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The road to the second Lebanon war: the Lebanese scene in the years 2000-2006

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Events and developments that influenced Lebanon

1.The six years preceding the second Lebanon war saw great turmoil on the Lebanese scene and in the history of Syrian and Israeli involvement in Lebanon. The developments in that period of time were influenced by **three dramatic events that occurred both inside and outside of Lebanon in the year 2000:**

a. **The IDF's withdrawal from the security zone (May).** Israel had been dragged into the Lebanese civil war and was involved in the goings-on in Lebanon since the war had first started (1975). The IDF's withdrawal from the security zone marked the end of Israel's direct,

[1] Based on a lecture by Reuven Erlich, PhD, given on September 6, 2007 during the "Lebanon 2000-2006" study day, being part of a seminar titled "The Second Lebanon War – 2006". The seminar was held in Ramat Efal by Yad Tabenkin, the Israeli Society for Military History at the Tel-Aviv University, and the Yisrael Galili Institute for the Study of the Defense Forces.

[3] For details, see: "Hezbollah's use of Lebanese civilians as human shields: the extensive military infrastructure positioned and hidden in populated areas. From within the Lebanese towns and villages deliberate rocket attacks were directed against civilian targets in Israel" (November 2006).

intensive involvement in Lebanon. The security zone collapsed, the IDF positioned itself south of the "blue line", thus discrediting the international (and, to a great extent, the internal Lebanese) legitimacy of Hezbollah's continuing armed struggle against Israel.

b. **The death of Syria's president Hafez Assad (June).** The Syrian president, who had reigned for thirty years, died of a disease and passed down the presidency to his inexperienced son, Bashar Assad. The government change in Damascus influenced not only Syria but also the "Syrian order" in Lebanon, which formed in Lebanon in the course of the last twenty-five years of the previous century.

c. **The outbreak of the Palestinian campaign of terrorism, referred to by the Palestinians as the "second intifada" (October).** As a result, Israel focused its attention on the struggle against the escalating Palestinian terrorism, making efforts not to be dragged once again into what was perceived as the "Lebanese swamp". Israel embraced a policy of containment vis-à-vis Hezbollah's terrorism, and avoided retaliatory actions that could have resulted in escalation on the Lebanese scene.

2. Those events were joined by dramatic developments on the international and regional scene, mainly the **September 11 attacks and the US takeover of Iraq.** Iran rushed to fill the void in the regional balance of power, caused by the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime, and joined forces with Syria to achieve regional hegemony. These developments also influenced the Lebanese scene.

3.It is against this background that we can examine **Hezbollah's buildup** in the years preceding the second Lebanon war. Hezbollah was perceived by the Iranian regime and by Syria as an important means of entrenching their influence in Lebanon (**and all the more so** following the withdrawal of the Syrian forces) and as an important instrument for promoting their interests in the struggle against Israel. As a result, **the two countries accelerated**

Hezbollah's military buildup while encouraging it to join the Lebanese government and further its integration into the Lebanese political system.

The formation of the opposing camps in Lebanon

4. **After the Syrian forces were pulled out of Lebanon in March 2005, two opposing camps formed on the Lebanese interior scene:**

   a. **The supporters of the "new order", or the March 14 Forces** (the date of a massive anti-Syrian rally in Beirut). A pro-Western, anti-Syrian, and anti-Iranian coalition, it is based on **Sunni Muslims** led by **Saad Hariri** (the son of Rafik Hariri, the assassinated prime minister) and **Fouad Siniora,** the Prime Minister of Lebanon. They were joined by part of the Christian camp **(Amin Gemayel, Samir Ja'ja')** and a significant portion of the Druze community **(led by Walid Jumblatt).**

   b. **The supporters of Syria and Iran,** led by **Hezbollah. This camp** also includes the **Amal** movement led by **Nabih Berry, and some of the Christian camp** led by **Michel Aoun,** who returned from his exile in France. Michel Aoun, who enjoys considerable support among the Christians, preferred to join the pro-Syrian camp (against which he fought in the past) out of his own self-serving interests (such as his desire to become president).

5. The Lebanese government, dominated by the March 14 Forces, enjoys a slight majority in the Lebanese parliament and is subjected to heavy political pressure by Hezbollah and the supporters of Syria and Iran. The internal Lebanese political struggles intensified following the second Lebanon war and sometimes even turned violent. However, the two opposing camps take great care not to be dragged into a civil war, such as the war that took place in the 1970s and 1980s of the previous century.

