Hezbollah

Profile of the Lebanese Shiite Terrorist Organization of Global Reach Sponsored by Iran and Supported by Syria

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• Part 1 - a description and analysis of Hezbollah as the Lebanese Shiite terrorist organization of global reach.
• Part 2 – appendices and data evidencing the nature, capabilities, and operating methods of Hezbollah.

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• Since its inception in 1982, Hezbollah has conducted a terrorist campaign aimed at promoting the radical Shiite-Islamicdoctrine conceived by Iran ’s spiritual leader Ayatollah Khomeini, who died in 1989. The basic principles of this doctrine, which reflect the fundamental identity of Hezbollah as a Shiite jihad organization, are 1) the consistent and relentless struggle against Israel until the “liberation of Jerusalem” and the annihilation of Israel are achieved, and 2) intense hostility toward the United States, along with efforts to force its presence and influence out of the Middle East. In order to achieve these goals, Hezbollah has placed the use of terrorism against its enemies at the focal point of its strategy of asymmetric conflict, with the weapon of suicide as one of its key components. In Hezbollah’s view, the United States and Israel have no adequate response to such weapon.

• During more than twenty years of its existence, Hezbollah has undergone a remarkable process of organizational development. Starting as a local Lebanese terrorist group, one among many others operating in Lebanon , it has grown into a political movement with global capabilities in the sphere of terrorism, an extensive military apparatus, and weapons that include land-to-land missiles. The highest authority of this intricate organizational structure, which encompasses civilian, military, and communal functions, is the Decision-Making Shura Council (see below). The Shura has been headed since 1992 by Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah and the main architect of its policy. Another member of the Shura is Nasrallah’s second-in-command, Imad Mughniyah, who is in charge of Hezbollah’s military framework, including its terrorist activity throughout the world and against Israel . Despite a tendency in Europe , motivated by political interests, to differentiate between the military and political wings of the organization, the leadership itself stresses time and again that Hezbollah is a package entity, and that the distinction between its military and political wings is merely technical.

• It goes without saying that Hezbollah would not have reached its present status without the extensive assistance and backing of Iran and Syria . Iran , which regards Hezbollah as a means of achieving its own ideological and strategic goals, is a large-scale provider of military support to Hezbollah. This includes first and foremost the al-Quds Force of Iran ’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC, hereinafter: “the Revolutionary Guards”) in Lebanon . Iran also supplies Hezbollah with a variety of military hardware, such as upgraded anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles, missile launchers, land-to-land missiles of various types, including long-range (43 km) Fajr-3 missiles and Fajr-5 missiles (with a 75 km range). Iranian assistance also comprises military training, logistic support, and financial assistance estimated at several millions of US dollars yearly (in addition to Hezbollah’s endeavors to generate its own financial resources through fundraising in Western countries and through criminal activity, mostly money counterfeiting and drug smuggling). Following recent evidence of Iranian and Hezbollah involvement in the bombing of the Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires (1994), the Argentinian prosecution served senior members of Hezbollah (including Imad Mughniyah), Iranian diplomats,and prominent Iranians (including former Iranian Information Minister Ali Fallahian) with arrest warrants to the judge in charge of the inquiry. A detailed recent report by Argentinian intelligence accuses Iran of direct involvement in the bombing, through its intelligence services and the Hezbollah organization.

• Syria , a strategic supporter of Hezbollah from its founding, prevented the dismantling of the organization following the signature of the Taif Agreement in 1989, and allowed its expansion to its present dimensions. Syria has upgraded the policy of cautious support that prevailed during the Hafez al-Assad regime to a strategic alliance following his son Bashar’s succession. Syria now regards Hezbollah as a strategic partner in its policy toward Israel . Syria also acts as a major source of military support to Hezbollah, alongside Iran , and recently provided the organization with long-range Syrian-made missiles. Syria also backs Hezbollah’s policy of terrorist attacks in southern Lebanon . It guarantees Hezbollah’s freedom of operation, while preventing the Lebanese government from enforcing its authority in the region in accordance with Resolution 425 of the UN Security Council. Since the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon , the organization has carried out some 30 terrorist attacks, all under the auspices of Damascus , including the deadly attack against civilians at Kibbutz Metsuba in March 2002. Damascus , while continuing to effectively control Lebanon , is responsible for creating the conditions that transformed Hezbollah from a troublesome terrorist group into a strategic threat to Israel and the entire Middle East .

• From a military-operational perspective , Hezbollah operates in three main arenas:

• The Lebanese arena : Israel ’s withdrawal from Lebanon on May 24, 2000 and the UN Security Council’s statement that Israel completed its withdrawal according to Resolution 425, did not alter the nature of Hezbollah. Neither did they affect its adherence to terrorism as the principal means of achieving its political-strategic goals, the essence of which is to wear down Israel until its final annihilation . Hezbollah exploits to the fullest the freedom of operation that Syria allows it to enjoy in southern Lebanon regarding the weak Lebanese administration in this region. It invests considerable effort in establishing, expanding, and reinforcing its military operational apparatus in southern Lebanon , with the effect of turning the region into Hezbollah-only country. Hezbollah has taken over the place of the weaker central administration and assumed the bulk of power in the region, similar to the state-within-a-state known as “Fatahland” created by the Palestinian terrorist organizations in southern Lebanon prior to 1982. Since the Israeli withdrawal, Hezbollah has endeavored to maintain controlled tension along the Israeli-Lebanese border. It has exerted continuous pressure on Israel by means of terrorist attacks against military and civilian targets along the northern border. At the same time, it is building up a military apparatus in Beirut and Lebanon ’s Bekaa region , keeping its strategic offensive system operation-ready. The latter is meant to serve as a key element in upholding the “balance of deterrence” vis-a-vis Israel . Its military apparatus will enable Hezbollah to prepare to drag the region into a wide-ranging military escalation at the “right” time.

• The Palestinian arena : a major component of the endeavors of Hezbollah is the extensive assistance it extends to Palestinian terrorism. Its purposes are to enhance the operational abilities of the Palestinian terrorist organizations, encourage them to pursue their armed struggle against Israel , and to duplicate the Lebanese model in the Palestinian territories . The assistance provided by Hezbollah to Palestinian terrorism comprises various elements, including the smuggling of high-quality weapons through Lebanon and Jordan and by maritime routes (using ships such as the Karine-A), as well as the provision of military training, financial support, information, and propaganda. Moreover, Hezbollah is setting up its own terrorist apparatus within Israel and the Palestinian territories , and is even recruiting Israeli Arabs to carry out terrorist missions. The leadership of Hezbollahdoes not deny its granting military assistance to the violent struggle of the Palestinians against Israel , and regards suicide attacks as a means of demoralizing Israeli society.

• The global arena : Since its establishment in 1982, Hezbollah has pursued a policy of global terrorism directed mainly against Israeli and American targets, and in the past also against European targets. This terrorism relies on a broad international network of collaborators recruited mainly (though not exclusively) from Shiite-Muslim communities worldwide, including the United States and South America . This network is meant to serve a number of purposes: gathering operational intelligence on Israeli / Jewish / Western targets; maintaining “latent cells” that can be activated in time of need and in accordance with the strategic considerations of the organization and the countries backing it; and raising funds in order to supplement the massive financing provided to it by Iran . Beyond all this, this network enables the organization to carry out at short notice “high-quality” attacks in various places in the world, as already happened twice in Argentina . The main areas of activity of this global network are in South America, Southeast Asia , Jordan , the Persian Gulf, and Europe . During the 1980s, Hezbollah attacks targetedWestern (American and European) objectives, mostly on Lebanese soil: bombing military and civilian compounds, hostage-takings, and hijackings. In the 1990s, Hezbollah adopted a more selective approach, focusing mainly on “high-quality attacks” such as the bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires in March 1992, the bombing of the Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires in July 1994, and the active involvement in the bombing of a military base housing US troops in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia in June 1996. At the same time, Hezbollah uses Europe as a platform for launching terrorist attacks against Israel and achieving bargaining power vis-a-vis the latter . In recent years, a number of such Hezbollah terrorists infiltrated into Israel with the intention of carrying out “high-quality attacks” or gathering operational intelligence for carrying out such attacks; and an Israeli citizen, Elhanan Tannenbaum, was kidnapped by Hezbollah in Europe in October 2000.

• Like al-Qaida, Hezbollah constitutes a global Islamic terrorist network with specific characteristics that make it a constant and major threat, not only to the State of Israel but also to regional as well as worldwide stability. Its distinct features and terrorist character derive from the following:

• Official backing and assistance from Iran and Syria, both of which have been identified by the American State Department as countries sponsoring terrorism:
  
  • Iran laid the foundations of the Hezbollah organization as part of its doctrine of “exporting the Islamic Revolution” and its strategy of using terrorism as a key element in its national security policy. Hezbollah was thus established in 1982 through Iran’s Revolutionary Guards sent to Lebanon’s Bekaa region during the civil war in Lebanon. Later on, the organization became the flagship of the Islamic Revolution and its major achievement outside Iranian borders. Iranshaped Hezbollah’s ideology, granted it political backing, and built up its operational capability. Iran continues to extend it military support (training and weapons), financial aid (the bulk of Hezbollah’s budget comes from Iran) and assistance in its terrorist activity (Iranian involvement in terrorist attacks as recently uncovered in Argentina).

• Syria is the second strategic patron of the Hezbollah. Indeed, Hezbollah has grown and developed under the auspices of Syria. Together with Palestinian terrorist organizations that operate from Syria and Lebanon, Hezbollah has become a tool in the hands of the Damascus regime, used to exert pressure on Israel in order to promote Syrian political and strategic interests. In recent years, following Bashar al-Assad’s accession to power, relations between Syria and Hezbollah have been upgraded. While Hafez al-Assad adhered to a policy of “cautious support” of Hezbollah, under his son’s regime, Hezbollah has become a full-fledged strategic ally backed by the Syrian president, who maintains close relations with its leader, Hassan Nasrallah. Damascus, like Tehran, uses the terrorist capacity with which it has vested Hezbollah in order to conduct a “war by proxy” against its enemies, specifically against Israel. This war by proxy has been the Syrian policy for several decades, from the beginning of the Hafez al-Assad regime in 1970, when Hezbollah took over the role of the Palestinian terrorist organizations as a preferred “proxy”.

• A sheltered territorial base that guarantees freedom of activity : Hezbollah, like al-Qaida until the American military operation against it in Afghanistan , enjoys the benefits of a powerful territorial base. Hezbollah is firmly established on the Lebanese scene and takes full advantage of the backing given to it by the Shiite community, as well as the weakness of the official administration in the region, which is totally dependent on Syria , Iran ’s strategic ally. Syria , motivated by strategic considerations, contributes to the consolidation of Hezbollah and the expansion of its activity. Therefore, in defiance of the Taif Agreement signed in 1989 and the ensuing dismantling of the Christian and Druze militias, Syria allowed Hezbollah to maintain and even further develop its military-operational power base in southern Lebanon , Beirut , and Lebanon ’s Bekaa region. This policy facilitated the establishment of a semi-autonomous apparatus, or a state-within-a-state in southern Lebanon as well as several locations in the north of the country, where a widespread and well-protected terrorism and guerilla apparatus thrives .

• Radical Shiite-Islamic ideology that places the emphasis on a holy war (jihad): the jihad doctrine of Hezbollah as conceived by Iran, explicitly calls for the annihilation of Israel, the struggle against the United States, the propagation of the “Islamic Revolution” and—in the long term—the transformation of Lebanon into an Islamic republic similar to that of Iran. Hezbollah, as a rule, is careful to camouflage these aspects of its ideology, emphasizing mainly its interim objectives, in particular supporting Palestinian terrorism against Israel , with the alleged purpose of defending Lebanese national interests and opposing the American presence in the Middle East . To achieve its ambitious and far-reaching goals, and in view of its own and the Palestinians’ military inferiority to Israel , Hezbollah advocates the widespread use of the “weapon of suicide”, stressing its value as an asymmetric and undeterrable means to achieving its goals. Hezbollah also grants extensive assistance to the Palestinians in the form of advanced weaponry and military training, the purpose of which is to help upgrade their terrorist activity and rule out the easing of violence in the Palestinian territories.
  
• This ideology and these goals obviously far exceed the narrow borders of Lebanon and the limited context of Israeli-Lebanese relations. These goals relate to the entire Arab and Islamic worlds. Hezbollah describes the conflict with Israel as a microcosm of a much larger conflict between the Muslim and the Western worlds, referring to this conflict as the very materialization of Samuel Huntington’s nightmarish vision of a “clash of civilizations”. Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, regards himself as a politician who enjoys a special status in Lebanon , a messenger of Pan-Islamism, one who carries the burden of a historical mission that transcends regions and trends: the mission of the Muslim struggle against the West. This ideological dimension highlights the threat embodied by this organization vis-a-vis Western countries and the international community, beyond the direct threat that it poses to Israel .

• The availability of advanced arms and the capability to have access to unconventional power resources, as well as the high level of technological skills and sophistication all far exceed the known standards of terrorist organizations worldwide, rendering Hezbollah a highly dangerous organization, both locally and globally. Complementing these means are highly sophisticated tactical as well as operational capabilities, developed thanks to massive Iranian support and Hezbollah’s own military experience from two decades of armed struggle against the Israeli army and many years of terrorist activity against Israeli and Western targets.
  
• Diverse military and political skills used to reach the organization’s goals - Hezbollah has developed a variety of capabilities in order to achieve its objectives: operational capabilities (including an extensive artillery system); a military-strategic apparatus (including long-range land-to-land missiles); the ability to carry out terrorist attacks in various locations (inside Israel , abroad, through Lebanon ; behind the scenes, or with direct involvement). Furthermore, the organization has developed various methods and approaches at the operational level, and devised military tactics along a variety of lines of attack, ranging from a war of attrition in varying degrees to all-out warfare. Alongside these channels, Hezbollah has set up an extensive political, social, and informational apparatus aimed at promoting its strategic agenda.

• A broad international network , based on operational cells maintained as latent throughout the world and on sympathetic Shiite Islamic communities – the latter serving as support apparatus for the operational system and convenient sources for recruiting collaborators. Hezbollah has already proven its ability to carry out terrorist attacks in locations around the world (e.g., Argentina ), while using local apparatus and exploiting international platforms to smuggle terrorists into Israel and the Palestinian territories. Hezbollah has spread its network almost everywhere in the world where a Shiite Islamic community exists: South America , Canada , the United States , Australia , Southeast Asia, Western Europe, and of course Lebanon and the rest of the Middle East .
  
• A source of inspiration for Islamic terrorist groups worldwide. During its twenty-odd years of existence, Hezbollah has become a source of inspiration for Islamic terrorist groups throughout the world, serving an example of a brave, sophisticated and daring organization that relies on a radical Islamic doctrine and pursues a violent struggle against the United States, Israel, and the rest of the West, Israel being perceived as the “American proxy” in the Middle East. This inspiration is not only spiritual and emotional, but also operational: Its significance lies in the ability to recruit followers and encourage them to carry out terrorist attacks in the name of Islam and the far-reaching strategic goals of the organization. It is worth noting that following the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon , Hezbollah also became a source of inspiration for the Palestinian terrorist organizations. These organizations draw encouragement from Hezbollah’s experience, which proves to them that political-strategic progress can be achieved through violence and terrorism, without entering into negotiations with Israel .

• The above analysis of Hezbollah’s power factors would be incomplete without mentioning the weaknesses of this organization. Indeed, a significant number of constraints affect Hezbollah’s decision-making process and policies, the main of which is the constant need to take into account the interests of Syria and Iran , its two strategic patrons, at the same time as those of the internal Lebanese system in which it operates.

• Hezbollah therefore is a multi-faceted organization with a variety of identities existing in a permanent state of tension: the Lebanese organization that wishes to appear as defending Lebanese national interests on the one hand, and the militant Islamic jihad movement, backed by Iran and supported by Syria, striving to liberate Jerusalem, annihilate Israel, expel the Americans from the Middle East, and transform Lebanon from a multi-religious state into an Iranian-linked, predominantly Shiite, Islamic state on the other.

Chapter I: Israel and the United States as Portrayed in the Doctrine of Hezbollah

• Since its founding in 1982, Hezbollah has conducted a bloody struggle and a murderous policy aimed at promoting its strategic goals. The organization’s purpose was initially to expel the foreign troops from Lebanon . However, later on, it adopted strategic goals that extended far beyond this “unassuming” one. Hezbollah’s ideology relies on an entrenched, radical Islamic doctrine that emanates from Tehran . It is part of the Iranian revolutionary philosophy, which set as its objectives the annihilation of Israel and the struggle against the United States , the West, and their strongholds in the region.

Hatred of Israel (“that vile microbe”) and the Jewish people

• A cornerstone of Hezbollah ideology, which derives from the vision of the founder and first leader of the Islamic Revolution in Iran , Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, is the consistent and unyielding war against the State of Israel , until its annihilation and the “liberation” of Jerusalem . Guided by this objective and the ambition to achieve it, the organization feels committed, both ideologically and practically, to pursuing a continuous struggle against Israel , using all possible means on all fronts .

