt and Syria, **the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan is a legal opposition to the Hashemite regime**. The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood branch was founded in 1945 under the aegis of King Abdallah the First, and was based on the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. In 1948, after the movement's activities were banned in Egypt many of its members found asylum in Jordan. In 1954 more of its activists fled to Jordan, including some of the leaders. At that time the movement in Jordan focused on establishing religious, charitable, educational and welfare institutions (the *da'wah*), which to this day serve as the basis for its social and political influence.

61. When Abdallah annexed the West Bank in 1950 the movement was permitted to operate openly and was known as **a legitimate, apolitical organization**, operating through branch offices throughout the kingdom. However, that did not prevent it from criticizing the regime, its connections with Britain and what it considered its deviation from the principles of Islamic law (the Shari'ah) in daily life, often leading to the arrest of movement leaders. However, the common interests of the Muslim Brotherhood and the regime overcame the tensions and disagreements, and they coexisted with mutual respect and wariness.

62. **During the 1950s the movement supported King Hussein in his struggle against leftist organizations and Nasserites**, even during the attempted coup of 1957. In that same year, when King Hussein issued an edict banning political organizations in Jordan, no limitations were placed on the Muslim Brotherhood. In return, the movement supported the regime through the mosques and other public platforms. However, despite the close relations, the Hashemite government was wary of the Muslim Brotherhood's strong anti-West, anti-Christian orientation and its long-term goal of establishing a Shari'ah-run Islamic state in Jordan. **For that reason the movement was overseen by the Jordanian security forces and the regime defined the limits of its political freedom of action**. However, it did not forcibly suppress it or completely eliminate it from political life.

63. In 1967, after the Six Day War, the movement's branches in Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip were subordinated to the Muslim Brotherhood leadership in Jordan. In 1970, when the Jordanian army expelled the Palestinian terrorist organizations from the refugee camps in

²⁰In preparing this section we relied on sources which included an article by Issam Abu Riya entitled "The Hashemite Monarchy, the Muslim Brotherhood and Jordan's Pseudo-Democratic System, 1989-1999" (Arabic) in *Jamaiyah*. Volume 2, 2003, pp. 11-38.

Amman and other Jordanian cities (the so-called "Black September" events), the Muslim Brotherhood supported King Hussein. It was rewarded with his support and received the education portfolio in the Jordanian government, thus being able to influence the values on which the younger generation was raised. **The movement participated in elections for the first time in 1989, winning a surprising 30 of 80 seats in the house of representatives.** After the victory at the polls, it announced that it did not intend to take over the Jordanian government. **It stressed that it would operate solely in legal ways as part of the parliament and as a constructive opposition.**

64. Its impressive victory in the 1989 elections and its popular support surprised King Hussein. However, his response was mild and he did not change his approach toward the movement. At the same time, however, the regime changed the electoral system, institutionalizing the kingdom's political activity on parties. The result was a decrease in Islamic power, and in the next elections the Muslim Brotherhood won only 18 seats.

65. The crisis in the Persian Gulf led to a rapprochement between the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood. In **January 1991**, at height of the crisis, following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, **five Muslim Brotherhood members were chosen as members of the Mudar Badran government**²¹. The movement had a series of conditions for participating in the government, the main one of which was the government's commitment to implement Islamic religious law in economics, education and the media. It also demanded government portfolios linked to ethical issues and norms, such as the ministries of education, justice and religious endowments (*waqf*). Eventually the Islamic bloc joined the government and its representatives received their five portfolios. After the Muslim Brotherhood joined, the Badran government won a large parliamentary majority and the movement was given freedom of action in areas it had never known before.

66. **However, the issue of the Muslim Brotherhood's inclusion in the government caused a deep ideological schism in the movement's leadership** (one of many), **leading to the formation of two camps:** one in opposition, which regarded participation in the government as harming the movement's image as representing a radical, "clean" alternative to the regime. That camp claimed that by entering the government, the movement would grant Islamic legitimacy to a regime not founded on Shari'ah and might hurt its societal activities, which were central to its existence. The other camp was in favor of

²¹Mudar Badran served as Jordan's prime minister from 1976 to 1984 with a brief interruption from 1979 until 1980, and again from 1989 to 1991.

participation in government, regarding it as an opportunity to influence the running of the country. **The final decision was to join the government.** However, when the crisis in the Persian Gulf ended and preparations were made in 1991 for Madrid Conference, King Hussein appointed a new government and **forced the Islamic block out** because it had opposed Jordanian participation in the negotiations with Israel.

67 Following new legislation in Jordan and the passing of the political party law, on October 28, 1992, **the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan established a political wing, the Islamic Action Front.**²² The IAF has both movement and independent Islamist activists. It was primarily established to have political influence in dealing with the challenges the movement faced with regard to the parliamentary elections scheduled for November 1993. **When the votes were counted, the Muslim Brotherhood had become the largest faction in the Jordanian parliament, and strongly opposed the peace treaty Jordan signed with Israel in 1994.**

68. However, **the establishment of the Islamic Action Front led to new tensions and rifts:** traditionalists and conservatives vs. modernists, moderate vs. radical, and trans-Jordanians vs. Palestinians. Within the new party there were also tensions and frictions between independent Islamists and Muslim Brotherhood members. Thus the IAF did not develop into a political party which could stand on its own with a clear, well-defined ideology, an organizational hierarchy and network of local branches.

69. **Between 2005 and 2006 the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan became radicalized, which damaged its relations with the regime.** In 2006 movement members expressed support for Hamas following the March affair of arms smuggling to the Gaza Strip through Jordanian territory. In June 2006 they even visited the mourning tent erected for Abu Mussa'b al-Zarqawi, senior Al-Qaeda representative in Iraq, who was killed in a targeted attack by an American plane, and openly lauded him. In response, the regime detained four Islamic Action Front members of parliament. In 2006, during the Second Lebanon War, the movement criticized the conduct of the regime and called for support of Hezbollah. In response, the regime took steps to restrain the movement's activity and weaken its public status.

²²Although the Islamic Action Front is the Muslim Brotherhood's political wing, it is a separate entity and has independent institutions. Over the years **there has been a continuous struggle between the two bodies,** especially prompted by the attempts of the movement to intervene in elections to the IAF and to influence its policies.

70. After its failure in the November 2007 parliamentary elections, **the movement underwent an internal shakeup concerning the nature of its activities within the internal political system and how to deal with the Hashemite regime.** It did some soul searching, at the end of which its governing body (the Shura Council) decided to disband itself three years before the next elections. The movement decided that its members of parliament would retain their positions but instructed the senior member who had been appointed to the senate to resign in protest of 2007 parliamentary election irregularities.

71. **Before the November 2010 elections, the movement announced it would boycott them,** as it did in 1997, **claiming that they were not fair.** In January 2011 the Islamic Action Front demanded that King Abdallah disperse the government and parliament because of the irregularities of the November 2010 parliamentary elections. The party secretary showed the media documents confirming forgeries and warned of corruption in Jordan which, he said, seriously threatened the country (Al-Quds Al-Arabi, January 18, 2011).

Al-Sabeel, the Official Muslim Brotherhood Newspaper

72. **The Muslim Brotherhood's newspaper Al-Sabeel** was first published as a weekly in 1995 and gained great popularity. Its editorial policy represents the movement's more extreme faction. In 2008 it lodged a request with the Jordanian authorities to publish daily. Authorization was delayed by the tension between the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood, but was finally granted at the end of the year.

73. In February 2009 it began appearing on a daily basis. Its editor-in-chief is Atef al-Julani (Al-Quds Al-Arabi, February 11, 2011). **The paper publishes anti-Israeli, anti-Semitic propaganda** (See below). The movement's pragmatic faction launched a website called Al-Bosala.com.

The Muslim Brotherhood and Jordan's Position on Israel

74. **The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan leads a blatantly anti-Israeli campaign and openly opposes the Israel-Jordan peace treaty, calls for it to be revoked and wages a campaign against normalizing relations with Israel.** It voiced strong opposition to the 1991 Madrid Conference and withdrew its representatives from the government. The movement's more extreme faction **strived for closer relations with Hamas and support its use of violence and terrorism against Israel.** One

manifestation of the policy is the considerable involvement of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan in flotillas and convoys to the Gaza Strip (See below).

75. The Muslim Brotherhood's opposition to all forms of compromise and peace with Israel **is based on its fundamental ideology and on political-electoral considerations.** Ideologically it rejects peace with Israel **because peace would mean giving up part of the land of "Islamic Palestine," which the movement regards as "sacred Muslim land" (*waqf*) which cannot be relinquished.** Politically-electorally, one of the Muslim Brotherhood's power bases in Jordan is **the Palestinian population in the refugee camps, most of which is strongly opposed to any form of Israeli-Jordanian relations.** However, the Muslim Brotherhood failed to keep the peace treaty from being signed or to prevent normalized relations between the two countries. **To this day it focuses its struggles against the manifestations of normalization and on turning the clock back.**

76 The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan **has supported Palestinian terrorism and has used its official newspaper to conduct a smear campaign against Israel and the Jewish people.** An Islamist columnist, **Ibrahim al-Aroush**, affiliated Al-Qaeda, was responsible for the following in **Al-Sabeel**:

1) **On January 15, 2008, he wrote an article denying the Holocaust.** He wrote that the Holocaust was a "plot" invented to promote political goals. He said the UN resolution regarding the Holocaust was meaningless because around the world they would be "swept away like leaves in the wind." **He also voiced support for suicide bombing attacks against Israeli civilians.**

2) **On March 11, 2008,** he wrote an article justifying the massacre of the students at Mercaz HaRav yeshiva in Jerusalem by a Palestinian saying that **"Every Jew on the land of Palestine today is of necessity part of the Zionist program...It is sufficient that they are invaders...for our duty to be to uproot the last Jew, especially those so-called progressives...Blessings on the pure white hands, the hands of the heros of the resistance, which help [the Jews] on their way to hell...Well done, you who hold the rifles! Well done, you who have strapped on explosive belts!..."**

77. **Support for terrorism and the call to murder Jews were the themes in a speech given by Sheikh Hammad Sa'id,** the inspector general of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. He said the following, broadcast by Hamas' Al-Aqsa TV on December 5, 2008:

1) He began by addressing the residents of the Gaza Strip, saying, "Blessed Gaza, raise your head, for you raise the head of [all] Muslims." He then spoke of the events in Hebron, appealing to the residents of the city by saying, "You, Hebronites, are waging a war against the Jews, and you are experienced fighters. **We saw you, how one day in 1929** [a reference to the indiscriminate slaughter of 67 Jews in Hebron, July 23-24, 1929] **you massacred the Jews of Hebron. Today you have to massacre them on the soil of Hebron [again]. Kill them in Palestine! Throw them out of Palestine!** [Do it] in defense of your Al-Aqsa [mosque], and of Nablus and Hebron.