6. In the year that passed since the second Lebanon war, Fouad Siniora's government has showed impressive determination and ability to withstand the pressure exerted by the opposition. The government has succeeded in

preserving its rule in spite of the resignation of Hezbollah ministers from the government and a series of protests and rallies organized by Hezbollah and the supporters of Syria and Iran. It can also boast some considerable achievements: the unprecedented deployment of the Lebanese army in south Lebanon and the strengthening of the Lebanese army in south Lebanon; the ratification of the international tribunal for the murder of Rafik Hariri; the deployment of the Lebanese army, for the first time, in the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp and the submission of Fatah al-Islam, the Al-Qaeda branch in Lebanon. However, **the government took care not to confront Hezbollah and did little to address the core issues of Security Council Resolution 1701:** preventing Hezbollah's military restoration; the demilitarization of south Lebanon and enforcing an effective embargo on arms smuggling from Syria and Iran.

7. An important test for both opposing camps is going to be the **process of the presidential elections,** beginning in late September 2007. The identity of the new president who will succeed pro-Syrian Emile Lahoud, and the manner in which he will be elected, will have a tremendous influence on the internal Lebanese scene in the coming years.

The formation and collapse of the Syrian order in Lebanon

8. The last quarter of the previous century saw massive Syrian involvement in Lebanon and the formation of the Syrian order, which characterized the internal Lebanese scene from 1989 (the Taif Accord) and 2005 (the pullout of the Syrian forces from Lebanon). The Syrians' path to enforce the Syrian order was **long, arduous, and fraught with difficulties:**

a. In the summer of 1976, the year when the Lebanese civil war reached its peak, the Syrian army invaded Lebanon, after indirect dialog with Israel brokered by the US. As part of the dialog, the two parties reached an understanding on the "red line", north of which the Syrian army enjoyed freedom of action. In 1976, the Syrian army took over the majority of Lebanese territory, except for south Lebanon (which

remained under the control of Palestinian terrorist organizations) and the Christian enclave of Mount Lebanon (controlled by the Christian Lebanese Forces, led by Bashir Gemayel).

b. The Syrian army which invaded Lebanon subdued the Palestinian terrorist organizations and their allies from the Muslim-leftist camp, which would not accept the dictates imposed by Damascus. Later on it received inter-Arab legitimacy, turned into the "Arab Deterrence Forces", and acted against the Christian camp, led by Bashir Gemayel. The differences of opinion between Syria and the Christian camp escalated into a violent conflict. Israel was dragged into the struggles waged by Syria against the Christian militias (1978-1982) first by providing indirect military assistance to the Christian camp and then by direct involvement on the Lebanese scene.

c. **On June 6, 1982,** the IDF invaded Lebanon (the first Lebanon War) and destroyed the political-military infrastructure of the Palestinian terrorist organizations in south Lebanon and west Beirut. Syria, weak both politically and militarily, facilitated the establishment of Hezbollah by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and assisted the organization in its terrorist activities and guerilla warfare against the Multinational Force (US, France) and the IDF. In January 1985, the IDF was forced to pull out of Lebanon without a political agreement after an intensive series of terrorist attacks by Hezbollah and the Shi'ite Amal movement, perpetrated with the encouragement of Syria and Iran.

9. The Syrians took advantage of the political vacuum formed after the IDF's withdrawal in order to entrench their control of Lebanon. In 1989-1991, the Syrian army overpowered the anti-Syrian Christian camp (led by Michel Aoun), occupied the Christian enclave on Mount Lebanon, disbanded the Christian militias, eliminated or exiled their leaders, and established a pro-Syrian Lebanese regime led by a pro-Syrian president. **Since then, Lebanon virtually became a Syrian protectorate,** which was reflected in the Taif Accord, which formally ended the civil war and the continuing crisis in Lebanon.

