



**Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
at the Center for Special Studies (C.S.S)**

August 7, 2006

**Analysis of the draft of the UN Security Council resolution
proposed by France and the United States to end the hostilities
between Israel and Hezbollah**

Overview

1. On August 5, 2006, after intensive diplomatic efforts, the **French and American** representatives to the UN reached an agreement for a proposed draft of a Security Council resolution to end the hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah. A vote is expected to be taken during the coming days. The proposed resolution is being debated and corrections and changes are expected to be made, mainly because of **Lebanese** reservations.
2. An analysis of the proposed resolution shows that **it is different in nature from the Security Council resolutions** adopted after the previous rounds of fighting between Israel and the terrorist organizations operating in Lebanon.¹ It relates to the **fundamental issues** concerning Hezbollah and does not limit itself merely to partial security arrangements in south Lebanon.
3. The articles of the resolution **relating to south Lebanon deal with “a full cessation of the hostilities” as the first stage** (without an IDF withdrawal from Lebanon) and an understanding between Israel and Lebanon concerning a list of political issues (including the Sheba’a Farms). **During the second stage**, after the understandings have been reached, there will be a Security Council resolution calling for a permanent ceasefire between Israel and

¹ Our Information Bulletin entitled “Agreements, arrangements and understandings concerning Lebanon to which Israel was involved during the past 30 years – background, data, lessons and conclusions,” by Dr. Reuven Erlich,” will shortly be posted on our Website.

Lebanon and the deployment of an international force in south Lebanon (whose battle order and mandate are still unclear). “Security arrangements” have also been determined based on extending the control of the Lebanese government in south Lebanon with the assistance of an international force and the banning of the presence and armed activity of Hezbollah in south Lebanon. The Lebanese government has already announced its readiness to send 15,000 soldiers to south Lebanon, but **after** a ceasefire and IDF withdrawal.

4. In addition to the “security arrangements” which are intended to make a fundamental change in the status quo ante in south Lebanon, **there are provisions that extend beyond the south-Lebanese context for the first time in a UN Security Council resolution at the end of an armed confrontation between Israel and terrorists in Lebanon.**² Particularly striking are the provisions calling for the **disarmament of “all armed groups”** in Lebanon [with Hezbollah as the focus], the establishment of an **international embargo** on the sale or supply of arms to those groups [i.e., Hezbollah], and a call upon the Government of Lebanon to ensure arms or related materiel are not imported into Lebanon without its consent. To add validity to the proposed resolution, other relevant resolutions are mentioned, as is the Taef Accord, which ended the Lebanese civil war, and even the Lebanese prime minister’s seven-point program.

5. However, in addition to its **positive provisions, the draft also has weak points** as far as Israel is concerned, and perhaps even as far as the United States and France, which drafted the proposal, are concerned. The most important ones are:

A. **The lack of an effective enforcement apparatus and a clearly-defined timetable** for the implementation of the provisions relating to south Lebanon, and even more so of those relating to north Lebanon: that enables Hezbollah to hinder and sabotage (and possibly even prevent) the implementation of provisions which are not to its liking and **in effect to turn the resolution into a hollow shell.** Aided, supported and

² The Taef Accord and Security Council Resolution 1559, mentioned in the draft, both of which call for the enforcing of government authority on south Lebanon and the disarming of the militias, were not adopted after crises in which Israel, Hezbollah and other terrorist organizations were involved, but only within internal Lebanese and Lebanese-Syrian contexts.

encouraged by **Syria and Iran**, Hezbollah can be expected to oppose attempts to diminish its power and status in Lebanon.

B. The condition for proceeding to the second stage of the resolution, including the establishment and deployment of an international force, of an Israeli-Lebanese agreement on a series of disputed diplomatic issues, including the Sheba'a Farms: In our assessment, that will take a matter of weeks and perhaps even longer, while a real possibility exists that the necessary agreements will not be reached. That is too long a time, because it might enable Hezbollah to renew its attacks on IDF forces in Lebanon and represent the attacks as a legitimate part of the “struggle against the occupation.” During that period (and perhaps after it) there will be no effective multinational force in place, and when the current confrontation ends, **UNIFIL will continue to be stationed in south Lebanon** without the capabilities to deal with continued terrorism.

