Chapter 1 -   The ideological dimension      The principle of “Exporting the Revolution”       Involvement of the upper echelons of the Iranian regime in decision-making and the approval of acts of terror       Milestones in Iran's involvement in terror       Characteristics of Iranian and Shiite terror        Targets of Iranian and Shiite terror        Attacks against Iranian exiles anopposition organizations        Home page


Iran as a terror-sponsoring state: An overview

The ideological dimension

Revolutionary Iran is based upon the Islamic worldview and doctrine of the Revolution’s founder, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. This worldview radically changed the traditional Shiite worldview—which was previously passive and dictated passive anticipation of the “return of the Vanished Imam”—and transformed it into an activist ideology supporting internal and external “revolutionary violence” alike. (It should be noted that this activist ideology is the “meeting point” of both Shiite and Sunni radical Islamic fundamentalism).

Khomeini’s worldview was characterized by messianic redemption that can be achieved by adopting an activist ideology involving political or violent activity as necessary. The struggle is directed, first and foremost, toward “cleansing” Islamic society from within, first in Iran and later in the wider Islamic realm. The struggle does not end in the Islamic arena; rather it is designated to also eradicate “the root of all evil” – i.e. the superpowers which are the cause of world corruption. In this context, the United States, “the Great Satan”, plays a major role, while its ally, Israel, is defined as “the Little Satan”.

Khomeini placed the Jihad [holy war] and shahada, or self-sacrifice, at the forefront of his ideology; it is therefore no wonder that in the 1980s, suicide bombings became the main feature of Iranian-inspired Shiite terror in Lebanon. From there, this form of violent action was “exported” to the Palestinian-Israeli arena and took the form of Palestinian terror.

Khomeini’s successor, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei supports similar views and does not hesitate to express them publicly. A prima facie “division of rule” between conservatives and reformists who espouse more moderate approaches enables Iran to display a “smiling face” to the world, while at the same time continuing to use the weapon of terror. It should be noted that the reformists, who have suffered defeat at the hands of the conservatives in the struggle for power, have no influence on the ideology and policy of supporting terror as dictated by the conservatives.

Khamenei, Khomeini’s successor,
implements the latter’s worldview
Ayatollah Khomeini: he added the ideological
dimension to the support of terror
(Politika-magazine.ru)


The principle of “exporting the Revolution”

The aspiration to “export” the Islamic Revolution to the entire Moslem world (and even to human society in its entirety) is an integral part of the philosophy of the Islamic Revolution. Khomeini and his confidants sought to transcend the religious differences between Sunni and Shiite Moslems as well as national division, and strove to create a coherent, revolutionary Islamic force “that will comprise a billion Moslems”. From Khomeini’s viewpoint, this concept served to justify Iranian intervention in the internal affairs of other Islamic states and to advocate rebellion against their rulers by their inhabitants, while declaring that the rulers of these Islamic states “live as infidels and animals”.

Iran has adopted a variety of means for “exporting the Revolution”: from presenting itself as a “role model”; through the use of terror and providing aid to extreme subversive Islamic movements in Lebanon and the Gulf States, the Balkans, and Africa; to dispatching the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC, hereinafter: “the Revolutionary Guards”) to various places including Lebanon, where they have succeeded in establishing a “front-line base” of the Islamic Revolution.

Propaganda activities serve as a principal means of “exporting the Revolution” and disseminating its values. They are carried out by various Iranian embassies, information delegations, and clerics, and also through “cultural centers” and mosques in various countries, including Western Europe. Moslem students from around the world go to Iran to study at its religious institutions, and some are recruited for both propaganda and terror activities.

The subversive activities of pro-Iranian elements have wrought havoc in many Moslem countries. For example, Anwar Sadat’s assassins in Egypt mentioned Khomeini during their trial as the inspiration behind their actions. The late King Hassan II of Morocco indicated that Iran was behind the wave of unrest that swept Morocco in 1983. A series of suicide attacks in Lebanon against French, American, and Israeli targets was directed and inspired by Iranians, with the aim of ridding Lebanon of any Western presence as the first step in establishing an “Islamic Republic” in that country based on the Iranian revolutionary model.

