



**Intelligence and Terrorism
Information Center
at the Israel Intelligence Heritage
& Commemoration Center (IICC)**

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One month into the lull in the fighting: an interim report (as at July 23)



A cement supply truck at the Sufa Crossing



Back to normal life in Gaza



Back to normal life in Sderot



Rocket fire at Sderot

Overview

1. The lull in the fighting became effective on June 19, 2008, at 06:00. The core elements of the lull arrangement are the cessation of terrorism from the Gaza Strip, the cessation of IDF's counter-activities in the Gaza Strip, and the opening of the crossings between the Gaza Strip and Israel. The ceasefire along the Israeli-Gaza Strip border was supposed to re-launch the Egyptian-brokered negotiations on the release of Israeli captive soldier Gilad Shalit (as demanded by Israel) and promote dialogue on opening the Rafah Crossing between the Gaza Strip and Egypt (as demanded by Hamas).

2. One month into the lull arrangement, the **interim report** shows a significant decrease in the number of rockets and mortar shells fired at Israel, and indicates that the ceasefire is generally upheld in western Negev population centers and in the Gaza Strip. However, the ceasefire has occasionally been violated by rocket and mortar shell fire from rogue terrorist organizations which oppose the lull (those are mostly local Fatah networks, with the Palestinian Islamic Jihad violating the lull only on one occasion). The cessation of the intensive fighting which had been going on before the lull, allowed the residents of Sderot and of western Negev population centers, as well as Gaza Strip residents, to return to normal life. However, they are still plagued with uncertainties and concerns about their future.

3. The ongoing violations of the lull by terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip prompted Israel to embrace a **response policy** of closing the crossings for short periods of time (from several hours to two days) in response to Palestinian violations. However, seeing as Israel is interested in maintaining calm in the western Negev, it has so far avoided military retaliation for violations of the lull, even though suggestions to that extent were raised among the military and political leadership.

4. **Hamas's conduct thus far** has clearly shown that **it is interested in upholding the lull**, hoping to enjoy its fruits, primarily **opening the crossings between the Gaza Strip and Israel and Egypt**. Opening the crossings, the "lifeline" of the Gaza Strip, would ease the economic and social pressure exerted on the Gaza Strip since Hamas seized power in June 2007. In Hamas's view, that would let it reinforce its political influence internally and externally, position itself as a dominant power which acts in a responsible and considerate manner towards the residents, while taking advantage of the lull to promote its military buildup process.

5. In view of that, Hamas operatives have **refrained** from participating in firing rockets and mortar shells at Israel. Publicly, Hamas leaders have stated time and again that the lull is a

Palestinian national interest which rests on a Palestinian consensus. On several occasions, Hamas members arrested Fatah operatives who were involved in firing at Israel and confiscated their arms. However, Hamas carefully avoids military confrontations with the rogue organizations, particularly the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). It does not want to be perceived as collaborating with Israel and compromising the "resistance" (which is one of the key values in its ideology). Accordingly, Hamas's **enforcement of the lull arrangement on the rogue organizations is not decisive enough**, and sporadic violations of the lull continue on a regular basis.


6. The cessation of the IDF's operational activity in the Gaza Strip, as stipulated in the lull arrangement, is being used by Hamas and other terrorist organizations to **advance their military buildup and increase their readiness** for a likely scenario of a future confrontation with the IDF. Since the beginning of the lull, weapons and ammunition have been smuggled into the Gaza Strip on a similar scale to the pre-lull times, despite an improvement in the Egyptian activity against the smugglers. Furthermore, Hamas has significantly accelerated its training activity and its military buildup, publicly announcing it on Palestinian and Arab media.

7. **To summarize: the lull arrangement** has put an end to the intensive daily fighting which took place in the Gaza Strip and in western Negev population centers, to a considerable degree making it possible for Israelis and Gaza Strip residents to return to normal life. Israel and the Hamas movement, the two key parties of the arrangement, have a **vested interest** in the continuation of the lull; however, Hamas does not care to forcefully exercise its full authority on rogue terrorist organizations (mostly Fatah networks). Thus, the **lull arrangement erodes**, reflected in sporadic fire on Israel to which Israel responds by temporarily closing down the crossings. In addition, there has been no progress so far regarding two key issues pertaining to the lull: **the negotiations for the release of Gilad Shalit**, which is clearly an Israeli interest, are delayed by Hamas, which considers it to be a bargaining chip to secure the profits of the lull; **the negotiations for opening the Rafah Crossing**, which is clearly an interest of Hamas, are also being delayed, as the Egyptians, being aware of the complexity of the issue and of its importance to Hamas, do not rush to find a solution for it.

