



**Intelligence and Terrorism
Information Center
at the Israel Intelligence Heritage &
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Has the Palestinian Authority fulfilled its security commitments, and to what extent, in accordance with the road map? (Interim analysis)



Israeli security force operation in the Old City of Nablus (IDF spokesman's Website, January 5, 2008). They uncovered an explosives laboratory, weapons and military equipment; 23 wanted Palestinian operatives were detained



The Palestinian security services enter the Old City (Abd Omar for Reuters, December 15, 2007). The security services enforce law and order in Nablus to a great degree but avoid dismantling the terrorist networks.

Overview

1. For the past two months, as negotiations were held with Israel and preparations were made for the Annapolis meeting, the Palestinian security services carried out intensive activity in Nablus and to a lesser degree in other cities in Judea and Samaria. The objective was to put an end to anarchy, enforce public order, strengthen the PA's status among the populace and hamper the activities of Hamas (in view of the fierce confrontation between Abu Mazen and Fatah on the one hand and Hamas and Ismail Haniya's government in the Gaza Strip on the other). Moreover, **the objective was to demonstrate to the United States, Israel and the international community that the PA was meeting the security commitments of the first phase of the road map.**

2. An interim analysis of the situation (as of the beginning of January 2008) indicates that with regard to law and order and limiting Hamas's political, social and propaganda activities, the Palestinian services have had local successes in Nablus and several other focal points of anarchy in Judea and Samaria. On the other hand, **with regard to all aspects of dismantling the terrorist networks and preventing terrorism**, as demanded of the Palestinians by the road map, **their activity has been limited and ineffective**, and the security services' activities were not significantly different from what they were in the past. Moreover, the PA has not met its commitments in respect to **stopping anti-Israeli propaganda and incitement**, which has **worsened** since the Annapolis meeting.

3. Thus, the Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and even Fatah operatives who do not subscribe to the "wanted terrorists agreement" continue their activities and attempt to carry out terrorist attacks in Judea and Samaria and within Israel, including suicide bombing attacks. The fact that there were fewer terrorist attacks in 2007 was the **direct result of intensive**

counterterrorist activities carried out by the Israeli security forces, not by the Palestinian security services. Those Israeli activities have continued into 2008, including a broad-scope operation in the Old City in Nablus, where a explosives laboratory, weapons and military equipment were discovered (January 2-5, 2008).

4. This bulletin contains the following:

A) **Part I:** Palestinian security service activities in Judea and Samaria.

B) **Part II:** The terrorist organizations' activities in Judea and Samaria and the Israeli counterterrorist activities in 2007.

C) **Part III:** An interim analysis of the PA's fulfillment of its commitment to fight terrorism in accordance with the road map.

D) **Appendix A:** Nablus as a test case for Palestinian security activities (November 2007-early January, 2008).

E) **Appendix B:** Video clip: The exposure of explosives laboratory and weapons during IDF counterterrorist activities, 2007 (Courtesy of the IDF spokesman).

Part I

Palestinian security service activities in Judea and Samaria.

Local successes in restoring public order and hampering Hamas activities

1. Since the beginning of November Palestinian security service activities have mainly focused on **Nablus**, which has traditionally been a **hotbed of terrorism and anarchy**. To a lesser degree it continued in urban centers including **Jenin, Hebron, Tulkarm** and **Bethlehem**. In the Nablus district and some of the other cities the security services had **local successes** in stopping anarchy and restoring public order, which had been undermined during the past seven years of the violent Palestinian-Israeli confrontation. (For an interim analysis of the activities of the security services in Nablus, which the PA regards as a model for other cities, see the **Appendix**).

2. The PA's efforts to weaken the Hamas networks in Judea and Samaria, especially in the districts of Nablus and Jenin, included widespread detentions of Palestinians, most of whom were suspected of belonging to Hamas (**430 individuals**).¹ Most of the detainees were released shortly thereafter, and only a few dozen remained in PA custody.