10. In the years **1989-2005,** during the "Taif Regime", the Syrians no longer needed to wage a sustained struggle to entrench their domination over Lebanon, and they managed to use their control of Lebanon **to their great benefit in the spheres of politics, defense, and economy.** The Syrian control of Lebanon was based not only on the presence of the army and security forces, but also on the **deep penetration of pro-Syrian Lebanese into the fabric of Lebanese politics, society, and economy.** The independence of Lebanon, given lip service in the Taif Accord, has actually become null and void. Lebanon became a Syrian province of sorts, closely monitored by the man in charge of the security and intelligence apparatus, **General Ghazi Kanaan (who took his own life)** and his successor Lieutenant Colonel **Rustum Ghazali, suspected of involvement in the murder of Rafik Hariri.**

11. **The last decade of the previous century saw the stabilization** of an internal Lebanese system based on checks and balances between the large sects, set against the background of concerns over the renewed outbreak of another civil war, a possibility no one desires. Following the Taif Accord, **the Christian and Druze militias were disbanded and the pro-Syrian Lebanese regime grew stronger; the Lebanese economy was rebuilt;** the ruined capital city of **Beirut** was rebuilt by Rafik Hariri (who became a symbol of Lebanon's post-war recovery); **the Lebanese army and the Lebanese intelligence apparatuses were rebuilt and grew stronger** (under the close supervision of the Syrian intelligence apparatuses). An exception was the **Hezbollah** organization, which the Syrians did not disband under the pretext of the continuing "resistance" against Israel because of the continued existence of the security zone.

12. **The traditional opposition to the Syrian takeover of Lebanon, mainly among the Maronite Christians, was smashed to pieces following the anti-Syrian uprising of Michel Aoun.** In the age of the Taif regime, the heads of the Christian camp did not dare to go against the Syrian policy. On the eve of the death of Hafez Assad, Lebanon did not have an

organized opposition capable of taking action against the Syrian order. The former leaders of the Christian camp **were either dead** (Bashir Gemayel, Dany Chamoun)**, or in exile** (Michel Aoun, who attempted to mobilize his many supporters from his exile in France), or **sentenced to long prison terms** (Samir Ja'ja'), or allowed to return from exile to Lebanon, taking it upon themselves to maintain a low profile (Amin Gemayel). **That state of affairs changed dramatically in the years preceding the second Lebanon war due to events and developments analyzed above.**

13. **A highly significant event was the death of Hafez Assad and the rise of his son, Bashar, in June 2000, shortly after the IDF's withdrawal from Lebanon.** The government change in Syria had far-reaching effects on the Lebanese scene. Hafez Assad had established **a reign of terror** in Syria and Lebanon, **including by the use of brutal force against his opponents.** Such brutal force was occasionally reflected in the physical elimination of Syria's opponents in Lebanon (mostly through the Syrian intelligence services and various Lebanese proxies). The rise of his son, Bashar, lacking in experience and charisma, **gradually dissipated the fear entertained by the Lebanese of the Damascene ruler and his Lebanese henchmen.** It appears that the fear of the Syrian regime has dissipated not only among the opponents of the Syrian order in Lebanon but also among Hezbollah and Syria's other supporters in Lebanon, which gained more independence and freedom of movement vis-à-vis Bashar Assad's regime.

14. **The new strategic situation formed in the Middle East after the September 11 attacks, the US takeover of Iraq** and the downfall of Saddam Hussein, put Syria **on the "axis of evil"** and increased the outside pressure exerted on it to relinquish its hold on Lebanon through an unusual **French-American joint diplomatic** effort, reflected in Security Council Resolution **1559,** dated September 2, 2004. The resolution expresses unequivocal support of Lebanon's sovereignty and independence, calls for the withdrawal of all non-Lebanese forces (i.e., the Syrian army) and calls to

disband the Lebanese militias (i.e., Hezbollah) and non-Lebanese militias (i.e., the Palestinian terrorist organizations in the refugee camps).

15. The processes that had formerly weakened the Syrian order **came into dramatic fruition with the murder of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, who refused to go along with the Syrian order.** After the murder, they were reflected in popular protests **of unprecedented scale** that broke out in Beirut ("Intifada of Independence"), **accompanied by anti-Syrian shows of solidarity between the various sects—Christians, Sunni Muslims, and Druze.** Hundreds of thousands of protesters took to the streets of Beirut, while Lebanese citizens appeared on Lebanese and international media and dared, for the first time, to demand the withdrawal of the Syrian army, the expulsion of the Syrian intelligence apparatuses, and the replacement of Syria's henchmen in the Lebanese government. **Inexperienced President Bashar Assad gave in to the pressure and quickly ordered the Syrian forces to pull out from Lebanon.**

16. Conspicuously absent in the anti-Syrian demonstrations were members of the Shi'ite community. The largest of Lebanon's sects, it also suffers from political, economic, and social discrimination. Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, which grew out of the Shi'ite community, stepped forward as leader of the pro-Syrian camp and initiated a power display in a mass rally (attended by hundreds of thousands of people) in Beirut, on March 8, 2005. That rally (as well as the "counter rally" by Syria's opponents on March 14, also attended by hundreds of thousands), clearly demonstrate that the internal Lebanese schism runs very deep, and that the internal Lebanese scene in the era following the withdrawal of the Syrian forces is potentially highly explosive.

