



Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center

September 1, 2009

Hamas steps up its struggle against the global jihad-affiliated networks trying to challenge its control of the Gaza Strip. Hamas recently used extreme force to suppress global jihad operatives, one of whose leaders proclaimed the establishment of an Islamic emirate in the Ibn Taymiyyah mosque in Rafah.



Top: Armed jihadist operative in the Sheikh Al-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah mosque in Rafah. Bottom: Sheikh Abd al-Latif Musa, one of the leaders of the jihadi-Salafist networks in the Gaza Strip, with his armed bodyguards, delivers a sermon viciously attacking Hamas and proclaiming the establishment of an Islamic emirate in Palestine (Hamas's PALDF forum, August 14, 2009).

Overview

1. On August 14, 2009 there were violent confrontations in Rafah (southern Gaza Strip) between Hamas and jihadi-Salafist operatives.¹ Prominent among the jihadists were operatives of the **Jund Ansar Allah** (“the army of Allah’s supporters”) network, which is affiliated with the global jihad. The confrontations began when Sheikh Abd al-Latif Musa, accepted by the jihadi-Salafist networks as a senior religious authority, delivered a Friday sermon in the **Sheikh Al-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah mosque**² in Rafah. The sermon strongly condemned the Hamas de-facto administration and **proclaimed the establishment of an Islamic emirate in Palestine.**

2. In response to what Hamas considered a challenge to its rule, Hamas security forces broke into the mosque and evacuated it by force. They were joined by operatives from the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades military-terrorist wing. Twenty-four Palestinians were killed in the battles in and around the mosque, and about 130 were wounded, among them jihadi-Salafist operatives, Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades operatives and civilians who were in the mosque or its vicinity at the time. Among the dead were two senior jihadists, **Sheikh Abd al-Latif Musa** (a source of religious and ideological authority for the jihadi-Salafist networks who was embraced by Jund Ansar Allah) and **Khaled Banath**, nicknamed **Abu Abdallah al-Suri** (military leader of Jund Ansar Allah). The Hamas forces did not hesitate to shoot at the mosque deliberately and inflict serious damage.

3. Behind the violent confrontations were the **penetration of global jihad ideas into the Gaza Strip and the strengthening of the jihadi-Salafist networks.** The networks affiliated themselves with Al-Qaeda and strive to implement by force the immediate imposition of Islamic religious law (*sharia*), as was customary during the days of the prophet Muhammad (7th century AD) and the first generations of Islam. They strictly adhere to an ongoing jihad, at any cost and in any location, demonstrate religious fanaticism and have no tolerance for the West and its values. It is ironic that the jihadi-Salafist networks are prospering and challenging Hamas specifically at a time when it has control over the Gaza Strip and is methodically Islamizing it (but apparently not quickly enough for them).

4. The networks, which include operatives who split from Hamas because it was too pragmatic for them, are called ***jaljalat*** (an Arabic verb meaning “to echo loudly”) by the

¹ **Salafism** is an Islamic movement which favors the tenets of Islam according to the first generations, which are considered role models. During the past few decades Salafism had turned from a fundamentalist Islamic idea to a radical political ideology held by extremist Muslims operating in the Middle East and around the world (including Al-Qaeda).

² The mosque is named for an Islamic theologian and religious judge active in the 14th century who is considered an extremely important religious authority. To this day his writings serve as the basis for the ideology of various radical Islamic movements, among them Al-Qaeda.

Gazans. (Full explanation of the verb in Paragraph 28). The most prominent among them are the **Jund Ansar Allah** (which was behind the failed showcase terrorist attack planned to be carried out at the Nahal Oz fuel terminal) and the **Army of Islam** (which participated in the abduction of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit). Both networks are affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the global jihad.

5. Hamas felt itself threatened by the increased activity and influence of the jihadi-Salafist networks **even though they cannot undermine its control of the Gaza Strip**. It is **extremely difficult** for Hamas to deal with them. On the one hand, they and Hamas **have a broad common denominator of radical Islamic ideology**, but on the other, Hamas is a national-Palestinian movement **responsible for the welfare of 1.5 million Gazans**, which forces it to maneuver between ideology and the exigencies of its rule. Thus Hamas, since it entered the Palestinian political arena, and especially since it took over the Gaza Strip, has had to demonstrate tactical pragmatism as opposed to adherence to ideology and strategy. It has done so by the way it **Islamizes the Gaza Strip** (gradually and with an ear to the reactions of the Gazans); with regard to its **terrorist policy of attacking Israel** (having adopted a policy of intermittent restraint; and in **its dealings with the West, particularly the United States** (keeping a “smile spin” since Barack Obama was elected).

6. As a result of its problematical attitude toward the jihadi-Salafist networks, until the incident at the Ibn Taymiyyah mosque in Rafah, Hamas showed great tolerance for them. It did not directly confront them with violence, as opposed to the brutality shown toward other powerful groups in the Gaza Strip which tried to challenge it (Fatah, for example, or influential clans such as Hilles and Dugmush). Hamas tried to **contain** their activities, primarily through occasional detentions of their operatives (some of whom tried to fire rockets into Israeli territory contrary to Hamas’ current policy), by increasing its oversight of the mosques (through its Ministry of Religious Endowments), and occasionally even by persuading network operatives to join the ranks of Hamas. However, apparently on this occasion Hamas’ patience was at an end, and it regarded the incident at the Ibn Taymiyyah mosque as **a direct public challenge to its control which necessitated a swift response**.

7. An analysis of the incident at the Ibn Taymiyyah mosque and the relationship between Hamas and the jihadi-Salafist networks allows us to draw several conclusions:

i) **Increased Hamas control over the Gaza Strip**: The events were an additional step in the process which **Hamas began in the summer of 2007 to increase its grip over the Gaza Strip and suppress other forces**. Since then Hamas has

gradually used the means at its disposal to enforce its control. However, when challenged either ideologically or with regard to security and its policies, Hamas has not hesitated to use brutal force to suppress the challenge, deploying its security forces and integrating the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades into them.

ii) **The Islamization process of the Gaza Strip will continue the way and at the pace Hamas decides, and not the way the jihadi-Salafist networks would expect:** The process encompasses all facets of civilian life and in our assessment will continue **gradually** to avoid both internal and external opposition. Hamas can also be expected not to make provocative statements, such as the establishment of an Islamic emirate in the Gaza Strip, which might lead to negative reactions from Egypt and other pro-Western Arab countries. The Islamization process will be undertaken in a way that will not unduly upset the Gazans and will enable it to both rebuild the Gaza Strip and to regain its military capabilities for the struggle against Israel.

iii) **Hamas will continue hampering the activities of the jihadi-Salafist networks,** in all probability more than in the past: However, because of the damage done to Hamas' image by its attack on Islamic operatives and symbols, in our assessment it will avoid, insofar as is possible, frontal confrontations with them, on the condition that they do not retaliate or continue challenging Hamas control. Instead, Hamas will use the means available to it **to gradually weaken them** (detentions, preventive activities of the security forces, working through the Ministry of Religious Endowments against the mosques controlled by the networks, propaganda and preaching, etc.).

iv) **The Jund Ansar Allah network suffered a serious blow during the incident at the Ibn Taymiyyah mosque** when most of its leadership was eliminated. However, in our assessment, **the back of the jihadi-Salafist networks in the Gaza Strip has not been broken.** They can be expected to continue their activities unabated, even if it means keeping a low profile in the short term. On the other hand, it is possible that to make themselves felt and **in retaliation for the incidents in Rafah they may try to carry out a provocative action which will challenge and embarrass Hamas** (for example, an attack against Hamas institutions or a showcase attack on Israel which will lead to a deterioration of the situation on the ground).

v) **Hamas' "smile spin," aimed at the West and particularly at the United States, may, in our assessment, be reinforced.** Hamas will represent itself (not

only to the West, but possibly also to Egypt and pro-Western Arab countries) as not hesitating to use force against networks affiliated with Al-Qaeda, as preserving the ceasefire with Israel and as prepared not to raise obstacles to the peace process. At the same time it will adhere to its basic ideology, which centers around refusing to recognize the existence of Israel and **pursuing the path of “resistance”** (i.e., terrorism and violence) as a way of solving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (even if it is done gradually with occasional lulls in the fighting).

8. This document is divided into the following sections:

- A) **Section 1:** An analysis of the events at the Ibn Taymiyyah mosque in Rafah.
- B) **Section 2:** Increased activity of jihadi-Salafist networks in the Gaza Strip.
- C) **Section 3:** How Hamas deals with jihadi-Salafist networks.
- D) **Appendices:**

- i) **Appendix I:** General description of the jihadi-Salafist networks in the Gaza Strip.

- ii) **Appendix II:** Interview in *Al-Ayyam* with an operative who identified himself as

- one of the leaders of the *jaljalat* (July 11, 2009).

- iii) **Appendix III:** The Islamic song “Jaljalat,” popular with jihadi-Salafist networks

- around the globe.

- iv) **Appendix IV:** Translation of a flyer issued by a *jaljalat* network on July 17, 2009.

Analysis of the events at the Ibn Taymiyyah mosque in Rafah

9. The violent confrontations which broke out between Hamas and **the jihadi-Salafist networks (prominent among which was Jund Ansar Allah)** were preceded by a public invitation to listen to the Friday, August 14 sermon at the **Ibn Taymiyyah mosque**³ in Rafah. The sermon would be given by **Sheikh Abd al-Latif Musa** (nicknamed **Abu Nur al-Maqdisi**), a jihadi-Salafist network leader in the Gaza Strip, and entitled **"Advice [worth its weight] in gold for the Ismail Haniya government"** (Al-Jazeera Talk, August 13, 2009). Sensing that the sermon might challenge Hamas, its police force deployed with reinforcements around the mosque. In anticipation of the sermon hundreds of jihadi-Salafist operatives belonging to various networks arrived from throughout the Gaza Strip. They were armed with Kalashnikov assault rifles, hand grenades and explosive belts.



An Internet call to the faithful to attend Friday prayers at the Sheikh Al-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah mosque in Rafah (MEMRI, August 17, 2009).⁴

10. Sheikh Abd al-Latif Musa delivered a sermon attacking the Hamas de-facto administration and proclaiming the **establishment of an Islamic emirate in Palestine**.⁵

³ **Sheikh Al-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah** was a 14th century theologian and Islamic exegete. Although his views are considered conservative, his writings serve as the basis for the ideology of various radical Islamic movements, among them Al-Qaeda. They also served to develop the conservative Wahhabi school of Islam prevalent in Saudi Arabia. He is considered an extremely important religious authority, whence the honorary title Sheikh Al-Islam.

⁴ **"A call to the flag [nafir in Arabic],"** a term from the Qur'an indicating the demand for the people to arrive en masse, and also indicating the proclamation of jihad. It is therefore no wonder that Hamas considered the invitation provocative.

⁵ A website affiliated with the global jihad posted the statement of a network calling itself the Jund Allah in Palestine proclaiming the establishment of an Islamic emirate led by the aforementioned Sheikh Abu al-Nur Maqdisi. The proclamation, which asked Muslims to support the emirate with money, manpower and weapons, had five articles (Al-Jazeera Net, August 14, 2009):

He also expressed resentment of Hamas' intention to take over and annex the mosque to the Ministry of Religious Endowments.⁶ He accused the Hamas judiciary system of operating according to Palestinian law [i.e., secular law] and not according to religious Islam law [the *shari'ah*]: "Hamas takes from Islam [only] slogans, from secularism and democracy [it takes its] laws and the procedures that obligate it."⁷

11. Sheikh Abd al-Latif Musa said he hoped Ismail Haniya, head of the Hamas government, was listening to the sermon, and he had a number of questions for him: Was Hamas becoming a secular party whose participation Israel was counterfeit? What did Hamas fear more, the United States, the European Union, Britain or France? He accused Hamas of having surrendered to the Israeli rabbis and to foreigners like Tony Blair and Jimmy Carter (both of whom visited the Gaza Strip and both of whom Islamist networks planned to kill during their visits). He also accused Hamas' security apparatuses of spying on the **Salafist groups** and of having confiscated computers and other equipment belonging to Jund Ansar Allah worth \$120,000. He called on Ismail Haniya to **implement religious Islamic law by force**, noting that if Hamas had applied the law of Allah, the Salafists would be at his disposal (QudsNews website, August 14, 2009).

i) The unification of military forces under the command of the "**Islamic emirate in Palestine**" (literally, "the Islamic emirate in **greater Jerusalem**," a term taken from the oral tradition of the prophet Muhammad [*hadith*] and referring to the **entire area of Palestine**.).

ii) A call the faithful to declare their loyalty to the Islamic emirate.

iii) A call to Muslims in the Gaza Strip to support and sponsor the *mujahideen* [jihad warriors].

iv) A call to Muslims everywhere to support the emirate with money, manpower and weapons.

v) An assertion that all the faithful believing in the unity of Allah will no rest until the religion of Allah is victorious, the Islamic states are liberated and Al-Aqsa mosque is purified of the "cursed Jewish defilement."

