Hezbollah as a case study of the battle for hearts and minds

Anti-Semitic and anti-Israeli propaganda

Anti-American propaganda

Psychological warfare: “Tel Aviv is not safe”

Fostering the suicide bomber myth

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Hezbollah as a case study of the battle for hearts and minds

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Overview

1. Hezbollah, “the party of Allah,” is a Lebanese Muslim terrorist organization, established with Syrian support in 1982 during the first Lebanon war (Operation Peace for the Galilee). Hezbollah’s ideology is radical Shi’ite Islam, and the organization serves as a tool to promote the goals of Iran and Syria, while at the same time it is an integral part of the Lebanon’s political and social fabric.

2. During the 25 years of its existence Hezbollah, with massive support from Iran, established an **extensive military infrastructure** in Lebanon. Equipped with advanced weapons, it was activated against Israel in the second Lebanon war. In addition to its military infrastructure, Hezbollah also established a **civilian framework** which supports Lebanese Shi’ites in the fields of education, health care, religion and provides various social services. Operated together, the two systems turned Hezbollah from a local Lebanese terrorist organization, with limited guerilla and terrorist capabilities, into an organization with military and civilian capabilities which go far beyond those

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1 This study is one in a series of Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center articles dealing with various aspects of the battle for hearts and minds and a continuation of Dr. Reuven Erlich’s February 14, 2006 article entitled “The battle for hearts and minds: The ongoing Israeli-Palestinian confrontation as a case study,” [http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malani_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/i_p_conflict_e.pdf].

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of the other terrorist organizations both in the Middle East and the rest of the world.

3. Hezbollah, like other terrorist organizations, is fully aware of the importance of the battle for hearts and minds, whose objective is to influence the insights and perceptions of various target audiences in Lebanon and abroad. The battle is waged in many different ways, from information and propaganda to “education” and indoctrination. Alongside its **vast network of educational and cultural institutions**, the organization, with massive financing from Iran, built a media empire and learned (as did the other terrorist organizations) how to exploit the possibilities presented by the communications and information revolution.

4. The flagship of Hezbollah’s **media empire** is its TV satellite channel, **Al-Manar**, which was set up in 1991 with aid from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. The channel’s broadcasts are slanted toward propaganda and reflect Hezbollah’s Iranian-inspired ideology and political agenda. From the very beginning Hezbollah specialized in mixing propaganda with factual information, including **visual material from the battlefield**. To that end, it established a body called “**battle information**,” which embedded professional photographers in the squads attacking the IDF and the South Lebanese Army. Al-Manar is professional and effective, and it is extremely popular not only in Lebanon but throughout the entire Arab-Muslim world, the Middle East (including the Palestinian Authority) and abroad.

5. In addition to Al-Manar, Hezbollah owns a radio station (Radio Nur), newspapers, Internet sites in several languages (including English, French, Spanish and even Hebrew) and publishing houses (the most notable of which is Dar al-Hadi, named for Hassan Nasrallah’s son Hadi, killed in south Lebanon). All of the above, in addition to the organization’s extensive network of religious, “educational” and cultural institutions, and its internal indoctrination system, have a uniform strategic propaganda base determined by Hassan Nasrallah, with neither internal criticism nor leaks to the media.
6. Hezbollah’s battle for hearts and minds employs terminology expressing Iran’s extremist Shi’ite Islamic worldview. Special emphasis is put on fostering the values of **jihad** (holy war) and **shahadah** (death as a martyr for the sake of Allah) to justify the campaign of terrorism and guerilla warfare waged by Hezbollah (and the Palestinian terrorist organizations) against Israel. At the same time, Hezbollah does not hesitate to use Western terminology unrelated to Islam, such as **muqawamah**, a modern secular Arabic term meaning “active resistance,” or to adopt anti-Semitic European Christian motifs to encourage hatred for Israel and the Jewish people.

7. The **principal messages** sent by Hezbollah to its target audiences at home, in the Arab-Muslim world and the Western world are the following: the organization is Lebanese-nationalist in character and non-sectarian; it plays a role as Lebanon’s “defender,” which legitimizes its military infrastructure; hatred for Israel and denying its right to exist, which justify the terrorist campaign waged by Hezbollah and the Palestinians against it, and it uses its communications empire to encourage anti-Semitism and hatred for the Jewish people; hatred for the United States, by representing it as the source of evil and terrorism; Hezbollah’s image of might, its “glorious successes” against Israel and Hassan Nasrallah as a role model; radical Shi’ite Islamic ideology and Iranian “leader Ali Khamenei” as a role model.

