Iran’s connections with al-Qaida: The art of the dual role

Iran practices a dual role policy regarding sponsoring terror and the various terror organizations. Outwardly, it disclaims any connection to terror acts and mass murder. However, behind the scenes, it extends massive assistance to terror organizations, while making all efforts to cover up its involvement and erase its “fingerprints”.

Iran’s policy vis-à-vis the al-Qaida organization fits well into this dual role pattern, as evidenced below:

On the one hand, we have the “official” Iran, represented mainly by its Foreign Ministry and President Khatami – the regime’s “smiling face”. This side of Iran publicly voices its criticism of al-Qaida’s terror activities (though a senior conservative official recently praised the attacks on Israeli targets in Kenya). It also wages a blood feud against the Taliban, al-Qaida’s allies and sponsors. Occasionally, Iran arrests and/or banishes from its soil operatives of al-Qaida who have found refuge in Iran. The Iranians usually refrain from handing over al-Qaida operatives to their country of origin, and at times allow them to choose their destination of extradition.

On the other hand, Iran grants safe haven, protection, and assistance to members of al-Qaida on its territory. For example:

Several hundreds of al-Qaida operatives currently reside in Iran. Among them are a number of senior members of the organization, including Saif al-Adel (of Egyptian origin), Abu Hafs (aka “Mr. Mauritania”), and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (a Jordanian) who has visited Iran on several occasions. One of Osama bin Laden’s sons, Saad, is residing in Iran as well.

Al-Qaida operatives residing in Iran are actively involved in the preparation of terror attacks against Western / Jewish targets outside Iran. Alerts have recently been issued regarding a possible attack by al-Qaida in Turkey, orchestrated from Iran.

Iran has granted support to Ansar al-Islam, a radical Islamic organization linked to al-Qaida. Ansar al-Islam was until recently active in the Iraqi Kurdistan, near the Iranian border. Some of its members apparently escaped to Iran, after the bombing of its bases during the American operation in Iraq.

The support granted to al-Qaida by the Revolutionary Guards, Iran’s most important security force, does not seem feasible without the approval of Iran’s leader Khamenei. Even though some elements in the Iranian regime, such as the Foreign Ministry and the President himself, oppose support to al-Qaida, because of the damage to Iran’s image on the international scene, they are in no position to prevent it. We presume that they are not aware of its full extent.

It appears to us that a combination of motives underlie the Iranians’ assistance to al-Qaida and their turning a blind eye to its activity in Iran. The first of these motives is ideology: The alliance with al-Qaida embodies the perception of a common Islamic objective directed against shared enemies – the United States, Israel, and the West in general. This alliance disregards basic differences of faith and opinion between the radical Islamic Sunna and Shia. A second motive is opportunism: The presence of al-Qaida people on Iranian soil allows Iran to use them as bargaining chips, ready for extradition on the one hand (mainly vis-à-vis the United States and the West), and for the carrying out of potential violent operations on the other hand (against the United States and its allies in the region, mainly if Iran should find itself targeted by the war on terror).

The above policy of dual role-playing and brinksmanship is not devoid of risk for Iran, a member of the Axis of Evil and an obvious target for American struggle against terror. However, the Iranian regime feels that the risk is a limited one, at least for the time being, as long as the Americans are kept busy by the war in Iraq and its aftermath.

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