Officers course graduation ceremony in Tehran

Iranian assistance to Palestinian terror is a chief component of the overall use that Iran makes of the weapon of terror as a tool for promoting its national interests. Through encouraging and assisting Palestinian terror in applying the “Lebanese model” to the Palestinian territories, the Iranians seek to achieve a number of objectives, including reinforcement of the radical Iranian-Syrian axis in the Middle East; weakening Israel by creating rifts and cleavages in its society and inflicting damage on its economy; causing Israel to direct its resources to the Palestinian conflict, thus detracting from its capabilities against Iran; reinforcing the extremist Islamic forces in the Palestinian territories; and sabotaging any chance of reaching an Israeli-Palestinian settlement and restarting the political process.

This Iranian strategy coalesced with Arafat’s use of violence and terror as levers for promoting his strategic objectives, particularly since the beginning of the present Intifada. This is the reason that over the course of the violent events in the Palestinian territories, there has been no real dispute between Iran and the Palestinian terror organizations that it supports, and the Palestinian Authority. On the contrary, during the conflict, the Iranians granted direct assistance to the Authority (the Karine-A affair), and indirect assistance to Fatah and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, which are subordinate to Arafat. All of this takes place despite the fact that the Iranians are essentially hostile toward Arafat and support the Islamic Palestinian organizations that are subversive to him and to the Palestinian Authority.

Recently, there has been an increase in Iranian involvement in the process of organizing the setting up of Fatah terror activity in the Palestinian territories. In this framework, inter alia, the Iranians financed a suicide bombing in the old Central
Bus Station in Tel-Aviv (January 5, 2003), resulting in 22 deaths, and another suicide bombing in the new Railway Station in Kfar Saba (April 24, 2003), resulting in the death of a security officer.

Both suicide bombings were carried out by Fatah members in Nablus, who had organized to carry out terror acts. The suicide bombing at the Railway Station occurred a short time before Abu Mazen’s presenting his new government. In this context, the Head of the Israeli General Security Service, Mr. Avi Dichter, was quoted in the Israeli press as stating, during a cabinet meeting held at that same day, that “Iran is trying to foment terror in order to thwart Abu Mazen’s assuming his new duty [as the Palestinian premier]” (Yedioth Ahronoth, April 28, 2003).

Characteristics of Iranian aid to Palestinian terror

In the past year, a great deal of information has been accumulated gathered by the Israeli defense establishment that illustrates the methods and dimensions of Iranian assistance to Palestinian terror. The information is based on a variety of sources, among which are interrogations of imprisoned terrorists, the interrogation of the Karine-A and Santorini crews, and documents of the Palestinian territories seized by the IDF.

These sources show that Iran, with the cooperation of its strategic ally Syria, grants diverse assistance to Palestinian terror in the Palestinian territories in a variety of spheres:

Political-propaganda backing: Iran’s media systematically encourage the continuation of the Intifada and glorify the violent activities and suicide attacks. Iran reiterates time and again in Islamic and international forums the ostensible legitimacy of Palestinian terror. It also provides a venue for conferences that support the continuation of terror, negates agreements and arrangements designed to put an end to terror, opposes any attempt to work toward shifting the conflict and terror route toward negotiation and talks, and systematically calls for the annihilation of the State of Israel.

Directing terror: The Iranians act in an ongoing manner to prevent any easing of tension in the Palestinian territories and to intensify terror activity. They achieve this both directly and indirectly:

Exploitation of the Palestinian terror organizations, both Islamic and secular, as contractors for carrying out terror activities in the Palestinian territories. The Iranians determine the policy, and the Palestinian organizations, i.e., the terror contractors, are responsible for carrying out the policy through their operatives in the Palestinian territories, in exchange for Iranian assistance, which mainly consists of funding.

Patronage that the Iranians have gained over the Palestinian Islamic Jihad terror organization, which is the body most loyal to Tehran in the Palestinian arena. Albeit small and extreme, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad is a “quality” organization with terror capabilities, which during the course of the Intifada has carried out brutal suicide attacks. In addition, the Iranians provide assistance to other terror organizations, the most prominent of which are Hamas and the PFLP-GC.

