Iranian Support of Hamas

Ismail Haniya, prime minister of the Hamas administration in the Gaza Strip, and Iranian Leader Khamenei (Iranian TV, December 10, 2006).

Ismail Haniya and Iranian president Ahmadinejad (Islamic Republic News Agency, December 10, 2006).
Overview

1. Israel’s **disengagement** from the Gaza Strip in August 2005 created a new situation which accelerated the establishment of the area controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip. It enabled it to translate its increased power on the ground into gains in internal Palestinian politics was well. It won a landslide victory in the January 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council elections, formed a government in March 2006, and took over the Gaza Strip by force in June 2007, neutralizing Fatah and the Palestinian Authority.

2. Following its takeover of the Gaza Strip, Hamas established a **radical Islamist entity** which is still being formed. The Hamas entity, with Iranian and Syrian support, conducts its own internal and foreign policies, wages a continual terrorist campaign against Israel, and is seriously at odds with Egypt and pro-Western Arab countries. In addition, it is isolated in the international arena and increasingly separated from the Palestinian Authority in Judea and Samaria, led by Mahmoud Abbas and Fatah.

3. After Israel’s disengagement, and more intensely in the year preceding Operation Cast Lead, **Hamas accelerated its military buildup**. One of its objectives was to make it possible to continue its strategy of terrorism (“resistance”) against Israel by using, at this stage, rockets as its main weapons (inspired by the achievements of **Hezbollah** strategy Israel during the second Lebanon war). Another was to give Hamas and the other terrorist organizations operating in the Gaza Strip defensive capabilities which would enable their military forces to survive, deter Israel from taking action in the Gaza Strip, and make it difficult to take it over or conquer parts of it.¹

4. Because of its internal and external difficulties, which increased after its military takeover of the Gaza Strip, Hamas had even greater need of **external strategic support** to ensure its political survival and advance its military buildup. Its natural choice was the **Iranian-Syrian axis**. Since the beginning of the second Palestinian terrorist campaign (the second intifada) in October 2000, Iran and Syria had provided extensive support for Hamas and Palestinian terrorism in general.² In addition, although Hamas is Sunni Muslim and Iran is Shi’ite, they shared a broad common denominator: the perception that terrorism (“resistance”) was the main Palestinian strategic tool, both objected to the Israeli-Palestinian

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² For the support Iran and Syria gave the Palestinian terrorist organizations during the second intifada, see our April 2003 Bulletin entitled “Iran as a State Sponsoring and Operating Terror / April 2003,” at [http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia//ENGLISH/IRAN/PDF/APR_03.PDF](http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia//ENGLISH/IRAN/PDF/APR_03.PDF).
Authority negotiations (the Annapolis process) and both had long-standing, deeply rooted hostility toward the United States and the West.³

5. **Iran**, for its part, has a **clear strategic interest** for helping Hamas reinforce its control of the Gaza Strip, despite the fact that Hamas, as opposed to Hezbollah, is not willing to fully subordinate itself to Iranian dictates. For Iran, a radical Islamic entity in the Gaza Strip is an important strategic asset against Israel’s southern border, in conjunction with the threat posed by Hezbollah along Israel’s northern border. In both cases, Iran regards using rockets as an effective way of **exhausting** Israel’s home front, both routinely and during a future regional crisis. Therefore, it has established large rocket arsenals for Hezbollah and Hamas, at the same time has developed their military capabilities, although at different quality levels (for Iran, Hezbollah is clearly preferable to Hamas).

6. Moreover, Iran regards **Hezbollah** (which has gained considerable political influence in Lebanon) and **Hamas** (which took over the Gaza Strip and gained influence in the Palestinian Authority) as **two important sources of power** which it can use to promote its strategic goals, at the center of which is **its striving toward regional hegemony**. Using Hezbollah, Hamas and other Palestinian terrorist organizations, the Iranian-Syrian axis can increase its influence in the Arab and Muslim world, pose a serious challenge to Mahmoud Abbas, harm the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority and export the Iranian brand of radical Islam to other Sunni countries, especially Egypt (which regards Hamas control over the Gaza Strip as an Iranian threat to Egypt and the entire region). From the Iranian point of view, **its sponsorship of Hamas is considered as a means of establishing an Iranian foothold in the heart of the Sunni world.**

7. The **meeting of interests** between Hamas, Iran and Syria led, over the past two years, to **massive Iranian support** for Hamas (and Syria, where the “external” Hamas leadership has settled). Iranian Leader Ali Khamenei is personally involved in directing the strategic support provided to Hamas by Iran. In practice, support is provided by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Quds Force, headed by **Qassem Suleimani**,⁴ and by Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security, headed by intelligence minister **Mouhsen Hussein Azahi**.

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³ The collaboration between Sunni Hamas, the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Shi’ite Iranian regime, is not obvious. Radical jihadist Sunni groups, such as Al-Qaeda and the global jihad do not collaborate with Iran and even sometimes oppose it. However, for Hamas, the strategic considerations of its confrontation with Israel are stronger than religious differences with Iran. When Musheir al-Masri, Hamas representative in the Palestinian Legislative Council, was asked if Hamas would accept aid from Iran, he said that it would, despite their ideological differences. He said that Iranian aid was “a thousand times preferable than relying on the Americans and Zionists...” (Al-Zaman, Iraq, July 7, 2007).
⁴ For further information about the activities of the Quds force in Lebanon and other countries, see our April 2, 2007 Bulletin entitled “Using the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guards as the main tool to export the revolution beyond the borders of Iran” at [http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/iran_e0307.pdf](http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/iran_e0307.pdf).
8. Iran aid to Hamas during the two years which preceded Operation Cast Lead were the
following: **weapons**, including hundreds of 122mm Grad rockets, with ranges of 20-40 km,
and advanced anti-tank missiles; **technological knowhow** which made it possible for
Hamas to manufacture lethal Hezbollah-inspired IEDs (*Shawaz* projectiles); **advanced
training in Iran** for hundreds of operatives from all the terrorist organizations; **several
hundred million dollars a year** for Hamas’s political and military wings; **political and
propaganda support**; as well as efforts to prevent the lull arrangement, to encourage
terrorist attacks, and to oppose Israeli-Palestinian negotiations (the Annapolis process).