In recent years, the policy of “exporting the Revolution” apparently became slightly more flexible, and Iran frequently chooses to give greater weight to political and economic considerations. At the same time, the principle per se has not been abandoned and Iran continues to support Islamic terror organizations operating against both the United States and Israel, as well as against moderate Arab regimes.

An Iranian stamp commemorating Khaled al-Islambouli, Anwar Sadat’s assassin:
An official mark of support for terror against Arab regimes

 


Involvement of the upper echelons of the Iranian regime in decision-making and the approval of acts of terror

Terror activities, subversion, and the elimination of opponents of the regime abroad must receive the approval of the upper echelons of the decision-makers of the Iranian regime, including the leader, Khamenei. The trial of Iranian agents in Germany convicted of the murder of four Kurdish exiles at the Mykonos Café in Berlin, and the bombings in Argentina, are typical examples of the Iranian decision-making chain of command. The leader, the Intelligence Minister, and the Supreme Council of National Security (which includes the president) directed the operational apparatuses and approved the targets selected in both cases.

In the past, former President Rafsanjani was also involved in that decision-making process. Today, decisions are made in this context without informing President Khatami beforehand, as he might oppose some of them. The majority of the decisions regarding terror are thus made today by the leader, Khamenei, the upper echelons of the Intelligence Ministry, and the Revolutionary Guards.

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Milestones in Iran's involvement in terror

Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran has become notable for its no-holds-barred radical foreign policy, including engaging in terror, for the purpose of “exporting the Islamic Revolution” and advancing its political aims. The use of terror as a tool for achieving political interests is neither exclusive nor unique to Iran though; there can be no doubt, however, that Iran is the most prominent state in encouraging and employing terror to achieve its aims. For Iran views terror as an efficient tool, both a substitute and a complementary means in diplomatic processes; in Iran’s view, terror is a legitimate tool to be used in its struggle against all its adversaries.

The Iranian security and terror apparatuses and the Iran-sponsored Shiite organizations, most prominent of which is Hezbollah, commenced their worldwide activities in 1980; since then, they have perpetrated hundreds of terror acts throughout the world. Iran also supports Sunni-Moslem (including Palestinian) terror organizations, such as the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, which is almost totally dependent upon Iran. These organizations, too, have perpetrated hundreds of terror acts inspired and assisted by Iran.

Iran does its utmost to avoid exposure of its involvement in terror activity and leaving incriminating “fingerprints” that would bring reprisals against it in their wake. It therefore customarily uses non-Iranian contact people and proxies, such as Hezbollah, to execute part of these terror acts (a method also used by Iran’s ally, Syria). Iran’s official bodies, including the Foreign Affairs Ministry, provide diplomatic cover for the activities of Iranian intelligence personnel, and they also handle issuing of forged documentation for terrorists belonging to other organizations.

Despite these attempts, due to its far-reaching activities, Iran does not completely succeed in avoiding leaving “fingerprints”. There is much evidence linking it to terror outrages and pointing to its having been a leading terror -sponsoring state over the past twenty years. The blowing up of the Jewish community building (AMIA) in Argentina exposed Iran's involvement in terror abroad. It thus constitutes a good case study for understanding the characteristics of the Iranian support of terror.

In the early years of Iran’s Islamic regime, the regime’s main thrust was stabilizing and consolidating its rule through the use of internal terror against the opposition. Also, the majority of terror attacks against foreign targets (American and British) were perpetrated on Iranian soil.

A second milestone in Iranian involvement in terror occurred in 1980 with the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war. During that conflict, the use of terror became a supporting tool in Iran’s war against Iraq on two levels: first, carrying out terror attacks against Iraqi targets inside Iraq and throughout the world; and second, attacking targets of countries identified as supporting the Iraqi war effort, such as France.

A third milestone in Iranian involvement in terror was the arrival of the Revolutionary Guards forces in Lebanon in 1982 and the inclusion of local Shiites in terror activity inside Lebanon against Western targets and Israel, and also in terror attacks worldwide on behalf of the Iranians. At a later stage, Iran also developed contacts with Sunni-Moslem terror organizations acting against both Israel and moderate, pro-Western, Arab regimes.