Violations of the lull by terrorist organizations—state of affairs¹

8. During its first month, the lull arrangement resulted in a **significant drop** in rocket and mortar fire at western Negev population centers. A relative calm has settled over Sderot and Israeli population centers near the Gaza Strip, occasionally broken by rockets and mortar shells fired by rogue terrorist organizations (mostly networks belonging to Fatah and, at least on one occasion, the PIJ). Hamas, on its part, holds down its arms, and its operatives have not been involved in violations of the lull so far. In the media sphere, Hamas claims that Israel violates the lull by closing down the crossings, and criticizes Egypt and the Palestinian Authority for disregarding the violations it accuses Israel of.

Rocket and mortar fire during the lull compared to the months preceding it



9. **Fatah's Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades** was responsible for most of the violations of the lull. At least on one occasion rockets were fired by the **PIJ**. In most cases, the perpetrators did not publicly claim responsibility for firing; however, Fatah and the PIJ did claim responsibility for some of the incidents. The rogue organizations' rocket and mortar shell fire was a response to Israel's so-called "violations" and protested the fact that the lull arrangement did not apply to Judea and Samaria as well. Furthermore, those incidents reflect the **internal Palestinian political rivalry** which exists mostly between Fatah and Hamas.

¹ As at July 19, 2008.

10. **During the first month of the lull in the fighting, some 15 Palestinian violations were counted** (see table in Appendix for details). The major events were:

a. **June 24** (five days after the arrangement became effective): the first violation of the lull. A PIJ squad fired **three rockets** on Sderot in response to the killing of one of its senior operatives in Nablus. It should be mentioned that the lull does not apply in Judea and Samaria, where terrorist activities by the various organizations continue and so do Israel's counter-activities (see section on Judea and Samaria below).



Rescue forces on their way to the rocket landing site in Sderot (photo by Hamutal Ben-Shitrit, www.sderotmedia.com, June 24)



A house in Sderot damaged by rocket fire (photo by Hamutal Ben-Shitrit, www.sderotmedia.com, June 24)

b. **June 26**: a rocket was fired at the city of Sderot. A network calling itself **Fatah/Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades/Imad Mughniyah Squad** claimed responsibility for the incident. In interviews granted to the media, the network's spokesman **Abu Qusay** said that launching the rocket was designed to convey a **double message**: a warning to Israel not to violate the lull, and a demand of those who signed the arrangement to apply it in the West Bank as well. Abu Qusay was arrested by Hamas following the incident and released a short time later.



Left: the Fatah network claims responsibility for the incident by telephone (Al-Jazeera, June 26).
Right: the rocket fired by Fatah's Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades on June 26 at Sderot (Alam TV, June 26)



c. **July 10**: two rocket landings were detected near a village in the western Negev. There were no casualties and no damage to property. **Fatah's Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades** claimed responsibility, saying it was retaliation for the killing of one of the organization's operatives in the Kissufim area earlier that morning.



A resident of Sderot enters a secure area upon hearing the warning siren (Ze'ev Trachtman, July 10)



Fatah's Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades launching rockets (Al-Jazeera, July 10)

11. Those violations have put to the test Hamas's willingness and ability to enforce the terms of the lull in the fighting on the rogue terrorist organizations, which publicly claim they accept it while violating it under various pretexts. Hamas leaders have emphasized time and again that the lull is a national Palestinian interest, threatened to arrest anyone attempting to violate the ceasefire, and accused Fatah of trying to undermine the arrangement. It is evident, however, that Hamas strives as much as possible to avoid a direct confrontation with the rogue organizations (particularly the PIJ), fearing it will be accused of collaborating with Israel and compromising the "resistance".² Accordingly, it has so far focused its efforts on **political persuasion** of the organizations to uphold the arrangement and on obtaining public support for the lull in the Gaza Strip.

12. At the same time, Hamas has taken several forceful measures against the violators of the lull. However, those measures have so far been **limited**, reflected in arrests for brief periods of time of those responsible for firing rockets and mortar shells and confiscation of weapons. Within that context, Hamas's security services have on several occasions arrested Fatah's Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades operatives, including the organization's spokesman Abu Qusay, who claimed responsibility for firing the rocket on June 29. However, all the operatives arrested so far were released after a brief interrogation and no decisive measures were taken against them.

