Analysis of the draft of the UN Security Council resolution proposed by France and the United States to end the hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah

Overview

1. On August 5, 2006, after intensive diplomatic efforts, the French and American representatives to the UN reached an agreement for a proposed draft of a Security Council resolution to end the hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah. A vote is expected to be taken during the coming days. The proposed resolution is being debated and corrections and changes are expected to be made, mainly because of Lebanese reservations.

2. An analysis of the proposed resolution shows that it is different in nature from the Security Council resolutions adopted after the previous rounds of fighting between Israel and the terrorist organizations operating in Lebanon.¹ It relates to the fundamental issues concerning Hezbollah and does not limit itself merely to partial security arrangements in south Lebanon.

3. The articles of the resolution relating to south Lebanon deal with “a full cessation of the hostilities” as the first stage (without an IDF withdrawal from Lebanon) and an understanding between Israel and Lebanon concerning a list of political issues (including the Sheba’a Farms). Duringthe second stage, after the understandings have been reached, there will be a Security Council resolution calling for a permanent ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon and the deployment of an international force in south Lebanon (whose battle order and mandate are still unclear). “Security arrangements” have also been determined based on extending the control of the Lebanese government in south Lebanon with the assistance of an international force and the banning of the presence and armed activity of Hezbollah in south Lebanon. The Lebanese government has already announced its readiness to send 15,000 soldiers to south Lebanon, but after a ceasefire and IDF withdrawal.

4. In addition to the “security arrangements” which are intended to make a fundamental change in the status quo ante in south Lebanon, there are provisions that extend beyond the south-Lebanese context for the first time in a UN Security Council resolution at the end of an armed confrontation between Israel and terrorists in Lebanon.² Particularly striking are the provisions calling for the disarmament of “all armed groups” in Lebanon [with Hezbollah as the focus], the establishment of an international embargo on the sale or supply of arms to those groups [i.e., Hezbollah], and a call upon the Government of Lebanon to ensure arms or related materiel are not imported into Lebanon without its consent. To add validity to the proposed resolution, other relevant resolutions are mentioned, as is the Taef Accord, which ended the Lebanese civil war, and even the Lebanese prime minister’s seven-point program.

5. However, in addition to its positive provisions,the draft also has weak points as far as Israel is concerned, and perhaps even as far as the United States and France, which drafted the proposal, are concerned. The most important ones are:

A. The lack of an effective enforcement apparatus and a clearly-defined timetable for the implementation of the provisions relating to south Lebanon, and even more so of those relating to north Lebanon : that enables Hezbollah to hinder and sabotage (and possibly even prevent) the implementation of provisions which are not to its liking and in effect to turn the resolution into a hollow shell. Aided, supported and encouraged by Syria and Iran, Hezbollah can be expected to oppose attempts to diminish its power and status in Lebanon.

B. The condition for proceeding to the second stage of the resolution, including the establishment and deployment of an international force, of an Israeli-Lebanese agreement on a series of disputed diplomatic issues, including the Sheba’a Farms: In our assessment, that will take a matter of weeks and perhaps even longer, while a real possibility exists that the necessary agreements will not be reached. That is too long a time, because it might enable Hezbollah to renew its attacks on IDF forces in Lebanon and represent the attacks as a legitimate part of the “struggle against the occupation.” During that period (and perhaps after it) there will be no effective multinational force in place, and when the current confrontation ends, UNIFIL will continue to be stationed in south Lebanon without the capabilities to deal with continued terrorism.

C. The draft of the resolution puts Hezbollah’s demands concerning two central points (which were adopted by the Lebanese government) on the agenda: the first is the redelineating of the Syrian-Lebanese border in the Sheba’a Farms region to prepare the ground for its “liberation” and turning over to Lebanon, even though the UN and the international community have rejected Lebanese claims concerning the area. The second is finding a “solution” for the Lebanese prisoners held in Israel (i.e., their release), when what must be remembered is that they were tried and found guilty of murder and involvement in terrorist activities³ and of spying for Hezbollah, and that in the past Israel refused to release them (although it should be remembered that the release of the abducted Israeli soldiers is unconditional).

8. This document contains the following sections:

A. The main points of the draft of the UN Security Council resolution.

B. The position of the Lebanese government.

C. Appendix: The text of the draft of the resolution.

The main points of the draft of the UN Security Council resolution

1. The following are the main points of the resolution (for the full text in English see the Appendix):

A. The cessation of hostilities: The resolution calls for the “full cessation” of hostilities based on the immediate cessation by Hezbollah of all attacks and the immediate cessation by Israel of offensive military operations. Thus it recognizes Israel’s right to respond to continued Hezbollah attacks.

B. The enforcement of Lebanese government control in south Lebanon: The resolution stresses the importance of imposing Lebanese government sovereignty over the entire country (i.e., over south Lebanon) based on Security Council Resolutions 1559 (2004)⁴ and 1608 (2006),⁵ and the relevant articles of the Taef Accord (1989).