• In order to support and legitimize its terrorist activity against Israel , Hezbollah continuously emphasizes its hostile attitude toward it. The use of anti-Semitic expressions, insults, and abusive language (“vile microbe”, “cancerous tumor”) is intended to justify the goal of eliminating Israel . Most blatant of all are the statements made by the leader of the organization himself, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, the main architect and chief spokesperson of Hezbollah ideology:

• “I wish to draw your attention to the threat posed by this entity which has robbed Palestine; this cancerous tumor, this vile microbe, an entity that knows no limits, that spreads out wherever Israelis are, wherever there is a remnant from the Talmud or where a Jewish rabbi once sat… Hope is rising for the fulfillment of the divine promise to eradicate this cancerous plague…” Nasrallah calls: “Death to Israel ” and the crowd chants in response: “Death to the Israelis”. [al-Manar television, May 7, 1998 ]

• “All great disasters that have befallen the region originate from the existence of Israel . As long as there is a state and its name is Israel , these disasters will persist. This is a cancerous presence in the region. If we ignore the presence of a cancer in our body, we may discover it when it is too late…Some people regard cancer as influenza…When a cancer is discovered, it must be dealt with courageously, and it must be eradicated. Part of this body and part of this blood must be sacrificed in order for this body to recover…” [al-Manar Television, April 9, 2000 ]

• Hezbollah hostility against the State of Israel is intertwined with hatred of the Jewish people . Hezbollah leaders time and again make virulent anti-Semitic statements, using both classic and Islamic anti-Semitic “arguments”. These statements are intended not only to negate Israel as a state, but also to discredit the entire Jewish people. The following are some quotations from speeches given by Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut :

• “What do the Jews want? They want security and money. Jews, from the dawn of history, are the most cowardly and greedy among Allah’s creatures. If you search the entire world, you will not find anyone stingier or greedier than the Jews.” [al-Manar Television, September 28, 2001 ]

• “Unfortunately, this year, the tenth day of the month of Muharram [Ashura: the anniversary of the establishment of the Shiah sect in early Islamic history] falls close to the fiftieth anniversary of the bitter and tragic historical disaster of the foundation of the state of the descendants of apes and pigs, in other words the Zionist Jews…” [al-Manar Television, May 7, 1998 ]

• “If we would have gathered the blood spilled and the money wasted in Iran , Iraq , and the Umma [the Islamic nation] during the eight years of war, it would have been enough in order to free Palestine dozens of times and eradicate Israel tens of times. True or false? ” [al-Manar Television, February 7, 2003 ]

• Hezbollah ’s philosophy rules out any possibility of a future peace agreement with Israel , of recognizing it as national entity in the region, or of peaceful co-existence with it . Hezbollah is consistent in expressing its steadfast opposition to any attempts towards achieving a peace settlement in the region. It strongly criticizes all those who negotiate with Israel , in order to increase the pressure exerted on them by Arab public opinion. It has been especially adamant during recent years in preventing any peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians by means of maintaining the state of violence and terrorism in the Palestinian territories. Following are a few statements by Hassan Nasrallah:

• “We claim that once Arafat threw the gun away and decided to resort to negotiation on the Palestinian issue, he proved that he is a Jew…The Taba Agreement is nothing but another nail in the coffin of the humiliating settlement [between Israel and the Palestinians]. Sooner or later this people [the Palestinians] will judge the one who imposes such agreements upon his people.” [Hassan Nasrallah, al-Manar Television, September 30, 1995 , in response to the signing of the Taba Agreement between Israel and the Palestinians]

• “There is no life and no co-existence with Israel; there is only one slogan: Death to Israel.” [Hassan Nasrallah, al-Manar Television, April 26, 1999 ]

• Hezbollah uses such ideology to justify its terrorist activity against civilians. In order to legitimize attacks against civilians, Hassan Nasrallah designates the entire Israeli population, including women, children, and the elderly, as a “military population”. According to this view, there are no innocent people, and each civilian must be fought against:

• “In our opinion, Israeli society is clearly a military society. We regard the Israeli entity as an imperialist frontal military base injected into the heart of the Arab and Islamic worlds. This is a society of warfare, a military society of warriors, men and women alike. There is no civilian society in this entity.” [Hassan Nasrallah, al-Manar Television, December 27, 1997 ]
  
  

• “Suicide attacks shake the enemy from within, they plunge him into an existential crisis, and thus prepare the ground for victory; these acts are completely legitimate, since there are no innocent civilians in Israel ; rather they all are occupiers and accomplices to crime and massacre .” [Hassan Nasrallah, al-Manar Television, September 14, 2001 ]

• Hezbollah constantly refers to its ambition of achieving a “balance of deterrence” vis-a-vis Israel , with the alleged purpose of averting Israeli “aggression” against Lebanon and “defending” Lebanon , its borders, and its waters. In reality, however, Hezbollah does not conduct a defensive policy; rather it initiates and carries out terrorist attacks against Israeli targets—long after the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon . By doing so, it expresses its headstrong opposition to the implementation of Resolution 425 of the UN Security Council, the purpose of which was to establish peace and security on both sides of the border. The true meaning of “balance of deterrence”, as perceived by Hezbollah, is justifying the terrorist acts that it initiates against Israel , while deterring the latter from any retaliation against Hezbollah or the countries backing it.

• The strategy of “asymmetric attrition” : the operational activity of Hezbollah is based on the principle of “asymmetric attrition”, a strategy aimed at generating continuous pressure on Israel by means of persistent terrorist activity, in defiance of Israel ’s military superiority . Hezbollah, as a rule, voices contempt for the resilience of Israeli society, depicting it as a traumatized body and a cobweb. It draws confidence from the internal pressures in Israel that led to the withdrawal of the Israeli army from Lebanon . In Hezbollah’s view, the only way to annihilate Israel —albeit a lengthy process—is by persevering in the armed struggle against it and striking at Israel ’s weak spot , i.e., its civilian population. Hezbollah’s contempt for the resilience of Israeli society is illustrated in the following statements by Hassan Nasrallah:

• “ Israel is a myth and a fiction, as it was established on the foundations of arrogance…The prevalent spirit among Israeli society is one of defeat…The Jews are a bunch of financiers, they are not capable of sacrifice… They did not come to Palestine in order to sacrifice themselves…The British, which represent the West and were succeeded by the United States , are the ones responsible for bringing the Jews together into Palestine , in order to serve Western interests. They would otherwise not have arrived here…The Jews will not sacrifice themselves on behalf of the country called Israel .” [al-Manar Television, August 19, 2000 ]

Hatred of the United States (“the big Satan”)

• Consistent with its hatred of Israel , Hezbollah also bears deep hostility against the United States . This hostility, one of the main components of Hezbollah’s ideology, has its roots in the Iranian revolutionary doctrine, which defines the United States as “the big Satan”. This ideological hostility against the United States found tangible expression in a series of terrorist attacks carried out by Hezbollah against the United States in 1982; during these attacks, dozens of Americans were killed in military as well as civilian compounds in the Middle East ( Lebanon and Saudi Arabia )¹. This hostility is evidenced in statements of the leaders of Hezbollah, in particular Hassan Nasrallah himself:

• “If Albright and Clinton and the rest of the Americans thought that, should they attack Hezbollah from Washington, then we would tremble and fear, let them know that we shall rejoice; because when they attack us through politics, through the media and with their army, it only strengthens our conviction and our belief that truth is at our side. When the Satan curses us, it means that Allah is by our side.” [Radio Nur, February 16, 2000 ]

• Hezbollah regards the United States as an imperialist country and claims that its political objective is to dominate the entire region and rob the Arabs of their natural resources, using Israel to implement this policy. During a conference held in Damascus on January 25-27, 2003, the purpose of which was to advocate the boycott of American products, Nasrallah appealed to the audience as follows: “We must discontinue all contacts with the United States and the American people, and adhere to the Arab boycott against Israel…The Arabs must understand that Israel is merely a battalion of the American army, and that the United Statesis the principal enemy.”[Radio Nur, January 26, 2003 ]

• Hezbollah exploits any occasion to agitate against the United States and even threaten it. For example, when the Americans mentioned their intention of moving their embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, Nasrallah stated: “The Palestinian people’s response should be as follows: You may move your embassy to Jerusalem and bring along your diplomats, but those who have dignity are capable of turning your embassy into ruins, and returning your diplomats to you in coffins. This is the only language that America and Israel understand” [al-Manar Television, July 30, 2000 ]. It should be noted that statements of this kind are circulated by the Arab media throughout the Arab and Islamic world, thus contributing to stirring up hatred of the United States .

• The American war against global terrorism in the wake of September 11 has resulted in boosting Hezbollah incitement and propaganda against the United States . From the onset of this campaign, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, has stepped up the frequency of his criticism against the United States and its policies:
  
  • “The Arab nations cannot be destroyed or isolated in the desert and the mountains. Never! In this region, there are living nations that will never surrender to any invader! I therefore foresee: The beginning of the large-scale American-Israeli offensive against our region will mean the end of the American domination of the world. [This will happen] because it [the United States] will find itself involved in a new and unequal confrontation; in such a battleground, those who function as commanders, officers, and soldiers are the common people, and not a state that could be threatened, or any specific organization that may be crumbled and whose financial resources may be frozen.”
    
  • “This is the war of a despotic, arrogant, and cruel country against the nations of the world—the nations of the Arab world, Islam and the Muslims, the Latin American countries, the Christians, the Buddhists, the Hindus, and the idolaters. It is the war of a cruel, despotic, and arrogant country against all those who refuse to yield to it…Let us adopt the definition of Imam Khomeini, who said that this is the war of the arrogant ones against the oppressed people of the world.” [al-Manar Television, November 11, 2001 ]
    
  • “If they insist on [conducting] a war and [embarking on] a full-scale confrontation… the Americans will find themselves on a battlefield where they cannot tip the balance, as their aircraft will be of no use to them, nor will the tanks, the trade embargo, or the freezing of funds… for in this nation we can speak of millions of youngsters, each of whom, no matter which country he comes from or which organization he belongs to, will purchase, by his own means and by the sweat of his brow, a weapon, a knife or explosives, in order to fight those invaders.”[al-Manar Television, January 26, 2003 ]
    
• Hezbollah thus runs an anti-American incitement campaign and propaganda apparatus in Lebanon , backed by Iran , which reverberates throughout the Arab and Islamic world. Its principal means of transmitting hate messages and propaganda are al-Manar Television,Radio Nur, and websites operated by the organization. Additional Arab television channels help circulate the hate messages by offering a public stage to Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, who enjoys great popularity in the Arab world, and by quoting al-Manar Television and other Hezbollah-controlled media. Al-Manar Television, however, remains the principal means of mass communication used in the campaign against the United States :
  
• During the second half of October 2002, a poisonous anti-American video clip was screened on al-ManarTelevision several times daily, especially before the news broadcasts. The clip appeared only on the satellite channel (and not on the local channel), over which it was sure to reach the Arab and worldwide viewing public. The highlight of the clip was the image of the Statue of Liberty, the face of which was replaced by a skull. The Statue was shown brandishing a knife, with two cannons deployed at its feet.

• During a ceremony held in Beirut in commemoration of “Martyr’s Day”, Hassan Nasrallah, after attacking the United States , shouted: “Death to America !” Hezbollah terrorists who attended the ceremony raised their hands in salute and echoed the call “Death to America !” Nasrallah responded: “ America will not die this way. You must raise your voices!” [al-Manar Television, November 11, 2001 ]
  

The doctrine of Hezbollah: Suicide attacks (“the shortest road to Allah”) are of supreme value

• A major component in Hezbollah’s moral support of and informational assistance to Palestinian violence is its backing of suicide attacks carried out by Palestinians in Israel . Hezbollah regards suicide bombings as istishhad, or the sacrifice of one’s own life for the sanctification of Allah’s name, in the context of an Islamic military campaign against the enemy. Istishhad is a sacred value embodying the “spirit of resistance” and the culture surrounding it (as opposed to intihar, which refers to “plain” suicide on personal grounds, which is prohibited by Islamic law). According to Hezbollah doctrine, this sacrifice does not limit itself to a one-time act but it represents a general way of life and a culture that the Palestinians should embrace in imitation of the Lebanese Shiite model created by Hezbollah.

• From the practical point of view, Hezbollah was the originator, in Lebanon , of the “innovative” doctrine advocating the widespread use of the “weapon of suicide” to promote strategic goals. Hezbollah recorded several remarkable achievements, such as the withdrawal of the Western forces and the Israeli army from Lebanon . Hezbollah applied the “weapon of suicide” in a series of spectacular terrorist attacks against Western and Israeli targets in Lebanon during the 1980s and the 1990s, using car bombs operated by suicide terrorists and lone suicide bombers. Its terrorist activities have served as source of inspiration for Palestinian terrorist organizations such as the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas, who adopted the suicide weapon as a means of perpetuating and escalating the violent struggle against Israel . Hezbollah, inspired by Syria and Iran , encourages the Palestinians to keep up the practice of the “weapon of suicide”. It applies ideological justification to legitimize using this practice against the civilian population, and it prompts the entire Arab world to use this weapon against the Americans.

• The theme of the “weapon of suicide” occupies a central place in Hassan Nasrallah’s speeches. For example, Nasrallah states [al-Manar Television, May 21, 2001] that “in the culture of resistance, the culmination of humanity and human dignity is the decision to perform istishhad in order to grant life to one’s people and dignity to one’s nation and homeland”. In this respect, the Deputy Secretary General of Hezbollah,Sheikh Naim Qassem claimed [al-Manar Television, October 10, 2002 ]: “All people must aspire to shahada [martyrdom by suicide for the sake of Allah]”. Nasrallah even defied religious rulings that oppose the practice of suicide when he appealed to the Palestinians [al-Manar Television, December 14, 2002 ] to disobey “all those who tell you that it is prohibited to carry out acts of istishhad”, adding that these acts are “the shortest road to Allah”.

• It is noteworthy that Sheikh Naim Qassem devotes a chapter in his book Hezbollah: Methodology… Experience… Future to the motive of suicide. In this book, recently published in Beirut , the Sheikh analyzes the religious ruling authorizing suicide acts (istishhad), and refers to these acts as “the main source of power on which one can rely, and the effectiveness of which has been clearly proven”. The Sheikh acclaims the achievements of these acts in Lebanon , but stresses that the use of this “weapon” must be selective, i.e., limited to operations that are sure to cause the enemy many casualties, in order not to “waste” this weapon on “routine” terrorist acts.
  
  

• Appendices :

• Statements made by senior members of Hezbollah on the annihilation of Israel and engaging in violent struggle against it – see Appendix 12.

Chapter II: Characteristics of Hezbollah’s

Political and Military Wings

The “political wing” and the “military wing”:
Inseparable twins

• In order to counter the American definition of Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, European countries have suggested that a distinction be drawn between the military (terrorist) wing and the political (“legitimate”) wing of the organization. Lebanese government officials have gone one step further and attempted to depict Hezbollah as a political movement, devoid of military or terrorist characteristics. These suggestions are unfounded, as is evidenced by some of Hezbollah’s spokesmen themselves:
  

• The above statement by Fannish is wellsubstantiated by the organizational structure of Hezbollah. From its establishment, the organization has undergone an accelerated development process resulting in its evolution into a number of wings and divisions: political, military, social, and informational. This evolution reflects Hezbollah’s growing strength and stature on the Lebanese scene, and its determination not to limit its activities to the military-terrorist spheres of its agenda. The governing body of Hezbollah is, as mentioned, the Decision-Making Shura Council, or Majlis Shura al-Qarar¹. It comprises nine members, seven of whom are Lebanese and two Iranian, the latter representing the interests of Iran, the organization’s strategic patron. Therefore, any attempt to depict Hezbollah as a purely Lebanese organization with no Iranian links is groundless.

• The Decision-Making Shura Council is headed by Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah. Subordinate to the Council are several sub-councils, including the Political Council, the Military Council, the Judicial Council and several other organs. The general concept is one of a centralized leadership that controls all aspects of the organization, including its military-terrorist activity.

The Organizational structure of Hezbollah

• The activities of all the sub-councils, in particular the Political Council and the Military Council, are determined in detail by the organization’s Secretary General and the Decision-Making Shura Council. Decisions are translated into explicit policy derived from the organization’s ideology and strategy, alongside an array of considerations and restraints mainly related to the interests of Iran and Syria, the organization’s patrons. The differentiation between the organization’s military-operational and political-social activity is therefore totally unfounded.

• Senior members of Hezbollah deny any such differentiation, arguing that Hezbollah, in all its aspects, is a single organic entity whose policy and activity are determined by its leadership. Thus, when asked: “Who makes the decisions regarding operations: the militia or the political leadership?” Hezbollah leader Nasrallah responded:
  

• Sheikh Naim Qassem, Nasrallah’s deputy, expressed similar views on this matter:

• “We are a political party whose top priority is resistance. For the struggle against Israel and the policy of opposing the occupation are acts of a political party. We believe that our political endeavors are combined with our resistance operations, which cannot be separated from our political activity.” [Lebanese Television, January 23, 2003]

• “If the military wing were separated from the political wing, this would have repercussions, and it would reflect on the political scene. But Hezbollah has one single leadership, and its name is the Decision-Making Shura Council. It manages the political activity, the Jihad [i.e., the military] activity, the cultural and the social activities…Hezbollah’s Secretary General is the head of the Shura Council and also the head of the Jihad Council, and this means that we have one leadership, with one administration.” [al-Mustaqbal, December 31, 2000]

Hezbollah’s leadership

Two figures stand out at the top echelon of Hezbollah’s hierarchy, occupying leading positions in directing the organization’s political and military activity: the leader of the organization Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah and his deputy, in charge of the military apparatus, Imad Fayez Mughniyah. The following is a profile of both leaders and their achievements:

Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of the organization and the brain behind its political and military activity

• Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah , 41, is a Shiite, born in the village Bazouriya in southern Lebanon . During his adolescent years he received a religious education in the town of Najaf in Iraq , as protégé of Sheikh Abbas Musawi, whom he later succeeded as leader of Hezbollah. He is the father of four children, the eldest of whom, Hadi, was killed in a clash with the Israeli army in 1997. His family lives in the Shiite Bir al-Abed neighborhood on the southern outskirts of Beirut , a Hezbollah stronghold and home of the organization’s headquarters.

• During the 1970s, Nasrallah, still a youth, joined Amal, a pragmatic Shiite movement founded in Lebanon by Imam Mussa Sadr to promote the interests of the Shiite community. He filled a number of positions in Amal, first as being in charge of the Bekaa Desk, then as regional presiding judge in charge of discipline, and eventually as a member of Amal’s Political Bureau. Around that time, Nasrallah also joined a radical Shiite Islamic movement, the al-Da’wa party, one of whose leaders was Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, the most prominent clerical authority in the Shiite community. Many of al-Da’wa’s members were later to join Hezbollah.

• In 1982, Hassan Nasrallah resigned from Amal, along with many others who were eager to carry out Khomeini’s doctrine; together with other Shiite elements and with the assistance of Iran , they founded Hezbollah. Nasrallah was granted a senior position in the organization’s founding nucleus. Soon after, he was placed in charge of the Bekaa region, the cradle of Hezbollah. He was only 22 years old.

• In 1985, Hassan Nasrallah moved to Beirut and was appointed Deputy Chair of the Beirut Council, one of the three wings of Hezbollah at the time. Within a few months he took charge of the organizational and military affairs of the city, and became responsible for the Recruiting Unit of the organization. In addition, he served as member of the Political Bureau of Hezbollah, which at that time functioned as the organization’s advisory body. In 1987 he was promoted to a function that was created for him: head of the Executive Council, and in this capacity became a member of the Decision-Making Shura Council. Nasrallah held these positions until the killing of the leader of Hezbollah, Sheikh Abbas Musawi, by Israeli troops on February 16, 1992 . Nasrallah was only 32 when he succeeded Musawi. Iran ’s then-President, Hashemi Rafsanjani, supported his appointment. Since then, he has been reappointed three times as head of the organization. In July 2001, he began his fourth term, following an amendment to the Hezbollah charter, which until 1998 allowed the leader of the organization to serve only two terms.