Hezbollah gains prominence among the Shi'ite community

17.A Lebanese Shi'ite organization, Hezbollah was founded by the **Iranian Revolutionary Guards** with the assistance of Syria, in the summer of 1982, at the height of the first Lebanon War. Hezbollah professes a Shi'ite radical Islamic ideology inspired by Khomeinist Iran. Throughout its entire existence, it has enjoyed massive assistance from Iran and Syria, which consider it to be a **strategic asset** and an important tool of promoting their national goals in the struggle against Israel, in Lebanon, and in the entire Middle East.

18. In addition to serving as a strategic tool for Iran and Syria, Hezbollah is also an **inseparable part of the internal Lebanese political and social system** inside which it operates. Hezbollah therefore has **two identities: the Shi'ite Lebanese identity and the Iranian jihadist radical Islamic identity,** existing side by side in perpetual tension:

a. **The Lebanese identity:** being a Lebanese organization of ethnic character, Hezbollah enjoys considerable support from the Shi'ite community, the largest and most underprivileged among all Lebanese sects. To a great extent, the organization represents the Shi'ites' struggle for power on the internal Lebanese scene at the expense of the traditional alliance between the Christians and the Sunni Muslims. Hezbollah attempts to portray itself as an organization acting to promote Lebanon's national interests within the context of the struggle against Israel, in which framework it often presents itself as "Lebanon's defender" against Israel.

b. **The jihadist identity:** at the same time, Hezbollah is also an organization of radical Islamic character directed and supported by the Iranian Islamic regime, which has embraced a radical ideology rooted in Iran. That identity, coupled with its great dependence on Iran and Syria, impose on the organization a **jihadist ideology striving for the elimination of Israel,** similarly to the Iranian regime**.** Like Iran, Hezbollah's ideology is unmistakably **anti-Western** (and mostly anti-

American), in stark contrast to Lebanon's long-standing history and tradition of relying on Western countries.

The Iranian leadership as the source of Hezbollah's religious and political authority

Posters with photographs of Iranian leader Khamenei and Ayatollah Khomeini, found in the course of the second Lebanon war on Hezbollah bases in south Lebanon

19. In the two decades that passed from the first Lebanon war to the second Lebanon war, **Hezbollah entrenched itself among Shi'ite population centers** and, with the backing of Iran and Syria, achieved success in its struggle against Amal, a Lebanese movement holding nationalistic and more pragmatic views. The Amal movement was dominant among the Shi'ite community before 1982. However, in the early 1990s, Hezbollah managed to establish itself as the **most powerful, leading organization among the Shi'ite community,** at the expense of Amal. The non-compromising struggle it waged against the security zone, the existence of a powerful military infrastructure, the large amounts of money it received from Iran, the charismatic figure of Hassan Nasrallah, and most of all the Syrian and Iranian backing—**all of these factors combined allowed the organization to attain a dominant status it did not possess before.**

20. **The financial resources coming in from Iran help Hezbollah conduct extensive social and economic activities among the Shi'ite**

community, taking advantage of the traditional discrimination and the neglect of Shi'ite needs by all Lebanese governments. Such activities cover numerous spheres, including education, healthcare, society, and religious services. **Hezbollah has therefore taken a firm hold among the Shi'ite community, for clearly internal Lebanese reasons** which are not necessarily related to the conflict with Israel. Such hold granted Hezbollah considerable support among the Shi'ite community, allowed it to **recruit its operatives** from the community's ranks, **allowed it to embed its military infrastructure inside of the community,** and helped it gain the community's support even after the suffering it underwent during the second Lebanon war.