² For example, Nabil Amro, the PLO representative in Cairo, said in an interview to Al-Hayat that the lull arrangement was turning Hamas into a "contractor of Israeli security" (Al-Hayat al-Jadeeda, June 23).

Judea and Samaria in the shadow of the lull in the Gaza Strip—state of affairs

13. **The lull in the fighting is valid for six months and only in the Gaza Strip** (during that time, Egypt will attempt to extend it to Judea and Samaria as well). The implication is that the Israeli security forces retain complete freedom of action against terrorist organizations in Judea and Samaria. On the other hand, it also means that the terrorist attacks perpetrated by terrorist organizations in Judea and Samaria are not considered as violations of the lull arrangement.

14. Since the very beginning, the PIJ, Fatah, and other terrorist organizations severely criticized Hamas for not being able to include Judea and Samaria in the lull arrangement. Spokesmen for the PIJ and for Fatah announced that they were willing to uphold the arrangement, all the while claiming that in their view there was no separation between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. In practice, those organizations occasionally took advantage of IDF's activity in Judea and Samaria as a pretext to violate the lull by firing at Israel. At the same time, Hamas and the other organizations kept congratulating the perpetrators of the terrorist attacks in Judea and Samaria during the lull period.

15. Terrorist activity in Judea and Samaria during the lull continued and even increased. There were **four major terrorist attacks** perpetrated since the beginning of the lull, without any terrorist organization claiming responsibility for them:

a. On July 22, a terrorist took a construction vehicle from a site near the Jerusalem quarter of Yemin Moshe and began racing along the street, ramming into cars. A civilian who noticed what he was doing shot the terrorist, but he continued, hitting cars and a bus. A border policeman shot and killed him. 28 people were wounded, one of them seriously.

b. **On July 11**, a terrorist who came near the Lions' Gate in the Jerusalem Old City opened fire on two police officers standing on the scene. Both were wounded, one of them died later of his wounds. The terrorist managed to escape.

c. **On July 2**, a terrorist driving a construction vehicle left a site in which he worked and started driving down one of Jerusalem's main streets, hitting everything on his path. As a result of the terrorist attack, **three civilians were killed** and about forty suffered (mostly light) injuries. The terrorist, a resident of Sur Baher in southeast

Jerusalem with an Israeli ID card, who also had a criminal background, was killed in the incident.³ It is our assessment that the terrorist attack was the terrorist's own initiative.



Crashed cars on the site of the terrorist attack (Source: Israel's Foreign Ministry, July 2)

16. **On June 20**, two terrorists sitting in a car opened fire on several Israelis hiking in a wadi near the town of Halamish (southwest Samaria). Three hikers were injured, one of them seriously.



The victims of the wadi shooting near Halamish arrive at the Tel-Hashomer hospital (ZAKA, photo by Yossi Yampell, June 20)

Opening the crossings between Israel and the Gaza Strip

17. Opening the crossings between Israel and the Gaza Strip, which are used as a vital supply line for the Gaza Strip, was and still is one of the major incentives for which Hamas agreed to the lull arrangement. In Hamas's view, keeping the crossings open for extended periods of

³ For details, see: [“Mass-casualty terrorist attack on Jaffa Road in Jerusalem. The terrorist was a Palestinian resident of East Jerusalem who used a bulldozer to smash cars and kill three civilians”](#) (July 3, 2008).

time will ease the social and political pressure exerted on the Gaza Strip since the Hamas takeover, and will even help reinforce its internal and external political status.

18. Starting June 22, after four days of calm, Israel started fulfilling its part of the arrangement and reopened the Sufa and Karni crossings for regular transfer of goods and gas. However, following the rocket attack on Sderot (June 24), Israel adopted a **policy** of closing the crossings for short periods of time (from several hours to several days) in response to rocket and mortar attacks on Israel. Ever since Israel adopted that policy of response, the crossings have been operated on an **irregular basis**, there have been interruptions in transfer schedules, and the quota of goods transferred through the crossings has not been raised (an exception is the Erez Crossing, used to facilitate the passage of international officials and Palestinian civilians due to humanitarian reasons. It is operated **constantly**, regardless of closing the other crossings).