Direct operation by recruiting injured Palestinians wounded during the Intifada and taken for medical treatment to Iran. Since the beginning of the Intifada, hundreds of wounded Palestinians have gone to Iran. Some were recruited by the Iranians for activities that comprise gathering intelligence information on Israel, recruiting a pool of collaborators for carrying out terror attacks, and smuggling weapons into the Palestinian territories under the guise of business transactions.

Use of the financial lever: The financial level serves as a tool of utmost importance in establishing a terror apparatus in the Palestinian territories and for starting terror activity. Findings related to the interrogation of prisoners captured and documents seized in Operation Defensive Shield show the existence of an institutionalized and systematic network for transferring large sums of money operated by Iran through the organizations under its auspices, which use the banking systems of Syria and the Palestinian territories. Interrogation of the prisoners and the seized documents reveal large-scale transfer of money from Syria and Lebanon to Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and indirectly also to the Fatah / al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades (in addition to funds received by Fatah from the Palestinian Authority). These funds were used to encourage murderous terror activities in the Palestinian territories and in Israel; carrying out these activities was a condition for transferring financial support to the terror operatives in the field.

Instruction and training: Iran also assists the Palestinian terror organizations in training. The al-Quds [“Jerusalem”] Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, the supporting force of the Iranian regime, recruits and trains—in addition to Hezbollah—Palestinian operatives from the terror organizations under their patronage, and frequently also from Fatah. These recruits undergo military training in Lebanon, often continue their training in Iran, and later return to the Palestinian territories and are integrated into the local terror apparatus. It is also known that some wounded Palestinians who had been sent for medical treatment in Iran were recruited, and in the course of their stay in Iran underwent military training.

Transferring high-quality weapons to the Palestinian Authority: Iran endeavors to assist the Intifada by transferring directly from Iran (the Karine-A affair) high quality weapons to the Palestinian Authority, and indirectly from Lebanon via the PFLP-GC and Hezbollah (the Santorini affair). Interrogation of the crews of these ships revealed Iran’s role and the involvement of the PFLP-GC and Hezbollah, as well as the Syrian connection to the smuggling affairs. There is little doubt that, had these high-quality weapons—including Katyusha rockets and Strella anti-aircraft missiles—reached the Palestinian Authority, the capabilities of the terror organizations of attacking the IDF, densely-populated areas in Israel (including the larger cites), and military and civilian aviation would have been significantly improved and would have created a “balance of terror”, similar to the Lebanon model.

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“Exporting” the Lebanese Model to the Palestinian Territories

A Sagger missile used by a Hezbollah terrorist in Lebanon
A Sagger Missile made in Iran found on board the Karine-A, which was on its way to the Plestinian territories for the use of Palestinian terror organizations

Among the documents seized by the IDF during Operation Defensive Shield was an empty envelope addressed to Brigadier General Fuad al-Shobaki, head of the financial department of the General Security and Arafat’s financial aide. The letter was sent to Shobaki from the “Embassy of the State of Palestine” in Iran. Shobaki was involved in smuggling weapons into the Palestinian territories from Iran, Iraq, Jordan, and Egypt. His name was brought up as the leading contact in smuggling weapons from Iran on the weapon ship Karine-A.

The envelope addressed to Shobaki

Translation

Note: it may be assumed that the letter was addressed to Shobaki by one of his liaisons in Iran, and dealt with acquisitions and funding.

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Iranian directing of Palestinian terror according to seized documents

Clear-cut manifestation of Iranian directing of Palestinian terror in the Palestinian territories can be seen in intelligence reports found among seized documents of the Palestinian security apparatuses, which were delivered for Arafat’s perusal; for example:

The subject of the intelligence report dated December 10, 2000, delivered by Amin al-Hindi, head of the Palestinian General Intelligence, was the transfer of large sums of money to the Palestinian territories by Iran (US$400,000 to the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades; US$700,000 to the Islamic organizations opposing the Palestinian Authority). According to the document, the funds were intended for supporting the Hamas military arm in Israel and encouraging suicide operations. According to the document, Hamas’ leadership in Syria maintains contact with operatives from the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades in the Palestinian territories in all matters pertaining to carrying out military attacks against Israeli targets.