C. The draft of the resolution puts Hezbollah's demands concerning two central points (which were adopted by the Lebanese government) on the agenda: the first is the redelineating of the Syrian-Lebanese border in the **Sheba'a Farms region** to prepare the ground for its “liberation” and turning over to Lebanon, even though the UN and the international community have rejected Lebanese claims concerning the area. The **second** is finding a “solution” for the Lebanese prisoners held in Israel (i.e., their release), when what must be remembered is that they were tried and found guilty of murder and involvement in terrorist activities³ and of spying for Hezbollah, and that in the past Israel refused to release them (although it should be remembered that the release of the abducted Israeli soldiers is **unconditional**).

In summation

6. The true test of the proposed Security Council resolution will be to what extent it succeeds in causing a **fundamental change** in the situation in Lebanon which led to the current confrontation, and makes it possible to enjoy the longest possible period of calm along the

³ The most prominent of the Lebanese prisoners is Samir Kuntar, a Druze from the Lebanese mountains. A member of the pro-Iraqi terrorist organization of Abu al-'Abbas, he was sentenced to life imprisonment for his participation in a terrorist attack in Nahariya carried out from the sea in 1979. He personally shot Danny Haran to death in front of his four year-old daughter, and then bashed her brains out with his rifle butt.

Israeli-Lebanese border. The draft contains **very positive proposals**, but even if it is adopted as a Security Council resolution, **implementing** it is liable to be met with **stiff resistance from Hezbollah**, and from its sponsors, **Syria and Iran**. Thus it is possible that many of the significant provisions will remain theoretical if the international community does not support them and shows itself unwilling to confront Hezbollah and its sponsors.

7. The weak point of the draft resolution is that with the lack of enforcement apparatuses and effective security arrangements in south Lebanon, **the IDF may find itself stuck in the areas it conquered**, exposed to Hezbollah attacks, limited in its responses and forced, in the final analysis, to once again withdraw unilaterally without sufficient security arrangements. Such a worst-case scenario, should it occur, will enable Hezbollah to represent the current confrontation as a “victory” which will provide the starting point for the next round of Israel-Hezbollah confrontations. That particular scenario is liable (as far as can be seen by Israel, the United States and the West) to have **negative regional ramifications** beyond the Israeli-Lebanese context.

8. This document contains the following sections:

- A. The main points of the draft of the UN Security Council resolution.
- B. The position of the Lebanese government.
- C. Appendix: The text of the draft of the resolution.

The main points of the draft of the UN Security Council resolution

1. The following are the main points of the resolution (for the full text in English see the **Appendix**):

A. **The cessation of hostilities:** The resolution calls for the “full cessation” of hostilities based on the immediate cessation by Hezbollah of all attacks and the immediate cessation by Israel of offensive military operations. Thus it recognizes Israel’s right to **respond** to continued Hezbollah attacks.

B. **The enforcement of Lebanese government control in south Lebanon:** The resolution stresses the importance of imposing Lebanese government sovereignty over the entire country (i.e., over south Lebanon) based on Security Council Resolutions 1559 (2004)⁴ and 1608 (2006),⁵ and the relevant articles of the Taef Accord (1989).

C. **A permanent ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon (Hezbollah, a cause of the frequent incidents, is not specifically mentioned.)** The ceasefire must be based on respect for the Blue Line⁶ and the territorial sovereignty and integrity of both Israel and Lebanon.

D. **The resolution does not call for an immediate IDF withdrawal from Lebanon.** However, it does mention, in general and without an obligatory schedule, **the elimination of foreign forces in Lebanon without the consent of its government.**

E. **UNIFIL monitoring of the resolution’s implementation:** The resolution requests **UNIFIL**, upon cessation of hostilities, to monitor its implementation and to ensure the safe return of displaced persons [UNIFIL was also mentioned in a context beyond south Lebanon, of assisting the Lebanon government to ensure that arms and related materiel not be imported into Lebanon without its consent, even though it is not deployed in north Lebanon and does not have the necessary capabilities].

