Tension has increased in Lebanon between Hezbollah and the pro-Syrian camp, and Fuad Siniora and the supporters of the New Order (The March 14 Forces). The tension previously existed but was significantly increased by the second Lebanon war. Hezbollah's efforts, supported by Iran and Syria , to restore its military and political power added fuel to the fire.

Nasrallah's appearance on Al-Manar TV (owned by Hezbollah), aimed primarily at Lebanon 's internal arena, clearly showed that the organization was serious about its political struggle against Siniora's government. Nasrallah warned that if his demand to establish a national unity government (in which his influence would increase) were not met, he would be able to overthrow the government by having his supporters take to the streets. The United States hastened to issue an exceptional statement according to which there was “mounting evidence” that Iran , Syria and Hezbollah were working for the (apparently violent) overthrow Siniora's government to prevent the establishment of an international tribunal to investigate the murder of Rafiq Hariri.

On November 6 Nabih Berri convened a forum in the Lebanese parliament attended by representatives of the entire political spectrum, including Hezbollah. The forum has discussed and will continue to discuss Hezbollah's demands for the establishment of a national unity government and other disputed issues. Hezbollah spokesmen warned that if no compromise was reached, the “street” would rise against the government. Hassan Nasrallah's threat to get his supporters into the street has the potential for violence and illustrates the growing threat to the future of Sinora's government . ¹

Hassan Nasrallah threatens to use the pressure of his supporters to overthrow the Lebanese government

On October 31 Hezbollah general secretary Hassan Nasrallah gave a long, aggressive, threatening interview to Al-Manar TV, the first since the September 22 “victory rally.” He particularly stressed post- war internal Lebanese relations. Other topics arising during the interview were the war and the lessons to be learned from it, the demand that Hezbollah disarm, UNIFIL activity, Lebanon 's rehabilitation, negotiations concerning the abducted Israeli soldiers and American intervention in the region.

Hassan Nasrallah issuing a threat to the Lebanese government
(Al-Manar TV, October 31)

Regarding internal Lebanese affairs, Nasrallah said Hezbollah was determined to establish a national unity government where the organization would have more influence and the ability to prevent decisions from being made if they were contrary to its own and Syria 's interests . The alternative, he threatened, would be to take his supporters into the street to overthrow the government , a potentially violent situation. Nasrallah is fully aware of the inherent dangers , although he emphasized his intention to struggle against the government in democratic ways.

Nasrallah related to other important issues:

A. The abducted Israeli soldiers : He said that “ serious and intensive ” negotiations were being held with a representative of the UN General Secretary and that they were expected to be difficult. He made it plain that his organization was in no hurry to agree to a deal to release the soldiers and that he would demand a high price for them (implying the release of non-Lebanese prisoners), although he was careful to remain vague as to what the price would be.

B. He stated that Hezbollah had no intention of disarming or of abandoning the path of “resistance” (i.e., violence and terrorism). He also boasted of his success in replenishing his rocket arsenal , which reflected the organization's effort to rehabilitate its military capabilities while dealing with internal Lebanese politics.

In an unusual announcement on November 1, White House spokesman Tony Snow said that there was mounting evidence to the effect that Iran , Syria and Hezbollah (and their Lebanese allies) were planning the (possibly violent) overthrow of Fuad Siniora's government (Agence France-Presse, November 1). He said that one of the objectives of the Syrian plot was to prevent the Lebanese authorization of an international tribunal to investigate the murder of Rafiq Hariri. On October 31, John Bolton, the American ambassador to the United Nations, also stated that the United States was worried that Iran and Syria were actively trying to destabilize the Lebanese government in violation of Security Council Resolution Security Council Resolution 1559, which calls for the honoring of Lebanon 's sovereignty and independence.

In response to the accusations, the Syrian embassy in Washington announced that the American claim that Syria was planning to overthrow the Lebanese government was “ridiculous and baseless,” that Syria honored Lebanese sovereignty completely and did not intervene in its internal affairs (Reuters, November 1). ² Hezbollah also issued an announcement stating that the American accusations were “a gross intervention in an internal Lebanese matter” and a clear expression of American objection to the “democratic option” of establishing a national unity government (Lebanese News Agency, November 2).

Appendix

The central topics of Nasrallah's interview with Al-Manar TV (October 31)

Criticism of the Lebanese government and Nasrallah's opponents (the March 14 Forces) and the call to establish a national unity government : Hassan Nasrallah expressed his disappointment with Fuad Siniora's government, questioned the patriotism of his opponents and threatened to create a political crisis.

A. Hassan Nasrallah was severely critical of the government's functioning during and after the second Lebanon war. He blamed his opponents for having joined forces with the United States and Israel against Hezbollah. He also blamed them for turning UNIFIL into a multinational force which would take over Lebanon on the pretext of supporting it. However, he said, their plot had been foiled by Hezbollah's “firm stand.” Now, he claimed, his opponents were increasing political pressure because they were disappointed the war had not led to Hezbollah's disarming. As to the rehabilitation of the country, Nasrallah said that an Arab-Islamic effort was being made to aid Lebanon , but the Lebanese government was not doing enough.

B. Thus, he claimed, the failure of the government necessitated the establishment of a national unity government which would make it possible to deliberate on disputed topics, including the presidency and a strategy for defending Lebanon . He again demanded that Siniora broaden the government to let Hezbollah and its camp to have a “blocking third” of the votes and enable them to be full partners in the government (“our participation in the government should be serious and practical, and not merely window dressing”). He made it clear that Hezbollah did not intend to use force to overthrow the government but stated that if its demands were not met, the organization was capable of using democratic methods to overthrow the government .