⁶ The Hamas de-facto administration is using its Ministry of Religious Endowments to try to take over the mosques of its rivals in the Gaza Strip to increase its grip (similar to the actions of the Palestinian Authority in Judea and Samaria regarding the mosques controlled by Hamas).

⁷ Hamas is trying to pass religious Islamic laws in the Gaza Strip but that has met with difficulties because of Mahmoud Abbas' objections. It is therefore forced to use a number of formal and informal methods and to operate gradually, using laws and bylaws. The jihadi-Salafist networks would prefer a swift, enforced implementation of Islam law. For further information see our July 28, 2009 bulletin "The Islamization process promoted by Hamas in the Gaza Strip and its social and political implications on the local, the Middle Eastern, and the international scenes" at http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/hamas_e076.pdf.



Left: Sheikh Abd al-Latif Musa surrounded by armed bodyguards as he delivers his sermon. Right: Sheikh Abd al-Latif Musa leaving the Ibn Taymiyyah mosque (Hamis's PALDF forum, August 14, 2009).



Sheikh Abd al-Latif Musa preaching in the Ibn Taymiyyah mosque, surrounded by armed bodyguards (Safa News Agency, August 14, 2009).



Picture circulated on the Internet by the Jund Ansar Allah in support of the [branch of the] Islamic emirate in Gaza. At the right in orange, Sheikh Abd al-Latif Musa. The lower inscription is an often-quoted Qur'an verse in praise of suicide bombers (Ansar al-Mujahideen forum, courtesy of MEMRI, August 17, 2009).

12. Hamas viewed the sermon as an **overt provocation** and responded to the challenge immediately. Its security forces were put on high alert throughout Rafah, set up roadblocks and surrounded the mosque. A shootout quickly followed between Hamas and jihad operatives, and hand grenades were thrown. After a lull of several hours, the confrontation was renewed that evening and ended the following morning, August 16.

"يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا أَطِيعُوا اللَّهَ وَأَطِيعُوا الرَّسُولَ وَأُولِي الْأَمْرِ مِنْكُمْ فَإِن تَنَازَعْتُمْ فِي شَيْءٍ فَرُدُّوهُ إِلَى اللَّهِ وَالرَّسُولِ إِن كُنتُمْ تُؤْمِنُونَ بِاللَّهِ وَالْيَوْمِ الْآخِرِ ذَلِكَ خَيْرٌ وَأَحْسَنُ



تأويلاً " النساء 59

إعلان الولاء للإمارة الإسلامية في أكناف بيت المقدس

الحمد لله والصلاة والسلام على رسول الله أما بعد...

بعد التوكل على الله سبحانه وتعالى ، نعلن نحن جماعة جند أنصار الله في أكناف بيت المقدس ، عن ولاننا التام للإمارة الإسلامية في أكناف بيت المقدس ، بإمارة مولانا الشيخ / أبي النور المقدسي حفظه الله ورعاه أمير المؤمنين في الإمارة الإسلامية ، ونعاهد الله سبحانه وتعالى على السمع والطاعة في المعروف ، ونقول لشيخنا أبي النور المقدسي ، سر على بركة الله ، فإنما نحن سهام في كتانتكم ، فارموا بنا حيث شئتم ، فوالله لن نجدوا منا إلا جنوداً مخلصين طائعين ، ورجالاً أشداء ثابتين ، وبناء على ذلك :

أولاً: فإننا نعلن عن ذوبان كل تشكيلاتنا العسكرية ، في الإمارة الإسلامية في أكناف بيت المقدس.

ثانياً : ندعو جميع الصادقين المخلصين في أكناف بيت المقدس للمشاركة بإعلان الولاء للإمارة الإسلامية.

ثالثاً : ندعو المسلمين في قطاع غزة إلى دعم المجاهدين ونصرتهم وإيوانهم.

رابعاً: نطلب من المسلمين في كل مكان أن يؤيدوا هذه الإمارة الفتيحة وأن يدعموها بالمال والسلاح والرجال فهي أمل الأمة في رفع راية التوحيد في أكناف بيت المقدس قال تعالى : (وَأَن اسْتَنْصَرُواكُمْ فِي الَّذِينَ فَعَلَيْكُمْ النَّصْرُ) فإياكم وأن تخذلوا هذه الإمارة الفتيحة.

خامساً : نقول لأعداء الله إن جنود التوحيد لن يبدأ لهم بال ولن يقر لهم قرار حتى ينصر دين الله سبحانه وتعالى ، وحتى تحرر بلاد المسلمين قاطبة ، وحتى يظهر أفضانا الأسير من دنس اليهود الملاعين.

فنسأل الله سبحانه وتعالى أن يعيننا على نصرته دينه وإعلاء كلمته ، ونصرة نبيه عليه الصلاة والسلام ، وأن يمكننا من فكاك أسيرات وأسرى المسلمين من سجون الكفار ، ونسأل الله أن يجمع شمل الأمة على كلمة التوحيد إنه ولي ذلك والقادر عليه .

الإمارة الإسلامية في أكناف بيت المقدس

Notice issued by the Jund Allah in Palestine fully supporting [a kind of swearing of allegiance] the Islamic emirate of Palestine under the leadership of the emir Sheikh Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi, the nickname of Sheikh Abd al-Latif Musa (Janah, a forum affiliated with the global jihad).

13. On the evening of August 14 Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades operatives (Hamass' military-terrorist wing) joined the Hamass security forces, which declared the area around the mosque a closed military area and brought out heavy military equipment, including RPGs. Many of the jihad operatives took cover in the mosque and shot at the Hamass forces. Later the focus of the confrontation moved from the mosque to the house of Sheikh Abd al-Latif Musa in the Al-Brazil neighborhood of Rafah, to which he escaped with **Khaled Banath** (Abu Abdallah al-Suri), the head of the network.

14. Recordings of conversations held on the communications network of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades force during the battle were issued through Islamic forums and on Palestinian Internet sites (Firas, August 26, 2009; PalPress website, August 24, 2009). They

indicate that Hamas did not hesitate to employ brutal military force against its opponents and civilians who were in the vicinity of the battle. For example:⁸

i) The Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades operatives received an order to blow up Sheikh Abd al-Latif Musa's house (referred to as "the pig") and at the house of Khaled Banath (referred to as "the impure one). One of the operatives reported that "the house of the pig Abd al-Latif Musa has been blown up." A commander gave an order to pay special attention to the minaret of the mosque (the damage done to it is clearly visible in the picture below).

ii) At the beginning of the battle it was reported that there were civilians in the vicinity of the fighting. Later on orders were given to shoot with no consideration for them. A senior commander on the ground ordered the operatives "to deal with the minaret." He then ordered that the jihadists be shot at as they retreated. "We don't need any of them" [i.e., "they should be eliminated"]. One of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades operatives reported that "the area is surrounded," and the order was then given to prevent photographs from being taken.



The Ibn Taymiyyah mosque. The damage done during the confrontation, especially to the minaret, is still visible (Reuters, August 16, 2009).

15. During the gunfights two senior jihad operatives were killed:

i) **Sheikh Abd al-Latif Khaled Muhammad Musa** (nicknamed Sheikh Abu al-Nur or Abu Nur al-Maqdisi): He was the religious-ideological authority for the jihadi-Salafist operatives in the Gaza Strip, which included Jund Ansar Allah and the Army of Islam. He was a doctor, 49, lived in Rafah, and worked for the Palestinian Authority's Ministry

⁸ For further information see our September 6, 2009 bulletin "Pictures and recordings of the battles near the Ibn Taymiyyah mosque in Rafah" at http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/hamas_e081.pdf.

of Health. He served as the imam of the Sheikh Al-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah mosque in Rafah.

ii) **Khaled Banath** (nicknamed Abu Abdallah al-Suri or Abdallah al-Muhajar⁹): Khaled Banath, 45, born in Rafah, moved to Saudi Arabia and from there Syria (where he acquired a Syrian passport¹⁰), and later to Afghanistan. He also fought in the Muslim ranks in Bosnia. After Israel disengaged from the Gaza Strip in 2005 he returned to it and served as an instructor in the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades. When the lull in the fighting between Hamas and Israel began he left its ranks and established Jund Ansar Allah (*Al-Watan*, Saudi Arabia, August 17, 2009). According to the Hamas forum (August 15, 2009) he proposed that the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades carry out a showcase attack at the Nahal Oz crossing using horses. However, they refused on the grounds that the timing was wrong. Jund Ansar Allah said in an official statement that he had been close to the senior operatives of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades (Janah, August 17, 2009).

16. There have been contradictory reports from Hamas concerning the circumstances of their deaths. According to Ihab al-Ghusein, spokesman for the Hamas de-facto administration's Ministry of the Interior, a negotiator who tried to mediate between Hamas and the Salafist operatives was convinced to enter Sheikh Abd al-Latif Musa's house. When he did, he was shot at. Afterwards Khaled Banath blew himself up with Sheikh Abd al-Latif Musa nearby, killing them both (Filastin al-'An website, August 15, 2009). According to a report from a Hamas-affiliated news agency, during a search the police discovered a tunnel between the Ibn Taymiyyah mosque and the sheikh's house, in which the two were hiding; they offered to surrender. When one of the policemen approached them Khaled Banath detonated an explosive belt, killing himself and Sheikh Abd al-Latif Musa and critically wounding the policeman (Safa News Agency website, August 15, 2009).

⁹ Both Hamas's PALDF forum (August 15, 2009) and the Saudi Arabian *Al-Watan* (August 17, 2009) mentioned Khaled al-Banath as the real name of the operative nicknamed Abdallah al-Muhajar or Abdallah al-Suri. Both reports gave bibliographical information.

¹⁰ Hence his nickname, "al-Suri" is Arabic for "the Syrian."



**Top pictures: Hamas security forces deployed against Jund Ansar Allah (Photos: Safa News Agency).
Lower picture: The ruins of Sheikh Abd al-Latif Musa's house (Reuters, August 16, 2009).**

17. During the confrontation Hamas operatives executed jihadist operatives by shooting them at close range, proved by pictures spread by Islamic websites and a video clip. For Ehud Yaari's report broadcast in Hebrew on Israeli Channel 2 TV on August 24,

[Click here \(Courtesy of Israeli Channel 2 TV\).](#)



Jihadist operatives executed by Hamas operatives (Photo courtesy of Israeli Channel 2 TV, Ehud Yaari reporting, August 25, 2009).



Photographs of dead jihadists, apparently taken with a cell phone camera, posted on an Islamic forum (August 16, 2009).¹¹



Left: The censoring green hand of Hamas blocks the lens of a television camera; the inscription reads "Taking pictures is not allowed." Right: The mosque in Rafah hit during the fighting with the jihad networks (Al-Quds website, August 16, 2009).

¹¹ <http://www.muslim.net/vb/showthread.php?t=357181>.

18. After the battle the toll to life and property was assessed: **28 dead and at least 130 wounded**. At least seven of the dead were Hamas operatives. Jihad operatives, Hamas security operatives and civilians were also killed (at least two Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades operatives served in the police force). The most senior was **Muhammad al-Shamali** (nicknamed Abu Jibril), 38, commander of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades for the eastern district of Rafah. The Ibn Taymiyyah mosque was deliberately damaged by Hamas;¹² Sheikh Abd al-Latif Musa's house was totally destroyed.



Poster of Muhammad al-Shamali (nicknamed Abu Jibril), commander of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades in the eastern Rafah district, killed during the confrontations (From the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades website, August 16, 2009).