8. However, all of the above messages are rife with **internal contradictions and weaknesses**. Hezbollah’s complete dependence on Iran (and Syria) and its regarding Khamenei as the source of authority contradict the image of “Lebanese nationalism” the organization tries to create; its clearly Shi’ite identity contradicts its non-ethnic stance; the radical Islamic Iranian ideology it represents contradicts the basic pragmatism which is characteristic of most of the Lebanese population, regardless of ethnic affiliation; its militant jihadist character contradicts Lebanon’s national interests and even the interests of the Shi’ites themselves, who bear the burden of the results of Hezbollah’s terrorism and guerilla tactics against Israel.
9. During the second Lebanon war Hezbollah waged a shrewd, successful propaganda campaign against Israel by using the media empire it had built over the years. The campaign was aimed primarily at Lebanese and Arab-Muslim audiences, but was also intended to influence Western and Israeli public opinion. **Hezbollah strove to delegitimize the IDF’s actions in Lebanon** by inculcating the message that Israel was harming innocent Lebanese civilians, while ignoring the fact that it had established its military infrastructure within the midst of Lebanon’s dense civilian population and was using them as human shields. At the same time, the organization waged a propaganda campaign and used psychological warfare to attack its Israeli target audience to lower morale, cause panic, increase fear of its rocket fire and strengthen Hezbollah’s image as a strong organization possessing impressive operational capabilities.

10. The battle for hearts and minds in the second Lebanon war was spearheaded by Al-Manar TV, which survived and remained on the air, even after the Israeli air force bombed its building in a southern suburb of Beirut. It regularly broadcast factual information mixed with propaganda about its rocket fire and the successes it achieved in battle, and its broadcasts served as a source for many other media. Hassan Nasrallah was interviewed six times during the war (four times by Al-Manar) and his statements were often quoted, especially in Lebanon, other Middle Eastern countries and around the world. To a great extent, during the war he succeeded in taking over TV screens (even in Israel), thus achieving an enormous advantage.

11. Hezbollah’s propaganda achievements were also the result of **its ability to prevent foreign journalists, Arab and Western alike**, from accessing combat zones and to keep information away from them, making it impossible for them to cover topics which were incompatible with the organization’s propaganda strategy. In general, foreign correspondents in Lebanon could not visit military sites (weapons’ depots, bases, facilities) or interview organization operatives in the field. They were channeled into covering Lebanese civilians harmed by Israeli attacks and the damage done to Lebanon’s civilian infrastructure. Reports by foreign correspondents show that only a few of
them succeeded in evading supervision and the limitations placed on them by Hezbollah, and in operating in ways other than those dictated by the organization.

12. After the war Hezbollah launched another extensive propaganda campaign, whose objective was to inculcate its target audiences with the myth of the “divine victory.” The campaign was based on three main elements:

   A. The IDF’s failure to stop or significantly reduce Hezbollah rocket fire throughout the war;
   B. The harsh internal criticism expressed for the IDF and the government when the war ended: the many failures and mistakes exposed were used and are still being used by Hezbollah as grist for its propaganda mill.
   C. Israel’s achievements and Hezbollah’s failures in the war were not sufficiently emphasized within Israel itself because of internal criticism. Therefore, they were not always picked in Lebanon and the Arab world, with the result that they did not succeed in undermining Hezbollah’s victory myth.

13. However, as the dust settled in the months following the war, and as the Lebanese internalized the destruction wrought upon their country, the myth of the “divine victory” began to crack, and internal criticism increased because of the high price Lebanon was forced to pay for Hezbollah’s military escapade. Therefore the organization was forced to switch to defensive tactics and must now face the accusations of its opponents in Lebanon for having dragged the country into an unnecessary war, and to fend off demands to disarm and implement UN Security Council Resolution 1701. The fierce dispute between Hezbollah and the opposition camp created an on-going political crisis in Lebanon, which is apparently far from being resolved.
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A portrait of Hezbollah

1. Hezbollah\(^2\) ("the party of Allah," in modern political terminology) is a Lebanese Shi’ite Muslim terrorist organization. It was established by Iran with Syrian support in the summer of 1982 during the first Lebanon war (Operation Peace for the Galilee). Hezbollah’s ideology is the radical Islam preached by Iran’s Khomeini. The organization is a strategic tool in Iranian and Syrian hands, and at the same time an integral part of Lebanon’s political and social fabric. Its radical Islamic identity and complete dependence on Iran and Syria dictate its jihadist militant stance towards Israel, against which it has waged a terrorist campaign and guerilla warfare since its inception (for the difference between terrorism and guerilla warfare, see below).