⁴ For further information see our Information Bulletin entitled “Disarming Hezbollah and extending the sovereignty and authority of the Lebanese government to south Lebanon , in accordance with Security Council Resolution 1559 (2004) and the Taef Accord (1989),” at http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/html/taef_e.htm.

⁵ Security Council Resolution 1680 is the follow-up resolution of Resolution Security Council Resolution 1559, which was adopted as an American-French initiative because of the lack of progress made in implementing Resolution 1559 after the Syrian forces left Lebanon. It was done to increase the pressure on Syria to permit the implementation of Resolution 1559.

⁶ The Blue Line runs along the international Israeli-Lebanese border, delineated by a team of United Nations cartographers on the eve of the IDF withdrawal from Lebanon (April-May 2000).

F. The release of the two Israeli soldiers abducted by Hezbollah: the resolution calls for the “unconditional release” of the two soldiers whose abduction led to the current confrontation. The resolution recognizes Hezbollah’s responsibility for the confrontation and mentions the attack on Israel carried out on July 12. At the same time, it encourages promoting **a solution for the problem of the Lebanese prisoners on Israel,⁷ that is, their release.**

G. Delineation of the international Israeli-Lebanese border and of the Sheba’a Farms region: The resolution calls for the delineation of the international border especially in areas where it is “disputed or uncertain” **including the Sheba’a Farms area.⁸**

2. The resolution calls for Israel and Lebanon to support “security arrangements” between the Blue Line and the Litani River, in order to prevent a resumption of hostilities. The “security arrangements” include:

A. A ban on the presence of terrorists: The establishment of an area “free of any armed personnel, assets [by implication, military assets, apparently strongholds and entrenchments] and weapons.”

B. The enforcement of Lebanese government authority: The Lebanese army will deploy in the area and Lebanese security forces and the Lebanese government will enforce its authority.⁹

C. Deployment of an international force to support the Lebanese government: The force’s mandate and battle order will be determined later in a separate resolution after the Israeli and Lebanese governments have agreed to the terms of the long-term arrangement. The limits of the deployment are not specifically defined but in that

⁷ The prisoners whose release Hezbollah demands and were sentenced to terms in Israeli jails are a Lebanese Druze brutal murderer and an Israeli Jewish spy.

⁸ The Sheba’a Farms area is in the Mt. Dov region on the slopes of Mt. Hermon, which the international community has recognized as part of the Golan Heights, and rejected Lebanese claims for sovereignty. Its “liberation” is demanded by Hezbollah and has been one of the fictions for continuing its attacks on Israel after the IDF withdrew from Lebanon. It should be noted that the Syrian-Lebanese border, which was never properly delineated, is not recognized as an international border.

⁹ In an interview with the Washington Post, Lebanese Prime Minister Fuad Siniora expressed his willingness to deploy 15,000 Lebanese soldiers in south Lebanon and to accept 2,000 soldiers belonging to a multinational force. The Lebanese government, in its August 7 meeting, authorized the deployment of the 15,000 soldiers after the ceasefire and IDF withdrawal. Two Hezbollah ministers also voted in favor.

context an area between the Blue Line and the Litani are mentioned. The force will operate under the authority of the UN mandate given by Chapter VII of the UN Charter.¹⁰

D. Providing maps of land mines: Israel will give the UN remaining maps of land mines in Lebanon in Israel's possession [as requested by the Lebanese government].

3. Security issues mentioned in the draft which go beyond the south Lebanon context:

A. The disarmament of the “armed groups” in Lebanon on the basis of the Taef Accord¹¹ and Security Council Resolutions 1559 and 1680 [the intention was to disarm Hezbollah and the Palestinian terrorist organizations]. Also mentioned is the Lebanese government decision of July 27, ratifying Fuad Siniora's seven-point program to stress the **internal Lebanese legitimacy** of the proposed resolution.