9. In retrospect, it can be seen that without the massive support provided by Iran, it would
have been extremely difficult for Hamas to engage in its military buildup, which peaked
during the past year. It is reasonable to assume that without such support Hamas would not
have been so aggressive in its rocket fire against Israel and its defiant political stance vis-à-
vis Egypt and the Palestinian Authority, which led to open schisms with both (*Egypt* is fully
aware that Iran’s strategic considerations are behind its sponsorship of the Hamas entity in
the Gaza Strip). The policy of firing increasing numbers of rockets to sabotage the Egyptian-
brokered lull arrangement was what led, finally, to its unilateral abandonment of the lull
arrangement and Operation Cast Lead.

10. Iran has explicitly stated that the war in the Gaza Strip is one aspect of a wider campaign
for the future of the Middle East being waged between the “resistance” camp and the forces
of “arrogance” (the United States, the “Zionist regime,” the West and waning liberal
democracy.) During Operation Cast Lead the Iranian regime, both directly and through
Hezbollah, encouraged Hamas to **keep fighting**, and on December 28 the Iranian Leader
even said that every Palestinian killed in battle would be a shaheed. At the same time, the
Iranian regime waged a hate campaign against Israel and Egypt, sent humanitarian aid to the
Palestinians, but was also very careful not to be drawn into direct involvement in the turmoil

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Left: Brigadier General Qassem Suleimani, Qods Force commander since 1998, in
uniform. Right: In a rare interview, Qassem Suleimani talks about a comrade
killed during the Iran-Iraq war (Iranian Channel 1 TV, March 18, 2007).
in Gaza. After the battles are over, regardless of whatever arrangement is achieved, the **common Hamas-Iranian-Syrian interests will lead to a joint effort to rehabilitate and restore Hamas’s military-terrorist infrastructure and capabilities** (as Iran and Syria rehabilitated and expanded Hezbollah’s terrorist infrastructure after the second Lebanon war).

11. Regarding the Egyptian initiative for a ceasefire, Hamas spokesmen made it clear that Hamas would not agree to stop the smuggling. Moreover, **Abu Usama Abd al-Mu’ti**, Hamas representative in Iran, appealed to “Islamic countries” (i.e., Iran) to send military equipment to the Gaza Strip to help Hamas. He said that since the United States had established an airlift for Israel, “observant Muslims” had to **send weapons to the fighters in Gaza** (Press conference held at the Islamic Propaganda Organization in Tehran,” Islamic Republic News Agency, January 13, 2009).

12. As opposed to Lebanon, however, Iran will face greater difficulties in supporting Hamas in the Gaza Strip once the dust settles. That is because Iran has no direct access to the Gazan border (as opposed to good access to Lebanon though its wide-open border with Syria), and an arrangement may be reached at the end of the fighting that will lead to closer supervision along the Egypt-Gaza border. As in the past, both Iran and Hamas are expected to be creative to overcome the difficulties and to ensure a renewed flow of weapons to the Gaza Strip, especially long-range rockets, which will renew the rocket threat and Hamas and Iran’s ability to threaten the million people living in Israel’s south. They also aspire to include new zones in the range of fire, up to at least 60 km, i.e., Tel Aviv.

13. The following is a short summary of the main components of the support and aid Iran provided to Hamas during the past three years, which enabled Hamas to establish its military-terrorist infrastructure in the Gaza Strip and accelerate the processes which led to the collapse of the lull arrangement and Operation Cast Lead. The Appendix presents a selection of Arab responses to Iran’s support for Hamas and conclusions drawn by the Arab regimes in the Middle East.
14. Hamas’s military buildup in the Gaza Strip is directed by Hamas headquarters in Damascus, headed by Khaled Mashal. It is based on Iranian and Syria military support, which supply it with weapons smuggled into the Gaza Strip in various ways. In addition, Iran provides Hamas with the technological knowhow necessary for manufacturing weapons and training Hamas terrorist operatives in place.

15. Iranian support is critical for Hamas in its efforts to accelerate its military buildup, including with advanced standard weapons, which are of superior quality to the ones it manufactures. Of particular importance are rockets and mortar shells, lethal IEDs used to attack Israeli infantry and armored forces and advanced anti-tank missiles. They all proved themselves in Hezbollah’s fighting Israel in the second Lebanon war, and Hamas is now using them to fight Israel in Operation Cast Lead.

16. For Hamas and the other terrorist organizations, rockets and mortar shells are an asymmetrical response to Israel’s superior military capabilities. This response, although it is subject to certain problems and deficiencies, is simple, accessible and cheap. It makes it possible to disrupt the normal life of the Israelis who live within range, and in some instances to undermine Israel’s social fabric, and allows Hamas to circumvent the security fence Israel constructed along the border and to create a kind of balance of terror, making it hard for Israeli forces to carry out counterterrorism activities. The strategy was inspired by Hezbollah in Lebanon and is in line with Iranian and Syrian strategy, which uses proxies to exert terrorist pressure on Israel without leaving traces of their involvement.