2. Hezbollah was established in the Baalbek region of Lebanon’s Beqa’a Valley, from whence it spread to Shi’ite population concentrations in south Lebanon and Beirut’s Southern Suburb. Within those areas Hezbollah established an extensive military infrastructure, aided and supported by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. The infrastructure has the military capabilities of a sovereign state, which on the eve of the second Lebanon war included more than 20,000 rockets and advanced anti-tank missiles. Relying on Shi’ites throughout the world, Hezbollah also maintains an operational infrastructure outside Lebanon and has created a real potential for terrorist attacks abroad.

3. The terrorist and guerilla operations undertaken by Hezbollah since its inception have focused on Israel, although occasionally it has acted against the United States and other Western countries, as well as against Israeli and Jewish targets abroad. While conducting its routine, on-going terrorist and guerilla activities, it also built up a military infrastructure, which was

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\(^2\) The name Hezbollah is taken from the Qur’an, Surah 5, Verse 56: “As to those who turn (for friendship) to Allah, His Messenger, and the (fellowship of) believers, it is the party of Allah that must certainly triumph,” http://www.isna.net/library/quran/quran_e/5.html.
4. With massive Iranian aid and support, Hezbollah also established an extensive civilian infrastructure. With facilities and institutions for education, health, religion, social services and propaganda, it helps the traditionally deprived Shi’ite Lebanese community to advance its sectarian interests politically, economically, and socially. Hezbollah’s civilian activities have enabled it to establish a broad power base within the Shi’ite community and to become an influential factor in Lebanon’s internal politics.

5. Hezbollah is motivated by radical Iranian Shi’ite Islamic ideology, exported from Iran and inculcated into the local Shi’ite population. The Ayatollah Khomeini, who instigated and led the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, and his heir, Leader Ali Khamenei, are two key personalities, both revered and acclaimed. They were turned by Hezbollah into role models, and in the second Lebanon war their pictures and sayings were found in Hezbollah offices and bases in south Lebanon. It should be noted that Hezbollah did not develop its own unique Islamic ideology, but rather adopted the Iranian ideology in toto.

6. Since its establishment, Hezbollah has succeeded in converting from a local terrorist organization to one with broad military, social and communications capabilities which surpass those known to be possessed by terrorist organizations in the Middle East and even beyond. That was made possible by the massive military and financial support and political backup provided by Iran and Syria, which view Hezbollah as an important strategic tool for waging their campaign against the United States and Israel, for increasing their influence in Lebanon and for advancing their regional interests.
The battle for hearts and minds in Hezbollah strategy

1. “Members of the resistance have come to the conclusion that while a bullet can wound a soldier or two, a picture can wound all of Israeli society, which is the most significant aspect of the conflict” (a senior member of Hezbollah’s battle information department to Al-Diyyar, Lebanon, October 25, 1997).

2. The confrontation between Hezbollah, the Palestinian terrorist organizations and Israel waged during the past decades is fought on three fronts:

   A. **On the ground**, between the organizations initiating terrorism and those who carry it out, and the security forces which try to prevent terrorist attacks;

   B. **On the political front**, as both sides try to rally support from the international community and the Arab-Muslim world;

   C. **In the battle for hearts and minds**, in which both the terrorist organizations and Israel, using a variety of means and methods, try to bring their positions and perceptions to the attention of the relevant target audiences.

   Success or failure on one of the fronts can influence, and sometimes determine, the events in the other two.

3. In the battle for hearts and minds rival sides use many methods to try to influence, directly or indirectly, the perceptions and insights of their various target audiences. The methods used include education, indoctrination,

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3 **Terrorist organizations** wage a politically-oriented campaign with the deliberate use of various forms of violence, usually accepting no moral or legal limitations. They more often **target civilians** rather than at army and security forces, with the objective of forcing governments to change their policies in various fields. The acts of violence are carried out by terrorist organizations supported in many instances, directly or indirectly, by sovereign states (“terrorism supporting countries”). The international community regards terrorism as illegitimate and heinous because its perpetrators attack innocent civilians to promote their national interests, as opposed to guerilla warfare, whose targets are army and security forces.
information, propaganda and psychological warfare. The battle is waged not only to reinforce the positions of supporters but to win over neutral and hostile target audiences.

