| |
|
|
| |
|
Executive
Summary |
| |
|
|
|
| |
|
Documents captured by the IDF
during Operation Defensive Shield
prove unequivocally that the Fatah movement and the Al Aqsa
Martyrs Brigades are one and the same. The documents
clearly
indicate that not only are the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades a pseudonym
for taking responsibility for terrorist attacks carried out by Fatah,
but
they are also a terrorist apparatus which up until the IDF Defensive
Shield operation was in the process of institutionalization
and
intensification of its suicide and murderous
attacks. The captured
documents demonstrate that Arafat and other senior
PA officials
(Marwan Barghouti is of note) are the leaders
of the Al Aqsa
Martyrs Brigades and finance its terror activities. According to one of
the documents, Arafat is well aware of the negative implications of the
terrorist attacks carried out by the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades at the
time of General Zinni’s stay in Israel, when the US State Department
included the Al Aqsa Brigades in its list of terrorist organizations.
On
this background, in an internal meeting Arafat tried to deny the fact
that the Fatah and Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades are identical, and
distanced himself from them.
|
| |
|
|
| |
1. |
Documents captured by the IDF during Operation
Defensive Shield prove that
the Fatah organization and the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades are one and the
same. |
| |
|
|
| |
2. |
The documents clearly indicate that the Al Aqsa
Martyrs Brigades are not just a
pseudonym for terrorist attacks carried out by the Fatah, but also a dedicated
apparatus aimed at perpetrating terror attacks. Until Operation Defensive
Shield, this apparatus had been in the process of institutionalization,
which is
expressed in the correspondence of the brigades with Fatah senior officials,
particularly Marwan Barghouti. The Al Aqsa Martyrs
Brigades terror activity,
their arms requirements, their structure and organization (in the Jenin
area, for
instance) and their financial requirements can be learned from this
correspondence (the financing of their activity is very central in the
correspondence). |
| |
|
|
| |
3. |
According to the captured documents, at
the head of the pyramid is Yasser
Arafat, the leader of the Fatah, in all its various pseudonyms and
apparatuses
(Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, Tanzim). One of the documents, which concerns
a
request to aid detained or wanted terrorists (belonging to the Fatah and
the
Palestinian security apparatuses) is addressed by the Fatah and the Al Aqsa
Martyrs Brigades to Yasser Arafat personally. |
| |
|
|
| |
4. |
It is of note that the Al
Aqsa Martyrs Brigades carried out suicide and murder
attacks in growing intensity during the six months
prior to Operation Defensive
Shield, overshadowing the Hamas and PIJ: after perpetrating two attacks
at the
end of 2001, they proceeded to carry out continuous
attacks in early 2002: 4
terror attacks in January (Hadera, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv), 6
in February (Mehola,
IDF base, Jerusalem, Maccabim checkpoint), 9
attacks in March (Netanya,
Ashdod, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Kfar Saba, and Efrat). Most of these terror
attacks
were directed at civilians in Israeli cities.
This was the background for the
brigades inclusion in the U.S. terror organizations
list (27 March 2002).
|
| |
|
|
| |
5. |
A captured document concerned
with a meeting of the “National and Islamic
Forces” (that include distinct terror organizations such as the Hamas)
demonstrates well enough the political problems with
which Arafat was faced
due to the terrorist wave in which the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades played
a key
role:
|
| |
|
|
| |
|
| a. |
The meeting took place on 21 March 2002,
when General Zinni was trying
to convince Arafat to agree to a cease fire. At this delicate time,
two suicide
attacks were carried out inside Israel, one on a bus in Wadi Ara.
(20 March
2002, perpetrated by PIJ), and the other in the Jerusalem pedestrian
mall
(21 March 2002, the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades). According to the
document, these attacks put Arafat “in a difficult position” vis-a-vis
General Zinni. Arafat opened the meeting by saying that “the
two attacks,
today and yesterday, came at an inappropriate time because of Zinni’s
presence” (i.e. Arafat is not criticizing the very perpetration
of suicide
attacks directed at civilians, but only the tactical difficulties
caused by their
timing). |
| |
|
|
| b. |
Hassan Yousef, a senior Hamas activist
in Ramallah, suggested to Arafat
[in irony?] to “calm the Fatah down” and stop its operations. Arafat
[on the
background of his inconvenience due to the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades
attack] replies to Hassan Yousef that the brigades are Fatah
personnel
who seceded [like the Abu Musa faction that had seceded before] and
not
the Fatah [note: this is an outright lie, since all participants in
the meeting,
including Arafat himself, are aware of the Fatah – Al Aqsa Martyrs
Brigades identity]. Later in the document, it is noted that Arafat
tried to
“prove” that the Jerusalem pedestrian-mall attack was carried out
by the PIJ
and not the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades [note: also a lie]. |
| |
|
|
| c. |
Later in the meeting, Arafat read out the
US Secretary of State’s decision to
add the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades to the US terror organization list,
and
said: “what is the meaning of Powell’s decision? It means that they
[the Al
Aqsa Martyrs Brigades] are the first Arab organization to be included
in the
terror list together with the Taliban and the Al Qaida. May
God protect us
from what will come next. |
|
| |
|
|
| |
6. |
Attached are the following
appendices: |
| |
|
| a. |
Appendix
A: Captured documents in Arabic and their English
translation,
demonstrating that the Fatah and the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades are
one and
the same. |
| |
1) |
Document 1:
a “letter of appreciation” to a fighter (known as a Fatah
activist) from the Fatah and the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. The stamp
at the bottom of the document is a joint stamp
of the Fatah and Al
Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. |
| |
|
|
| |
2) |
Document 2: Request for
financial aid for Fatah terrorists (arrested by
Israel and wanted) addressed to Yasser Arafat.