2) He then addressed Mahmoud Abbas: "**Abbas, remove your treacherous hands from the Palestinian people**, never send the preventive security service to kill our brothers or confiscate our weapons..." He pointed the finger of guilt at the Palestinian Authority's security forces, telling them to "**oppose the [PA's] preventive security service**, do not fear them...you are lions." To the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip he said, "**Gaza, send rockets and end the lull [in the fighting], there must be no lulls with the enemy.**"

3) He called for an end to relations between Israel and Jordan, saying, "**Young people, tell the government of Jordan to throw the Israeli ambassador out of Amman, [because] Amman is pure and a Jewish ambassador cannot be allowed to defile it** [with his presence]! [Tell the government] to recall the Jordanian ambassador from Palestine [i.e., Israel] to Amman. **There must be only jihad fighters [mujahideen] in Palestine.** [There cannot be] ambassadors, ministers or representatives of [the Islamic] nation. Do not recognize the [Israeli] ambassador. **Palestine is jihad land and self-sacrifice.**"

4) He also called on the Jordanians **to put an end to normalized relations with Israel and to boycott its products**, calling those who trade with Israel "collaborators" and "traitors," adding, "the [Muslim] clerics have determined that **anyone who trades with Jews is a traitor and collaborator.**"



Left: Hammam Sa'id, the inspector general of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, during a march for solidarity with the Gaza Strip. Right: The march (Al-Aqsa TV, December 5, 2008).

78. A recent example of the movement's **fundamental hatred for Israel and its rejection of any signs of normalized relations** was an announcement issued by Hammam Sa'id, the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan inspector general, in advance of a visit to Jordan of Israeli opposition leader Tzippi Livni. It denounced giving receptions to what he termed "war criminals" wanted in Jordan for the so-called "holocaust in the Gaza Strip," and demanded that the Jordanian government prevent them from "tainting the soil of Jordan." The announcement also denounced the reception of the "Zionist president" Shimon Peres in Amman and called for the end of normalized relations with Israel (Official Muslim Brotherhood website, December 1, 2011).

Ties between the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan and the Hamas Movement

79. **The issue of the relations between Hamas, the Palestinian branch of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan was a source of tensions between the movement members.** Until recent years the movement in Jordan dealt mainly with internal Jordanian issues and was less openly supportive of Hamas. In the past the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan made an effort to demonstrate its loyalty to the Jordanian regime even during disagreements over the question of Hamas activity in Jordan before its leadership was expelled and moved to Damascus. Before then the Muslim Brotherhood leadership demanded that Ibrahim Ghousheh, one of the deportees, stop reporting from Amman on Hamas activity, claim that "we are a law-abiding organization and loyal to the country," and "we do not employ terrorism within our country."

80. **At the end of the 1990s the issue of the nature of the relations between the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan and Hamas was raised within the Jordanian movement.** Hamas gained its main support from the extremist faction, whose activists are of Palestinian origin. However, another Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan faction has an internal Jordanian agenda and supports Jordanian nationalism and reforms in the country's political

system. In the past the nature of the relations with Hamas caused a violent disagreement within the movement and high-ranking activists threatened to resign. Movement members tried to mediate between the sides by apparently to this day the situation is still controversial (Al-Quds Al-Arabi, September 17, 2009). Two senior figures, Hammam Sa'id and Zaki Bani Arshid belong to Hamas supporters of the extremist faction.

Senior Activists

81. Three senior Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan activists are the following:

1) **Sheikh Hamman Sa'id**, the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan's inspector general. Of Palestinian origin, elected to head the movement in May 2008, belongs to its extremist faction. Member of the Jordanian parliament in 1989. Holds a PhD in Islamic law (Shari'ah). Taught at the University of Jordan for many years. Holds extremist views regarding Israel, while having close relations with Hamas.

2) **Zaki Bani Arshid**, born 1957, head of the IAF political bureau. Of Jordanian origin, married, father of ten, holds a BA in chemical engineering. Joined the Muslim Brotherhood in 1973, later cofounded the IAF. Considered extremist and close to Hamas and Khaled Mashaal, head of Hamas' political bureau.

3) **Hamza Mansour**, secretary general of the Islamic Action Front since 2006. Born 1944 in a village near Haifa. Preacher, holds an MA in education. Member of Jordanian parliament for three years.

Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan Participation in the Propaganda Displays against Israel

The Flotilla-Convoy Campaign

82. **Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan activists are prominent in the flotilla-convoy campaign aimed at condemning and defaming Israel**, support the de-facto Hamas administration in the Gaza Strip, and make it difficult for Israel to maintain its closure of Gaza. Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan participation in the *Mavi Marmara* flotilla was particularly prominent (May 31, 2010).

83. The Jordanian delegation to the flotilla was one of two large Arab groups. There were 31 Jordanian activists aboard the *Mavi Marmara*, including prominent public figures and trade union members. Many members of the delegation were affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, two in particular:

1) **Wa'al Ikram Assad al-Saqa**, who headed the Jordanian delegation aboard the *Mavi Marmara*. Born in 1956, engineer, veteran Muslim Brotherhood member, **chairman of the Jordanian LifeLine Committee**, which orchestrated the Jordanian participants in the flotillas and convoys. Heads the Jordanian engineers union, continues active participation in dispatching flotillas and convoys to the Gaza Strip.



Wa'al al-Saqa at a press conference after his return to Jordan from the *Mavi Marmara* flotilla (Picture from the bokra.net website).

2) **Professor Salem Yusuf Muhammad al-Falahat**

A. Born 1954, Muslim Brotherhood activist, belongs to the movement's more moderate faction, which does not prevent him from supporting Palestinian suicide bombing attacks against Israel. Was formerly inspector general of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. In 1997 boycotted the parliamentary elections. Detained by Jordanian general intelligence in 2001 after participating in a unauthorized demonstration in support of the Palestinians. **During the demonstration in Zarqa he called for suicide bombing attacks against Israel.**

B. In June 2010 he said in an interview that the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, regarded Palestine as part of the Islamic Arab lands and could not be given up, rather, it had to be protected as a national and religious duty. The Muslim Brotherhood, he said, regarded the Hamas movement in in Palestine as leading the Islamic Arab liberation project, adding that **the Muslim Brotherhood supported Hamas and all the Arab resistance [i.e., terrorist] movements in the**

region working for liberation (Al-Ra'i, Qatar, September 23, 2009, quoted by MEMRI, June 2, 2010).



Salem al-Falahat (Picture from the hkjtoday.com website)

C. In August 2011 al-Falahat denounced Jordanian security coordination with Israel, denounced Israel's so-called "aggression" against the Palestinians, and called for young Arabs to support Al-Aqsa mosque. He also appealed to the Arab peoples in general to exert pressure on their various regimes to support the Palestinian people (Hamas' Palestine-info website, August 28, 2011).

3) **Saud Salim Abu Mahfuz Zarka** (aka Habib al-Rahman), born 1959, newspaper correspondent, former Muslim Brotherhood faction member of Jordanian parliament. Belongs to the Muslim Brotherhood's Islamic Action Party. General manager of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan's daily Al-Sabeel. His son, who was a correspondent for Hamas' Al-Aqsa TV in Jordan, was detained in Egypt in 2008 (Al-Jazeera TV, August 12, 2008).

The "Million Man March"

84. The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan was prominent in organizing the so-called "million man march," a propaganda event held on Friday, November 25, 2011, in the Jordan Valley north of the Dead Sea. **It was an Islamic event whose objective was to emphasize the so-called "Islamic identity" of Jerusalem and protest the so-called "the Judaizing of Jerusalem."** The event was held around the anniversary of the UN General Assembly vote on the Partition Plan which established the State of Israel in 1947.

85. According to Al-Sabeel, the event's organizers chose the site north of the Dead Sea because it was the closest location in Jordan that "looked out over Jordan" (Al-Sabeel, November 1, 2011). On November 25, 7,000 demonstrators gathered at the site, having

arrived from various districts throughout Jordan. The event passed peacefully, there were no violent clashes and no attempt was made to march to the Israel-Jordan border.

86 Speeches were given by a number of important Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan figures, among them Hamman Sa'id, the movement's inspector general. Various propaganda displays were held and the demonstrations held signs and shouted slogans such as "with spirit and blood we will redeem you, Al-Aqsa." The event ended with the burning of Israel flags and models of Israel's holy Second Temple (Agence France-Presse, November 25, 2011).

"Million Man March" Slogans



"NO to the plot of an alternative homeland, YES to the return [of the Palestinian refugees] and the liberation of Palestine" (Picture from the ammonnews.net website)



"Together with Jerusalem" (Picture from the ammonnews.net website)



"Death for the sake of Allah is our most exalted aspiration" (part of the Muslim Brotherhood motto, which appears on the emblem of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan: "Allah is our objective, the prophet [Muhammad] is our leader, the Qur'an is our law, jihad is our way and death for the sake of Allah is our most exalted aspiration") (Picture from the ammonnews.net website).

The Muslim Brotherhood in Algeria



The emblem of the Movement of Society for Peace (MSP), a moderate Islamic party affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood which promotes Islamic values in Algerian society (<http://fr.hmsalgeria.net>)

86. The Muslim Brotherhood apparently began its operations in Algeria in the 1940s. Between 1953 and 1954 its leader was **Sheikh Ahmed Sahnoun, considered the undisputed spiritual father of the Algerian Islamic movement.** Between 1954 and 1962, as Algeria fought for its independence, the movement opposed the French occupation and called for jihad against it. However, the Muslim Brotherhood played a relatively minor role compared to the FLN, Algeria's national liberation movement, which spearheaded the struggle and went on to win power after independence was gained.

87. After a multi-party system was established in Algeria in the early 1990s, **the local Muslim Brotherhood branch formed the Movement of Society for Peace (MSP).**²³ It was a **moderate Islamic party** which agreed to act according to the rules imposed by the regime and was integrated into the government (as part of a cross-party alliance which supported President Bouteflika). While the MSP was not officially defined as a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in Algeria, the two were definitely affiliated.²⁴ **Mahfoud Nahnah,** considered a powerful, charismatic figure, led the MSP until his death in 2003. Nahnah was a presidential candidate in 1995 and came in second with about 25% of the votes. He was succeeded by **Bouguerra Soltani,** seen as being weaker than his predecessor.

²³ In Arabic: **Harakat Mujtama' al-Silm** (HMS).