17. The standard rockets and mortars supplied by Iran and smuggled to Hamas and the other terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip improve their military capabilities. Iran has also transmitted the technological knowhow that enables Hamas to increase the range of the rockets it manufactures. In addition, standard rockets enable Hamas to increase its attack range and cause more accurate and greater destruction than its homemade rockets. The rockets supplied by Iran are standard 122mm rockets with ranges of between 20 and 40 km. During 2008, that made it possible for Hamas to put close to a million Israeli people
living in the cities of Beersheba, Ashdod and Ashqelon in range of Hamas rockets, cities with vital strategic facilities.\(^5\) The 122mm rockets with a 40-km range Iran supplied to Hamas are apparently identical to those it supplied to Hezbollah and were fired during the second Lebanon war. Hamas now aspires to include other Israeli cities in its rocket range, including Tel Aviv, as proclaimed during one of its TV broadcasts:

18. The first standard Grad rocket was used to attack Israel on March 28, 2006, election day for the 17th Knesset (Israeli Parliament). Before 2008 Hamas sporadically fired standard Grads, apparently because it did not possess enough of them. The fundamental change in the amount of Grad rocket fire occurred in 2008, after Hamas successfully smuggled large quantities of standard rockets into the Gaza Strip (many of them during the period of the lull arrangement). They were smuggled in over land (for example, during the breaching of the Rafah crossing in January 2008) and through the tunnels under the Egypt-Gaza border, hundreds of which were dug before Operation Cast Lead.

19. The fundamental change in Hamas rocket capability was first noticed during the round of escalation at the end of February 2008, when Hamas fired at least 18 long-range rockets at the city of Ashqelon. They were **modular 122mm rockets** with a range of up to 20 km. The difference between modular rockets and the Grad rockets previously used by Hamas is that the motor is composed of **four 50cm sections**. In the Middle East, there are some countries which manufacture such rockets, including Iran and Syria. In our assessment, Iran initiated the technological adaption to make it easier to dismantle the rockets for smuggling into the Gaza Strip for Hamas and the other terrorist organizations.

20. During Operation Cast Lead Hamas and the other terrorist organizations responded to IDF activity by firing massive barrages of rockets into Israel, with an unprecedented use of long range rockets. During the days of the operation, hits were identified beyond the population centers which had been under threat of rocket fire, among them the cities of Beersheba, Ashdod, Gedera, Yavneh, Kiryat Gat, Kiryat Malachi and Netivot, putting almost a million people at risk. Such long-range rockets enable Hamas to fire from deeper within the Gaza Strip, from centers of densely populated areas, especially after the IDF took control of the “routine” launching sites in the northern Gaza Strip.

21. On December 28, 2009, during Operation Cast Lead, for the first time artillery fire was identified near the towns of Gan Yavneh and Bnei Darom. The rockets had been launched
from the northern Gaza Strip and reached a distance of 33-34 km. An examination of the rocket remains indicated that they were standard 122mm rockets which had been manufactured in China and supplied to Hamas by Iran. They can reach a maximum range of 40 km, and later the same type of rocket fell in the cities of Beersheba and Ashdod.

**Remains of 122mm 40-km range rockets which landed in the Israeli villages of Gan Yavneh and Bnei Darom**

22. As of January 14, during Operation Cast Lead 94 standard Chinese Grad rockets with a range of 40 km were fired. In addition, 71 modular 122mm rockets with a range of 20 km were also fired, for a total of approximately 165 standard rockets, supplied to Hamas by Iran and smuggled into the Gaza Strip (about one third of all the rockets fired until then). In addition, four homemade 175mm rockets were fired and 48 90mm and 115mm rockets, manufactured in the Gaza Strip with Iranian technological knowhow. It can therefore be stated that the rockets supplied to Hamas by Iran or manufactured with Iranian technology were both quantitatively and qualitatively important to Hamas attack capabilities during Operation Cast Lead.
23. Hamas also improved its mortar shell capabilities. Iran helped Hamas stock up on standard 120mm mortar shells, which were smuggled into the Gaza Strip. They are more accurate and more lethal than Hamas's improvised mortar shells. They were first used at the beginning of 2008 in the following events:

i) On February 24, 2008, Hamas fired a standard 120mm mortar shell. An examination of its remains indicated that it had been manufactured in Iran, and was a copy of an Israeli military-industry mortar supplied to the Shah of Iran in the 1970s. The shell had an auxiliary motor which increased its range from six to ten kilometers.

ii) On February 29, 2008, a mortar shell fell near an IDF post in the southern Gaza Strip. An examination of the remains indicated that it was a standard 120mm explosive mortar shell manufactured in Iran in 2006.
24. Since then, attacks have continued against the villages along the Gaza Strip. During Operation Cast Lead (as of January 10) dozens of Iranian-delivered 120mm mortar shells have been fired into Israel.

The areas marked in red indicate the range of rockets Hamas seeks to get from Iran, capable of reaching Tel Aviv.
25. One important aspect of Iran’s support for Palestinian terrorism is the supplying of technological knowhow to Hamas and the other terrorist organizations. It helps them in two main fields:

   i) **Manufacturing powerful IEDs**: The terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip possess explosively formed penetrators (EFPs) which can penetrate more than 200mm (8") of steel. They were manufactured by Hamas operatives using technological knowhow supplied to them by Iran.

   ii) **Upgrading homemade rockets**: Upgraded rockets include improvised 115m rockets which in November 2007 had a range of 12.4 km and struck the city of Ashqelon, 175mm which in February 2008 reached a range of 18.5 km.

### Supplying Technological Knowhow for the Manufacture and Detonation of IEDs

26. In the use of IEDs, Hamas follows the model of Hezbollah, which used massive quantities of lethal IEDs against Israel in Lebanon, manufactured with Iranian technology (also supplied to terrorist networks fighting the United States and the coalition forces in Iraq).

27. Conspicuous in that respect are the **EFPs called Shawaz** (“flame” in Arabic). In a number of instances they were used against the IDF in the Gaza Strip, and are more effective than the other IEDs used by the Palestinian terrorist organizations. That is because they are manufactured with more powerful explosives, based on Iranian and/or Hezbollah technological knowhow.