Characteristics of Iranian and Shiite terror

Besides the traditional terror methods of skyjacking or targeting specific assassination victims, the Iranians have developed two main methods that have become the trademark of Iranian-directed terror:

Suicide attacks – The Shiite terror organizations directed by Iran were the first to successfully use suicide attacks against Western targets in both Lebanon and Kuwait. The effect of these attacks was far-reaching: They brought about the withdrawal of the French-American multinational force from Lebanon and became the trademark of Iranian-activated Shiite terror. The Iranian media, and those of Hezbollah, customarily grant legitimacy to these actions in order to encourage the Palestinians to copy “the Lebanon model” by carrying out such actions.

Hostage-taking – In the 1980s, the taking of Western hostages became the principal modus operandi for exerting pressure on Western and other countries in order to change their policies on the Iran-Iraq war and the Israeli-Arab conflict, and also for the purpose of freeing imprisoned Shiite terrorists throughout the world.

Statistically, between 1980 and 1999, Shiite terror organizations and Iranian elements perpetrated 260 acts of international terror (this figure does not include Hezbollah actions against IDF forces in Lebanon and attacks against Iraq). Of these, 67 were acts of hostage-taking; 82 were acts of detonating explosive charges and car bombs; 12 acts of skyjacking / blowing up aircraft; and 97 assassination attempts, the majority of whose victims were Iranian exiles.

Iranian / Shiite acts of terror were perpetrated in 32 countries on four continents: 57 in Europe, 173 in the Middle East, 23 in Asia, six in the United States, and one in Africa. The majority of these terror attacks (190) were perpetrated on the territory of Islamic countries in the Middle East and Asia, owing to the existence of an apparatus of local collaborators and extremist sponsoring organizations that actually perpetrate the acts or assist Iranian bodies in their execution.

Targets of Iranian and Shiite terror

The United States

The US is perceived by the Iranian revolutionary regime as “the Great Satan”, as noted. It stands accused of four “fundamental sins”: its imperialist and exploitative character and its oppression of the Third World; its support of the former Shah’s regime; its support of reactionary Arab regimes in the Middle East; and its support of Israel and Zionism. The Iranian regime also perceives the United States and Western culture as the source of moral corruption.

The majority of the devastating attacks launched against American targets in the Middle East has taken place in Lebanon (a series of suicide attacks against American targets – the embassy and the marines headquarters) and in Saudi Arabia. Two car bombs exploded in Saudi Arabia: one in Riyadh in 1995, in which seven people were killed, among whom were five US citizens; the second in al-Khobar in 1996, near an American military base, in which 19 people were killed and over 500 wounded. In both cases, the attacks were carried out by Saudi Arabian elements supported by Iran.

Cultivating hatred for the United States: a demonstration
in Tehran in front of the former US Embassy
[November 21, 2002,]
www.iranian.com
Terror against the United States: the attack against
Khobar Towers [June 1996]
(www.cnn.com)

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France

Against the backdrop of its involvement in Lebanon, its close ties with Iraq in the past, and its hosting of Iranian opposition activists, France has also become a target of Iranian terror. Terror against France has comprised exploding a booby-trapped vehicle at the French headquarters in Beirut in 1983, and the hijacking of Air France aircraft both in 1983 and 1984. Iran has also created a terror network that operated inside France in 1985-1987, and was involved in carrying out 12 terror attacks in that country. Iran was also active against Iranian opposition activists who had settled in France, which involved assassination attempts, the last of which proved a success, when the Iranian Prime Minister in exile, Shahpour Bakhtiar, was assassinated.

The campaign of terror against France proved effective for Iran: France removed its forces from Lebanon. Also the wave of terror attacks waged by the pro-Iranian network in France in the mid-1980s resulted in France expelling several exiles and Iranian opposition organizations from the country (including the headquarters of the Mojahedin-e Khalq, that were transferred from Paris to Iraq in July 1986). France also forgave part of the debt Iran owed it as a “goodwill gesture”. Nevertheless, Iran continued to carry out terror activities in France, which brought about a temporary termination of diplomatic relations in July 1987.

Britain

The Salman Rushdie affair put Britain “on the map” ofIranian terror targets. At the beginning of 1989, Salman Rushdie published his book The Satanic Verses, a parody that relates to the Quran as a fairy tale. As an immediate response, Khomeini published a fatwa, or religious ruling, in which he decreed a death sentence on Rushdie and called on all Moslem worshippers to act toward preventing the distribution of the book. Hezbollah, acting under Iranian patronage, announced that it regarded itself as committed to carry out the fatwa.