²⁴ Many reports about the MSP consider it to be affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. Such reports include articles published on websites affiliated with the global Muslim Brotherhood movement (e.g., www.tsa-algerie.com).



Bouguerra Soltani (HMS website, February 24, 2011)

88. The Muslim Brotherhood in Algeria **did not join the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS)**. The FIS was established in 1989 and won 54% of the votes in the first round of the 1990 parliamentary elections. Concerned about the possibility of radical Islam attaining power, the army changed the voting system in 1991 to prevent the FIS from winning the second round . **The FIS was banned in 1992.**

89. After the election results were voided, **Algeria was plagued by a decade of civil war** that claimed nearly 100,000 lives. Brutal massacres were committed by Islamic elements affiliated with the FIS, particularly the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS, considered the military wing of the FIS) and an Islamic organization known as the Armed Islamic Group (GIA).²⁵ In 2002 the GIA was persecuted into virtual extinction by the Algerian authorities, while AIS members were pardoned by President Bouteflika in 1992.

90. Thus the Muslim Brotherhood in Algeria remained a **law-abiding organization which espouses democracy and national reconciliation and is represented in the government and the parliament**. In 2000 the MSP, under the leadership of Bouguerra Soltani, was part of President Bouteflika's coalition. The party split in 2009 over internal differences between Bouguerra Soltani's faction and the one headed by Nahnah's ally Abdelmadjid Menasra, who established a party called the **Movement for Preaching and Change** (*Harakat al-Da'wah wal-Taghyir*). The split and the personal rivalry between Soltani and Menasra weakened the Muslim Brotherhood in Algeria.

91. The Muslim Brotherhood in Algeria **was strongly represented on board the *Mavi Marmara***. Most of the 32 members of the Algerian delegation belonged to the MSP. The delegation was headed by physician and MSP activist **Abderrazak Makri**.

²⁵Groupe Islamique Armée.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan²⁶



The website of the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan, March 2011

Overview

92. The Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan has a strong social, organizational and political foundation. The Sudanese branch has remained independent from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, with a unique Sudanese version of the Muslim Brotherhood's ideology and political conduct. For several decades the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan has taken an active role in the country's political life, both within the parliament and in support of the coups staged by Jaafar Nimeiri and Omar al-Bashir. **Its involvement occasionally gave the movement power to influence Sudan's regimes and the officers who led the revolutions. However, due to political changes in Sudan and in the region at other times, the movement lost its influence, faced persecution from the authorities and saw its leaders imprisoned for lengthy sentences.**

Milestones in the Movement's History in Sudan

93. The Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan has a long history. Bordering Egypt and affected by Egyptian politics, **Sudan was influenced by the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.** Many Sudanese students studying in Egypt in the 1940s were exposed to the movement's ideology and **organized into networks in universities, forming the nucleus of the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan.**

94. In 1946 **Jamal al-Din al-Sanhuri** and **Sadiq Abdallah Abd al-Majid** were sent to Sudan by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood to recruit members, establishing branches in several peripheral towns between 1947 and 1949. However, the Muslim Brotherhood in

²⁶ For this section used material from the essay "The Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan: From Reforms to Radicalism" by Prof. Gabriel R. Warburg, Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, August 2006 .

Sudan was subsequently prohibited from acting openly unless it declared independence from the Egyptian movement, which at that time was illegal. Another founding member of the Sudanese movement was **Al-Sa'im Muhammad Ibrahim**, a former teacher who in 1947 founded the **Islamic Liberation Movement (ILM)**, whose stated objective was to combat Communism. The early adherents of the ILM came mostly **from the rural areas of northern Sudan**, where the predominant faith was the Sufi school of Sunni Islam.²⁷

95. **The Sudanese branch of the Muslim Brotherhood was officially founded on August 21, 1954.** It was headed by **Al-Rashid al-Tahir**, one of the most prominent leaders of the Sudanese student group exposed to the Muslim Brotherhood ideology in the 1940s. Al-Tahir, who later became the general guide, established close relations with the Free Officers in Egypt, especially with their representative in Sudan. When the Egyptian authorities turned against their own Muslim Brotherhood, the movement in Sudan cut off its ties with the Egyptian movement and joined the political forces advocating Sudan's independence.

96. After the 1958 military coup **led by Gen. Ibrahim Abboud, the army's commander-in-chief, the Muslim Brotherhood was allowed to continue its activities as a religious movement**, while all other political parties were banned. On November 9, 1959 Al-Rashid al-Tahir plotted to overthrow the regime with the help of an illegal cell within the army, composed of Muslim Brotherhood supporters, Communist activists and others. The plot was exposed, the conspirators were arrested, **and the Muslim Brotherhood lost the support of the army and its freedom to act in Sudan.**

97. A revolution in October 1964 toppled Gen. Ibrahim Abboud's regime and facilitated the establishment of a national unity government. In 1964 **Abdallah Hassan al-Turabi** and several leading Muslim Brotherhood activists returned to Sudan from their studies abroad. Al-Turabi, who joined the movement while a student at Khartoum University, had completed his studies in London and Paris and was offered a teaching post at the university. **He emerged as an important spokesman for the movement and later became its leader.** Most of the mass demonstrations organized at the time which ultimately led to Gen. Ibrahim Abboud's downfall were led by Muslim Brotherhood activists in the university. Compared to the Communists, however, the movement suffered from certain disadvantages within the intelligentsia. In 1965 it therefore founded **a party called the Islamic Charter Front**

²⁷**Sufism** is a faith as ancient as Islam, combining asceticism and austerity with a mystically-oriented yearning to become one with Allah. Sufis belong to groups called tariqas (orders), headed by teachers or leaders (sheikhs). **The Muslim Brotherhood has roots in Sufism.** As a young boy, Hassan al-Banna joined a Sufi order known as **Ikhwan al-Sahafiyya** (named after Hassanain al-Sahafi), which had splintered from the Shadhiliyya order. In his teachings, Al-Banna included Sufi elements of spiritual affinity to Allah. For more information, see John Calvert, Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005) pp. 9, 81, 83; see also Uriya Furman, Islamiyyun – Religion and Society in Contemporary Islamist Thought (Tel-Aviv: Ministry of Defense Publishing, 2002, in Hebrew).

(ICF), with Al-Turabi as secretary general. The party was a convenient platform for Al-Turabi to promote the Islamization of Sudan's elites and occupy positions of political influence.

98. Between 1965 and 68 the ICF cooperated with Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi's wing of the Ummah party²⁸ in its anti-Communist drive and to promote religious legislation. The Muslim Brotherhood allied with other parties and in 1965 succeeded in having the Communist party outlawed. The ICF drew up a religious constitution which was not implemented owing to the officers' coup in May 1969, led by Jaafar al-Nimeiri and his Communist allies. Following the coup, some of the Muslim Brotherhood's leaders, including Al-Turabi, were arrested; others fled to Egypt and other countries.

99. Al-Nimeiri suppressed his opponents, including the Muslim Brotherhood. However, after an unsuccessful coup in 1971, Nimeiri removed the Communists and pursued a rapprochement with the Muslim Brotherhood. In July 1971 Al-Turabi met with Nimeiri and received permission to resume the movement's activities in Sudan. In 1972 the Students Unity Front, the Muslim Brotherhood's new organization, took control of the Students Union of Khartoum University. In those years Al-Turabi concentrated his efforts on restructuring the movement with those who had supported him in the 1960s. After another abortive anti-Nimeiri coup in July 1976, the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood founded a new party, the National Islamic Front (NIF), and became integrated into Sudan's political system. Al-Rashid al-Tahir, the leader of the Sudanese branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, was appointed vice president and prime minister in 1976.

100. The elites appointed by Al-Turabi filled the void left by the Communists in the administrative and military leadership, and occupied key political positions. Shortly thereafter, in 1983 Nimeiri imposed Shari'ah—Islamic religious law—as state law. His decision sparked a rebellion in southern Sudan led by Col. John Garang, leader of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), and a bloody civil war ensued.²⁹

101. The Muslim Brotherhood gained considerable political power in Sudan in the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s. In 1979 Hassan al-Turabi was appointed attorney general and many of his followers were given senior government positions. The NIF party became better organized and was successful in the 1986 elections, becoming the third largest party. The NIF's success was partly due to its financial resources, as in the 1970s it had gained control of Sudan's Islamic banking system using its connections with

²⁸ **The Ummah party**—an Islamic movement in Sudan. It is the party of the Ansar, the descendants of those who followed Muhammad Abdallah, who had declared himself Mehdi (Vanished Imam) in the 19th century and fought a holy war (jihad) against the British forces until his defeat in 1898.

²⁹ See Ephraim Herrera and Gideon M. Kressel, *Jihad – Fundamentals and Fundamentalism* (Tel-Aviv: Ministry of Defense and Dvir Publishing, 2009; in Hebrew), p. 199.

Saudi Arabia. The establishment of the Faysal Islamic Bank in 1978 enabled the Muslim Brotherhood to infiltrate the Sudanese financial system **and gain power, assets and popularity with the population.**

102. The strong resistance of the Christian population of southern Sudan to the enforcement of Islamic law (Shari'ah) motivated the government to launch peace talks with it. The talks led to an agreement according to which Shari'ah would not apply to residents of the south as of June 30, 1989. On that day, **Gen. Omar Suleiman al-Bashir, with the support of Islamic officers influenced by Al-Turabi, seized power by force.** The new regime began enforcing an Islamic policy inspired by Al-Turabi.³⁰ At the same time, the regime launched a cleansing campaign in the army and the administration, accompanied by executions and torture.³¹

103. In the first half of the 1990s the NIF consolidated its control of the banks, building industry, transportation and media. **In 1996, for the first time since the military coup, elections were held in Sudan.** Al-Turabi won a seat in the National Assembly and was appointed its speaker. The influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, and of Al-Turabi himself, greatly increased through the presence of **Osama Bin Laden, who had moved to Sudan.** He met Al-Turabi on several occasions in late 1989 and decided to transfer Al-Qaeda headquarters from Afghanistan (where it was under pressure from the Soviets) to Sudan (now under a regime which had adopted an Islamic orientation). In addition, Bin Laden cemented a personal bond with Al-Turabi by marrying his niece, and in return Al-Turabi arranged for Bin Laden to import construction equipment and vehicles customs-free.³²

104. Once in Sudan, Osama Bin Laden, with a group of veterans of Afghanistan who had come with him, established an economic empire. It included leather factories, construction companies, a bank, farms, and import-export ventures. The extensive economic network provided him and his associates with **sources of income to finance their subversive and terrorist activities in various conflict zones around the globe** (Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya, etc.). His stay in Sudan came to an end in May 1996 when he was forced to leave Sudan and return to Afghanistan.³³

105. **In the 1990s, in addition to involvement with Al-Qaeda, Al-Turabi formed close relations with radical Islamic and terrorist elements.** He established ties with

³⁰ Herrera and Kressel, *Jihad – Fundamentals*, p. 199.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 200.