19. In the course of the lull, large quantities of food, gas, construction materials, and other supplies necessary for the recommencement of economic activity in the Gaza Strip have been transferred through the Sufa and Karni crossings. The number of trucks passing through the Sufa Crossing (the main crossing used for transferring goods) is **about 70 per day**, which is similar to the number of trucks passing there before the crossings were closed following the Kerem Shalom terrorist attack (April 19, 2008). There has been a change in the variety of the goods recently, when limited amounts of cement and iron, textile, and other vital raw materials started making their way into the Gaza Strip.

20. The Hamas movement considers closing the crossings to be an Israeli violation of the lull arrangement and is concerned about the quantity and variety of goods transferred into the Gaza Strip. Hamas's National Economy Ministry, which monitors the activity of the crossings, noted in its report that Israel was transferring mostly consumables and a limited quantity of fuel, and that it was transferring almost no construction materials such as cement and iron (Pal Media, July 9). Hamas spokesmen called upon Egypt to exert pressure on Israel and even threatened to end the lull if Israel does not lift the blockade on the Gaza Strip. Web surfers on Hamas's online forum complained that they did not feel any improvement in their situation, and even suggested launching massive rocket attacks each time Israel closed down a crossing.



The Sufa Crossing: a truck loaded with cement going through the crossing (photo by the Information Center, July 10)

The Rafah Crossing issue

21. Hamas places **much significance** on opening the Rafah Crossing between the Gaza Strip and Egypt in order to lessen its dependence on Israel. During the talks on the lull arrangement, Hamas demanded that the Rafah Crossing be opened as soon as the arrangement became effective, and publicly portrayed the opening of the crossing as one of the main reasons it agreed to the lull. The ceasefire, according to the lull arrangement, was supposed to initiate a round of talks on regulating the crossing, which have yet to begin.

22. **Egypt**, on its part, made it clear that the Rafah Crossing would not be opened unless it was in accordance with the **November 2005 crossings arrangement**, which stipulates that the Europeans, the Palestinian Authority, and Israel would all be involved in operating the crossing. Hamas, however, refuses to let Israel take part in regulating traffic through the Rafah Crossing. Egypt also announced that it would invite representatives from the **Palestinian Authority**, which was party to the original arrangement, to participate in the negotiations. It appears that at this point Egypt is in no hurry to initiate talks on the Rafah Crossing issue, thus exerting pressure on Hamas. The lack of progress on the Rafah Crossing issue and the issue of Hamas operatives detained in Egypt have created tension between the two sides, which may surface at some point in the future and even evolve into a conflict.

23. In the meantime, until the opening of the Rafah Crossing is regulated, Egypt continues to open the crossing in a controlled manner and for brief periods of time, mostly to allow the passage of civilians detained on the Egyptian side.⁴ On July 1, the Rafah Crossing was partially opened for three days to allow sick people to pass into Egyptian territory and to

⁴ The Egyptians brought up the idea of opening the **Kerem Shalom Crossing** as a temporary solution in order to relieve some of the burden of Gaza Strip residents (Al-Hayat, June 20). Hamas leaders are opposed to that idea, fearing the Kerem Shalom Crossing will be operated instead of the Rafah Crossing.

allow Gaza Strip residents to return to their homes. In protest of the limited opening of the Rafah Crossing, **hundreds of Palestinians attempted to force their way to the Egyptian side of the crossing** (July 2). Conflicts erupted between the Palestinians and Egyptian forces, which dispersed the demonstrators using riot control measures. Following the confrontations, Egypt reinforced the border and said that the crossing was closed. Spokesmen of Hamas, embarrassed by the incident, responded by saying that it was “a spontaneous occurrence”. With that in mind, Egypt sent 400 police officers to reinforce the crossing and thwart any future attempt by the Palestinians to storm the crossing (AFP, July 10).

The release of Gilad Shalit

24. In Israel's view, resuming intensive talks on the release of abducted IDF soldier Gilad Shalit is part of the lull arrangement. Hamas leaders, on the other hand, claim time and again that the lull arrangement is not about the return of Gilad Shalit. In their view, the issue of Gilad Shalit is completely separate, having to do only with Israel's willingness to comply with Hamas's demands to release Palestinian prisoners. Egypt, the broker of the lull arrangement, promised that intensive talks on the release of Gilad Shalit would resume once the ceasefire took hold; however, for the time being the talks are being delayed.