The buildup and operation of Hezbollah's military force in the years 2000-2006

Characteristics of the military activity against Israel

21. Following the IDF's withdrawal from the security zone (May 2000), Hezbollah lost the international and, to a great extent, the internal Lebanese legitimacy for the continuation of the armed struggle against Israel. As a result of that, during the six years preceding the second Lebanon war Hezbollah scaled back its routine operative activity against Israel. **It did not, however, abandon it completely, continuing to carry out terrorist attacks against Israel based on "game rules" of its own design.**

22. **Hezbollah's spheres of operative activity in the years 2000-2006 were:**

a. **Abducting IDF soldiers.** The two noteworthy events were the abduction of three IDF soldiers on Har Dov (October 2000) and the abduction of two IDF soldiers, Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser, which

led to the second Lebanon war. Between those two incidents were other failed attempts (prominent among them was an attempt to abduct IDF soldiers in the village of Ghajar under the cover of a firing attack along Israel's northern border, which took place on November 21, 2005).

b. **Attacking IDF outposts and patrols,** primarily on Har Dov (Shabaa Farms), where Hezbollah claims its activity is still legitimate. Dozens of attacks were perpetrated during that period of time, including mortar fire, anti-tank fire, small arms fire, and setting roadside charges against IDF outposts and IDF patrols.

c. **Firing Katyusha rockets on Israel.** The most noteworthy event since the IDF's withdrawal from the security zone was a volley of eight 122-mm Katyushas on Mount Meron, resulting in a day of clashes between the IDF and Hezbollah (May 28, 2006). In several other incidents, rockets were fired by Palestinian terrorist elements. Such attacks were perpetrated with Hezbollah's tacit agreement.

d. **A firing attack inside Israeli territory through the activation of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad** (March 12, 2002). That terrorist attack took place on the Shlomi-Metzuba road, in the vicinity of the Israeli-Lebanese border. Perpetrated at the peak of the Palestinian terrorist campaign (the Intifada), it led to the deaths of five civilians and an IDF soldier. Hezbollah did not publicly claim responsibility for the terrorist attack.

23. As the terrorist attacks along the Lebanese-Israeli border continued, Hezbollah assisted Palestinian terrorist organizations, mostly by supplying arms and transferring money to fund acts of terrorism **in order to bring about an escalation in the Palestinian campaign of terrorism against Israel.**

The military buildup

24. Hezbollah's construction of an extensive military infrastructure in Lebanon was a **prolonged process,** which grew faster since the IDF's withdrawal from the security zone. Following the IDF's withdrawal, Hezbollah, for the first time since its foundation in 1982, could finally rid itself of the burden of day-to-day fighting and **focus** its attention on building up and upgrading its military force.

25. The buildup of the military force was done **with the unprecedented assistance and backing of Iran and Syria,** which assisted Hezbollah in the acquisition of high-quality advanced arms and ammunition, turning it **from a terrorist and guerilla organization to an organization with capabilities approaching (and at times even surpassing) those of a state.** An important figure in the buildup and operation of Hezbollah's military infrastructure is **Hajj Imad Fayez Mughniyah,** the military deputy of organization leader Hassan Nasrallah and the man behind many terrorist attacks against Israeli and Western targets.

Hajj Imad Fayez Mughniyah

26. The upgraded military infrastructure is designed to achieve the following goals:

a. **Gaining strategic resilience,** meaning:

1. **In the offensive aspect,** the ability to conduct a sustained campaign against Israel in order to inflict **massive, continuous damage** to civilian population, including on the Israeli home front.

2. **In the defensive aspect,** the ability to mount a coordinated, well-planned defense against a ground assault by the IDF, **allowing the organization to maintain its survivability, power, and status.**

b. **The creation of a balance of terror, which would deter Israel from entering another confrontation and allow Hezbollah to continue provoking it, based on the "game rules" the organization has been shaping since May 2000** (those game rules **no longer** exist since the second Lebanon war).

c. **Establishing Hezbollah's power and status on the internal Lebanese scene,** where it is a revolutionary force striving to establish the dominance of the Shi'ite community and radically change the existing traditional government system and the pro-Western orientation of the Lebanese regime.

Hezbollah's concept of deployment and use of military force

27. Before the second Lebanon war, Hezbollah's **deployment** across Lebanon covered four different territorial divisions populated by the Shi'ite community:

a. **The "general headquarters" in Beirut,** which includes infrastructure in Shi'ite suburbs of southern Beirut. Most of it was set up in **Harat Hreik,** in an area nicknamed the "security square", which housed Hezbollah's military "nerve center". The "general headquarters" controlled Hezbollah's operative and regional units across Lebanon.

b. **The operative core in south Lebanon,** which, up until the war, included most of the organization's rocket arsenal. The operative core is designed to allow **sustained** rocket and artillery fire on Israel and resist possible IDF ground assaults.

c. **The rear combat zone in the Nabatiyeh region,** north of the Litani River. This zone, providing Hezbollah with defensive depth, is used for firing long-range rockets on Israel.

d. **The training and logistics division in the Bekaa Valley.** This is where Hezbollah receives arms and ammunition from Syria and Iran, subsequently storing or distributing them to other territorial divisions.