³² Warburg, "The Muslim Brotherhood," p. 10.

³³ Saul Shai, *The Never-ending Jihad: The Mujahidin, the Taliban and Bin Laden* (Herzliya, Mifalot Publishing, the Interdisciplinary Center, 2002; in Hebrew), pp. 131-132.

the Islamic regime in Iran, as well as with the PLO and Hamas, which had offices in Khartoum (the relationship came to an end in 1993, when Israel and the PLO started negotiations in Oslo).³⁴ In 1991 Al-Turabi launched the annual Popular Arab and Islamic Conference for Muslim groups from across the globe. Participants in the conference included terrorist organizations such as Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, etc. He also received visits from operatives belonging to Abu Nidal's terrorist organization and Hezbollah, as well as terrorist Ilich Ramírez Sánchez from Venezuela, aka Carlos. In 1995 Al-Turabi signed a statement expressing support and solidarity with Hamas, which was printed in the London-based Al-Hayat, according to which jihad was the only legitimate alternative the Palestinians had for the liberation of Palestine.³⁵

106. However, Hassan al-Turabi, who hosted Carlos in Sudan, **had no qualms about making a deal to hand him over to the French in return for several million dollars, which he received through a French bank** (and which Sudan used to pay its debt to the International Monetary Fund).³⁶ According to Al-Turabi, he asked Carlos to leave Sudan as quickly as possible, and when he refused he handed him over to France. Interviewed by the Washington Post on May 3, 1995, he said that Carlos was not a Muslim, and therefore extraditing him to France did not pose a moral problem. France, for its part, provided Al-Turabi's party (NIF) with weapons and satellite photos of the rebel bases in southern Sudan (according to an interview with a senior French officer, August 14, 2002).³⁷

107. The growing strength of Al-Qaeda in Sudan, as well as Al-Turabi's drift into extremism and his ties with terrorist networks, **led to external pressure on the Sudanese regime and internal conflicts within the regime itself**. On the domestic scene, a split emerged within the intelligence services as well as between the army and the NIF, as a result of which the army once again assumed control of the intelligence services. On the foreign scene, pressure exerted by Egypt, the United States and Saudi Arabia, concerned about the radicalization on Sudan's internal situation, **prompted President Bashir to cut off his relations with Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda and to expel them from Sudan**.

108. In the late 1990s internal changes and external pressure **signaled the end of the influence of Al-Turabi and his party**. In 1999 Al-Turabi was imprisoned on charges of conspiracy; he was arrested two years later under the pretext of trying to limit Bashir's

³⁴ Warburg, "The Muslim Brotherhood," p. 10. Also see the Wikipedia entry on Al-Turabi, with a citation from an article in Asia Times dated February 23, 2002.

³⁵ Warburg, "The Muslim Brotherhood," p. 10.

³⁶ Millard Burr, Robert O. Collins, *Revolutionary Sudan: Hasan al-Turabi and the Islamist State* (New York: Brill, 2003), p. 161.

³⁷ Jonathan C. Randel, *Osama, the Making of a Terrorist* (London and New York, I.B Tauris & Co., 2005), p. 315.

powers. He was released in October 2003, but served another prison term from March 2004 to June 2005. He was detained once again in 2008, but was questioned and released without charges. In January 2009 Turabi was among those who called on Omar al-Bashir to surrender himself to the international tribunal for war crimes in Darfur. Immediately afterwards he was detained for two months and kept in isolation. He served yet another prison sentence from May to July 2010. In January 2011, as instability in Sudan increased, he was detained once again.

109. In 2008 **Dr. Al-Hibir Yusuf Nour al-Dayyim** was appointed the general guide of the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan. Al-Dayyim has a PhD from the University of Edinburgh, Scotland. He chaired the Education Committee of the Sudanese parliament and was head of the Department of Arabic Language at Khartoum University.³⁸



General Guide Al-Dayyim gives a speech during the 2010 election campaign (Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood website)

Abdallah Hassan al-Turabi: Profile



Abdallah Hassan al-Turabi (blog.aljazeera.net)

110. **Abdallah Hassan al-Turabi**, born 1932, is a Sunni cleric who imposed Shari'ah law in many parts of Sudan. His father was a Sufi sheikh in the city of Kassala, in northeast Sudan. As a child, he received a traditional Islamic education. He studied law in Khartoum and at

³⁸Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood website, February 2010.

Oxford, and received his PhD in law from the Sorbonne. In the early 1950s he was one of the founding members of the Sudanese branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. He headed the movement in Sudan and was its general guide from 1964 to 1967 and from 1969 to 1979.³⁹ He later became the most prominent Muslim Brotherhood figure.

111. Al-Turabi is a pragmatist. His ideological view advocates the renewal (*tajdid*) of Islam, and argues that Islam is open for reinterpretation by the Islamic community. He supports rapprochement between the Sunna and the Shi'ah, the incorporation of music and singing into religion, and the enhancement of women's rights. For example, in 2006 he issued a *fatwa* allowing a Muslim woman to marry a non-Muslim. He has also made it permissible to consume alcohol under certain circumstances.

112. **However, Al-Turabi's pragmatism did not prevent his supporters in the army, the security services and the urban middle class from imposing an intolerant Shari'ah state which was unpopular with a vast number of Sudanese.⁴⁰ Furthermore, when Al-Turabi gained political power, he helped Al-Qaeda establish a foothold in Sudan, supported Hamas and its terrorist attacks, and had relations with other Middle Eastern and global terrorist groups and networks.**

113. The heyday of Al-Turabi's political influence in Sudan **was in the 1980s and 1990s**. In 1992 he was injured in an assassination attempt at Ottawa Airport. The would-be assassin was a Canadian Sudanese man who opposed the Islamic regime in Sudan. However, Al-Turabi political influence declined beginning in 1999 and was repeatedly detained and released, as noted above.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Saudi Arabia⁴¹

Overview

114. The first Muslim Brotherhood activists **came to Saudi Arabia in the first half of the 1950s**, when an attempt on Gamal Abdel Nasser's life estranged his regime from the Muslim Brotherhood, which was accused of planning the assassination. Consequently, thousands of the movement's members fled to neighboring countries, many to Saudi Arabia. One of them

³⁹ Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood website.

⁴⁰ Warburg, "The Muslim Brotherhood," p. 8.

⁴¹ This section is based in part on Dore Gold's book *Hatred's Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism* (Washington DC: Regnery Publishing, 2003) .

was Muhammad al-Outb, the brother of Sayyid al-Outb, one of the major ideologues of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, who turned to radical Islam.⁴²

115. **Saudi Arabia was a convenient asylum for the Muslim Brotherhood at a time when Abdel Nasser's secular nationalism was fighting the Wahhabism of the pro-Western Saudi regime.** For the Saudi regime, helping Islamic movements in Egypt disrupt its secular tendencies was an investment in the security of the Saudi kingdom. Furthermore, the Wahhabist school and the Muslim Brotherhood were ideologically close: they were both **Salafi movements**, i.e., preached that in religious behavior all Muslims should follow the example of the first generation of Islam.

116. **At the time, Saudi Arabia also harbored non-Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood activists.** They included **Palestinian members of the Muslim Brotherhood**, such as Abu Jihad (Khalil al-Wazir), who began his activities in the movement, left Gaza (then under Egyptian rule), and arrived in Saudi Arabia to practice teaching. He later became a Fatah leaders (second only to Yasser Arafat). In 1982 **some activists belonging to the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood fled to Saudi Arabia**, after Syria's President Hafez al-Assad delivered a fatal blow to the movement. **Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood activists**, including Hassan al-Turabi, also found refuge in Saudi Arabia before joining Jaafar al-Nimeiri's government.

The Saudi Royal Family's Approach to the Muslim Brotherhood: Respect and Suspicion

117. Despite the ideological affinity, and despite the political considerations that motivated the Saudi regime to provide refuge to the thousands of persecuted Muslim Brotherhood activists, **the Saudi regime adopted a cautious approach towards the movement's members and kept them from fully integrating into social and religious life.** That was because **their ideology was seen as competing with Wahhabiyya**, the dominant Saudi religious school. Another consideration was their jihadist bent, reflected in the ideology of Sayyid Outb and Muslim Brotherhood activists who joined the global jihad, which could jeopardize the Saudi regime's relations with the United States and even undermine its legitimacy.

118. **Despite its circumspect approach, the royal family did not hesitate to use Muslim Brotherhood activists to its own end.** The exiles who found refuge in Saudi

⁴² Muhammad Outb, who settled in Saudi Arabia, edited and published Sayyid al-Outb's writings. In due course he became lecturer of Islamic studies at Abd al-Aziz University in Jeddah. His writings included blatant anti-Western themes (Gold, *Hatred's Kingdom*).

Arabia were educated, spoke foreign languages, were exposed to the outside world, and were more politically experienced and sophisticated than the Wahhabi religious scholars (*ulamaa*), who found it hard to cope with the modern world. For instance, in 1961 the Saudis sought the Muslim Brotherhood's help in **building the Islamic University of Madinah as an alternative to the Al-Azhar University in Cairo**, which was tightly controlled by the Nasser regime (some Muslim Brotherhood activists were given senior teaching positions in the Islamic University of Madinah). In the 1960s King Faysal established the **Muslim World League** to promote the Saudi Wahhabi brand of Islam to counterbalance Nasser's secularism in Egypt. Members of the league included Muslim Brotherhood activists, and in 1966 it condemned Egypt for persecuting the Muslim members of the movement.⁴³

119. **Saudi Arabia plays a major role in funding the Muslim Brotherhood in the kingdom itself and elsewhere.** Since its arrival in Saudi Arabia, the Muslim Brotherhood has been generously funded by the Saudi regime. For example, Hermann Eilts, former U.S. ambassador to Egypt and Saudi Arabia, remembered meeting Hassan al-Banna in 1948 in the office of the Saudi deputy finance minister. According to Eilts, Al-Banna often came to Saudi Arabia to receive money. In addition, many Muslim Brotherhood exiles amassed considerable wealth in Saudi Arabia and, in the late 1970s, became important sponsors for Egypt's Islamist movements.