4. The terrorist organizations fighting Israel regard the battle for hearts and minds as extremely important. Hezbollah and Hamas, which are radical-Islamic in nature,² are particularly prominent. Both devote enormous resources to the battle and use it extensively when dealing with their rivals at home, as well as against Israel and the West. The weapons used are virtual: pictures shown on television, the written word, hard-copy media, the Internet, radio broadcasts, the sermons of the preachers in the mosques.

5. However, the harm done by such virtual weapons and their long- and short-term influence on morale are no less than those of real bullets. For better or worse, they influence the motivation, will and determination of both sides to continue the battle, despite the difficulties and the harm done to morale. In the battle for hearts and minds each side tries to create a positive image for itself and a negative image for its enemy and to draw favorable public opinion to its cause.

6. The terrorist campaign and accompanying battle for hearts and minds are waged on the backdrop of the communications revolution, especially exploiting satellite television channels and the enormous vistas opened by the Internet. The terrorist organizations, aware of the critical importance of the battle for hearts and minds, have chalked up impressive successes by using the media to transmit their messages, create public interest in their doings, generate support and sympathy for their causes and increase the influence of terrorism.⁵

² The Islamic version of the battle for hearts and minds appears in the Hamas charter (Article 15), “… the propagation of Islamic awareness among the masses.”

⁵ See the article (in Hebrew) by Boaz Ganor, “Communications and the strategy of terrorism,” in Security and Communications, the Dynamics of Relations, The Ben Gurion Heritage Institute and Research Center, 2005, pp. 219-235.
Among the radical Islamic terrorist organizations which learned how to exploit the possibilities presented by the communications and information revolution, most prominent are Hezbollah, Hamas and Al-Qaeda. All three completely reject the messages spread by Western television and the Internet and at the same time use both media to spread their own messages and support for their terrorist campaigns. In a recent article about the second Lebanon war, American journalist Marvin Kalb related to the issue by quoting an Austrian expert and noting that ‘‘If Bin Laden didn’t have access to global media, satellite communications and the Internet, he’d just be a cranky guy in a cave.’ Maybe, but in fact Bin Laden does understand the enormous power of modern communications.”

8. The Iranian regime invests great efforts to export its Khomeini-inspired radical Islamic ideology. Hezbollah, inspired by Iran, established a broad network of educational, cultural (including publishing houses) and religious institutions, all intended to shape the Shi’ite mindset to the ideology of the Iranian Islamic revolution. Hezbollah also acts as the vanguard in exploiting the potential of mass communications in the battle for hearts and minds. Hezbollah is exceptional in that it is the only terrorist organization to possess a satellite television channel, a radio station and a vast Internet presence, all of which reach the organization’s various target audiences. They are based on a uniform propaganda strategy, with no internal criticism and no leaks to the media. Thus Hezbollah has become a model for the Palestinian terrorist organizations, especially Hamas, in the battle for hearts and minds as well as in terrorism.

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Hezbollah’s terminology

1. Hezbollah, having adopted the Islamic radical Shi’ite Iranian ideology, often employs specific terminology to express it. Hatred is fostered for Israel by calling it “the Zionist entity,” and for the United States by calling it “the enemy of Islam” and “the source of world evil.” The tenets of jihad and shahadah are also glorified and used to justify terrorist campaign waged by the organization against Israel.7 At the same time, Hezbollah does not hesitate to employ Western terminology completely unrelated to Islam. For example, it makes extensive use of the term “resistance” (see below), nor does it hesitate to exploit Christian European anti-Semitic motifs for its own purposes.

Jihad according to Leader Khamenei

“Jihad [is] one of the gates to paradise opened by Allah to his chosen faithful.” That is, Allah determined jihad as a recommended path for the chosen Muslim faithful to reach paradise (from the introduction to a jihad booklet which quotes an Islamic oral tradition [hadith] attributed to Caliph Ali, the founder of Shi’a).

During the second Lebanon war four copies of a book called Al-Jihad were taken from Hezbollah operatives in Maroun al-Ras. It was published in 2004 by the Imam Khomeini Cultural Center in Beirut, and analyzes the significance of jihad according to the worldview of Iranian Leader Ali Khamenei.

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2. The terminology used by Hezbollah, like that of the Palestinian terrorist organizations, represents terrorist attacks as **legitimate actions** which cannot be surpassed. It glorifies the various types of terrorism, making no distinction between suicide bombing attacks and rockets fired into civilian populations, and turns the suicide bombers into role models for the younger generation. At the same time, the terminology negates the right of the State of Israel to exist. It makes free use of anti-Semitic slogans, sometimes with no distinction between Israel, the Zionist movement and the Jewish people. Two examples follow, one of Hezbollah’s use of terminology borrowed from the West, and the other of Islamic terminology:

A. First, Hezbollah often uses the term **muqawamah** ("active resistance"), which is in effect a modern secular Arabic term. Hezbollah and its operatives are often called “the Islamic resistance in Lebanon.”