28. In these divisions, key among which is south Lebanon, Hezbollah has built **three combat arsenals:**

a. **The offensive arsenal:** before the second Lebanon war, it was based on a large rocket arsenal estimated at **over 20,000 rockets** of varying ranges. **Most** of the rockets were hidden in designated storehouses **in the villages of south Lebanon, and only some** were hidden outdoors.

b. **The defensive arsenal:** designed to allow Hezbollah to wage guerilla warfare against the IDF in south Lebanon while inflicting heavy casualties, in order to **make it difficult for IDF forces to take over south Lebanon.** The central components of that guerilla force are infantry, anti-tank fire (by means of advanced anti-tank missiles), sabotage, special forces, and anti-aircraft fire.

c. **The logistics infrastructure:** based on arms storehouses located in hundreds of residential buildings and social and religious institutions (including mosques). It is designed to provide Hezbollah with sustained fighting ability and makes it more difficult for the IDF to attack.



A schematic distribution of Hezbollah's four territorial divisions

29. In order to operate those four divisions, Hezbollah, in our assessment, can recruit **more than 10,000 operatives in times of crisis.** During the second Lebanon war, **several thousands** of Hezbollah operatives served south of the Litani River, alongside several **hundreds of operatives on the Nabatiyeh region.** Of those operatives, the organization's **quality hard-core** included (before the war) **about 1,000 regular operatives** and the rest were reservists.

30. The majority of Hezbollah's offensive and defensive military arsenal was **concealed within densely-populated area** where the Shi'ite community resides, **using the local population as human shields.** Hezbollah's arms and ammunition were sometimes hidden inside residential buildings as well as in religious and social institutions. This was designed to increase its **survivability** during wartime and provide Hezbollah with benefits in the sphere of media and propaganda, as happened in the second Lebanon war.

Part of the military arsenal was hidden in non-populated areas (ditches, bunkers, tunnels, and so forth).

Stockpiling arms and ammunition inside or near mosques[3] in south Lebanon



A Hezbollah base near a mosque in a densely populated area in the village of Al-Khiam



An arms storehouse situated near a mosque in the village of Qana

A vehicle carrying anti-tank missiles detonated by an IDF force near a mosque in the village of Marwahin

Outdoor rocket launch site

Hezbollah's arms and ammunition

The rocket arsenal



The ranges of Hezbollah's rockets on the eve of the second Lebanon war

31. The most potent offensive threat to Israel from Hezbollah is the organization's extensive **rocket arsenal**. On the eve of the second Lebanon war, Hezbollah had **over 20,000 rockets** designed for various ranges. These rockets can be divided into **three types:**

a. **Rockets made by the Iranian arms industry: Fajr-3** (43 km), **Fajr-5** (75 km), **Falaq** with enhanced warhead (10-11 km), **Zelzal** (125-210 km), **Naze'at** (80-140 km). Those rockets are the source of the **strategic threat** posed by Hezbollah to the civilian population of northern and central Israel.

Zelzal rocket launchers

Fajr-3 rocket launcher

Naze'at rocket

The remains of Fajr-3 rockets (including engine). On July 17, four days into the war, two Fajr-3 rockets exploded near industrial facilities in the vicinity of the Gulf of Haifa.

b. **Rockets produced by the Syrian arms industry:** 220mm (70 km), 302mm (over 100 km). **Of note are the 220mm rockets, equipped with metal pellets, which struck the city of Haifa.**

These rockets caused numerous casualties in Haifa during the second Lebanon war.

Damage caused by a 220mm rocket in Haifa

A direct hit of a 220mm rocket at a railroad service station in Haifa

The explosion on the roof of the service station

The damage sustained by a nearby train wagon

220mm rocket hits on residential buildings

The collapse of a building's façade in the Haifa neighborhood of Bat Galim (hit by a 220mm rocket)

The damage caused by a 220mm rocket on a building some 30 yards away from the source of the explosion

c. **Short range, 122mm rockets made by Iran, Russia, and China, provided to Hezbollah by Iran and Syria:** Russian and Iranian **122 mm** HE (i.e., high explosive)-frag rockets, **122 mm** Chinese increased-range **Grad** rockets and **122 mm** Chinese cluster rockets. **Most of the rockets fired at Israeli population centers were various types of 122 mm projectiles**.