3. **Forceful steps were also taken against the "charitable societies"** and other institutions belonging to Hamas's civilian network (**the *da'wah***): some of the "charitable societies" were closed, the Hamas activists who ran them were fired and workers were replaced, as were a number of mosque preachers. Salam Fayyad's government began instituting reforms intended to weaken the Hamas hold on the *da'wah* institutions (including passing a law against money laundering and dismantling 92 "charitable societies" operating on the West Bank and uniting them with 11 societies operating under Ministry

¹ Updated to the beginning of January 2008.

of Endowment supervision). **Those were steps in the right direction whose success will depend on the PA's determination and ability to carry them out over a long period of time.**²

4. As part of their activities against the Hamas *da'wah* in Judea and Samaria, the Palestinian security services acted against the **mosques**, many of which were traditionally **Hamas strongholds for preaching, propaganda and incitement, and in the past even for terrorist organization operational activity**. Action was taken against 30 mosques and propaganda material was confiscated. In addition, six preachers were detained and several were replaced. However, the process of replacing them, many of whom are affiliated with **Hamas**, has so far been very limited and **anti-Israeli and anti-PA incitement from the mosques continues**.

5. The Palestinian security forces also had local success in **Bethlehem**, a focus of international attention at Christmas. On Christmas Eve the Palestinian National Security Forces deployed throughout the city. They secured Abu Mazen's entourage and that of the Armenian patriarch, both of whom visited Bethlehem in honor of the holiday. Their activity, coordinated with those of the various security services, contributed to the holiday events which were attended by tens of thousands of tourists and which took place without interruption. To mark Fatah's 43rd anniversary a military display of the security services was held in Bethlehem in which 600 activists participated. **Muhammad Ghanem**, head of Palestinian general intelligence for Bethlehem, said that during the previous two months the services had detained Hamas operatives and confiscated weapons (Ma'an News Agency, January 6).

² The PA under Arafat took short-term steps to weaken the Hamas *da'wah*, but they were not continued and in the end Hamas regained its control of the "charitable societies" and other institutions.

Following their release the commander of Palestinian General Intelligence, Colonel Abdallah Kamil, ⁵ said after their they had been interrogated that those detained were not dangerous to public safety and stressed that only a few individuals remained in Nablus' Al-Juneid prison (Al-Hayat Al Jadeeda, December 18).



Members of the Palestinian security forces securing Christmas events in Bethlehem (Imad Awad for Reuters, December 24, 2007).

6. On the other hand, in the **Hebron district**, where tradition and religion are very influential, **Hamas has retained its main center of West Bank power**. It has always been very strong in the Hebron district, politically, socially and operationally. In addition the dominant clans enjoy more power there than in other districts. In recent months the Palestinian security services in Hebron uncovered weapons and had a number of confrontations with Hamas and the radical Islamic Liberation Party. However, so far the security services in the Hebron district have not yet carried out extensive security activities of the sort they did in the Nablus district, and have made no real attempt to uproot the networks belonging to Hamas and the other terrorist organizations.



Demonstrators in Hebron confronting Palestinian security service personnel during a demonstration against the Annapolis meeting (Naif Hashalmon for Reuters, November 27).

7. **In summary:** Palestinian Interior Minister **Abd al-Razaq al-Yahya** said recently that “security anarchy has ended” and that the activities of the “armed groups” was completely eliminated (The Voice of Palestine Radio, December 26, 2007). **In our assessment, his statement has no basis in fact, and the Israeli security force detention of 23 wanted terrorists and the exposure of a large quantity of weapons in the Old City in Nablus demonstrated that.** In our estimation, the PA **has not yet completed its enforcement of law and order**, certainly not in a problematical district like Hebron. In addition, it is still too early to determine whether its initial achievements in a traditional hotspot of anarchy like Nablus (and in other locations) can be sustained, and whether and to what degree the PA will make an effort to ensure that they endure.

Limited activity to dismantle the terrorist organization networks and prevent terrorism



The burned vehicle of the Hamas terrorist squad from Nablus which carried out the shooting attack at the Ariel junction, wounding an IDF soldier critically and a civilian slightly (IDF spokesman, October 24).

8. While the Palestinian security services had **local success** in enforcing law and order and harming the Hamas civilian network, **they avoided taking effective action which would lead to the dismantling of the terrorist-operative infrastructure of Hamas** (and other terrorist organizations) throughout Judea and Samaria. For example:

1) **Only a few of the 430 detained in Judea and Samaria, most of them affiliated with Hamas, had a genuine connection to its**

terrorist operative wing. Most of them were employed by the political-civilian network, principally in the Nablus and Jenin districts. In addition, the Palestinian security services avoided detaining armed operatives belonging to Fatah and other organizations who might have resisted. Thus most of the detentions were carried out peacefully and only in a few instances were the security services forced to confront armed operatives.