The request was
issued by the Fatah and the “Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades” and the stamp
on the document is a joint stamp of Fatah
and “Al Aqsa Martyrs
Brigades”. (Some of the terrorists mentioned in the document are
known to belong to the Fatah, the General Intelligence Apparatus,
the
Police and National Security Apparatus – additional evidence of the
PA security apparatuses’ involvement in terrorist attacks). |
| |
|
|
| |
3) |
Document 3: A request (dated 17 November 2001)
to the Bethlehem
municipality to provide financial aid for the activities of the military
arm. At the bottom of the document is the definition of the requesting
entity: the “Palestinian National Liberation Front”
– “Fatah” and
the “Al Aqsa (Church of the) Nativity Martyrs Brigades”. The
“(Church of the) Nativity” addition was designed to accredit the “Al
Aqsa Martyrs Brigades” with legitimacy among Bethlehem’s
Christian population. |
| |
|
|
| |
4) |
Document 4: a poster on which appear the “Al Aqsa
Martyrs
Brigades” emblem (on the left) and the Fatah emblem (on the right).
The term: “The Palestinian National Liberation Movement
– Fatah
and its military wing, the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades in Palestine”
is mentioned in the poster. The poster was issued in memory of the
deceased Magdi Musa Tib Jaradat (a Fatah
and Al Aqsa Brigades
activist in Jenin). |
| |
|
|
| |
5) |
Document 5: A letter addressed to “Marwan
Barghouti, Secretary of
the Fatah Movement”, from the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades,
southern
area”. In the letter, there is a joint stamp
of the “National Liberation
Movement-Fatah” and the “Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades”. |
| |
|
|
| |
6) |
Document 6: A poster with the emblems
of the Fatah (in the
center) and the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades (on both sides). The
poster is in memory of the deceased Faras Sabri Jaber, a senior activist
in the Fatah/Tanzim terrorist infrastructure in Tulkarm. Faras Sabri
Jaber participated in the murder of two Israeli restaurant owners
in
Tulkarm and in numerous firing attacks. The poster includes a photo
of Jaber after he was killed with a kaffia (Arab headdress) on his
head
and on it the inscription “Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades”. |
| |
|
|
| |
7) |
Document 7: In a PA General Intelligence report
on the general
situation among Fatah arms-bearers in the Tulkarm district (6
February 2002) the “Mansour Shreim Squad” that carried out many
“successful attacks” against Israel is mentioned (Mansour Shreim is
a
senior Fatah cell activist in Tulkarm, connected to many terrorist
attacks). The report states that this squad is closely linked to Marwan
Barghouti; it is attempting to obtain his approval for appointing
Mansour Shreim as responsible for the “Al Aqsa Martyrs
Brigades” in the Tulkarm district. |
| |
|
|
| |
8) |
Document 8: A report of the Fatah movement in Jenin
refugee camp
(25 September 2001), addressed to Marwan Barghouti,
secretary of
the Fatah Movement Supreme Committee, reviews
the events in Jenin
refugee camp. The report states that the “Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades”
whose center is in the north (northern West Bank) are in Jenin refugee
camp and they are the ones who enhanced the presence
and
operational capabilities of Fatah. |
| |
|
|
| |
9) |
Document 9: A report (8 May 2001) of the “Al Aqsa
Martyrs
Brigades” in the Jenin district addressed to Marwan
Barghouti,
Secretary of the Supreme Committee (of the Fatah
Movement). The
report reviews the activity of the “Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades” in the
Jenin area and requests financial aid from Barghouti on the
background of accumulated debts of the “Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades”
and the competition between them and competing terrorist
organizations (the PIJ and Hamas). |
| |
|
|
| |
10) |
Documents 10 and 11: Two documents of the Al
Aqsa Martyrs
Brigades that were found in Fuad Shubaki’s bureau, inside Arafat’s
compound in Ramallah. Shubaki is a close associate of Arafat and
Head of the Financial Directorate of the General Security Apparatus.
The documents concern requests for funding the day to day and
infrastructure needs of the “Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades”, including
requests for funding the procurement of arms specifically
dedicated
for terrorist attacks (explosive charges) and for establishing
a heavy weapons production workshop, (e.g. rockets
and mortars). |
| |
|
|
| b. |
Appendix
B: A report about a meeting of “the National and Islamic
Forces” that took place in Ramallah, in Arafat’s headquarters, on
21 March
2002, on the background of terrorist attacks carried out by the Al
Aqsa
Martyrs Brigades at a timing inconvenient for Arafat (while Gen. Zinni
was
in the Middle East) and on the background of the Al Aqsa Brigades
inclusion in the US terror organizations list. In the meeting, Arafat
is trying
to distance himself from the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades (in our assessment,
out of apprehension that his statements may leak and complicate him
with
the US, that demanded of him at the time to accept a cease fire). |
| |
|
|
|
| |
|
|
| |
|
|
|
| |
|
|
| |
|
|
|
| |
|
|
| |
| |
