February 2014

Violence and Terrorism in Judea and Samaria, 2013
Data, Characteristics and Trends

Overview

1. In 2013 there was a significant increase in the scope of violence and terrorism in Judea, Samaria and the Jerusalem area. According to data from the Israel Security Agency (ISA), in 2013 there were 1,271 terrorist attacks, as compared with 578 in 2012 (a year in which violence and terrorism also increased).

2. The two main trends of violence and terrorism were the following:

   a. The so-called "popular resistance" (which can be considered popular terrorism): The popular resistance is a leading strategy used by the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Fatah. In 2013 it accounted for 858 attacks (as compared with 535 in 2012). The popular resistance includes the use of Molotov cocktails (a frequent modus operandi), and stabbing and vehicular attacks.
In addition, every month there were hundreds of stone-throwing events targeting the Israeli security forces and/or Israeli civilians driving along the roads in Judea, Samaria and the Jerusalem area (including Israeli civilian buses).

b. "Military attacks" (guns, explosives, abductions): In 2013 there were 201 military attacks involving the use of arms (as compared with 37 in 2012). Most of them (170 attacks) involved IEDs, and some of them involved shooting and throwing hand grenades. In addition, one Israeli soldier was abducted in Bat Yam, south of Tel Aviv, and murdered in Samaria by an illegal Palestinian resident from the region of Qalqiliya. In some instances, the distinction between the popular resistance and military attacks is blurred. On occasion popular resistance operatives have tried to "upgrade" the attacks to the use of arms. On the other hand, sometimes operatives who carry out military attacks [i.e., the terrorist organizations] integrated cold weapons into their attacks.

3. The terrorist attacks in Judea and Samaria and within Israeli territory were responsible for the deaths of five Israelis in 2013, two civilians and three IDF soldiers (no Israelis were killed in terrorist attacks in 2012). Three of the deaths were caused by stabbing attacks, the most lethal modus operandi of the popular resistance. Most of the attacks in which Israelis were killed were not carried out by established terrorist organizations but rather by lone terrorists or local networks.

4. Additional characteristics of the terrorist attacks and Israeli counterterrorism activities carried out in 2013:

   a. Increased prevention: In 2013 the Israeli security forces prevented approximately 190 major terrorist attacks, most of them planned for Judea and Samaria (112 in 2012). Most of the attacks prevented (67) involved IEDs. Also prevented were abductions (52), shooting attacks (52) and suicide bombing attacks (16). The statistics above illustrate the effectiveness of the Israeli security forces’ counterterrorism activities.

   b. Involvement of Hamas and Palestinian prisoners released in the Gilad Shalit prisoner exchange deal in directing terrorism: In 2013 Hamas made a conspicuous effort to promote terrorist attacks in Judea and Samaria. It employed local networks and often involved headquarters and operatives beyond the Judea and Samaria borders. The involvement of Palestinian prisoners released in the Gilad Shalit deal to the Gaza Strip was
particularly prominent in directing terrorist actions in Judea and Samaria, in blatant violation of the release agreement.

c. Exposure of Salafist-jihadi networks: In 2013 several Salafist-jihadi networks in Judea and Samaria were exposed, some local and some directed from beyond the borders of Judea and Samaria. Particularly conspicuous was the exposure of a network, two of whose operatives were residents of east Jerusalem. The network was handled from the Gaza Strip and its operatives planned a double suicide bombing attack at the International Conference Center in Jerusalem and the American embassy in Tel Aviv, as well as other attacks.

d. Terrorist organizations' efforts to carry out abductions: In 2013, especially in view of the Gilad Shalit prisoner exchange deal, the Palestinian terrorist organizations increased their efforts to abduct Israelis in Judea, Samaria and Israel, who would be used as hostages to bargain for the release of Palestinian terrorist operatives imprisoned in Israeli jails. Their efforts were foiled in a series of Israeli security force preventive actions in Judea and Samaria. The operatives who were apprehended admitted their plans to abduct Israelis. In many instances the abductions were orchestrated either by terrorist operatives imprisoned in Israel or by prisoners released in the Gilad Shalit deal (ISA, September 2013).

5. PA and Fatah support for popular resistance violence and terrorism: The PA gives the popular resistance political, media and sometimes financial support, falsely represents it as "non-violent" (muqawama silmiyya) and exploits it in the anti-Israel campaign it is waging alongside the peace negotiations. In early 2013 senior PA and Fatah figures reiterated their intention to intensify popular resistance events. Their assumption, which was borne out, was that they could gain the greatest possible benefit from the events while controlling them and preventing their exploitation by Hamas and other organizations.

6. At the same time, the PA and Fatah objected to armed military attacks under the current circumstances. Therefore, the PA's security forces conducted ongoing preventive activities and continued security cooperation with Israel to enforce PA policy. However, PA incitement to violence against Israel continued unabated and senior Fatah figures often made it clear that the option of an "armed military resistance" had not been abandoned, even if current circumstances made the popular resistance preferable.
7. In our assessment, if the American-sponsored Israeli-Palestinian negotiations reach a dead end in 2014, popular resistance violence and terrorism may increase (throwing stones and Molotov cocktails, carrying out stabbing and vehicular attacks). That is in view of the PA and Fatah's encouragement of the strategy, and in spite of the PA's desire to control the situation on the ground. At the same time, the PA can be expected to intensify the political campaign they are waging against Israel in international institutions and in international public opinion, while encouraging the Palestinian NGOs (which do not belong to Fatah or the PA) orchestrating the BDS campaign. All of the above are liable to encourage Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and other terrorist organizations to try to increase the scope of the armed military resistance even if by doing so they would challenge the PA and Fatah's current strategy.

8. The study has eight sections examining a different practical or political aspect of Palestinian violence and terrorism in Judea and Samaria in 2013:

A. Basic Data
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   v. Exposing a Hamas squad that intended to carry out abductions and other terrorist attacks
   vi. Detention of a Hamas operative who intended to carry out an abduction and shooting attack
   vii. Preventing of a mass-casualty attack in Jerusalem

G. Prevention of terrorist activities by Salafist-jihadi elements

H. Policy of the PA and Fatah
   i. Overview
   ii. Statements by senior PA officials
   iii. Statements by senior Fatah officials
   iv. Glorification of the popular resistance and incitement to violence and terrorism on Fatah's social networks
The Scope of Violence and Terrorism in 2013

9. In 2013 there was a significant increase in the scope of all forms of violence and terrorism in Judea, Samaria and the Jerusalem area. According to data from the Israel Security Agency (ISA),\(^1\) in **2013 there were 1,271 attacks, as compared with 578 in 2012** (a year in which violence and terrorism also increased). Most of the attacks were considered "popular terrorism" (the so-called popular resistance). There was a significant increase in the use of arms (guns, IEDs, hand grenades). In addition to the ISA data, hundreds of stone-throwing events should be added, considered a part of the Palestinian popular resistance.

10. The increase in the number of all types of terrorist attacks in 2013:

   a. **Attacks involving arms** (guns, IEDs and hand grenades): There were **201 terrorist attacks** in 2013 involving the use of arms (compared with 37 in 2012), **45 of them in the Jerusalem area**. Most of them (107) involved IEDs. Particularly serious were the sniper fire that murdered an IDF soldier in Hebron and the bomb placed on a bus in the city of Bat Yam (south of Tel Aviv).

   b. **Abduction and murder**: One abduction and subsequent murder was committed in 2013. The culprit was a Palestinian from Qalqiliya staying in Israeli illegally. The abduction began in Ban Yam and ended in Samaria with the murder and burial of the soldier. The **large number of plans and attempts to abduct Israelis that were exposed indicates the Palestinians' high level of motivation** to acquire Israeli hostages to be used to negotiate for the release of prisoners.

   c. **The so-called popular resistance** (i.e., popular terrorism): The popular resistance is a leading strategy used by the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Fatah. In 2013 there was a significant increase in popular resistance events, mainly the throwing of Molotov cocktails. In addition, there were a large number of stone-throwing attacks. Also particularly prominent were stabbing

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\(^1\) The statistics in this study are based on the summary of terrorism in 2013 issued by the ISA (ISA website). Analyzing and interpreting the statistics was carried out by the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center.
and vehicular attacks. Some of them, especially the stabbing attacks, were fatal.

Various Types of Terrorist Attacks in 2013

Note: The graph does not include the throwing of stones and Molotov cocktails, which account for most of the attacks.

Israeli Victims in Judea, Samaria and Israel

11. In 2013 there was a sharp increase in the number of Israelis killed in terrorist attacks originating in Judea and Samaria. Five Israelis were killed, three of them IDF soldiers (there were no deaths from terrorist attacks in 2012). Three Israelis were stabbed to death (the first on April 30, at the Tapuah junction in Samaria, the second on October 10 at Brosh Habiqa' in the northern Jordan Valley, and the third on November 13 in the northern city of Afula). In addition, an IDF soldier was shot and killed by a sniper (on September 22 in Hebron) and another soldier was abducted and murdered (on September 20).

