| Overview |
This week, significant progress was made in the Egyptian-sponsored contacts for a lull in the fighting. It followed Israel 's decision to exhaust the dialogue with Egypt , while maintaining the option of a rapid military operation in the Gaza Strip. On June 17 senior Hamas figures announced that the lull would begin on Thursday, June 19, at 6 o'clock in the morning.
Contacts regarding the lull are being held in the shadow of intensive rocket and mortar shell fire. At the same time, IDF counterterrorist activities continued, which this past week resulted in the deaths of at least ten terrorist operatives, six of them during a number of attacks on June 17.
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Escalation in rocket and mortar shell fire
During the past week rocket fire targeting western Negev population centers escalated. There were 26 identified rocket hits, compared with 19 last week. In addition, there was a sharp rise in the amount of mortar shell fire, 83 shells launched this week at Israeli villages near the Gaza Strip and at IDF forces, compared with 39 last week.

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Hamas mortar shell fire (Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades Website, June 12, 2008). |
Prominent incidents this past week included:
June 16 : A 90mm rocket shell fell in an open field south of Ashqelon near a school and kindergartens, wounding a city resident. Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack.
June 12 : There was intensive rocket and mortar shell fire in response to an “work accident” in the house of a Hamas operative in Beit Lahia (See below). In the afternoon hours a heavy barrage of rockets and mortar shells was fired. Twenty-two mortar shells hits were identified (nine of them 120mm shells) and 12 rockets (of which two or three were Grad rockets) . A woman on Kibbutz Yad Mordechai was wounded. Hamas claimed responsibility for the attacks.
June 11 : Seven mortar shells were fired, three of which fell on the factory at Kibbutz Nir Oz (where a shell killed Amnon Rosenberg of neighboring Kibbutz Nirim on June 5). One factory worker was slightly injured. Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack.
On June 12, under cover of the rocket and mortar shell fire, the terrorist organizations attempted to use a booby-trapped tractor to carry out an attack. The tractor aroused the suspicions of the IDF forces when it approached the security fence in the northern Gaza Strip near Netiv Haasara. When it stopped moving, a terrorist was seen running away; he was shot and killed.

The tractor used by the terrorist organizations in the attempted
attack on June 12 (IDF Spokesman, June 12, 2008).
Weekly Distribution of Identified Rocket Hits in Israel