28. **Firing systems**: During the past few months the IDF seized a number of advanced firing systems for IEDs. They were essentially different from most of the firing systems used by Hamas. Since **identical firing systems have been used by terrorist networks in Iraq**, it is reasonable to assume that the technological knowhow for making them, and even the firing systems themselves, were supplied to both Iraq and Hamas in the Gaza Strip from the same source, apparently Iran.

29. On March 9, 2008, the British Sunday Times printed an interview conducted in the Gaza Strip by their correspondent Marie Colvin with a senior operative in the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas’s military-terrorist wing. He was joined by an operative from Hamas's weapons production branch. Both terrorists mentioned the technological knowhow Hamas
received from Iran, which Hamas considered extremely important in view of Hezbollah’s success in fighting against Israel in 2006 [the second Lebanon war]. The operative said they had used Iranian technological knowhow to develop IEDs and rockets from simple raw materials available in the Gaza Strip. The senior operative said that using Iranian technology, Hamas had developed the Shawaz 4, which was a new generation IED. The weapons production operative said that “Anything they [the Iranians] think will be useful [for us], our guys there e-mail it to us right away.” (For another aspect of the interview, see below Section 40).

Hamas’s homemade Shawaz (“flame” in Arabic) EFPs. They have higher penetrating capabilities than the IEDs usually used by the Palestinian terrorist organizations (estimated at more than 200mm of steel).

Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades Shawaz EFPs found by IDF forces during searches in the Gaza Strip during Operation Cast Lead (IDF Spokesman, January 11, 2009).
30. The second Lebanon war accelerated Hamas’s equipping itself with advanced anti-tank weapons. Between 2007 and 2008 dozens of anti-tank missiles were smuggled into the Gaza Strip, including **Ra’ad** (Iranian copies of Sagger missiles) and **Konkurs (AF-5)** missiles. In addition, anti-tank weapons with tandem (two-stage hollow) warheads, which upgraded capability of the anti-tank weapons already in Hamas hands, were also smuggled in. It is reasonable to assume that the source of the missiles was **Iran**, which had already provided them to Hezbollah, which used them against the IDF during the second Lebanon war.

31. **Copy of Russian-made Sagger missile (Ra’ad missile)**

Technical specifications:

i) Warhead diameter: 125 mm  
ii) Missile length: 86.4 cm  
iii) Armor piercing capability: 400 mm of armored steel  
iv) Minimum range: 500 m  
v) Maximum range: 3,000 m

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6 At the seized materials display of the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center is one of the Sagger missiles seized on board the Karine-A ship. The Iranians scratched off the Iranian army emblem which was inscribed on the launching system.
32. **Russian-made Konkurs missile**

![Konkurs missile in container, ready for firing](image)

Technical specifications:

i) Armor piercing capability: 600 mm of steel; 800 mm after reactive plating\(^7\)

ii) Maximum day range: 4,000 m

iii) Maximum night range: 2,500 m

\(^7\) **Reactive plating**—a technology developed after 1967. It is an armor which reacts to an impact in such a way as to reduce damage to the vehicle fitted with the plating. Usually, reactive plating contains units of propellant explosives installed on the outside of the vehicle and explode on impact, making anti-tank weapons less effective.
33. Iran smuggled weapons to Hamas and the other terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip by sea, air and overland, through the Persian Gulf, Syria, the North African countries and the Horn of Africa. From Sinai they were smuggled into the Gaza Strip through the tunnels dug under the Egypt-Gaza border or overland when the border crossing was breached at the beginning of 2008. The tunnel industry flourished as soon as the lull arrangement went into effect in June 2008, and the Egyptian preventive actions were ineffective. The Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (Iran’s main secret wing operating beyond its borders) was involved in smuggling the weapons, as was the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security. In certain instances, both of them use Hezbollah to smuggle weapons into the Gaza Strip.

34. The Iranians tried to send arms by sea in at least one instance in the past, as exemplified by the Karine A affair in December 2001. The ship was boarded by the Israeli Navy in the Red Sea, and it was found to be carrying a cargo of about 50 tons of weapons from Iran destined for the terrorist organizations in the Palestinian Authority. The shipment included long-range rockets, mortar shells, mines, anti-tank weapons and various types of ammunition, all camouflaged in the ship’s hold as innocent merchandise. An interrogation of the Palestinians involved in the affair showed that the shipment had been arranged with the full cooperation of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards.

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8 For further information see our April 2, 2007 Bulletin entitled “Using the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guards as the main tool to export the revolution beyond the borders of Iran” at http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/iran_e0307.pdf.

9 The ship was purchased in Lebanon at the end of August 2001. It sailed from Lebanon to Sudan and anchored outside Port Sudan for 12 days while its name was changed to Karin A. From Sudan it sailed to the Yemenite port of Hodeidah, a journey of four days. In December 2001 it sailed to Iran where it took on many different types of weapons brought from Iranian army warehouses. The weapons were supposed to upgrade the military capabilities of the terrorist organizations. They were loaded into 83 containers which could be dropped into the water and were invisible on the surface, an Iranian innovation. The ship left for the Suez Canal to unload its cargo, which was consigned to the naval headquarters of the Palestinian Authority, on the shores of El-Arish and Gaza. On January 1, 2002, it was identified by the Israeli Navy which boarded and took control before it could enter the Suez Canal. The ship was brought to the port of Eilat with crew and cargo intact.
35. A potential conduit for smuggling is the massive humanitarian aid currently delivered to the Gaza Strip, including Iranian aid, and is expected to continue after Operation Cast Lead. During December 2003 and January 2004 the Iranian Revolutionary Guards established airlifted equipment and weapons to Hezbollah using Syrian airspace. They were camouflaged as humanitarian aid for the victims of the earthquake in the southern Iranian city of Bam, a cynical abuse of the open skies at a time when many planes from all over the world landed in Iran carrying genuine humanitarian aid.
Training

Overview

36. Iran customarily trains hundreds of Hamas terrorist operatives in its training camps (as it has trained Hezbollah operatives as well). There are courses for infantry, guerilla warfare, sabotage and anti-tank operations. The instructors belong to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, and some of the courses take place in Revolutionary Guards bases in Tehran. Their objective is to upgrade Hamas’s operational capabilities. The operatives return to the Gaza Strip where they in turn instruct new Hamas recruits.