The term was borrowed from the French *résistance* and was intended to imbue terrorism with the cachet of self defense against a foreign occupier. However, the French Resistance in the Second World War did not operate against civilians but rather against soldiers and military facilities with the objective of driving the Nazis out of France (and is therefore considered a guerilla movement). In addition, **muqawamah**, which is the translation of *résistance*, also expresses general resistance to an enemy arising from disgust related to non-military aspects, such as culture, economy and society, and not just narrow terrorist-operational activities.

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8 The full name of Hamas in Arabic is the **Islamic Resistance Movement**. Both Hezbollah and Hamas took names integrating an Islamic motif with the term *resistance*. The Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese parliament is called Loyalty to Resistance.
Adherence to “resistance”

Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah: “This is the year of adherence to resistance, the preservation of resistance and the insistence on resistance, and that is our choice, our faith and our path, and our national, pan-Arabic and Islamic deed…” (Al-Manar TV, February 9, 2005).

B. Secondly, Hezbollah uses the term *istishhad*, cognate with *shaheed* (a martyr for the sake of Allah). It means “dying the death of Muslim martyr for the sake of Allah through self-sacrifice on the battlefield against an enemy,” and has been attached principally to suicide bombing attacks. That is done to justify suicide bombing terrorism, since suicide is forbidden by Islam if its motive is personal, in which case it is called *intihar*. Hezbollah (and the Palestinian terrorist organizations) use the term freely and the message is that death as a martyr through self-sacrifice (i.e., a suicide bombing attack) is a transcendent, heroic action done first and foremost for the sake of Allah, and also for the sake of all Muslims. Its objective is to advance the Islamic terrorist organizations’ political agenda, but also to provide the suicide bomber and his or her family with bonuses both in this world and the next, which “ordinary” Muslims usually do not receive. Thus the suicide bomber is glorified, and it is no surprise that suicide bombing terrorism has spread from Lebanon throughout the entire Arab-Muslim world, fomented especially by propaganda in the media and mosques.
Hezbollah fosters the shaheeds

From the page of Islamic Resistance shaheed pictures appearing on the Hezbollah Website of the village of Houleh in south Lebanon: two Hezbollah shaheeds under an inscription reading “the martyrs, in the eye of their Lord... shall have their Reward and their Light.” The objective is to turn the shaheeds into role models. Hezbollah has a Website called “Jihad and Shahadah” devoted to the operatives of the organization who were killed in confrontations with the IDF.

9 Qur’an, Surah 57, Al-Hadid, Verse 19.
Hezbollah encourages Palestinian terrorism and turning suicide bombers into role models. From an Al-Manar TV movie praising the suicide bombing attack carried out by Muhammad Mahmoud Bakker Nasr, a Palestinian Islamic Jihad operative who blew himself up in the Wall Street café in Kiryat Motzkin near Haifa on August 12, 2001, injuring 16 people. Under the suicide bomber's picture appear the Arabic words “blessed martyrdom.” The ultra-Orthodox Jew (middle row, right hand picture) personifies all Israelis, who represent “heresy” and “treachery” (Al-Manar TV, August 18, 2001).
Hezbollah’s target audiences

1. Hezbollah is a terrorist organization that specializes, among other things, in the battle for hearts and minds, supported and inspired by Iran. That component of the organization’s strategy enables it to upgrade its terrorist-operational and political activities. Hezbollah’s battle for hearts and minds is directed at many target audiences, each of which is ranked differently in importance, and each receives unique and specially suited messages, some of them sometimes contradictory.

2. The classic propaganda is aimed at three types of audiences: the home audience, the neutral audience and the audience identified with the enemy. Hezbollah, although it is a Lebanese Shi’ite organization, is not satisfied with the home audience and makes a great effort to spread its propaganda to the other two. The various target audiences in Lebanon, the Middle East and the West are the following:

A. The Lebanese, whom Hezbollah regards as of supreme importance: Its power base is among the Lebanese Shi’ites and they are Hezbollah’s first priority. The organization places special emphasis on children, adolescents and university students, whom it views as its future. In addition to the Shi’ites, there are various other sectarian groups, parties and organizations that Hezbollah regards as important, even if they are not necessarily among its supporters. Hezbollah works to increase their support and to be more effective with its opponents.