Original document

Original document

An intelligence report dated June 1, 2000, delivered to Arafat by the Iranian Head of General Intelligence, tells of a meeting that was held in the Iranian Embassy in Damascus on May 19, 2000. Present at the meeting were the Iranian ambassador and senior officials of the Hamas, the Islamic Jihad, and the Hezbollah. “During the meeting,” the report continues, “the Iranian ambassador demanded that the above-mentioned persons carry out military operations in Palestine without taking responsibility for these operations…” [for a translation of the document, see “Document No. 1”, Appendix 2].

Original document

In an intelligence document dated September 11, 2000 delivered to Arafat from Gaza by the Administration of Political Affairs in the Palestinian Preventive Security Service, reference is made to a series of intensive meetings held between leaders of the Palestinian opposition factions in Syria and Lebanon, which were attended, inter alia, “by representatives of the Hamas, the Islamic Jihad, and the Hezbollah in Palestine.” The meetings were attended by representatives from Syria, Iran, and the Hezbollah; the meetings’ objective was to “coalesce [their] action strategy in the near future.” In these meetings, agreement was reached about bringing about the escalation of military activity in Jerusalem, without taking responsibility. [for a translation of the document, see “Document. No. 3”, Appendix 2].

Original document

The Palestinian Islamic Jihad, headed by Ramadan Shalah, is the Palestinian organization most closely associated with Iran, and the one most loyal to the Iranian regime. Albeit small, it is a “quality” terror organization, which carried out brutal suicide attacks that resulted in hundreds of Israeli casualties during the Intifada. The organization is defined as a terror organization not only by the United States, but also by the European Union.

Logo of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad organization

Ramadan Shalah and the other Islamic Jihad leaders living in Syria pay frequent visits to Iran and maintain ties with the heads of the Iranian regime in order to obtain funding and assistance for their terror operations. The Islamic Jihad has a permanent representative in Iran who maintains ongoing contact with various Iranian bodies in order to maintain and strengthen their ties. According to Iranian media [ISNA, May 2002], Abu Jihad Muhammad, the representative of the Islamic Jihad, attended the conference held in memory of those killed in Jenin, and spoke in their honor.

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The Islamic Jihad’s encouragement of murderous suicide attacks: The case of Jenin

The flow of large sums of money significantly improves the operational capabilities of the organizations under the auspices of Iran, and mainly those of the Islamic Jihad, who, contrary to the Hamas and Fatah, do not have deep roots in the Palestinian population (in the Jenin region, for example, Islamic Jihad’s operational capabilities are greater than those of the Fatah / al-Aqsa Brigades). The large sums of money given to the organization by the Iranians, both directly and indirectly, fund terror activities and constitute a motivating and inciting factor for the execution of these activities by all of the terror organizations, including the Fatah / al-Aqsa Brigades, who indirectly receive Iranian money.

Thabet Mardawi and Ali al-Saadi (“Safouri”), two senior operatives in the Islamic Jihad in Jenin responsible for a number of murderous attacks in Israel, said in their interrogation that they had regularly received large sums of money from Islamic Jihad headquarters in Damascus. They said that they opened several bank accounts under their names or that of an older woman (in order to cover up their activities). Ali “Safouri” said that each operational group of the Islamic Jihad had a bank account in which it balanced its own account. The monies were transferred to each group as needed, based on their operational needs. At times, transferring the money would take 3-4 days. According to a seized document of the Palestinian General Intelligence in the Jenin region, part of the money was also transferred to the bank account of Bassam al-Saadi, a senior member of the Islamic Jihad in Jenin.

The money transferred from Damascus was used for several purposes: carrying out suicide attacks in Israel, support of the families of “martyrs” and prisoners, and acquisition of equipment designated for suicide attacks, such as IDF uniforms. Two examples of the large sums of money transferred by Dr. Ramadan Shalah from Damascus to the Islamic Jihad personnel in Jenin can be found in the seized document of the Palestinian General Intelligence in the Jenin region.