Left: The funeral of Palestinians killed in Rafah (Photo: Ibrahim Abu Mustafa for Reuters, August 15, 2009). Right: Hamas security forces at the entrance to the Al-Auda mosque in Rafah secure the funeral (Photo: Muhammad Salem for Reuters, August 15, 2009).

19. After Hamas took control of the mosque in Rafah **the confrontations were moved to Gaza City**, apparently because the jihadi-Salafist operatives fled to the Sabra neighborhood in the southern part of the city where the Army of Islam-affiliated **Dugmush clan** (which has already confronted Hamas) has its stronghold. On August 15 and 16 there were exchanges of fire in the area and eventually the jihadi operatives were routed by the Hamas

¹² Hamas, which accused Israel of damaging the mosques in the Gaza Strip during Operation Cast Lead, did not hesitate to open fire on the Ibn Taymiyyah mosque in Rafah, which was seriously damaged, as was apparent in newspaper photographs.

forces. According to one report, Mumtaz Dughmush turned over several Jund Ansar Allah men after Hamas accepted as a condition that they would not be executed or tortured (Fatah-affiliated Al-Ahed website, August 19, 2009). During the confrontations the Hamas security forces gave **Army of Islam commander Mumtaz Dughmush** an extension to surrender to the Hamas forces. He was blamed for the death of an Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades operative which occurred during a family feud (Hamas's PALDF forum, Ma'an News Agency, August 16, 2009). It is not clear whether or not he in fact surrendered.

Previous confrontations between the Hamas de-facto administration and the Dugmush clan



Hamas police enter the Al-Sabra neighborhood in Gaza City, the stronghold of the Dugmush clan (Both photos from the Palestinian police website in the Gaza Strip, Al-Aqsa TV's website and Hamas's PALDF forum, September 16, 2008).



Weapons confiscated by the Hamas security forces during confrontations with the Dugmush clan.

Reactions to the events at the Ibn Taymiyyah mosque Hamas

20. Hamas spokesmen issued statements accusing Jund Ansar Allah operatives of heresy and deviating from the path of Islam, claiming that the proclamation of the establishment of an Islamic emirate in Palestine was "insanity," "madness" and "ideological deviation" from Islam. They stressed that Hamas would not create anarchy and that anyone who carried arms or broke the law would be arrested. They falsely claimed that only policemen and members of the security forces had participated in the fighting after reports that the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades were involved. After the dust settled Hamas softened its tone. The Haniya de facto administration expressed regret for "the unfortunate event in Rafah" and said that "confronting the Jund Ansar Allah group had not been on the agenda of the

Ministry of the Interior's security apparatuses, but circumstances forced it on them" (*Felesteen*, August 19, 2009).

21. The **Hamas de-facto administration's Ministry of the Interior** stated in an official announcement that the sermon given by Sheikh Abd al-Latif Musa at the mosque in Rafah showed he had "gone mad." It also stated that anyone who broke the law and carried a weapon to create anarchy would be arrested (Ma'an News Agency, August 14, 2009). Fathi Hamad, Minister of the Interior, promised to strike with "an iron fist" at anyone who violated internal security in the Gaza Strip (PalToday website, August 24, 2009).

22. Ihab al-Ghoussein, Ministry of the Interior spokesman, said that following the events Hamas had appointed **a committee of clerics and religious Islamic sages** to provide "ideological therapy" for people holding "**extremist opinions**" [i.e. jihadist and Salafist networks]. He claimed that those who had been influenced by "external groups" were for the most part minors who had become acquainted with them through the **Internet**. He accused "external groups" [i.e., global jihad elements] of providing funds and advancing those ideas to "replace the security of Gaza with anarchy" (*Al-Quds Al-Arabi*, August 22, 2009).

23. The following is a selection of other reactions from Hamas spokesmen:

i) **Ismail Haniya**, head of the Hamas de-facto administration, told a meeting of adolescents that the security forces were forced to act against Jund Ansar Allah operatives in Rafah because they had rebelled against the government, turned their weapons against it and blown themselves up amid its policemen. He accused elements whose names he did not mention of having exploited young people and brainwashed them with "strange thoughts" about heresy and bloodshed, and called on the youth to avoid deviating from the path of Islam (Hamas' Palestine-Info website, August 14, 2009).

ii) **Sami Abu Zuhri**, Hamas spokesman, said that Hamas would not permit anyone to take the law into their own hands, and that the proclamation of an Islamic emirate was "madness" (Hamas' Palestine-Info website, August 14, 2009).

iii) **Taher al-Nunu**, Hamas de-facto administration spokesman, said in a statement that there were groups which "deviated from Islam" and seduced Palestinian society to acts of heresy. Those groups, he said, had carried out a large number of crimes and attacks against civilians and property. They had also crossed the line when they threatened innocent people and took the law into their own hands under the slogan of an Islamic emirate. The statement placed responsibility for the battles in Rafah on the

shoulders of Sheikh Abd al-Latif Musa and his followers, and they were called on to surrender to Hamas (Al-Aqsa TV, August 14, 2009).

iv) **Musheir al-Masri**, secretary of the Hamas faction in the Palestinian Legislative Council, accused the Palestinian Authority of fanning the flames of civil war in the Gaza Strip by supporting Jund Ansar Allah. He said that the Hamas administration had held a dialogue with members of the organization, which had no more than 50 or 60 activists, but that nothing had resulted from it. He claimed that interrogations of detained Jund Ansar Allah operatives had revealed the organization's links to the [security] apparatuses of the Palestinian Authority (QudsPress website, August 16, 2009).

v) **Ihab al-Ghusein**, spokesman for the Ministry of the Interior, also claimed that the Jund Ansar Allah network had links to the Palestinian Authority (Al-Alam TV, August 16, 2009). On another occasion he denied that the networks were affiliated with Al-Qaeda or Salafist organizations, and emphasized that all the Palestinian organizations in the Gaza Strip were "factions of the resistance to the Israeli occupation" (German News Agency, August 17, 2009).

24. Senior cleric **Sheikh Yussef al-Qardawi**, a prominent authority on Islamic law in the Sunni Muslim world (including Hamas), **expressed support for Hamas**. At the convention held by the Egyptian Journalists' Union in Cairo on August 19 he was asked about the legitimacy of the fighting waged by Hamas against Jund Ansar Allah. He answered that the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip had been justified in its actions because it had been trying to prevent Jund Ansar Allah from killing its brothers, but that they had refused and compelled Hamas to use force. The audience of more than 1000 people broke into wild applause (Islam Online, Sheikh Qardawi's Islamic portal, August 20, 2009).

Jund Ansar Allah

25. An official Jund Ansar Allah statement issued after the events in Rafah attacked the Hamas leadership and accused it of "collaborating" [apparently with Israel] and of "fanning the flames of civil war" [*fitna*]. According to the statement, Jund Ansar Allah had no intention of besmirching Hamas' honor, but that the opposite was true, the Jund Ansar Allah operatives were close to Hamas military wing. The statement also said that Jund Ansar Allah did not accuse anyone of heresy and that they had no connection with Al-Qaeda (Jund Ansar Allah official website, janah.ps, August 17, 2009).

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

(وَلَا تَحْسَبَنَّ الَّذِينَ قُتِلُوا فِي سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ أَمْوَاتًا بَلْ أحيَاءٌ عِنْدَ رَبِّهِمْ يُرَزَقُونَ * فَرِحِينَ بِمَا آتَاهُمُ اللَّهُ مِنْ فَضْلِهِ وَيَسْتَبْشِرُونَ بِالَّذِينَ لَمْ يَلْحَقُوا بِهِمْ مِنْ خَلْفِهِمْ أَلَّا خَوْفٌ عَلَيْهِمْ وَلَا هُمْ يَحْزَنُونَ * يَسْتَبْشِرُونَ بِنِعْمَةِ مِنَ اللَّهِ وَفَضْلٍ وَأَنَّ اللَّهَ لَا يُضِيعُ أَجْرَ الْمُؤْمِنِينَ)

رحم الله شهدائنا .. والله الذي لا إله إلا هو الذي رفع السموات الطباق بلا عمد
لنتأرن لدمائكم ولترملن نساءهم كما رملوا نساء مجاهديننا
غزونا بني صهيون في عقل دارهم ورجعنا لاهلينا سالمين غاثمين .. فقتلوا على أيديكم في ليلة الجمعة وفي هذه الأيام المباركات
كل هذا لأجل الدعاية التي نشرتها ان حماس تريد ضم المسجد الى وزارة الأوقاف
حصنت مع قرارها أرواح المجاهدين والمؤمنين تحت بند أننا قاعدة وتكفيرين

ولمن انتصر بعد ظلمه فأولئك ما عليهم من سبيل {41} إنما السبيل على
الذين يظلمون الناس ويغيثون في الأرض بغير الحق أولئك لهم عذاب أليم {42}

ولمن انتصر بعد ظلمه فأولئك ما عليهم من سبيل {41} إنما السبيل على الذين يظلمون الناس ويغيثون في الأرض بغير الحق أولئك لهم عذاب أليم {42}

رحم الله شهدائنا .. والله الذي لا إله إلا هو الذي رفع السموات الطباق بلا عمد
لنتأرن لدمائكم ولترملن نساءهم كما رملوا نساء مجاهديننا
غزونا بني صهيون في عقل دارهم ورجعنا لاهلينا سالمين غاثمين .. فقتلوا على أيديكم في ليلة الجمعة

Left: The statement, apparently hastily written and with spelling errors. It was posted on the Jund Ansar Allah website immediately following the incident at the mosque in Rafah instead of the website which was no longer accessible. It begins with a quotation from the Qur'an relating to the reward received in paradise by shaheeds (including suicide bombers). Right: The same statement, edited, after the site reappeared on the Internet. It begins with a different quotation, two verses stating that whoever is an unjust oppressor [in this case, Hamas] will be punished (Janah.ps website, August 17, 2009).

The jihadi-Salafist networks in the Gaza Strip

26. The jihadi-Salafist networks in the Gaza Strip issued statements of solidarity with Jund Ansar Allah, accompanied by threats of revenge.¹³ Some were issued under their own names while others used aliases to avoid violent responses from Hamas:

i) The “**Swords of Truth**” issued a statement which included a call to Palestinians to keep their distance from Hamas operatives because “the war is approaching” and Hamas would be a target. It swore allegiance to the “Islamic emirate of Gaza” and to the emir who would be chosen as its leader (Al-Ahed, a Fatah-affiliated website, August 16, 2009).

¹³ On the evening of August 29, two IEDs were detonated near two Hamas security force installations. According to assessments in the Gaza Strip, Jund Ansar Allah was responsible for the explosions (BBC in Arabic, August 30, 2009).



A statement from the Swords of Truth Battalions expressing faith in "the Islamic emirate of Gaza" and swearing allegiance to the new emir when he is chosen (Al-Ghad, August 16, 2009).

ii) The "Shari'ah Committee of the Army of Islam" issued a statement distributed by the Al-Noor Media Foundation. It contained many Qur'an and *hadith* verses, denounced Hamas (without mentioning its name) and praised those who were killed at the Ibn Taymiyyah mosque. It saw a continuous line of fighting against "treachery" and for the sake of Allah running from Serbia, Chechnya, the Swat Valley (Pakistan), Indonesia and Nahr Al-Barad (Lebanon) to the Ibn Taymiyyah mosque in Rafah.

iii) A Salafist network which did not reveal its name but apparently operates in the Gaza Strip called on the "activists" [the global jihad] around the world to put an end to Hamas' rule of the Gaza Strip, and issued a hit list headed by the Hamas internal and external leadership [i.e., Damascus]. The hit list included the Hamas

leaders in the Gaza Strip and the commanders of its military-terrorist wing (Hamas's PALDF forum, the Al-Qassam website, August 14, 2009).

iv) **A network calling itself the Salafist Islamic Jamaa'** said in a statement that it expressed its condolences for the deaths of the Salafist operatives at the Ibn Taymiyyah mosque. According to the statement the fighters murdered by Hamas would be resurrected on Judgment Day. **Islamic jihad fighters around the world were asked to mobilize against Hamas.** It also noted that a meeting had been held of Islamist operatives from various countries (Chechnya, Lebanon, Sudan and Iraq) at which they voted to end the corrupt Hamas rule of the Gaza Strip, which was using Islam to kill Islamic jihad fighters (Sky Press website, August 15, 2009).

v) **The Islamic Liberation Party** said in a statement that Hamas had given too much importance to the proclamation of the establishment of an Islamic emirate. That was because it was impossible to establish it at the present time since the Gaza Strip was still, it claimed, subject to the "Israeli occupation." It denounced the "cruelty" of the Hamas security forces during the deliberate attack on the mosque in Rafah, which contradicted the spirit and path of Islam and was intended to "please the West" (*Al-Hayat Al-Jadeeda*, August 18, 2009).