B. Arabs and Muslims: Hezbollah also regards the support of neutral target audiences in the Arab-Muslim world as important. It tries to gloss over the rivalry and contradictions between Shi’ites and Sunni Muslims and to stress what it views as common denominators, especially political and cultural factors, such as hostility toward Israel and the West, particularly the United States, support for the Palestinians, rejection of modern Western values and the preservation of the values of traditional Islam. Sometimes if does so by appealing directly to the Arab street,
bypassing the heads of the pro-Western Arab regimes hostile to Hezbollah and the Iranian-Syrian axis (i.e., Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan).\textsuperscript{10} Hezbollah also regards the Palestinian target audience as particularly important and pays it a great deal of attention to \textbf{encourage} the Palestinian terrorist organizations to escalate their campaign against Israel (see below).

\textbf{C. Western countries}, and concentrations of Lebanese and Muslim Arabs in Western countries: When dealing with the West, Hezbollah tries to play down its image as a terrorist organization in order to win justification for its military-terrorist attacks against Israel, to vilify Israel and its policies, and to make it difficult for the IDF to operate in Lebanon. Aware of the difficulties it faces in the West (as a terrorist organization operated by Iran), Hezbollah uses terminology specially adapted to Western ears, sometimes even glossing over or even hiding the radical rhetoric it usually employs when dealing with Israel, the Jewish people and the West.\textsuperscript{11}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{10} Despite their basic hostility, both Saudi Arabia and Egypt permit Hezbollah to broadcast Al-Manar TV using communications satellites which they control, while Hezbollah compensates them by avoiding blatant direct attacks on pro-Western Arab regimes (see below).
  \item \textsuperscript{11} For example, in view of the fact that its broadcasts are forbidden in the United States and France (see below), at the beginning of April 2005 Al-Manar TV launched a news site on the Internet in Arabic and English (www.manartv.com.lb). It claims to focus on religious tolerance, strengthening culture and dialog, unity and cooperation between members of monotheistic religions and world cultures, a complete contradiction of the hate propaganda and encouragement of terrorism which are spread by Al-Manar TV.
\end{itemize}
Hezbollah-supporting Shi’ite Muslims participate in an parade in London on the occasion of Iran-promoted Jerusalem Day (October 22, 2006)

Demonstrators in London carrying banners, pictures of Hassan Nasrallah (with the Dome of the Rock) and Lebanese and Hezbollah flags (http://publicansdecoy.livejournal.com)

Hezbollah capes, flags and hats sold at the demonstration in London (http://publicansdecoy.livejournal.com)

D. The enemy target audience, Israeli public opinion: Hezbollah attempts to manipulate Israeli public opinion with propaganda in Arabic and sometimes even Hebrew.\textsuperscript{12} That is done to increase the impact of its

\textsuperscript{12} Hezbollah sometimes uses Hebrew texts or subtitles in its Al-Manar broadcasts and Websites. The language is usually fairly inarticulate and it is obvious that Hezbollah does not invest much effort in preparing them.
terrorist activities, to widen the schisms within Israeli society and to turn Israeli public opinion against government policy makers. Its influence was felt both during the years of the IDF’s presence in the security zone in south Lebanon and during the second Lebanon war, when Hassan Nasrallah used mass communications to hold a kind of dialogue with the Israeli public, employing propaganda and psychological warfare. He represented Hezbollah as an organization which was reliable and faithful to its word, as opposed to the Israeli leadership, which he claimed was hiding the truth from the Israeli public. The issue of the abducted Israelis and the corpses of IDF soldiers were exploited to humiliate the IDF and the State of Israel, to reinforce Hezbollah’s achievement, and to transmit the message that the Israeli government was not doing enough to release the Israelis held by Hezbollah. It was also intended to drive a wedge between the government and the people and to exert pressure on the government to comply with Hezbollah’s demands.

Exploiting the sensitivity of Israeli-Lebanese relations to increase tension along the border: Hezbollah operatives putting up a sign in south Lebanon bearing the picture of Hassan Nasrallah, a rocket launcher and the pumps drawing water from the Wazani Spring. The inscription reads “At your command!”

3. Hezbollah employs many methods to send the following messages to different target audiences, mainly to the internal Lebanese one:

A. **“Hezbollah is a popular, national-Lebanese non-sectarian movement which conducts political, social and cultural activities**

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13 For example, after the abduction of three IDF soldiers in 2000, Al-Manar TV broadcast a clip advising then-prime minister Ehud Barak to “count his soldiers every morning.”
and is well-integrated into the fabric of Lebanese life.” Hezbollah attempts to play down its Shi’ite sectarian character and to deny its being a cat’s paw for Iran and Syria, which provide it with massive military and financial aid and use it promote their own interests. The organization is also very sensitive to attempts to undermine that message (see below).