37. While in Iran, the Hamas terrorists learn how to use a variety of weapons: launching rockets of various ranges and anti-tank missiles, placing mines, firing light arms, preparing and placing IEDs, manufacturing various types of explosives, and more. At the same time, they are indoctrinated with Iran’s radical Islamic ideological.

38. The training courses last between one and six months. Those who excel remain in Iran for more advanced training, while the other return to the Gaza Strip, some of them as instructors. On the eve of Operation Cast Lead there were hundreds of combat instructors specializing in various fields who had been trained in Iran. In addition, the Iranians train hundreds of terrorist operatives in the Gaza Strip via email.

39. Funding the trips of terrorist operatives to Iran, including the logistics and bureaucracy involved in the journey, is taken care of by Iran. The operatives leave through Egypt, from there they go to Syria and from Syria to Iran. Their passports are not stamped either when they enter or leave Iran to conceal the fact that they have been there. Those who train in Iran are sworn to secrecy and say nothing about what they have learned or about their contacts with Iranian intelligence personnel. They return to the Gaza Strip through the Rafah crossing.10

Examples of Hamas and Fatah operatives training Iran, 2007-2008

40. On March 9, 2008, the British Sunday Times published an interview conducted in the Gaza Strip by its correspondent Marie Colvin, with two Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades terrorist operatives. The senior operative described in detail how Hamas operatives were trained in

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10 For example, Tawfiq al-Tirawi, former head of the Palestinian Authority’s general intelligence service, said that among those delayed on the Egyptian side of the Rafah crossing were more than 70 Hamas operatives who were on their way home after training in Iran (Al-Quds, July 14, 2007).
Iran and Syria. He said that hundreds of Hamas operatives have been trained in Iran by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards since Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip in 2005.\textsuperscript{11}

41. On April 15, 2008, the IDF and the Israel Security Agency detained Alaa’ Jihad Awad Abu Mudeif, a resident of Qarara (near Khan Yunis), who was involved in rocket fire attacks against the western Negev and was to have been dispatched on a suicide bombing attack (which did not materialize). \textbf{He received advanced military training in Iran}. During his interrogation he said that in May 2007, a short time after he had been recruited into the Abu Rish network of Fatah in the Gaza Strip, and was part of a group of operatives who were sent to Iran for training. The group left the Gaza Strip through the Rafah crossing into Egypt, and from Cairo they flew to Damascus, and from there to Iran. Once in Iran they were transported to isolated military camps in a mountainous location where they received extensive military training.

42. He said the exercises lasted for about a month and included:

i) Physical fitness and navigation.

ii) Using various weapons, such as light arms, machine guns, hand grenades and anti-tank weapons.

iii) Assembling and detonating IEDs.

iv) Indoctrination, most of which was anti-Israeli and anti-American propaganda.

v) Spy craft skills (evading followers, etc).\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{11} For further information see our March 17, 2008 Bulletin entitled “Senior Hamas operative figure tells London Sunday Times’ Gaza Strip correspondent about Iranian and Syria military aid” at \url{http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/hamas_160308e.pdf}.

\textsuperscript{12} For further information see our May 20, 2008 Bulletin entitled “The Israeli security forces detained a Fatah terrorist operative from the Gaza Strip who underwent advanced military training in Iran” at \url{http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/ct_190508e.pdf}. 
Financial Support

43. **Iran transfers several hundred million dollars a year to Hamas.** The funds are earmarked for the Hamas administration in the Gaza Strip, to finance Hamas movement activities and to fund its military-terrorist wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades in the Gaza Strip. Iran is not only Hamas’s main source of funding but also for other terrorist organizations, among them Hezbollah and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

44. Between December 7 and 11, 2006, Hamas administration prime minister **Ismail Haniya** visited Iran, meeting with Leader Khamenei and president Ahmadinejad, and others. During his visit he situated himself firmly on the Iranian-Syrian axis, while the Iranians promised to support him, presented him with **$250 million** and expressed their willingness to sponsor a number of development projects.

45. On December 11, 2006, the Hamas website reported that the Iranians had given Ismail Haniya $250, $100 million of which would be paid in 2007 to cover the salaries of employees in Hamas social, labor and cultural ministries for a period of six months. **$250 million** would be used for allotments for prisoners in Israeli jails and their families for the next six months. In addition, Iranian support was promised to 3,000 Palestinian fisherman and 100,000 unemployed Gazans. According to Iranian newspapers, elements within the Basij (a voluntary semi-military unit belonging to the Revolutionary Guards) donated to Ismail Haniya **$550,000** of money contributed (December 2006).

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13 Regarding those ministries as a way of increasing Hamas influence within Palestinian society.
14 For further information see our December 12, 2006 Bulletin entitled “Hamas prime minister Ismail Haniya firmly positioned himself in the Iranian-Syrian axis during visits to Damascus and Teheran” at [http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/ismail_haniya_e.pdf](http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/ismail_haniya_e.pdf).
46. When Ismail Haniya returned to the Gaza Strip, Israeli Defense Minister Amir Peretz demanded the Rafah crossing be closed to prevent the entrance of Haniya, who was carrying tens of millions of dollars he wanted to smuggle into the Gaza Strip. An exchange of fire developed in the Rafah crossing area between forces of Mahmoud Abbas’s presidential guard and Hamas operatives who tried to break though the crossing by force. Following the events the European monitors announced they were closing the crossing. The Egyptian authorities are reported to have confiscated the funds carried by Ismail Haniya. However, large sums from Iran have continued flowing into the Gaza Strip through the tunnels under the Egypt-Gaza border and in various other ways.