The Palestinian Islamic Jihad

27. **Khaled al-Batash, senior figure in the Palestinian Islamic Jihad** (a terrorist organization also subject to pressure from Hamas in the Gaza Strip), described the events in Rafah as "a genuine catastrophe." He said he deplored the fact that Hamas had used force against Salafist groups without enlisting Islamic sages to deal with the crisis. On the other hand, he also criticized Jund Ansar Allah, which, he said, had issued an unrealistic proclamation about the establishment of an Islamic emirate in the Gaza Strip (German News Agency, August 16, 2009).

Al-Qaeda

28. On August 16 the Al-Qaeda-affiliated Al-Fallujah website posted a statement **strongly attacking Hamas** (without the precautionary restrictions taken by the jihadi-Salafist networks in the Gaza Strip). It contained remarks such as "hypocritical Hamas should be ashamed of itself," the aggression had been carried out by "Jews and the dogs of Jews" represented by "infidel, hypocritical Hamas," Hamas' terrible slaughter would "go down in history as one of the slaughters perpetrated against the Palestinian people." They asked Hamas if its atheism had reached such a base level that it would destroy a mosque?

The Palestinian Authority

29. The Palestinian Authority exploited the events to defame Hamas. Mahmoud Abbas, summing up the Fatah conference during a government meeting in Ramallah, also mentioned the events in Rafah and accused Hamas of having acted “inhumanly” toward Jund Ansar Allah or the Army of Islam (he apparently could not differentiate between them). He also claimed that Hamas had blown up the mosque (a slight exaggeration), saying that “We do not need Israel to blow up mosque when they [i.e., Hamas] blow them up...” (Wafa News Agency, August 17, 2009).

Cartoons



The Palestinian Authority sneers at Hamas: “We are opposed to those who accuse us of heresy, those murderous extremists” (Al-Hayat Al-Jadeeda, August 17, 2009).



The rift between Hamas and the Salafist jihadist organizations, another schism dividing the Palestinian people (Al-Hayat Al-Jadeeda, August 20, 2009).



Hamas cuts off its own arm and shoots it. The inscription on the arm reads “Jund Ansar Allah” (Al-Watan, August 16, 2009).



The Gaza Strip: The child in the tent asks his father (Al- what “the only legitimate representative”¹ means Arab Al-Youm, Jordan, August 16, 2009).

Increased activity of jihadi-Salafist networks in the Gaza Strip

30. During the past two years, **various jihadi-Salafist networks in the Gaza Strip have prospered** in the wake of the Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip and its Islamization.¹⁴ Some of them are by nature violent terrorists seeking to turn the Gaza Strip into a base for a local, regional and international jihad; others share Al-Qaeda's ideology, which seeks to instill the local population with its ideas through preaching (*da'wah*).

31. The jihadi-Salafist networks aspire to establish an Islamic rule in the Gaza Strip based on Islamic religious law (*shari'ah*) and to return to the Islam of its first generations (7th century AD), and some of them even seek to restore the Islamic Caliphate. They do not take into consideration the constraints of administration and Palestinian nationalism which Hamas has been forced to make provision for, especially after its takeover of the Gaza Strip. For those networks, as for Al-Qaeda, despite its radical Islamic ideology, Hamas has deviated from the true path of Islam by involving itself in Palestinian politics and abandoning the jihad against Israel, which must be waged without pause.¹⁵

32. The jihadi-Salafist networks in the Gaza Strip have, in our assessment, several hundred activists (although the number of their supporters is far greater and may reach thousands). Prominent among the terrorist jihad networks are **Jund Ansar Allah**, which failed in its attempt to carry out a showcase attack at the Nahal Oz crossing; the **Army of Islam** commanded by **Mumtaz Dughmush**;¹⁶ the **Army of the Nation** commanded by **Ismail Hamid**, established by operatives who left the ranks of the Popular Resistance Committees;

¹⁴ See Note 6 above.

¹⁵ For the criticism of Hamas by Ayman al-Zawahiri, bin Laden's deputy, see our March 22, 2007 bulletin "Ayman al-Zawahiri lashed out at the Hamas movement once again, accusing it of abandoning jihad and 'selling Palestine' for seats in the Palestinian unity government" at http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/al_zawahiri_e.pdf.

¹⁶ For further information about the Army of Islam, see our February 11, 2008 bulletin "[A group called "Army of the Nation, Jerusalem" is yet another global jihad offshoot in the Gaza Strip.](#)"

Fatah al-Islam in Ardh al-Ribat¹⁷ and other networks. They are apparently local networks and the links between them are tenuous. It would also seem that their connection to Al-Qaeda and the global jihad is based primarily on their adoption of the global jihad ideology (through the Internet, among other means)¹⁸ and not necessarily on a direct operational connection to the Al-Qaeda leadership, although some of them do strive to establish such a connection.

33. The Hamas de-facto administration in the Gaza Strip, represented by the Hamas movement as a victorious Palestinian Islamic regime, increased the popularity of the jihadi-Salafist networks among the Gazans and motivated them to less secrecy, and to carrying out actions challenging the Hamas administration itself. As long as they were not a threat to Hamas, it allowed them relative freedom, although some of them were involved in terrorist attacks on Western targets or against targets perceived as serving the West and its interests,¹⁹ which proved embarrassing for Hamas. On occasion Hamas collaborated with the networks, sometimes using them to promote its own interests, and sometimes, when they went too far, operating against them.²⁰

34. However, since the lull in the fighting in the Gaza Strip (June-December 2008) and more to the point since Operation Cast Lead, **the jihad networks have increased their activities and daring**. They have been critical of Hamas' readiness to agree to a timeout in fighting Israel, even because of tactical considerations, and tried to carry out their own attacks contrary to Hamas policy. During and after the lull **operatives left the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades** and joined the jihad networks because of internal disagreements, some of the ideological. They felt that Hamas, with its lull arrangement with Israel and its policy of restraint after Operation Cast Lead, became too moderate. In some instances the networks were reinforced by global jihad operatives from various countries, who infiltrated into the Gaza Strip, found refuge there, and joined the local jihadists.

¹⁷ **Ardh al-Ribat**: a frontier where Muslims have settled to protect the interior Islamic land. It is a kind of nickname for Palestine.

¹⁸ Al-Qaeda's recruiting and handling of terrorists throughout the world via the Internet was analyzed in "Violent Islamist Extremism, The Internet, and the Homegrown Terrorist Threat," a report prepared by the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and issued on May 8, 2008. For further information see our July 14, 2008 bulletin "Terrorism and Internet: a US Senate report analyzes the extensive use made by Al-Qaeda of the Internet in its war for hearts and minds" at http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/int_140708e.pdf. For bringing jihad to the Palestinian Authority-administered territories see our March 25, 2009 bulletin "Terrorism and the Internet: Al-Qaeda and the global jihad continue to recruit Palestinian operatives on the Internet" at http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/gj_e003.pdf.

¹⁹ For attacks on Christian institutions in the Gaza Strip, see our February 21, 2008 bulletin "[YMCA library building in Gaza City blown up: another incident in a series of attacks on Western and Christian targets in the Gaza Strip.](#)"

²⁰ For example, when the Army of Islam abducted BBC correspondent Alan Johnston in March 2007, **Hamas used force, including gunfire, to set him free** four months later.



A Hamas forum calls for the unification of all the “resistance” factions in the Gaza Strip, including those belonging to the jihadist networks.

35. The Gazans call some of the networks and operatives *jaljalat*.²¹ A long *Al-Ayyam*²² interview on July 11, 2009 with a commander named **Mahmoud Muhammad Abu Taleb** (nicknamed Abu al-Mu'tassem) revealed information about *jaljalat*. According to the interview, *jaljalat* is the local name for the networks of Islamic terrorist squads which regard themselves as an alternative to Hamas, which they regard as having deviated from the true path of Islam (including abandoning jihad against Israel, especially after it won the Palestinian Legislative Council elections in January 2006). According to the commander, as far as the *jaljalat* networks were concerned, Hamas' taking control of the Gaza Strip signified the beginning of its concentrating on political activity in the Gaza Strip, forcing it to consider political restraints, turning it into a governing body. *Jaljalat* operatives usually consult Islamic activists (especially abroad) for instructions and Islamic religious support for their activities. He also said *jaljalat* operatives have threatened to carry out a large showcase attack as a way of formally swearing allegiance to Osama bin Laden.

Jaljalat used by the global jihad



A graphic representation of *jaljalat* (From an Islam forum affiliated with Al-Qaeda, March 22, 2009).

²¹ *Jaljalat* is an Arabic verb meaning “split the air, echoed loudly, thundered.” It comes from a famous jihad song which became popular among jihadist networks around the world. The song accompanies many Internet videos documenting the activities of global jihad operatives, especially Al-Qaeda (See Appendix III).

²² *Al-Ayyam* is a paper published in Palestinian Authority. For a full translation of the interview see Appendix II).

36. During the lull in the fighting (June-December 2009), and after Operation Cast Lead, *jaljalat* operatives were involved in attacks carried out contrary to Hamas' policy of restraint. In some instances they collaborated with other terrorist networks in the Gaza Strip. The most serious attack in which they participated was on January 27, 2009 (the first post-Operation Cast Lead attack) when an IED exploded near an Israeli army patrol moving along the security fence. One IDF soldier was killed in the attack, an officer was critically wounded and two other soldiers sustained minor injuries. Another serious attack, in which Jund Ansar Allah (also referred to by Gazans as *jaljalat*) was involved, was the attempted showcase attack at the Nahal Oz fuel terminal in the northern Gaza Strip on June 8, whose objective was to attack an IDF patrol and abduct a soldier. The attempt took place when an IDF force near the terminal saw a number of terrorist operatives planting IEDs along the security fence. The force, with helicopter backup from the Israeli Air Force, attacked the terrorists. During the ensuing exchange of fire **five terrorists were apparently killed** and an unidentified number wounded.²³

37. According to the interview in *Al-Ayyam*, and according to additional information in the Palestinian and Arab media, those networks were behind a series of attacks, some of which were prevented, against Western figures visiting the Gaza Strip and against institutions identified with Western culture. One of the *jaljalat* networks was responsible for the attempted attack on former American President Jimmy Carter when he visited the Gaza Strip on June 16, 2009. Quartet emissary former British Prime Minister Tony Blair was also targeted, but his visit to the Gaza Strip, scheduled for July 15, 2009, was cancelled out of fear of an attack. *Jaljalat* operatives also responsible for a number of attacks on Internet cafés in the Gaza Strip on the pretext that they spread corruption and foreign culture. The *jaljalat* network was also apparently responsible for the July 22 bombing of a Dahlan family event in Gaza City, which wounded at least 60 partygoers (*Al-Sharq Al-Awsat*, August 17, 2009). The planned showcase attacks, had they succeeded, would have challenged Hamas and its rule and caused it considerable embarrassment in both the internal Palestinian and international arenas.

²³ For further information see our June 14, 2009 bulletin "Internet and terrorism: a local network in the Gaza Strip affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the global jihad was behind the failed attempt to perpetrate a showcase terrorist attack at the Nahal Oz fuel terminal (June 8)" at http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/gj_e004.pdf.