25. For now, the talks on Gilad Shalit, which were supposed to take place in Egypt, **have not resumed**. Hamas leaders have blamed Israel for the non-resumption of the talks, saying that the decision not to resume the negotiations was taken because Israel did not uphold the lull arrangement, and that the Hamas movement would not negotiate on Gilad Shalit until Israel opened the crossings and completely lift the blockade from the Gaza Strip. The release of Gilad Shalit came up during a Hamas delegation's visit to Egypt (July 12), however, no progress was achieved at that time.

26. The swap between Israel and Hezbollah has given Hamas leverage regarding its demands from Israel (i.e., releasing terrorist prisoners charged with murder). Hamas spokesmen said that the exchange deal was a great victory for the “resistance” and claimed it was proof that the best way to release prisoners was by abducting soldiers. They also asserted that by releasing Kuntar, Israel loosened its policy of not releasing prisoners with “blood on their hands”.

The military buildup of Hamas and the other terrorist organizations

27. The lull in the fighting is used by Hamas and the PIJ to continue their military buildup and prepare for the next round of confrontations with the IDF. The intensive activities carried out within that context include:

- a. **Smuggling weapons and ammunition**, including mines, explosive charges, and supplies for manufacturing rockets, such as pipes.
- b. **Significantly increasing the amount of training** in the Gaza Strip. The movement’s operatives undergo training in a variety of fields, including advanced anti-tank weapons, naval training, special forces course, facing the IDF in a possible scenario of a large-scale Israeli operation in urban territory, and so forth.
- c. **Developing the technical capabilities** of Hamas’s engineering and manufacturing unit.



A television clip showing the PIJ training during the lull (NTV, July 9)

28. The Egyptians try to stop the smuggling activity, however, their impact on the scope of smuggling is limited. The Egyptian border police continue to track down and demolish tunnels. So far, the Egyptian forces have located several dozen tunnels since the beginning of the lull. Also, the Egyptians exposed a weapons cache in the Sinai Peninsula, which was probably meant for the Gaza Strip. Found in the cache was a large quantity of ammunition and about 500 lbs. (250 kg) of TNT explosives.

Effects of the lull on western Negev and Gaza Strip residents

Western Negev residents

29. Despite the sporadic violations, the lull arrangement made it possible for Israelis living in Sderot and western Negev population centers to slowly return to normal life. In the past month, farmers have started to work the fields near the border fence, and more and more children can be seen playing in public facilities and in the streets of Sderot and western Negev population centers. Shows are put on in the city of Sderot, and the children spend their vacation in summer camps. However, having lived more than eight years under threat, the residents are finding it hard to cope with an immediate change from daily rocket and mortar attacks to a situation of calm, and the prevailing sentiment is that the calm that has settled there is only temporary. Some residents say that they are still haunted by the threat, and some of them still sleep in safe rooms.

30. The timeout brought about by the lull is used to further reinforce residential buildings, bus stops, and public sites, and to provide better psychiatric care to the population, a significant part of which still suffers from anxiety.



A sign of the lull: a poster announcing a Friday pool party in the village of Nahal Oz (photo by the Information Center, July 10)

Gaza Strip residents

31. Gaza Strip residents have welcomed the lull arrangement with mixed emotions. Alongside their distrust of Israel and their doubts in the continuation of the lull, Gaza Strip residents express their hope and expectations that the lull will result in lifting the blockade and improving their lives. Gaza Strip residents interviewed on Arab media said they were satisfied

with the lull in the fighting and expressed their hope that it would improve daily life in the Gaza Strip, restore the economy, and help all the sectors hit as a result of the fighting.



The lull in the Gaza Strip: children in an amusement park and in a pool (Palestine-info)

32. The effects of the lull in the fighting are already evident on the ground. There are reports of a drop in the black market prices of commodities and fuels, and masses of people flock to the beaches, parks, and markets. Also, some residents living east of Khan Younes, in the friction sites with Israel, have started coming back to their homes. There has been a considerable increase in the number of public appearances of Hamas PM Ismail Haniyah, who was seen on the beach playing soccer and appearing relaxed (Ma'an News Agency, June 19). Those expressions of normalization are **widely covered** on Gaza Strip media as part of Hamas's fundamental interest in the lull (Hamas-controlled media continue to incite to terrorism and violence against Israel, however).