• During the 1990s, Hassan Nasrallah strengthened his relations with the Iranian authorities, in particular with the leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who assigned him as his delegate in Lebanon on religious matters in the mid- 1990s. Nasrallah travels several times yearly to Iran to conduct close consultations with the Iranian leadership, during which decisions are made regarding the policy and operation of Hezbollah. It should be noted that the leadership in Iran places great confidence in Nasrallah, and values his judgment

• Today Nasrallah is the undisputed leader of Hezbollah. He is the principal authority and foremost decision-maker of the organization, and enjoys the unreserved support of Iran and Syria. Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000 has further strengthened his position as the leader who succeeded in “expelling Israel by military force” without extending it any political “rewards”.

• Nasrallah holds his cards close to his chest, particularly regarding the delicate issue of the Israeli hostages held by Hezbollah, which involves only a strictly limited circle of operatives of the organization. Nasrallah personally conducts and supervises all dealings concerning this issue, and is adamant in his refusal to disclose even the smallest item of information. By doing so, he entirely disregards the basic humanitarian principles that are commonly upheld in the international community. He refuses to give information on the conditions of hostages, or to grant them their most basic human rights such as meeting Red Cross delegates, receiving health services, or communicating with their families. As early as the 1980s, Hezbollah hostages from the West were subjected to these conditions.
  

• Character description: Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah stands out as a tough, autocratic, and charismatic leader, a gifted speaker who enjoys the personality cult surrounding him, and insists on being personally involved in all of Hezbollah’s activities.

• In spite of his young age and fierce rhetoric, Nasrallah is evidently a prudent leader and pragmatic in his dealings.He is careful to maintain close relations with his patrons in Tehran and Damascus, especially since the upgrading of his relations with the latter after Bashar al-Assad became president of Syria in July 2000.

• Hassan Nasrallah enjoys uncontested authority within the organization. During recent months, the continued Palestinian Intifada and the American preparations for the war against Iraq clearly motivated him to aspire to a broader leadership, reaching beyond the local Lebanese scene.

Hezbollah’s second-in-command, Imad Fayez Mughniyah: the person in charge of the organization’s military wing and a senior terrorist on the US wanted list

• Imad Fayez Mughniyah (aka “al-Mukhtar” / “Abu-Salim” / “Jawad” / “Nur al-Din”) is of Shiite origin, born on July 12, 1962 in the village Tayr Dibbah in southern Lebanon . Mughniyah is one of the ten most wanted terrorists in the United States . An international warrant of extradition has been issued in respect of him.

• In the late 1970s, during the Lebanese civil war (which began in 1975), Mughniyah joined the ranks of Arafat’s Fatah organization. In 1982, when the PLO evacuated Lebanon, Mughniyah remained behind and became a member of Hezbollah. Thanks to his close links with Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, the senior clerical authority and perhaps the most prominent figure in the Shiite community in Lebanon, he soon became head of the organization’s security apparatus. In the middle of the 1980s, Mughniyah was behind the founding of Hezbollah’s terrorist wing operating under the cover name of “Islamic Jihad”.
  

• In the light of his status as a wanted terrorist in the United States, and Hezbollah’s interest in diminishing the terrorist image of the organization, Hezbollah spokespeople deny any links with Imad Mughniyah. The chair of the Hezbollah party in the Lebanese Parliament, Muhammad Raad, once referred to Mughniyah as a “Jihad warrior not connected to Hezbollah” [LBC, November 19, 2002]. This statement is untrue and unsubstantiated since, to the best of our knowledge, Mughniyah continues to be in charge of Hezbollah’s military and terrorist activity and occupies the position of second-in-command of the organization.

• What makes Mughniyah one of the United States’ most wanted terrorists? Mughniyah has been implicated in numerous terrorist acts against many targets. He is responsible for a number of terrorist operations in Lebanon and abroad, including aircraft hijackings, kidnappings of Western hostages, and terrorist attacks against Israel as well as against American and Western targets in Lebanon and abroad.

• The following are some of the more conspicuous terrorist attacks in which Mughniyah has been involved:

• The bombing of the US Embassy in Beirut on April 18, 1983 resulting in 63 deaths. The attack was carried out through a car bomb driven by a suicide terrorist. This attack was probably the result of Syria’s concern about the impending signing of an agreement between Israel and Lebanon under American auspices (which was indeed signed a month later, on May 17, 1983).

• The bombing of the US embassy was the first in a line of suicidecar bombings, among them the bombing of the US Marine Corps compound in Beirut and the attack against the French unit of the Multinational Force, both carried out in October 1983.

• The attack against the US Marine Corps compound in Beirut was a particularly spectacular one. It involved a large truck carrying a cargo of 5,450 kg of TNT, which broke into the compound through the front gate, burst in, and exploded, destroying the whole building and killing 241 American troops. The FBI Forensic Laboratory described the bombing as the largest conventional attack in the world ever investigated by its experts [Source: the FBI investigation report as cited by the Marine Corps Gazette, February 1984].

• Additional terrorist activity in which Mughniyah was implicated: the bombing of the US Embassy in Kuwait in 1983 and 1984; the kidnapping and murder of CIA operative William Buckley in Lebanon in 1983; the murder of Lieutenant Colonel William Higgins of the UN Observer Mission in southern Lebanon in 1988; the hijacking of the TWA aircraft in 1985, resulting in one death; the hijacking of two Kuwaiti Airlines aircraft in 1984 and 1988; the kidnappings of dozens of Western civilians in Lebanon, carried out under the cover of various organizations, and the murder of many of them in the 1980s; the bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Argentina in 1992, resulting in 34 deaths; the bombing of the AMIA (Argentinian-Israeli Mutual Association) building of the Jewish community in Buenos Aires in 1994, resulting in 86 deaths; and the bombing in Saudi Arabia in 1996, resulting in six deaths.

Imad Mughniyah: a senior terrorist on the US wanted list

[Source: the FBI website
http://www.fbi.gov/mostwant/terrorists/termugniyah.htm ]

Alias: -Hajj

DESCRIPTION

Date of Birth Used:  -1962-Hair:-Brown

Place of Birth: - Lebanon -Eyes:-Unknown

Height: -5'7"-Sex:-Male

Weight: -145 to 150 pounds-Citizenship:-Lebanese

Build: -Unknown- - 

Language: -Arabic

Scars and Marks: -None known

Remarks: - Mugniyah is the alleged head of the security apparatus for the terrorist organization, Lebanese Hizballah. He is thought to be in Lebanon.

CAUTION

Imad Fayez Mugniyah was indicted for his role in planning and participation in the June 14, 1985, hijacking of a commercial airliner which resulted in the assault on various passengers and crew members, and the murder of one U.S. citizen.

REWARD The Rewards For Justice Program, United States Department of State, is offering a reward of up to $25 million for information leading directly to the apprehension and/or conviction of Imad Fayez Mugniyah.

Indoctrination and propaganda:

Hezbollah’s extensive use of the media to inculcate its vision and propagate the struggle against Israel and the West

• Hezbollah relies to a large extent on its widespread media network in order to propagate its doctrine and its vision to all of its followers in Lebanon and the Arab and Islamic world. It also uses its communications network as a means of transmitting messages to various recipients, including the Western countries and even the Israeli public, its sworn enemy.

• The organization operates a number of powerful means of communications, the most prominent of which are al-Manar Television and Radio Nur. These channels provide continuous coverage of events in Lebanon , the Middle East , and worldwide, and broadcast statements issued by Hassan Nasrallah and other senior members of Hezbollah. Hezbollah also publishes two leading magazines, al-Intiqad, which deals with political issues, and Baqiatollah, which addresses religious matters.

• Hezbollah makes extensive use of the Internet ; the organization operates an official website (www.hizbollah.tv), which provides updated information on its activity and quotations of its leaders’ statements. Its contents comprise video clips, photographs, speeches by senior members of the organization, and narratives of “achievements” by Hezbollah operatives. It also features highlighted messages that the organization intends to convey to its target users, i.e., its followers and the Arab and Western public. An additional website is www.nasrollah.org, Hassan Nasrallah’s personal site in which the leader of Hezbollah is portrayed as the emissary of the Iranian leader and the “exporter” of the Islamic Revolution. Aside from these, each of the organization’s electronic and printed media has its own website.
  

• Throughout its multiple communication channels, Hezbollah avails itself of advanced technology and spectacular effects (presumably with the assistance of Iran ) to produce slick propaganda films and clips. This use of the media evidences the organization’s awareness of its importance in its war on the public’s consciousness. Hence its endeavors—paired with significant Iranian investments—to promote this sphere of activity in order to position itself at the forefront of communication technology.

• An important role of Hezbollah’s media network is its utilization for the purpose of incitement and propaganda aimed at reaching a large public in the Arab world, in particular the Palestinians. Mass media are drafted to promote the Palestinian armed struggle, provoke the escalation of terrorism, exert pressure on the moderate / pro-Western Arab regimes, and enhance the status and impact of Hezbollah and its leader, Hassan Nasrallah. They also serve the organization as a means of transmitting propaganda broadcasts to the Israeli public, applying psychological warfare tactics in order to achieve demoralization and encourage surrender and emigration from Israel .
  

The financial sources of Hezbollah

• Western intelligence sources estimate Hezbollah’s yearly budget at approximately $100 million, originating primarily from Iran . This sum finances the organization’s military-terrorist activity (arms purchases, salaries to the militia, training of the militia, and so forth); the operation of communal institutions such as schools, hospitals, and relief institutions, and the coverage of overhead expenses that derive from the various activities of Hezbollah (rent, office equipment, salaries to non-militia members, and so forth).

• More than half of Hezbollah’s budget originates from Iran via two main channels:

• Governmental institutions - Part of Hezbollah’s budget is financed through the Revolutionary Guards (represented by the al-Quds Force) and the Iranian Foreign Ministry (by means of the embassies in Damascus and Beirut ).

• Semi-governmental institutions - After the 1979 revolution, a number of charity funds were established in Iran , which operated and continue to operate under the supervision of the Iranian leader. These funds have branches in Lebanon, which serve the purpose of “exporting the revolution” by extending wide-ranging financial and social assistance to Hezbollah and the Shiite population that identifies with the organization.

• Aside from receiving institutionalized assistance from Iran , Hezbollah has strived for years to develop its own additional sources of financing through a global funding apparatus. This supplementary funding, however modest in comparison to Iranian support, may have been motivated by the organization’s ambition to reduce its total dependence on Iranian support. Additional financing sources include:

• Fundraising in Lebanon and worldwide : Hezbollah conducts fundraising activity in Lebanon and worldwide (mainly in Shiite-Muslim communities) amounting to several millions of US dollars yearly. In Lebanon , this fundraising is carried out via the Islamic Resistance Support Association, affiliated with Hezbollah. Outside Lebanon , fundraisers operate by means of charity funds (similar to the fundraising practices of Hamas) and through local Shiite community centers. The main centers of fundraising activity outside Lebanon are located in the Ivory Coast and the tri-border region in South America; fundraising also thrives in the United States and Western Europe (see Chapter IV below).

• Legitimate business activity - This comprises commercial firms owned by Hezbollah or its affiliated charitable institutions, as well as a range of business activities conducted by Hezbollah operatives themselves, such as oil transactions, real estate, and small businesses.
  
• Criminal activity in Lebanon and worldwide : Hezbollah operatives engage in two main types of criminal activity: trafficking in illegal drugs and moneyforgery (specializing in the forgery of US $100 bills) , which is carried out in Hezbollah-controlled areas of the Bekaa region. Other criminal activity includes cigarette smuggling, car thefts, and credit card forgery. It is often difficult to pinpoint whether a Hezbollah operative who engages in criminal activity does so on behalf of Hezbollah or for his or her own benefit; usually the two are combined (see Chapter VII below).
  
• Partaking from the National Budget of Lebanon : Hezbollah uses its faction in the Lebanese Parliament to persuade the Lebanese administration to finance projects currently sponsored by Hezbollah in Shiite population centers. Assigning such projects to the Lebanese administration offers two advantages to Hezbollah: It releases it from a heavy financial burden at the expense of the national budget, allowing it to reap the fruits of propaganda and indoctrination conducted among its Shiite supporters.
  

Chapter III: Support for Hezbollah Provided by Iran and

Syria , Two Countries Sponsoring Terrorism

Iranian support

• The bulk of Hezbollah’s operational infrastructurewas established, from 1982 onwards, through extensive Iranian assistance. This assistance comprises financial support, large supplies of arms (mostly via Damascus ) and the training of Hezbollah militia. In addition, Hezbollah depends on Syrian political and military support, which was significantly boosted after Bashar al-Assad acceded to the presidency.

• Iran views Hezbollah as its spearhead in the use of the “weapon of terrorism” in general, and its use against Israeli targets, in particular. It also regards Hezbollah as a main source of inspiration and a model for leadership in the context of the Palestinian armed struggle against Israel , and in the broader context, as a key instrument in the Islamic war against Israel . This view is evidenced by Iranian leader Ali Khamenei’s statement in which he explicitly called on Hezbollah to focus its activities on supporting the Palestinian struggle. Khamenei made this statement after his meetings with senior members of Hezbollah at the International Conference in Support of the Palestinian Intifada held in Tehran in April 2001. The appeal was reiterated in the closing address of the conference, which called on “all those who took part in the liberation of southern Lebanon to assist the Palestinian resistance.”

• Iran considers the consolidation of Hezbollah’s position in Lebanon to be a greatsuccess (the only one so far) in realizing the doctrine of “exporting the Islamic Revolution”. Even after the Israeli pullout from Lebanon , Iran views Lebanon as its front line against Israel , and Hezbollah as a key entity in leading the offensive. Based on this perception, Iran has persisted, especially during the last two years, in strengthening Hezbollah’s military capability, including supplying it with an arsenal of land-to-land missiles unparalleled by any other terrorist organization worldwide. Iran consistently advocates the continued terrorist activity of Hezbollah along the Israeli-Lebanese border, and calls for the “liberation” of additional Lebanese territories, which it claims are occupied by Israel (in blatant contradiction to the statement issued by the UN Security Council confirming Israel’s full withdrawal from Lebanese territory and compliance with resolution 425 of the Security Council).

• The “al-Quds Force” [“Jerusalem Force”] of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards deployed in Lebanon is the Iranian extension operating in Lebanon and assisting Hezbollah. Al-Quds Force provides military guidance and support for terrorist attacks against Israel , especially those carried out by Hezbollah and Palestinian secular as well as Islamic terrorist organizations. The support comprises sizeable financial resources and far-reaching military assistance down to the tactical level. Iran ’s military support to Hezbollah includes the following:
  
  • Providing training and instruction to Hezbollah militia on various military and operational topics

• The al-Quds Force plays an important role in Hezbollah’s operational contingency planning for military escalation against Israel, in outlining its implementation and in determining relevant levels of response by Hezbollah. The significance of this, is that the Iranians are instrumental in planningHezbollah’s operational-terrorist pursuits, and capable of triggering regional deterioration whenever they see fit.
  

• Financing the buildup of military-terrorist power : the financial assistance from Iran allows Hezbollah to translate its plans into military escalation and operational deployment. After Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon in May 2000, Iranstepped up its financial supportto Hezbollah as part of the Iranian policy of promoting Hezbollah’s military deployment against Israel, and in order to enhance its ability to support Palestinian violence and boost its impact as the actual ruling power in southern Lebanon.

Syrian support

• Hezbollah plays a key role in the “Syrian order” in Lebanon . In defiance of the Taif Agreement signed in 1989, Damascus has transformed Hezbollah into Lebanon ’s chief armed militia. Whereas other ethnic militia groups have been disarmed, Syria allowed Hezbollah to maintain a wide-ranging military apparatus and engage in undisturbed operational activity from the South of Lebanon against Israel .

• After Bashar al-Assad became president of Syria in July 2000, relations between the Syrian regime and Hezbollah underwent a thorough makeover, which consisted mainly of upgrading the organization’s status in Syrian eyes. Having served as an instrument in the hands of the Syrian regime for the implementation of its policy vis-a-vis Israel and Lebanon , Hezbollah became a strategic partner (“front-line operational arm”) and a key player exerting considerable influence on the above Syrian policy.

• Underlying this major change is the special and close relationship developed between Bashar al-Assad, an inexperienced leader, and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, in strong contrast to the reserve and distrust harbored by Hafez al-Assad in his attitude toward the organization. Two main developments contributed to the rapprochement between the two parties and shaped current relations between them:

• A shift in the balance of power between Syria and Hezbollah, following the power succession in Syria and Hezbollah’s achievement in bringing about the Israeli pullout from southern Lebanon in May 2000. During the initial stage of Bashar al-Assad’s adjustment to the presidency, Syria found itself at a political disadvantage, whereas concurrently, Hezbollah’s power and prestige were peaking, following its achievements in Lebanon .

• The confluence of interests between Syria and Hezbollah thatresulted from the collapse of peace negotiations in the Syrian route in March 2000; the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000; and the concern about what appeared to be an Israeli attempt to impose new “game rules”, namely attacking Syrian objectives in retaliation for terrorist attacks from southern Lebanon in April and July 2001.

• In the light of the above, Syrian assistance to Hezbollah is extended in the following ways:
  
  • Syria provides Hezbollah with military assistance , complementing the assistance that it receives from Iran . Syria today is more disposed to granting support to the organization than under Hafez al-Assad’s rule. Last year, it supplied Hezbollah with Syrian-made long-range missiles, quite counter to the policy that prevailed during the former regime. From the mid-1980s, following its entanglement in the Hindawi affair² , Syria lowered the profile of its direct involvement in terrorist activity and abstained, among other activities, from granting direct military support to terrorist organizations.
    
  • In addition to the above, Syria is attempting to purchase upgraded anti-aircraft SA-18 missiles from Russia , which may eventually find their way into Hezbollaharsenals. Regarding this, the Israeli press reported that Hezbollah already purchased this type of anti-aircraft missiles, and that Israel tried to persuade Russia to cancel the Syrian transaction. [Israeli Television Channel 10, cited by the daily Maariv, February 28, 2003 ]

• Syria provides political backing to Hezbollah on the local Lebanese scene as well as in the international arena . Syria allows Hezbollah the freedom of operation needed to strengthen its position in Lebanon and pursue its activity in southern Lebanon . The purpose of the latter is to prevent the cessation of unrest along the Israeli-Lebanese border and to uphold a controlled level of tension. Some examples are the “casual” attacks in the Har Dov (hereinafter: “Mount Dov”) area, referred to by Hezbollah as Shabaa Farms; anti-aircraft retaliation attacks in excess of the usual reaction to Israeli Air Force patrols, intended to terrorize the civilian population along the border; and terrorist attacks, sometimes under Palestinian guise, outside the Mount Dov area, e.g., the attack against Kibbutz Metsuba on March 12, 2002. These incidents prevent the Lebanese administration from imposing its sovereignty and enforcing its authority in southern Lebanon , thus thwarting the full implementation of Resolution 425 of the UN Security Council.
  