120. **The Saudis often used the Muslim Brotherhood's global infrastructure to disseminate their Islamic ideology.** In exchange, Muslim Brotherhood activists in Saudi Arabia were given positions and funding. Thus, **Saudi Arabia became one of the major centers for the export of radical Islam in the 1970s and 1980s.** The number of Islamist (and radical) activists influenced by Muslim Brotherhood ideology **who found refuge in Saudi Arabia grew** during those two decades. For instance, **Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman**, the blind Egyptian cleric convicted in 1993 for his involvement in the New York World Trade Center bombing, resided in Saudi Arabia from 1977 to 1980 and taught at a women's seminary. **Ayman al-Zawahiri**, who began in the Muslim Brotherhood, was given a warm welcome in Saudi Arabia despite his past involvement in Islamic radicalism and the assassination of President Anwar Sadat. In 1986 al-Zawahiri left Saudi Arabia for Afghanistan, where he became Bin Laden's second-in-command⁴⁴ (and succeeded him after he was killed by the Americans). The Palestinian-born **Abdallah Azzam**, Osama Bin Laden's spiritual teacher and a major influence on many young Saudis, found refuge in Saudi Arabia. **Hassan**

⁴³ Gold, Hatred's Kingdom.

⁴⁴ Gold, Hatred's Kingdom.

al-Turabi, the most prominent figure of the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan, also spent several years in Saudi Arabia.

121. However, relations between the **Muslim Brotherhood and the Saudi royal family remain tense**. The royal family is **suspicious of the movement**, considering it disloyal to the royal family. As a result, **the movement was not allowed to establish a branch in Saudi Arabia**, unlike most other Arab countries. This suspicious attitude, which provoked conflicts between the Saudis and the Muslim Brotherhood, has become more prevalent over the past decade, particularly after the September 11 terrorist attacks, when Saudi Arabia was accused by the United States and the West of responsibility for the emergence of Al-Qaeda and the growth of global terrorism.⁴⁵

The Muslim Brotherhood in the UAE

Qatar

122. Qatar became a Muslim Brotherhood stronghold in 1954, when a group of its activists found refuge there. In 1961 Sheikh Dr. Yusuf Abdallah al-Qaradawi also found refuge in Qatar, where he established a branch of Al-Azhar University. For many, Al-Qaradawi has been the highest religious authority of the Muslim Brotherhood, even though he is not officially its leader.⁴⁶

123. **Al-Qaradawi created a socio-religious infrastructure for the Muslim Brotherhood in Qatar, and used it to expand his influence to the Arab-Islamic world and Muslim communities in Western countries**. In 1977 he founded the Department of Islamic Law (Shari'ah) Studies in the University of Qatar and headed it until 1990. He also founded an institute for Sunna study. Since 2009 Al-Qaradawi's students have gathered for an annual conference in Qatar to develop the Wasatiyya school of thought (literally the "middle path") under his guidance. Wasatiyya sets itself apart from the Muslim Brotherhood and defines itself as a moderate branch of Islam that seeks balance between hearts and minds. Al-Qaradawi also developed the doctrine of law of Muslim minorities (*fiqh*

⁴⁵ The surge of international interest in Saudi Arabian radical Islam, which produced a number of prominent terrorist operatives, has put the Saudi regime at odds with the Muslim Brotherhood. As far as the Saudis are concerned, responsibility for the emergence of the jihadist trend in the kingdom rests with the radical Islam that originated in Egypt and had its source in Sayyid Qutb's teachings. On the other hand, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has argued that Wahhabism is a fanatic movement responsible for the radicalization of clerics in Egypt and elsewhere in the Muslim world (Ad-Dustour, Egypt, May 2010).

⁴⁶ For further information see the February 27, 2011 bulletin "Portrait of Sheikh Dr. Yusuf Abdallah al-Qaradawi, senior Sunni Muslim cleric, affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood " at http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/hamas_e138.pdf.

al-aqalliyyat), which provides Muslim minorities living in non-Islamic countries with ways to balance their daily lives with Islamic law.

124. **Even though Al-Qaradawi opposes Al-Qaeda, he is an enthusiastic supporter of Hamas and Palestinian terrorism against Israel and the Jews.** In the past, **he issued *fatwas* authorizing terrorist attacks against civilian targets, even those aimed at women and children.** He considers the entire territory of "Palestine" an Islamic endowment, strongly opposes the existence of the State of Israel, rejects the peace treaties signed with it and opposes the Palestinian Authority. He disseminates his views across the Arab-Islamic world using electronic media, **mainly the Qatar-based Al-Jazeera channel, which he exploits for blatant incitement against Israel and the Jewish people.**



Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi (Palestine-info, August 15, 2010)

Kuwait

125. A branch of the Muslim Brotherhood was established in Kuwait by activists who fled Egypt in the 1950s. The branch usually keeps a low profile and works in secret. The Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait has a political wing called the **Islamic Constitutional Movement** (ICM, or HADAS in Arabic), founded in 1991 as a legally-operating party. As in other countries (e.g., Jordan), the movement and the party have disagreed on various issues.⁴⁷ The ICM pursues a conservative social agenda and represents itself as the guardian of Kuwaiti morals. It seeks to amend the Kuwaiti constitution to make Islamic law its exclusive (rather than major) source of authority.⁴⁸

126. **The ICM and the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait support the Palestinian cause in general and Hamas in particular.** In October 2009 ICM representative Dr. Jaman al-

⁴⁷ For example, in 1999 the ruler of Kuwait attempted to pass a bill in the parliament to allow women to vote. The Muslim Brotherhood supported the bill while the ICM voted against it.

⁴⁸ mondediplo.com, 2002.

Herbish submitted a bill to ban contact with the "Israeli occupation." The Muslim Brotherhood, on the other hand, avoided criticizing Kuwaiti-American security cooperation.⁴⁹

127. Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 **caused a split between the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait and the global movement.** Some of its members in Kuwait supported allowing foreign (mostly American) forces to deploy in Kuwait and participate in liberating the country from Saddam Hussein's occupation. According to Ismail al-Shatti, a high-ranking Muslim Brotherhood official in Kuwait, the movement's members remained in the country after it was invaded by Iraqi forces. At the time, the Muslim Brotherhood changed its name to Murabitun ("those who stand guard") and formed a military wing and a social wing to help liberate Kuwait.⁵⁰ However, non-Kuwaiti branches of the Muslim Brotherhood (e.g. in Jordan and among the Palestinians) strongly opposed it, arguing that American involvement in the liberation of Kuwait would bring the Middle East back under a "new imperialist occupation."⁵¹ As a result, Muslim Brotherhood activists in Kuwait suspended their membership in the global movement and were funded by the Kuwaiti government.⁵²

128. In 2003 the ICM won only two of the 50 seats in Kuwait's National Assembly (parliament). That number increased to six in 2006, when it allied itself with the majority coalition bloc. It lost about half of its strength in the May 2008 elections. In February 2009 the ICM announced its intention to challenge the prime minister of Kuwait on the lack of economic growth. The government consequently resigned, but the reigning prime minister,⁵³ the nephew of Kuwait's ruler, was asked to establish a new government.⁵⁴

129. **One of the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait is Dr. Tareq Suwaidan.** He was educated in American universities and has a PhD in petroleum engineering from the University of Texas. He made a fortune and became a prominent media personality on Arab TV. He is the director of Al-Risala TV, owned by Saudi Arabia's Prince Al-Waleed bin Talal. In 2007 his name was mentioned in the United States as one of the suspects in providing assistance to the Holy Land Foundation (HLF), found guilty of financially

⁴⁹ berkleycenter.georgetown.edu, ikhwanweb.com.

⁵⁰mondediplo.com, 2002.

⁵¹ zavita.co.il; mondeditplo.com, 2002.

⁵²mondeditplo.com, 2002. The ICM has a strong financial infrastructure. Its financial base is a company called **Kuwait Finance House**, which operates according to the principles of Islam (mondeditplo.com, 2002; historycommons.org; en.wikisource.org). The local **Al-Islah Charitable Society** also assists the ICM and once even funded its parliament election campaign.

⁵³ He was replaced only in November 2011, following the escalation of political protests in the country. One of the demands was for the prime minister to resign.

⁵⁴ jcpa.org.il.

helping Hamas. He portrays himself as a moderate Muslim who supports the improvement of women's status under Islamic law, and condemned the September 11 attacks. **However, he supports Palestinian terrorist attacks against Israel.** He has issued approximately 30 books as well as tapes pertaining to Islam. One of his publications, book called *The Encyclopedia on the Jews*, is riddled with anti-Semitism. Some of his books became bestsellers.⁵⁵

Bahrain

130. The Muslim Brotherhood is active among Bahrain's Sunni minority. It operates through a movement called **Jam'iyyat al-Islah**, established in 1941. The movement has a **political branch called Jam'iyyat al-Minbar al-Islami** (Society of the Islamic Pulpit), represented in the Bahraini parliament. The Muslim Brotherhood in Bahrain claims to fully support the authorities, at least for the time being⁵⁶

The United Arab Emirates

131. The Muslim Brotherhood's activity in the UAE began in the 1970s when students returned home after studying in Egypt and Kuwait. **They founded Jam'iyyat al-Islah** (Society of Reform). An society of the same name already existed in Kuwait and supported the Muslim Brotherhood. In 1974 Dubai's Governor Sheikh Rashid bin Saeed Al Maktoum advertised the society in public and donated money for the establishment of its headquarters in Dubai. Two more branches were later founded in Ras al-Khaimah and Fujairah. Since the society's inception, its activists have made efforts to attract students. In the early 1980s the society already controlled the public education system and, through the Ministry of Education, set the country's curriculum. In 1988 the society launched a periodical called Al-Islah, which served as the public relations and propaganda wing of the Muslim Brotherhood in the UAE.

132. At the same time, the Muslim Brotherhood became the most powerful organization in the UAE. As early as 1971, the term of the UAE's first government, a Muslim Brotherhood representative was a minister. In 1988-1989 Al-Islah was temporarily shut down by the authorities due to its belligerent style, but immediately afterwards it moderated its editorial stance and began publishing again.

133. **Subsequently, however, the authorities became concerned about the Muslim Brotherhood's potential for subversion, and limited its freedom of action.** In 2003 the authorities transferred more than 170 Muslim Brotherhood members who worked in the

⁵⁵ mondediplo.co, 2002; washingtonpost.com; enotes.com.

⁵⁶ ar.wikipedia.org.

education system to other government ministries. In 2006 the government removed some of the movement's members from the Ministry of Education. Apparently, the regional uprisings in 2011 and the growing power of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt deepened the authorities' concerns about the movement (according to some reports, many of those who signed a petition for political reforms circulated in the country were Muslim Brotherhood members). However, the movement has always enjoyed special treatment from Sheikh Saqr al-Qassimi, the governor of Ras al-Khaimah. The Al-Islah Society is still in existence and has offices in Dubai, Ras al-Khaimah, and Fujairah. In addition, there is a center in Ajman called Markaz al-Irshad ("Center of Instruction").

