Introduction
With the downfall of its nemesis Saddam Hussein, Iran can now pursue two principal
objectives in Iraq: the first is to stir up problems for the Americans to keep
them pinned down and divert their attention from its nuclear program. The second
is to assert its influence over the Hawza, or the Shi'a religious centers in
the two holy cities of Najaf and Karbala, and to prevent the emergence in these
cities of an independent religious and spiritual leadership competing with the
Iranian city of Qum.
In a Friday sermon on April 9, delivered at Tehran University amid shouts of "Death
to America, Death to Israel," Expediency Council head Hashemi Rafsanjani
said: "The present situation in Iraq represents a threat as well as an opportunity...
It is a threat because the wounded American beast can take enraged actions, but
it is also an opportunity to teach this beast a lesson so it won't attack another
country."(1)
Open Borders - An Invitation to Subversion
It is commonly recognized that the coalition forces have been unable to fully
control Iraq's borders with its neighbors, particularly with the antagonist neighbors
- Iran and Syria. On Iraq's eastern and southern fronts, both Iranian intelligence
agents and Iranian-sponsored terrorists have been able to enter Iraq at will.
Many of them are easily disguised as religious pilgrims who, for the first time
in years, are able to visit the two holy cities of Najaf and Karbala freely.
For Shi'a Muslims, these pilgrimages are almost as theologically significant
as a pilgrimage to Mecca.
Operating in a friendly milieu in southern Iraq, which is inhabited predominantly
by Shi'a Muslims, Iranian intelligence officers have used a combination of incentives
and coercion to widen the base of collaborators. According to the Iraqi
daily Al-Nahdha, the Iraqi police have arrested many Iranians who are ostensibly
pilgrims but, in reality, are intelligence operatives. The newspaper estimates
the number of Iranian agents operating in Iraq at 14,000. They are penetrating
the country's nascent security forces and taking advantage of the open distribution
of books and literature. As a measure of their success to sell their revolutionary
dogmas to the Iraqis, the newspaper's reporter has found that, for the first
time in modern Iraqi history, a growing number of policemen have grown beards
as a symbol of their identification with revolutionary Iran. Pilgrims are
also known to have brought to Iraq hundreds of remote controls devices capable
of activating explosives.(2)
Al-Sadr's Visit to Iran
The young Iraqi Shi'a revolutionary cleric and rabble rouser Muqtada Al-Sadr
has visited Iran in 2004 as a guest of the Revolutionary Guard. During his visit,
Al-Sadr met with Hashemi Rafsanjani, head of the Expediency Council, as well
as the head of the revolutionary guard intelligence, Murtadha Radha'i, and the
commander of the Al-Quds Army responsible for Iraqi affairs, Brig.-General Qassim
Suleimani, and other government and religious leaders.(3)
Training Camps for Al-Sadr's Supporters
A source in the Al-Quds Army of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard revealed to the
London daily Al-Sharq Al-Awsat information relating to the construction of three
camps and training centers on the Iranian-Iraqi borders to train elements of
the "Mehdi Army" founded by Muqtada Al-Sadr. The source estimated that
between 800 and 1200 young supporters of Al-Sadr have received military training
including guerilla warfare, the production of bombs and explosives, the use of
small arms, reconnoitering, and espionage. The three camps were located in Qasr
Shireen, 'Ilam, and Hamid, bordering southern Iraq which is inhabited largely
by Shi'a Muslims.
The newspaper also reported that the Iranian Embassy in Baghdad has distributed
400 satellite phones to supporters of Al-Sadr and to clerics and students at
the A'thamiyya district of Baghdad, Al-Sadr City, and in Najaf, all of which
are inhabited predominantly by Shi'a Muslims.
The Iranian source, known in Iraq as "Abu Hayder," confirmed that the
intelligence service of the Revolutionary Guards has introduced to the Shi'a
cities radio and TV broadcasting facilities which are used by Al-Sadr and his
supporters.(4)
The source estimated the financial support to Al-Sadr in recent months have exceeded
$80 million, in addition to the cost of training, equipment, and clothing of
his supporters.