12. The attacks in which Israelis were killed were not carried out by established terrorist organizations, but rather by local networks or lone terrorists. Two attacks involved Palestinians staying in Israeli illegally. The abduction on September 20 was orchestrated and directed by Palestinian terrorist operatives imprisoned in Israel. The stabbing in Afula was carried out by a lone terrorist operative who was staying in Israeli illegally.
13. In 2013, **44 Israelis were wounded**, a slight increase over the previous year (40 wounded). **Most of them (42) were wounded during popular resistance events**: 34 (about 77%) by **stones or Molotov cocktails**, six (about 14%) **were stabbed**, and two were injured in **vehicular attacks**. In addition, one Israeli was shot and injured and another was wounded when an IED exploded.

**Distribution of Israelis Wounded in Various Types of Terrorist Attacks**
Friction Zones

14. Most of the increase in the number of all types of attacks occurred in Judea, where 1,042 were carried out, 260 of them in the Jerusalem area. In Samaria 229 were carried out for a total of 1,271. The number of attacks in the city of Jerusalem declined in 2013, where there were 126 attacks (187 in 2012). Most of them (212) involved Molotov cocktails thrown during popular resistance events.

15. Most of the attacks were carried out during confrontations between popular resistance operatives and the Israeli security forces during the riots at the traditional friction zones in Judea and Samaria. For a number of years the friction zones have been the scene of either permanent violent activities or occasional violence on memorial days or various protest demonstrations. The most prominent friction zones are the following:

   a. The Palestinian villages, especially those near the security fence, where protest riots are held mainly on the claim that the security fence runs through Palestinian land. However, over the years the local protests have been expanded to seek far-reaching political goals. The two most prominent villages are Bil'in and Ni'lin, which the Palestinians have turned into popular resistance symbols. Other villages include Um Safa and Nebi Saleh (north of Ramallah), Al-Massarah and Um Salmuna (south of Bethlehem), whose residents are involved in land disputes with Jewish settlers. Weekly riots are held at the above locations, usually on Friday.²

   b. Roadblocks, crossings, Israeli facilities, guard posts, Jewish sites and regions near the Jewish villages where there is constant friction between Palestinians and the IDF/Jewish settlers. The friction zones include the Qalqiliya crossing, south of Ramallah; the Cave of the Patriarchs crossing in Hebron; the Tomb of Rachel (often a target for bombs and Molotov cocktails in 2013); the Tomb of Rachel crossing in Bethlehem, near the Al-Aida refugee camp; the Gilboa (Jalame) and Salem crossings near Jenin in Samaria; and the Bitunia crossing near the Ofer prison, southwest of Ramallah (on the outskirts of the village of Bitunia), which became a symbol of the so-called prisoners' protest.

² Friday, especially after the noon prayers in the mosques, is the time usually chosen for popular resistance events at the various friction zones, as are Palestinian memorial days (such as Land Day, Palestinian Prisoner Day, Nakba Day and Naksa Day, etc.).
c. The Arab neighborhoods in east Jerusalem, where there is friction with the local Jewish population also living there. Prominent are the neighborhoods of A-Tor and the Mount of Olives (east of the Old City); Issawiya (northeast of the Old City); and the neighborhoods of Ras al-Amud and Silwan (southeast of the Old City). There is also the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood (southwest of the Temple Mount and French Hill).

d. The Temple Mount, which this year as well was one of the main friction zones between Palestinians and the Israeli security forces. The Temple Mount is a traditional focus for national-religious confrontations. It is inflamed by Hamas' systematic incitement (which the PA supports). According to Hamas propaganda, Israel is "plotting" to Judaize Jerusalem and destroy Al-Aqsa mosque. The Temple Mount is highly sensitive and explosive, and events there resonate beyond the Israeli-Palestinian arena to the entire Arab-Muslim world. The Northern Branch of the Islamic Movement of Israeli Arabs (directed by Sheikh Ra'ed Salah) also fans the fires of provocation. The PA permits (and sometimes encourages) outbreaks of violence and rioting on the Temple Mount, but works to contain them and prevent them from spreading to other friction zones in Judea and Samaria.

Armed Military Attacks in Judea and Samaria in 2013

Shooting Attacks

Overview

16. In 2013 there was a rise the number of shooting attacks involving the use of light arms. There were 30 shooting attacks in 2013 (compared with 23 in 2012). The most serious attack was carried out in Hebron, where a Palestinian sniper shot and killed an IDF soldier (September 22, 2013).

17. In addition to the increase in shooting attacks and beyond the use of arms for terrorism, this past year there was a significant presence of armed terrorist operatives on the ground. They challenged not only the Israeli security forces, but the PA's governance. Their presence was particularly prominent at the funerals of Palestinian terrorist operatives killed in confrontations with the Israeli security forces and the Palestinian security apparatuses, especially in the Palestinian refugee camps, and sometimes in demonstrations and protests.
18. In 2013 the Israeli security forces uncovered an increasingly large number of caches containing weapons used in terrorist attacks (including standard and improvised hand guns, and hunting and ordinary rifles).

19. The most prominent shooting attacks were the following:

a. On September 22, 2013 a Palestinian sniper shot and killed an IDF soldier. The sniper shot at an IDF force engaged in security activities in Hebron, shooting from a Palestinian neighborhood of near the Jewish settlement in...
Hebron. The victim was First Sergeant Gabriel (Gal) Kobi, 20, from the northern city of Tirat HaCarmel (IDF Spokesman, September 22, 2013).

b. On March 18, 2013 a 70 year-old Israeli man was shot as he stood near a bus stop at the entrance to the village of Qdumim (near Qalqiliya). He was seriously wounded and evacuated to a hospital. After the attack the Palestinian gunmen fled in the direction of one of the villages in the area (Ynet, March 18, 2013). Two months later, in May 2013, the Israeli security forces detained a Palestinian from Qalqiliya who was an operative in one of the PA's security apparatuses. He carried out the shooting attack from the vehicle he was riding in. Also detained were two of his brothers, who had helped him carry out the attack and helped him escape (Israel Security Agency (ISA), July 3, 2013).
The Israel man shot at the entrance to Qdumim is evacuated to a hospital
(Facebook page of Judea and Samaria Rescue, March 18, 2013).

c. On May 2, 2013 a Palestinian opened fire at an Israeli car parked in the
Wadi Kelt parking lot (near Jericho). The two sightseers in the car, an Israeli
woman and a European tourist, were not harmed by the vehicle was
damaged. The shooter fled. A number of days later the Israeli security forces
detained a terrorist squad from Hebron and Nablus whose operatives
belonged to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). One of
the squad members had carried out the shooting attack on the sightseers
(ISA, June 27, 2013).

d. On June 25, 2013 a number of shots were fired at an Israeli bus near the
village of Hawara (near Nablus). The Israeli security forces called to the site
found bullet holes in the bus. The previous week an Israeli bus had been shot
at in the same spot. There were no casualties in either attack (Ynet, June 25,
2013). On July 25, 2013, IDF forces detained a Palestinian who had carried
out the attack. In the IDF’s assessment, the same Palestinian was behind two
previous shooting attacks targeting Israeli buses in May. No casualties were
reported in either attack. It is assumed that the terrorist was a lone attacker
not affiliated with any terrorist network (IDF Spokesman, July 25, 2013).
e. On September 10, 2013 light arms fire targeted an Israeli Border Police force operating in Qalqiliya. The force returned fire. Later stones were thrown at the force. No casualties were reported.

f. On November 7, 2013 a Palestinian terrorist operative opened fire with an improvised gun (according to a number of reports he used a flare gun) in the bus stop at the Tapuah Junction. He was shot and killed by IDF and Border Police forces (Border Police Facebook page, November 7, 2013). The terrorist was Bashir Sami Habanin, from the village of Mirkah, southwest of Jenin. He taught at the Khadouri University in Tulkarm (Dunia Al-Watan, November 8, 2013).

**Detonating IEDs and Throwing Hand Grenades**

20. In 2013 there was a significant increase in the number of attacks involving IEDs and hand grenades. **One hundred seventy IED attacks were carried out, most of them (145) in Judea, 23 in Samaria and two in Jerusalem.** Most of the devices were improvised, and were used to attack Israeli security forces and civilians. **Prominent was the placing of a bomb on a bus in the city of Bat Yam,** south of Tel Aviv, orchestrated and carried out by a PIJ terrorist squad from Bethlehem. (See the section on terrorist attacks inside Israeli territory).

21. The most prominent attacks involving IEDs were the following:

   a. On **July 28, 2013** an IED, apparently a dummy, was discovered on the Allon Road between the Jewish village of Kochav Hashahar and the Migdalim...
Junction. Police demolitions experts were called in (Tazpit News Agency, July 28, 2013).

b. On **August 14, 2013** an IED was detonated in an attack on a Border Police post in Abu Dis (east Jerusalem). There were no casualties. It was the third IED planted in the same region.

c. On **September 10, 2013** an IDF force neutralized a pipe bomb placed near a gate close to the town of Alfei Menashe. The gate is used by Palestinian farmers to reach their fields. According to the commander of the IDF force, the bomb was apparently intended to be used to attack IDF forces patrolling the area (IDF Spokesman, September 10, 2013).

d. On **October 25, 2013** an IED, apparently improvised, was thrown at a bus carrying two children as it passed near the village of Yabed (northern Samaria). There were no casualties and no damage was reported (Ynet, October 26, 2013).