47. On May 24, 2008, Khaled Mashal, head of Hamas’s political bureau in Damascus, headed a delegation of bureau members to Iran. The reason was the lull arrangement initiative and indirect contacts for an Israeli-Syrian peace initiative. In Iran he spoke with high-ranking Iranians, among them Leader Khamenei, president Ahmadinejad, Rafsanjani (Chairman the Expediency Discernment Council), Saeed Jalili (head of Iran’s National Security Council), foreign minister Mottaki, Revolutionary Guards commander Ja’afari, Qassem Suleimani (commander of the Quds Force) and senior members of Iran’s military industry. He also participated in a conference whose theme was “the end of Israel,” held at Tehran University’s technical college.

Khaled Mashal meets with Saeed Jalili, head of Iran's National Security Council (Al-Alam TV, May 24, 2008).

48. The senior Iranians with whom he met expressed their support for Hamas and the terrorist strategy (“resistance”) it represented. Ahmadinejad said the Palestinian and Lebanese victories (i.e., the victories of Hamas and Hezbollah) were the result of “resistance and persistence,” and that they would continue in the future (Mehr News Agency, May 26, 2008). Rafsanjani said that the “resistance” (i.e., terrorism) was the main way for the Palestinians to achieve their rights (ISNA News Agency, May 26, 2008).

49. Practically speaking, the London-based Arabic language newspaper Al-Sharq Al-Awsat reported that the Iranians agreed to increase their aid to Hamas during the second half of
2008 to $150 million, and promised to send Hamas the weapons it needed. According to the news item, the aid would be conditional on Hamas’s not negotiating with Israel either directly or indirectly. It also reported that the Revolutionary Guards’ commander promised Mashal a supply of modern rockets manufactured in Tehran’s Baqri center (a weapons facility) especially for Hamas (Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, May 25, 2008).
Encouraging Hamas’s Strategy of Terrorism (“Resistance”)

50. The Iranian leadership is in close contact with Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (which receives special treatment) and other Palestinian terrorist organizations. The contacts usually take place in Damascus. Iran encourages the Palestinian terrorist organizations to continue the “resistance” (i.e., terrorist attacks) and to oppose the peace process undertaken by the Palestinian Authority headed by Mahmoud Abbas.

51. The Iranians and the Syrians used Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Fatah groups, with support from Hezbollah, to encourage suicide bombing terrorism within the Palestinian Authority when it was the main threat against Israel. At that time, directing terrorism included coordination and briefing (using the telephone, Internet, and by inviting operatives to Damascus), and organizing mega-casualty attacks (such as blowing up the Azrieli Towers, Tel Aviv’s two tallest buildings). Along with instructions to escalate and increase suicide bombing attacks, instructions were also sent to temporarily restrain terrorism when it served the interests of Syria and Iran (for example, after the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States).

52. Terrorist attacks carried out in the past by the Palestinian terrorist organizations and directed by Iran took a toll of dozens of Israeli deaths and injuries. The most conspicuous attack directed by Iran was carried out on January 5, 2003, at the old Central Bus station in Tel Aviv, in which two Fatah operatives killed 23 Israeli civilians and wounded 106. The Fatah network behind the attack was located in Nablus and directed by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in Lebanon. Other suicide bombing attacks were carried out in population centers in Israel during the period of suicide bombing terrorism, including one in the Ashdod port on March 14, 2004, by two terrorists from Beit Lahiya in the northern Gaza Strip. The attack killed 10 and wounded 12.

53. Iran has adapted the aid it sends to Hamas to the new stage of Palestinian terrorism, in which rockets have become the weapon of choice and replaced suicide bombers (a stage which was accelerated after the Israeli disengagement from the Gaza Strip). Iran’s main “contribution” was supplying Hamas in the Gaza Strip with advanced weapons, especially long-range standard rockets. Iran’s military aid made it possible for Hamas to create a rocket arsenal, bolster its military infrastructure, become more self-confident and significantly broaden and intensify its rocket attacks against Israel, eventually leading to Operation Cast Lead.
Harsh Criticism for Iran from Egypt and the Arab World

Overview

1. The military aid given by Iran to the Hamas radical Islamic entity in the Gaza Strip, which in the final analysis led to Operation Cast Lead, set alarm bells ringing in the Arab world, especially in Egypt and Saudi Arabia (both of which are well aware of the internal threat an Iranian-supported Hamas “Islamic emirate” poses to their regimes.). Below are examples of the harsh Arab criticism directed at Iran in an editorial by a Saudi Arabian columnist published in Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, and other examples from Arab media during Operation Cast Lead.

Editorial published in Al-Sharq Al-Awsat on January 6, 2008

2. From the beginning of Operation Cast Lead, there was harsh criticism of Hamas in all the pro-Western media in the Arab countries, including criticism of its acting as an Iranian proxy. The criticism appeared mainly in Al-Sharq Al-Awsat and Al-Hayat, both of which are London-based. Both are widely-read and shape the opinions of the Arab elite and as well as that of the general public. Hamas and Iran have also been harshly criticized in the Egypt establishment press.