• At the indoctrination and propaganda level, Syria and the Syrian-controlled Lebanese administration go out of their way to provide Hezbollah with an international “defense umbrella”, presenting Hezbollah to the global public as a legitimate “resistance organization” while denying its image of a terrorist organization.
  

• Appendices:

• Statements of senior members of Hezbollah regarding Syrian support to the organization – see Appendix 7.

• How does President Bashar al-Assad view Hezbollah? See Appendix 8.

Chapter IV: Hezbollah – Terrorist

Organization of Global Reach

The worldwide infrastructure of Hezbollah

Hezbollah’s involvement in international terrorism: An overview

• Since its founding in 1982, Hezbollah conducts, aside from its activity in Lebanon, a global terrorist strategy consisting of setting up operational apparatuses throughout the world (see map) and carrying out terrorist attacks against Israeli and US targets. Hezbollah has been thus active in a variety of arenas, while focusing on South America, Southeast Asia, Jordan, the Persian Gulf, and the European continent.

• During the 1980s, Hezbollah was behind a series of terrorist attacks against Western targets, congruent with the policy dictated by Iran. In the 1990s, following a shift in Iranian policy, Hezbollah lowered the profile of its anti-Western pursuits and focused its attention on terrorist activity against Israeli and Jewish targets, while availing itself of its worldwide apparatus.

• Hezbollah has built up its capacity for carrying out attacks worldwide through its operationalwing, which specializes in global terrorist activity. This wing, the so-called “Islamic Jihad”, operates branches throughout the world and is headed by Imad Mughniyah, Hassan Nasrallah’s military second-in-command.

• Hezbollah makes considerable efforts to promote its image, in particular since the September 11 attacks, in order to blur its identity as a terrorist organization. It publicly denies its involvement in terrorism in general, and the existence of a specific apparatus of global terrorism, in particular.At the same time, it continuesto build up its strategic operational apparatus abroad.This apparatus consists of a network of latent operatives, local safe houses, and storage depots of arms and explosives, spread over a large number of countries worldwide. We believe that this operational infrastructure is meant to carry out spectacular terrorist attacks against Israeli, Jewish, and US targets worldwide, on short notice upon receiving the order from the organization’s leadership or from Iran, and in retaliation for extreme developments in Lebanon or the Palestinian territories.

• Hezbollah has a formidable history of terrorist activity against Western objectives. During the 1980s, it carried out terrorist attacks against US as well as European targets in Lebanon and abroad. These included a series of bombings in France and a number of kidnappings of US and European civilians and French, British, German, and Russian diplomats. The latter activity was intended to exert pressure for the release of Hezbollah operatives held captive in various countries worldwide. Hezbollah is responsible for most of the kidnappings of foreign nationals carried out in Lebanon during the 1980s and until the beginning of the 1990s. During that period, no less than 18 citizens of Western countries were held hostage under harsh conditions, and three of them were killed.

• Hezbollah’s terrorist activity against Western countries includes bombings carried out against US, French, and Arab targets:

• April 18, 1983 – the car bombing of the US embassy in Beirut in which 63 people were killed. The responsibility for this attack was claimed by the Islamic Jihad, which served at the time as a cover name forHezbollah.

• October 23, 1983 – the car bombings against the US Marine compoundand the French unit of the Multinational Force in Beirut, in which 241 US soldiers and 58 French paratroopers were killed. Once again the Islamic Jihad, serving as a cover name for Hezbollah, claimed responsibility.

• September 20, 1984 – the car bombing against the US embassy annex in East Beirut, in which some 30 people were killed.

• Aircraft hijackings – the TWA hijacking of July 14, 1985, an attempt to obtain the release of Shiite detainees in Israel; the hijacking of two Kuwaiti Airlines aircraft in 1984 and 1988, both attempts intended to bring about the release of Shiites held by the Kuwaiti government, including one Hezbollah militia member.

• In the first half of the 1990s, Hezbollah carried out two terrorist attacks in Argentina, evidencing outstanding operational abilities. In May 1999, the Argentinian Supreme Court, upon completion of the official investigation, charged Hezbollah with the bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires on March 17, 1992 and issued a warrant for the arrest of Imad Mughniyah, a terrorist wanted by the United States since the September 11 attacks, for his involvement in terrorist activity during the 1980s.

Hezbollah as “terrorist contractor” on behalf of the Iranian regime:

The Argentinian intelligence report on the AMIA bombing

• In January 2003, SIDE, the Argentinian intelligence service, issued a 150-page report summarizing its findings on the responsibility of Iran and Hezbollah in the bombing of the Jewish community (AMIA) building in Buenos Aires. The attack was carried out in July 1994 and claimed the lives of 86 people. The SIDE report provides the evidential basis for the report issued by Judge Juan Jose Galiano, who was assigned to the case, and for further investigation of the affair. This report, parts of which were leaked to the press, charges Iran (including its leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and its former Intelligence Minister, Ali Fallahian) and Hezbollah with direct responsibility for the bombing.

• The report refers to Imad Mughniyah (a current member of the Decision-Making Shura Council and head of Hezbollah’s military wing) as head of the special operations unit (the so-called “Islamic Jihad”) assigned by Iranian intelligence to carry out the bombing as its “sub-contractor”. The report includes transcripts of recorded phone calls made by officials of the Iranian embassy in Buenos Aires with Hezbollah operatives and others. It also mentions the contacts established by Iran and Hezbollah with Shiite collaborators in the tri-border area (Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay), who assisted in carrying out the bombing.

• In view of the report’s findings, the Argentinian legal authorities requested that warrants of arrest and of extradition be issued in respect of prominent Iranians, including former Intelligence Minister Fallahian, and Hezbollah operatives including the head of its military wing, Imad Mughniyah.

• The AMIA bombing is analyzed in Appendix 5 as an example of Hezbollah’s modus operandi.

Argentina files an official accusation:
Iran is responsible for the Buenos Aires bombings

[Extended version of an article published in Haaretz on March 11, 2003]

Three weeks ago, Miguel Angel Toma, head of the Argentinian intelligence services (SIDE), visited Israel and met with head of the Mossad Meir Dagan and senior Foreign Ministry officials. The purpose of Toma’s four-day visit was to present his Israeli counterparts with a copy of a top-secret report.

The report in question directly implicates Iran, its senior leaders, its intelligence services, and the Hezbollah organization in the July 1994 bombing of the AMIA building, the Center of the Jewish Community in Buenos Aires, in which 85 people were killed and hundreds were wounded. The SIDE report mentions, albeit in passing, that the same pattern of operation and level of command—the Iranian leadership, Iranian intelligence, and Hezbollah—had been behind the bombing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires in March 1992, in which 29 people were killed and dozens injured.

The extensive report, several thousand pages long, includes appendices, transcripts of investigations and phone calls, and border control records. It also mentions names of dozens of Iranian government officials, diplomats, and intelligence officers, as well as Hezbollah operatives and Argentinian and other South American collaborators and auxiliaries involved in initiating, planning, and carrying out the AMIA bombing. The report is based on eight years of intensive investigation conducted with the assistance and participation of the Israeli Mossad, the United States CIA, and other intelligence services.

Dagan and senior Foreign Ministry officials labeled the report “professional, razor-sharp, in-depth, and courageous”. Toma, a senior member of the Peronist party, though a political appointee and only one year in office, has shown the courage to point the accusing finger at those identified as responsible for the murderous attack. The list comprises at least twenty-three names, including Ali Khamenei, Iran’s leader who, by virtue of his post, has been also in charge of its intelligence services, and numerous Iranian intelligence officers and diplomats, including Iran’s then-ambassador to Argentina. It also mentions ImadMughniyah, the alleged “operations officer” of Hezbollah and head of its special operations unit—the so-called “Islamic Jihad”—who is closely connected to Iranian intelligence.

Mughniyah, who was behind the TWA hijacking in Beirut in 1985 and the kidnappings of Western hostages in Lebanon during the 1980s, features on the US list of most wanted terrorists published by the FBI in the wake of the September 11 attacks. He is also considered one of the most sought-after targets of Israeli intelligence, and is reported by foreign sources to have escaped several attempts of the Mossad to eliminate him. The most notorious incident occurred in the south of Beirut in 1994, when a car bomb exploded at the entrance to his brother’s garage. Since then, Mughniyah has been on the run, hiding in the Sudan, Damascus, and Iran.

Although the report in fact reiterates Israeli intelligence allegations that both bombings were the work of Iranian intelligence assisted by Hezbollah, this is the first time that a non-Israeli and non-Jewish authority asserts in such unequivocal terms that Iranian leaders and intelligence officers initiated and perpetrated terrorist attacks.

The report contains records of border control registrations, evidencing that Iranian diplomats and government officials entered and left Argentina under aliases close to the time of the AMIA bombing. It also contains transcripts of recordings of phone calls made by the Iranian embassies in Argentina and neighboring countries to alleged operatives of Hezbollah. In addition, it uncovers links between Iran, Hezbollah, and collaborators residing in the region of Ciudad del Este in the tri-border area of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, a region known to house a large concentration of Shiite Muslim immigrants.

The report also refers to the secret testimony given by AbdolghassemMesbahi, a senior Iranian intelligence officer who defected to Germany in 1996. According to this testimony—a 100-page document, parts of which were published by the New York Times—the decision for both bombings was made by none other than Iranian leader Ali Khamenei and then-President Hashemi Rafsanjani – both of whom also supervised and financed the operation.

Both defector Mesbahi’s testimony and the SIDE report mention that the preparations for the bombings took a long time and necessitated meticulous planning in order to avoid leaving any fingerprints and risk the uncovering of the perpetrators. After the Iranian leaders endorsed the decision and allocated the required funding, Intelligence MinisterAli Fallahian was appointed to be in charge of the operation. Iranian intelligence approached Hezbollah to act as its sub-contractor in carrying out the bombings. The operational responsibility was assigned to Imad Mughniyah, assisted by intelligence officers who had been posted at the Iranian embassies in the region and the local network of collaborators and supporters.

According to the SIDE report, the bombings were inspired by ideological- religious motives of hostility toward Israel and the Jewish people, and also by political motives. The essence of the latter was to “punish” the Carlos Menem regime for violating a commitment given by his predecessor President Raul Alfonsín to supply Iran with know-how and equipment needed for setting up the nuclear reactors in Bushehr, including the installing of a heavy water pool. The choice of Argentina as target was facilitated by the presence of a sizeable Jewish community, and the fact that the tri-border area is home to a pro-Iranian and Hezbollah-supporting community, from which collaborators could have easily been recruited. The proximity of the timings to incidents occurring in the Middle East indicates that both bombings also coincided with vengeful feelings on the part of Hezbollah. The pretext for the bombing of the embassy was the killing of Hezbollah Secretary General Abbas Musawi by Israeli combat helicopters in southern Lebanon. The bombing of the AMIA building occurred shortly after the abduction to Israel of Mustafa Dirani, a senior Shiite officer with close links to Iran and Hezbollah, who captured and detained the Israeli air force navigator Ron Arad.

Based on the SIDE report and an independent inquiry, a few days ago Argentinian Investigating Judge Juan José Galiano issued international arrest warrants in respect of four Iranian officials: former Intelligence Minister Ali Fallahian, already sought by German authorities in connection with the murder of dissident Iranians; Ali Balesh Abadi, a courier for Iranian intelligence; Mohsen Rabbani, an Iranian intelligence envoy posted under the cover of “cultural attaché” at the Iranian embassy in Buenos Aires, and designated in the report as the “operations officer” of the bombing; and Ali Akbar Parvaresh, former Education Minister and Deputy Speaker of the Iranian Parliament. The latter three visited Argentina a short time before and at the time of the bombing, and left the country immediately afterwards.

Judge Galiano’s report quotes the SIDE report in stating that the bombing was carried out by “armed units” of Hezbollah. It does not, however, demand the arrest of any of Hezbollah’s operatives. Judge Galiano is also hesitant to directly implicate the Iranian leadership, and chooses to refer, in the explanatory notes accompanying his request to issue arrest warrants, to “radical circles” in Iran. These formulations exacerbate the suspicion that Judge Galiano arouses among Jews in Argentina. The Jewish community has already accused him and the country’s legal system of conducting an indecisive policy of cover-ups and disinformation, following the disappearance of important documents pertaining to the investigation and incidents where vital witnesses failed to appear before the court.

The general mood was also affected by allegations made by the Iranian defector Mesbahi and published by the New York Times. According to these allegations, former President Carlos Menem received $10 million in bribery from a secret bank account in Switzerland controlled by Khamenei and the son of former supreme leader Ayatollah Khomeini, in order to smother the investigation. Menem, who is running again for the forthcoming presidential elections, denied the allegations, threatened to file a libel suit against the newspaper, and is now hoping to see his reputation cleared by the inquiry conducted at present in Switzerland.

The relatives of the victims claim that, even though the SIDE report is an important document, it has shifted attention away from the Argentinian scene towards the international arena: it turns the focus away from the collaborators, among whom are police officers who may have known about the impending bombing and did nothing to impede it. During the past few months, a lawsuit is being brought against twenty people suspected of collaboration, mainly in connection with the purchase of the bomb car. Most of these suspects are criminals and some of them are former police officers. In spite of the above, the Israeli Foreign Ministry already communicated its appreciation to the Argentinian government for its courageous stance. The Iranian government, on its part, denies the allegations against it. It also warned, in a strongly worded conversation with the Argentinian chargé d’affaires at the embassy in Tehran, that pursuing what it defines as a “smear campaign” will lead to the deterioration of relations between the two countries.

Hezbollah’s involvement in additional terrorist activities overseas

• Aside from the bombings in Argentina, Hezbollah has been involved in additional overseas terrorist activity during the 1990s: in June 1996, a bombing was perpetrated against a US military base in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, by the Saudi Hezbollah (according to the FBI report issued in June 2001, on which the indictments were based). The attack was presumably coordinated with and assisted by Hezbollah (Saudi Hezbollah operatives were trained in Lebanon). Hezbollah also carried out the kidnapping of Elhanan Tannenbaum in October 2000, the Israeli abducted in Brussels and subsequently transferred to Lebanon to serve as a “bargaining chip”.

• Despite Hezbollah’s reluctance in recent years to carry out terrorist activity outside Lebanon, it maintains its readiness to carry out such attacks, once a decision is made, and builds up its operational capability to this effect. Hezbollah’s operational-terrorist capability constitutes a potential weapon in the hands of the Iranian and Syrian regimes, which they can utilize in the future in line with “strategic considerations” (e.g., in response to a US or an Israeli offensive against Hezbollah’s terrorist apparatus in Lebanon, or against Iran, as one of the three states comprising the “axis of evil”).

Europe as an operational platform for terrorist attacks in
Israel and the Palestinian territories

• In recent years, and in particular since the pullout of the Israeli army from Lebanon, Hezbollah has clearly focused its activity on targets in Israel and the Palestinian territories. It has even harnessed its overseas operational apparatus for this purpose, and dispatched operatives via Europe to carry out operational missions on Israeli territory. These missions include gathering operational intelligence, dealing with explosives and arms, and even attempting to carry out terrorist attacks.

Chart showing the process of using Europe as base for terrorist missions in Israel and the Palestinian territories

• The following are a few episodes uncovered in Israel, evidencing the way in which Hezbollah exploits the European continent as an operational platform for preparing and launching terrorist attacks on Israeli territory:

• The Hussein Mikdad episode (1996): Hussein Mikdad, a Shiite Lebanese citizen and Hezbollah operative, was sent from Lebanon to Israel presumably in order to carry out a “high-quality terrorist attack” on Israeli territory. Mikdad flew from Syria to Austria and traveled by train to Switzerland. He stayed a few days in Hotel Regina in Zurich together with his handler, who prepared him for his entry into Israel. Mikdad entered Israel via Ben-Gurion Airport, using a forged British passport. He spent several days in Tel Aviv and subsequently in Jerusalem, and was seriously injured while assembling an explosive charge in his hotel room at the Lawrence Hotel in East Jerusalem.

• The Smirak episode (1997): Stefan Smirak, a young German who converted to Islam in 1994, made up his mind to become a shahid, or martyr, by committing a suicide attack in Israel. To achieve this end, in August 1997 Smirak approached a Hezbollah operative in Germany, who referred him to the Hezbollah headquarters of overseas terrorist activity in Lebanon. In November 1997, Smirak boarded a flight from Amsterdam bound for Tel Aviv. Upon his arrival in Israel, he was supposed to collect an explosive charge in order to carry out a suicide bombing.

• The Fawzi Ayub episode (2000):Fawzi Ayub is a Lebanese Shiite of Canadian nationality, and an operative of Hezbollah’s apparatus of overseas terrorist activity. Ayub left Lebanon for Europe in October 2000, on his Canadian passport. Upon his arrival in Europe, he left his passport behind and purchased new personal belongings to conceal his Lebanese origin. He met with a Hezbollah operative, who supplied him with a forged US passport for his entry into Israel. Ayub stayed in Jerusalem, attempted to approach arms brokers, and was arrested in Hebron by the Palestinian police. In June 2002, following an Israeli military operation in Hebron, Ayub was apprehended by the Israeli security forces. The purpose of his stay in Israel was thus far not uncovered. It is assumed that he intended either to carry out a spectacular bombing, or gather operational intelligence on “high-quality” targets in Israel. Another likely purpose was his infiltration in order to set up an apparatus for future terrorist activity in Israel and the Palestinian territories.

• The Jihad Shuman episode (2001): Jihad Shuman, a Lebanese Shiite and Hezbollah operative of British nationality, entered Israel in January 2001. Shuman flew from Lebanon to the United Kingdom on his Lebanese passport, which he was instructed to leave in a hiding place for its collection by another Hezbollah operative. Shuman availed himself of theHezbollahapparatus in the United Kingdom, and flew to Israel on his authentic British passport. He stayed in Jerusalem, presumably, among other purposes, on a mission of operational intelligence for a terrorist attack in Israel.
  

Germany

• In January 1987,Muhammad Hamade, brother of senior Hezbollah operative Abdel Hadi Hamade, was arrested in Germany while attempting to smuggle containers of liquid explosives camouflaged in three large bottles of arrack. During his interrogation, Hamade revealed the existence of several storage depots of arms near the French-German border. Following his arrest, Hezbollah carried out several terrorist attacks against German targets, including the kidnapping of two German nationals in Lebanon.