22. In 2013 there were **three attacks involving hand grenades. Two of them were** the following:

a. In **April 2013** an improvised hand grenade was thrown at the Tomb of Rachel in Bethlehem. There were no casualties and no damage was reported.

b. On **November 30, 2013** during a riot near the Tomb of Rachel, an improvised hand grenade and stones were thrown at Israeli security forces (IDF Spokesman, November 30, 2013).
23. In 2013 three terrorist attacks were carried out in Israeli territory that originated in Judea and Samaria. One of them involved planting a bomb on an Israeli bus, the second was a stabbing attack, and the third was the abduction and murder of an IDF soldier. The attacks resulted in the deaths of two Israelis. Involved in the carrying out of the attacks were Palestinians staying in Israel illegally and Arab Israeli drivers. The plan for the abduction and murder was formulated by Palestinian terrorist operatives imprisoned in Israel.

24. The identity of the terrorists who carried out the attacks: The bombing of the bus was carried out by a PIJ squad from Bethlehem. The other two attacks were carried out by lone terrorists staying in Israel illegally who had relatives serving prison terms in Israel.

Abduction and Murder of an IDF Soldier from Bat Yam

25. On the evening of September 20, 2013 it was reported that an IDF soldier named Tomer Hazan was missing and had not contacted his family since the morning. Intelligence activity led investigators to a Palestinian named Nidal 'Amer from the village of Bayt Amin (southeast of Qalqiliya). Nidal 'Amer, 42, had worked with the missing soldier in a restaurant in Bat Yam. Nidal 'Amer picked up Tomer Hazan in a taxi and the two drove to the Jewish village of Shaarei Tikva, near Nidal 'Amer's village.

26. During interrogation Nidal 'Amer confessed that he had convinced Tomer Hazan to join him in a trip to 'Amer's village. He led him to a place north of the village of Saniriya, where he killed him and hid his body in a pit. He said he killed him because he wanted to trade his body for the release of his brother, Nur al-Din 'Amer, a Fatah-Tanzim terrorist operative who had been imprisoned in Israel since 2003 for involvement in a number of terrorist attacks (ISA, September 21, 2013). Fatah's military-terrorist wing said in an announcement that it congratulated Nidal 'Amer for carrying out the attack and that it had been "the natural response to the crimes of the
occupation." The announcement called for national unity and continuing the attacks on IDF soldiers and Jewish settlers (Facebook page of Fatah's military-terrorist wing).³

Left: The Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades (Fatah's military-terrorist wing)'s (doubtful) claim of responsibility for the shooting attack in Hebron that killed an IDF soldier (ONA News Agency, September 22, 2013). Right: Sergeant Tomer Hazan, who was abducted and killed, and whose death was applauded by the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades (IDF Spokesman)

### Stabbing Attack in Afula

27. On **November 13, 2013** IDF Private Eden Atias, 19, from Nazareth Ilit, was **stabbed** to death by a 16 year-old Palestinian terrorist on a bus in the northern Israeli city of Afula. Private Atias was taking the bus from Nazareth Ilit to his base. He was asleep when his killer stabbed him in the neck several times, fatally wounding him. Private Atias was evacuated to the hospital in Afula where he later died of his wounds.

28. The terrorist who stabbed him was **Hussein Sharif Ghawadra**, 16, from the village of **Bir al-Basha**, south of Jenin. According to initial reports he infiltrated into Israel where he remained illegally. The attack was premeditated. During interrogation he admitted carrying out the attack against Private Atias, and claimed it was to protest the incarceration of relatives of his in Israeli jails (Israel Police Force Facebook page, November 13, 2013). The Palestinian media reported that **Shadi Ghawadra and Muhammad Ghawadra**, both cousins of the killer, were imprisoned in Israel (one of them for murdering an Israeli civilian in Baqa al-Gharbia in 2003).

³ The social networks posted the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades' (Fatah's military-terrorist wing) claim of responsibility for the attack. The veracity of the claim is doubtful.
29. On the afternoon of **December 21, 2013** an IED exploded on a civilian bus in the central Israeli city of Bat Yam. A passenger on the No. 240 bus from Bnei Brak to Bat Yam found a suspicious bag on one of the rear seats and alerted the driver. The driver stopped the bus in the center of the city, told the passengers to get off and called the police. A few minutes later an explosion was heard. A policeman, who helped the passengers exit the bus, sustained minor injuries.
30. A week after the attack the Israeli security forces exposed and detained the terrorist squad that had planted the bomb on the bus. The squad operatives were PIJ terrorist operatives from Bethlehem. Among the terrorists detained were two brothers, Shehadeh Muhammed Shehadeh Ta'mari, born in 1989, previously imprisoned in Israel, and Hamdi Muhammad Shehadeh Ta'mari, born in 1992, also previously imprisoned in Israel. Hamdi Ta'mari was a cadet in a PA police officers' training course in Jericho. Also detained were Sami Omar Sami Harimi, born in 1993, who stayed in Israel illegally and worked in a restaurant; Yusuf Nasser Yusuf Salameh, born in 1991; and ten others.

31. The initial investigation revealed that after having decided to carry out a terrorist attack in Israel, the two brothers made the bomb. They used two kilograms, or 4.4 pounds, of homemade explosives, screws, nails and ball bearings. The detonator was attached to a cell phone which would be used as a remote control to explode the bomb. Sami Harimi was given the bomb in a black bag. On the morning of the attack he took it to south Mt. Hebron and from there he entered Israel through a breach in the security fence. He got into a car with an Israeli Bedouin who drove illegal Palestinians into Israel, and asked to be taken to Jaffa. Somewhat later he got on a No. 240 bus in the city of Bat Yam, left the bomb on the bus, got off and a few minutes later called the cell phone which was attached the bomb and supposed to activate the detonator.
Popular Resistance Terrorist Attacks and Violence in 2013 Overview

32. Most of the violence and terrorism in Judea and Samaria directed against Israeli security forces and civilians is part of the popular resistance strategy adopted by the PA and Fatah in 2009. It includes "cold" weapons attacks, or what can be considered popular terrorism, such as throwing stones and Molotov cocktails, and stabbing and vehicular attacks. In 2013 the strategy of popular resistance was far from the "peaceful, non-violent resistance" Mahmoud Abbas and senior PA figures represented it as being. The popular resistance made massive use of violence which in some instances led to casualties. The most common popular resistance type of attack was throwing stones and Molotov cocktails, but there were also eight stabbing attacks and two vehicular attacks.

33. Although the use of guns and explosives is far more deadly than the use of cold weapons, in 2013 it was also shown that throwing stones and Molotov cocktails, to say nothing of stabbing and vehicular attacks, could also cause serious injuries and even be fatal to soldiers and civilians. Their potential for causing fatalities was shown in 2013 by the Israeli civilian and soldier who were stabbed to death, and by the number of injuries, some of them serious, caused by stones and Molotov cocktails.

Stabbing Attacks

34. Stabbing attacks are a common type of popular resistance attack and are particularly lethal. They are carried out sporadically and far less often than stone- and Molotov cocktail-throwing attacks. However, their potential for killing a victim is much greater. In 2013 there were eight stabbing attacks, two of which were fatal. Moreover, dozens of potential stabbing attacks were prevented by the discovery of knives and other sharp instruments in the possession of Palestinians at the IDF roadblocks and checkpoints.

35. In recent years there has been a stabbing attack every few months (during the second intifada they were carried out more frequently, every few weeks). In 2013 there were eight stabbing attacks, as compared with four in 2012. In addition, the Israeli

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4 For an analysis of stabbing attacks, see the November 19, 2013 bulletin "The Fatal Stabbing Attack of an Israeli Soldier at the Afula Central Bus Station is a Widespread Modus Operandi that is Relatively Easy to Carry Out, Constituting Part of the Palestinian "Popular Resistance" Attacks. The PA and Fatah Support the "Popular Resistance", Presenting it (Falsely) as a Non-violent Struggle."
security forces prevented several dozen planned and/or attempted stabbing attacks which were not included in the above statistics.

36. A stabbing attack is easy to carry out because knives and other sharp instruments are readily available and preparations are unnecessary. Generally speaking, stabbing attacks are carried out by lone terrorist operatives. During interrogation several perpetrators of stabbing attacks admitted that their basic goal had been to kill a Jew (soldier, Orthodox-religious or settler). In most cases, knives of various types and sizes were the weapons of choice, but in exceptional incidents axes or other sharp instruments were used.