2) **Most of those detained were released after a few days through the familiar revolving door.** That was the case of 31 Hamas activists who were detained in Nablus on the eve of the Muslim holiday of Eid al-Adha (November 17),⁵ and of **Ahmed Dula**, a senior Hamas activists in Nablus. The same was true for the detention, release and redetention of the terrorists who planned to assassinate Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert during a visit to Jericho.⁶

3) **Since the beginning of November the Palestinian security services confiscated hundreds of weapons from wanted operatives belonging to Hamas and other organizations** (particularly **Fatah** operatives included in the “wanted terrorists agreement”). They even surrendered a number of charges and several kilograms of explosives to Israeli security forces. However, most of the weapons were inoperable and were not the personal weapons of wanted terrorists.⁷ There are still wanted terrorists, some included in the

⁶ For further information see our October 24, 2007 Bulletin entitled “The detention and rush release of terrorists: the revolving door policy under Arafat: it was recently revealed that the Palestinian Authority released three terrorist operatives who planned to assassinate Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert during a visit to Jericho in late June 2007 (which in the end was cancelled).” at http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/html/detainees_release_e.htm and http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/detainees_release_e.pdf.

⁷ For example, Nablus Police Chief Colonel **Ahmed al-Sharqawi** announced that dozens of explosive charges had been found in an abandoned building in the Kasbah in Nablus. In reality, they were old charges which did not belong to the terrorist organization networks.

“wanted terrorists agreement”⁸ and some not, who have large quantities of weapons in their possession.⁹



Left: Wanted Fatah-Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade terrorist operatives return weapons to the Palestinian security services. Right: Some of the weapons returned.

⁸ The agreement removed many Fatah terrorists from terrorist activity, but there are still some who continue, or who returned to it, and who are targets for Israeli security forces’ counterterrorist activities. Squads affiliating themselves with the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade continue **carrying out terrorist attacks in Judea and Samaria** and sometimes publicly take claim for them.

⁹ For further information see our November 14, 2007 Bulletin entitled “The Amnesty Plan for Fatah operatives on Israel’s wanted list—Interim Summary” at http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/html/ct_141107e.htm and http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/ct_141107e.pdf.

¹⁵ For example, **Riyad al-Maliki**, Minister of Information in Salam Fayyad’s government, held a press conference where he announced that the security services had detained a Hamas squad which planned to carry out a suicide bombing attack against an Israeli target (Wafa News Agency, Agence France Presse, December 31, 2007). However, Israel security sources could not verify the incident.

Unmethodical and inconsistent prevention of terrorist attacks

9. In certain instances the Palestinian security services carried out pinpoint operations to prevent terrorist attacks, and the PA claimed it had prevented terrorist attacks against Israel.¹⁵ However, their counterterrorist activities are unmethodical and inconsistent, and are based on random information transferred by Israeli security forces. In addition, Fatah operatives who also belonged to the Palestinian security services participated in two terrorist attacks carried out in recent months (at Kidumim and near Hebron).

10. The lack of thorough measures against the terrorist operative networks makes it difficult to prevent terrorist attacks in **Judea and Samaria**. The last example was the murder of two off-duty IDF soldiers on a field trip north of Hebron on December 28, 2007, carried out by a squad of three terrorists which included two Fatah operatives, one of whom worked for Palestinian National Security and the other who was in contact with Palestinian General Intelligence.¹⁶

11. After the attack the two operatives surrendered to Palestinian General Intelligence (the third was killed by the two off-duty soldiers) for protective custody, fearing they would be detained by the Israeli security forces. The Palestinian security services detained and interrogated them, while senior PA figures boasted about the efficiency of the Palestinian security services to show their capabilities and seriousness regarding the implementation of the road map. Salam Fayyad and other highly-placed members of his government falsely claimed that the attack was criminally motivated, while in reality the Palestinians' cooperation with the Israeli security forces was weak and inefficient.

¹⁶ It was not the first time activists of the Palestinian security services were recently involved in deadly terrorist attacks. On November 19, 2007, an Israeli civilian was murdered by three Fatah operatives, two of whom belonged to Palestinian national security.



The Israeli soldiers, David Ruben and Ahikam Amihai, murdered while on a field trip near Hebron (IDF spokesman, December 29, 2007).

12. In addition, with the lack of effective activity to prevent attacks, in recent months the Palestinian security services tried to falsely represent their counterterrorist activities. For example:¹⁹

1) On September 25 and 26 the Palestinian security services told the media that two rockets aimed at Jerusalem had been seized in Bethlehem, as had a number of explosive charges and a suspicious suitcase. However, after the weapons had been transferred to Israel, an examination by an Israeli sapper showed that **the pipes were empty, lacked propellant** and could not be launched.