A threat to take his supporters into the streets to force early elections to the Lebanese parliament if the current political meetings did not lead to the establishment of a national unity government: “…We want to realize our political objective [the establishment of a national unity government] by using every quiet, democratic political means. That is our natural right. We can demonstrate for a day, two days, three days…ten and thirty [days], wherever we like…They [our opponents] want to demonstrate and say: A demonstration for a demonstration?...Wonderful. Let them respond by having their own people take to the streets…” Nasrallah views the establishment of a national unity government as urgent because, he claims, the current government has harmed Lebanese stability at a time when regional instability is on the rise .

Instilling the myth that Hezbollah won the second Lebanon war and refusing to abandon the strategy of “resistance” (i.e., violence and terrorism):

A. Hassan Nasrallah continued to glorify Hezbollah's “firm stand” in opposing Israel . He claimed that Hezbollah's position was strengthened in the war and that it could and would have continued the fighting had Israel and the United States , fearing the collapse of the Israeli army, not asked for a cease fire. He advised the Lebanese to follow the announcements of the Israeli political leadership, army commanders, newspapers and public opinion polls. If they did so, he stated, they would understand that the Israelis had been thoroughly beaten in Lebanon .

B. Nasrallah claimed that after 33 days of fighting, the IDF did not take control of the area south of the Litani River or even to occupy the towns and villages near the border. He claimed that the war illustrated that “the strategy of resistance” was correct in view of the weakness of the Lebanese army and its inability to face Israel alone. “[The Lebanese army] does not have the necessary facilities, tanks, anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles…,” he said. He stated that Hezbollah had no intention of abandoning the path of resistance (i.e., violence and terrorism) or of disarming .

Restoring Hezbollah's military capability : Nasrallah claimed that after the war his organization had restored its military capability and returned to its prewar strength. He claimed that before the war Hezbollah had 33,000 rockets and today more than 20,000 , and noted that under present conditions the organization would be able to repel new Israeli acts of aggression. “The resistance,” he said, “has fully returned to its former might…”

Negotiations concerning the abducted Israeli soldiers

A. Hassan Nasrallah stated that currently, “serious and intensive” negotiations were being conducted by a UN representative (whose name was not mentioned) and Hezbollah (“I only want to calmly say that [dealing with] the subject has begun…Let us leave it for negotiations…”) regarding the abducted Israeli soldiers. He claimed that committees had been set up to discuss the details without involving the media.

B. He said he expected the negotiations to be difficult (“I say that the negotiations before us are difficult. They are serious…”) and that Hezbollah would demand a high price for the abducted soldiers, and by implication the release of the non-Lebanese prisoners : “…as for the families of non-Lebanese – Palestinian, Jordanian, Syrian and other Arab prisoners – naturally they want to hear from me…[Let us] leave the topic for negotiations.”

C. He was also careful to remain vague and avoid direct statements about the price he would demand for the release of the Israeli soldiers.

Receiving assurance that UNIFIL would not disarm Hezbollah

A. Nasrallah claimed that all the countries participating in the UNIFIL force had appealed to him for assurance regarding the safety of their soldiers . He added: “We told [them] that we had no objection if their mission was to support the Lebanese army and not to disarm the resistance.” He stated that in response, UNIFIL made it clear that its soldiers would not disarm the organization : “We have received enough assurance and it is sufficient that the secretary general of the UN, Mr. Kofi Annan, has said more than once that the role of UNIFIL is not to disarm the resistance…”

B. He expressed the fear that his opponents, the March 14 Forces, would attempt to expand UNIFIL's authority and deploy its forces throughout Lebanon (one of the articles of Security Council Resolution 1701 to which Hezbollah is vehemently opposed). ³

The failure of the United States ' regional policies : Hassan Nasrallah devoted a considerable portion of the interview to the United States and its regional policies:

A. The United States seeks to force its hegemony on the region : “There is an American program…and its real essence is hegemony…over all the countries in the region…” Nasrallah said that Hezbollah was participating in the struggle against American hegemony along with all the peoples of the Arab-Muslim world.

B. The current situation, he said, was that the American plan was failing or had already collapsed. The Americans had not managed to force their terms on the Palestinians and had failed in Afghanistan and Iraq : “ Afghanistan is clearly a failure…What are the results in Iraq ? Failure, failure, failure.”

C. The United States had also failed in its attempt to establish control over Lebanon through the new order camp, he claimed, while casting doubt on the patriotism of his opponents. That failure was one of the motives behind Israel 's “aggression” in the war. Nasrallah also accused the Americans of planning targeted killings in Lebanon . ⁴

D. Nasrallah expects the Americans “to pack up and go home” in a few years and leave the Middle East and the Arab-Muslim world the way they left Vietnam . He called upon those who were counting on American aid to learn from the experiences of Vietnam and of the Israeli-backed South Lebanese Army, and to know that when the Americans lost the battle they would abandon them to their fate.

¹ In the meantime, on November 11, 2006, Hezbollah and Amal announced that their government ministers were resigning in view of the fact that the discussions had reached a dead end.

² Decades of Syrian intervention in Lebanon 's internal affairs, which have continued to this day, ridicule the embassy's announcement.

³ Security Council Resolution 1701 calls for the upgraded UNIFIL force to support the Lebanese government in preventing arms smuggling into its territory in compliance with its request. Hezbollah vehemently opposes broadening UNIFIL's mission further afield than south Lebanon .

⁴ Nasrallah stated that some of the [Lebanese] security services had confiscated silencers at the Beirut airport being sent to the American Embassy. He claimed that they were going to be used in assassinations carried out under the auspices of the Americans and Israelis.