



Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
at the Center for Special Studies (C.S.S)

August 17, 2006

Implementing Security Council Resolution 1701 (Update No. 2)

The situation on the ground

IDF tank leaving Lebanon (near moshav Avivim)...



(Finbar O'Reilly for Reuters)

...and the Lebanese army deploying south of the Litani River



(Ali Hashisho for Reuters)

1. So far, Hezbollah has respected the ceasefire, which has gone into its fourth day. In general south Lebanon has been quiet, with the exception of a few local skirmishes. The most prominent clash was between an IDF force and a Hezbollah squad at Shaqif al-Nimel, in the central sector, in which three terrorists were killed (August 15).

Lebanese army deployment in the south

2. At a meeting held on August 16, the Lebanese government decided that in collaboration with UNIFIL, the Lebanese army would deploy in the area south of the Litani and in the eastern sector (the region of al-'Arkub and the Hatsbayia and

Marjayoun districts). It also determined that the army would preserve order and security in those areas and prevent “**the presence of any other authority of any type [i.e., Hezbollah], with the exception of government authority.**” Lebanese prime minister Fuad Siniora and the minister of information stated that no areas would be “off limits” for the Lebanese army and that it would be the only armed presence. The minister of information also stated that **the Lebanese army did to intend to confront Hezbollah.** The implication is that **the Lebanese government will not force Hezbollah to hand over its weapons.**

3. In our assessment, the current Lebanese policy is the fruit of a compromise reached between Prime Minister Siniora and **Hezbollah, according to which Hezbollah will not disarm, although it will lower its armed profile to avoid a confrontation with the Lebanese army.** Such a compromise, typical of the way agreements are implemented Lebanon, is a violation of both Security Council Resolutions 1559 and 1701, as well as other relevant resolutions demanding the disarmament of Hezbollah and the other terrorist organizations.

4. The **6th, 10th and 11th Brigades of the Lebanese army** will deploy in the areas evacuated by the IDF, in addition to the two brigades routinely stationed in south Lebanon. The 6th Brigade will deploy in the western sector, the 10th in the eastern sector and the 11th in the central sector. They will deploy after the IDF transfers control of the areas to UNIFIL, which will in turn transfer them to the Lebanese army.



Lebanese army forces deploying in south Lebanon on August 17 (A)

5. **The process of the IDF's transferring of evacuated areas to UNIFIL control began on August 16** with some of the areas south of the Litani and the region of Marjayoun. On the morning of August 17, 1,500 soldiers from the 10th Brigade, commanded by Brigadier General Charles al-Sheikhani arrived in Marjayoun, and 6th Brigade forces arrived in Tyre.

Difficulties in establishing an upgraded UNIFIL force

6. Establishing a reinforced and upgraded UNIFIL force, as stipulated by Security Council Resolution 1701, **has met with difficulties**. In an interview with Le Monde, a UNIFIL commander said that recruiting 15,000 soldiers would take a year, and in an interview with Israeli TV's Channel Two, the UN Secretary-General said that deploying the force in south Lebanon was liable to take "between a number of weeks and months." A state department spokesman, on the other hand, noted the **urgency** of deploying the UNIFIL force and said that the situation could not remain as it was for "a number of months."

7. In practice, the European countries with the potential to send troops to expand the UNIFIL force were waiting for France. Although France was central in the formulation of Resolution 1701, it has been dragging its feet concerning sending a significant number of forces to south Lebanon. In the meantime, until reinforcements arrive, the UN has been forced to make do with the UNIFIL force in place (about **1,900** soldiers). **If an upgraded UNIFIL force is not established within a reasonable time period, there are liable to be difficulties in implementing Resolution 1701 in south Lebanon.**

The internal Lebanese arena

8. As the war ended, fundamental differences of opinion appeared between Hezbollah opponents ("March 14th Forces") and supporters, **the latter with the full**

approval of Iran and Syria. The main disagreements **focus on Hezbollah's disarmament**, as demanded by Resolution 1701.

9. In response to criticism, Hezbollah has focused its **political-propaganda efforts on two fronts:**

- a. **Defensively**, it is trying to stem the tide of voices calling for its disarmament while agreeing to lower its profile as an armed organization, and in south Lebanon to be less visible in areas of Lebanese army activity.
- b. **Offensively**, with the aid and support of Syria and Iran, it is waging a fierce propaganda war intended to position Hezbollah and the path of "resistance" [i.e., terrorism] at the forefront of the "glorious victory" in the war against Israel.