2) On December 4, 2007, Hassan Dibeq was detained, an activist in the Palestinian National Security Service in Jericho. He was detained because he belonged to a Fatah-Tanzim squad which planned to carry out attacks along the Jericho bypass, and because he provided the squad with weapons. Israel sent a request to the Palestinian security services to detain him since he was planning attacks and was a security threat. The Palestinians replied that he had been detained. However, an Israeli security force examination showed that he was free in Jericho at the time the Palestinians claimed he was in custody. He was therefore detained by the IDF and brought to the ISA for interrogation.

¹⁹ Based on information from the Israel Security Agency, “**Summary for 2007 – data and trends in Palestinian terrorism**” (the ISA Website, www.shabak.gov.il, January 1, 2008.)

In 2007 one suicide bombing attack was carried out (in Eilat), originating from the Gaza Strip ²¹ (December 29, 2007).

Part II

The terrorist organizations' activities in Judea and Samaria and the Israeli counterterrorist activities in 2007.

The attacks

1. In 2007 the terrorist organizations in Judea and Samaria continued intensive preparations to carry out attacks both against Israeli targets in the West Bank and within Israel. **Although there was no drop in motivation, there was a sharp drop in the number of terrorist attacks carried out.** That was the result of the continuous, intensive counterterrorist activities carried out by the Israeli security forces and **not the result** of counterterrorist actions taken by the Palestinian security services.

2. Particularly conspicuous was the fact that during 2007 the terrorists networks in Judea and Samaria did not manage to carry out **suicide bombing attacks** because of the counterterrorist activities of the Israeli security forces.²¹ However, it should be noted that **in the three instances suicide bombers did infiltrate into Israeli territory from Judea and Samaria and the attacks were prevented at the last minute:** in February a PIJ terrorist operative who planned to blow himself up in Tel Aviv was captured in Bat Yam, while his explosive belt was found in Rishon Letzion; in March a car bomb was dispatched by Hamas in Qalqilya and seized in Israel; in September an explosive belt sent by Hamas in Nablus was seized in an apartment in Tel Aviv.

3. Most prominent among the terrorist attacks carried out in Judea and Samaria by the various organizations were **shootings and stabbings**. Three such attacks caused the deaths of four Israelis, two civilians and two soldiers (almost one third of the Israelis were killed in terrorist attacks in 2007). While

such attacks cause fewer casualties than suicide bombing attacks, from the point of view of the terrorist organizations, they are also easier to carry out.



The scene of the attack at the Kidumim junction where Ido Zoldan was murdered. The attack was carried out by Fatah operatives, two of them (detained by the Israeli security forces) activists in the Palestinian national security services (Photo courtesy of Zaka, November 19, 2007).

Counterterrorist activities

4. The decrease in terrorism from Judea and Samaria was caused by the vigorous counterterrorist activities of the Israeli security forces during which explosives laboratories and many weapons were discovered. **In 2007 close to 4,000 terrorist operatives were detained** (compared with 5,000 in 2006). Of those detained, **117 were described by the ISA as potential suicide bombers** (compared with 279 in 2006). Despite the decrease in the number of potential suicide bombers, there are still large numbers of them, and were it not for the Israeli security forces intensive activities mass-casualty suicide bombing attacks would have been carried in Israeli cities.

5. **The terrorist-operative cells of Hamas in Judea and Samaria** are a main target of the Israeli security force counterterrorist activities, which are focused on two areas:

1) **Hamas in Samaria**, especially in the **Nablus district**, which is defined by the ISA as dangerous and working energetically to rehabilitate its ranks, which were damaged in Operation Defensive Shield (April 2002). In 2007 a series of counterterrorist activities was carried out against Hamas's operational networks and many of its operatives were detained, several of them high-ranking. One of the them, **Nihad Shukeirat**, admitted during interrogation that his collaborator had smuggled an explosive belt into Israel and hidden it in a building in Tel Aviv. The belt was in fact found in Tel Aviv and detonated by sappers. Following the detention of the explosives expert of the Hamas terrorist network in Nablus, two explosives laboratories were uncovered which were used for making high grade explosive devices for attacks against the IDF and the explosive belt for the planned suicide bombing attack in Tel Aviv.

2) **Hamas's network in Judea** is also a primary target for Israeli security force counterterrorist activities. Most of those detained and brought in to the ISA for interrogation in 2007 on suspicion of involvement in terrorist attacks, belonged to the Hamas network in Judea. In April a Hamas squad was exposed in the Hebron district which had been responsible for laying explosive charges against IDF targets next to the trans-Judea highway. Following the detention of the squad, dozens of kilograms of materials which had been earmarked for the manufacture of explosives were seized.