B. “Hezbollah is the shield of Lebanon and its military activity against Israel is undertaken for the sake of Lebanese national interests” (i.e., the “liberation” of the security zone, and, after the IDF withdrew, of the Shebaa Farms, and the release of the Lebanese prisoners in Israeli jails). Hezbollah claims that its role as “Lebanon’s shield” will exist as long as the country is weak and does not have its own “strong national army” to defend it. The message, which is backed up by Hezbollah’s supporters in the Lebanese government, is intended to allow the organization to claim that its military infrastructure terrorist and guerilla actions against Israel are legitimate, and to fend off the demands of opponents in Lebanon and abroad that it disarm.

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14 Hezbollah’s communications media often deal with the Lebanese prisoners serving terms in Israeli jails for murder, and praise them and their actions. Samir al-Kuntar, who led a squad of terrorist-operatives and on April 22, 1979 murdered three members of the Haran family in Nahariya, receives special attention. Hezbollah continually promises the prisoners’ families that it is working to secure their release and that they will be set free in the near future.

15 To his opponents Hassan Nasrallah says: “Build that [strong Lebanese national] army and then we will be able to settle the issue of resistance” (Al-Manar TV, April 8, 2007).
Hezbollah as “Lebanon’s shield”

Homepage of Hezbollah’s Wa’ad (“promise”) Website (www.wa3ad.org): Hassan Nasrallah flanked by Lebanese and Hezbollah flags.

A small Lebanese flag bearing the inscriptions “We are all for the homeland” and “We are all resistance.” It was found in the possession of Hezbollah terrorist-operatives in the village of Rajamin on August 10, 2006, during the second Lebanon war.

Hezbollah as “Lebanon’s shield:” the raven (the IDF) caught in a trap (Hezbollah)

Hezbollah “defends Lebanon” according to a false claim that Hezbollah prevented IDF incursions into Lebanese territory: pictures from Hezbollah propaganda broadcast after exchanges of fire at Har Dov (the Shebaa Farms). It purports to show how Hezbollah stands guard over Lebanon and does not permit the IDF to cross the border: the Hezbollah trap kills the raven (the IDF) (Al-Manar TV, June 29, 2005). In reality, Hezbollah terrorist-operatives tried to infiltrate into Israel.
C. “Israel and the United States seek to harm Lebanon and they are behind all the ills and problems plaguing the country.”

Hezbollah fosters hatred for Israel, denies its right to exist, strives to destroy it, justifies terrorism against it and disseminates anti-Semitic propaganda, sometimes without making a distinction between Israel, the Zionist movement and the Jewish people. Hezbollah also spreads hate propaganda against the United States and the American administration, representing them as a source of evil and terrorism, and accusing them of bloodshed, worldwide oppression, attempts to cause a split between Shi’ites and Sunni Muslims, etc.

**Hezbollah’s commitment to secure the release of murderers imprisoned in Israel**

On the left is Samir al-Kuntar, draped in the Lebanese flag, on the right Hassan Nasrallah; picture from the home page of Hezbollah’s Website dedicated to Samir al-Kuntar. The inscription in red reads “the true promise,” the name Hezbollah gave to the operation in which the Israeli soldiers Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev were abducted on July 12, 2006, precipitating the second Lebanon war.
Disseminating anti-American hate propaganda

An undated booklet published by Hezbollah entitled *America, the Source of Terrorism*. The cover bears a picture of Ali Khamenei. The back cover shows the Hezbollah emblem. The booklet was seized in the village of Kantara on August 12, 2006, during the second Lebanon war.

A convention of Hezbollah operatives in Lebanon. The inscription reads “Our enemies forever, USA and Israel.”

A cardboard figure of George Bush set up next to the Fatma Gate by Hezbollah propaganda agents. Bush is holding two rockets, apparently intended for Lebanon, and another rocket, labeled [UN Security Council Resolution] 1559, is poised over the UN General Assembly building. In the background are Hezbollah posters (Lebanese News Agency, December 2, 2005, photo from Al-Intiqa, a Hezbollah publication).