Hamas' dilemma in dealing with jihadi-Salafist networks

38. Hamas has a **basic dilemma** in dealing with the increasing influence of the jihadi-Salafist networks in the Gaza Strip:

i) On one hand, **Hamas and the jihadi-Salafist networks have a common radical Islamic ideology**, which makes it difficult to strike them. In addition, the Hamas' Islamization of the Gaza Strip creates an atmosphere which contributes to the popularity of the networks and encourages them to be more openly daring vis-à-vis the Hamas regime.

ii) On the other hand, **Hamas is also by nature a Palestinian national political movement** which is responsible for the needs of 1.5 million Gazans, and seeks to control the entire Palestinian Authority. **Thus it is forced to be pragmatic and to maneuver between ideology and the exigencies of rule.** Its pragmatism is expressed in its routing activities and policies: gradually Islamizing the Gaza Strip, its policy of restraint regarding attacks against Israel, its "smile spin" for the West, especially the United States.²⁴

39. Because of the dilemma with the jihadi-Salafist networks, until recently **Hamas showed a relatively large amount of tolerance for them.** That was in contradiction to the brutality it employed against other rivals in the Gaza Strip (i.e., Fatah and the Dugmush and Hilles clans); and despite the fact that the terrorist activities of the jihad networks might cause serious difficulties for the Hamas de-facto administration if they succeed (For example, if they had managed to attack important Western figures such as Jimmy Carter and Tony Blair, or carry out a showcase terrorist attack against Israel during a particularly quiet period, which is in the interests of the Hamas regime).

40. Hamas' relative tolerance of the jihad networks has been manifested primarily by avoiding all-out frontal confrontations with them and preferring dialogue. However, when the networks increased their activity and grew bolder, and gained popularity even among Hamas operatives, Hamas exerted limited pressure on them. Among the pressures exerted against them by Hamas in recent months were the following:

i) **The detention of *jaljalat* operatives** who acted counter to Hamas policy (for example, after the attempted assassination of Jimmy Carter on June 16). One of the operatives, Yasri Salaha, reportedly died in a Hamas prison.

²⁴ For further information see our August 3, 2009 bulletin "Hamas is conducting a "smile spin" for the West, particularly the United States" at http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/hamas_e077.pdf.

ii) **Preventing jihadists from firing rockets at Israel** at a time when Hamas employed a policy of restraint. There were often reports of shootouts between Hamas security forces and jihad operatives, the detention of operatives and the confiscation of weapons.

iii) **Increasing supervision of the mosques affiliated with the jihadi-Salafist networks, and sometimes closing them.** For example, the Hamas security forces closed the Bilal Ibn Ribah mosque in Gaza City on June 13 following attempts by Salafist Islamic elements to encourage worshippers to join their ranks.

41. Hamas's attempts to appease the jihadi-Salafist networks and not enter into frontal confrontations with them encouraged them to become bolder and to openly criticize Hamas, its policies and its administration of the Gaza Strip. The jihadi-Salafist networks have used their affiliated media to accuse Hamas of selling the ideology of jihad (one of the pillars of Islam) in return for control of the Gaza Strip, and of being an infidel movement which has betrayed the Islamic community of nations. The criticism began during the lull arrangement and increased after Operation Cast Lead.

42. The following are examples of statements attacking Hamas made during the months preceding the confrontation at the Ibn Taymiyyah mosque in Rafah:

i) "Muslim community of nations! The [Hamas] internal security forces are breaking into our houses and frightening our women and children. If the Hamas administration is one of resistant and jihad as it claims, it must protect the holy warriors and provide them with the money and weapons it collects in the name of Islam, Muslims, jihad and holy warriors" (The "Electronic Mujahideen Network" forum of the **Army of the Nation**, June 25, 2009).

ii) A statement from the **Jund Ansar Allah** called Operation Cast Lead "the heresy of the traitors of Hamas against the Islamic jihad warriors in Palestine." They accused Hamas of persecuting the jihad fighters and warned that the worse the "Hamas traitors" behaved, they [Jund Ansar Allah] would act more to "purify their house [i.e., the Gaza Strip] with one hand and harm the Zionist enemy with the other" (*Al-Ahed*, July 31, 2009).

43. **Defiance of Hamas peaked with the proclamation at the Ibn Taymiyyah mosque of an Islamic emirate**, which Hamas viewed as a provocation which could not be overlooked. Hamas, prepared to deal with that kind of challenge to its rule over the Gaza Strip, responded brutally, killing many jihadists and civilians, and attacking worshippers at the Ibn Taymiyyah mosque, an extremely important Islamic symbol (while accusing Israel of

attacking mosques during Operation Cast Lead). So far it is not clear if Hamas' response signals a fundamental change in its policy toward the Salafist networks in the Gaza Strip or whether it will return to its familiar routine of turning a blind eye to their existence, while taking pinpoint actions to contain them and prevent them from harming the Hamas regime.

Appendix I

Salafist jihadist groups and networks in the Gaza Strip

1. In our assessment there are currently several dozen jihadi-Salafist networks operating in the Gaza Strip. While some of them believe in military jihad, others focus on preaching and education activities (*da'wah*). They identify with the ideology of Al-Qaeda and global jihad, and seek to turn the Gaza Strip into a staging ground for jihad against Israel and/or Western and Arab targets across the Middle East. Some of them strive to increase the presence of foreign global jihad operatives in the Gaza Strip and to secure the direct assistance of Al-Qaeda. The networks advocate a return to the original Islam of the prophet Muhammad, and some of them are involved in violent activities. The Salafists are noted for their religious fanaticism and intolerance of the West and its values, and of the Christian minority in the Gaza Strip. In our assessment there are several hundred Salafist activists in the Gaza Strip, concentrated mostly in Khan Yunis, Rafah, and Gaza City.

Publications and articles issued by jihadi-Salafist networks in the Gaza Strip, seized in Operation Cast Lead



A CD released by Al-Furqan, Al-Qaeda's media center, featuring a photograph of Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, the global jihad operative killed by US forces in Iraq. The CD contains video clips of terrorist attacks perpetrated by Al-Qaeda against the US forces in Iraq.



The June 2007 issue of the monthly periodical Al-Jannat ("Garden of Eden"), published by jihadi-Salafist networks in the Gaza Strip. It includes articles on global jihad activity and editorials. The title (upper right) reads: "Jannat monthly, with the mujahedeen [jihad warriors] everywhere."

10

صع المجاهدين في كل مكان

ليت الأمة كلها عرجاء مثلك داد الله



جثته: الشهيد الملا داد الله - جسده كذلك - لله حميمه -
 أحد من لواء الإسلام - أسد الأفغان ومرعب الأمريكان -
 تجده في أول الصفوف مقاتلاً جسوراً -
 ومع أنه معزول برجل واحدة يسلق الجبال ويهاجم الكفار
 ويقاتل أعداء الله بكل شجاعة وإقدام... فقال تعالى: ﴿لَقَدْ
 جَاء عَلَىٰ قُرْبَىٰ وَإِنَّا لَآتِيهِمْ بِسُلْطٰنٍ مُّبِينٍ﴾
 أسد إلا أن بعداً يعرجه العجة كعمر و بن الجموح
 إنه السطل الذي نزل . وما زالت صدق كلفته بنوي أن
 حاله كحال الشهيد الذي يمني أن يعود للثبات مرة
 ليستعيد لما يلقى من أجر وثواب الشهيد، ونحن نتمنى أن
 يعود إلى السلطة مرة متى ترضى تسليم ابن لادن
 والإخوان العرب .
 وكف العالم مستدواً هو ينظر إلى جثة مرعب الثاني
 والأمريكان ومعيد سيد طليان فلما رأوه حاروا ، وبأسه
 رجل شعث أعر من بسطه المسلمون له سيق ولحمة
 فتأثر : أهدأ هو من قامت له الدنيا ولم تعد لمقلته ؟
 أهدأ هو من ضحك له الإعلاميون من كل حنوب وصوب ؟
 المتفوقون على التقاط صور له ، أهدأ هو الذي دوخ الفتى
 والذ مناهم ؟ أهدأ هو ذو التمسك الواحدة الذي تب الرعب
 في قلوب أهل الصناعات المتطورة والتكنولوجيا المتطورة
 والأقمار الصناعية الجديدة ؟ أهدأ هو
 نعم الملا داد الله . هو ذلك الرجل شبيه الصحابة وهو من
 المتفوقين الذين ليس عليهم حساب في الجهاد ، فإن نوى
 الإخافة الإيرانية والمكرية الشماليين من الإخافة الصعبة عن
 هؤلاء المعاملة ؟

أين من رضي بالكل نبيلاً عن
 الجهاد والعتو تحمل بطنه وبتبع
 منه من رضي بالعملة لعنوه
 في احتلال بلد وأطمع منيما
 جرمنا من فعل ذلك وهو محسوب
 على دعاة للاستلام .
 قتل الملا داد الله ٤٠ عاماً في سوجهات صعبة بتعليم علمت
 الجنوبي شاركت فيها قوات احتلال بريطانية وأفغانية
 ومن قوات الاحتلال الأمريكية ضد عنصر حركة
 طالبان
 والملا داد الله تاريخ طويل في الجهاد ضد الاحتلال في
 أفغانستان
 وتمتع الشهيد داد الله بشخصية صليبة ترفض الهزيمة ،
 حتى أنه كان القائد الطليق الوحيد الذي رفض
 الاستسلام لقوات الاحتلال الأمريكية في نوفمبر ٢٠٠٦
 ضمناً حاصرت ولاية كندوز . ويعتقد أنه عاد إلى أسرته
 كجاني بولاية هلمند .
 وكان لشهيد داد الله القائد الوحيد في حركة طالبان الذي
 كان يظهر معلقاً عن شصمته في وسائل الإعلام .
 وكان قائد في جواره الأخير مع فصيلة الحزيرة أنه من
 النسخ أن يكون ضد المجاهدين المسلمين لفضح القتل
 ضد قوات الاحتلال حالياً هو سنة الأمت تقريباً ورسمياً
 يصل إلى عشرة آلاف ، وأحد أن لسان استجواب ذات
 الاستهوايين المسلمين لتفضي عمليات استهوانية ضد
 قوات الاحتلال وعائلاتها .

An article from the June 2007 issue of Al-Jannat entitled “May the entire nation be as lame as you are, Dad [his name, not an appellation] Allah,” a reference to one of the Taliban chiefs in Afghanistan, a cripple, killed by US forces in May 2007. The article refers to the mullah as the “lion of the Afghans and the terror of the Americans,” “a hero,” a symbol and a shining example of jihad warfare.

الكتاب كتاب الإسلام

حرب أمريكية بأيدي لبنانية ومباركة فتحاوية فلسطينية

الحرب على فتح الإسلام



جثته: فتح الإسلام الذي نزع من لصوربه إبادة على به
 الجيش اللبناني - الذي كلفه الباش أن له بيات وألمسة
 ثقيلة لم تستخدم يوماً ضد الاحتلال الصهيوني - في مخيم
 نور الفرد للاجئين الفلسطينيين بالقرب من طرابلس كبرى
 مدن شمال لبنان، أطن من إنشائها في ٢٦ تشرين
 الثاني أو فبر ٢٠٠٦ ، أعلنت أنها تعظيم أسلم في جهادي
 بكر بالطا فورت ويسعى لتخسكه شرع أسلم في الأرض
 ومعارفة اليهود في السطنتي بعقيدة إسلامية صافية .
 ولأن من فتح الإسلام ، بالحدود التي صنعها الاستعمار بين
 الدول العربيه لذلك يضم في صفوفها مسلمين فلسطينيين
 وعرب ، وبقز بالقرب الفكري مع تعظيم الأداة المعاهد .
 ويترجم فتح الإسلام شاكرك العيسى ، وهو فلسطيني محكوم
 عدياً بسالإعدام في الأردن بسنوية اغتيال الشيلو ماسبي
 الأمريكي لورينس لولي في عمان ، ويعتقد العيسى من مركز
 صيات للشتمات الاقتصادية في نهر اليسارد بغسر القضاة
 بتعليمه .
 وصل أن سجون في سورية لعامين وسبعة أشهر منذ العام
 ٢٠٠٢ لتخليطه لهزيمة قوات أسير البلبية في سرهعات
 اللوزان السورية المحتلة .
 وكان العيسى ينتمي سابقاً لفتح الإنفاضة قبل أن ينفضل
 عنها بشكل تنظيمه الخاص .
 وكانت له صلة بالأمير المهدد أو مصعب الزرقاوي حيث
 حكمت عليهم محكمة عسكرية أردنية بسالإعدام بسنوية
 اغتيال الطولماسي الأمريكي في العام ٢٠٠٢ .
 وينتمي زعيم فتح الإسلام شاكرك العيسى أن تكون هناك
 علاقة أجماعة فتح الإسلام بالمخابرات السورية ؟
 وقد أثار ظهور فتح الإسلام في نهر الفارد خطا الذي حركة
 فتح العلمانية وبغية التنظيمات الفلسطينية التي وأت أن فتح
 الإسلام ستجذب إليها الشباب والمجاهدين من الفصائل
 الفلسطينية التي أتبعهم كلاماً طيلة عشرات السنين نور
 فعل خلفي ملموس لذلك كان واضحا الدعم الذي قدمته هذه
 الفصائل للحكومة اللبنانية في جوسها على فتح الإسلام ،
 وكان مستهيا على إقتل عشرات المدنيين الفلسطينيين
 بغلاف جيش اللبناني وتعتبر الخوف على رؤوس سائكية
 طارا على هذه الفصائل التي أضاعها جسدتها وكراحتها
 للعلماني الجدي .
 الفلسطينيين في المعجم ستر عان ما فورا فتح الإسلام لنا
 بدون من تعليمهم الشرعية والتز أديم بالقصة اليسوية لذلك
 أجهم الفلسطينيين في السببات ورحوا بهم والمسرور هو .
 وقد برت فتح الإسلام لبنان فلسطينيين على مخدرة اليهود