Britain’s refusal to extradite Rushdie (who was forced to go into hiding for a lengthy period) to Iran and stop the book’s distribution, brought about a deterioration in relations and the severance of diplomatic relations between Iran and Britain. In addition, it brought about a wave of terror attacks carried out by Shiite Iranians or by elements operated by them, directed against British targets, retail outlets, and individuals who were engaged in the translation or the distribution of Rushdie’s book throughout the world. Six terror attacks were carried out in London, most of which were against stores in which The Satanic Verses was sold. Three attacks were carried out in Pakistan against libraries and British cultural centers, and additional attacks were carried out against British targets in Turkey (the explosion of the British consul’s car) and Malaysia. Attacks were also carried out against stores in the United States, Italy, and Greece which distributed the book.

Following the election of President Khatami, new hopes emerged for the end of this affair, when Khatami announced that Iran “would not annul the fatwa, but it would not take any actual steps to implement it either.” However, conservative Iranian elements continue to announce their adherence to the fatwa: as recently as February 14, 2003 the Revolutionary Guards announced that the fatwa is “an historical and divine sentence” designed to protect Islam from its enemies, and therefore it cannot be annulled.

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Germany

Iran, having maintained relatively good relations with Germany, assumed that it could use Germany as a station or base for terror activities. However, the exposure of these activities by the German authorities brought about a deterioration in the relationship between the two countries in the second half of the 1980s, and the consequent execution of a series of attacks against German targets, the main goal of which was the release of the Hamade brothers - Hezbollah terrorists who were imprisoned in Germany. In this case too, Iran used Hezbollah operatives as terror contractors. This situation enabled Iran to position itself as the “mediator,” seemingly trying to help the Germans resolve their problems with the Hezbollah organization.

Despite the fact that Germany is perceived in Iran as one of the “friendlier” countries, the Iranians did not refrain from acting on German soil against exiles and Iranian opposition activists. Exposure of the involvement of the Iranian leadership in the elimination of members of the Iranian opposition in Germany (for instance, the Mykonos affair) brought about a deep crisis in the relationship between the two countries.

The murder in the Mykonos Cafe
On the night of September 17, 1992 the leader of the Kurdish Democratic Party in Iran (KDPI) and three other party members were murdered by the Iranian regime’s agents. Following are pictures of the murdered, and a brief summary of the event as appeared in an interview with a survivor of this incident, published on an Iranian Web
site that belongs to activists opposing the regime (www.iranian.com)



It happened on the night of September 17, 1992. At around 11, gunmen stormed Café Mikonos in Berlin, killing four members of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran: its leader, Dr. Mohammad Sadegh (Saeid) Sharafkandi, along with Fattah Abdali , Homayoun Ardalan, and Mohammad Nouri Dehkordi.



Sharafkandi
, who had replaced Abdolrahman Ghassemlou, (also murdered in Vienna a few months earlier), had traveled from Iraqi Kurdistan as a guest of the German Social Democrats.



The assassins were of Iranian and Lebanese nationality
and all had been trained at the special commando camp of the Revolutionary Guards in Rasht in northern Iran. The head of the "special unit" was Kazem Darabi, member of the Revolutionary Guards and the Intelligence Ministry, who received a double-life sentence (a total of 30 years according to German law).



An international warrant was issued against Ali Fallahian
whose reign of terror during his tenure as the head of the Intelligence Ministry included assassinations of the regime's opponents in Iran and abroad…".


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Additional countries

Azerbaijan - assassination of the speaker of the Azeri parliament on September 1, 1997.

Bosnia - thwarding Iranian intensions to hit UN forces stationed there.


Israel

Iran, and Hezbollah under its patronage, repeat the call for the obliteration and annihilation of Israel and grant this call religious and political legitimacy. In recent years, Iran has made its utmost efforts to carry out terror attacks directed at Israel. It is investing major efforts and a great deal of resources in activities directed against Israel from Lebanon, and Hezbollah has been the beneficiary of funding, the provision of weapons and closely supervised training provided by members of the Revolutionary Guards stationed in Lebanon.