C. A permanent ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon (Hezbollah, a cause of the frequent incidents, is not specifically mentioned.) The ceasefire must be based on respect for the Blue Line⁶ and the territorial sovereignty and integrity of both Israel and Lebanon.

D. The resolution does not call for an immediate IDF withdrawal from Lebanon. However, it does mention, in general and without an obligatory schedule, the elimination of foreign forces in Lebanon without the consent of its government.

E. UNIFIL monitoring of the resolution’s implementation: The resolution requests UNIFIL, upon cessation of hostilities, to monitor its implementation and to ensure the safe return of displaced persons [UNIFIL was also mentioned in a context beyond south Lebanon, of assisting the Lebanon government to ensure that arms and related materiel not be imported into Lebanon without its consent, even though it is not deployed in north Lebanon and does not have the necessary capabilities].

F. Therelease of the two Israeli soldiers abducted by Hezbollah: the resolution calls for the “unconditional release” of the two soldiers whose abduction led to the current confrontation. The resolution recognizes Hezbollah’s responsibility for the confrontation and mentions the attack on Israel carried out on July 12. At the same time, it encourages promoting a solution for the problem of the Lebanese prisoners on Israel,⁷ that is, their release.

G. Delineation of the international Israeli-Lebanese border and of the Sheba’a Farms region: The resolution calls for the delineation of the international border especially in areas where it is “disputed or uncertain” including the Sheba’a Farms area.⁸

2. The resolution calls for Israel and Lebanon to support “security arrangements” between the Blue Line and the LitaniRiver, in order to prevent a resumption of hostilities. The “security arrangements” include:

A. A ban on the presence of terrorists: The establishment of an area “free of any armed personnel, assets [by implication, military assets, apparently strongholds and entrenchments] and weapons.”

B. The enforcement of Lebanese government authority: The Lebanese army will deploy in the area and Lebanese security forces and the Lebanese government will enforce its authority. ⁹

C. Deployment of an international force to support the Lebanese government: The force’s mandate and battle order will be determined later in a separate resolution after the Israeli and Lebanese governments have agreed to the terms of the long-term arrangement. The limits of the deployment are not specifically defined but in that context an area between the Blue Line and the Litani are mentioned. The force will operate under the authority of the UN mandate given by Chapter VII of the UN Charter.¹⁰

D. Providing maps of land mines: Israel will give the UN remaining maps of land mines in Lebanon in Israel’s possession [as requested by the Lebanese government].

3. Security issues mentioned in the draft which go beyond the south Lebanon context:

A. The disarmament of the “armed groups” in Lebanon on the basis of the Taef Accord¹¹ and Security Council Resolutions 1559 and 1680 [the intention was to disarm Hezbollah and the Palestinian terrorist organizations]. Also mentioned is the Lebanese government decision of July 27, ratifying Fuad Siniora’s seven-point program to stress the internal Lebanese legitimacy of the proposed resolution.

B. The establishment of an international embargo on the sale or supply of arms and related equipment to Lebanon except as authorized by its government [mainly to prevent Iran and Syria from supplying Hezbollah with weapons]. The draft calls for the Lebanese government to ensure that arms are not brought into Lebanon without its authorization and asks UNIFIL to assist the Lebanese government when requested [although UNIFIL does not have the capability to inspect the transfer of weapons from Syria to Hezbollah].

C. Lebanon’s economic rehabilitation: The draft calls upon the international community to take “immediate steps to extend its financial and humanitarian aid to the Lebanese people, including through facilitating the safe return of displaced persons and, under the authority of the Government of Lebanon, reopening airports and harbors for verifiably and purely civilian purposes, and calls on it also to consider further assistance in the future to contribute to the reconstruction and development of Lebanon.”

4. Timetables:

A. The cessation of hostilities is to be immediate. The timetables or the resolutions other provisions are unclear.

B. The resolution requests the Secretary General to develop, in liaison with key international actors and the concerned parties, proposals to implement the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and of resolutions 1559 and 1680 and to present them to the Security Council within 30 days.

C. In that context, disarmament [of the terrorist organizations], the delineation of Lebanon ’s international borders and the issue of the Sheba’a Farms are also mentioned.

D. During that period [of 30 days] the proposal calls upon all sides to maintain the ceasefire.

E. Although it is not specifically stated, the period between first and second parts of the proposed resolution is liable to be longer than 30 days if Israel and Lebanon do not reach an agreement.

The position of the Lebanese government

5. The Lebanese should, at first glance, be clearly interested in accepting and implementing the Security Council resolution because it would significantly promote the weakening of Hezbollah and strengthen the government. On the other hand, the resolution has the potential to cause internal Lebanese tensions to the point where the situation might deteriorate if an attempt is made to force Hezbollah into taking steps which do not suit it. That is what the Lebanese government is afraid of.

6. As far as Hezbollah is concerned, the resolution is dangerous and liable to damage its status in Lebanon . It specifically calls for the organization to be disarmed, limits its rearmament, allows for an Israeli presence (although a temporary one) in Lebanon after the ceasefire and emphasizes the idea of deploying a multinational force.