Oman

134. The Omani authorities were quick to realize the Muslim Brotherhood's potential for subversion and **it suffered persecution from its beginning in the early 1970s**. The detainees included senior officials in Oman's administration, and heavy punishments were inflicted on them. The movement apparently still exists but keeps a low profile.⁵⁷

Lebanon

135. **In Lebanon the Muslim Brotherhood works through Al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyya**, an organization established in 1964. **It has symbolic representation (one deputy) in the Lebanese parliament and has no real influence on Lebanese politics.**

136. **Within Lebanon, the organization faces tension between its radical Islamic identity on the one hand and its Sunni and national Lebanese identity on the other. Thus it has relations with Hezbollah—a Shi'ite organization—mostly on Islamic and social (rather than military) issues, but it is also well-coordinated with pragmatic elements of the March 14 camp** (led by former Prime Minister Saad Hariri, who enjoys considerable support within the Sunni population). **The Hezbollah-led violence inside Lebanon** in May 2008, as well as the government's decision to dismantle Hezbollah's telecommunications network, **escalated the tensions between Al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyya and Hezbollah.**

137. **With regard to Israel, the organization rejects negotiations and supports in principle for the "resistance"** (i.e., Hezbollah's path of violence and terrorism). Specifically, the organization **raises funds and public support for the Palestinians, usually avoiding direct participation in military activity against Israel.** In the first Lebanon war (1982) it collaborated with Palestinian organizations and Hezbollah in fighting

⁵⁷ www.s-oman.net.

against Israel, and even carried out shooting attacks against IDF and South Lebanon Army outposts. In the second Lebanon war (2006) some of the organization's members joined Hezbollah forces, although they had no impact on the fighting.

The Muslim Brotherhood's Attitude towards Hezbollah

138. The Muslim Brotherhood's attitude towards Hezbollah is influenced by the tension between their shared animosity towards Israel and the wide rift between radical Shi'ite Islam and radical Sunni Islam. Another factor is that Mubarak's regime was hostile to Hezbollah, considering it a subversive Iranian proxy, making it even more difficult for the Muslim Brotherhood to develop ties with Hezbollah.


139. During the second Lebanon war (2006) former General Guide Mehdi Akef said that he was willing to send 10,000 fighters to help Hezbollah. **No fighters were sent.** Starting in 2007, as the Egyptian regime stepped up its efforts against Hezbollah, the Muslim Brotherhood leadership did not demonstrate support for Hezbollah, fearing the reaction of the regime. **The exposure of the Hezbollah cell in Egypt** in 2008-2009 was another example of the movement's ambivalence towards Hezbollah: while former General Guide Mehdi Akef repeatedly expressed sympathy for Hezbollah, **the movement's representatives in the Egyptian parliament parroted the local national discourse and the government's policy, condemning the violation of Egypt's sovereignty:** they expressed support of the so-called "resistance," but not at the expense of Egypt's national security.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Morocco



The homepage of Unity and Reform, a movement affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood in Morocco

140. The Movement for Unity and Reform (MUR),⁵⁸ **affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood in Morocco, was founded in 1996.** It was joined by various Islamic movements founded from the 1970s on. **The parliamentary wing** of the movement is called the **Justice and Development Party (PJD).**⁵⁹ It is a **moderate Islamic movement** involved mostly in education and social work (*the da'wah*). It espouses democracy and pluralism, and is politically integrated into the institutions of the royalist regime.⁶⁰



The emblem of the Justice and Development Party (PJD)

141. **Moroccan parliamentary elections were held on November 25,** about five months after the constitution was amended to give more power to the government and the parliament, and passed by a majority of votes in a referendum. **The PJD won the most parliament seats** (107 of 395), considerably more than other parties (the old Al-Istiqlal party, which had led Morocco to independence, came in a distant second with 60 seats).

142. **On November 29, 2011, King Muhammed VI appointed PJD Secretary General Abdullah bin Kiran was appointed prime minister.** Interviewed by Al-Hayat on November 23, 2011, he said that his party did not expect to share power with the king. According to bin Kiran, **the King of Morocco was the head of state and of the constitution,** making him responsible for the army and the religion.

143. There is also **a Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated radical Islamist group called Justice and Charity Group,** more Sufi in character.⁶¹ It was established in 1987 and went through many incarnations under different names. The group rejects the king's authority,

⁵⁸ Harakat al-Tawhid wal-Islah.

⁵⁹ Hizb al-Adala wal-Tanmiya,, in French: Parti de la Justice et du Développement (PJD).

⁶⁰ The King of Morocco is both a political and religious leader. He is considered a descendant of Prophet Muhammad, holds the Islamic title of Amir al-Mu'minin, and so far enjoys considerable public support, even after the regional uprisings.

⁶¹ Jama'at al-Adl wal-Ihsan.

strives to establish an Islamic republic and boycotts the party system, subjected to the king. The royalist regime does not recognize the group.

144. The group is headed by Abdul Salam Yassine, who has spent many years in prison. In 1982 he was arrested on charges of incitement against the king, and was put under house arrest until 2000.⁶² The group is currently **outlawed in Morocco** and many of its members have been arrested. After the recent regional uprisings, the group demanded that the Moroccan regime implement reform as well. Its activists demonstrated against the regime and were arrested for supporting the protest demonstrations.⁶³

The Muslim Brotherhood in Tunisia

145. The Muslim Brotherhood branch in Tunisia is relatively new. It was established in the 1970s by **Rashid al-Ghannouchi and others** influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Even though it was established by individuals influenced by the radical teachings of Sayyid Qutb and Abul A'ala Maududi,⁶⁴ **the movement's founders described it as "moderate Islamic" and a development of Islam unique to Tunisia.**

146. The founders of the movement in Tunisia preached for **democracy and a kind of Tunisian Islam that recognized political pluralism.** They rejected the commonly-held Islamic opinions that Allah was the source of legitimacy, placing it instead in the hands of the people. They also supported dialogue with the Western world and liberal ideas. As in Egypt, the movement's influence in Tunisia was **particularly strong among the urban middle class, university students and the intelligentsia.** However, it did not enjoy wide support within the working class. In the summer of 1987 it had an estimated 5,000-6,000 activists. By the mid-1980s the movement had become part of the international Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood in Tunisia currently operates **through the Al-Nahda party, the movement's local branch.** The movement was banned during the Zine Ben Ali regime **and its leader, al-Ghannouchi, was exiled to London.** After the Jasmine Revolution he returned to Tunisia, where he won a great deal of power.

⁶² Al-Jazeera TV, October 3, 2004.

⁶³ The Justice and Charity Group website (www.aljamaa.net).

⁶⁴ **Abul A'ala Maududi** (1903-1979) was one of the 20th century's first and most important ideologues of radical Islam. He was the founder of the **Jamaat-e-Islami** party ("The Islamic Group," the Urdu version of the Arabic Al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyya). The party, founded in Lahore in August 1941, is the oldest and most prominent in Pakistan. Its worldview is similar to that of the Muslim Brotherhood, **yet it is more radical**, since its founder was the first Islamic political thinker who rejected the values of Western civilization (the new Jahiliyya) (with the exception of science and technology), claiming that they were incompatible with the values of Islam. The worldview was further developed by **Sayyid Qutb**, a major influence on the Muslim Brotherhood's jihadist school of thought. Qutb argued that instead of modern Arab and Muslim states, it was necessary to establish an Islamic state with Allah as the only sovereign (hakimiyya).

Milestones in the History of the Muslim Brotherhood in Tunisia⁶⁵

147. In the 1970s opposition elements emerged which undermined Habib Bourguiba's regime. They included Communist groups that were brutally oppressed, and Islamic opposition forces that had grown out of the sectors of society which could not integrate into the bureaucratic institutions nurtured by Bourguiba and were dissatisfied with his secular social policy.

148. At first the authorities encouraged the activity of the Islamic groups, mostly to counterbalance the left wing groups. In time, however, their approach changed. The Muslim Brotherhood branch in Tunisia began with the **Islamic Association**, an organization established in 1976. To have the organization officially recognized as a party, in 1981 it turned itself into the Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI), led by Rashid al-Ghannouchi. The authorities refused to recognize the movement and even persecuted it.

149. The fundamental objectives of the party were similar to those of the global Muslim Brotherhood movement: to liberate Muslim lands from foreign influence and establish a Shari'ah-based Islamic state. **However, the movement in Tunisia adapted itself to the Tunisian context. Rashid al-Ghannouchi and Abdel Fattah Moro** changed some of the party's positions on various core issues, including Islamic activism, the implementation of Shari'ah law and the status of women.

150. In numerous statements, interviews and articles, Rashid al-Ghannouchi and other movement spokesmen stressed such issues as the need to fully integrate into Tunisian society and consider the demands of the masses rather than dictate codes of behavior, as well as the recognition of values such pluralism and tolerance, freedom and democracy, not only as part of European culture but of world heritage.

151. The leaders of the MTI were arrested about six months after its founding, **leaving it with almost no chance to build public trust and prove its democratic path**. In the summer of 1984, when al-Ghannouchi and his allies were released from prison, **a radical faction was formed which called for armed struggle, calling it preferable to a political struggle**. After a series of confrontations on university campuses and lower-class sections of the capital, as well as other cities in Tunisia, the MTI leadership was arrested in March 1987 on charges of incitement. **Al-Ghannouchi was sentenced to life imprisonment in early September 1987**. Thus, the confrontation between the state and

⁶⁵Our sources for this section include Ghassan Salamé, ed., *Democracy without Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World*, I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd. NY 2001; Michel Abitbol, Daniel Zisenwine, *From Colonialism to Nationalism: Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco*, Open University Press (in Hebrew).

the Islamic movement became overt, and the clandestine branch of the MTI prepared itself for a coup to free its leaders.

152. On November 7, 1987, Bourguiba was deposed in a quiet revolution led by Zine Al-Abidine Ben Ali, then the prime minister. Habib Bourguiba's fall in November 1987 raised hopes for new relations between the government and the Islamic opposition. At that time, contacts and talks were also being held between the leaders of the Islamic movement and the heads of state, indicating that the authorities were willing to bring the movement closer to the political establishment, perhaps in an effort to moderate its oppositionist character. The MTI reacted positively to Ben Ali's gestures. After his release in May 1988, Al-Ghannouchi promised that the movement would abandon violence, pledging that it would not build itself into a military or security force. He also expressed his willingness to recognize the Code of Personal Status of 1956, a milestone in the modernization of Tunisia which guaranteed equal rights for women. MTI representatives were invited to take part in formulating the national constitution, which was signed in November 1988.