3. Prominent Saudi columnist Turki al-Hamid expressed harsh criticism of Iran in Al-Sharq Al-Awsat on January 6, 2008, as follows:

i) The truth, he wrote, is that I greatly admire the subterfuge of Iran’s political leadership in everything that has to do with directing the policies which serve its long-term goals. Their Machiavellianism is so professional it motivates me to suppose that president Ahmadinejad and the mullahs sleep with The Prince under their pillows, reading a chapter every night before they turn out the lights, and get up the next morning to put it into practice.

ii) The recent events in the Gaza Strip, and the events in Lebanon in 2006, were less the result of the national resistance of Hezbollah and Hamas, and more the ways to distract Israel, the only regional power that could compete with Iran, so that Iran could be free to advance its nuclear program and other plans for achieving regional hegemony.

iii) What happened in Lebanon in 2006, and what is happening today in the Gaza Strip, are indirect Iranian activities designed to light a fire under the region from time to time to give it more time to achieve its long-term goals. Under the aegis of anarchy and causing conflicts, Iran quietly operates to put its larger strategy in place. It doesn’t care how many thousands of people die, since human life has no value in the culture
which dominates our region, and it only serves as fuel to power specific interests. The Israeli attacks on the Gaza Strip and Lebanon seem more like the fruit of an Iranian plan than an isolated Israeli initiative.

iv) The number of Hamas rockets, or rather, the number of Hamas fireworks, kill the occasional Israeli or wound him, and that is enough to send Israel into a furor, since it sees each individual as having worth, and the abducted soldier [Gilad] Shalit and the two soldiers abducted by Hezbollah in 2006 are only examples of that [outlook]. The few fireworks, which killed more Gazans than Israelis, made Israel attack and made everyone forget Iran’s nuclear program, and that is exactly what Iran wants. In 2006, Hezbollah’s abduction of the two Israeli soldiers led to a war that destroyed everything in Lebanon, but nothing was important if it meant promoting the Iranian plan.

v) The Iranian plan, in both Lebanon and Gaza, is based on certain scenarios. If Israel does not wake up and respond to the abduction of its soldiers or the explosion of fireworks, then it is weak, or it will seem weak in the eyes of the Arab-Muslim street, which wants nothing more than to see Israel as weak and ephemeral. That will provide moral support for the spread of Iran’s revolutionary ideology, by both spreading political Shia and by turning Iran into a model of resistance to imperialism.

vi) According to the other scenario, Israel will wake up and respond, and will deal a blow, and that is exactly what Iran wants, since it will bring more popularity to Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran, the bearers of the standard of resistance and those who seek to wipe Israel off the map. Here, they say, is Israel, with which I am trying to make peace, and it doesn’t want peace, it kills women and children in Gaza as it did in Lebanon, and there is no solution except wiping it off the map.

vii) Wiping it off the map? Let us assume that can be done, despite the fact that international circumstances and insufficient resources make it impossible, if so, where is Iran in relation to what is going on in Gaza today? Where is Syria, Israel’s neighbor, with its firm stance? Where is Hezbollah with its rockets which can reach Tel Aviv and Haifa and Eilat? On the other hand, Israel’s blow to the Gaza Strip also means Syria will fully return to the Iranian bosom, stop the talks with Israel, which were succeeding, meaning that Iran will have lost an important ally in carrying out its regional plan. Thus the point here is absolute Iranian hegemony, which says let the children of Gaza die, their deaths will atone for Iran.

viii) Let Gaza be wiped off the map, what matters is that Hamas survives, and that its leadership remains safely ensconced in Damascus and other havens. The confused Palestinian doesn’t know where the next blow is coming from, from someone close by whom he chose to decide his fate, or from the friend he trusts, or
from the enemy from whom he expects no mercy. Haniya’s miserable outburst was nothing more than proof that the **Iranian plan is behind the events in the Gaza Strip**; he said that Israel’s aggression would not achieve its goals even if the Gaza Strip were completely destroyed and not one Palestinian were left standing, because Hamas would never retreat. From what won’t it retreat? From exploding fireworks or from humiliating the Palestinian people in Gaza for the sake of the plans of the Iranians?

ix) Since the dawn of history, every real resistance movement has had an agenda and has struggled to achieve its demands, whatever they were. What is Hamas’s agenda? The liberation of Palestine from the river [Jordan] to the [Mediterranean] sea? An independent Palestinian entity? Fireworks won’t get them anywhere, nor will a military confrontation when the balance of power is unequal. **Hamas’s only agenda is survival**, even if it is at the expense of the people of Gaza, and that is what was evident in the speech made by ‘brother’ Ismail Haniya and **carrying out of the Iranian ‘mission.’**

x) Then we hear from Hassan Nasrallah, who tries to incite the Egyptian army against the regime for the sake of saving the Gaza Strip and the Gazans. But really, what does Nasrallah want? For the world to spin in the other direction for the sake of Ahmadinejad, the Iranian mullahs and the Hamas leaders? **Nasrallah and Iran want a war between Egypt and Israel,** or at least tension between them, and that will lead to the spread of conflicts and confrontations in the Middle East, and firmly establish the anarchy so desired by Iran to keep the world from paying attention to it and enabling it to carry out its plans in tranquility.