An improved 122mm Grad rocket with a range of some 20 km

Casualties caused by Hezbollah rockets during the second Lebanon war

32. In the course of the second Lebanon war, Hezbollah fired **nearly 4,000 rockets of various types** on Israeli territory. Most of them were short-range rockets (122mm). **53 people were killed as a result of the rocket fire, one third of all the war fatalities (159).** Among those killed were 41 civilians and 12 soldiers (as a result of a rocket which landed near Kibbutz Kfar Giladi). Most of the victims were residents of Israel's big cities. The leading city is **Haifa** (13 killed). No one was killed in **Kiryat Shmona,** hit by the largest number of rockets.

Other arms and ammunition provided by Iran to Hezbollah

33. **Other advanced arms and ammunition provided by Iran to Hezbollah:**

a. **Upgraded Iranian-manufactured anti-tank missiles with a double tandem-type warhead which can penetrate armor even after reactive shielding**: the **Raad**, an Iranian version of the Sagger, has range of 3000 meters (1.86 miles) and can penetrate 400 mm; the **Raad-T**, an Iranian version of the Sagger with a tandem warhead, has a range of 3000 meters and can also penetrate 400 mm (16") after reactive shielding[5]; the **Toophan** is an Iranian version of the TOW, has a range of up to 3750 meters (2.33 miles) and can penetrate 550 mm (22") steel armor (these were coupled with **Kornet** and **Konkurs**, advanced anti-tank missiles made by the USSR). The advanced anti-tank missiles delivered to Hezbollah were used with a high degree of skill day and night, hitting dozens of armored IDF vehicles in south Lebanon.

[5] A new shielding for tanks causing the missile to explode before it even contacts the tank.

A ready-to-use Kornet anti-tank missile launcher, in the south Lebanese village of Ghandouriyeh

Raad-T anti-tank missile

Toophan anti-tank missile

b. **Chinese made coast-to-sea C-802 missiles,** such as the missile that hit the IDF Hanit missile boat off the coast of Beirut two days after the outbreak of the war (July 14). The hit killed four crewmen and the missile boat was severely damaged. The C-802 has a range of 65 nautical miles and carries a warhead weighing 165 kg (363 lbs).

Coast-to-sea C-802 missile

c. **Ababil unmanned air vehicles (UAVs),** developed by the Iranian aeronautical industry. There are a number of different models, including reconnaissance and "attacker" UAVs carrying warheads weighing scores of kilograms, found in the possession of Hezbollah. During the war, Hezbollah launched a UAV, probably an "attacker", which was shot down off the coast of Haifa on August 7. Its remains were found in an open field near Kibbutz Kabri, about 4 km (2.1 miles) east of Nahariya (August 13).

The remains of the Ababil UAV shot down over the sea on August 7 by the Israeli Air Force (IDF Spokesman, photo by Anna Brosh).

d. **Motorized hang gliders**, to which a small piston motor can be attached, as they were used by Palestinian terrorists during "the night of the hang gliders" (November 25, 1987). The system preserves the form and operation of the hang glider, but gives it propulsion sufficient to

raise it to a greater than usual height and assure it a prolonged stay in the air, **allowing it a range greater than 100 km** (62 miles).

e. Russian made SA-7 and SA-14 **anti-aircraft** missiles.

f. **Night-vision goggles**.

The post-war restoration of Hezbollah's military infrastructure

34. In the year that has passed since the second Lebanon war, Hezbollah has restored its military infrastructure to the north and south of the Litani River, **without any effective attempt on part of the Lebanese government to prevent it from doing so,** as it is obliged by Security Council Resolution 1701. During that year, Hezbollah **smuggled** to Lebanon a large quantity of arms and ammunition in order to rebuild its military infrastructure. A special emphasis was placed on **rockets, anti-tank, and anti-aircraft weapons.**

35. The arms and ammunition were provided to Hezbollah by **Iran and Syria.** The main smuggling route runs through Syria. Arms and ammunition are transported on vehicles to the Bekaa Valley, and then to other regions of Lebanon. In the year that has passed since the second Lebanon war, the Lebanese army stopped, on two separate occasions, vehicles that transported arms from Syria. However, those were uncharacteristic incidents rather than part of an overall policy.