7. Therefore, both the Lebanese government and Hezbollah (through its proxy, Nabih Berri, the chairman of the Lebanese Parliament) oppose the current wording of the draft and it is expected that the Lebanese government will make a diplomatic effort to change it and promote its own proposed resolution. In concrete terms, the Lebanese reservations relate to certain central parts of the proposal, among them the demand for a full, immediate ceasefire which will include an immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from south Lebanon (after which the Lebanese government will be willing to send 15,000 soldiers to south Lebanon ).

Appendix

Draft of U.N. Security Council Resolution on Hostilities in Lebanon and Israel¹²

Saturday, August 5, 2006; 12:31 PM

Draft UNSC resolution / Projet de résolution du Conseil de Sécurité

The Security Council,

PP1. Recalling all its previous resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 520 (1982), 1559 (2004), 1655 (2006) and 1680 (2006), as well as the statements of its President on the situation in Lebanon, in particular the statements of 18 June 2000 (S/PRST/2000/21), of 19 October 2004 (S/PRST/2004/36), of 4 May 2005 (S/PRST/2005/17) of 23 January 2006 (S/PRST/2006/3) and of 30 July 2006 (S/PRST/2006/35),

PP2. Expressing its utmost concern at the continuing escalation of hostilities in Lebanon and in Israel since Hizbollah's attack on Israel on 12 July 2006, which has already caused hundreds of deaths and injuries on both sides, extensive damage to civilian infrastructure and hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons,

PP3. Emphasizing the need for an end of violence, but at the same time emphasizing the need to address urgently the causes that have given rise to the current crisis, including by the unconditional release of the abducted Israeli soldiers,

PP4: Mindful of the sensitivity of the issue of prisoners and encouraging the efforts aimed at settling the issue of the Lebanese prisoners detained in Israel,

OP1. Calls for a full cessation of hostilities based upon, in particular, the immediate cessation by Hizbollah of all attacks and the immediate cessation by Israel of all offensive military operations;

OP2. Reiterates its strong support for full respect for the Blue Line;

OP3. Also reiterates its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized borders, as contemplated by the Israeli-Lebanese General Armistice Agreement of 23 March 1949;

OP4. Calls on the international community to take immediate steps to extend its financial and humanitarian assistance to the Lebanese people, including through facilitating the safe return of displaced persons and, under the authority of the Government of Lebanon, reopening airports and harbours for verifiably and purely civilian purposes, and calls on it also to consider further assistance in the future to contribute to the reconstruction and development of Lebanon;

OP5. Emphasizes the importance of the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory in accordance with the provisions of resolution 1559 (2004) and resolution 1680 (2006), and of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, for it to exercise its full sovereignty and authority;

OP6. Calls for Israel and Lebanon to support a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution based on the following principles and elements:

- strict respect by all parties for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Israel and Lebanon;

- full respect for the Blue Line by both parties;

- delineation of the international borders of Lebanon, especially in those areas where the border is disputed or uncertain, including in the Shebaa farms area;

- security arrangements to prevent the resumption of hostilities, including the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani river of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Lebanese armed and security forces and of UN mandated international forces deployed in this area;

- full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006) that require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, so that, pursuant to the Lebanese cabinet decision of July 27, 2006, there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese state;

- deployment of an international force in Lebanon, consistent with paragraph 10 below;

- establishment of an international embargo on the sale or supply of arms and related material to Lebanon except as authorized by its government;

- elimination of foreign forces in Lebanon without the consent of its government;

- provision to the United Nations of remaining maps of land mines in Lebanon in Israel's possession;

OP7. Invites the Secretary General to support efforts to secure agreements in principle from the Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel to the principles and elements for a long-term solution as set forth in paragraph 6 above;

OP8. Requests the Secretary General to develop, in liaison with key international actors and the concerned parties, proposals to implement the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), including disarmament, and for delineation of the international borders of Lebanon, especially in those areas where the border is disputed or uncertain, including by dealing with the Shebaa farms, and to present those proposals to the Security Council within thirty days;

OP9. Calls on all parties to cooperate during this period with the Security Council and to refrain from any action contrary to paragraph 1 above that might adversely affect the search for a long-term solution, humanitarian access to civilian populations, or the safe return of displaced persons, and requests the Secretary General to keep the Council informed in this regard;

OP10. Expresses its intention, upon confirmation to the Security Council that the Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel have agreed in principle to the principles and elements for a long-term solution as set forth in paragraph 6 above, and subject to their approval, to authorize in a further resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter the deployment of a UN mandated international force to support the Lebanese armed forces and government in providing a secure environment and contribute to the implementation of a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution;

OP11. Requests UNIFIL, upon cessation of hostilities, to monitor its implementation and to extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the safe return of displaced persons;

OP12. Calls upon the Government of Lebanon to ensure arms or related materiel are not imported into Lebanon without its consent and requests UNIFIL, conditions permitting, to assist the Government of Lebanon at its request;

OP13. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council within one week on the implementation of this resolution and to provide any relevant information in light of the Council's intention to adopt, consistent with paragraph 10 above, a further resolution;

OP14. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.