في الشيطان وأرسل المجاهدين لسيرة إيو الهد في العالم
 فاز سلتها بالمشبهين إلى العراق .
 وكانت الجماعة أعلنت قبل أسابيع عن استهداف أربعة من
 عناصرها بينهم فاديان على أيدي قوات الأمن السورية
 أثناء مسيراتهم السنوية إلى العراق لتعمدوا إيو الهد
 المجاهدين في دولة العراق الإسلامية .
 وتوعد سديان لجماعة فتح الإسلام بنشر على الإنترنت
 بالانقسام ممن أسماهم "ذئاب العواجت وحسروا"
 الطوا أعت في سوريا : ردا على فعل طاهرها الأربعة
 وببهم القادبان المتفان بسلمو : لبيت الشامي (سهر شاكرك
 العيسى زعيم الجماعة) أبو عبد الرحمن الشامي
 وقد بدأ هجوم الجيش اللبناني على فتح الإسلام بعد أيام من
 إيو هد نائب وزير الخارجية الأمريكي بقاء زعيم الحكومة
 اللبنانية ومطله العام بمخارية التنظيمات الإسلامية .

نزح الحجاب .. شرط لدخول معرض
الكتاب بتونس

إسلام أون لاين : حيث على رواد الفورة آت ٤٥
 لمعرض الكتاب الدولي في تونس حالة استياء شديدة
 نتيجة لإجراوات الأمانة المشددة على المحتجبات
 والمتصين ومن أسرها السرايط المعاصر الأمنية
 الموجودة على مناهل المعرض على المحتجبات نزح
 حجابهن لتأكد من هويتهن .
 ويقول مراسل إسلام أون لاين : إن إجراوات نزح
 الحجابات ، الذي ابتدأه من هذا العام في محل هذه
 العالمية الثانية ، سبب في إعدام أكثر من المئتين
 عن نفول للمعرض وهو ما أدى لاختفاء المئتين
 خصوصا أنه جرت المسألة أن يكون معظم رواد
 معرض الكتاب من الجزائر من ليبيا .

An article from the June 2007 issue of Al-Jannat about the Lebanese army's confrontation with Fath al-Islam in Lebanon. It is entitled “American war in Lebanese hands and the blessing of the Palestinian Fatah: the war against Fath al-Islam.” The article sympathizes with Fath al-Islam, a terrorist organization operating in Lebanon and affiliated with the global jihad.

2. Some of the networks are called *jaljalat*, a nickname picked up by the media following the reports of the attempt on the life of on former US president Jimmy Carter during his visit to the Gaza Strip (June 16). The name refers to networks and operatives affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the global jihad, and sharing Salafist jihadist ideology. Some of the networks' members are **operatives who left Hamas** (and sometimes also other terrorist organizations). They consider *jaljalat*, the nickname given to them by Gaza Strip residents, a temporary designation (see below for details). The *jaljalat* are a growing phenomenon, even though Hamas attempts to downplay its extent and significance.

3. Descriptions of some of the more prominent networks follow:

i) **The Army of Allah's Supporters in Palestine (Jund Ansar Allah fi Aknaf Beit al-Maqdis):** The network's name appeared after its unsuccessful attempt to carry out a showcase attack at the Nahal Oz fuel terminal (June 8, 2009).²⁵ The network announced its establishment in the Gaza Strip in November 2008 and identifies itself as ideologically affiliated with global jihad. According to sources in the Gaza Strip, many of its operatives are **former Hamas members**. A member of an online forum said that the network was supported by Hamas and that its members trained at facilities belonging to the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, which provided the network with vehicles and weapons. It was also reported that the terrorists responsible for the attempted terrorist attack in the Nahal Oz region were under the command of "Abdallah al-Suri" (killed during the Hamas attack of the Sheikh Al-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah mosque in Rafah) and that there were about 500 terrorists in the Gaza Strip who belonged to it (muslim.net, June 9, 2009).



Left: The Army of Allah's Supporters claims responsibility for the Nahal Oz terrorist attack. Right: The network's insignia resembles that of global jihad organizations, including elements such as the globe, a Kalashnikov rifle, swords, and verses from the Qur'an.

²⁵ On the morning of June 8, IDF forces thwarted an attempt to perpetrate a combined showcase terrorist attack near the Nahal Oz fuel terminal. An IDF force operating near the Nahal Oz fuel terminal in the northern Gaza Strip noticed several terrorists planting IEDs along the border fence. Assisted by IDF helicopters, the soldiers shot at the terrorists. **Apparently five terrorists were killed** and several others were injured. The Israeli forces sustained no casualties. For further information see our June 14, 2009 Information Bulletin: "Internet and terrorism: a local terrorist network in the Gaza Strip affiliated with Al-Qaeda and global jihad was behind the failed attempt to perpetrate a showcase terrorist attack at the Nahal Oz fuel terminal (June 8). The network's website is serviced by several companies, including one based in the US," at http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/gj_e004.pdf.



Photographs from the scene of the terrorist attack near the Nahal Oz fuel terminal. Left: The carcass of one of the three horses used for the terrorist attack. Right: The remains of a truck used by the terrorist squad (Al-Jazeera TV, June 8).

ii) **The Army of Islam (*Jaish al-Islam*)**: A network established in 2004 by **Mumtaz Dughmush** after the latter left the Popular Resistance Committees (He was also a member of the Palestinian Authority's preventive security and later of Hamas.). Affiliated with the powerful Dughmush clan, there have occasionally been tensions between the network and Hamas. It is affiliated with Al-Qaeda. It abducted the British journalist Alan Johnston (March 2007) and took part in the abduction of Gilad Shalit.²⁶ It is believed to be the largest and best-armed among the jihad networks in the Gaza Strip (MEMRI, August 17).



The insignia of the Army of Islam.



A videotape produced by Army of Islam of the abducted BBC reporter Alan Johnston wearing an explosive belt and presenting the organization's demands for his release (Al-Arabiyya TV, June 25, 2007).

iii) **The Army of the Nation (*Jaish al-Umma*)**: A network officially established in January 2008, it is affiliated with the global jihad. One of its leaders is **Abu Hafs al-Maqdisi**, arrested by Hamas on several occasions.

²⁶ Several organizations claimed responsibility for the abduction of Gilad Shalit (June 25, 2006): Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades (Hamas's military-terrorist wing), the Popular Resistance Committees, and the **Army of Islam**.

iv. **Ansar al-Sunna (Supporters of the Sunna):** A network which frequently claims responsibility for shootings at IDF forces in the Khan Yunis region of the southern Gaza Strip. A *jaljalat* operative said in an interview that the “Supporters of the Sunna” was a general name used by the jihadi-Salafist network operatives in the Gaza Strip to refer to themselves (Qudsnet, July 22).



Photo from a video documenting Army of the Nation in training (featured on the organization’s website since July 2007, one month after the Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip).



The insignia of the Army of the Nation



Army of the Nation operatives

v. **The Battalion of the Swords of Truth (Katibat Sayf al-Haqq al-Islamiyya, or Jama’at Suyuf al-Haqq al-Islamiyya):** A network operating even before the Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip, it claimed responsibility for attacks against targets associated with Western and secular values, such as the attacks on 12 Internet cafés in Gaza City. (It earlier threatened to blow up churches in the Gaza Strip in response to the Prophet Muhammad cartoons affair in Denmark). On June 4, 2007, the network threatened to behead anchorwomen who did not wear veils on Palestinian TV. The network operatives are mostly concentrated in the Beit Hanoun area (northern Gaza Strip). After the clashes at the Sheikh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah mosque in Rafah, Abu Malik al-Shamali, one of the network’s operatives, issued an announcement expressing

complete loyalty to the Islamic emirate of Gaza and his willingness to swear allegiance to the new elected leader (Al-Fallujah, a forum affiliated with Al-Qaeda, August 15).



The insignia of Battalion of the Swords of Truth

vi. **The Liberation Party (Hizb ut-Tahrir, also spelled Hizb al-Tahrir):** A radical Islamic party not involved in terrorism, advocating the ideology of the establishment of a Caliphate based on Islamic religious law. It has networks and supporters in the Arab world and among Muslim communities worldwide, and operates in both Judea and Samaria and in the Gaza Strip. It considers the Hamas rule as having departed from the true path of Islam, even though, owing to tactical considerations, it cooperates with Hamas in Judea and Samaria against the Palestinian Authority. The Liberation Party also attracts disenchanted Hamas operatives.



The insignia of the Liberation Party

4. In addition, there is the occasional announcement of the establishment of other networks, some of them insignificant, some of them existing only on paper, and some of them with local support.

Appendix II

Translation of an Al-Ayyam interview with an operative who identified himself as one of the leaders of the *jaljalat* (Al-Ayyam, July 11, 2009)²⁷

Jaljalat is waiting to carry out a major operation to swear allegiance to Bin Laden

By Hassan Jabr

1. There are military networks operating in the Gaza Strip which embrace the modus operandi of jihadi-Salafists. **They are commonly known as *jaljalat*, the name given to them by the people.** Many blame them for the attempted assassination of former US president Jimmy Carter during his recent visit to the Gaza Strip. Who are the *jaljalat*? What is their worldview? What is their goal? Who are the fighters joining their ranks? How do they operate? How are they connected to other factions and organizations [operating in the Gaza Strip]? Those questions, and dozens of others, came to mind while our car was making its way through the streets of Gaza City toward an interview with one of the *jaljalat* field commanders, whose media appearances are rare indeed.

2. After a ten-minute ride the car, with several middlemen inside, stopped in front of a Gaza City hideout for the meeting. It was an attempt to obtain clear answers about the networks, which shroud themselves in secrecy because of the special circumstances in the Gaza Strip, forcing them to be extremely wary. That became evident once *Al-Ayyam* tried to arrange the interview, a process which took several weeks. That was mainly because the subject of our interview, **Mahmoud Muhammad Taleb** (nicknamed Abu al-Mu'tassem), 23, a *jaljalat* leader, has been wanted by the Hamas security apparatuses for the past several months on various charges, having escaped from prison.

3. Inside the hideout, the dark-bearded man surprised up by smiling. Throughout the interview he radiated serenity, a far cry from the image most people have of the networks, **knowing that they are directly responsible for most of the Internet café bombings in the Gaza Strip.**

²⁷ ITIC translation emphases.