$31,000 was supposed to be delivered by Ali “Safouri”, but never arrived at its destination. This sum was defined in the document as “the remainder of expenses” for the suicide attack in Afula of November 27, 2001.

$127,000 was transferred for support for the families of “martyrs” and prisoners (this sum too did not reach its destination).

The large sums of money transferred from Syria to the Islamic Jihad’s terror operatives in Jenin clearly reinforced the organization’s capabilities and positioned it as a leading terror organization based in the Jenin region, characterized by a large number of suicide operations (in one of the seized documents, Jenin was labeled “the capital of suicide terrorists”). According to a seized document of the Palestinian General Intelligence, this fact enabled Islamic Jihad operatives to fund Fatah activities (to the great frustration of the Fatah / al-Aqsa Brigades operatives, who suffered from a lack of funds), to help the families of the Fatah victims, bribe members of the Palestinian Authority’s security people, and harness the Fatah / al-Aqsa Brigades to carry out joint terror attacks inside Israel (such as the suicide attack on Afula of November 27, 2001).

All of this clearly illustrates the methods by which prudent activation of the levers of influence, and particularly the financial lever, afforded Iran patronage over a small but “quality” terror organization, and through it influence over the scope of terror in the Palestinian territories and the focal point of suicide activities in Jenin. The murderous terror attacks carried out by Islamic Jihad from its stronghold in Jenin, “the capital of suicide bombers”, can be regarded, from the Iranian standpoint, as a notable expression of the success of its policy of supporting terror, all in all while blurring Iranian “fingerprints” and investing relatively small input.

· In the Ein al-Hilweh refugee camp near Sidon, a terror faction of Fatah has been operating, headed by Colonel Munir Hussein Khalil Maqdah. Maqdah and his organization, the Black September 13 Brigades, (founded in that date in 1993 as a protest against the signing of the “Document of Principles”) are considered opponents of Arafat’s policies and constitute an opposition to Fatah’s mainstream in Lebanon. Nevertheless, interrogation of prisoners captured during Operation Defensive Shield, and interrogation of a terrorist detained in 2001, prove that Maqdah regularly transfers large sums of money in support of terror operatives from the Fatah / Tanzim / al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades in various parts of the West Bank. The amount of monies transferred by Maqdah since the beginning of the Intifada is assessed at hundreds of thousands of dollars.

Munir Maqdah

· There is little doubt that Munir Maqdah has no independent source for funding the wide-ranging activities of the Fatah / al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades; it is reasonable to assume that the source of this money is Iran; according to the media, Iran grants financial aid to Maqdah through the “Martyrs’ Fund,” a fund that provides assistance to the “war martyrs”, including the Palestinians and the Hezbollah. In other words, Iran also provides indirect assistance to the Fatah’s terror network, led by Yasser Arafat, while Arafat takes no effective steps whatsoever to sever the operational-terror ties between his and Maqdah’s people.

Iran and the Palestinian Authority

· Iran’s willingness to indirectly transfer money to Fatah bodies – and later, to provide the Palestinian Authority with direct assistance (as in the Karine-A affair) –constitute a significant shift in Iranian policy. During the initial stages of the Intifada, Iran regarded the Palestinian Authority as a treacherous entity seeking to reach a political agreement with Israel. However this attitude underwent a change as, since the second half of 2001, the Palestinian Authority and the terrorist apparatuses operating under its auspices have gradually become leaders in the struggle and the terror activities directed against Israel.

The honeymoon of the Iran-Arafat relationship at the initial stages of the Islamic revolution Arafat, who cherished hopes of gaining strength fro revolutionary Iran, was the first leader to visit Tehran immediately after the victory of the revolution (February 1979). He was received in Tehran with great honor and was given the Israeli delegation’s building to house his embassy. This was followed by disillusionment, and his relationship with the Iranian regime has since experienced ups and downs. Arafat giving a speech during his first visit to Iran, before the masses in Ahvaz, the capital of Khuzistan, an oil-rich region and a district mainly populated by people of Arab origin; standing next to him is Khomeini’s son. Photograph taken during the first meeting between Arafat and Khomeini in February 1979

Source: the book The Imam Khomeini and the Palestinian Problem, published by the “Strong Bond”, first edition (April, 1979).
Author: Hani Fahs, who, according to the book, delivered a message from Arafat to Khomeini on January 9, 1979.
Venue of publication: not mentioned; in our opinion, it was Beirut.