xi) **Hezbollah and Hamas are nothing more than puppets whose strings are pulled by Iran whenever and however it chooses,** and let the Palestinians go to hell. Actually, they already are in hell.
### Examples of Other Press Comments about Iran from the Arab World (December 2008 - January 2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quote</th>
<th>Writer</th>
<th>Source</th>
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<tr>
<td>“Iran is a genuine threat to Arab security, today it is planning to attack Egypt and tomorrow Saudi Arabia.”</td>
<td>Turki al-Hamid</td>
<td>Al-Sharq Al-Awsat</td>
<td>December 30</td>
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<td>“Although Iran demands the Arabs and Muslims stop [the supply of] oil to the West to help Gaza, some of them don’t understand that Iran is storing quantities in rented tankers in the open sea...hoping the prices will go up.”</td>
<td>Turki al-Hamid</td>
<td>Al-Sharq Al-Awsat</td>
<td>January 10</td>
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<td>“The truth is that Hamas does not want to bear the responsibility for the catastrophe, and found that an attack on Egypt is the best possible defense.”</td>
<td>Abd al-Rahman al-Rashed</td>
<td>Al-Sharq Al-Awsat</td>
<td>December 29</td>
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<td>“The Iranians want the Arabs to fight so that they can bargain for influence in Lebanon, Iraq and the [Persian] Gulf.”</td>
<td>Abd al-Rahman al-Rashed</td>
<td>Al-Sharq Al-Awsat</td>
<td>January 3</td>
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<td>“Iran wants to use Hamas to make Egypt fold on the issue of the Gaza Strip and open the border without restrictions and conditions for its faction in Gaza.”</td>
<td>Mashari al-Zaidi</td>
<td>Al-Sharq Al-Awsat</td>
<td>December 30</td>
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<td>“The security and continuing stability of the Arab world will be threatened if it continues...to adapt itself to Arab forces which suit their positions and policies to Iranian interests.”</td>
<td>Ghassan al-Imam</td>
<td>Al-Sharq Al-Awsat</td>
<td>December 30</td>
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<td>“Iran plays its cards in an Arab world bound by international commitments to try to elude all its future international commitments.”</td>
<td>Samir Atallah</td>
<td>Al-Sharq Al-Awsat</td>
<td>January 3</td>
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<td>“For the Egypt government, Hamas in the Gaza Strip is an Iranian cat’s paw, as it understands that the Iranian objective to strengthen its position in negotiating with the United States at the expense of Egypt and Palestinian national interests. It does so by dividing the influence in the Middle East between Washington and Tehran at the expense of every Arab interest.”</td>
<td>Jihad al-Khazan</td>
<td>Al-Hayat</td>
<td>January 1</td>
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<td>“Why does Nasrallah specifically attack Egypt? The answer is clear: Egypt is the largest Arab country, it leads the moderate camp and plays a central role in preventing Iranian”</td>
<td>Hassan Heidar</td>
<td>Al-Hayat</td>
<td>January 2</td>
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“Instability in Egypt can be dangerous for Israel, especially if Iran benefits from Israeli extremism and succeeds in using the Gazan problem to topple the Egypt government.”

Raghida Dargham Al-Hayat January 2

“The Arab streets oppose Egypt to satisfy Iran and its money and fawn on Syria, which behind closed doors is responsible for the situation in Lebanon.”

Muhammad Ali Ibrahim Al-Gumhuriya January 6

“Iran and Hezbollah and their Arab agents, especially the Palestinians in Syria and the Islamic groups in the Gulf, particularly Qatar...pushed Hamas in the Gaza Strip to war with promises of support, but in fact they are all sitting on their hands. Not only that, but some of them even organized demonstrations not against the aggressor, Israel, but against Egypt.”

Usama Saraya Al-Ahram January 5

“...that at a time when it seems that the Syrian army’s growing military capabilities along with Hezbollah’s arsenal and the Iranian missiles should be enough to deter Israel and prevent it from continuing its aggression against Gaza. That while making do with demonstrations and condemnations and the claim that the problem is limited because Egypt has closed the Rafah crossing, it is simply a game. The results of such a game are known and whose objective is to free them from all blame in the eyes of the Palestinians and Arabs and to create the impression that only Egypt is to be blamed for the situation.”

Samih Abdallah Al-Ahram January 7

“Without a doubt the responsibility for this war of destruction waged against the Palestinian people lies entirely with Hamas, and after that also with Iran and Syria, which pushed Hamas into the Israeli trap in such a way as to then be able to sit back and make accusations.”

Galal Dwaydar Al-Akhbar January 7

“Why do elements in Iran, Hezbollah, Syria and Qatar blame Egypt for negligence and having sold out the Palestinian cause? Why aren’t all of them holding their guns or missiles and pointing them at Israel? Why did they organize demonstrations against Egypt and its embassies but...”

Rifat Rashad Al-Masri Al-Yawm January 6
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<th>Source</th>
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<td>Mahmoud al-Ajami, Radio Sawt al-Arabi</td>
<td>“This behavior [of Hamas] was not only expressed by raising obstacles in the path of the national Palestinian dialogue because of Iranian and Syrian considerations, but it is also expressed with demonstrations and empty slogans demanding the siege of Gaza be lifted.”</td>
<td>December 27</td>
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<td>Abu al-Ghait, Egyptian foreign minister</td>
<td>“Ali Khamenei, the Islamic revolution’s spiritual leader, spoke in Tehran and said senior Arab figures were responsible, as if the of hundreds of thousands of Iranians has been spilled over the past 30 years [for the sake of the Palestinian cause]. Iran has motives which push Arab factors into working for the good of Iran.”</td>
<td>December 31</td>
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<td>Abu al-Ghait, Egyptian foreign minister</td>
<td>“We are sorry to see demonstrations against Egypt taking place in the streets of Arab countries. We know what their objectives are, and what is behind those objectives.”</td>
<td>January 1</td>
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<td>Muhammad Bassiouni, chairman of the Foreign Relations National Security Committee at the Shura Council</td>
<td>“There is a struggle between two blocks, and that is the reason for all the problems. One calls for calm, peace and stability in Egyptian leadership, and the other which calls for escalation and involving Egypt for the same of haggling over its own private interests. That block is interested in tension throughout the region - Iran, Syria and Qatar, and with them three militias: Hezbollah, connected to Iran, and Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, connected to the Revolutionary Guards.”</td>
<td>January 5</td>
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<td>“Senior Egyptian source”</td>
<td>“The remarks made by Hezbollah secretary general, Hassan Nasrallah, express ignorance of the facts and create a difficult problem for Iran’s number one representative in Lebanon. The Hezbollah secretary general openly announces [the organization]’s hatred for Egypt in a vulgar way, clearly showing that it is being dragged after the revolutionary Islamic country that is trying to use him [as a tool] to influence his country [Lebanon].”</td>
<td>January 8</td>
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