37. Descriptions of the stabbing attacks carried out in 2013 follow:

a. On January 29, 2013 a 17-year-old Israel boy was stabbed at the Tapuah junction, south of Nablus, while he was waiting for a ride. He was seriously wounded and received medical care at the site. He was then evacuated to a hospital for further treatment. An IDF soldier who arrived at the scene chased the terrorist attacker. During the chase they called for backup from the Border Guards, who detained the attacker (IDF spokesman, January 29, 2013). He was 23 years old, a resident of the village of Bayt Rima and a student at Al-Najah University in Nablus. During interrogation he admitted that he had initiated the attack himself, without partners, and that his goal had been to kill an IDF soldier. Not finding a suitable victim, he decided to stab one of the civilians at the Tapuah junction bus stop.
b. On February 4, 2013 there was a stabbing attack on Sultan Suleiman Street in east Jerusalem. A Israeli civilian suffered minor wounds. The knife hit a prayer book in his pocket, preventing it from injuring him seriously. The stabber was detained on site by the Jerusalem police. He was a Hamas operative, 28, from the village of Idna (south of Mt. Hebron). During interrogation he admitted he had been planning to kill an Orthodox Jew or settler for three months. A few days before the attack he infiltrated into Jerusalem and stayed there until the stabbing. He also confessed that he had considered planting an improvised bomb on a Beit Shemesh bus used by Orthodox Jews.

c. On April 30, 2013 a Palestinian terrorist armed with a knife stabbed and killed an Israeli waiting for a bus at the Tapuah junction. He approached a group of civilians waiting for a bus and stabbed one of them in the chest, critically wounding him. The terrorist took the wounded man's gun and shot at a nearby Border Police force. The Border Policemen shot back and wounded the terrorist. Attempts to resuscitate the wounded Israeli man were unsuccessful. He was 32 years old and the father of five. The Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades (Fatah's military-terrorist wing) claimed responsibility for the attack. According to its announcement, the attack was carried out by "released prisoner and hero Salam Assa'd Zaghal, a son of the village of Shuwaykah and one of the heroes of the Shaheed Rae'd Karmi Squad." Salam Assa'd Zaghal was released from an Israeli jail in March 2013 after
having served a term of three years for throwing stones (Palestinian TV, April 30, 2014).

d. On **July 16, 2013** a young Orthodox man, father of four from Jerusalem, was stabbed by two Palestinians. The stabbing occurred near the Nablus Gate. The young man was returning home after having prayed on the Temple Mount. He was severely wounded and evacuated to a hospital. The two attackers fled the scene. The Israeli security forces searched the area but they escaped (Ynet, July 16, 2013).

e. On the night of **October 11, 2013** an Israeli civilian, Seraya Ofer was murdered just outside his home in the village of Brosh Habiq'a in the northern Jordan Valley. At home with his wife, at about 0100 hours they heard barking dogs and noises coming from their yard. Ofer went outside and was attacked and murdered with iron bars and an axe. His wife, who witnessed the attack, escaped and called for help. The area was searched and the murder weapon was found. The Israel Security Agency (ISA) initiated intelligence activities to locate the killers. On October 12, 2013 two Palestinians suspected of involvement in the murder were detained. They were Oudeh Farid Taleb Haroub, 18, and Bashir Ahmed Oudeh Haroub, 21, both residents of the village of Deir Samet (Hebron region). During interrogation they admitted that two weeks previously they had gone to the Ofer home late at night. The information was verified by Ofer’s wife, who said that they had in fact previously visited the house under suspicious circumstances (ISA website, October 13, 2013).

f. On **October 20, 2013** a Palestinian got on an Israeli bus and asked to be let off near the Beitar roadblock (northwest of Bethlehem). When the driver refused the Palestinian took out a knife and threatened him. He later got off the bus. There were no casualties. IDF forces searched the area (IDF Spokesman, October 20, 2014).

g. On **November 7, 2013** a young Palestinian was shot to death after he tried to stab an Israel Border Police soldier at a roadblock near Abu Dis, east of Jerusalem. During the night a vehicle arrived at the roadblock and the soldiers, suspecting it was carrying drugs, conducted a search. As the search was being conducted another vehicle arrived and a Palestinian got out. Holding a knife, he attacked one of the soldiers stationed at roadblock. The
soldier opened fire, wounding him; he later died of his wounds (Facebook page of the Israel Police, November 7, 2013).

h. On December 23, 2013 an Israeli policeman was stabbed at the entrance to the village of Adam (north of Jerusalem). He was evacuated to a hospital with the knife still in his back. He and other policemen had been called to the Adam Junction following a minor traffic accident. The police were directing traffic when he was stabbed in the back. His attacker escaped to the nearby village of Jaba' (Ynet, December 23, 2013).

Left: The Israeli security forces search for the stabber (Judea and Samaria District Spokesman, December 23, 2013). Right: The Adam junction, the site of the attack (Tazpit News Agency, December 23, 2013).

38. In 2013 the Israeli security forces prevented many stabbing attacks, among them the following:

a. On May 7, 2013 a stabbing attack at the Tomb of Joseph in Nablus was prevented during a monthly visit to the site secured by the IDF. Following intelligence obtained prior to the visit, a Palestinian was detained. He was armed with a knife and had been planning to stab an IDF soldier (IDF spokesman's website, May 7, 2013).

b. On November 11, 2013 a Palestinian woman arrived at the Tapuah junction and took out a knife, advancing on an IDF soldier. She was detained and taken for interrogation (IDF spokesman's website, November 11, 2014).
Vehicular Attacks

39. Vehicular attacks are carried out less frequently than stabbing attacks but are more deadly. They are usually carried out by lone terrorists, do not require much advance planning and are usually spontaneous. In 2013 two vehicular attacks were carried out in Judea and Samaria. (In 2012 there were a number of vehicular attacks. In one of them an Israeli civilian was killed and in several members of the Israeli security forces were injured.5)

40. The most serious vehicular attack occurred on October 17, 2013 when a Palestinian driving a tractor tried to enter an IDF base near Al-Ram (southeast of Ramallah). He drove at high speed toward the base fence, crossed it and tried to run over IDF soldiers, using the tractor blade in an attempt to turn over a jeep. He was shot and killed by an IDF force. (IDF spokesman and Ynet, October 17, 2013). The terrorist who carried out the attack was Khader Younes Radeideh from the village of Ubeidiya (east of Bethlehem) whose brother was killed carrying out a similar attack in 2009 (Al-Aqsa TV and the Facebook page of New Bethlehem, October 21, 2013).

41. On February 14, 2013 a Palestinian broke through the Karnei Shomron roadblock and attempted to run over a policeman. The policeman shot at his wheels but he

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5 Between 2000 and 2008, 15 vehicular attacks were carried out, killing 15 people. Three serious vehicular attacks were carried out in Jerusalem during the second half of 2008, two of them using front loaders. Three people were killed in the Jerusalem attacks and about 100 were wounded (Israel Security Agency website, report analyzing the types of terrorist attacks carried out in the preceding decade).
continued driving forward. The policeman then shot at the car and wounded the driver, who was evacuated to a hospital (Ynet, February 14, 2013).

**Throwing Molotov Cocktails**

42. Throwing Molotov cocktails is one of the most common forms of popular resistance attacks, *with several score thrown every month*. Since 2012 attacks involving Molotov cocktails have risen significantly, and become, with throwing stones, a *main type of popular resistance attack*. In 2013 there were 858 attacks in which Molotov cocktails were thrown in Judea and Samaria, as compared with 535 in 2012 (and 318 in 2011).

43. Molotov cocktails are usually thrown by lone Palestinians but sometimes also by organized groups. They are often used to attack Israeli security forces during the weekly Friday riots at the traditional friction zones. *Sometimes a combined attack is carried out involving the throwing of both stones and Molotov cocktails*. In several instances Israeli civilians were destroyed by fire after a Molotov cocktail attack.

**Annual Rise in the Number of Molotov Cocktail Attacks**

44. The most serious Molotov cocktail attacks in 2013 were the following:

a. On the night of **January 26, 2013** IDF forces detained two Palestinians who threw Molotov cocktails at an Israeli military post near Hawara (south of Nablus). They also had three Molotov cocktails ready for throwing in their possession, as well as three improvised hand grenades.
b. On **April 4, 2013** four Palestinian youths reached an IDF post near Einab (Tulkarm) and threw Molotov cocktails at the soldiers stationed there. An IDF force pursued them, opening fire. Two of the Palestinians were killed and a third incurred minor wounds (IDF Spokesman, April 7, 2013). The two who were killed were 17 and 18 years old from the village of Anabta.

c. On **May 16, 2013** a Molotov cocktail was thrown at an IDF jeep on patrol near the village of Hursa (south of Mt. Hebron). The jeep overturned and burst into flames. The four IDF soldiers in the jeep, who incurred minor injuries, managed to exit the vehicle (IDF Spokesman, May 16, 2013).

d. On the evening of **September 14, 2013** (after Yom Kippur) a Molotov cocktail was thrown into the Jewish area of the Abu Tor neighborhood in east Jerusalem. There were no casualties and no damage was reported.
On November 8, 2013 a Molotov cocktail was thrown at an Israeli civilian vehicle near the village of Tekoa in the Etzion Bloc. There were a husband and wife in the vehicle, both of whom managed to get out. The vehicle went up in flames. The husband incurred minor injuries and the wife was seriously injured. Both received medical treatment at the site of the attack and were then evacuated to Hadassah Ein Kerem Hospital (Tazpit News Agency, November 8, 2013).
f. On **November 30, 2013** a Molotov cocktail was thrown at the village of Karmei Tzur (southwest of Bethlehem) There were no casualties and no damage was reported (IDF Spokesman, November 30, 2013).

**Other Attacks Involving Molotov Cocktails**

Students from Beir Zeit University throw Molotov cocktails at the gates of the Ofer prison (Wafa News Agency, February 12, 2013).