B. The establishment of an international embargo on the sale or supply of arms and related equipment to Lebanon except as authorized by its government [mainly **to prevent Iran and Syria from supplying Hezbollah with weapons**]. The draft calls for the Lebanese government to ensure that arms are not brought into Lebanon without its authorization and asks UNIFIL to assist the Lebanese government when requested [although UNIFIL does not have the capability to inspect the transfer of weapons from Syria to Hezbollah].

C. Lebanon's economic rehabilitation: The draft calls upon the international community to take “immediate steps to extend its financial and humanitarian aid to the Lebanese people, including through facilitating the safe return of displaced persons and, under the authority of the Government of Lebanon, reopening airports and harbors for verifiably and purely civilian purposes, and calls on it also to consider further

¹⁰ Chapter VII of the UN Charter is the most severe category of UN Security Council resolutions and reserved for cases of blatant aggression, such as Saddam Hussein or the Serbs in Bosnia. Basing the operation of a force on Chapter VII means giving it legal force and the authority to impose sanctions and the use of military force. Thus as far as Israel is concerned, there may be negative implications and Israel's freedom of action in its war against terrorism in Lebanon may be hampered, a war which is expected to continue after the current confrontation.

¹¹ The Taef Accord on 1989, which marked the end of the Lebanese civil war, stated that all the Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias were to be disarmed within six months. Syria, which at that point was extending its control of Lebanon, implemented the Accord only partially and made sure that Hezbollah would not be disarmed. The Palestinian terrorist organizations as well were not disarmed.

assistance in the future to contribute to the reconstruction and development of Lebanon.”

4. Timetables:

A. The cessation of hostilities is to be **immediate**. The timetables or the resolutions other provisions are **unclear**.

B. The resolution requests the Secretary General to develop, in liaison with key international actors and the concerned parties, proposals to implement the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and of resolutions 1559 and 1680 and to **present them to the Security Council within 30 days**.

C. In that context, disarmament [of the terrorist organizations], the delineation of Lebanon’s international borders and the issue of the **Sheba’a Farms** are also mentioned.

D. During that period [of 30 days] the proposal calls upon all sides to **maintain the ceasefire**.

E. Although it is not specifically stated, **the period between first and second parts of the proposed resolution is liable to be longer than 30 days** if Israel and Lebanon do not reach an agreement.

The position of the Lebanese government

5. The Lebanese should, at first glance, be clearly interested in accepting and implementing the Security Council resolution because **it would significantly promote the weakening of Hezbollah and strengthen the government**. On the other hand, the resolution has the potential to **cause internal Lebanese tensions to the point where the situation might deteriorate** if an attempt is made to force Hezbollah into taking steps which do not suit it. That is what the Lebanese government is afraid of.

6. As far as Hezbollah is concerned, **the resolution is dangerous and liable to damage its status in Lebanon**. It specifically calls for the organization to be disarmed, limits its

rearmament, allows for an Israeli presence (although a temporary one) in Lebanon after the ceasefire and emphasizes the idea of deploying a multinational force.

7. Therefore, both the Lebanese government and Hezbollah (through its proxy, Nabih Berri, the chairman of the Lebanese Parliament) oppose the current wording of the draft and it is expected that the Lebanese government will make a diplomatic effort to change it and promote its own proposed resolution. In concrete terms, the Lebanese reservations relate to certain central parts of the proposal, among them the demand for a full, immediate ceasefire which will include **an immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from south Lebanon** (after which the Lebanese government will be willing to send 15,000 soldiers to south Lebanon).

Appendix

Draft of U.N. Security Council Resolution on Hostilities in Lebanon and Israel¹²

Saturday, August 5, 2006; 12:31 PM

Draft UNSC resolution / Projet de résolution du Conseil de Sécurité

The Security Council,

PP1. Recalling all its previous resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 520 (1982), 1559 (2004), 1655 (2006) and 1680 (2006), as well as the statements of its President on the situation in Lebanon, in particular the statements of 18 June 2000 (S/PRST/2000/21), of 19 October 2004 (S/PRST/2004/36), of 4 May 2005 (S/PRST/2005/17) of 23 January 2006 (S/PRST/2006/3) and of 30 July 2006 (S/PRST/2006/35),