10. As part of the propaganda war, all Hezbollah media have shown pictures of destroyed IDF equipment; clips are shown of wounded IDF soldiers and IDF tanks which were blown up; songs of praise for Hezbollah and its members are played, etc., etc. **On the other hand**, pictures of the Lebanese army moving southward and the news of Hezbollah's lowering its weapons profile **illustrate the depth of the change in south Lebanon, the most important aspect of which is the strengthening of Lebanese governmental authority and the weakening of the fiction fostered for years that Hezbollah was "Lebanon's protector."**

11. Those themes were apparent in the speech Hassan Nasrallah gave on August 14. Its main points were (according to Al-Manar TV):

- a. **Lebanon stands before a "historic strategic victory."**
- b. **Hezbollah will do everything in its power to help the displaced and the wounded to rehabilitate the ruins** (according to Nasrallah, 15,000 living units were destroyed.)
- c. **Hezbollah supports the deployment of the Lebanese army in the south**, reinforced by UNIFIL.

- d. **Hezbollah will not disarm** because Lebanon is still weak and cannot by itself attain its goals, such as the return of the Sheba'a Farms or the release of the prisoners ("Lebanon's strength is now in its resistance.").
- e. **At this point, there should not be a public discussion about the disarmament of Hezbollah**, which must be left to an internal Lebanese dialogue carried out behind closed doors.

Syria

12. On August 15, Syrian president Bashar Assad delivered a **belligerent speech** before a conference of the Syrian Journalists' Union, the first since the war broke out in Lebanon and the escalation increased in the Palestinian Authority. **He adopted the Hezbollah line, praised the "resistance" [i.e., terrorism] as a possible alternative to peace and firmly supported Hezbollah's propaganda attack.**

13. The main themes he related to were (Syrian TV, August 15):

- a. **Praise for the "resistance"** (i.e., Hezbollah), which had "won the war with Israel," as the alternative in facing the current challenges. He said that accusing Syria of having provided support for the "resistance" (i.e., Hezbollah) was a badge of honor.
- b. **Peace was a strategic option but not the only one, and Hezbollah was another possibility** ("When any strategic choice can be made, that does not mean that there are no other strategic options... Quite the opposite is true, the further away peace gets, the more important and the more necessary it is to look for other options and solutions to emphasize our rights...").
- c. **Fostering hatred for Israel and the promise that revenge would be attained**: "Israel should know that the entire [younger] generation hates it more than the previous one. Israel should know that time is working against it. In fact, there will be a generation more determined to destroy Israel and it will take revenge for everything that happened in the past, **and then your sons, Israelis, will pay the price...**"

- d. **An accusation of treason against the opposition to Syria in Lebanon, the March 17 Forces:** “Lebanese groups failed to implement their pro-Israeli plans, and they therefore encouraged the military incursion of Israel to extricate them from their problems, strike the resistance, and add Lebanon to the Israeli convoy.” He threatened that the fall his opponents in Lebanon was not far off. [In Lebanon, such a statement is considered a threat of assassination.]¹

14. In our assessment, such a belligerent speech (which was strongly criticized in Lebanon and the Arab world) an indication that **Syria still views Hezbollah as its main strategic asset in the Lebanese arena**. Thus, along with its ally, Iran, **not only will it continue to provide political support for Hezbollah’s refusal to disarm, it will aid in the rehabilitation of its operative capabilities, in direct contravention of Security Council Resolution 1701.**

Hezbollah stresses its centrality in the campaign to rehabilitate Lebanon, competing with the Lebanese government

15. Hezbollah, whose opposition accuses it of responsibility for the great destruction suffered by Lebanon, has shown considerable activity in aiding the country’s rehabilitation **in “competition” with the Lebanese government**. It is doing so to reap the rewards in prestige from the Shi’ite population, to deflect criticism and to prepare the ground to repair its infrastructures in south Lebanon, gaining the support of the population. Its activity, most likely generously funded by Iran, has been widely covered by the media and thoroughly exploited by its propaganda campaign.

16. **Hezbollah has already established a “construction and rehabilitation team” in the southern suburb of Beirut**. Residents have been asked to present themselves at “service centers” near their homes, bringing documents with them attesting to the ownership of apartments which were destroyed, in preparation for a process of reparations payments. Hezbollah also sent a team (through its “construction jihad”

¹ Saad Hariri responded by saying that the Syrian regime trafficked in the blood of the children of Qana, Gaza and Baghdad to foment civil wars among the Lebanese, Palestinians and Iraqis.

fund) to the region of **Tyre** to evaluate damages, remove debris and provide first aid for the families whose houses were destroyed. In addition, Hezbollah sent 30 trucks of food for distribution.

17. In the face of Hezbollah's energetic activities, the Lebanese government has been dragging its feet.