6. The aforementioned networks received close guidance from **Hamas headquarters outside the PA-administered territories**. Operatives were sent from abroad to Judea and Samaria whose mission was to rehabilitate the Hamas networks and to carry out terrorist attacks against Israel. In recent months new terrorist networks were formed in Samaria which were operated by Hamas's external headquarters. They sent their operatives abroad for training, upgraded their military-technological knowhow and arranged their financial affairs. One of the objectives of Hamas headquarters' increased activity is the **development capabilities and manufacture of**

rockets and mortars to copy the modus operandi of the Gaza Strip into the West Bank.

7. The PIJ network:

1) The PIJ network in Judea and Samaria, especially in northern Samaria, has participated to a great extent in the suicide bombing terrorism against Israel since the violent confrontation broke out in September 2000. **This dangerous network receives instructions from its headquarters in Syria and support from senior PIJ operatives in the Gaza Strip.** It ceaselessly attempts to carry out terrorist attacks against Israel. The counterterrorist activities of the Israeli security forces and the construction of the security fence make it difficult for this network to carry out mass-casualty suicide bombing attacks in Israel.

2) **On many occasions in 2007 the PIJ attempted to carry out suicide bombing attacks in Israel.** For example, in November a squad was arrested whose objective was to infiltrate a suicide bomber into Israel disguised as a high school student and carrying an explosive device in a backpack. In February a suicide bomber was detained who had infiltrated into Israel to carry out a suicide bombing attack in Tel Aviv. Recruited in the Jenin refugee camp (traditionally a focal point for recruiting suicide bombers), he surrendered his explosive belt, which he had thrown into a garbage can in Rishon Letzion.

3) In 2007 a great deal of effort was invested in preventing the PIJ from carrying out attacks and in removing those who headed the cells. Close to 300 operatives were detained, suspected of planning or carrying out mass-casualty attacks against Israel. Among them were terrorists who had been involved in mass-casualty attacks. For example, in July 2007 **Adham Yunis** was detained, a terrorist operative who escorted the suicide bomber who blew himself up in the Sharon shopping mall on December 5, 2005, murdering five Israelis and wounded 40. He had been involved in scores of shootings and laying explosive charges, and was active in rehabilitating the PIJ network in Tulkarm.



A military display of the security services in Jenin (Palestinian TV, November 17, 2007). So far the services have avoided dismantling the terrorist networks in and around the city.

8. Between January 2 and 5, 2008, the IDF and the ISA carried out a broad operation against the terrorist organization networks in the Old City in Nablus. Twenty-three wanted terrorists were detained, most of them Hamas and Fatah operatives, and a weapons laboratory was revealed. The operation was good, updated proof that the terrorist networks were alive and well in Nablus, **even after** the intensive activities of the Palestinian security services (For details see the **Appendix**).

Part III

An interim report of the PA's fulfillment of its commitment to stop terrorism in accordance with the road map

Palestinian security obligations according to the road map

1. **The first phase of the road map** (April 30, 2003) was devoted to “**ending terror and violence**, normalizing Palestinian life, and building Palestinian institutions.” The Palestinians were required to “**declare an unequivocal end to violence and terrorism**” and undertake “visible efforts on the ground to arrest, disrupt, and restrain individuals and groups conducting and planning violent attacks on Israelis anywhere.” Palestinian security services, “**rebuilt and refocused**,” were required to “begin sustained, targeted, and effective operations aimed at confronting all those engaged in terror and **dismantlement of terrorist capabilities and infrastructure**” (from the text of the road map that appears on the American State Department's website).

2. On March 25, 2003, the Israeli government accepted the road map, adding its own view of the document. The first addition was the following: “Both at the commencement of and during the process, and as a condition to its continuance, **calm will be maintained. The Palestinians will dismantle the existing security organizations** and implement security reforms during the course of which **new organizations will be formed and act to combat terror, violence and incitement... These organizations will engage in genuine prevention of terror and violence through arrests, interrogations, prevention and the enforcement of the legal groundwork for investigations, prosecution and punishment**” (Israel's response to the roadmap, English version, Knesset website, May 25, 2003).