Evacuating a Palestinian youngster wounded in confrontation with IDF forces near the Ofer prison. He still holds a Molotov cocktail (Fatah Facebook page, May 15, 2013)
Stone-Throwing Incidents

45. Throwing stones and Molotov cocktails at Israeli security forces in the traditional friction zones and at Israeli vehicles on roads in Judea and Samaria is the most common modus operandi of the popular resistance. The stone throwers are usually young Palestinians, sometimes high school students and even younger children. This type of attack is easy to market in the media, showing stone-throwing as legitimate and harmless, while Israel is shown as an occupying
force suppressing the Palestinian popular resistance. However, stone-throwing is sometimes lethal, as was proved during 2013.

46. We do not have precise statistics regarding stone-throwing incidents. In 2013, as in previous years, between 150 and 350 incidents are estimated per month. That may increase or decrease as a direct result of national Palestinian events and various commemorative days, which increase the stone throwers’ motivation. For example, in 2013 the number of stone-throwing incidents increased between February and April due to the “prisoners protest.”

47. Stone-throwing may not look dangerous but it can be fatal, especially when the stones (and sometimes rocks) target civilian and military vehicles driving (sometimes rapidly) on the roads of Judea and Samaria, or at Israeli security forces in confrontations with Palestinian rioters. Thrown stones can damage or shatter windshields or cause the driver to lose control of the car, leading to the death or injury of the driver or passengers. However, the level of lethality of stone-throwing at security forces deployed at friction zones in Judea and Samaria is low relative to other types of popular resistance. That is because the security forces have protective equipment and have developed tactics for defending themselves.

48. A fatal stone-throwing incident occurred on the evening of March 14, 2013, when a mother and her three daughters were driving on Highway 5 (the trans-Samaria highway). At the Giti Avisar Junction, near the city of Ariel, the truck in front of her stopped suddenly because stones were being thrown at it. The woman...
crashed into the truck and her car was crushed beneath it. **One of the girls, a three-year-old, was critically injured.** Her mother and two sisters, aged four and five, were seriously injured. The truck driver sustained minor injuries. A barrage of stones was thrown at a bus passing by as well. The bus driver and three passengers were sustained minor injuries.

A car accident caused by stone-throwing near Ariel. Four family members were injured, including a toddler, who was fatally injured (Magen David Adom, March 14, 2013).

49. **Most prominent this year were incidents of stones thrown at buses (including in Jerusalem).** For example, on **July 25, 201**, there were two instances of Palestinians throwing stones at buses near the Damascus Gate in the Old City of Jerusalem. Fifteen people were wounded, including children and babies, and four people were taken to the hospital. On **October 1, 2013**, stones were thrown at an Israeli bus near Herod's Gate en route to the Western Wall. There were no casualties. The bus was damaged (Tatzpit News Agency, October 1, 2013).
50. Other notable incidents were the following:

a. **On October 26, 2013**, eight Israelis and a Palestinian girl were wounded near the village of Al-Fawar (in the southern Mount Hebron area) when stones were thrown at a bus and car. The casualties were treated at the scene and later taken to a hospital (Ynet, October 26, 2013).

b. **On November 28, 2013**, a toddler was wounded by a large stone which hit the car she was riding in near the Armon Hanatziv neighborhood in Jerusalem in the early evening. The mother was driving her car with her three children as passengers when stones were thrown at them. One of the stones hit her two year-old toddler on the head. The baby was evacuated to a hospital in critical condition. On the way, her condition was stabilized and designated serious. The stone that hit her came through the window on the right side of the car. That night police detained four suspects aged 15-20 from the East Jerusalem neighborhood of Sur Baher.

c. **On November 17, 2013**, a resident of the Israeli town of Ofra was injured when the window of her vehicle was shattered by stones thrown by Palestinians near Givat Assaf (south of Beit El), on Road 60 (the main road along the mountain ridge). The victim was evacuated for medical treatment. Palestinians also threw stones at cars and a bus on the Etzion-Hebron highway near Al-Aroub (Judea and Samaria rescue services).
Car in which an Ofra resident was wounded by stones thrown by Palestinians near Givat Assaf, south of Beit El (Facebook page of the Jewish Voice, November 17, 2013)

Stone-Throwing during Clashes with Israeli Security Forces

Demonstrators throwing stones at vehicles of Israeli security forces in the area of Qadoum (near Qalqilya) (Filastin al-'Aan, January 26, 2013)
Palestinians throwing stones at the entrance to the village of Ni'ilin (Wafa News Agency, March 1, 2013)

Palestinian throwing stones at IDF forces in Nabi Saleh during the weekly riot against the separation fence (Wafa News Agency, May 24, 2013)
Propaganda Events

Overview

51. The popular resistance activities of 2013 included propaganda displays initiated by popular resistance activists. Their objective was to diversify routine events and give them new momentum. To that end, the organizers planned new and creative activities that often included foreigners, mostly Europeans. In some cases they were anti-Israeli activists, members of NGOs from Western countries participating in the campaign to delegitimize Israel. Foreign diplomats and MPs attended several such events. The PA and Fatah encourage the involvement of foreigners in the popular resistance events, regarding them as strengthening the legitimacy of the popular resistance.

52. One of the events led to a violent clash between a foreign diplomat and the Israeli security forces. In an act of defiance of September 20, 2013, a French diplomat was documented attacking a Border Policeman during an attempt by Palestinian activists to erect an illegal outpost in the northern Jordan Valley. According to the Israeli media, Israel filed a complaint and it was later agreed that diplomat, who served as a cultural attaché at the French consulate in Jerusalem, would leave Israel by the end of this year (Israel Today, September 21, 2013).
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Erecting Illegal Outposts

53. One of the most prominent propaganda displays of the popular resistance was the establishment of outposts as an act of defiance against Israel, creating confrontations between the Palestinian and foreign activists and the Israeli security forces. Sites in Judea and Samaria were selected from time to time and a few dozen activists would come to the site, usually in the middle of the night. They erected tents and/or structures to establish facts on the ground. The displays were supported by senior figures in Fatah and the PA, who arrived on the scene and attracted considerable attention from the official Palestinian media.
54. Examples of Palestinian attempts to erect illegal outposts in 2013:

a. **The Bab al-Shams outpost:** On January 11, 2013, several dozen Palestinian protesters, supported by radical foreign left-wingers, erected a tent camp between Jerusalem and Ma'aleh Adumim, in an area designated as Area E1. The illegal outpost was called "Bab al-Shams" (Gate of the Sun) and had about 50 tents. The organizers said in an announcement that they had decided to erect the outpost after Israel announced its intention to build 4,000 housing units at the site. They also said that it was one form of popular resistance (Ma'an News Agency, January 11, 2013). Many high-ranking Palestinian officials tried to reach the tent camp in order to show their support for the Palestinian activists there, but their entry was blocked by the IDF. Immediately after the tent camp was erected, Israel issued an ultimatum to the demonstrators to leave the area or be forcibly evacuated. Arab lawyers appealed to the Israeli High Supreme Court for an injunction to prevent the evacuation. On the night of January 12 the illegal outpost was evacuated by Israeli security forces.

![Image of the Bab al-Shams illegal outpost](image1)

b. **The Bab al-Karama outpost:** On January 18, 2013, Palestinians erected an illegal outpost in the village of **Beit Iksa** (northwest of Jerusalem). It was erected on a site disputed between Israel and the villagers regarding the route of the security fence. The Palestinians, who claimed that the area belonged to the village, set up tents. They also began building a brick structure designed to serve as a mosque. The Palestinians said that they would not allow Israel to demolish the illegal outpost the way they had the previous one (Wafa News...
Agency, January 18, 2013); however, it was ultimately evacuated by Israeli security forces.

The Al-Karama illegal outpost. Left: Attempts to build a brick mosque (Shihab, January 19, 2013). Right: Palestinian holding a sign which reads: “Oh fascist occupation. We will remain in Beit Ikasa and will not be removed. Your settlers will eventually be evacuated because this is the law of history. The Popular Resistance Committees in Jerusalem (Wafa News Agency, January 18, 2013).

c. An outpost in the Jenin area: On January 25, 2013, several dozen activists tried to erect an illegal outpost near the security fence in the village of A'anin (near Jenin). Their objective was to protest the condition of prisoners incarcerated in Israel. The demonstration turned into a riot after Israeli forces forbade the demonstrators from marching from Jenin to the village. Some of the demonstrators climbed on military vehicles and threw stones at IDF soldiers (Ynet, January 25, 2013).

Fatah activists in the village of A'anin (near Jenin) climbing on IDF vehicles and throwing stones (Wafa News Agency, January 26, 2013)
d. **Bab al-Huriyyah (Gate of Freedom) or Al-Muntar** (the Guard) neighborhood: On February 2, 2013, an illegal outpost was erected in the area of Burin (south of Nablus). Seven tents were set up and some building frames were constructed. According to the organizers, their objective was to protest the destruction of the previous outpost and protect the site from the construction of Jewish settlements. The establishment of the illegal outpost led to confrontations with Israeli security forces, who tried to remove the tents, and with Israeli settlers, who arrived from Har Bracha. As a result, the site was declared a closed military area (Ma'an News Agency, February 2, 2013).