In addition, Iran maintains especially close ties with the Palestinian Islamic Jihad terror organization, whose nearly entire budget is provided by the Iranian regime. In addition, Iran maintains good relations with Hamas and other Palestinian terror organizations such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC, Ahmed Jibril’s organization). In the course of the violent events taking place in the Palestinian territories, Iran has also established operational ties with elements of the Fatah organization, controlled by Arafat. It transfers money and directs attacks while attempting to ensure that it (Iran) maintains a foothold in the Palestinian territories (see chapter 3 dealing with the Iranian assistance to Palestinian terror).

Beyond the ideological imperative of destroying Israel, promoting Palestinian terror also serves Iran's strategic-political goals. For Iran would like to see the failure of any chance of advancing a peaceful solution between Israel and its neighbors, and more specifically, between Israel and the Palestinians. Therefore, it makes every effort to escalate the crisis in the region and prevent any respite in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For this purpose the high echelons of the Iranian regime were behind the attempt to smuggle a sizeable quantity of weapons into the Palestinian Authority (the Karine-A affair), with the goal of “exporting” the Lebanese model to the Palestinian territories and escalating the conflict.

Beyond the encouragement of terror originating in Lebanon and in the Palestinian territories, Iran does not refrain from taking action against Israeli and Jewish targets abroad, and was behind (as the Argentinian intelligence report proves) the terror attacks directed against the Israeli embassy and the Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires, attacks executed under the direction of Iranian leader Ali Khamenei in the early 1990s.

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Arab Targets

Khomeini did not recognize the legitimacy of the majority of the Arab regimes, and perceived them as serving Western imperialism. This was particularly evident in his attitude toward the Gulf States; the latter soon became the chief target of the “export” of the Islamic revolution, affected by the use of the weapon of terror. The main thrust of terror activity was directed against Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, where the attacks were carried out by local Shiites, as well as against targets belonging to these countries throughout the world. In most cases the Iranians operated, as usual, through operational proxies, making it impossible to prove direct Iranian involvement.

Terror attacks directed against targets in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States had several objectives: undermining the regimes, the purpose of which was to bring about their fall and the establishment of Islamic regimes in their stead; freeing terrorists who had been imprisoned in the Gulf States, or avenging the execution of terrorists; during the Iran-Iraq war, attacks were also carried out as a means of exerting pressure on the Gulf States to terminate their assistance to Iraq.

Iranian subversive activity took place during the pilgrimages [hajj] to the holy sites of Mecca and Medina in Saudi Arabia. Instructed to do so in advance, Iranian pilgrims incited large-scale riots. Hundreds were killed—the majority of whom were Iranians—by the Saudi Arabian security forces. Approximately two years later, 16 Kuwaiti citizens were brought to trial in Saudi Arabia. They admitted to a series of attacks during the pilgrimage season of 1989, assisted by the Iranian embassy in Saudi Arabia. Following their execution, a series of revenge attacks was carried out in which six Saudi Arabian diplomats were killed in various places around the world (Lebanon, Turkey, and Thailand).

Kuwait also served as a target for a series of attacks carried out by Hezbollah, in retaliation against the imprisonment of members of a Shiite terror network, some of them having been executed. The attacks were carried out in and outside Kuwait and comprised an attack on oil installations and the explosion of a car bomb near a hotel. In this same context, a Kuwaiti Airlines aircraft was hijacked in April 1987 en route from Thailand to Kuwait, and was forced to land in Mashhad, Iran. The hijackers, members of Hezbollah, demanded the release of the prisoners. Imad Mughniyah, who was behind the hijacking, is today in charge of Hezbollah’s military-terror activities.

There is a large Shiite minority in Bahrain and therefore Iran regarded the country as having promising potential for subversive activity, which reached its height in 1996 in a wave of attacks directed mainly against Bahrain’s foreign residents. In June 1997, eight members of the Bahraini Hezbollah were apprehended and admitted to carrying out one of the attacks. Their interrogation shows that they underwent training in Iran, where they were provided with money and weapons in order to work toward overthrowing the regime in Bahrain.

During the 1990s, Iran was involved in Turkey in the elimination of local journalists and intellectuals who opposed the “exporting of the Islamic revolution” to Turkey, and also in the elimination of Iranian opposition activists there.

In the 1990s, the Iranians also supported the P.K.K. (a Kurdish organization in Turkey defined by the US State Department as a terror organization). It is not clear whether or not this support is still taking place today. At the same time, the Iranians did not hesitate to use the weapon of terror against a Kurdish organization opposed to the Iranian regime (the Mykonos affair).