3. Israel's first addition further states: "In the first phase of the plan and as a condition for progress to the second phase, **the Palestinians will complete the dismantling of terrorist organizations** (Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front, the Democratic Front Al-Aqsa Brigades and other apparatuses) **and their infrastructure**, collection of all illegal weapons and their transfer to a third party for the sake of being removed from the area and destroyed, cessation of weapons smuggling and weapons production inside the Palestinian Authority, activation of the full prevention apparatus and cessation of incitement. **There will be no progress to the second phase [of the roadmap] without the fulfillment of all above-mentioned conditions relating to the war against terror" (Ibid.).**

Interim summary of the fulfillment of the PA's commitments to the war on terrorism

4. **An interim examination (as of early January 2008) clearly shows that so far, the Palestinian Authority has not fulfilled its obligations regarding the war on terrorism as set forth in the road map.** That is particularly evident in the **Gaza Strip**, controlled by the Hamas movement since June 2007:²² the terrorist infrastructure in the Gaza Strip is growing stronger and terrorist activities from that region (mainly **rocket fire** into Israel) have escalated for the past two years. The terrorists in the Gaza Strip continues to guide those in Judea and Samaria, and the large-scale production of rockets and other arms continues in the Gaza Strip as well. Arms and ammunition are still smuggled through the Philadelphi Road, while the Palestinian media -- whether controlled by Hamas or the Palestinian Authority led by Abu Mazen -- continue incitement against Israel and the Annapolis process.

²² **The road map makes no distinction between the Gaza Strip and Judea and Samaria**, referring to the obligations of the Palestinian side in the war on terrorism **as a single whole**. Hamas, which controls the Gaza Strip, has reiterated that it considers violence and terrorism ("resistance") as the means to "liberate" all the land of Palestine (i.e., the destruction of the State of Israel). Terrorist organizations operating in the Gaza Strip encourage terrorist attacks in Judea and Samaria, providing the terrorist networks in Judea and Samaria with funds, know-how, arms and ammunition.

5. **However, even in Judea and Samaria**, (controlled by security services loyal to Abu Mazen) **the Palestinian Authority is far from fulfilling its obligations regarding the war on terrorism** as specified by the first phase of the road map. That is particularly evident in **three main areas**:

1) **Dismantling terrorist networks and preventing terrorism:**

The security services of the Palestinian Authority **have not dismantled the various terrorist networks** in Judea and Samaria (according to their public statements, they never intended to dismantle it, only to enforce law and order) **and the activities they conduct against them are ineffective**. As a result, the terrorist networks continue to exist **and even carry out terrorist attacks** against Israel, such as the series of deadly shootings in Judea and Samaria in the second half of 2007. The scope of the terrorist activities would have been far greater **were it not for the effective counterterrorist activities conducted by Israeli security forces in Judea and Samaria**. That was clearly demonstrated by the Israeli security force operation in the Old City of Nablus (January 2-5, 2008).

2) **Significant reforms in the security services:** According to the road map, the Palestinians were required to **rebuild their security services**, which have demonstrated poor operative ability, low morale and lack of motivation in dealing with terrorism (on several occasions, they even abetted terrorist activity). The changes made in the security services by Abu Mazen's regime and the founding of his power in Judea and Samaria **have so far been strictly cosmetic**, some of them being no more than **plans and hopes for the future**. Some developments of note include training and arming the services, integrating Force-17 activists into the National Security Service and the Presidential Guard, plans to retire several thousand activists, and plans to rebuild the prisons and the security services' centers destroyed during the Palestinian terrorist campaign. However, the significant reforms, which, as set forth in the road map, must be implemented during the first phase (such as

establishing new, effective security services), have yet to be implemented.²³

3) Anti-Israeli incitement: The terrorist activities against Israel in the Gaza Strip and in Judea and Samaria are backed by Palestinian media, which, despite the road map, continue their incitement against Israel. The media in question are those controlled by Hamas and other terrorist organizations, and, to a lesser extent, associated with Fatah and the Palestinian Authority. Other than blatant anti-Israeli incitement, the Palestinian media continue to use anti-Semitic symbols and images. Abu Mazen and other PA leaders approach Israel with maximalist demands regarding the core issues and systematically avoid preparing the Palestinian public mind for a peace agreement with Israel and the possibility of concessions and compromises. As a result, the Palestinian people have unrealistic expectations and are frustrated, compromising the Annapolis process and legitimizing violence and terrorism.

²³ Abu Mazen relies on the security services in Judea and Samaria as his main power base. Although exceptional, some groups within them oppose Abu Mazen's policy and have their own terrorist agenda. For further information see December 3, 2007 Bulletin entitled "The Israeli security forces detained a terrorist squad of three Fatah operatives, two of whom were members of the Palestinian national security services. They carried out the drive-by shooting which killed Ido Zoldan near Kedumim" at http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/html/ct_31207e.htm.