The Lebanese army confiscating arms and ammunition

A civilian truck used by Hezbollah for arms smuggling, confiscated by the Lebanese army in the Beirut neighborhood of Hazmiyeh (Reuters, February 8, 2007, photo by STR News)

36. As a result of the massive supply of rockets by Iran and Syria, **Hezbollah is completing the restoration of its rocket arsenal, hit during the second Lebanon war.** As already mentioned, the organization had over 20,000 rockets of various ranges on the eve of the war. It is our assessment that the number of rockets Hezbollah can currently fire on Israel **is similar to** the number it fired during the war, **and that the range of the rockets allows the organization to fire on population centers in northern and central Israel.**

37. In the region of the "operative core", south of the Litani River, Hezbollah has rebuilt most of its military infrastructure, while **adapting its activity to the new reality formed following the deployment of the Lebanese army and that of UNIFIL.** Following are the characteristics of its activity and deployment:

a. **Avoiding terrorist attacks against the IDF** (for the first time in a long period of time since the establishment of Hezbollah).

b. **Avoiding frontal confrontations with UNIFIL and the Lebanese army.**

c. **Low visibility:** the lack of an outpost line along the border, camouflaging the transportation of arms, appearing without Hezbollah uniform (with only flags and posters to indicate the organization's presence).

Signs of Hezbollah presence: flags and posters

UNIFIL alongside Hezbollah: an armored patrol of the UNIFIL force passes near a poster above which hangs the Hezbollah flag in the village of Aita al-Shaab in south Lebanon (Reuters, July 14, 2007, photo by Ali Hashisho)

Hezbollah hoists its flag vis-à-vis the town of Metula (Al-Manar Television, May 17, 2007)

Hezbollah operatives in uniform: an uncommon sight

Two armed, uniformed Hezbollah operatives being interviewed in the village of Aita al-Shaab in south Lebanon. Left: a close-up on the operative's rifle (Al-Manar Television, July 15). It is a rare photograph, seeing as Hezbollah operatives usually wear civilian clothes, avoid carrying weapons in the open, and avoid media attention.

d. It is our assessment that Hezbollah currently has **thousands of 40-110 km rockets** in south Lebanon. South of the Litani River are **hundreds of anti-tank missiles and anti-tank rocket launchers, hundreds of anti-aircraft missiles and anti-aircraft cannons, and a large quantity of roadside charges.**

e. **Manpower:** to replace the well-trained operatives killed, Hezbollah recruited **new operatives, trained** them, and gradually brought them back to regular activity. It is our assessment that there are now **several thousands of operatives** south of the Litani River.

The implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701 (interim account)

38. UN Security Council Resolution 1701 (August 12, 2006) marked the end of the second Lebanon war and forced Hezbollah to adapt to a **new reality in south Lebanon.** Following is an interim account of the resolution's implementation a year after it was first passed:

a. **On one hand,** it is the first time that a significant force of the Lebanese army, with the assistance of an upgraded UNIFIL force, is deployed south of the Litani River; **Hezbollah has lost its position as the sole key player in south Lebanon** and its freedom of action has been restricted. **A relative calm** has settled in south Lebanon. Hezbollah, busy restoring its military power and struggling to topple Fouad Siniora's government, has so far avoided (for the longest time since its foundation) perpetrating terrorist attacks against Israel. The void formed by Hezbollah **has been filled by global jihad elements, which attempted to act in south Lebanon as well** (the most prominent incident was the firing of three rockets from the Taybeh-Adeiseh region on Kiryat Shmona on June 17, 2007).

The deployment of the UNIFIL force in south Lebanon (as at July 2007)



The deployment of the Lebanese army in south Lebanon (as at July 2007)



b. **On the other hand, the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701 has only been partial and its main components have not been implemented:** the south Lebanon region has not been demilitarized of terrorist organizations. Hezbollah has not been disarmed, it continues the process of its military restoration with the assistance of Iran and Syria; no effective embargo has been imposed on arms smuggling from Syria to Lebanon; and there has been no significant progress on the issue of the two abducted IDF soldiers.

39. **The interim account a year after the second Lebanon war indicates that the achievements of Security Council Resolution 1701 are short-lived, and that they cannot create long-lasting calm and stability in south Lebanon and elsewhere in the country.** Hezbollah might change its policy of terrorist attacks and attempt to regain its status as "master of the south" once its restoration is complete or once there is a change in Hezbollah, Iran or Syria's set of considerations in internal Lebanese or regional contexts (such as a political crisis in Lebanon or a regional crisis).