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Iranian aid in training of the Palestinian terror organizations

Iranian assistance to terror operatives and Palestinian terror organizations is also manifested in training. The arm through which this dimension of assistance to Palestinian terror is executed is the Revolutionary Guards (Pasdaran), led by the al-Quds [”Jerusalem”] Force. This force is in fact the military-intelligence branch of the Revolutionary Guards that operates abroad, including the Bekaa region in Lebanon.

Since the beginning of the violent events that have taken place in the Palestinian territories, the activities of the Revolutionary Guards in Lebanon are characterized by an ever-increasing effort to recruit Palestinians to fight Israel. The Iranians well identified the potential embodied in recruiting Palestinians from “outside” (refugee camps) and from “inside” (the Palestinian territories); efforts to inculcate these Palestinians with ideology similar to that of the Hezbollah are therefore quite apparent.

In the context of the training assistance provided, the Revolutionary Guards recruits Islamic operatives trained in Lebanon, and who also frequently continue their training in Iran. They later return to the Palestinian territories and are integrated into carrying out terror activity

Original document



An intelligence report of the Palestinian Preventive Security Services mentioning
an Iranian guide training a Hamas group in Lebanon in.

An intelligence report delivered to Jibril Rajoub (former head of the Preventive Security Services in the West Bank) by the head of the Bethlehem Department of Preventive Security; the report deals with the list of wanted Hamas members preparing for the execution of suicide attacks. The report lists the names of two members of the group, who, according to the report: “…have undergone a training course in Lebanon at the Yahfufa base (south of Baalbek in the Lebanon Bekaa), under the supervision of Abu Khaled, an Iranian instructor. They participated in a three-month course in Lebanon and returned to Palestine…” [for translation of the document, see “Document No. 4”, Appendix 2].

Recently it has come to light that Iranian experts from the Revolutionary Guards in Lebanon have been instructing Palestinians from the Fatah and Hamas organizations in the use of individual SA-7 (Strella) shoulder-launched ground-to-air missiles, evidently manufactured in Russia. According to the media, the course was conducted at the Janta Base in the Bekaa valley in Lebanon. 20 Palestinians from the Fatah and Hamas organizations took part, having participated last year in a basic military course given by the Revolutionary Guards in Lebanon. Upon completing the course, the graduates would undergo a special training course in Iran, near the city of Qom, and from there would return to the Palestinian territories. The chief operatives involved in this matter were also mentioned, including the coordinating member of the Revolutionary Guards, Ali Reza Hamizi, and the liaison officer, Munir Maqdah, leader of the dissent faction from the Fatah, who operates in the Ein al-Hilweh refugee camp near Sidon (see Indirect Iranian Assistance to Fatah terror apparatus).

During his interrogation, Salameh said that during the course of his activities in Hamas, he left for the Sudan, where he had been working in the organization’s offices for eight months. In 1993, he moved to Syria, where he trained at the PFLP-GC. From Syria he returned to the Sudan, where he met with a group of some 18 wanted Hamas members who had fled the Gaza Strip.

Members of the group exerted pressure on the Hamas leadership in the Sudan to undergo military training. Those responsible for the group arranged a three-month military training course for them. The group members were flown from the Sudan to Syria and from there, they were flown by an Iranian aircraft to Iran.

Salameh pointed out that upon their arrival in Tehran, they were met by Osama Hamdan, the Hamas representative in Iran. Together with two other Palestinians and an interpreter, the group was sent from the airport directly to a military base, where they were trained by 10 Iranian instructors in the following subjects:

At the end of the course, Salameh was sent back to the Sudan, and from there continued to Syria. In Syria, he began planning his return to the Gaza Strip, which had since been transferred to the Palestinian Authority. After his return , as stated earlier, Salameh was behind murderous terror attacks against Israeli citizens.