Anti-Semitic cartoons



A cartoon by Hamas-affiliated Omayya Joha (affiliated with Hamas), published in the Palestinian Authority's Al-Hayat Al Jadeeda (December 12, 2007). The snake is a common anti-Semitic motif.



“Oh, Muslims, rise for the sake of Al-Aqsa” (Firas, a Website identified with Fatah, December 26, 2007)

Appendix A

Nablus as a test case for Palestinian security services activity (November 2007 - early January 2008)

Overview

1. As political dialogue between Israel and the Palestinians resumes, and with the Annapolis meeting just over, since early November 2007 Nablus has been the scene of intensive Palestinian security service activities directed by Salam Fayyad's government. The objective was to restore law and order, strengthen the PA's authority and weaken Hamas. Another objective was to let the United States, Israel and the international community know that the PA had implemented the first phase of the road map in a hotspot of terrorism and anarchy.

2. The Palestinian Authority chose Nablus **as a test case because it is a focal point of anarchy and lawlessness**. For the PA, the success of the security service activity in Nablus was supposed to signal its determination to restore order in places in Judea and Samaria where anarchy rules. In fact, following the operation in Nablus, security operations were carried out in other cities in Judea and Samaria, albeit on a smaller scale.

3. To reinforce the security services operating in Nablus, an additional **308 National Security operatives were assigned to the city**. They reached Nablus on November 2 and joined the security services operating there. On December 21, 2007, after two months of activity, most of the PA's reinforcements left Nablus for training in Jericho (in all probability owing to PA leaders' assessment that their task in Nablus had been completed).

4. An interim summary of the security service activity in Nablus follows (to December 2007).



The Palestinian Authority's security services deploy in Nablus (Al-Arabiyya TV, November 2, 2007)

Analysis of the security service' activity in Nablus

5. The security services conducted their activities in the **Nablus district**, including the city of Nablus itself, the refugee camps on its outskirts, and the outlying villages. **During the first stage** (early November), they **put an end to anarchy and enforcing law and order**: they imposed a ban on carrying firearms, prevented the movement of stolen vehicles, prevented shooting in public places, stopped the "protection" racket, detained lawbreakers, etc. Their activities won the support of the city residents, who for a long time had lived under the shadow of chaos and anarchy.



The activity of the security services in Nablus (Al-Arabiyya TV, November 4).

6. As a result of the security service activity, life in Nablus returned to normal with the completion of the first stage. On November 13, 2007, a correspondent for Agence France Presse described the situation in the city as follows: “The gunmen who had imposed a reign of terror are no longer there... The army of street merchants who had formerly strangled the city square is gone... Movement is free... After years of recession, business is slowly getting back on track...”

7. The second stage of the security service activity was **to step up the enforcement of law and order in several prominent strongholds of terrorism and anarchy** where there had been no law enforcement authority presence throughout the years of the confrontation (i.e., the refugee camps and the Old City). At the same time, actions were taken to **strengthen the judicial system** to complement the increased law enforcement: residents who did not present themselves in court were detained and severely punished with high fines and arrest, court decisions were enforced, and members of the juridical system (judges and prosecutors) were provided with protection.



Hamas propaganda (right) and arms and ammunition (left) seized in Nablus (Palestinian TV, November 17, 2007).

8. Highlights of the security-related activity in Nablus’s hotspots of terrorism and anarchy:

1) Detentions of wanted terrorists and bolstering presence in the Balata refugee camp in south Nablus (November 5): The

activities followed an attack on a police squad by several wanted operatives, regarded by the refugee camp residents as lawbreakers and responsible for anarchy. Members of the security services surrounded the camp, seized key positions on rooftops and conducted operations inside the camp. One security operative and eight civilians were wounded in violent incidents, and 25 people were detained. The activity in the Balata refugee camp set a precedent for the Palestinian security services, as it was the first time they had conducted activities there. When they had finished, on November 6 the Governor of Nablus announced that the services would patrol the all streets of the camp without exception.

2) Detentions of wanted terrorists and bolstering presence in the Ein Beit al-Maa refugee camp in northwest Nablus (November 18): The activity of the services was similar to that in the Balata camp. Its objective was to detain wanted gunmen who refused to appear in court, some of them operatives in the PFLP. Unlike the residents of the Balata refugee camp, residents of Ein Beit al-Maa resisted the security services and abetted the wanted operatives. Negotiations were held to convince the wanted operatives to surrender and turn over their arms. The negotiations failed and the wanted operatives managed to escape from the camp, most likely to the Old City (the Qasba).