The source of the [networks'] name and their development

4. Why "*jaljalat*?" Taleb smiled at our first question. **"There isn't anything called '*jaljalat*,' he answered. "However, that's the name the people gave us early on, after they saw our publication in memory of the martyr Hamdi Shubeir,²⁸ which begins with the Islamic poem '*Jaljalat*,' calling for jihad and launching a war.²⁹ I would like to emphasize that our official name is not '*jaljalat*' because our leadership has yet to give us a specific name. **They are waiting to carry out a major operation to swear allegiance [i.e., following the operation] to Osama Bin Laden and to the honored ones** [*mashayikh*, i.e., the radical Islamic clerics from whom they draw inspiration] and to declare the networks' name." He further added, "Generally, we have been referring to ourselves as '**Ansar al-Sunna**' (Supporters of the Sunna [Prophet Muhammad's way]). However, we have yet to adopt any other name."**

5. Hassan Jabr: The *jaljalat* are composed of an unknown number of groups operating as a network to ensure maximum secrecy for their jihadist activities. According to Taleb, the *jaljalat* began their operations in the Gaza Strip as soon as the Hamas movement took part in the Legislative Council elections in early 2006, by publishing a ruling which stated that religious Islamic law prohibited participation in them.

The elite begins to act

6. Taleb emphasized that the opposition to Hamas participation in the elections was great, particularly because all those who did participate in them were some of the best fighters, **[and they began to act within] Hamas' military wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades**. Although not all the best fighters joined the protest," he says, "I can say that most of the elite fighters – in view of the nature of their activities – were part of a special structure, separate from the other Qassam operatives. Most of them had fought under the previous Qassam leadership, such as the two shaheeds, Ibrahim al-Maqadma³⁰ and Salah Shehadeh,³¹ killed by Israel during the second intifada. He added, "It was the elite generation that joined the protest movement [against Hamas], and therefore a lot of effort was put into dissuading us. However, we continued on our path, especially since we – even though we were brought up with the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood within the [Hamas] movement – **used to seek the truth and tried to absorb the ideas of the senior**

²⁸ Hamdi Shabir was an Izz al-Din al-Qassam operative who died in a targeted killing in Gaza on May 8, 2008 (see: <http://altakwa.net/forum/showthread.php?p=250724>, www.paldf.net/forum/showthread.php?t=253968).

²⁹ See Appendix III for the poem.

³⁰ Dr. Ibrahim Maqadma was one of the leaders of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Martyrs Brigades. He died in a targeted killing in Gaza on March 8, 2003.

³¹ Salah Shehadeh – the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades chief in the Gaza Strip, died in a targeted killing in Gaza on June 22, 2002.

Islamic clerics, who called for global jihad in Chechnya before they began to talk about moving it to Afghanistan and Iraq.”

7. Taleb stressed that the hard core *jaljalat* did not find **a call for global jihad against the infidels** in the worldview of the Muslim Brotherhood, because their call was limited to fighting and active resistance (*muqawamah*) against the [Israeli] occupation. Consequently, **they consider Hamas a nationalist political movement which seeks to participate in parliaments and legislative councils, rather than an Islamic movement which seeks to enforce Islamic religious law.**

A tough beginning

8. Mahmoud Muhammad Taleb said that “the networks’ first operations ran into difficulties, during which various material and organizational sanctions were imposed on those who protested [against Hamas]. However, they were convinced that they had retired from the Al-Qassam Brigades at their peak, and they did not expect any financial benefits, salaries, or jobs.”

9. “We joined [the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Martyrs] Brigades to fulfill the Islamic duty of jihad,” he said. “We weren’t motivated by political or financial gain.” Taleb denied a rumor popular in the Gaza Strip that the person responsible for the activities of the *jaljalat* was the martyr Nizar Rayyan,³² killed by Israel during the war for the Gaza Strip [Operation Cast Lead]. **“Senior Al-Qassam Brigades operatives did join the *jaljalat*, but I am not going to mention their names. We have political leaders joining us, senior academics, university lecturers, and regional supervisors [for the Hamas de facto administration in the Gaza Strip].”**

Preparations for a major operation

10. The *jaljalat* have no specific date for their founding or the beginning [of their operations]. That is because as embracing the practices of the *salaf al-salih* [the “righteous predecessors” of early Islam, the inspiration for a modern political movement called Salafiyya], which began in the time of the Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, they consider themselves the descendants of that age.

11. The Islamic movement [of which the *jaljalat* are part] burgeoning in the Gaza Strip is not cut off from foreign roots, and **has contacts and corresponds with the leading Islamic personalities [calling for global jihad]**. In addition, when it began, it carefully

³² A senior Hamas operative killed in Operation Cast Lead.

studied Gazan society from the point of view of who would side with it and who would oppose it. In view of the results, **the networks launched military activities and preparations for a major operation, following which an official announcement would be made of the organization's establishment.**³³

[The movement's worldview is] close to Al-Qaeda's ideology

12. The *jaljalat's* ideas **are remarkably close to those of Al-Qaeda abroad.** However, they have not yet joined it, and have not yet sworn allegiance to the Islamic leaders abroad. According to Taleb, "When the brothers [i.e., the jihad warriors who share their worldview] in Algeria and Libya began their jihad operations and embraced the idea of the unity of God (*al-tawhid*) and jihad, the Islamic figures said their doctrines and activities were correct. [Then] the warriors swore allegiance to them and recognized their authority. We now strive to make our position and worldview clear to them, and I believe that they are already aware of it. That is because Sheikh [in this context, referring to an esteemed Islamic personality] Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi,³⁴ whose protégé was Sheikh Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi,³⁵ talked about us. The same is true for Sheikh Osama Bin Laden, who mentioned the jihad warriors of Palestine³⁶ and the need to unite their efforts and resources." Taleb does not deny that the networks corresponded with Abu al-Laith al-Libi³⁷ before he was killed in Afghanistan. Again he said, **"So far, Al-Qaeda has not embraced our activity. We are waiting to carry out a major jihad operation to swear allegiance to Bin Laden.** Indeed, as a course of action and as a doctrine [*aqida*], our ideas and doctrine are compatible with those of Al-Qaeda. Accordingly, if Al-Qaeda asks us to swear allegiance and assist it, we are perfectly ready and willing." According to Taleb, there are about seven thousand *jaljalat* activists and they are deployed in many regions, the most important of which are the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, the "internal" territory [Israeli territory inside the Green Line] and Sinai.

³³ Carrying out a showcase terrorist attack is a theme which recurs throughout the interview.

³⁴ **Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi** is the codename of 'Issam Muhammad Taher al-Barqawi, a Jordanian of Palestinian descent who helped shape radical Islamic ideology. In the 1980s he relocated from Jordan to **Afghanistan** after his activities were circumscribed by the Jordanian authorities, together with **Sheikh 'Umar Mahmoud Abu 'Umar**, better known as Abu Qatada (See below for details). Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi returned to Jordan in 1994 where he was imprisoned for five years with Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, who embraced his worldview and implemented it until his death in 2006. He was imprisoned again in 2005. For further information see our October 2005 bulletin "Abu Musab al-Zarqawi: his biography, world-view and contribution to the ongoing jihad in Iraq by Dr. Yoram Kahati" at http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/zarkawi.pdf.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ In all probability, in one of his tapes.

³⁷ One of the leaders of Al-Qaeda, he operated in Afghanistan, appeared on several videotapes released by the organization and served as its spokesman. On January 29, 2008, he was killed in an air strike by the American forces operating in Afghanistan (see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abu_Laith_al-Libi).

Seven thousand members

13. [Taleb] said, "Our members currently number thousands, about seven thousand,³⁸ most of them Palestinian youngsters who embrace jihad and active resistance [*al-muqawamah*], far away from the life of pleasure or pain. **The increase has escalated our dispute with Hamas, which has swelled our ranks, particularly [at the expense of the Izz al-Din] al-Qassam Brigades.** It is hard for us to accept that our activity in the Brigades went down the drain, while those who join us receive training and instruction.

We tried to assassinate Carter and Blair

14. Taleb noted that the Hamas security forces had arrested some of them in the past. However, only three are left in prison now, there on charges of an attempted attack on the convoy of former US president Jimmy Carter and Britain's former PM Tony Blair, both representing countries which according to the *jaljalat*, combat Muslims. Blair, in particular, as prime minister was one among those responsible for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Taleb said, "We are compelled to fight them, and they shouldn't expect us to greet them with roses." **He attributed the failure of the attempt on Carter's life to Israel's exposure of the network members as they were planting explosive devices on Salah al-Din Road near the Beit Hanoun passage [Erez crossing],** by using balloons and sophisticated surveillance aerial equipment. A report was then relayed to the Red Cross, which in turn reported to Hamas, whose members went to the site and defused the devices. Taleb exposed a previous attempt to carry out an attack on Tony Blair's convoy, however Israel prohibited him from entering the Gaza Strip, thus foiling the operation.

15. It should be noted that the *jaljalat* **has also denied involvement in the "horse attack"**³⁹ which took place in June 2009 near the Nahal Oz fuel terminal, east of Gaza City. However, **responsibility for that attack was claimed by Jund Ansar Allah,**⁴⁰ whose worldview is closely affiliated to that of the *jaljalat* networks, which treat it with great respect, as Taleb says.

Efforts to unite the Salafi jihadist networks

16. Taleb said, "We have contacts with the small Islamic groups and networks. Efforts were made to combine them into one network following the speech given by Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, who called on them to unite."

³⁸ In our assessment this figure is exaggerated.

³⁹ See Appendix I Footnote 26.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

17. Taleb said the networks included **Jaish al-Islam** (Army of Islam), **Jaish al-Ummah** (Army of the Nation), **Kata'ib al-Tawhid wal-Jihad** (Battalions of Adherence to Allah's Unity and Jihad),⁴¹ **Jund Ansar Allah** (Army of the Supporters of Allah), and the *jaljalat* networks.

18. The *jaljalat* have no political affiliation and joining them is no small undertaking. New members must undergo religious training and indoctrination before becoming members of the *jaljalat*, which claim responsibility for most terrorist attacks in Internet cafés in the Gaza Strip.

Yes, we do carry out terrorist attacks in Internet cafés which spread corruption

19. Taleb admitted that the *jaljalat* networks were responsible for terrorist attacks in Internet cafés. "We are not responsible for all the terrorist attacks," he said, because "before an attack is carried out, we explain to the owner that he owns a business which is offensive and spreads corruption."⁴² The message is delivered to him by personal or open letter or a telephone call instructing him to shut down his corruption-spreading business. If he does not close up shop after several warnings, once the relevant religious judicial ruling has been received, an attack is carried out. It is done without causing damage to the neighbors' property or lives. We also make sure not to harm him [i.e., the owner] physically, only the business which spreads corruption."

20. Taleb had the following to say about how the decision to carry out an attack is made: "The attack is carried out after information has been received about the existence of a corruption-spreading business. After that, we send out people who pretend to be regular customers. We make sure that the suspicions are true; we do not do it out of motives of personal hatred." He explained the attempt to pin the blame for the attacks on the *jaljalat* by the fact that they were the first who initiated attacks.

The attack on Abu Ras's residence: it was not an attempted assassination

21. Taleb commented on the reason for the attack **in the residence of Palestinian Legislative Council member Dr. Marwan Abu Ras**,⁴³ a member of the Hamas

⁴¹ The name is reminiscent of the original name used by Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi's organization before he became Al-Qaeda's representative in Iraq: "Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad" (Networks of Adherence to God's Unity and Jihad).

⁴² *Mafsada* in Arabic; a term derived from the Qur'an. Using it is designed to justify the attack on said business.

⁴³ Dr. Marwan Abu Ras is a member of the Legislative Council on behalf of Hamas. An IED exploded near his residence on July 26, 2008, and the *jaljalat* networks claimed responsibility (from Al-Quds newspaper, July 26, 2008).

leadership: "That incident occurred as a result of severe disagreements between us and [the Hamas] internal security apparatus [in Gaza]. While some of our supporters were arrested, Sheikh Abu Ras said that we were serving the Israeli Mossad. We wanted to send him a message to stop making those accusations, and has been done. I would like to emphasize that it wasn't an assassination attempt, as was claimed at the time – Fatah was blamed for it. He added, "We sent that message so that Dr. Abu Ras would stop making accusations – and he did."

22. The spread of the jihadi-Salafist doctrine in Gaza drove the Hamas movement, as Taleb said, to concentrate on the Salafist youth and to channel their worldview towards fighting the occupation, whenever [Hamas] desired and not in a public manner. However, that became known to Abu Abdallah al-Suri,⁴⁴ who heads Jund Ansar Allah, and he rejected it outright in an audio tape in which he clarified his method of operation to the public.