• Some two years later, in March 1989, the German authorities arrested Bassam Garib Makki, a Hezbollah operative and student in Germany. Makki was found to have in his possession documents containing operational intelligence on Israeli, Jewish, and US targets in Germany that had been targeted for terrorist attacks. He also held operational intelligence on other (British, French, Iraqi, Saudi, and Kuwaiti) objectives, designated as potential targets. The search carried out in his flat in Darmstadt revealed items associated with terrorist activity, such as instructions in Arabic for the preparation and use of explosive charges.

• In the bombing of the Mykonos restaurant in Berlin in September 1992, four senior members of the Iranian Kurdish Democratic Party were killed and others were injured. The attack was initiated by the Iranian Intelligence Ministry, one of whose officials presumably recruited two operatives of the Hezbollah cell in Germany with whom he was acquainted, and who assisted in carrying out the bombing.

Spain

• In November 1989, a Hezbollah cell, comprised of Hezbollah operatives and local collaborators, was uncovered in the Spanish town of Valencia. The uncovering occurred after a large cache of arms—including explosives and detonators—was found on board a ship that had arrived from Lebanon via Cyprus. The members of the cell were arrested, and additional arms were found in their homes. During their interrogation, they admitted their intention to use these arms in order to carry out terrorist attacks against Israeli and US targets in Europe.

France

• In March 1987, French authorities arrested the members of a terrorist network headed by Paris-born Fouad Saleh, who had received military training in Iran in 1981-1982. The arrest led to the uncovering of a widespread operational apparatus that had been responsible for 13 terrorist attacks in France, most of them in the Paris Metro, in all of which Hezbollah operatives were involved.

• In 1989, Hezbollah devised a scheme of carrying out suicide attacks using small aircraft crashing onto French ships. Iran trained a number of Hezbollah operatives to fly small, single-engine aircraft for this purpose.

United Kingdom

• Mustafa Maza, a Hezbollah operative, was killed in August 1989 in a London hotel, when the luggage in his possession exploded.

Cyprus

• In 1986, Cypriot security forces arrested two Hezbollah operatives in Larnaca, after they were found in possession of weapons and explosives.

• In 1997, a Hezbollah unit collected operational intelligence on the US Embassy in Nicosia.

Russia

• In September 1985, Hezbollahkidnappedfour Soviet diplomats in Lebanon. The kidnappers demanded that the Soviet Union exert pressure on Syria to stop the military activities of pro-Syrian organizations against an Islamic movement in Tripoli. The Soviet diplomats were set free following PLO leader Yasser Arafat’s intervention.

• Between 1995 and 1999, Hezbollah recruited Palestinian students in Russia for the purpose of setting up an operational apparatus for terrorist activity. The students collected operational intelligence on Israeli and Jewish institutions in Russia, focusing mainly on the Israeli embassy in Moscow. They were also instructed to gather intelligence on US institutions in Moscow.

Italy

• In November 1984, a Hezbollah operative was arrested upon his arrival from Lebanon to Switzerland, after he had been found in possession of arms. His arrest led to the uncovering of an operational network comprised of Lebanese students, who had planned an attack against the US embassy in Rome.

Kidnappings of Israeli citizens in European countries

• During the 1980s, Hezbollah “specialized” in kidnapping citizens of Western countries. Nowadays it is trying its hand at kidnapping Israeli nationals in European countries, and transferring them to Lebanon in order to create a “stock” of “bargaining chips”.
  

• Hezbollah uses the European continent as a setting for its operatives to contact Israelis, as part of its newly devised enticement scheme. Examples so far:

• In October 2000, Elhanan Tannenbaum, a reserve colonel in the Israeli army, was abducted and transferred to Lebanon. Hezbollah carried out the kidnapping with the intention of obtaining a “bargaining chip” for future negotiation of prisoner exchanges with Israel. Tannenbaum had traveled from Israel to Brussels to attend a meeting in Europe. He was flown from Brussels to Lebanon, possibly via one of the Gulf States.

• Hezbollah planned—but failed to execute—a similar abduction of former Israeli Energy Minister Gonen Segev to Lebanon.

Uncovering a Palestinian recruited by Hezbollah to carry out terrorist activities in Europe and Asia

• Israeli security forces recently arrested Ghulam Mahmud Qawqa, a Palestinian operative of the Fatah’s al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades who was also employed by Hezbollah from Lebanon. Aside from his terrorist intentions inside Israel, such as the bombing of nightclubs and hotels in Jerusalem, Qawqa also engineered terrorist attacks against Israeli targets in Europe. At the end of 2002, Qawqa planned the killing of Israeli ambassador to Germany Shimon Stein. He instructed a Lebanese woman residing in Germany and with whom he was in contact, to take pictures of the Israeli embassy from four different angles.

• Qawqa attempted a similar operation in Asia. A Jordanian who worked in China and with whom Qawqa was acquainted, offered to provide him with a flight ticket to China. Qawqa’s idea was to fly to Jordan and from there to China, where he intended to kill the Israeli ambassador to China Yitzhak Shelef. Qawqa approached a Hezbollah operative and started things rolling, but his scheme was cut short by his arrest.

Hezbollah’s activity in Jordan

• As part of its endeavors to support Palestinian violent activity, Hezbollah engages in the smuggling of “high-quality” military hardware into the Palestinian territories and Israel via Jordan. At the end of June 2001, Jordanian security forces arrested three members of Hezbollah’s operational unit specializing in overseas terrorist activity. The operatives were caught transporting 25 rockets of 107 mm caliber, which had been transferred from Lebanon via Syria to Jordan and were obviously intended to reach the Palestinian territories. The three men were released from Jordanian prison in May 2002 and returned to Lebanon.

Hezbollah’s activity in Southeast Asia

Singapore

• In 1995, Hezbollah set up a terrorist cell in Singapore with the intention of attacking US and Israeli targets on the island. Hezbollah operatives, who had traveled from Lebanon to Singapore, recruited five Muslims among the local population to operate the cell. The cell’s mission was to launch explosive boats against US and Israeli ships passing through or anchoring in the Singapore Straits, based on relevant operational intelligence. The operatives also took pictures of the US and Israeli embassies in Singapore.

The Philippines and Malaysia

• Pandu Yudhawinata, an Indonesian Hezbollah operative, was arrested in 1999 at the Manila city airport in the Philippines. During his interrogation, he revealed Hezbollah’s intentions to recruit Malaysians and Indonesians in order to carry out terrorist attacks in Australia and in Israel.

• Tri-lateral cooperation between the United States, Israel, and the Philippines led to the arrest of a senior Hezbollah operative based in Malaysia, who had planned to carry out terrorist attacks in Southeast Asia.

Hezbollah’s activity in the United States

• Hezbollah activity has even reached the United States, the country that defined it as a dangerous terrorist organization, and which suffered hundreds of casualties in its murderous bombings in Lebanon. In July 2000, 23 people suspected of supporting Hezbollah were arrested in North Carolina. They were accused, among other things, of providing assistance to terrorist organizations and of money-laundering activities. Like Hamas and other Middle Eastern terrorist organizations, Hezbollah conducts fundraising activities in the United States (see below).

• South America is home to numerous Shiite Lebanese communities with connections in Lebanon. Hezbollah’s core activity in the region is in the tri-border area of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay. This area constitutes a fertile environment for terrorism-sponsoring activity. In addition, Hezbollah operates cells in Colombia, Venezuela, and other countries. Hezbollah’s operational apparatus was instrumental in carrying out the organization’s two strategic attacks in Argentina: the bombings of the Israeli Embassy in 1992 and of the Jewish community building in Buenos Aires in 1994.
  

• In addition to its operational-terrorist endeavors, Hezbollah conducts a variety of activities in South America :

• Hezbollah-operated training camps in the rain forest : at least one of these camps serves as a training ground for youngsters in the use of military hardware, combined with radical indoctrination including anti-US and anti-Semitic messages.
• Raising funds for the financing of terrorist activity : Hezbollah generates revenues through legal businesses, but also—and more commonly—through criminal pursuits, ranging from drugsmuggling to CD counterfeiting. Hezbollah engages in large-scale smuggling of cigarettes and drugs in the tri-border area. Hezbollah operatives in this area have been asked by their Lebanese counterparts to provide them with equipment such as computers, night vision devices, mine detectors, GPS satellite navigation devices, and aviation equipment. According to various estimates, Hezbollah revenues in South America amount to hundreds of thousands of US dollars yearly, totaling tens of millions of US dollars so far.
  

• Hezbollah uses its apparatuses throughout the world not only to strengthen its operational capabilities for launching terrorist attacks, but also as a means of purchasing the advanced arms and equipment needed for the organization’s operational activities. To transact these purchases, Hezbollah uses its operatives who reside outside Lebanon (either permanently or temporarily), “innocent” businesspeople (including Lebanese), and companies founded by the organization (some of which are front companies). The equipment purchases comprise computers of various types, night vision equipment, satellite navigation equipment (GPS), mine detectors, and aviation-related software. This equipment is used on a regular basis by Hezbollah to conduct its operational activity in Lebanon.

• Hezbollah’s procurement system is active in the United States as well, availing itself of the advanced technology on this market. In the beginning of 2001, US authorities issued warrants for the arrest of several Hezbollah operatives—including Ali Amhaz and Mohammad Dbouk—involved in supplying arms and combat support equipment to Lebanon. Ali Amhaz was even arrested in Canada at the end of 2001, and charged for his role in providing arms and equipment to the organization. In 2000, some seventeen people were convicted of trading in counterfeit consumer goods, money laundering, and supplying equipment to Lebanon, such as night vision equipment and satellite navigation devices. One of these, Ahmed Hammoud, is suspected to have undergone military training in Lebanon.

• It seems that the organization is keen on keeping itself on the cutting edge of the most advanced technological means available on the free market, in order to support its operational-terrorist apparatus. Hezbollah purchases these means on a regular commercial basis, and delivers them to its apparatus in Lebanon, to complete the ongoing supplies of Iranian equipment

• Hezbollah raises funds in Lebanon and among Lebanese Shiite communities throughout the world as an “add-on” to the massive financial support that it receives from Iran. We estimate the total annual amount raised by Hezbollah at several millions of US dollars, half of which originate from sources outside Lebanon. Besides operating a worldwide network of fundraisers, funds are also raised through so-called “charity funds”. Some of these are extremist Islamic institutions that, while not directly connected to Hezbollah, support it, albeit marginally, in view of their radical Islamic orientation.

• The Hezbollah fundraising network stretches over the American, African, Asian, and European continents. This network, most of which is supervised by the organization’s Foreign Relations desk, is closely linked to Hezbollah’scivilian apparatus in Lebanon. The following is a description of Hezbollah’s fundraising activity broken down by continents and countries:

North America

• Hezbollah employs several dozen operatives in North America whose fundraising activity accounts for tens of thousands of US dollars annually.

The United States

• Hezbollah’s fundraising in the United States focuses mainly on areas housing sizeable Shiite communities, such as New York, Detroit, Boston, and Los Angeles. While US authorities define Hezbollah, including its civilian wing, as a terrorist organization, we know of no concrete measures taken against charity funds associated with Hezbollah and operating in the United States.

• Among the centers mentioned above, Detroit, home to a large Shiite community of southern Lebanese origin, stands out as the main center of Hezbollah’s fundraising activity in the United States. Compared with other centers, fundraising in Detroit is carried out by a fairly well organized mechanism. Three charity funds operate in the Detroit area. Additional fundraising is carried out through the Islamic Resistance Support Association. Al-Shahid Fund [the “Martyr’s Fund”] appears to be the major fundraising institution in Detroit, probably Hezbollah’s main fund in the United States. It is closely linked to Hezbollah’s Foreign Relations desk, and is also related (to an extent which is yet unclear) with the al-Shahid Association in Lebanon. Two additional funds operate in Detroit: the Educational Development Association (EDA) and the Goodwill Charitable Organization (GCO).

• The Islamic Resistance Support Association raises funds in the Detroit area by means of “alms boxes” placed in restaurants in the local Shiite community. Until recent years, donors were also openly referred to bank account numbers used by the “Support Association”. Since the September 11 attacks, however, this practice is no longer in use. It is still possible, though, to donate money directly to the bank accounts used by the Islamic Resistance Support Association.
  

• Hezbollah’s main fundraisers in the United States are:
  • Ahmed Ali Ghassan, aka “Abu Bakr”, born 1965, resident of Middletown, New Jersey
  • Sheikh Abdallah Bazi, Shiite, born in Lebanon in 1961. A radical sheikh of a mosque in Dearborn, Detroit, he has resided in the United States since 1990.

Canada

• Hezbollah fundraising in Canada is carried out in the cities of Montreal and Ottawa and the towns of Hamilton and Windsor (both in the Toronto area). The fundraising center is located near Toronto, possibly because of this city’s proximity to the US border and the large Shiite community living in this area.

• One of Hezbollah’soperation channels in Canada is the al-ShahidAssociation, a branch of the Lebanese al-ShahidAssociation. The latter institution provides financial support to families of Hezbollah members killed in terrorist attacks (including suicide bombers), carried out by these members.
  

South America

• Hezbollah fundraising in South America is carried out in two main centers: the tri-border area and Venezuela. Of these two centers, the tri-border area is the main center for two reasons: the sizeable local Shiite community, estimated at tens of thousands of members, and the relative ease of carrying out fundraising on behalf of Hezbollah, with little interference on the part of the local law enforcement authorities.

• The tri-border area is the region surrounding the meeting point of the Brazilian, Argentinian, and Paraguayan borders. Three towns are located in this area: Ciudad del Este, Paraguay; Puerto Iguazu, Argentina; and Foz do Iguaçu, Brazil. These towns serve as centers for Hezbollah’sfundraising activity in South America. Among those involved in this activity is the Barakat clan, a prominent Shiite family whose members are spread throughout the tri-border area and who raise funds for Hezbollah’scivilian projects. As’ad Ahmad Barakat, one of the clan chiefs, is currently detained in Brazil because of his involvement in fundraising on behalf of Hezbollah. Barakat had already been arrested by the Paraguayan police in December 2001 on the same charge, but was released shortly afterwards and escaped to Brazil.

Africa

• African countries, in particular the Ivory Coast, play an important role in Hezbollah’s fundraising activities. Shiite communities have lived in these countries for many years, and some of them identify ideologically with Hezbollah. Hezbollah’s activities also benefit from the relatively slack enforcement of the law by the local authorities. According to our estimates, funds raised in Africa amount to hundreds of thousands of US dollars yearly. The main fundraising countries are:
  
• The Ivory Coast – Hezbollah’s foremost fundraising countryin Africa and one of the organization’s main fundraising centers worldwide.
  
• South Africa – fundraising for Hezbollah in this country is carried out on a small scale, probably reaching the amount of tens of thousands of US dollars yearly. The following Hezbollah-related organizationsoperate in South Africa:

• PAGAD (People Against Gangsterism and Drugs) – a Muslim organization founded in 1995 following a dramatic rise in crime and the authorities’ inability to cope with it. PAGAD, which started as a communal militia for self-defense, soon became a militant opposition organization involved in terrorist activities against Jewish and American interests and the South African administration. PAGADappears on the American list of terrorist organizations. We have no evidence of any fundraising activity by this organization on behalf of Hezbollah, even though it seems highly likely. For in an interview granted to the press in 1996, a senior member of PAGAD admitted the link between this organization and Hezbollah.

• Karballah Foundation for Liberation – an organization founded in 2002 by Shiite residents of Johannesburg, with the purpose of raising funds on behalf of the Palestinians. Part of the funds are possibly meant for Hezbollah, or funneled through Hezbollah to the Palestinians.

• Democratic Republic of the Congo (Zaire) – The core of the Lebanese-Shiite community’s activity in this country is a mosque in the capital, Kinshasa. The mosque is financed by the Iranian embassy and as of the end of 1996, was headed by Sheikh Hassan Salah Mahdi. We believe that, due to the lack of any other central institution of the community, the mosque constitutes a kind of umbrella framework for fundraising activity on behalf of Hezbollah.

• Senegal – about 30,000 Lebanese immigrants live in Senegal, the majority of which in the capital, Dakar. It also serves as a secondary center for Hezbollah’sfundraising activity in Africa. We have no estimate as to the extent in which the Lebanese community in Senegal is linked to Hezbollah. Still, one cannot ignore the abortiveattempt in 1998 to smuggle approximately $1.7 million from Senegal to Lebanon. When this affair was uncovered, the local Lebanese community admitted that senior members of the community had been behind the attempt, but denied any connection with Hezbollah and claimed that the smuggling was intended to circumvent Senegalese law.

Europe

• Germany is Hezbollah’s main arena for fundraising activity in Europe. We estimate the amount of funds raised in this country at tens of thousands of US dollars annually. These funds are mainly destined to finance Hezbollah’s social welfare work, but we do not rule out that part of the donations make their way to other channels as well.

• In 2002, Germany closed the Al-Aqsa Fund which was engaged in fundraising for Hezbollah. It is rather difficult to evaluate, for the time being, the impact of this measure on the scope of Hezbollah fundraising in Germany. To the best of our knowledge, however, Germany’s measures were not aimed at challenging the activities of some of the more conspicuous Hezbollah institutions in Germany:
  
  • The Fatima Mosque – This mosque, located in the town of Münster, was established in 1994 with Iranian financing.
    
  • The Lebanese Islamic Association – This association made headlines in June 2002 following loud protests by the local (non-Muslim) residents sparked by the association’s plans to establish an Islamic center in Berlin. The center was intended to house a religious school, a kindergarten, and a youth club. The German authorities suspected that it was also meant to serve the additional objective of facilitating fundraising on behalf of Hezbollah. We assume that the protest thwarted the plans to establish the center. It is not known whether the association is planning to set up an Islamic center elsewhere.
  
  
  • The Al-Aqsa Fund which was closed – a fund owned by the Hamas movement, which in the past conducted several fundraising campaigns also on behalf of Hezbollah. The manager of the Netherlands branch of the al-Aqsa Fund mentioned some time ago that the branch conducts fundraising activity on behalf of Hezbollah in coordination with the main office in Germany. The German al-Aqsa fund was outlawed in 2002 because of its links with Hamas; yet, its branch in the Netherlands is still active. We know of no link between Hezbollah and the fund that presumably succeeded the al- Aqsa Fund.

United Kingdom

• Hezbollah’sfundraising activity in this country is conducted on a small scale. According to our estimates, fundraising does not exceed a few tens of thousands of US dollars yearly, despite the fact that some key figures of the Lebanese community in the UK are involved in fundraising institutions. The following are some of the institutions active in fundraising on behalf of Hezbollah:

• LWC – the Lebanese Welfare Committee – this is presumably Hezbollah’s political wing in the UK. As such, it is also active in fundraising, and is also involved in propaganda, albeit on a small scale.
• The Help Foundation – established in 1987 for the purpose of raising funds for Lebanon, and is suspected of raising funds for Hezbollah.
• Ahmed al-Saifi – a Lebanese who operates an Islamic center in London, through which funds are raised for Hezbollah among the Muslim communities in the UK. The funds are transferred to Beirut by means of checksdrawn to the order of Jam’iyat al-Abrar [“the Association of the Righteous”], a Lebanese charity fund which supports the Palestinians.