![Right: the establishment of another illegal outpost called Bab al-Huriyyah (Gate of Freedom) in the area of Burin, near Nablus (Fatah al-Youm, February 3, 2013). Left: clashes with Israeli security forces in the area of Burin in the wake of the establishment of the illegal outpost (Shihab, February 2, 2013)](image)

![e. **Canaan Village**](image)

On February 9, 2013, an illegal outpost was erected east of Yatta (south of Hebron), called "Kafr Canaan" (Village of Canaan). The initial intention had been to erect an illegal outpost in the Hawara area, but the plan was changed due to the massive presence of Israeli security forces there. **Mazen Qumsiyeh**, spokesman for the outpost and a BDS activist, said that the activists erected the outpost in support of the residents of Yatta, whose land had been expropriated, and noted that the action would be repeated in different locations (Palestinian TV, February 10, 2013). Upon arrival the activists began to set up the main tent of the village, but

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According to the activists, the name Canaan was chosen as a symbol of a name with a history of thousands of years, which “represents Arabism and honor.” We believe that the name was chosen to emphasize the Palestinians’ alleged deep connection to the Land of Israel, whose roots allegedly go back to the Canaanite period.
immediately after they finished the tent was destroyed by Israeli security forces, who declared the area a closed military zone (Ma'an News Agency, alresala.net, Quds News, February 9, 2013).


f. The Ahfad Younis (Descendants of Younis)\(^7\) Neighborhood: On March 20, 2013, on the day of US President Obama’s visit to Israel, dozens of Palestinians and foreign activists erected an illegal outpost. It numbered about 15 tents, and was erected in Al-Eizariya, opposite Ma'aleh Adumim (Area E1). According to the organizers, Ahfad Younis is one of the neighborhoods of Bab al-Shams, the illegal outpost erected in January 2013. The activists waved the Palestinian flag and hung banners denouncing Barack Obama and America's sympathetic attitude toward Israel (Shihab, March 20, 2013). Senior Fatah activists were also present (Ma'an News Agency, March 20, 2013). On the night of March 23, the illegal outpost was evacuated by Israeli security forces without incident.

\(^7\) Younis is the hero of Elias Houri’s book, Bab al-Shams.
g. **Canaan 5**: On July 28, 2013, a tent camp was erected near **Kfar Etzion**. The activists waved signs and banners protesting Israel and clashed with Israeli security forces, who arrived and dispersed the crowd. According to **Hassan Breijia**, the Popular Committee coordinator in Bethlehem, the operation was a message to the Israeli government “that the settlements will disappear sooner or later and that the Palestinian people clings to its land” (Wafa News Agency, July 27, Al-Hayat al-Jadeeda, July 28, 2013).

h. **Illegal outpost in the Jordan Valley**: On September 20, 2013, dozens of Palestinian demonstrators, left-wing foreign activists and diplomats gathered near the community of Hemdat in the Jordan Valley. The demonstrators, who were equipped with tents, attempted to erect an illegal outpost at the site.
They threw stones at Israeli security forces who arrived to disperse the demonstration (Tatzpit News Agency, September 20, 2013). During the evacuation, a Reuters correspondent documented a French diplomat attacking an Israeli Border Policeman.

Palestinian activists clash with IDF forces (Wafa News Agency, September 20, 2013)

** Blocking Roads  

55. Another modus operandi in the popular resistance is blocking main roads in Judea and Samaria. For example, on **February 18, 2013**, Palestinian demonstrators blocked Highway 60, which crosses Judea and Samaria, to Israeli vehicles as part of the protest on behalf of the prisoners (Wafa News Agency, February 18, 2013).

Blocking Highway 60 to Israeli vehicular traffic (Wafa News Agency, February 18, 2013)
56. **On July 15, 2013,** Palestinian and foreign activists blocked Highway 60 to Israeli vehicles near the villages of Hussan and Beitar Ilit (Bethlehem area). The road was blocked to protest Israel’s intention to implement the Prawer plan regarding the land settlement for the Bedouin population of the Negev. The demonstrators were dispersed by Israeli security forces (PNN website, July 15, 2013).

57. **On July 9, 2013,** Palestinian operatives used sledgehammers to break through the Palestinian side of the Israeli security fence in the area of Abu Dis (east of Jerusalem). The demonstrators tried to cross to the Israeli and were dispersed by Israeli security forces.\(^8\)

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\(^8\) See our Information Bulletin from July 14, 2013: “Popular Committee operatives in Judea and Samaria broke through the security fence in the neighborhood of Abu Dis, implementing so-called ‘creative tactics’.”
Popular resistance operatives making holes in the security fence in Abu Dis (bokra.net, July 9, 2013)

Thwarting and Exposing Terrorist Networks

Overview

58. As part of the ISA's preventive actions, about 190 serious attacks planned mainly in Judea and Samaria, were thwarted and prevented in 2013 (compared with 112 in 2012). Most of the attacks (67) involved planting IEDs. In addition, 52 planned abductions, 52 planned shooting attacks and 16 planned suicide bombing attacks were prevented.

59. The large number of planned attacks revealed in 2013 demonstrated the effectiveness of the Israeli security services. They also indicated the efforts of terrorist organizations, especially Hamas, to promote terrorist activities in Judea and Samaria (a trend that has risen since Operation Pillar of Defense in November 2012). The terrorist activities are carried out by means of the infrastructure in Judea and Samaria, often under the guidance of headquarters and operatives located outside Judea and Samaria.

60. During 2013, terrorists who were released in the Gilad Shalit prisoner exchange deal and deported to the Gaza Strip were involved in guiding terrorist networks in Judea and Samaria. That was in flagrant violation of the release agreement brokered
by Egypt. Sometimes countries such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan were used as meeting places for the residents of Judea and Samaria and their Gazan handlers.

**Thwarting Various Types of Attacks**

61. The most prominent attacks thwarted were the following (according to the General Security Service website).

**Detention of a PIJ Squad Planning to Carry Out an Abduction**

62. On January 1, 2013, acting on advance intelligence, the Israeli security forces detained a squad of three terrorists in Israeli territory near the Eyal checkpoint (east of Kfar Saba). **They planned to abduct a soldier or civilian for bargaining purposes.** Ropes, tape, ski masks, a utility knife and a dummy gun were found in the terrorist operatives' cars. Two of them were residents of Jenin and the third was an Israeli Arab citizen, from the town of Qalansuwa.

63. Under interrogation, the members of the squad revealed that a few days earlier they had **driven by bus stops in the Sharon region (the center of Israel) favored by soldiers and offered rides to a number of soldiers and civilians, but the soldiers refused.** Failing to abduct soldiers, they planned to abduct civilians returning from New Year's Eve parties. Failing that as well, they spent the night in their car near the Eyal checkpoint with the intention of continuing their efforts the following day.
Exposing a Hamas Squad in the Hebron Region that Intended to Carry Out Terrorist Attacks

64. In January 2013, around 20 Hamas operatives from the Hebron area were detained by the Israeli security forces. They belonged to a squad intending to carry out terrorist attacks, especially abductions for bargaining for the release of prisoners. The operatives were already preparing to carry out an abduction attack. They tried to find a safe house and make contact with an Israeli civilian who would serve as their driver. Many weapons were found in their possession, including over 10 types intended for use in the planned terrorist attacks.

65. Most of the detainees had previously served long terms in Israeli prisons for terrorist activities. The operatives were in contact with Hamas officials outside Judea and Samaria to receive assistance, instructions and funding. Most of the contact was with Hussam Badran, a Hamas operative who was released from Israeli prison as part of the Shalit deal. In 2004, Badran was sentenced to 17 years in prison for involvement in suicide bombing attacks during the second intifada. On his release (October 2011), he was deported to Qatar.
66. In addition, in early 2013 the Israeli security forces exposed another terrorist squad that also belonged to the military wing of Hamas in the Hebron area. The squad was directed by a Hamas operative who had been deported to Gaza as part of the Shalit deal. The squad operatives intended to carry out IED and shooting attacks but were detained before they managed to do so. A pipe bomb was found in the possession of one of the terrorist operatives. The squad was headed by Munjed Musa Diab Junaydi, a 23 year-old resident of Hebron. During interrogation he admitted he had been in contact with Bassel Himouni, a Hamas operative from Hebron who was released as part of the Shalit deal and deported to the Gaza Strip.

Exposure of East Jerusalem Squad Planning to Abduct and Murder a Jew

67. In March 2013, the Israel Security Agency and the Israel Police Force detained a seven-man terrorist squad of East Jerusalem residents (from Ras al-Amoud, the Old City and A-Tur). They planned to abduct and kill a Jew, and to steal his weapon. The squad also planned to grab the weapons of Israeli policemen in the A-Tur area. The operatives went to A-Tur several times to find targets. On one occasion they gave a ride to a Jew but released him when they saw that he was unarmed.

68. The leader of the squad, Nur Shahadeh Ahmed Hamdan, a resident of Ras al-Amoud, admitted during interrogation that he had also planned to carry out a military action on the Temple Mount “to defend Al-Aqsa mosque.” To that end he appealed to
Fatah Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades networks in the Gaza Strip and Nablus and asked them for help in shooting Israeli security forces on the Temple Mount. He recruited a number of friends from A-Tur and held shooting practice with them several times. He also planned to go to Nablus to acquire weapons and money from a local Fatah-Tanzim operative.