The source indicated that elements of the Al-Quds Army and the Revolutionary
Guard Intelligence lead many of the operations directed against the coalition
forces. These elements are also leading a campaign against the senior Shi'a clerics
such as the Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, Hussein Al-Sadr [Muqtada's uncle],
Ayatollah Ishaq Al-Fayyadh, and others, because of their opposition to the concept
of "the Rule of the Jurist" (Wilayat Al-Faqih), which is Khomeini's style
of government.(5)
Iranian Intelligence Services in Iraq
An Iranian official known as Al-Haj Sa'idi, who was previously in charge of the
Iraqi desk in the Iranian intelligence services, spoke of a dense Iranian presence
from the uppermost point in the north of Iraq to the lowest point. The Iranians
can draw upon a large reservoir of potential agents from the Iraqi Shi'a but
more so from the Iraqi-Iranian nationals who were expelled by Saddam Hussein
to Iran and are now coming back to Iraq not only acting as agents but also representing
a large reservoir of Shi'a voters who could tip the scale in favor of Al-Sadr
in future elections in Iraq. These agents are suspected of assassinating the
liberal Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir Al-Haqim, the former leader of the Supreme Council
of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and a former member of the Iraqi governing
council, and were about to assassinate Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani,
another moderate cleric, before their designs were exposed.(6)
Iranian Money to Support Secular Groups
The Iraqi daily Al-Zaman reported a secret investigation being carried out by
the CPA and the Iraqi Governing Council on the flow of funds from Iran to secular
groups. Meetings with such groups are also known to have taken place in various
Gulf countries. While Iran has denied intervening in the internal affairs of
Iraq, every available evidence suggests the contrary.(7)
In an article, Al-Zaman criticized Iran for allowing into Iraq members of Al-Qa'ida
and of extremist Arab groups loyal to Tehran. It also criticized Iran's attempt
to impose its control over the Iraqi Shi'a Islamic centers, and terrorize those
who do not acquiesce. Further, the article referred to the smuggling of Iraqi
oil, sheep and spare parts, and the destruction of the Iraqi economic infrastructure
in the hands of organized Iranian gangs - criminal acts which, the paper argued
could not have been carried out without explicit support of the Iranian authorities.
The paper characterized Iranian policies as "nefarious and unfathomable."(8)
Hizbullah in Iraq
Another arm of Iran's intervention in Iraq is its proxy - Hizbullah. According
to the London daily Al-Hayat Iran sent 90 of its fighters to Iraq shortly after
the fall of the Saddam regime. The presence of Hizbullah fighters in Iraq is
meant to neutralize any attempt by the coalition forces to activate opposition
to Iran from within Iraq. In the words of an Iraqi daily, Iran is telling Washington, "We
can help but we can also cause harm."(9) In the meantime, seeking more controversy,
Muqtada Al-Sadr announced that he was in alliance with Hizbullah, which has Iranian
support, and with the Palestinian Hamas. This alliance was broadly criticized
by the Iraqi press.
Pilgrims Inundating Holy Sites
With borders wide open and with no requirement for either a passport or a visa,
150 buses arrive daily in Karbala. The number of visitors was much larger
during 'Ashura, when the Shi'a Muslims mourn the death of Hussein, Prophet Muhammad's
grandson, or during other religious holidays. Al-Hayat wrote about "black
spots" moving from one place to another preceded by someone carrying a flag
as is common in tourist groups. The rotating chairman of the Iraqi Governing
Council, Muhsin Abd Al-Hamid said Iraq has authorized the visit by 1000-2000,
but in fact 10,000 Iranians cross the borders daily.(10)
However, the borders are, in essence, open in only one direction. The Iraqi daily
Baghdad writes about the unhappiness of many Iraqis that Iranians can enter the
country without passports - and, in some cases, can even bring in drugs which
they exchange for fabrics and food. By contrast, an Iraqi citizen has to pay
$140 to obtain a visa to enter Iran.(11) According to Iraqi estimates 10 percent
of the 5 million Iranian visitors have managed to register as Iraqis and are
able to vote in future elections.(12)
Iranian Flags in Karbala
In a piece titled "Do Not be Surprised to See the Iranian Flags over Karbala," the
front page editor of the Iraqi daily Al-Mashriq wrote that it is one thing for
the Iranians to visit the holy sites or to organize exhibitions in Baghdad to
distribute pictures of their religious symbols (referring perhaps to the photographs
of Ayatallah Khomeini); it is altogether a different thing to raise the
Iranian flags by the side of holy sites or for the Persian language to
become the spoken language of the people of Karbala. The editor complained about
Iranians who bring drugs or who smuggle Iraqi antiquities, heritage and food.