PP2. Expressing its utmost concern at the continuing escalation of hostilities in Lebanon and in Israel since Hizbollah's attack on Israel on 12 July 2006, which has already caused hundreds of deaths and injuries on both sides, extensive damage to civilian infrastructure and hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons,

PP3. Emphasizing the need for an end of violence, but at the same time emphasizing the need to address urgently the causes that have given rise to the current crisis, including by the unconditional release of the abducted Israeli soldiers,

PP4: Mindful of the sensitivity of the issue of prisoners and encouraging the efforts aimed at settling the issue of the Lebanese prisoners detained in Israel,

¹² Source: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/05/AR2006090500440_pf.html

OP1. Calls for a full cessation of hostilities based upon, in particular, the immediate cessation by Hizbollah of all attacks and the immediate cessation by Israel of all offensive military operations;

OP2. Reiterates its strong support for full respect for the Blue Line;

OP3. Also reiterates its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized borders, as contemplated by the Israeli-Lebanese General Armistice Agreement of 23 March 1949;

OP4. Calls on the international community to take immediate steps to extend its financial and humanitarian assistance to the Lebanese people, including through facilitating the safe return of displaced persons and, under the authority of the Government of Lebanon, reopening airports and harbours for verifiably and purely civilian purposes, and calls on it also to consider further assistance in the future to contribute to the reconstruction and development of Lebanon;

OP5. Emphasizes the importance of the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory in accordance with the provisions of resolution 1559 (2004) and resolution 1680 (2006), and of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, for it to exercise its full sovereignty and authority;

OP6. Calls for Israel and Lebanon to support a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution based on the following principles and elements:

- strict respect by all parties for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Israel and Lebanon;
- full respect for the Blue Line by both parties;
- delineation of the international borders of Lebanon, especially in those areas where the border is disputed or uncertain, including in the Shebaa farms area;
- security arrangements to prevent the resumption of hostilities, including the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani river of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and

weapons other than those of the Lebanese armed and security forces and of UN mandated international forces deployed in this area;

- full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006) that require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, so that, pursuant to the Lebanese cabinet decision of July 27, 2006, there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese state;

- deployment of an international force in Lebanon, consistent with paragraph 10 below;

- establishment of an international embargo on the sale or supply of arms and related material to Lebanon except as authorized by its government;

- elimination of foreign forces in Lebanon without the consent of its government;

- provision to the United Nations of remaining maps of land mines in Lebanon in Israel's possession;

OP7. Invites the Secretary General to support efforts to secure agreements in principle from the Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel to the principles and elements for a long-term solution as set forth in paragraph 6 above;

OP8. Requests the Secretary General to develop, in liaison with key international actors and the concerned parties, proposals to implement the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), including disarmament, and for delineation of the international borders of Lebanon, especially in those areas where the border is disputed or uncertain, including by dealing with the Shebaa farms, and to present those proposals to the Security Council within thirty days;

OP9. Calls on all parties to cooperate during this period with the Security Council and to refrain from any action contrary to paragraph 1 above that might adversely affect the search for a long-term solution, humanitarian access to civilian populations, or the safe return of displaced persons, and requests the Secretary General to keep the Council informed in this regard;

OP10. Expresses its intention, upon confirmation to the Security Council that the Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel have agreed in principle to the principles and elements for a long-term solution as set forth in paragraph 6 above, and subject to their approval, to authorize in a further resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter the deployment of a UN mandated international force to support the Lebanese armed forces and government in providing a secure environment and contribute to the implementation of a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution;

OP11. Requests UNIFIL, upon cessation of hostilities, to monitor its implementation and to extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the safe return of displaced persons;

OP12. Calls upon the Government of Lebanon to ensure arms or related materiel are not imported into Lebanon without its consent and requests UNIFIL, conditions permitting, to assist the Government of Lebanon at its request;

OP13. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council within one week on the implementation of this resolution and to provide any relevant information in light of the Council's intention to adopt, consistent with paragraph 10 above, a further resolution;

OP14. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.