Secret commander

23. The *jaljalat* are headed by a commander⁴⁵ from the Gaza Strip, whose name and identity Taleb refused to expose. He stressed that it was a well-known, key figure whom the public considered a reliable person. According to the common practice of the jihadi-Salafist networks, **the *jaljalat* use the Internet to publicize their activities and ideology.** However, their website was taken down on several occasions, temporarily forcing them to rely on other well-known websites, such as Al-Hasba and Al-Fallujah.⁴⁶ In the meantime, their specific website is under construction and will be launched in the near future.

24. The relationship of the *jaljalat* network to other factions and networks [i.e., other Gazan terrorist organizations] does not appear complex; however, it is not close enough to launch joint jihadist operations. Taleb said, "Contacts are held, but for now **we do not conduct joint jihadi operations.** We sometimes contact one another to resolve conflicts and differences of opinion, nothing more." He added, "We consider the factions [i.e., the other terrorist organizations] as groups which embrace the concept of fighting the occupation.

⁴⁴ The codename of Khaled Banath, the military leader of Jund Ansar Allah. We have no information about him.

⁴⁵ In the original *emir*, a term often used by radical Islamic organizations to refer to their leaders.

⁴⁶ Online forums affiliated with Al-Qaeda.

That is because Sheikh Abu Qatada al-Filastini⁴⁷ issued a *fatwa* relating to that matter, permitting cooperation with them in fighting the infidels and removing corruption."⁴⁸

We did not take part in the battles waged by Hamas and Fatah

25. Taleb denies that the *jaljalat* networks took part in the takeover of the Gaza Strip when disagreements arose between Hamas and Fatah. He said that those were political issues, although he believes it is necessary to fight the regime to remove any signs of religious corruption, and because of political considerations.

26. The *jaljalat* participated in defending the Gaza Strip during the war [i.e., Operation Cast Lead] and there is video documentation of operations in which they took part. That was the result of their belief that fighting the occupation and defending Muslims was both a moral and religious Islamic duty. On the other hand, Taleb said, "We did not see 'Gaza turn into a graveyard for the invaders,' which the factions talked about."

What happened in Gaza was not a victory

27. Taleb added, "**We do not consider what happened in Gaza a victory**, particularly when more than 1500 people died and houses and facilities were destroyed." **"If the Jews wanted to enter Gaza City, they would have.** We found documents written by the occupation army showing that it planned to enter densely-populated areas, such as Sheikh Radwan. However, we don't know why it did not carry out those plans." He continued, "The occupation targeted all of Hamas' careful preparations, including the tunnels and the rocket launchers buried underground." He emphasized that **before the war in Gaza, the *jaljalat* had asked Hamas for assistance with a number of things in the West Bank for a major operation [i.e., large-scale terrorist attack] in Israel. However, Hamas categorically refused, [instead offering some assistance in Gaza, which the *jaljalat* refused** because they came to the conclusion that it would serve Hamas interests.

28. Taleb still hopes that the Hamas movement will return to the path of jihad and abandon politics and legislation, and that it will rule according to the *shari'ah* instead of man-made laws.

⁴⁷ Sheikh (an honorable term referring to an Islamic personality) 'Umar Mahmoud 'Uthman Abu 'Umar (Abu Qatada) is a Jordanian national of Palestinian descent, one of the chief ideologues of Salafi jihad in Britain. He is an Al-Qaeda supporter and a preacher with tremendous influence on global jihad operatives. In recent years he has been either held in prison or under house arrest. For further information see our May 20, 2007 bulletin "The Army of Islam, a radical Islamic Palestinian terrorist network in the Gaza Strip, claimed responsibility for the abduction of British journalist Alan Johnston. In exchange for his release, they demand the release of global jihad operatives, particularly Sheikh Abu Qatada (a Jordanian of Palestinian descent, held prisoner in Britain)" at http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/html/islam_troops_e.htm .

⁴⁸ *Dar' al-mafased*, one of the principles of Islamic religious law (*fiqh*).

A commander wanted [by Hamas]

29. For the last four months, Taleb has been wanted by the Hamas security forces, having escaped from Ansar Prison in Gaza City with the help of friends and associates. He walks the streets of Gaza in anonymity. For that reason he refused to be photographed, fearing exposure. **“I am wanted by Hamas for a terrorist attack, establishing a radical terrorist network, and compromising national security,”** he said. “I was under arrest for one month when I escaped from Ansar-2 Prison⁴⁹ with the assistance of people from Hamas who help us and provide us with information.”

30. Since then, Taleb has refused to surrender **and wears an explosive belt most of the time.** “Whatever happens,” he says, “I will never surrender to them, and we call upon the Muslim youth not to surrender either.” He added: “When some of our men were brought to justice, the younger ones asked for their trial to be held in accordance with the Qur’an rather than man-made laws, but Hamas rejected it. I would like to tell you that [some of the above-mentioned people] were put on probation; their prison sentences will begin once they commit other acts.” Taleb stressed that youngsters are constantly being arrested and released, and weapons and ammunition are confiscated, particularly during rocket-launching attempts.

The implementation of the shari’ah is obligatory

31. Regarding their stance on the current situation in the Gaza Strip, Taleb said that they were striving to improve the state of the nation and to enforce the *shari’ah*, because, being just and egalitarian as it is, it filled every Muslim with a sense of well-being. He added: **“The correct implementation of the *shari’ah* in the Gaza Strip will solve the problems while maintaining jihad, because the closure of the crossings and imposing the siege were carried out after Hamas stopped fighting the Jews.”**

⁴⁹ In the first Lebanon war, the IDF established a detention facility in south Lebanon near the village of Ansar. In our assessment, Ansar-2 is a pejorative term referring to one of Hamas’s own prisons, comparing Hamas to Israel.

Appendix III

Jaljalat, an Islamic song popular with jihadi-Salafist networks worldwide

"Jaljalat" is an Islamic song which became almost the anthem for jihadi-Salafist networks worldwide (including Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Gaza Strip). Its objective is to the spirit of battle in jihad warriors and give them a sense of honor. It is frequently uploaded to Islamic forums and YouTube, and can be found in several versions.⁵⁰ One of the performers of the song is a Saudi Arabian singer known as Abu Ali.



Saudi Arabian singer Abu Ali, one of the performers of *Jaljalat*.

2. Translation of "*Jaljalat*" (ITIC emphasis)

The shouts of the proud
The shouts broke out and **sang the oppressors'**
We come like a great beam of light,
We stride toward lofty deeds
Oh lions, make your roar heard,
Raise your voices, because there is no army
The infidels will be ground down by [our] swords,
Death is their reward, thus
We will never be humbled, for we are
Through jihad the flag of manifest
With our blood we fashion our glory,

split the air of the horizon
songs of death
we are Muslims and our religion is our way of life
and we will bring light and faith to the whole world
because **the hour of jihad is at hand,**
but the army of truth, which can put to flight the wicked
for death is the heart's wish of the honest
they make their way to paradise. Do not fear death
the young lions of the victorious warriors
victory will surely be bestowed⁵¹
for the battlefield is the arena of lions

⁵⁰ See for example:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_9DsosBKzAg, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_mf2BJMoW2k.

⁵¹ Cf. *Qur'an*, Surah 48 (Al-Fatt-h), Verse 1.

We will not fear the enemy, since we have
Our prayer is based on our swords
We will be victorious again
Come, brave young lions,
Quick, quick, fear not

place our faith in Allah, trusting him fully
and became a fortress of glory
only if we struggle
be heroes of glory
Quick, quick, fear not, your determination is like fire in the
tyrants' faces

3. Notes:

i) ***Jaljalat*** is the first word of the song and its title. It is an Arabic verb meaning "to split the air," "to echo loudly."

ii) The Arabic term ***jaljala*** (pl. ***jaljalat*** or ***jalajel***) refers to a voice, sound, ringing, or rolling noise of various levels of intensity (including a lion's roar) and can be used in various contexts. Literally, the term is based on the root (and verb) *jaljal*, which means to make a sound or noise, a shrill cry, a beautiful musical sound. The noun *jaljala* can therefore refer to an echo, rolling laughter, a loud (or thundering) noise which symbolically or effectively heralds a coming war (war trumpets, clashing swords, war drums), various kinds of noise, snorting or choking, as well as a strong and echoing sound heard by a Muslim on his deathbed.

Appendix IV

Translation of an announcement published by the *jaljalat* on July 17, 2009⁵²

The Qur'an states: "And yet another blessing that you love: help from Allah and a victory near at hand; and give good news to the believers" (Surah 61, Al-Saff, Verse 13).

Memorandum of opinion and [good] tidings to the Muslim people of Gaza

Blessed be Allah, who glorified His Slave and soldiers and defeated those who ally against him. Allah's prayer and blessing be on Muhammad, His slave, His messenger, His friend, His chosen, and on His family and close friends. To the matter at hand:

Those who follow the message that will soon be upon us **and the coming great act of jihad [i.e. terrorist attack] which will rock the entire region and the entire world**, will believe and realize that the signs of victory are at hand – what is more, they are plain for all to see, all those who follow them and take interest in them. In comparison, the signs of defeat, misery, and loss of all those atheists who mocked and ridiculed the words of the commander, hero, and jihad warrior **Mahmoud Muhammad Taleb, Abu al-Mu'tassem**,⁵³ may Allah keep and cherish him.

The coming major jihad operation will cause an enormous and significant change in the region. It will prove to all the various jihadist networks in the Gaza Strip that jihad is their path, that the *jaljalat* – **Allah willing – will soon operate with new strength, a new name and a new leadership**, which will be characterized by justice, the hallmark of Islamic religious law. That will further increase the support from the general public and those who already support it. We will thus achieve our aspirations and happily, joyously give the Islamic nation of communities and our Muslim brothers worldwide the news for which the *mujahedeen* have been waiting for so long. That news will bring joy to the Muslims and infuriate the league of infidelity and betrayal. [That will be] **the news of jaljalat, under their new name, joining the organization of Qaedat al-Jihad** [Al-Qaeda's official name since 2001] and the swearing allegiance both by the leadership and by the ordinary fighters to [Al-Qaeda] **and to the good sheikh and jihad warrior Abu Abdallah Osama Bin Laden, may Allah keep him.**

We are serious, and determined to announce the signs of the coming victory. Our resolve and determination are strong. Our **heroic jihad warriors** – who are now, praise Allah, the most powerful force – **have already left the Gaza Strip and are making their way to**

⁵² The Arabic text of the announcement: <http://www.palmil.net/vb/showthread.php?t=19234>, <http://www.palvoice.com/forums/showthread.php?t=214713>. (ITIC emphasis.)

⁵³ **Mahmoud Muhammad Taleb (Abu al-Mu'tassem)** is the same senior operative who was interviewed by *Al-Ayyam* (See Appendix II). The announcement was probably published by the *jaljalat* in response to the interest in and responses to the interview.

a meeting with their commanders and the senior clerics who instruct them abroad. Then they will be joined by their brothers **who will carry out the suicide attacks** [in the original: *istishhadiyyun*, those who sacrifice their lives for Allah as part of a holy war against the enemies of Islam] **and our jihad warriors, trained and willing** [to carry out their missions]. They are superior to other fighters in experience, faith, patience, confidence in Allah's victory, and deeply-rooted belief in the defeat of the infidels and reestablishment of the Islamic state. That is in addition to the increasing popular support of them, **compared to popular anger and disgust with the Hamas movement, which constantly increase and which have reached their peak in light of that movement's interest in political objectives which go against Islamic religious law and true Islam.**

Oh Muslims, we call our Muslim brothers (Underlined in the original)

We call all those who belong to the ranks of the traitors and infidels in the Gaza Strip – be they [warriors] in tongue, pen or sword [common descriptions of the various kinds of jihad] – and still claim to be Muslim, to look at themselves carefully and to compare their deeds to what is written in the book of Allah, may He be exalted, and with the way [*sunna*] of His Messenger, Allah's prayer and peaceful blessing be upon Him, that is: **is Allah's word superior in the Hamas movement, or is it the word of the traitors and the infidels?** We pray for our jihad warriors abroad [and wish them] success in the realization of the [happy] news.

Allahu Akbar, Allahu Akbar, glory to Allah, to His Messenger, and to the jihad warriors

Jaljalat networks – Information Department

Friday, Rajab 24, 1430 / July 17, 2009