The members of the squad in East Jerusalem that planned abduction and shooting attacks
(Shihab, April 18, 2013)

**Exposure of a Hamas Squad that Intended To Carry Out Abductions and Other Terrorist Attacks**

69. In May 2013, security forces exposed a squad of Hamas operatives from the Ras Karkar and Silwad region (west and east of Ramallah, respectively). They planned to carry out attacks such as planting IEDs, abducting a soldier or a civilian resident of Judea and Samaria and launching locally manufactured rockets. The squad members were in contact with the Gaza Strip via the Internet and telephone, and received training in manufacturing weapons. They received concrete instructions to abduct a soldier, take his ID card and mobile phone for negotiating purposes and then kill him and hide his body.

70. At the time of their arrest, the members of the squad were in the advanced stages of preparations for the attack and had even notified the Gaza Strip that they were
prepared to act within a few days. The interrogation of the squad members revealed
that the man behind some of the intended attacks was Fathi Hamad⁹, interior minister
in the Hamas de-facto administration and, as such, also responsible for the
enforcement of the lull in the Gaza Strip.

Arrest of a Hamas Operative Who Intended to Carry Out
an Abduction and Shooting Attack

71. In May 2013 the ISA detained Hamas operative Baker Atallah Samih Sa’ad, from
the village of Mazra’a al-Sharqia (in the Ramallah region), who planned to carry out
abductions and shooting attacks. Interrogation revealed that in April 2013 he had
met in Jordan with Hamas operative Hisham Abd al-Qader Ibrahim Hijaz, from
the same village, who had been released in the Gilad Shalit deal.¹⁰ Hijaz recruited
him to Hamas and instructed him to plan abductions and shooting attacks against
Israeli soldiers and civilians. He was told that close to the date of the attacks a
messenger would bring him four weapons. He was also instructed to raise money for
his terrorist activities. Baker Atallah Samih Sa’ad agreed to go to Sudan for military
training.

Preventing a Mass-Casualty Attack in Jerusalem

72. In August 2013, Israeli security forces detained six operatives belonging to the
Hamas network in Ramallah and Jerusalem. They had made advanced preparations
to carry out a terrorist attack using an IED at a mall in Jerusalem during the Jewish
High Holidays (New Year and Yom Kippur). The network was headed by Hamdi
Hasanein Hamdi Roumaneh, from Al-Bireh, born in 1991. Roumaneh recruited two
operatives from East Jerusalem who were supposed to transport an IED into Israel
using their Israeli ID cards. The two, who worked as janitors in the Mamilla Mall in
downtown Jerusalem, were supposed to bring the IED into the mall and conceal it
in their workplace locker. During one of the High Holidays, when the mall was

⁹ In the months that have passed since Operation Pillar of Defense, Hamas operatives in the Gaza Strip,
led by Fathi Hamad, interior minister in the Hamas de-facto administration, have made an effort to
establish a terror infrastructure in Judea and Samaria to carry out attacks against Israel. Fathi Hamad’s
involvement in directing attacks in Judea and Samaria exposes his two sides, as both handler of terrorism
squads in Judea and Samaria, and as responsible for the security services of the Hamas administration
that enforces the restraint policy in the Gaza Strip. In addition, for years there has been close collaboration
between the security services he heads and the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas’ military-terrorist
wing.

¹⁰ Hisham Abd al-Qader Ibrahim Hijaz is responsible for the deaths of 10 Israeli civilians and IDF
soldiers in terrorist attacks. He was given ten life sentences but was released as part of the Shalit deal and
deported. He now lives in Qatar.
crowded with people, they were supposed to camouflage the IED in gift-wrapping and place it in a restaurant or shop.

73. Investigation exposed a laboratory in Roumaneh’s home where materials for manufacturing explosives were found. Also found were written instructions for manufacturing explosives and IEDs. Roumaneh admitted he had been in touch with a laboratory worker from Bitunia and two Ramallah residents who provided him with chemicals from which he was able to manufacture explosives.

74. The squad operatives were planning other terrorist attacks, including booby-trapping a house in Ramallah to attack IDF soldiers, manufacturing rockets and firing them at Israeli villages near Ramallah, and using hand guns to shoot at IDF soldiers in the Hizma roadblock, north of Jerusalem.

Hamas’ intention of carrying out an attack in Jerusalem’s Mamilla Mall during the High Holidays by means of an improvised IED was thwarted. Left: Ball bearings that were added to the IED to increase its lethality. Right: The IED (Israel Security Agency, September 1, 2013)
75. A squad was uncovered in 2013 in the Hebron region whose operatives belonged to a Salafist-jihadi organization. In addition, a number of Salafist-jihadi operatives from Judea and Samaria were identified as having gone to fight in Syria alongside the jihad groups fighting the Assad regime. Nevertheless, it can be said that the level of activity of Salafist-jihadi elements affiliated with the global jihad ideology in Judea and Samaria is still low-profile.

76. The most prominent event of the year was in November 2013, during an Israeli security force action in the region of the village of Yatta (Hebron), when three terrorist operatives were killed during an Israeli soldiers attempt to detain them. The three belonged to a local Salafist-jihadi network operating in the area that was planning a terrorist attack. Two guns and a number of explosive devices were found in the terrorists’ car.

77. Before the event, several operatives belonging to the network had been detained in Yatir and Nablus. Investigations revealed that the network was planning to carry out a number of attacks against Israeli and PA targets. In the months before

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11 For information on Palestinian foreign fighters in Judea and Samaria, see the January 5, 2014 bulletin, “Israeli Arabs and Palestinians Join the Ranks of the Rebels in Syria”
they were killed they established a broad military-terrorist network, setting up a safe house, purchasing weapons and manufacturing explosives (Israel Security Agency, November 2013). The three were also wanted by the PA’s security forces (Al-Hayat, November 27, 2013).

78. The Mujahideen Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem, a network in the Gaza Strip affiliated with the global jihad, issued a statement following the deaths of the three terrorist operatives. It announced the introduction of jihad into the West Bank and said a jihad would be waged there against the “PA tyrants” (Al-Fidaa forum, November 29, 2013). The three were buried in Yatta. During the funeral, black Salafist flags were waved. Senior Judea and Samaria Salafist figures were present, their first public appearance (Al-Hayat, November 27, 2013).

79. On December 25, 2013, the Israeli security forces detained three terrorist operatives who belonged to a network affiliated with the global jihad. Two of them were residents of East Jerusalem and carried Israeli ID cards. The members of the network, who did not know one another, had been recruited and were handled by an operative from the Gaza Strip, mainly through the Internet. According to sources in the ISA, they used the Internet to operate in the same way as Al-Qaeda organizations around the globe. The members of the organization received computer files from the Gaza Strip containing training materials for manufacturing explosives. One of the operatives was supposed to go via Turkey to Syria for military training and to coordinate the attacks.
80. The members of the network in Jerusalem planned to carry out a number of attacks, including an attack on a bus going from Jerusalem to Ma’aleh Adumim. The intention was to shoot the tires of the bus, causing it to overturn, and then to shoot the passengers and rescue forces at close range. After the attack was canceled, they decided to carry out a double suicide bombing at the Jerusalem Convention Center and at the US Embassy in Tel Aviv. They also planned to abduct a soldier from a bus stop in Jerusalem and place an explosive device in the building in Jerusalem’s Abu Tor neighborhood, where Jews live. The suicide bombings at the Jerusalem Convention Center and the US Embassy were planned to be carried out by five foreign terrorists, who were supposed to come to Israel disguised as tourists with fake Russian documents.

Policy of the PA and Fatah

Overview

81. The PA and Fatah publicly support the terrorism and violence carried out as part of the popular resistance. Furthermore, beginning in 2013, PA and Fatah spokesmen declared that the popular resistance should be expanded during the coming year (which was called the “year of the explosion of popular resistance”). It is PA policy to provide political and propaganda support for the popular resistance, falsely presenting it as “resistance carried out by peaceful means” and exploiting it for its anti-Israeli campaign even as it holds political negotiations.

82. At the same time, Mahmoud Abbas reiterated his objection to the military armed struggle. Nevertheless, the Fatah movement, which is Mahmoud Abbas’s power base, again made it clear that the principle of the “armed struggle” should not be abandoned even if popular resistance was given priority under the current circumstances. The platform of Fatah’s sixth conference (August 2009) specifically stated that the concept of the “armed struggle” remained a possible future alternative when the political and social conditions in the conflict with Israel required it. Moreover, even during the popular resistance, Fatah and the PA are careful to preserve the heritage and symbols of the “armed struggle” against Israel. That is reflected, inter alia, by the commemoration of shaheeds (from all the organizations) who were killed in terrorist attacks against Israel, and support for Palestinian prisoners, including those who carried out terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians.
83. As part of its support for popular resistance, the PA directly and indirectly provides financial and logistic aid to the networks and organizations that promote popular resistance. PA and Fatah officials publicly praise the popular resistance and take part in its events, especially propaganda displays (demonstrations, erecting outposts, conferences and rallies). In addition, the PA’s security services do not take effective preventive measures against the use of cold weapons the way they do against armed activity, though they make an effort to contain and control violent conflicts. In the international arena, the PA fully legitimizes the popular resistance. Despite the considerable violence that it triggers and although it often causes casualties, the PA markets it to the international community as peaceful resistance (muqawama silmiya) or unarmed resistance (muqawama ghayr musallaha).