153. **In December 1988 the MTI renamed itself the Al-Nahda** ("Rebirth") party. However, it was prohibited from taking part in the 1989 elections, and its members ran as independent candidates. According to "official" figures released by the Ben Ali government, the independent candidates received between 10 to 17 percent of the total votes. However, the results made the authorities concerned about the growing power and influence of the Islamic movement.

154. The relations between Ben Ali and the movement soured after the 1989 parliament elections. In October 1991 the authorities claimed they had exposed an attempt by the movement to stage a coup and topple the regime, **launching a systematic campaign to oppress it and remove its leaders from positions of political influence**. Thousands of its activists were arrested and most of its leaders, **including Rashid al-Ghannouchi, went into exile**. The movement was eradicated from Tunisia's political landscape, even though the authorities kept looking for any sign that it might be resuming its operations.

The Transformation of the Al-Nahda Party into a Major Political Force



The emblem of the Al-Nahda movement in Tunisia (Wikipedia)

155. On March 2, 2011, after the Jasmine Revolution, the Tunisian interior minister legalized Al-Nahda and gave it permission to operate as a political party. The movement was thus able to take part in the parliament elections held in October 2011. The Al-Nahda party won the elections **with 41 percent of the parliament seats, changing from the strongest opposition force into the leading government force**. In their public statements, the party leaders portray themselves as **representatives of moderate Islam**.⁶⁶ However, it remains to be seen whether the liberal, moderate image of the Al-Nahda party will stand the test of time, and whether it will continue its moderate democratic line after winning the elections and achieving political power.

Profile of Rashid al-Ghannouchi



Rashid al-Ghannouchi (globalmbreport.org, January 31, 2011)

⁶⁶ A discordant statement made by Hamed Jebali, the secretary general of the party. On November 13, 2011, a rally was held in eastern Tunisia, attended by a Hamas representative. Jebali said he hoped that a Caliphate would be established soon, and that the liberation of Tunisia would also result in the liberation of Jerusalem (tunisia-live.net). Another discordant note was Ismail Haniya's visit to Tunisia (January 3-8, 2012), when Al-Nahda Party organized anti-Israeli events where anti-Semitic slogans were shouted.

156. Rashid al-Ghannouchi, leader of the Tunisian Al-Nahda movement, was born in southeast Tunisia in 1941. As a youth he attended traditional education institutions. He did not speak French and thus found it difficult to integrate into Tunisia's higher education system. He went to study in Syria, where he completed an undergraduate degree in the humanities. During his studies he was influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, particularly by Sayyid Qutb.

157. After his return to Tunisia, he worked as a high school teacher and also wrote articles for Islamic newspapers. He was one of the founders of the Islamic Tendency, which in due course renamed itself to Al-Nahda ("The Rebirth"), which espoused the introduction of appropriate religious themes into Tunisia's public life. He condemned the use of violence, arguing that political change had to be effected through nonviolent means. He was arrested by the authorities for his activities and served a prison sentence in 1981-1984. He was also given a life sentence in 1987. However, he was released by Ben Ali after the latter's rise to power, and even had contacts with the president in an attempt to achieve official recognition for the movement. However, the deteriorating relations between the movement and the authorities after 1991 derailed the talks and al-Ghannouchi, who was persecuted by the authorities, **went into exile in Britain, where he continued criticizing the regime.**

158. Rashid al-Ghannouchi is an **original Islamic thinker**. He believes in the **synthesis between Islam and modern life**, and its adaptation to Tunisia. He **is in favor of multi-partisan politics and the protection of human rights**. In November 1995 he and a group of non-Muslim exiles, including former Prime Minister Muhammad Mzali, issued a joint statement **calling for democracy in Tunisia** by electing parliament representatives to represent a variety of opinions and political parties.

159. From his exile in London, Al-Ghannouchi has often talked about the need for an open dialogue with the West. He rejected Samuel Huntington's idea of "clash of civilizations" as well as the Al-Qaeda-style jihadist ideology. However, **his rhetoric became increasingly anti-Western and anti-Zionist in the few years before he returned to Tunisia**. After the Jasmine Revolution, Al-Ghannouchi was permitted to return to Tunisia from his exile in Britain. He returned in January 2011, welcomed by about one thousand people. Since the Al-Nahda party won the elections, he is **likely to play an important role in the new political map of Tunisia**.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Europe

The Inception and Growth of the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe

160. Several non-Egyptian branches of the Muslim Brotherhood were established early in the movement's history, in 1928-1954. However, the main catalyst for its spread outside Egypt was the **systematic oppression of Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser** in 1954. In the 1950s two large, well-organized Muslim Brotherhood groups **fled from Egypt to Saudi Arabia and Qatar**. A third, less cohesive group of activists **fled to the United States and a number of European countries, including West Germany**.

161. In Germany, the Muslim Brotherhood activists first integrated into the Muslim community and then spread to university campuses and the left-wing opposition. **Over the next several decades it gradually established itself in other European countries and became responsible for the spread of radical Islam in the West** and the de facto representative of the Muslim immigrant communities. The various organizations, networks and activists in Europe **often deny their affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood**, particularly after the September 11 terrorist attacks.

162. Using financial assistance from the Persian Gulf states (which continues to this day), the movement expanded its infrastructure in Europe and the United States by creating a network of banks, mosques, research centers, Islamic institutes, and social and educational institutions that spread the Muslim Brotherhood's political radical Islam to the Muslim communities in Europe. According to an article written by Ehud Rosen on the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe, the movement currently claims to have branches **in over 80 countries across the globe**.⁶⁷

163. The most prominent Islamic centers in Europe directly or indirectly affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood are currently located in **Britain, Germany and France** (for a long time, Munich was a major base of its operations). Prominent institutions in these countries include

⁶⁷For more information on the Muslim Brotherhood's presence and activity in Britain and Europe, see Ehud Rosen, "Mapping the Organizational Sources of the Global Delegitimization Campaign against Israel in the UK," issued in 2010 by the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs website.

the **Islamic Society of Germany (IGD), France's Union of Islamic Organizations,⁶⁸ and the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB).**

164. A prominent figure in the growth of the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe was **Sa'id Ramadan** ("little Hassan al-Banna"). He was married to Hassan al-Banna's daughter Wafa; his son is Tareq Ramadan, one of today's most prominent Islamist thinkers in the West. Sa'id Ramadan joined the Muslim Brotherhood at the age of 14, and over the years was also influenced by Sayyid Qutb. He had a major role in establishing relations for the Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East, Pakistan and Europe. He played a key role in establishing the IGD and creating the movement's first mosque in the West, in Munich, Germany. The high point of his activity was the establishment of the Islamic Center in Geneva (1961), currently directed by one of sons. Prominent among the financial figures of the Muslim Brotherhood network in Europe was a businessman named **Yousef Nada**, born 1931, who for many years was considered the movement's international finance person.

The Muslim Brotherhood's Umbrella Organizations in Europe

165. In the late 1980s and 1990s **the Muslim Brotherhood created** several umbrella organizations in Europe, **most of them influenced by Qatar-based Sheikh Dr. Yusuf al-Qaradawi. The Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe (FIOE)** was established in 1989. Until recently it operated from Britain, but in 2007 **it relocated to Brussels.** The FIOE currently has 28 member organizations in EU countries (including Scandinavia and Eastern Europe) and non-EU countries and territories (e.g., Kosovo, Turkey, Moldova, the Ukraine and Russia). **The social network created by the FIOE consists of mosques, schools for Quranic studies, Islamic culture centers and various Muslim associations. The Muslim Brotherhood is based in Britain (see below) but also has considerable presence in Germany and Belgium.**

166. The FIOE is headed by Chakib Ben Makhlouf, from Sweden. It is directed by an executive committee with an organizational structure similar to that of the Muslim Brotherhood (there are sections dealing with such diverse issues as education, media, the *da'wah* and women, as well as regional subdivisions). The FIOE oversees other organizations, including **the Federation of Muslim Youth and Student Organizations, the**

⁶⁸ The most prominent figures in the history of the Union of Islamic Organizations in France were Faisal al-Alawi, who went on to become the leader of Al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyya, the Muslim Brotherhood movement branch in Lebanon; and Rashid Ghannouchi, the leader of the Al-Nahda ("The Rebirth") movement, the Muslim Brotherhood branch in Tunisia.

Federation of European Arab-Islamic Schools and the European Assembly of Muslim Imams.

167. In 1997 Yusuf Qaradawi established the FIOE's **Dublin-based** theological wing, **the European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR)**, headed by headed by **Hussein Halawa**. Its objective is to promote Islamic religious law (Shari'ah) in Muslim immigrant communities in Europe. In 2004 al-Qaradawi established the **International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS)**, which includes around 500 Islamic scholars from across the world. It was launched in London in July 2004, when Qaradawi was invited to Britain by London's anti-Israeli mayor Ken Livingstone.

The European Muslim Brotherhood's Sympathy for Hamas

168. **The Muslim Brotherhood in Europe, particularly Britain, sympathizes with the Palestinians, in general and with Hamas in particular.** It expresses solidarity with Hamas and inspired by Sheikh Qaradawi has even declared support for suicide bombing attacks against Israeli civilians. **The Muslim Brotherhood in Europe plays a major role in the anti-Israeli delegitimization campaign currently being waged.** To that end **it has joined forces with radical left-wing elements**, with which it shares an anti-Israeli platform, despite the ideological differences between them.

169. The presence and activity of Muslim Brotherhood activists is notable in several fields: **organization of convoys and flotillas to the Gaza Strip** (the Muslim Brotherhood, in close cooperation with the Turkish IHH, played an important part in organizing the Turkish flotilla which ended in a violent confrontation on board the Mavi Marmara); **intensive anti-Israeli propaganda** (during annual conferences and through Arab and European media); **insistence on the Palestinian refugees' so-called "right of return"** as a means of destroying the State of Israel (the leading organization in this field is the British PRC, controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas operatives).

Muslim Brotherhood Activity in Turkey

170. Since 2006 **Turkey has been a center of intensive Muslim Brotherhood activity.** The ruling AKP party allowed Muslim Brotherhood activists and organizations, including Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi's IUMS, freedom of action in Turkey, an example of which is the seven conferences and fundraising events held in Istanbul in recent years.⁶⁹ The first was

⁶⁹ For further information see the July 11, 2010 bulletin "Internal Turkish criticism of the Islamic regime for enabling Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood to conduct political-propaganda activity on Turkish soil and sway public opinion

held in July 2006 and was attended by Al-Qaradawi, who called it "The [Conference of the] Muslims in Europe" (which reflects how the Muslim Brotherhood conceives of itself as the representative of Europe's Muslims).