• Belgium – Hezbollah’s activities in Belgium seem to focus mainly on indoctrination and propaganda; fundraising plays only a marginal role.

• Switzerland – Imad al-Musawi, a member of Hezbollah’s political bureau, has admitted to donations made in support of the organization by the Lebanese community in Switzerland. The manner in which these funds are raised has not been disclosed.

• Italy – Italy seems to be a marginal source for fundraising on behalf of Hezbollah. The manner in which the funds are raised is not clear, but Hezbollah is known to be involved in the Lebanese community in Italy. In 2002, the city of Como hosted a convention intended to strengthen the bond between the Lebanese community in Italy and its homeland Lebanon. A Hezbollah delegate, a member in the Lebanese parliament, was the guest of honor at the convention and he also delivered a speech.

• The Netherlands – this country occupies a very marginal position as far as fundraising for Hezbollah is concerned. As mentioned earlier, the manager of the Netherlands branch of the al-Aqsa Fund admitted to raising funds on behalf of Hezbollah in cooperation with the German fund. The scope of fundraising is unknown, but since the al-Aqsa Fund raises funds mainly for Hamas, the sums destined for Hezbollah are bound to be small.

Asia

• Arab countries – no designated fund or other fundraising institution affiliated with Hezbollah is known to operate in any Arab country. It is, however, known in general that Hezbollah raises funds in Arab countries.

• Turkey – an article published in 1998 reported the uncovering of a network of seven charity funds active in fundraising in Turkey on behalf of Hezbollah. We know of no fundraising activity in Turkey in support of Hezbollah ever since.

• Thailand – no fundraising activity in Thailand on behalf of Hezbollah seems to take place. There is, however, a non-governmental organization giving financial support on a monthly basis to some of Hezbollah’s operatives in Thailand. This organization’s name (loosely translated) is the International School for Religious Studies Abroad. It is run by Hussein Ali Pour, an Iranian active in Bangkok, among other places.

Appendices:

• Major terrorist attacks carried out by Hezbollah’s overseas terrorist apparatus – see Appendix 4.

• The bombing of the Jewish Community building in Argentina (1994), an example of Hezbollah’smodus operandi abroad – see Appendix 5.

• Hassan Nasrallah’s statements regarding Hezbollah’s overseasactivities – see Appendix 6.

Chapter V: Duplicating the Lebanese Model

in the Palestinian Territories – Hezbollah’s

Support for Palestinian Terrorism

• In the context of the policy dictated by Syria and Iran, and consistent with its own goal of annihilating the state of Israel, Hezbollah endeavors by various means to assist the Palestinian terrorist organizations and improve their capabilities in pursuing their armed struggle against Israel. The violent struggle conducted by these organizations since September 2000 has opened a new channel of activity for Hezbollah. It has motivated Hezbollah to support Palestinian violence in order to undermine and shatter the foundations of Israel from within thus accelerating the process of its elimination.
  

• The means of wearing down Israel consists of “exporting” the methods that Hezbollah used in its war against Israel in Lebanon. It means waging an asymmetric war of attrition, an unremitting struggle aimed against the civilian home front, in order to undermine the sense of security of the Israeli population and accelerate its demoralization and disintegration.

• In this context, Hezbollah uses four main channels of assistance to the Palestinian violent struggle:
  
  • The military channel: Hezbollah’s military support includes supplying arms, smuggling them into the Palestinian territories, training Palestinian militias, setting up terrorist apparatuses in the Palestinian territories, sending terrorists to the Palestinian territories, and recruiting Israeli Arabs to carry out terrorist attacks and gather intelligence.
    
  • The channel of cross-border operations: Hezbollah carries out terrorist attacks from the Lebanese-Israeli border, using various tactics, as a means of supporting the Palestinian struggle. When Israel exerted military pressure on the Palestinians during Operation Defensive Shield, Hezbollah boosted its activity, launching a Palestinian terrorist attack against a civilian target, Kibbutz Metsuba.
    
  • Thefinancial channel: Hezbollah transfers funds to terrorist organizations active in the Palestinian territories, mainly those identified with Fatah.
    
  • The indoctrination and propaganda channel: Hezbollah enlists its media channels—in particular al-Manar Television—to the Palestinian violent struggle, broadcasting messages focusing on the need to pursue violence and resist peace negotiations and the relief of tension.
    
• Senior members of Hezbollah often boast of their support of the Palestinians:

• Muhammad Raad, chair of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese parliament: “We do not deny that we support the Intifada, stand by it, and assist it on the political, informational [media] and operative levels.” [Interview granted on March 3, 2002 to al-Siyasa, an Egyptian quarterly focusing on international relations]

• Hezbollah’s Deputy Secretary-General Sheikh Naim Qassem: “We are eager to assist our Palestinian brothers…This assistance takes on many forms, including military support.” (NTV, April 21, 2002) “We support the Intifada in various ways, such as carrying out operations in Shabaa Farms, financial aid, donations, military support, transferring arms, and training.” (NTV, May 25, 2002)
  

• Abdallah Qusseir, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese parliament: “We believe in providing all forms of support…All fear the most dangerous form of support and are afraid to talk about it. I refer to the military support. We publicly state that we provide military support to the Intifada, to the best of our ability…All roads are open before us; none is forbidden.” [LBC Television, April 4, 2002]

Recruiting and operating Israeli Arabs and Palestinians

• Since the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, and in particular once violence has started in the Palestinian territories, Hezbollah is focusing its efforts on recruiting Israeli Arabs and Palestinians, viewing them as major potential for setting up terrorist apparatuses. Hezbollah draws onexisting terrorist groups (usually identified with Fatah), operating them from Lebanon in order to carry out terrorist attacks, while supporting and financing them. An additional resource is recruiting collaborators in order to set up an apparatus for gathering intelligence information.

• Hezbollah trains and sponsors these terrorist apparatuses located ‘inside’ by giving the operatives military instruction in camps in Lebanon, and transferring arms from Lebanon through various smuggling channels. In addition, Hezbollah attempts to infiltrate terrorists into Israel for the purpose of performing spectacular attacks on Israeli territory. One of these is Hussein Mikdad, a Lebanese Shiite who entered Israel, gathered intelligence information on prime targets, and accidentally blew himself up while preparing an explosive charge in his room at the Lawrence Hotel in East Jerusalem in 1996.

• Hezbollah is trying hard to set up its own network of collaborators on Israeli soil, which may eventually be used for terrorist activities. It recruits Israeli citizens, both Arabs and Jews, to carry out missions such as smuggling arms into Israel, passing on intelligence information to Lebanon, and even carrying out terrorist activities. The following are some examples:

• Hezbollah recruited several Arabs and Druse residents of villages in the north of Israel (the Galilee and the Golan Heights), in order to smuggle arms from Lebanon to Israel, including Claymore mines, mortars, small arms, and explosives. Part of the arms were captured when the smuggling was uncovered in October 2001.

• In 2002, the Israeli security forces arrested Nissim Nasser, an Israeli citizen of Lebanese origin, on charges of assisting Hezbollah. He was reported to have Israeli relatives serving in the Israeli army, some of whom high-ranking officers, which may have been the incentive for his recruitment. At the end of 2000, a Hezbollah cell was uncovered in the Galilee. The cell consisted of Israeli Arabs from the village of Abu-Snan, and was operated through a collaborator in Lebanon, a relative of the recruited Arabs. The cell had planned to kidnap an Israeli soldier and even to plant bombs in public places.

• Additional episodes illustratingHezbollah’s recruiting efforts among Israeli Arabs and Palestinians:

• In October 2001, Israeli security forces arrested a Palestinian from the Samaria region, the father of thirteen children. He had been recruited by Hezbollah operatives while in Saudi Arabia to perform the Hajj, or pilgrimage to Mecca required by Islam. He revealed to his interrogators that his handlers had instructed him to gather intelligence information on Israeli settlements in Samaria and to consider purchasing arms. The Hezbollah operatives had also tried to assign him to recruit additional operatives (including one of his sons), and had planned to use him as mediator to make contacts with Israeli Arabs.

• In the second half of 2002, Hezbollah assigned several groups of criminals from among the Israeli Arab population in the north of Israel to carry out missions, consisting mainly of gathering operational intelligence. In order to transmit the intelligence data, Hezbollah availed itself of channels used for drug smuggling into Israeli territory. In July 2002,a gang of drug dealers from Nazarethand the Israeli part of the village of Ghajar (see below) was arrested. They were suspected of smuggling into Lebanon computer software, maps, equipment, various documents, and classified material in return for drugs and arms. The smuggling was carried out by residents of Ghajar, avillage divided between Israel and Lebanon (following the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon), whose residents can easily access both countries.

• In September 2002, ten Israeli citizens of the Galilee region were arrested under suspicion of handing over sensitive information to Hezbollah in Lebanon in return for drugs and money. The main detainee in this affair was Lieutenant-Colonel Omar al-Hayb of the village of Beit-Zarzir, who had a long-time relationship with Lebanese drug baron Kamil Nahara (code-named “Abu Sa’id”) and closely connected to Hezbollah. “Abu Sa’id” asked al-Hayb to supply him with maps of the northern part of Israel as well as information on the Israeli troops in the Shabaa Farms region, on the former Chief of the Northern Command (now deputy Chief-of-Staff of the IDF) Major-General Gabi Ashkenazi, and on tank ambushes. Two other detainees, arrested after making a drug deal near the border fence, were used as couriers for passing on intelligence information to Lebanon and smuggling drugs into Israel. The remaining detainees in this affair were also linked to Hezbollah agents in Lebanon, and had been engaged in handing over to them intelligence information. One of the detainees had smuggled several Israeli cellular phones into Lebanon in the context of these contacts. In the course of the investigation, it turned out that one of these phones was found on the body of one of the Palestinian terrorists who had entered Israel with Hezbollah assistance and carried out the attack near Kibbutz Metsuba in March 2002, that cost the lives of six Israeli citizens.

• In November 2002, Israeli security forces arrested Ahmed Rageh Ahmed Awiti, a man in his forties who had arrived in 1994 from Lebanon to the Gaza Strip along with other Palestinian Authority personnel. Awiti was employed as a flight engineer at the Dahaniya Airport in Gaza. During his interrogation, Awiti admitted that on February 24, 2001, he traveled to Mecca together with an official delegation from the Gaza Strip, for the Hajj pilgrimage. During his stay in Saudi Arabia, Awiti met a Hezbollah operative, who recruited him to act as agent for the organization in the Gaza Strip and conduct terrorist activity against Israel. Awiti was given a Lebanese phone number to call his Hezbollahhandler, code-named “Rimon”. He called him several times from his office at the Dahaniya Airport in the Palestinian authority. “Rimon” invited Awiti to Lebanon, presumably for the purpose of military training and assignments against Israel. Awiti was arrested by the Israeli security forces upon returning from Lebanon.

• In February 2003, the Israeli security forces uncovered a particularly serious affair involving Israeli citizens from the village of Ghajar (mentioned above) and the Israeli border town of Kiryat Shmona; they had been operated by a senior member of Hezbollah through the mediation of Ramzi Nahra, a Lebanese drug dealer and Hezbollah collaborator. The following are the main elements of this affair:

• Underlying the affair is a mass network of drug smuggling into Israel. The main convict in the affair, Saad Kahmuz, a resident of the village of Ghajar, admitted during his interrogation to having recently smuggled four tons of drugs into Israel. Drug smuggling from Lebanon into Israel is carried out with the full support and backing of Hezbollah , which controls southern Lebanon. Hezbollah avails itself of Israeli and Lebanese drug dealers in order to achieve operational intelligence objectives and, as a by-product, weaken Israeli society (see Chapter VII: Crime and Terrorism – Hezbollah’s Criminal Activity).

• Hezbollah instructed theGhajar drug dealers to use the criminal gang’s network in order to carry out intelligence missions inside Israel and set up an apparatus of Israeli collaborators. Saad Kahmuz confessed that he had carried out several intelligence missions during recent months on behalf of the drug dealer Ramzi Nahra, with whom he was connected (Nahra was killed in an explosion near his home village on December 6, 2002). He also admitted to having been aware that Nahra was closely related to Hezbollah and worked for the organization.

• Saad Kahmuz further told his interrogators that he had carried out several video filming missions in the area stretching from the village of Ghajar to the Golani intersection north of Tiberias, and that he had been instructed to focus especially on military bases and shopping malls. He filmed the northern border town of Kiryat Shmona from various angles, and also took still pictures of intersections and signs in the Ghajar and Kiryat Shmona area. The investigation also uncovered three pistols supplied by Ramzi Nahra to gang members, and revealed that various purchases were made in Israel and delivered to Nahra. These included state-of-the-art night vision binoculars, electronic translation devices and various reference books such as atlases, business management manuals, and the Statistical Abstract of Israel, the annual publication of the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics.

• The results of all of the data-gathering missions carried out by the Israeli recruits were delivered to Ramzi Nahra and his collaborators at meetings that took place in the northern part of the village of Ghajar. Kahmuz, in light of his “professional relations” with Nahra, was also invited to meetings on Lebanese territory. These meetings would sometimes last 24 hours, and were attended by people known to the Israeli security forces as Hezbollah operatives and prominent collaborators,including members of the Nahra family, a notorious family of drug smugglers.

• A man and a woman, both residents of Kiryat Shmona, were arrested in connection with the affair. They admitted to have known about the activity of Saad Kahmuz, and to having helped him carry out his drug deals. The woman confessed that she had been aware of Kahmuz’s meetings in Lebanon, and that he had asked her to buy a copy of the Statistical Abstract of Israel in order to take it across the border to Lebanon. She had also purchased, together with Kahmuz, night vision binoculars and electronic translation devices, which were taken to Lebanon. The man confessed that he had received two pistols sent from Lebanon, that he had purchased a Statistical Abstract of Israel for Kahmuz, and that he knew about the purchase of the night vision binoculars.
  

• Hezbollah organizes military training courses for Palestinian terrorists in camps in Lebanon,the purpose of which are to upgrade Palestinian terrorist activities against Israel. In the course of these training sessions, the terrorists are taught various tactics for planning and executing terrorist attacks aimed at inflicting maximum damage to human lives. Graduates of these training sessions are sent back to the Palestinian territories in order to consolidate the terrorist apparatus and raise the level of attacks against Israel. A noteworthy example is the training in Lebanon of Fatah / Tanzim operatives from the village of Burka in Samaria. The following are highlights of the episode:

• Between May and July 2002, three Fatah / Tanzim operatives from the Samaria region were arrested. They admitted to having received militarytraining in Lebanon fromHezbollah.

• One of the three, Omar Hamdan Muhammad Seif from the village of Burka, confessed to his interrogators to having been sent in 2002 from Jordan to Syria and from there to Lebanon, in order to undergo a Hezbollah training course. After arriving in Syria,Omar was joined by a Lebanese, who accompanied him to Beirut. From there, he was taken to a closed training compound in the mountains, belonging to Hezbollah. The training consisted of a number of stages. At first he received instruction in the dismantling and assembly of various weapons including a pistol, an Uzi sub-machine gun, and an M-16 rifle. Then he practiced the use of these weapons. Once this stage was over, he joined a Hezbollah instructor, who taught him the use of explosives in theory, after which he received practical training including detonating explosive charges. He was also trained in operating RPG launchers and throwing hand grenades.

• During the training, Omar was returned to Beirut to attend a meeting, in which he was instructed to recruit additional operatives in the Palestinian territories and send them for training in Lebanon. He was also given 400 dinars, and was promised additional sums of money for the purpose of purchasing arms, which would reach him through recruits that he would send to Lebanon.During his stay in Lebanon, Omar was asked to buy a map of a central city in Israel, presumably for carrying out a terrorist attack in that city.

• At the end of the training, Omar was sent back to Jordan via Syria and from there he returned to Burka. Omar did what he had been instructed to do: He recruited three candidates for military training from his village. One of them, Fadi Azzam Ahmad Seif, 21, admitted during interrogation that he accepted Omar’s offer. In June 2002, Fadi traveled to Jordan with two additional recruits, Darjam Salah and Iyad Qassem. However, he was refused an entrance visa into Jordan, and returned to Burka. His two companions, Darjam Salah and Iyad Qassem, made it to Jordan and from there to Syria and Lebanon. In Lebanon, they underwent military training by Hezbollah, during which they were instructed in carrying out terrorist attacks in Israel.

Overview

• Consistent with Iranian and Syrian policy, Hezbollah strives to incite the escalation of Palestinian violence. One of the means to achieve this goal is the supply of high-quality military hardware to the Palestinian territories. Hezbollah’s strategy is to provide the Palestinians with sophisticated means that will improve their operational capabilities, establish a “balance of terror” vis-a-vis Israel, increase the loss of human lives among the Israelis, escalate violence, and duplicate the “Lebanese model” in the Palestinian territories.

• The terrorist organizations operating in the Palestinian territories, such as Hamas, are indeed inspired by what they regard as Hezbollah ’s successful experience in Lebanon. Launching Qassam rockets against Israeli population centers, such as the southern town of Sderot, is meant to imitate the firing of Katyusha rockets on the northern towns of Israel. It is intended to create a “balance of terror”, which will eventually tie the hands of Israel and enhance the freedom of action of Palestinian terrorism¹.

• Hezbollah was behind at least three smuggling attempts by sea. The first of these was carried out on the ship Santorini (in January and April 2001). A third, more conspicuous attempt of unprecedented scale was made on the ship Karine-A. Following are highlights of these affairs, based on the interrogation of the ships’ crews after their capture by the Israeli navy:

Hezbollah’s involvement in the
Karine-A affair

• The interrogation of the Karine-A crew evidences Hezbollah ’s involvement in the arms shipment intended for the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian terrorist organizations. Facts pointing to this involvement are mentioned by the Karine-A captain Omar Akawi as well as other crew members:

• Omar Akawi revealed that he was due to arrive in Iran in July 2001 for “special arrangements”—apparently referring to instructions to Palestinian Authority personnel—for handling submersible containers (custom-made, leak-proof containers used for the arms smuggling; they could not have been manufactured in Lebanon, but were definitely Iranian-made). However, he did not arrive in Iran as planned, following a briefing according to which Hezbollah operatives would take charge of this matter.