For the newspaper, these events represent "a cultural invasion."(13)
Al-Sistani Issues a Fatwa Calling for Calm
The recent rebellion by Muqtada Al-Sadr and his threat to use his militia to
rain "the fire of hell" upon any attempt by the coalition forces to
enter Najaf and capture him, has been denounced by the Shi'a religious establishment
in Najaf and Karbala. They have called upon Al-Sadr to take his forces out of
these two cities to save their inhabitants "death, suffering, fire, and
smoke."(14) More importantly, the senior Shi'a cleric, Grand Ayatollah Al-Sistani
issued a fatwa forbidding anything that would lead to the disruption of peace.
The fatwa reads: "In the name of the Almighty - We denounce the methods
of the occupation forces in dealing with current incidents, as we denounce the
violation on public and private properties and anything that disrupts the peace
and prevents Iraqi officials from carrying out their duties in serving the people.
We call for treating these matters with wisdom and through peaceful means and
the avoidance of any escalating measure that leads to more chaos and bloodshed.
It is incumbent on the political and social forces to participate actively to
put an end to these tragedies and Allah is the Source of Success."(15)
Al-Sistani believes that in free elections in Iraq, the Shi'a will gain a majority
which will lead them to head the post-occupation elected government, and he is
not interested in rocking the boat. He sees in Al-Sadr not only a challenge to
his authority but a disruptive element that could jeopardize the chances of the
Shi'a to reach their goal. It is not surprising that he has refused to meet with
Al-Sadr despite the latter's many appeals.
Similarly, it was reported from the city of Qum, the Shi'a religious center in
Iran, that Ayatollah Kadhem Hussein Al-Ha'iri, who is considered Muqtada Al-Sadr's
spiritual father, has expressed his displeasure with Al-Sadr's conduct and for
failing to coordinate with Al-Ha'iri's office in Najaf.(16) In addition, religious
and tribal leaders in the Najaf area have denounced the heavy-handed tactics
used by the Al-Mehdi Army to impose its will on the local inhabitants.(17)
It is too early to tell how the rebellion led by Al-Sadr will end. It is clear
that if the sovereignty of Iraq is to be transferred on June 30 the militias
will have to cease to exist. Failing to do so will raise the danger that the
various ethnic groups and sub-groups might resort to the use of force to attain
their goals. The Ir
anians could help for a price but the CPA is on record against any Iranian involvement
in the affairs of Iraq.(18) Hence, other means for removing Al-Sadr and his militia
from two holy Shi'a cities of Najaf and Karbala may be inevitable.
*Nimrod Raphaeli is a Senior Analyst at MEMRI.
Endnotes:
(1) Al-Siyassah (Kuwait), April 10, 2004.
(2) Al-Nahdha (Iraq), February 17, 2004.
(3) Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), October 8, 2003.
(4) Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), April 9, 2004.
(5) Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), April 9, 2004.
(6) Al-Furat (Baghdad), April 4, 2004.
(7) Al-Zaman (Iraq), April 17, 2004.
(8) Al-Zaman (Iraq), November 11, 2003.
(9) Al-Hayat (London), November 25, 2003.
(10) Al-Sabah (Iraq), February 23, 2004.
(11) Baghdad (Iraq), February 23, 2004.
(12) Al-Zaman (Iraq), April 14, 2004.
(13) Al-Mashreq (Iraq) February 17, 2004.
(14) Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), April 28, 2004.
(15) Al-Ittihad (Baghdad), April 12, 2004.
(16)Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), April 30, 2004.
(17)Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), April 30, 2004.
(18) See the interview with Ambassador Bremer on Al-Jazeera TV, April 26, 2004.