3) The security services enter the Old City (December 15): The Palestinian security services entered the Old City for the first time since the outbreak of the violent confrontation between Israel and the Palestinians, a move described as a takeover of “the last stronghold” (of anarchy causers) in Nablus. The security operatives met with no resistance or particular problems in the Qasba and were greeted by the locals with rice and flowers. Upon entering the region, the security services began dismantling roadblocks as a first step towards enforcing law and order.

9. As law and order enforcement began, action was also taken against Hamas’s civilian network in Nablus. Hamas-affiliated

“charitable societies” were closed, propaganda materials were confiscated in the mosques, several preachers were detained, activities were conducted in Al-Najah University (a Hamas stronghold) on November 15, 2007, in which a large quantity of propaganda material was confiscated, a large stock of propaganda material was confiscated in the Hamas Al-Nour Center in Rafidiya (west of Nablus), and Hamas’s public activities (demonstrations and rallies) were prevented before the Annapolis meeting.

10. In an article in the Israeli daily Haaretz (January 3, 2008), Avi Issacharoff described his visit to Nablus. After speaking with local residents and interviewing the Governor of Nablus and the Commander of General Intelligence, he described the new situation in the city: no more gunmen in the streets, no more blackmail, threats, and armed robberies, young women are free to walk safely in the streets, the stands which had flooded downtown Nablus have been removed, stolen cars disappeared, there was no more shooting at weddings, funerals, and other events. According to the title of the article, Nablus is no longer “the capital of terrorism and chaos.”

The activity of Israeli security forces in the old city (the Qasba)



IDF soldier inside an explosives laboratory uncovered in the old city (IDF spokesman’s Website, January 5, 2008).



IDF forces during the operation in Nablus (IDF Spokesman’s website, January 5, 2008).

11. On January 5, 2008, the IDF and the ISA completed a large-scale five-day operation against terrorist networks in Nablus's old city. Twenty-three wanted operatives were detained during the operation (most of them from Hamas and Fatah) and brought to interrogation by the Israeli security forces. A laboratory for manufacturing explosives, with arms and ammunition, was uncovered. The hidden laboratory contained **two rockets in initial stages of manufacturing and an explosive belt**. There were also two hand guns, materials used in the manufacture explosive charges (explosives, steel balls), cables and forms for setting explosive charges, ammunition, and military equipment. The arms and ammunition were detonated by an IDF Engineering force (IDF spokesman's Website, January 3).

12. The Palestinian security services, which, in recent months have been conducting intensive activities in Nablus (including entering the Old City), managed to impose much law and order in the city and to remove the gunmen from the city streets. However, the **security services** did not dismantle the terrorist organization networks, including detention of Hamas and Fatah operatives not included in the "wanted terrorists' agreement."

Photographs of the laboratory for manufacturing explosives, found in a hiding place in the old city in Nablus (photo courtesy of the IDF spokesman's Website, January 5, 2008)



The laboratory: an inside look



The entrance to the hiding place



Rockets in initial stages of manufacture



The laboratory: an inside look



Ammunition and military equipment

[Click here for a Video clip: The exposure of explosives laboratory and weapons during IDF counterterrorist activities, 2007 \(Courtesy of the IDF spokesman\).](#)

Conclusions

13. At this point, Nablus can be said to have lost its title as “the anarchy capital.” It can also be said that the PA has managed to enforce a great deal of law and order there. However, regarding the war on terrorism, the security services have made no efforts **to dismantle the operative-terrorist networks of Hamas and other terrorist organizations** (even though their operatives are involved in anarchy and criminal activity). As a result, only few terrorist operatives of Hamas and other terrorist organizations have been detained, and terrorist operatives in Nablus have been left with a

considerable quantity of weapons, as demonstrated during the IDF activity in Nablus's Old City.

14. On December 21, 2007, most of the reinforcements of the National Security left Nablus, leaving the public increasingly concerned about the possible return of the gunmen and anarchy causers to the streets. It is still too early to determine whether the activity conducted by the regular security forces and the reinforcements will have long-term effect on law enforcement, and to what extent the Palestinian Authority will **persist** in its security-related activity in the city. However, **it can be said that the security services have so far taken no effective action to dismantle the various terrorist organization networks, and that Nablus remains a focal point of anti-Israeli terrorist activity.**