171. The most important conference was held in Istanbul on February 14-15, 2010. It was attended by approximately 200 activists and clerics from the Arab-Muslim world and Muslim communities in Western countries (many of them affiliated with the radical Islamic ideology of Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood). **Ninety of the activists who took part in the conference signed a jihadist charter ("The Istanbul Declaration") calling for the fulfillment of the duty of jihad and "resistance" [i.e., terrorism] against Israel ("the Jewish Zionist occupation"). The conference also called for more assistance to jihad and the "resistance" with money, weapons, clothes, food, medical supplies and other materials, and stated that the Palestinian Authority did not represent the Palestinian people.**⁷⁰

172. After the events in Al-Tahrir Square in Egypt began, the Muslim Brotherhood joined the Turkish Islamic organizations calling for Mubarak's immediate resignation. On February 5, 2011, a demonstration was held in Istanbul led by IHH and its leader Bülent Yildirim. One of the participants was Dr. Ashraf Abdul Ghaffar, a Muslim Brotherhood leader in Turkey. During the demonstration, Bülent Yildirim implied that other Middle Eastern leaders might meet a fate similar to Mubarak's (ihh.org.tr).

Britain As a Center of Muslim Brotherhood Activity in Europe

173. **Britain is the political, media and economic hub of Muslim Brotherhood activity in Europe.** As in other countries, the activity of the Muslim Brotherhood in Britain began in the 1950s. **Over the years exiled movement leaders from the Middle East have gathered there**, especially leaders from Egypt, Syria, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Iraq. The second generation then became active in the movement, profiting from their involvement in British society and having full command of both the English language and culture. **During the 1990s senior Hamas activists from Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip** arrived in Britain and joined the movement, the most prominent of whom is **Muhammad Sawalha**. For many years Muslim Brotherhood activists in Britain **have collaborated with Islamic**

against Israel and the West. In the background: a phone call from Turkey's prime minister Tayyip Erdogan to Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah" at http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/hamas_e116.pdf.

⁷⁰ For more information on the activity of the Muslim Brotherhood in Turkey, see Steven G. Merley's article "Turkey, the global Muslim Brotherhood, and the Gaza flotilla," Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs website, January 2010.

activists of Pakistani extraction, mostly those who follow the radical Islamic ideology of Abul A'ala Maududi.⁷¹

174. **The Muslim Brotherhood conducts extensive activities in Britain**, although its activists, active in many Islamic institutions, **do not publicly admit to affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood or with extremist Islam**. Among the prominent organizations affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood is the **Muslim Association of Britain (MAB)**, which had a key role in forging the political alliance with the British left, especially with the Muslim Brotherhood's younger generation.⁷² Other organizations affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood and radical Islam include the **British Muslim Initiative (BMI)**, the **Palestinian Return Centre (PRC)**, and the **Federation of Student Islamic Societies in the UK and Ireland (FOSIS)**.⁷³ In addition, the Muslim Brotherhood in Britain has a media network operating from London and its contents are often coordinated with the movement in Egypt (see below).

175. The Muslim Brotherhood's long-term presence and broad activities in Britain together with the country's freedom of expression and political tolerance **have given Hamas, the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, a relatively large sphere in which to operate. Thus Hamas has turned Britain into the focus of its political, economic and media activities in Europe**. Hamas exploits its presence in Britain to promote the project of land and sea convoys to the Gaza Strip, in which an important role is played by Viva Palestina, the organization led by extreme leftist pro-Hamas former British MP George Galloway. **Hamas activists who settled in Britain are prominent in organizations and networks affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood and extremist Islam**. For example, **Zaher al-Birawi**, Hamas activist and senior PRC figure, was also chairman of the MAB from 2001 to 2003. Hamas activist **Muhammad Sawalha** and Hamas-Muslim Brotherhood activist **Dr. Azzam al-Tamimi** were among the founders of the BMI. Other Hamas activists have important positions in the leadership of the PRC, an organization outlawed in Israel which specializes in inculcating the idea of "right of return" within the political establishment and public opinion in Britain and other European countries.

176. The issue of the link between the MAB and the Muslim Brotherhood **was raised in the British Parliament a number of times** by organizations representing the Jewish


⁷¹ **Abul A'ala Maududi** (1903-1979) was one of the first and most important ideologues of radical Islam in the 20th century.

⁷²Rosen, "Mapping the Organizational Sources."

⁷³FOSIS was established in 1962 as a forum for Islamic students in Britain. There are indications that it is affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood and Abul A'ala Maududi's organization, Jamaat-e-Islami. For further information see Rosen, "Mapping the Organizational Sources." p. 43.

community in Britain. **They pointed to the MAB's contribution to contemporary anti-Semitism.** The issue was also raised by British politicians worried by the role the MAB was playing in shaping the lives of Muslims in Britain. In **November 2010, MP Alistair Burt**, a parliamentary under secretary of state at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, said that "We are aware of reports which suggest that there are significant historic linkages between the Muslim Brotherhood, its overseas affiliates and Hamas. Historically the Brotherhood has presented Hamas as a legitimate resistance movement for the Palestinian people. **The Muslim Association of Britain (MAB) is the Brotherhood's representative in the UK. MAB in the UK publically [sic] rejects violence and state that they work for wider Muslim integration into British society**" (Quoted by Rosen in "Mapping the Organizational Sources;" ITIC emphasis throughout).

The British Muslim Brotherhood (and the PRC) in the Campaign to Delegitimize Israel⁷⁴



⁷⁴Rosen, "Mapping the Organizational Sources." p. 47.

London as the Muslim Brotherhood's Media Center

177. **London is an important media center for the Muslim Brotherhood. Its main medium is its Arabic satellite channel, Al-Hiwar TV, which was established in July 2006 by senior BMI figures.**⁷⁵ Al-Hiwar TV broadcasts programs with Islamic themes and anti-Israeli propaganda and incitement. **It targets Arabs and Muslims all over the globe, especially Europe.** In 2007 its viewing audience in Europe, the Middle East and North America was estimated at two million.⁷⁶ **Muhammad Sawalha,**⁷⁷ a Hamas operative who lives in Britain, is a permanent guest on Al-Hiwar TV programs. Two of its senior employees are the **PRC's Zaher al-Birawi**, programming director and head presenter, and **Dr. Azzam al-Tamimi**, Hamas and Muslim Brotherhood activist, one of the co-founders of the BMI, who also founded Al-Hiwar TV and has headed it since 2006.⁷⁸

178. **Another important Muslim Brotherhood medium is the weekly Risalat al-Ikhwan, its main Arabic publication, published in London. It encourages Hamas terrorism, calls for jihad against Israel and prints invective against the United States and the moderate Arab regimes:**

1) **On September 1, 2010, the weekly column "Media Communiqué" extolled the terrorist attack which killed four Israeli civilians** at Bani Naim (south of Mt. Hebron) on August 31. (The political objective of the terrorist attack was to disrupt the opening session of the direct negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.) According to the column, **"the Muslim Brotherhood movement applauds the military action taken yesterday by the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades [operatives] in the city of Hebron in the West Bank.** The movement emphasizes **that the option of the resistance [i.e., terrorism] is the only one**

⁷⁵ Rosen, "Mapping the Organizational Sources."

⁷⁶ Rosen, "Mapping the Organizational Sources." Hamas also considers Arab-Muslim audiences in Europe important, and invests great resources in Al-Aqsa TV, its satellite channel, which broadcasts anti-Israeli anti-Western propaganda and incitement and supports terrorism. **Thus the Arab-Muslim audiences in Europe are exposed to radical Islamic jihadist propaganda, sometimes also anti-Semitic, broadcast from London by the Muslim Brotherhood as well as from the Gaza Strip by Hamas.**

⁷⁷For further information about Muhammad Sawalha, see the January 29, 2010 bulletin, "Hamas continues initiating anti-Israeli activities in Europe: Muhammad Kazem Sawalha is a Hamas activist living in Britain who in the past was involved in operational activities in Judea and Samaria. He is personally involved in preparations to dispatch another aid convoy to the Gaza Strip by sea to confront Israel" at http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/html/hamas_e095.htm.

⁷⁸For further information about Dr. Azzam Tamimi and the importance of Britain in Hamas operations in Europe, see the February 21, 2010 bulletin, "Britain as a Focus for Hamas' Political, Propaganda and Legal Activities in Europe" at http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/hamas_e097.pdf.

which ensures the return of the stolen Palestinian land and the establishment of a Palestinian state with holy Jerusalem as its capital, on all the land of Palestine, which is Arab and Islamic land. [The movement emphasizes] that support for this option is a personal obligation⁷⁹ of all the peoples, governments and organizations in all the Arab and Muslim countries.

2) In the October 21, 2010 issue, **Mohammed Badie, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's current General Guide, called for a jihad and armed intifada against Israel. The article included propaganda and incitement against the West and the moderate Arab regimes.** It was posted on the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt's official website as well (ikhwanonline.com, September 30, 2010) and the following day appeared on Risalat al-Ikhwan in London, which represents the Muslim Brotherhood movement worldwide (ikhwanpress.com).

3) **Mohammed Badie's** communiqué dealt with the battle of Badr in 624 AD, in which early Muslim forces overcame the more numerous population of Mecca (Risalat al-Ikhwan, issue 652, July 24, 2010). He asked whether today's Muslim could be the same. They were a few, he says, when jihad was forced on them. **Full of faith, they waged jihad despite the paucity of their numbers.**

4) He noted that praying to Allah and the desire to reach paradise gave them the strength to win the battle of Badr. He said that **"Our brothers in faith [i.e., Islam] call to us from wherever Muslims are persecuted. We see them in Palestine, Iraq, Somalia, Afghanistan and other places where their enemies attacked them and their friends delivered them [to the enemy]. If we are men of Badr, who believe in Allah, will we not go to their aid?"**

⁷⁹ **Fard 'ayn** in the original. Jihad as the "personal obligation" of every Muslim is the foundation for **Dr. Abdullah Azzam's** jihadist ideology. Abdullah Azzam, a Palestinian from the Jenin region, joined the Muslim Brotherhood as a student in Jordan. He later studied in Egypt. He eventually developed a radical Islamic ideology **and until his death in 1989 was Osama bin Laden's spiritual mentor. Today he is considered one of Hamas' role models.**