• Salem Mahmud al-Sankari, a naqib [captain] in the Palestinian naval force, who had previously taken part in an attempted naval terrorist attack against Israel, was on board the Karine-A at the time of its capture. He told his interrogators that he had undergone a designated training program in Lebanon in September 2001, during which he practiced diving and handling the submersible containers. His instructors were Hezbollah operatives. According to al-Sankari, when the arms cargo was loaded on board the Karine-A, off the Iranian coast, one of these operatives was there.
  

• Riyad Abdallah, one crew member, revealed that he had traveled to Syria in July 2001 in order to purchase a ship. There he met with a Hezbollah liaison officer called Hajj Bassam, who provided him with an advance payment to carry out the purchase.

• On board the Karine-A, seized on January 3, 2002, were “force multiplier” weapon systems, including 107 and 122 mm rockets and launchers with a range of up to 20 km, which the Palestinians do not possess for the time being. Providing these rockets and launchers to the Palestinian Authority could have implied that big Israeli cities would have been within Katyusha range; or, in other words, that the “Lebanese model” would have indeed been duplicated in Israel. The ship also carried improved anti-tank launchers, 120 mm mortars, mortar shells, and powerful explosives. These arms, had they reached the Palestinian Authority, would have significantly improved the operational capability of the terrorist organizations, in particular the Fatah / al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades; they would have increased their power of deterrence vis-a-vis Israel; and they would have created a Lebanese-style “balance of terror” – all of which are goals which the Iranians, the Syrians, and Hezbollah strive to achieve.

• A large part of the weapons and ammunition found aboard the vessel had been manufactured in Iran (manufacture year: 2001). Among these were: anti-tank rockets of types PG-7 Tandem and PG-7 Nader, YM3 anti-tank mines and YM1 anti-personnel mines. The markings on most of the weaponry items had been modified and the weapons’ serial numbers erased so that their origin could not be identified and traced. Typically, the Iranians were quick to deny any connection with the affair [January 4, 2002], to evade being identified as “terrorism-sponsoring
  

Hezbollah’s involvement in the Santorini affair

• Another example of Hezbollah’s (and PFLP-GC’s) endeavors to smuggle “high-quality” arms from Lebanon into the Palestinian Authority is the Santorini, which was seized while sailing toward the coast of Gaza, on its way to deliver its deadly cargo to the Palestinian terrorist organizations.

• The crew members of the Santorini told their interrogators that by the time of their arrest, four smuggling attempts had been made, using the Santorini and another ship named Calypso-2. Three of these attempts succeeded (some of the arms reached Gaza and the Sinai shores) and the fourth was thwarted by the Israeli Navy. One of the successful smuggling operations was carried out by Hezbollah from the Jiyah beach, south of Beirut, in April 2001.

• On its last voyage, the Santorini left Tripoli, Lebanon and was to unload its cargo off of the northern Sinai coast. It was captured by the Israeli Navy on May 6, 2001, about 150 miles west of Tyre. Aboard the ship, the navy found a large variety of quality weapons, including dozens of barrels packed with Katyusha rockets, anti-aircraft (Strela) missiles, anti-tank missiles, mortars, and small arms and ammunition. Ahmad Jibril, head of the PFLP-GC, admitted publicly that his organization was responsible for the arms shipment, which was meant to support the Palestinian people [A.P., May 8, 2001]. Hezbollah chose to hush up its role. If these arms had reached the Palestinian territories, they would have significantly improved the operational capability of the terrorist organizations.

• The interrogation of the Santorini crew uncovered several important aspects of Syria’s and Hezbollah’s involvement in arms smuggling operations from Lebanon to the Palestinian territories. One crew member, a Lebanese named Dib Muhammad Rashid Awita, gave his interrogators the following account:

• During the search for a suitable vessel for arms smuggling to the Palestinian territories, a boat named Abd al-Hadi was found in the port of Arwad in Syria. Awita traveled to Syria with the help of PFLP-GC to examine the boat. The boat was found suitable for the task, and an agreement about its purchase was reached in the Shahin Restaurant in the port town of Tartus in the north of Syria. The Abd al-Hadi was then registered as Lebanese, and its Syrian registration was erased.A Syrian crew sailed the vessel from Syria to the port of Tripoli in Lebanon, where it was renamed Santorini.

• Awita overheard a conversation about an arms transfer from Syria to Lebanon, to be loaded onto the Santorini during one of the smuggling attempts from Tripoli. The arms were placed in barrels in Syria, loaded aboard a passengerbus with Syrianlicense plates from which the passenger seats had been removed, and transferred via the Damascus-Beirut highway to Zahlah and from there to Tripoli in the north of Lebanon.

• During the third smuggling attempt from the coast of Jiyah, Hezbollah loaded the arms on board the Santoriniin a manner reminiscent of a military operation. Twenty-five Hezbollah operatives took part in the operation, some in charge of securing the shore and the roads leading to it while others engaged in loading the boat. According to Awita, if a Lebanese Navy patrol had arrived on site, Hezbollah operatives would have fired in order to chase it off.

• The project of high-quality arms smuggling into the Palestinian territories was conducted jointly betweenHezbollahand the PFLP-GC. Two senior operatives were presumably involved in it:

• On the part of Hezbollah - Awita recounted that he had met with a Hezbollah liaison officer named Hajj Bassam just before the third arms smuggling attempt. Awita visited Bassam’s office near Beirut Airport, where he recalled having noticed a picture of Khomeini on the wall of the office. From there they drove to a small bay on the Jiyah coast in order to load the arms onto the boat.

• On the part of the PFLP-GC - According to information published in the press following his death, Jihad Jibril had been in charge of the desk responsible for relations with the Palestinian Authority in the PFLP-GC [al-Watan, Saudi Arabia, May 21, 2002]. Jibril, the son of PFLP-GC leader Ahmad Jibril, was also reported to have been the leading figure in the financing and procurement of arms, ammunition and explosives, and their shipment to the Palestinian territories.

The land route: Arms smuggling via Jordan

• A secondary channel used by Hezbollah for arms smuggling to the Palestinian terrorist organizations is the land route, which cuts through the borders between Israel and neighboring countries (mainly Jordan). In one of Hezbollah’s attempts to use this route, three of its operatives were caught and placed under arrest in Jordan in June 2001. They had planned to smuggle twenty-five 107 mm Katyusha rockets into the Palestinian territories.

• The capture of the Hezbollah operatives aroused massive media interest, and fuelled fiery criticism by Hezbollah’s leader against Jordan and the manner in which it handled the issue. Hassan Nasrallah portrayed the smuggling attempt as a legitimate and permissible step, and stressed the need to pursue this type of operation:
  
  • “We must assist the Palestinian people at least with weapons and money… They did not ask us to send them warriors, they only ask for support – especially weapons. It is therefore our and everyone’s duty to send weapons to the Palestinians; whoever does not do so is thoughtless and criminal…If supplying arms to the Palestinians is a legally punishable crime, then we are prepared to be punished.” [al-Majalla, March 24, 2002]
    
  • “The Palestinians need weapons – military equipment, explosives, etc. They also need money to finance and carry on their operations… Supplying arms to the Palestinians is highly important. We must supply the arms to the Palestinians, so that they can be used in the Intifada; for the explosive charge, the machine-gun, the bomb, or the shell greatly enhance the continued resistance ‘inside’.”[al-Manar Television, April 8, 2002].

The war on consciousness: Hezbollah’s moral support for the Palestinian violent struggle

• Besides military support, Hezbollah provides the Palestinian terrorist organizations with large-scale assistance in indoctrination and propaganda. Hezbollah makes extensive use of the media channels that it owns—especially al-Manar Television—to broadcast incitement and propaganda to its target publics throughout the Arab world, in particular the Palestinian Authority. The messages directed toward the Palestinian population advocate violence, particularly suicide attacks against Israel, and discourage all efforts to relieve tension and promote a cessation of hostilities. Al-Manar Television also provides a platform for Palestinian terrorist organizations closely linked to Syria and Iran, through which they publicly assume responsibility for terrorist attacks performed ‘inside’.

• Demonstrating their genuine desire to show their solidarity with the Palestinian struggle, Iran and Hezbollah alsomake cynical and manipulative use of the Palestinian cause. The massive attention directed at the Israeli-Palestinian conflict indeed serves their interests, as it distracts the US from Iran (a member of the “axis of evil”) and Hezbollah (a leading terrorist organization). Iran and Hezbollah also know that this conflict occupies the attention and efforts of Israel. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah remarked on NBN Television on January 5, 2002 that as long as Israel is trapped in the Palestinian conflict, it can do nothing against Hezbollah or any of the other Arab countries.

• The Hezbollah leadership encourages the Palestinians to carry out suicide attacks and escalate the situation in the Palestinian territories, in full disregard of the damage this causes the Palestinian population. It also uses the Palestinians as cover for its own terrorist pursuits against Israel, in areas where the organization has no “legitimacy” for carrying out terrorist attacks. The most striking example was the terrorist attack near Kibbutz Metsuba on March 12, 2002, in which Palestinian terrorists were used in order to camouflage Hezbollah’s “fingerprints”.

Appendices:

• Seized document: A Palestinian intelligence report dated October 31, 2001 concerning the Iranian intention to use Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad in orderto escalate the situation in the Palestinian territories – see Appendix 9.

• Statements of senior members of Hezbollah regarding the need to support the Palestinian violent struggle against Israel – see Appendix 10.

Chapter VI: Lebanon as Base for the Military, Political and

Social Activities of Hezbollah

Overview

• The Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon on May 24, 2002, followed by the UN Security Council’s statement that Israel completed its withdrawal according to Security Council Resolution 425, has not altered Hezbollah’s strategy or reduce its adherence to the use of terrorism as a means of achieving its goals. The withdrawal, however, deprived Hezbollah of its main cover of legitimacy for terrorism, and confronted it with the increasingly challenging dilemma of pursuing its military-operational activity from Lebanese territory.

• This dilemma originates from the growing need to maneuver the organization’s policy along an intricate system of considerations and constraints that are subject to adjustments from time to time. Hezbollah ’s main constraint consists of the need to coordinate its policy with the policy and interests of Syria and Iran, the two countries that sponsor it. Other considerations that the organization cannot afford to overlook are possible retaliations by Israel (including the risk of an offensive against Syria) and constraints deriving from the local Lebanese scene. Regarding the latter, Israel’s withdrawal exacerbated the controversy over Lebanon’s future character, rejecting both the “Hong Kong doctrine”—which could transform Lebanon into a peaceful and prosperous country—and the “Hanoi doctrine” in favor of continued violence consistent with Iranian and Syrian interests [both terms were coined by the Druse leader and head of Lebanon’s Progressive Socialist Party, Walid Jumblatt, who stated in January 2001 that Lebanon “cannot be both Hanoi and Hong Kong”].

• Regarding this controversy, there is no doubt that Hezbollah has already succeeded in turning southern Lebanon into a “Hanoi”. Since the Israeli pullout from Lebanon, Hezbollahhas made considerable efforts in establishing, expanding, and enhancing its operational-military apparatus in the area. Exploiting the freedom of operation it enjoys in southern Lebanon, Hezbollah is motivated by its basic interest of preventing the relief of tension along the Lebanese-Israeli border. Hezbollah also takes advantage of the support generously provided to it by Syria and Iran. The latter support constitutes an essential element of Hezbollah’s ability to maintain a military apparatus far exceeding the scope and quality of the apparatuses of other terrorist organizations known to us in the world.

• After the Israeli withdrawal, Hezbollah positioned its forces in the former “Security Zone” along the entire border, thus preventing the Lebanese army from deploying and exercising its control in the area. It set up a massive military

• apparatus, including long-range land-to-land rockets, enabling it to carry out various types of terrorist attacks at short notice. Hezbollah has built up remarkable operational capability for emergency and escalation scenarios, in which it will no doubt seek to employ the immense power it has accumulated in recent years. For it has developed considerable endurance and stamina, allowing it to wage a prolonged war against Israel, based on its apparatus of military equipment and human resources in southern Lebanon.

• The basic concept underlying Hezbollah’s operation is “asymmetric attrition”, which consists of exerting sustained pressure on Israel by means of continuous terrorist endeavors. As a rule, Hezbollah voices contempt for the resilience of Israeli society, depicting it as a “cobweb”. According to Nasrallah, the weakness of Israeli society was a decisive element in the outcome of the conflict in Lebanon, i.e., the Israeli one-sided pullout. In this context, Hezbollah seeks to drag Israel, through repeated provocations, into an “ambush” that will force it into escalation. This will eventually leave Israel bruised and damaged, demoralized by these new “character-shaping” experiences, aimed at inculcating the concept of threat and weakness into Israeli society while boosting the confidence of its enemies.

• In addition to its operational apparatus in the southern Lebanese frontier, Hezbollah maintains a strategic offensive capability in Beirut and the Bekaa, which is kept on alert and serves as the organization’s main tool in the “balance of deterrence” vis-a-vis Israel. This apparatus is part of Hezbollah’s well-known strategy of tying Israel’s hands and preventing it from responding harshly to the organization’s terrorist attacks (oras Hassan Nasrallah puts it: “the whole northern area, from Haifa to Tiberias, is in the grip of Hezbollah ’s warriors in Lebanon”). From the viewpoint of Iran and Syria, this offensive capability enables the potential exhaustion of Israel from Lebanese territory, adding an extra dimension to the military capability of their respective armies.
  

Operational activity from Lebanon

• In disregard of the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon and the UN Security Council announcement that Israel fully implemented Resolution 425, Hezbollah continues to pursue its terrorist operations against Israel along the Lebanese border.

• Since the Israeli withdrawal and until the beginning of 2003, Hezbollah has carried out more than 33 terrorist attacks. During these attacks, Hezbollahkilled five Israeli soldiers and six civilians, kidnapped three soldiers from Mount Dov outposts and one Israeli civilian abroad, and wounded 33 soldiers and eight civilians. In spite of all these, Israel has retained its policy of restraint, forbearance, and refraining from opening a “second front” at the Lebanese border.
  

• The main characteristics of Hezbollah activity along the Lebanese border:

• Hezbollah focuses its hostile operations against Israeli outposts on the Mount Dov slopes, or the area known as Shabaa Farms, claiming that these operations are legitimate (a claim rejected by the international community).

• Hezbollah has also engaged in sporadic attacks on additional locations along the border, especially at the height of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (during Operation “Defensive Shield”). The most conspicuous of these episodes was the infiltration of Palestinian terrorists, who carried out a shooting incident and suicide attack near Kibbutz Metsuba (see below).

• Hezbollah makes frequent use of anti-aircraft fire above Israeli population centers (with “special attention” given to the towns of Kiryat Shmona and Shlomi). The aim of this activity is to cause casualties, damage to property, and panic, and thus terrorize and demoralize the population. Hezbollah is also engaged in this activity even when the Israeli Air Force does not patrol the skies above Lebanon.
  

• Hezbollah, as part of its military operations and consistent with its usual practice, makes extensive use of indoctrination, propaganda, and psychological warfare aimed at demoralizing Israeli soldiers and civilians. The following are some examples:

• Displaying posters and placards glorifying and encouraging terrorism, violence, and bloodshed along the border.

• Frequent statements by senior members of Hezbollah, in particular its secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah, touching raw nerves of Israeli society, such as repeated mention of deadly terrorist attacks and of the fact that kidnapped Israelis are held by Hezbollah.

• Extensive use of the media, including the broadcasting of real-time documentation of Hezbollah ’s terrorist operations along the Israeli-Lebanese border [al-Manar Television].

The infiltration route used by the terrorists who carried out the attack near Kibbutz Metsuba on March 12, 2002

Hezbollah’s military apparatus in southern Lebanon

• Hezbollah has built up an extensiveoperational military apparatus in southern Lebanon, comprising hundreds of militia members trained in various types of warfare, in addition to thousands of other guerrillas. It has furnished the militia with a vast arsenal consisting of large quantities of explosives, small arms, anti-tank missiles (including Tow and Sagger), and a wide range of artillery weapons such as mortars, cannons, and various types of rockets with a range of approximately 30 km.

• After the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon, Hezbollah deployed its militia throughout the former “Security Zone”, and began setting up its operational apparatus–which includes long-range missiles—in the areas evacuated by the Israeli troops.

• Hezbollah ’s deployment in southern Lebanon enables it to launch a variety of complex terrorist attacks at short notice, and to wage a prolonged and unrelenting war based on its existing human resources and equipment in the south, without resorting to external aid. The main characteristics of Hezbollah’s deployment and operation in southern Lebanon are:

• Explosives - Hezbollah has planted mines and explosives along the Lebanese border with Israel, and presumably also deep inside Israeli territory.

• Artillery - Hezbollah has prepared various artillery targets situated deep inside Israeli territory, in order to achieve a more efficient operation of its artillery layout and improve its capability to strike at the civilian front.

• Intelligence - Hezbollah has deployed intelligence equipment of various types, including cameras and bugging devices, which provide it with accurate operational intelligence allowing it to carry out highly complex terrorist attacks.

• Entrenchment - Hezbollah has built underground bunkers and widened natural tunnels in southern Lebanon for use as storage depots for arms.
• Military doctrine - Hezbollah studies Israel’s methods of operating and has developed various combat strategies and tactics that it believes will improve its military capability against Israel.
• Planning - Hezbollah has developed various lines of attack against Israel, such as using gliders to infiltrate Israeli territory, seizing control of Israeli communities, and kidnapping civilians for “bargaining purposes”.

Hezbollah’s military arsenal in Lebanon

Hezbollah has built up a large and diversified arsenal of weapons and ammunition in Lebanon, supplied to it by Iran over the years. Hezbollah ’s arsenal comprises the following arms:

• Thousands of Katyusha rockets (of 107 mm and 122 mm caliber)
• Cannons and mortars of various types
• Long-range Fajr-3 and Fajr-5 rockets,with a strike range of up to 75 Km
• Anti-tank Tow and Sagger missiles
• Anti-aircraft cannons of various types and anti-aircraft SA-7 missiles. It was recently reported that improved SA-18 anti-aircraft missiles may also find their way to the organization.
• Explosive charges among the most advanced in the world and a wide range of small arms.
• Hezbollah probably avails itself of gliders, which enable it to penetrate Israeli territory while bypassing the array of obstacles along the border.
  

Hezbollah’s long-range artillery threat

Transforming southern Lebanon into a Hezbollah-controlled zone

• In 1989, in the context of the Taif Agreement, Syria imposed on the Lebanese administration the continued presence of Hezbollah as the only militia organization in Lebanon, whereas all other ethnic militias were dismantled. Hezbollah’s special status—along with the weakness of the Lebanese central regime—has enabled the organization as of 1989 and until today, to use its power and seize military as well as civilian control in southern Lebanon (and several areas of the Bekaa region), while taking over the place of the legitimate Lebanese regime. This process has continued even after the Israeli pullout from Lebanon.