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Iranian activity in the Palestinian territories through “Charitable Associations”

Deepening Iranian influence through extremist Islamic “charitable associations”
operating in the Gaza Strip

“Charitable associations” in the Gaza Strip, which are identified with the extremist Islamic groups, enjoy a great deal of assistance granted by the extremist Arab states, chief among them is Iran. Thus, for example, Iranian bodies headed by the Iranian Popular Committee for Supporting the al-Aqsa Intifada transfer financial aid and food packages to the extremist Islamic associations in the Gaza Strip, such as al-Ihsan (identified with Islamic Jihad), Ard al-Ribat, and the al-Aqsa association in Bani Suheila (identified with Hamas).

It was reported, for example, that the Iranian Popular Committee financed a project for the al-Ihsan “charitable association” in 2002 that distributed food packages at the cost of US$72,000, and it intends to finance a similar additional project in the near future. The al-Ihsan association, identified, as stated earlier, with the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, provides community services and financial aid while focusing on the “martyrs”’ families. Thus, for example, it runs a kindergarten in Beit Hanoun called Basha’er al-Intisar [“blossoms of victory”] for children of Islamic Jihad operatives.

Transferring support to the “charitable associations”, the majority of which are identified with Hamas, provides the Iranians with an additional pipeline for supporting Hamas and serves as an additional channel of influence in the Palestinian arena and Fatah. The Palestinian Authority is well aware of the motives for the Iranian “humanitarian aid,” but it does nothing to bring it to a halt due to its desire to avoid confronting Hamas and Islamic Jihad.

The significance of this assistance can be seen in a seized document dated June 2000 that deals with a report on a meeting held in Damascus between Iranian President Khatami, who was visiting Syria at the time, and the Hamas leadership. The meeting, according to the document, was designed to gain Iranian support for Hamas. The report, which was delivered to Arafat, contains a description of Hamas’ wide-ranging da’wa [preaching, propaganda, and in fact, religious-political indoctrination] activity in the Palestinian territories as it was presented to the Iranians: “The Hamas leadership addresses the Palestinian apparatus [in the Palestinian territories] on various issues: schools, universities, trade, public services for women, and the emerging young generation for its recruitment. [This includes] also preschools, in order to train an entire generation of supporters [of Hamas] in the clubs and community centers. [For the full translation of the document, see “Document No. 2”, Appendix 2].

Original document

The ideological sanction for transferring monies collected for charity in
order to support Hamas military activity

Hamas operatives in the Palestinian territories receive financial support from the organization’s headquarters in Damascus for funding their activities. Money that has been collected for “charity purposes” and designated inter alia for the support of families of the “martyrs” and prisoners is also transferred from Syria and Lebanon. These monies also find their way to Hamas’ military wing. Seized documents show that the Palestinian Authority has traced these monetary transfers, but has not taken any effective steps to prevent them from being placed.

Thus, for example, the December 10, 2000 intelligence report by Amin al-Hindi, head of the Palestinian General Intelligence, mentions a decision made by a list of Islamic elements (affiliated with Iran) to transfer the zakat, or charity donations of year 2000 (collected in Lebanon?) to the Hamas movement in the Palestinian territories. The Hamas would then distribute these monies without the involvement of the Palestinian Authority. Part of this money, the report adds, will be directed toward support of the Hamas military wing in the Palestinian territories.

Zakat, or charity donations or alms, is considered one of the five basic precepts of Islam. A pillar of social justice in Islam, it is supposed to be used for advancing social objectives. Using the charity funds for military needs seemingly runs counter to these objectives.