Daily Distribution of Identified Rocket Hits in Israel

Daily Distribution of Mortar Shells Fired

A “work accident” at Beit Lahia
The rocket and mortar shell fire of June 12 came in the wake of an explosion in the house of Ahmed Hamouda , a senior Hamas operative in Beit Lahia. It caused the collapse of his house and those of several of his neighbors, killing ten Palestinians and wounding more than 40. Six of the dead were Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades terrorist operatives, three of them commanders in the northern Gaza Strip. Civilians were also killed and wounded , among them women and children, including Hamouda's four-month old baby daughter.
Hamas and the Palestinian terrorist organizations operating in the Gaza Strip were quick to blame Israel for the explosion before investigating the matter. Hamas spokesman Musheir al-Masri stated that Israel would pay a high price for blowing up the building. At the same time, Hamas's terrorist-military wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, began intensively shelling Israel from the northern Gaza Strip .
Later, after dozens of rockets and mortar shells had been launched into Israeli territory , Hamas announced that six of its operatives had been in the building when it collapsed and were engaged in preparations for an attack . The nature of the explosion and the degree of damage it did to the building and those surrounding it made it clear that there had been an enormous quantity of explosives on the premises, which caused the collapse of the building.
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Counterterrorist Activities |
The Gaza Strip
This past week the IDF continued its counterterrorist activities against squads launching rockets and mortar shells and against sites where weapons were manufactured. The most conspicuous events were the following:
June 17 : In the afternoon the IDF attacked a vehicle carrying terrorist operatives in the central Gaza Strip. Earlier in the day two other such vehicles were also attacked, the first in Khan Yunis, the second in Dir al-Balah. All three attacks were described as successful (IDF Spokesman). The Palestinians reported the deaths of six operatives.
June 16 : At 7 o'clock in the morning IDF forces observed three terrorist operatives attempting to plant two IEDs near the security fence in the southern Gaza strip. The terrorists were shot and killed; weapons were found in their possession. One of the shots fired by the IDF forces detonated an IED, causing it to explode. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad officially announced the death of three of the organization's operatives (Jerusalem Battalions Website, June 16, 2008 ). A search of the area revealed two other terrorist operatives, who were shot and killed.
June 16 : The Israeli Air Force attacked two rocket manufacturing sites, one in Khan Yunis and the other in Gaza City . In addition, the IAF struck a rocket launching squad which had fired rockets into Israeli territory, killing a PIJ operative and wounding two others (Palestinian media, June 16).
Jordan
On June 12 the Jordanian national security court sentenced three Jordanian citizens to long prison terms for conspiring to carry out an act of terrorism and for the illegal possession of explosives and unlicensed automatic weapons. According to the indictment, the ringleader, Ayman Naji Hamdallah Dragme, joined Hamas in 2002. He contacted Hamas liaison officers in Damascus and participated in two military training courses given by the movement. He also received tens of thousands of dollars to store weapons in Jordan and to carry out surveillance on Jordanian intelligence officers.
Weapons found in the possession of the three accused
terrorists in Jordan (Al-Jazeera TV, June 15, 2008).
Hamas condemned the sentence, saying that “trying men accused of supporting the Palestinian resistance sets a precedent” (Palestine-info Website, June 12, 2008 ). Senior Hamas figure Musa Abu Marzuq said that it was a “political trial” and claimed that Hamas did not harm anyone outside Palestine (BBC in Arabic, June 12, 2008 ).
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The Egyptian Initiative for a Lull in the Fighting |
Progress in the contacts regarding the lull
On June 11 the ministerial National Security Committee decided to give Defense Minister Ehud Barak the authority to make the most of the dialogue with the Egyptians to achieve a lull in the fighting on Israeli terms , as agreed to by the prime minister and the foreign and defense ministers. That would include negotiations to speed up the release of abducted Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, in Hamas captivity for two years. At the same time, the committee instructed the IDF to make preparations for a rapid military operation in the Gaza Strip, should it be decided on (Website of the Israeli prime minister's office, June 11). 1
Following the decision, Amos Gilad, head of the political security branch of the Defense Ministry, left for Egypt to present Omar Suleiman, head of Egyptian intelligence, with Israel 's position. During talks on June 12, Gilad raised the connection between the lull in the fighting on the one hand and the release of Shalit and Egyptian efforts to stop the arms smuggling from the Sinai into the Gaza Strip on the other (Haaretz, June 15). Hossam Zaki, Egyptian foreign ministry spokesman, said that Amos Gilad had given an affirmative answer to Hamas regarding the lull, while demanding guarantees regarding the release of Shalit and the issue of smuggling from Egypt into the Gaza Strip (IslamOnline Website, June 13).
On June 15 the Hamas delegation met with Omar Suleiman in Cairo to receive Israel 's answer regarding the lull. The delegation was composed of Musa Abu Marzuq, Muhammad Nasser, who represented the “external leadership” (i.e., Damascus ) and Khalil al-Hayieh and Jamal Abu Hashem who represented the “internal leadership” (i.e., the Gaza Strip). The delegation returned to the Gaza Strip on June 16 to present Israel 's position to the other Palestinian terrorist organizations, while being optimistic about the lull's chances.

Musa Abu Marzuq leaving for Egypt
(Al-Jazeera TV, June 15, 2008).
Al-Hayat reported that “Egyptian sources” were optimistic after having spoken to Hamas about the lull. The main point of disagreement was Israel 's reservations about the import of various goods into the Gaza Strip, such as iron and aluminum which might be used in the manufacture of rockets. Hamas claimed that not importing them would paralyze factories in the Gaza Strip (Al-Hayat, June 16, 2008 ). Hamas spokesman Sami Abu Zuhri said that another issue which had been discussed was the detention of Hamas operatives during the breach of the border fence between Egypt and the Gaza Strip, whom Egypt had promised to release (Filastin al-‘An Website, June 16, 2008 ).
Hamas prime minister Ismail Haniya said that authorization for the lull was close and that the issue of Gilad Shalit had been separated from it. He praised the Egyptian efforts “to meet Hamas's demand to separate the issue of Gilad Shalit from the lull…” (Palestine-info Website, June 16, 2008 ). According to Haniya, Shalit's release depended on the release of the Palestinian prisoners held in Israel , as Hamas demanded, and was not related to the lull (Reuters, June 14).

Ismail Haniya declaring the issue of Gilad Shalit is unrelated
to the lull (Al-Jazeera TV, June 15, 2008).
On the afternoon of June 17, Hamas held a press conference in Gaza City to announce that the lull in the fighting would begin on Thursday, June 19, at 6 o'clock in the morning.
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