The death of Yasser Arafat (November 2004) and the election of Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) for Chairman of the Palestinian Authority marked the beginning of a new era, or rather a new phase, in the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian violent confrontation that had started in September 2000. In this new era, terrorist attacks were supposed to stop and there was supposed to be a lull in the fighting, based on an agreement achieved in Cairo between the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian terrorist organizations. The fundamental disagreements between Israel and the Palestinian Authority should have been resolved by resuming dialogue and negotiations in the spirit of the agreements achieved in the Sharm el-Sheikh summit (February 8, 2005).

However, the expectations prevalent among the Israeli public and, to a large extent, among the Palestinian public as well, were not fulfilled in the course of the first six months of the lull in the fighting. As the lull continued, the level of restraint exhibited by the terrorist organizations diminished. Since the month of March, the extent of terrorist attacks systematically increased every month and reached its peak in the month of July, when more terrorist attacks were perpetrated than in any other month in the year that preceded the lull. However, as of the end of July, there has been a sharp decrease in the extent of terrorist attacks and the situation on the ground during the disengagement remains relatively calm.

A consequence of the continuing terrorist activity by the various terrorist organizations (primarily the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, which sought to derail the lull in the fighting) was the reemergence of the familiar pattern that had been seen during the violent confrontation: Palestinian terrorist attacks prompting countermeasures by the Israeli security forces, which in turn served as a pretext for the continuation and even escalation of terrorism. The Palestinian Authority, headed by Abu Mazen, repeatedly expressed its opposition to the continuation of the confrontation, with its violent characteristics, with far greater resolve and clarity than it had under Arafat. It was unable, however, to enforce its policy on the various terrorist organizations. A prominent exception was the Palestinian Authority's willingness to confront Hamas during the massive Qassam rocket and mortar attack carried out in July 2005.

This state of affairs can be further elaborated by two additional characteristics:

• In the course of the lull, there has been a significant drop in the deadly effect of the terrorist attacks compared to the year before the lull. This stems, in our assessment, primarily from the significant drop in the number of suicide bombing attacks and the emphasis placed on terrorist attacks that cause relatively few casualties (shooting attacks; Qassam rocket and mortar fire).

• During the past month, after the July peak of terrorist attacks, there has been a sharp decrease in the extent and severity of terrorist attacks, as already mentioned. The factors contributing to this decrease are, in our assessment, the concentration of IDF forces on the outskirts of the Gaza Strip and Israel 's statement that it would not hesitate to resort to force in order to preclude the possibility of the disengagement taking place under fire. Coupled with these is the negative stance of the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian population over Qassam rocket fire, the demonstration of the Palestinian Authority's willingness to confront Hamas over this issue and, above all, the overall desire not to disrupt the disengagement. Is it a change of direction or just a temporary decrease stemming from the disengagement? It is hard to say for certain and this document does not deal with that.

Following are the characteristics of the terrorist activities in the course of the first six months of the lull in the fighting (February-July 2005) compared to terrorist activities from January 2004 to January 2005, and ensuing implications.

Characteristics of terrorist attacks in the course of the lull in the fighting

Following are two graphs that summarize the characteristics of all the terrorist attacks during the first six months of the lull in the fighting and in the year before.

Characteristics of terrorist attacks in monthly distribution
during February-July 2005

Characteristics of terrorist attacks in monthly distribution
between January 2004 and January 2005

Two main conclusions arise from the statistical data:

• The erosion of the lull in the fighting. During the first months of the lull (February-March 2005), after the Sharm el-Sheikh summit, there was a sharp decrease in the number of terrorist attacks compared to last year. However, starting from March until July, the lull gradually eroded. The extent of terrorist attacks systematically increased every month until it hit a peak of 463 terrorist attacks in the month of July, more than in any other month in the year 2004.

• The form of terrorist attacks changed in the course of the lull. The most visible characteristic is a significant decrease in the number of suicide bombing attacks (15 suicide bombing attacks in 2004 compared to 2 suicide bombing attacks during the first six months of the lull in the fighting ¹). In comparison, shooting attacks as well as rocket and mortar fire were a prominent form of terrorist attacks during the lull. The use of Qassam rockets and mortar shells against Israeli towns and settlements in the Gaza Strip and the Western Negev gradually increased and peaked in the month of July. It appears, therefore, that the Qassam has taken the place of the suicide bomber as the primary weapon of choice during the lull in the fighting, even though the deadly effect of the Qassam rocket is lesser than that of the suicide bomber (see below).

• Following is comparative data on suicide bombing attacks and on Qassam rocket and mortar fire.

Characteristics of terrorist attacks in recent weeks (end of July – middle of August)