The lull in the Gaza Strip: crowded markets and beaches

The internal Palestinian scene

33. The Palestinian Authority and Fatah are well aware that the lull arrangement may increase Hamas's political strength and erode the strength of the Palestinian Authority. However, they have no interest in opposing the cessation of hostilities, which would make it seem that they are against the lifting of the blockade on the Gaza Strip. Abu Mazen expressed his support of the arrangement to the Egyptians and **praised** the arrangement in a press release, saying it was a "national interest". He also expressed his hope that the arrangement would ease the distress of the residents, quicken the peace process, and also result in an internal Palestinian dialogue between the sides (Wafa News Agency, June 18). Abu Mazen also called upon the Palestinian organizations to exercise restraint and not to involve outside agendas (possibly hinting at Iran) that may compromise the lull (Wafa Agency, June 20). At the same time, Abu Mazen's government is trying to minimize the damage caused to its status by taking part in initiatives that are meant to grant it some relevancy, such as deploying an Arab force in the Gaza Strip or taking part in the operation of the border crossings, all of which have yet to kick into high gear).

34. On the ground, Fatah emerges as the main organization in the Gaza Strip responsible for violations of the lull. On the other hand, the Fatah movement in Judea and Samaria shakes off responsibility for the rocket and mortar attacks perpetrated by Fatah networks in the Gaza Strip. Fatah spokesman Abd al-Rahman stressed that the organization supported the lull and condemned any violation of it. He also said that any claims of responsibility by Fatah's Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades were fictitious, and that they were "fake, made-up announcements released by dubious elements" (Wafa Agency, July 14).

35. On the internal Palestinian political scene, so far the lull has not led to progress in the dialogue between Hamas and Fatah. Hamas feels itself strengthened by the arrangement and is in no rush to negotiate with Abu Mazen, who, on his part, has not changed at all his preconditions for negotiations with Hamas. The two sides continue their propaganda war and, at this point, avoid negotiations on pertinent, major issues, such as extending Abu Mazen's tenure and operating the Rafah Crossing, of which the Palestinian Authority is an involved party.

Appendix

List of Palestinian violations⁵

Date	Violation	Perpetrator	Israel's response	Notes
June 24	Three rocket landings detected in the city of Sderot	PIJ	On Israel's Defense Minister's orders, the crossings were closed (June 25).	According to the organization, the rockets were fired in response to the killing of a senior operative in Nablus. Judea and Samaria are not included in the lull arrangement
Night of June 23-24	Mortar shelling	No claims of responsibility	--	--
June 26	One rocket landing detected in an open area near the village of Gevim	Fatah's Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades	Closed crossings	According to the organization's spokesman, the rocket fire was meant to send a warning signal to Israel and a demand from Hamas and Egypt to expand the lull
June 27	Firing two mortar shells at Karni Crossing	No claims of responsibility	Closed crossings	--
June 28	Firing a mortar shell at Karni Crossing	No claims of responsibility	Closed crossings	In our assessment, some of the unidentified attacks were perpetrated by Fatah networks
June 30	Rocket landing detected in the village of Miflasim	No claims of responsibility	According to the Defense Minister's decision, the crossings (opened on June 29) were closed	According to a report on the Firas website, the launcher was a PIJ operative arrested by the police (Firas, July 2)
July 3	Rocket landing detected in an open area north of Sderot	An unknown organization called "Bader Forces"	Following the rocket landing, the crossings were closed on July 4	

⁵ According to data provided by the IDF. These are landings located in Israeli territory.

July 6	Fire opened on farmers working in the fields of the village of Nahal Oz	No claims of responsibility	--	
July 7	Mortar shell landed near Karni Crossing	No claims of responsibility	According to the Defense Minister's decision, the crossings were closed (July 8). They were partially reopened on July 9	
July 8	Mortar shell landed in an open area in Eshkol Regional Council	No claims of responsibility		
July 10	Two rocket landings detected in an open area near the village of Gevim	Fatah's Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, Imad Mughniyah squad	According to the Defense Minister's decision, the crossings were closed and reopened several hours later	According to the claim of responsibility, the fire was a response to the killing of one of the organization's operatives near Kissufim earlier that morning
	Three rocket landings detected some 2 miles southwest of Sufa Crossing, one west of Holit	No claims of responsibility		
July 12	One rocket landing detected near an open area in Sha'ar HaNegev Regional Council; there were no casualties and no damage to property	No claims of responsibility		
July 13	Two mortar shell landings detected near the border fence (on the Palestinian side) in the Nahal Oz region	No claims of responsibility	Following the attack, the Sufa and Nahal Oz crossings were closed	
July 15	Mortar shell landing detected	No claims of responsibility		