Iran also maintains ties with terror organizations in Egypt and North Africa. In recent years Iran has limited its subversive activity in the Arab world, but it still maintains ties with terror organizations in various countries, and is waiting for the right moment when domestic stability is undermined in order to act again.

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Attacks against Iranian exiles and opposition organizations


In the wake of the Islamic revolution, many who opposed it were forced to leave Iran fearing for their lives, following a large-scale elimination campaign against the opposition activists of the new regime. However, Iran hounded the leaders of the opposition abroad, and Iranian and Shiite terror groups carried out a series of assassinations around the world.

Particularly notable is the assassination of Shahpour Bakhtiar, the last prime minister under the rule of the Shah, in his Paris apartment, carried out by Iranian intelligence agents in August 1991. In 1995, the son of a key witness in the case of Bakhtiar’s murderers was murdered in Paris. Additional notable cases involving the murder of opposition activists took place in Austria, Switzerland, Italy, Pakistan, and Turkey. Inter alia, Iran also hounded and eliminated activists in Kurdish opposition organizations who have been engaged in promoting self-rule for the Kurds.

Dr. Shahpour Bakhtiar, prime minister on the eve of Khomeini’s return to Iran Murdered in Paris
in 1991 by intelligence agents of the Iranian regime



At the same time, the conservatives in Iran, who are in charge of security and intelligence, continue to employ terror directed against Iranian citizens in Iran itself. Thus, at the end of 1998, Iranian citizens were shocked by a series of assassinations of intellectuals who were known for their opposition to the regime. Those who ordered these assassinations were senior officials of the intelligence ministry. Although the investigation led to the conviction of several planners and perpetrators, Iran’s legal system, governed by the conservatives, managed the release of the offenders from prison after a short period. The prime suspect in the affair, Said Emami, Deputy Intelligence Minister, “committed suicide” in jail after “drinking a detergent,” so that he would not reveal his superiors’ involvement.

The assassination attempt against President Khatami’s close advisor, Said Khajjarian in March 2000, which resulted in Khajjarian’s paralysis (and which also resulted in the early release of the assassin) made it clear to the Iranian citizens that the reign of terror of the revolution’s early days had not come entirely to an end, and that criticism of the Islamic regime entailed a great deal of personal risk.


The Iranian intelligence ministry: responsible for carrying out terror attacks abroad

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Summary

An analysis of Iran’s terror policy in the 24 years that have passed since the outbreak of the Islamic revolution shows that despite shifts in emphasis and arenas of activity, Iran has not abandoned terror as a strategic weapon and still regards it as a legitimate course of action for promoting its interests, both domestic and abroad. For this purpose, the most important governmental mechanisms are being mobilized and substantial resources are being invested.

Iranian terror activity is carried out cunningly, with Iran trying not to leave “fingerprints” which might identify it as being behind terror activities. Therefore, Iran uses various organizations, mainly Arab ones, for carrying out activities that it initiates and supports. In order to reinforce this policy of concealment, the Iranian leadership, in its public statements, is reserved vis-à-vis terror activities and condemns them, even going so far as to present itself as having been a victim of the Mojahedin-e Khalq perpetrators of terror.

Iranian terror is motivated in part by ideological considerations, in the spirit of Khomeini’s heritage to which his successor Ali Khamenei is committed. Therefore, in certain spheres (such as the struggle against Israel which is perceived as an ideological imperative), the degree of Iranian flexibility is slight. Iranian terror is frequently triggered by utilitarian considerations; hence, terror activities are carried out based on calculations of gain and loss. Often Iranian terror serves as a tool for blackmailing victims, obtaining political aims, or for obtaining specific goals (such as the release of imprisoned terrorists, preventing the distribution of Salman Rushdie’s book, and so forth).

As a rule, it can be said that in the overall balance of examining the results of terror activity so far, Iran may (justifiably) reach the conclusion that in gain and loss calculations, terror is worthwhile. The Iranian “balance sheet” on this issue shows considerable success in achieving political goals in proportion to a relatively low price, which it was forced to pay in return, at least until now. Therefore, it may be assumed that in the absence of a resolute and united international response to Iran, it will continue to use terror for promoting its objectives in the foreseeable future.

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