• Southern Lebanon has in fact turned into a state-within-a-state, or a “Hezbollahstan”, similar to “Fatah-land” – the territory of southern Lebanon controlled by the Palestinians until 1982. Hezbollah has thus become the ultimate authority in this region, undisturbed by the Lebanese regime’s loose control, which centers mainly on economic development projects that are themselves approved by Hezbollah.

• In the light of these circumstances and with Syria’s blessing, Hezbollah pursues its own policy in southern Lebanon, which it imposes on the Lebanese government:

• Hezbollah opposes the effective deployment of the Lebanese army in the south. It prevents the Lebanese regime from assuming responsibility for this region’s security and implementing its sovereignty. According to resolution 425 of the UN Security Council, the Lebanese army was to deploy in the south of the country. However, Syria got in the way, using Hezbollah as its means and the continued struggle against Israel as an excuse. Or, as expressed by Hezbollah Deputy Secretary General Sheikh Naim Qassem on Lebanese Television on January 31, 2002: “Those who demand the entrance of the Lebanese army into the south, actually wish to close the file of the conflict with the enemy…We find this logic unacceptable.”

• Hezbollah maintains a state of controlled tension along the border, and is constantly looking for pretexts to build up that tension with Israel, even on non-military issues. For example, regarding the Israeli-Lebanese controversy over the al-Wazani spring water pumping, Hezbollah official in charge of the southern region, Sheikh Qaouq, stated that the issue “is not open for bargaining or negotiation” [al-Liwa, October 9, 2002]. Similarly, Muhammad Raad, chair of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese parliament, mentioned that “the world is trying to force us into negotiating about the al-Wazani waters…We have the right to use this water as we wish and in every way we find appropriate, and no one is entitled to interfere with this right of ours.” In other words, this is a terrorist organization, which assumes the authority of an official Lebanese body representing the interests of the legitimate administration, determining whether or not negotiations are to take place over water rights.

• Senior spokesmen for Hezbollah did not hesitate to assert in public that the organization had “imposed itself” and also imposed the concept of armed struggle on the Lebanese government. The following are some examples of threatening rhetoric by leading Hezbollah figures, directed toward the Lebanese government in this respect:

• Abdallah Qusseir, a Hezbollah delegate to the Lebanese parliament, voiced the threat that if the Lebanese government should strive to achieve a political agreement with Israel, “it will have a problem with the organization and with other parties in Lebanon.” [Radio Tehran, October 24, 2000]

• Nawaf al-Musawi, in charge of Hezbollah ’s foreign relations desk, stressed that “the resistance imposed itself as a reality, and forced international legitimacy to recognize it.” [al-Mustaqbal, November 24, 2000]

• Muhammad Raad, chair of Hezbollah ’s faction in the Lebanese parliament, argued that “no one will succeed in preventing us from pursuing our armed struggle...and no one will succeed in forcing us to lay down our weapons.” [al-Ittihad, December 4, 2000]

• Hezbollah does not shy away from confrontations with UNIFIL observers posted in southern Lebanon. On April 4, 2002, Hezbollah guerrillas assaulted and beat six observers in the “Shabaa Farms” area,five of whom had to be hospitalized. The reason given for the assault: “intrusion” into the area without Hezbollah’s “permission”.

• Hezbollah, in its ambition to strengthen its foothold in the Shiite community, is constantly opposing and physically obstructing any “rival” attempt to operateamong the Shiite population centers in southern Lebanon and Beirut. It does so even at the cost of severely harming the Lebanese economy and impairing foreign investments in Lebanon. For example, in response to Prime Minister Hariri’s initiative to develop the al-Uzai (Shiite) area in Beirut, Hezbollah operatives clashed with the Lebanese internal security forces, physically assaulting members of the “development council” on June 26, 2002.

• Hezbollahincited the local population to molest government officials who had arrived for a visit. Hezbollah operatives beat the prime minister’s advisor and vandalized vehicles belonging to the security forces and equipment belonging to the project. Senior members of Hezbollah contacted their peers in the security forces and threatened them. Hezbollah leader Nasrallah himself threatened that, if worse came to worst, he would arrive on site to prevent the works with his own body. Government spokespeople claimed in return [NBN Television, June 26, 2002], that Hezbollah was thwarting any infrastructure project attempted by the government in areas where the organization operates, and accused Hezbollah of extortion and violation of the law.

• Syria’s control over Lebanon prevents the latter’s government and Prime Minister, Rafik Hariri, fromchallenging Hezbollah, in particular regarding issues relating to the south of Lebanon. The Lebanese government has therefore no choice but to yield its authority in southern Lebanon to an organization representing foreign “interests” determined in Damascus and Tehran.

Hezbollah’s social and welfare activities within the Shiite community

• The Shiite community, the largest in Lebanon, has always been the most underprivileged among the ethnic communities in Lebanon. Its status of social and economic underdog in Lebanon and lack of initiative on the part of the Lebanese government have created fertile soil for the extensive social and economic activity of Hezbollah. Far-reaching social and welfare activities, financed by the abundant funds received from Iran, have earned Hezbollah the trust and support of many Shiite community members as well as non-Shiites. Behind this activity lies Hezbollah’s long-term objective of consolidating its political status on the Lebanese scene and achieving key positions in the upper echelons of the regime. These steps concur with the objective of promoting the vision of an Islamic republic in Lebanon, in which social predominance will shift from the Christian to the Shiite-Muslim community.

Hezbollah’s wide-ranging social activities are conducted through a system of specialized departments:

• the “culture and information department”, responsible for cultural activities within the community;
• the “education department”, which runs educational institutions and dictates their curricula;
• the “women’s affairs authority”, in charge of the education and vocational training of Muslim women;
• the “health authority”, responsible for providing health and medical services, including clinics, medications, evacuation of casualties, and distribution of food;
• the “social bureau”, in charge of finding solutions for social welfare problems;
• the “bureau of religious studies”, responsible for religious education;
• the “philanthropic association”, in charge of establishing and running welfare institutions;
• the “Scouts”, a youth movement in which youngsters receive paramilitary training

• At the economic level, Hezbollah ’s efforts focus on assisting the Shiite community in developing income sources. Hezbollah is a primarily Shiite organization, and as such is genuinely interested in strengthening the Shiite community (though also enlisting its support). It is in constant struggle with the Lebanese administration over the allocation of resources for rehabilitating disadvantaged Shiite areas and raising Shiite living standards. Hezbollah’s policy is clearly a narrow, sectoral one, whose agenda centers on the underprivileged Shiite community, mainly in the Baalbek-Hermel area in the Bekaa region and the so-called “liberated areas” in southern Lebanon. On these grounds, Hezbollah has challenged several Lebanese governments, and is engaged from time to timein heated confrontations with Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.

Appendices:

• Survey of Hezbollah’s activities against Israel along the Lebanese-Israeli border after the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon – Appendix1.
• Survey of Hezbollah’s attacks against Israeli outposts in the Mount Dov area (“Shabaa Farms”) after the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon – Appendix 2.
• A detailed list of Hezbollah’s arms arsenal– Appendix 3.
• Statements by Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah regarding Hezbollah’s military capabilities – Appendix 11.

Chapter VII: Crime and Terrorism –

Hezbollah’s Criminal Activity

• Aside from its military-terrorist, political, and economic-social endeavors, Hezbollah is also engaged in large-scale criminal activities. These consist of heavy involvement in illegaldrug dealings and money counterfeiting, both of which are thriving industries in Lebanon, as well as other criminal pursuits. Hezbollah ’s criminal activity is intended to promote several objectives of the organization:
  
  • Creating an independent fund-raising channel in addition to the financing received from Iran.
    
  • Taking advantage of professional criminal elements to improve Hezbollah’s operational capabilities in Israel, in Arab countries, and worldwide (this was well evidenced by the uncovering of drug-smuggling networks in Israel, which combined their drug pursuits with operational intelligence and arms smuggling missions on behalf of Hezbollah).
    
  • As a byproduct, weakening the social and economic fabric of Israel and Western countries, in particular the United States, as part of the global war waged by Iran and Hezbollah against the Western world.
    
• In the context of its involvement in the drug and money counterfeiting “industries”, Hezbollah makes clever use of the following advantages:
  
  • Its status as the main power-broker among the Shiite population of the Bekaa region, where the centers of these “industries” are located;
    
  • Its control over the “marketing” routes of the drugs and the forged money, including smuggling routes from southern Lebanon to Israel;
    
  • Its strong links with Lebanese communities abroad and its operational apparatuses throughout the world, especially in international crime and smuggling centers such as Latin America, Southeast Asia, and the former Soviet Union;
    
  • Its connections with Iran, from which it receives advanced training and technological support (a luxury not enjoyed by “ordinary” terrorist organizations). These connections enable Hezbollah to maintain high standards of money counterfeiting.
    
  • Its tight relations with the Syrians, who control the Bekaa region. These relations consist of granting Hezbollah’s criminal activity immunity from the law enforcement authorities in return for transferring part of the proceeds to senior Syrian officials. Mustafa Tlas, the Syrian minister of defense and Major-General Ghazi Kan’an, who was until recently in charge of the Syrian intelligence in Lebanon, have been mentioned in the past as beneficiaries of these dealings.

Drug production and trade

• Lebanon is regarded as a large-scale drug-producing country, cultivating poppy and cannabis and even engaging in the import of “raw materials” from which it produces heroin and cocaine. The “raw materials” used for the Lebanese “drug industry” are derived from three sources:

• Poppy and cannabis aregrown in the Bekaa region; the former serves as headquarters for the production of heroin, and the latter as headquarters for hashish and marijuana processing.
• The “raw materials” used to manufacture morphine-based heroin are imported from the Far East (the “Golden Triangle”) and from Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey.
• Cocaine salt (cocaine hydrochloride) is imported into Lebanon directly from Latin American countries (Colombia, Venezuela, Brazil) or via Europe.

• The above “raw materials” are processed into illicit drugs in dozens of home-based laboratories spread throughout the Bekaa villages, especially in the Baalbek region. Lebanese drugs are exported to the rest of the Middle East (including Israel), Europe, the United States, and other destinations worldwide. The proceeds of this flourishing “market” are estimated at more than $1 billion annually, of which Hezbollah receives its major share.

• The poppy and cannabis cultivation and the drug production in laboratories are carried out in areas populated byShiites, where Hezbollah occupies a central power position and the Lebanese regime’s control is extremely loose. Furthermore, Hezbollah controls the smuggling routes from Lebanon, by land and by sea, to the rest of the Middle East (Egypt is a major outlet for hashish) and the West. This control further strengthens Hezbollah’s position in Lebanon’s “drug industry”.

• The Bekaa families who handle the cultivation, production, and marketing of drugs are mainly Shiite clans whose members occupy senior positions in Hezbollah. The more prominent among these are the Hamiya family (of the village Taraiya, west of Baalbek), the Tles and Mazloum families (of the town Brital) and the al-Masri family (of the village Hawr Ta’ala).

• The rate of drug cultivation and production in the Bekaa region has gone through ups and downs. Between 1992 and 1996, it slumped significantly. The reason was a change in Syrian and Lebanese policy, aimed at giving the false impression (especially to the United States) of joining the war against the “drug epidemic”. Since 1997, however, a resurgence in cannabis cultivation has been evident, resulting from the economic crisis in Lebanon and the financial troubles of the local population, for which drug cultivation is a major source of income. At the same time, heroin and cocaine production are believed to have decreased.

• During the years of slowdown in cannabis and poppy cultivation in the Bekaa, the home-based laboratories in the region increased their output of hard drugs,especially heroin produced from imported raw materials. It should be noted that the hard drug business offers larger profit margins and smaller risks of incrimination for Syria and Lebanon.

• Regarding the Israeli illegal drug market: its main import from Lebanon is hashish, whereas heroin and cocaine are marginal markets. According to Israeli Police estimates, hashish imports from Lebanon into Israel in 2002 amounted to some 10 tons.Hezbollah takes advantage of its control over the Israeli-Lebanese border and the routes accessing it in order to “grant its patronage” to drug-smuggling activities, combining them with missions intended to support its operational-terrorist activity in Israel.

• For additional reading on how Hezbollah exploits drug smuggling to promote its operational objectives in Israel, see “ Recruiting and Assigning Israeli Arabs and Palestinians”, in Chapter V.

Counterfeiting money

• Iran is an important center of the global counterfeiting industry. Several Iranian attempts to flood the world market with high-quality fake US dollar notes were uncovered during the 1990s. However, the volumes circulated were not such as could severely harm the American economy.

• Iran’s relative advantage in this respect is its access to advanced technologies,which enable it to produce fake 100-dollar bills of outstanding quality (theso-called“Super Dollars”or“Super Notes”). The manufacture of “Super Dollars” requires a combination of photogravure printmaking, sophisticated printing blocks, special ink and paper, proficiency in color separation, and the technical ability to reproduce security features (e.g., security stripes). These technologies and know-how are typical of national authorities, not of terror and crime organizations, let alone individuals. Iran owes these advanced capabilities to none other than the United States, who supplied them to the Shah’s regime; the Ayatollahs’ regimes employed them to forge American money.

• In order to ward off incriminating evidence and avoid an entanglement with the United States, Iran chose to use Hezbollah (and possibly other Lebanese elements as well) as personnel for the manufacture and circulation of counterfeit notes. To this effect, Iran shipped counterfeit notes to Lebanon and supplied it with advanced technologies. In the early 1990s, “Super Dollar” notes surfaced in Lebanon’s Bekaa. It seems that in the initial stage these notes were printed in Tehran, and Lebanon was used only as distribution center. However, at some point in the early 1990s, Iran provided Lebanon with intagliomachines, and the Baalbek region in Syrian-controlled Bekaa became a production and marketing center of “Super Dollar” notes.
  

Following American pressure on Syria at the most senior levels (e.g., during the Clinton-Assad meeting in 1994), the intagliomachines used for the manufacture of “Super Dollars” were moved from Lebanon to another country. This happened in the mid-1990s, but the counterfeiting “industry” is still alive.

• During the second half of the 1990s, money counterfeiting in the Bekaa region continued to thrive. However, though the fake dollars were still of high quality, they didnot match the standards of the “Super Dollar”. In this “industry”, Hezbollah plays a prominent role, while joining forces with criminal elements and taking advantage of its powerful position in the Bekaa and its relations with Iran and Syria.

• The Bekaa region is the heart of the counterfeiting “industry” in Lebanon. The Hezbollah-controlled town of Brital, south of Baalbek (which is home to a population of some 7,000 Shiites) is the maincenter of money counterfeiting. In the second half of the 1990s, Brital housed an estimated ten to fifteen printing presses. These presses were operated in homes and workshops, and specialized in various lines of production, in particular high-quality fake 100-dollar bills. In the past they also produced fake 20-dollar and 50-dollar bills as well as fake currency of other Western and Arab countries, of varying qualities. Reports from the last two years confirm that the counterfeiting “industry” in Bekaa is still thriving,and that Hezbollah as well as criminal elements are involved in it¹.

• The Lebanese counterfeiting “industry” is in the hands of powerful criminal elements, mainly members of large Shiite clans who closely cooperate with Hezbollah.The leading clans in this respect are Mazloum, Saleh, Sadek, Tles (in Brital) and al-Masri (in the village Hawr Ta’ala, south of Brital). Hezbollah also maintains relations with southern Lebanese clans engaged in large-scale drug smuggling, such as Nahra (from Ibl al-Saqi) and Berro (from the village Kafr Kila).

• Hezbollah’s involvement in the money counterfeiting “industry” allows it to benefit from the proceeds of this industry, and also entails operationaladvantages for its overseas activities. The technical know-how required for counterfeiting was exploited, as a by-product, to develop a sophisticated apparatus of document forgery. This apparatus produces passports used by Hezbollah operatives, and exports its “products” all over the world, mainly to Russia, the Ukraine, Cyprus, Latin American countries, and Arab countries.

• As for the Israeli market: fake dollars, originating from Lebanon, have been found in the past in Israel. As of now, there are no indications of attempts to “export” large amounts of forged notes to Israel. During an Israeli military operation in thePalestinian territories, the Palestinian Security forces were found in possession of forged Israeli notes, but these did not originate from Lebanon. Nonetheless, both Iran and Hezbollah have the technological capabilities enabling them to flood the Israeli market with high-quality counterfeit notes, if and when the decision is made to do so.

Specimens of counterfeit notes from the “production line” of the printing presses in the town Brital (as of 1998)

• Hezbollah’s operatives and the criminal elements linked with the organization are also involved in “commonplace” felonies (theft, fraud, and smuggling), as an additional means of “diversifying” their revenues. A particularly thriving line of activity is stealing cars and other property for the purpose of smuggling and selling the stolen goods:
  

• Hezbollah dealings in Lebanon include: trade in luxury cars stolen in Europe; theft of luxury cars and other property; transferring this property to the Bekaa region (mainly to Brital) and “restoring” it to its owners in return for large ransoms.

• Sources in Europe reported in 1999-2000 that Hezbollah members had cooperated with European and international criminal elements in smuggling cars stolen from European countries. The cars were sent by sea to Lebanon and transferred to Middle Eastern and other countries, where they were sold.
  
  • Hezbollah operatives in Europeengage in other criminal activities as well. In November 2001, Spanish police arrested criminal elements connected with Hezbollah on the charge of fraudulent dealings (summer cottages in the Caribbean), forgery, blackmailing, money laundering, and other criminal activity, amounting to millions of US dollars.
    
• Several cases of criminal activity uncovered in recent years in the United States and Canada evidence that Hezbollah has spread its tentacles from Europe to countries overseas.
  
• In the United States: a major smuggling operation was uncovered in 2002 in Charlotte, North Carolina. Over the years, several Americans of Lebanese origin have been engaged in a large-scale smuggling of cigarettes, taking advantage of the tax differentials between the low cigarette tax in North Carolina and the high cigarette tax in Michigan. Part of their profits went to finance Hezbollah activity in the Middle East. Mohammad Hammoud, the leader of the smuggling network, was recently sentenced to 155 years’ imprisonment. His brother Shawki was sentenced to four years, and three others individuals of Lebanese origin received between two and three years.

• Similar criminal pursuits have been reported in Canada, as well as other illegal activities of Lebanese Shiites linked to Hezbollah. These include purchases of arms and explosives, fundraising, and car theft. In addition, large sums of money were transferred to Hezbollah in Lebanon through Canadian banks.

• In Latin America, Lebanese Shiite criminal elements with links to Hezbollah engage in similar pursuits, including smuggling, drug trafficking, blackmail, and racketeering. Part of their profits are funneled to sponsor Hezbollah’s activities in Lebanon and abroad. The most popular area for these pursuits is the tri-border area between Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina, where the local law enforcement is extremely lax.