84. The PA and its security forces enforce their policy against the armed military struggle on Hamas and the other terrorist organizations. They engage in ongoing preventive activities and security cooperation with Israel, despite harsh criticism, mainly from Hamas. However, an analysis of the terrorist attacks and violence in 2013 shows that significant increase in popular resistance incidents may lead to an increase in the scope and severity of armed military activity, although that is not PA policy.
Statements by Senior PA Officials

85. Following are a number of statements about the popular resistance made by senior PA figures:

A. Referring to the issue of “resistance,” Mahmoud Abbas said that “the armed option” as tried in the past had not proved itself, and therefore circumstances dictated adhering to the principle of nonviolent popular resistance. He also said that that position was shared by the PA and Hamas. Hamas was quick to issue a denial (Al-Mayadeen, January 25, 2013).

B. Interviewed in Moscow, Mahmoud Abbas said there was no need for the Palestinian people to resume the “armed struggle” because the balance of power was not in favor of the Palestinian people and it would be of no benefit. The Palestinian people had other weapons, i.e., popular demonstrations by peaceful means and addressing international forums (Russia al-Youm, March 15, 2013).

C. In a speech at the UN Mahmoud Abbas detailed the activities of the settlers against the Palestinians and Israeli construction in Judea and Samaria. He contrasted them to what he called “the peaceful popular resistance” of the Palestinian people (Palestinian TV, September 26, 2013).

D. At an exhibition of agricultural products held at the Muqata’a in Ramallah, Mahmoud Abbas praised Palestinian agricultural produce, stressing it was one of the Palestinian people’s forms of peaceful popular resistance (Sawt al-Ghad, June 11, 2013).

E. In a taped interview during his visit to Cairo, Mahmoud Abbas stressed his adherence to peaceful popular resistance with the goal of protecting the soil (Al-Fajr, Egypt, May 17, 2013).

F. At an event held in Ramallah commemorating Yasser Arafat, Mahmoud Abbas said that despite the obstacles from Israel the Palestinians continued protecting their rights under international law and according to their legitimate right. He said Palestinian rights should be protected through diplomatic activity and peaceful popular resistance, adherence to national principles and with regard to every grain of soil (Al-Hurriya News Agency, November 10, 2013).
G. On March 1, 2013, the Palestinians marked the eighth anniversary of the battle over the route of the security fence in Bil‘in, in the presence of former Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad. Fayyad gave a speech praising the demonstrations in Bil‘in, noting that they had become a model of nonviolent popular resistance worthy of emulation. During the rally, stones were thrown at the Israeli security forces. The Palestinians reported that about 25 demonstrators were injured during the clashes. Salam Fayyad was evacuated because of tear gas fired by Israeli security forces at the stone throwers (Al-Hayat al-Jadeeda, March 1, 2013).

H. Adnan al-Dmeiri, spokesman for the PA’s security services, called on Palestinians to increase and expand the popular resistance so that the world would pressure Israel to stop its “acts of aggression” (Radio Mawtini, which belongs to Fatah’s propaganda mechanism, January 3, 2013).

I. Saeb Erekat, member of the PLO Executive Committee and head of the Palestinian negotiating team, said in an interview that if American Secretary of State John Kerry’s mission failed, Mahmoud Abbas would join international organizations to conduct the struggle against Israel, while continuing its popular resistance activities (PTV, Al-Mayadeen, Al-Hayat, June 6, 2013).

J. Minister for local government Sa‘ed al-Kuni spoke on behalf of the prime minister at the Third Palestinian Convention for Popular Resistance. He said that the popular committees played an important role in defending the Palestinian cause at all levels. He added that the popular resistance had been able to neutralize the Israeli army and strengthened the Palestinian position, according to which the Palestinians were an “innocent people who oppose the occupation.” He also emphasized the government’s position regarding future assistance to the popular committees that coordinate the popular resistance activities.

**Statements by Senior Fatah Officials**

86. When speaking publicly, Fatah activists are less restrained than PA officials. They adhere to the popular resistance and claim that they will escalate it. At the same time, they make it clear that the option of armed struggle has never been
abandoned. In addition, many posters calling for violence and terrorism appear on Fatah’s social networks (see below).

87. Some of the statements made during the year were the following:

A. At a rally in the village of Kadum marking the second anniversary of the popular resistance, Mahmoud al-Aloul, a member of Fatah’s Central Committee and head of the movement’s ministry of recruitment and organization, stressed the importance of various forms of popular resistance in the struggle (PNN website, July 5, 2013).

B. Speaking at the Third Palestinian Convention on Popular Resistance, Mahmoud al-Aloul said that the issue of popular resistance as the Palestinian people’s current chosen alternative should be disseminated. However, he added that that did not mean that the Palestinians had abandoned other alternatives. He praised the creativity of popular resistance in recent times, which was manifested by erecting outposts and attempts to destroy the security fence (Ma’an News Agency, August 31, 2013).

C. Tawfiq al-Tirawi, a member of Fatah’s Central Committee, called on the residents of the towns and villages to use “human shields” to “defend the people of the resistance” and protect the homeland (Wafa News Agency, August 26, 2013). In a statement in response to Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, Tawfiq al-Tirawi said that Fatah had never abandoned the gun, the stone or the struggle, and that “Kiryat Arba and the Etzion Bloc do not belong to Israel, while Nazareth, Jaffa and Haifa will remain Palestinian. We will have a Palestinian state from the [Jordanian] river to the [Mediterranean] sea” (Ma’an News Agency, October 9, 2013; Tawfiq al-Tirawi’s Facebook page, October 13, 2013).

D. Yasser Dudin, Fatah secretary in southern Hebron, gave a speech for Fatah founding day in which he said: “We promise you, in 2013 we will work to escalate the popular resistance... according to the model of Bil‘in, Ni‘lin and Al-Ma‘sara…” (Palestinian TV, December 31, 2012).

E. During public relations activities in Beit Jala attended by European ambassadors and consuls, Nabil Shaath, a member of Fatah’s Central Committee and the movement’s head of foreign relations, called for “popular
resistance against the Israeli occupation” (Quds News website, October 11, 2013; Radio Mawtini, October 12, 2013). During the event a number of activists sabotaged the fence in the Jewish settlement of Har Gilo which, according to them, was erected on land belonging to Beit Jala (PNN Channel, October 11, 2013).

Nabil Shaath is interviewed in the media during the event in the Beit Jala area (PNN Channel, October 11, 2013)

F. Sultan Abu al-Einein, member of the Fatah Central Committee, gave an impassioned speech attacking the negotiations with Israel during a rally held in Nablus (November 11, 2013). He said, “It is time for us not to accept condolences for our shaheeds,” and that “every people living under an occupation has the right to resistance (muqawama) of all types, including armed struggle” (Ma’an News Agency, November 11, 2013).

Glorification of the Popular Resistance and Incitement to Violence and Terrorism on Fatah’s Social Networks

88. Fatah’s social networks serve as platforms for incitement to violence and terrorism against Israel. They feature posters glorifying the popular resistance, stress the importance of the armed struggle as a means to achieve Palestinian goals, foster the images of the shaheeds and perpetrators of terrorist attacks and disseminate hatred of Israel:
“Heroes of the stones. Our stones are stronger than your rifle bullets”  
(Fatah’s official Facebook page, July 11, 2013).

“The Bridge of Return” (Fatah’s official Facebook page, July 14, 2013).
Left: “How many likes for the soul of the shaheed…? Fadi Qafisheh, king of explosive devices.”
The picture shows Fadi Qafisheh preparing explosive belts (used by suicide bombers) (Fatah’s official Facebook page, July 22, 2013). Right: A poster bearing the message “My homeland taught me that the blood of shaheeds is what marks its borders” (Fatah’s official Facebook page, July 21, 2013).

Poster that appeared on the Facebook page of Fatah’s Ministry of Recruitment and Organization. This poster shows Mahmoud Abbas speaking at a UN assembly alongside a Palestinian armed with a rifle and another Palestinian holding a large stone. The caption reads “Fatah. Struggle in all ways until [the establishment of] the state” (Facebook page of the Fatah Office of Recruitment and Organization, September 8, 2013)

Fadi Qafisheh – operative in the military arm of Fatah in Nablus. Killed on August 31, 2006 during an IDF operation in Nablus. Qafisheh was involved in preparing dozens of explosive belts for suicide bombing attacks and in attempts to carry out terrorist attacks in Israel by means of car bombs.
Left: Facebook page: “Death to Israel” in Arabic and in Hebrew. A call to distribute and publish this on Facebook pages and the Internet (Facebook page of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades – the Al-Asifa Army, September 29, 2013). Right: “And rage, and rage, and rage” (Facebook page of Fatah’s Ministry of Recruitment and Organization, July 17, 2013).

A poster on the Facebook page: “Our decision, resistance” (Facebook page of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades – the Al-Asifa Army, October 4, 2013)