However, the Imam Khomeini resolved this issue. A description of his “solution” can be found in the book Palestine in the Speeches of the Imam Khomeini, published in Syria by the Syrian Information Ministry. The book quotes the response to the question addressed to Khomeini by a group of Palestinian fida’iyun [“warriors”]: Is it permitted or prohibited to use zakat prescribed by Islam, for arming Moslems? In answer to the question, Khomeini explained:

“I have already explained that the establishment of the exploitive State of Israel constitutes a great danger to Islam and the Islamic states…Since danger faces Islam, it is imperative that the Islamic state in particular, and the Moslems in general, remove this germ of corruption in all possible ways. We should not be content with the practical aid given for this purpose, but permission is granted to transfer resources from zakat and other Moslem charity funds for this purpose [Adnan Hussein Abu Nasser, Palestine in the Lectures of the Imam Khomeini, published by the Information Ministry of the Syrian Arab Republic, 2000, p. 120].

This perception grants religious-legal sanction for the transfer of money from abroad to the “Charitable Committees” of the Hamas and additional terror organizations in the Palestinian territories, as well as diverting part of these funds for military activity. Money for the “Charitable Committees” is transferred from Lebanon and Arab and Western countries to the Palestinian territories, part of which “trickles into” the operational-terror apparatuses of the terror organizations.

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The use of wounded Palestinians receiving treatment in Iran as a lever of influence in the Palestinian territories

Overview

× Since the outbreak of violent events in the Palestinian territories, hundreds of wounded Palestinians have received medical treatment in Iran.

× During their stay in Iran, official Iranian bodies have established contact with the wounded Palestinians, seemingly as an act of humanitarian aid. De facto, Iran exploits the wounded Palestinians as a human resource pool that can be mobilized for Iranian activity against Israel. This activity comprises gathering intelligence information, recruiting a pool of collaborators in the Palestinian territories for executing terror activities and smuggling weapons into the Palestinian territories under the guise of business transactions. Some of the wounded underwent military training in the course of their stay in Iran. In this manner, Iran is clearly strengthening its foothold in the Palestinian territories and is also directly operating Palestinians (though not through the terror organizations).

Detailing the process of recruiting wounded Palestinians

× The wounded Palestinians left the Palestinian territories for Jordan, and from there were flown by military and civilian aircraft to Iran. Their passports were not stamped, and no visas were required. The wounded were transferred from there to military hospitals in Tehran such as Baqiyatollah Hospital – a Revolutionary Guards hospital, in which they were hospitalized in a separate ward – and Sisan Hospital.

× During their stay in Iran, the wounded underwent intensive indoctrination: Official receptions were held in their honor, which were attended by senior Iranian officials such as Mehdi Karoubi, speaker of the Iranian majles (parliament), and the head of President Khatami’s office. They were taken by members of the Headquarters for Coordination and Support of the Intifada to visit various official sites, and were introduced to various “Popular Committees.” Inter alia, the wounded visited Khomeini’s home and grave, the Shah’s palace museum, a base of Iraqi prisoners, the Iranian Book Fair, and the University of Tehran. In one instance, they were taken to a theater and shown an Iranian propaganda film dealing with the war against Israel and the Jews. During their stay in Iran, the wound were shown video films depicting the violent events taking place in the West Bank.

× The Iranians gave the wounded Palestinians pocket money, allowed them to make telephone calls to the West Bank, and gave them an allowance granted by the Iranian parliament. During their stay in Iran, the wounded Palestinians were visited by senior officials of the terror organizations sponsored by Iran, among them Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s Secretary General; Khaled Mash’al, a senior member of the Hamas leadership; Osama Hamdan, representative of Hamas in Lebanon; Abu Muhammad Mustafa, representative of Hamas in Iran; Ramadan Shalah, leader of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad; and Muhammad Tukhi (Abu Jihad), representative of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Iran.

Schematic chart: the process of recruiting wounded Palestinians in Iran

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The operating of wounded Palestinians by Iran:

The case of Odah Qatash

Name Odah Qatash Reesidnt of al-Bire Age: 40 Location and date of injury: al-Bireh, Palestinian Authority, December 2000; injured by a gunshot in the leg, treated at Ramallah Hospital Left for treatment in Iran: In April 2001, Qatash made contact with “Abu Sajed”, secretary of the Committee for Support of the Intifada in Iran, asking for his assistance. “Abu Sajed” arranged for him to leave for Iran the same month, together with additional wounded Palestinians. Recruitment for military activity: In May 2001, Abu Muhammad Mansour approached Qatash, introducing himself as a member of the Revolutionary Guards, and asked him to help him smuggle weapons into the West Bank. Abu Muhammad suggested that they carry out the smuggling under the guise of a business transaction. Later during his stay in Iran, Qatash met with Abu Mahdi (Najafi), a member of the Revolutionary Guards, who explained to him that the Revolutionary Guards is a body that directs its efforts to preserving the Iranian revolution. · “Abu Mahdi” complained to Qatash that residents of the West Bank were not doing enough and were not sufficiently active in the Intifada. He added that he wanted to help the Palestinian people in their “war”, and that in order to reach this goal he needed the help of the residents of the West Bank. In an additional meeting between the two, “Abu Mahdi” told Qatash that the Revolutionary Guards sought to lay the groundwork for recruiting numerous military cells which would operate from the West Bank, and that he would help Qatash in financing the purchase of weapons and moving them into the West Bank. “Abu Mahdi” added that he sought Qatash’s help in transferring additional wounded Palestinians for treatment in Iran and in opening a branch of the Iranian Popular Committee in Ramallah, which would constitute a cover for security activities. Of the wounded Palestinians who would come to Iran, he wished to recruit more of them for action, in particular students or those skilled in electricity and chemistry. These people would be trained in weapons, but training would be conducted under cover. Qatash updated Abu Mahdi and told him that he was a welder by profession, and Abu Mahdi asked him if he could operate lathes for producing weapons. He also proposed recruiting engravers and welders who would be trained in Iran and in the Palestinian territories in order to produce arms. Abu Mahdi made it clear that he wanted Qatash to establish ties with Fatah operatives in the West Bank so that they would use the weapons produced in the future. At the end of the meeting Abu Mahdi gave Qatash the sum of US$1,000. Qatash noted that “Abu Muhammad” Mansour asked him to set up a Web site for the use of the wounded, so that any injured Palestinian who wanted to receive treatment could do so by entering the site, which would be managed by the branch of the Iranian Popular Committee to be established in Ramallah. Qatash also noted that he was instructed by “Abu Muhammad” to write a thank you note in the name of the wounded to the Iranian Republic, as well as a personal thank you note to Hassan Nasrallah, leader of Hezbollah. The letters would be publicized over al-Manar, Hezbollah’s television station. He also suggested that Qatash would receive in advance the names of Palestinians going to Iran; he would give them basic lessons in weapons in the field so that they would begin military training with a basic knowledge of operating weapons. At the beginning of June 2001, Qatash left for military training at a recruits’ base in Iran, during which he underwent theoretical and practical training in the use of the M-16 rifle. In addition, he was given instructions relating to conduct during interrogation in the event that he would be detained by the Israeli security forces, and he was told that he should take care to assess whether he was being followed. In the course of his interrogation, Qatash emphasized that in fact all of the operatives of the Iranian Popular Committee for Support of the Intifada were members of the Revolutionary Guards under cover. Qatash’s activity in the Palestinian territories: Having returned from Iran, Qatash began establishing contacts with the wounded, mediating between them and “Abu Sajed”, in order to bring them to Iran for treatment. At the beginning of July 2001, he cooperated with “Abu Sajed” in establishing a branch of the Iranian Popular Committee in Ramallah in order to facilitate the process. As the Committee’s representative, Qatash was promised a monthly salary. Ties with Iran also continued when Qatash was in the Palestinian territories. In August 2001, “Abu Sajed” received an update from Qatash regarding a terror attack that took place in Haifa. He showed interest in the number of dead and wounded. Qatash provided him with the details and told him that no one was killed except for the terrorist, but that some of the people there were wounded. “Abu Sajed” told Qatash that they did not want them to send to Iran those who had been severely wounded in the Intifada, since it would involve lengthy and costly treatment. Iran wanted to treat as many wounded as possible, at the lowest possible cost and investment. The Iranians also wanted those who had sustained light injuries so that they could train them for military activity. “Abu Sajed” requested the transfer of compensatory funds to the wounded through the “charitable associations” belonging to organizations such as Hamas.

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