16 The crossing into Lebanon near Metulla in northern Israel.
D. The image of Hezbollah’s military might is nurtured, its successes against Israel are glorified and Hassan Nasrallah’s personality cult is fostered (as is that of Ali Khamenei, who serves Hezbollah as a source of religious authority). The organization represents itself as being unconquerable: “We have never suffered a defeat, never at any time...we will never be defeated, if Allah so wills it” (Hassan Nasrallah speaking before students and their families, Al-Manar TV, April 8, 2007).

On the other hand, it exposes what it views as weaknesses and claims Israel’s army and leadership are weak, and its social fiber is disintegrating. That is done to reinforce the claim that Israel’s social, economic and political foundations can be undermined through adhering to a strategy of violence and terrorism (i.e., “resistance”). Nasrallah has many stock phrases which reappear in his speeches, such as claiming Israel is “weaker than a spider’s web” (after the IDF’s withdrawal from the security zone).

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17 Hezbollah follows the Israeli media closely and exploits reports on the IDF’s shortcomings in its battle for hearts and minds. For example, sheikh Nasim Qassem, Hezbollah’s deputy secretary general, said: “Imagine a group from the Golani Brigade, about 200 of them, demonstrating because those in charge of them refused to allow them to be examined by an Israeli entity psychiatrist. That shows...the loss, the tension and the nervous breakdowns that plague them...[and] indicates the low fighting level of the soldiers of the elite units of the Israeli army” (Hezbollah publication Al-Intiqad Website, March 16, 2007). As of this writing (June 2007), Hezbollah has made intensive propaganda use of the Winograd Committee’s Report regarding its investigation of the second Lebanon war.
Fostering Hassan Nasrallah’s personality cult

Left: a large poster of Hassan Nasrallah taken by IDF soldiers from a house in the village of Yarun. Right: the same poster, found hanging on a wall in the village (Photo courtesy of the IDF spokesperson)

Propaganda and psychological warfare

Hezbollah’s psychological warfare: **Israel is not a safe place to live.** Its objective is to increase the sense of insecurity which follows a Palestinian suicide bombing attack.

Al-Manar TV, August 18, 2001  
Al-Manar TV, October 23, 2001
“Zionists, you have no security in Palestine...” (Al-Manar TV, August 3, 2001)

4. In addition to the above, and despite its claim as being a Lebanese organization, Hezbollah’s propaganda department also deals with fostering the personality cult of Iranian Leader Ali Khamenei (since, with the exception of Hassan Nasrallah, it does not view any Lebanese figure as worthy of being called a leader). Cultivating the image of Khamenei and representing him as a worthy model result from Hezbollah’s complete identification with the ideology of Iran’s Muslim revolution, from its dependence on Iran and essentially from the fact that it is Iran’s Shi’ite Muslim vanguard at the heart of the Arab Sunni Muslim world.

5. Moreover, Khamenei is represented as Nasrallah’s patron, who in the past served (and who in the present sometimes serves) as Khamenei’s senior legal emissary in Lebanon. It should be noted that in Shi’ite Islam, especially that represented by Khomeini, the leader always has a personality cult, a custom rooted in the high religious status of the Shi’ite Islamic Imam, who is considered both a religious and political leader.18

Fostering personality cults of the Iranian leadership among Hezbollah operatives in Lebanon

Posters of Ali Khamenei and the Ayatollah Khomeini, found in rooms which served Hezbollah operatives in the villages of Bint Jbeil (left) and Shihin (right) in south Lebanon. Iranian ideological material was found in the possession of Hezbollah terrorists in various Lebanese villages, clear proof that the ideology of the Iranian revolution is being exported to Lebanon.¹⁹

Hassan Nasrallah (right) and Ali Khamenei (left) flanking the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem on a calendar for the holy Muslim month of Ramadan. It was found during the second Lebanon war in the village of Kila on August 7, 2006.

¹⁹ For further information see our September 8, 2006 Bulletin entitled “Hezbollah as a strategic arm of Iran,” at http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/iran_hezbollah_e1.pdf
7. Since May 2000, when the IDF withdrew from the security zone in south Lebanon, and September 2000, when the Palestinian terrorist campaign ("second intifada") broke out, **Hezbollah has invested an enormous effort in the battle for the hearts and minds of the Palestinians. That is part of its commitment to the Palestinian cause and its desire to emphasize its identity as a radical jihadist Islamic organization.**

8. Hezbollah’s media empire (at the center of which is Al-Manar TV) encourages the Palestinian terrorist organizations to escalate their campaign against Israel, praises the suicide bombing attacks and opposes agreements and arrangements brokered to calm the situation and bring an end to terrorist activity. Al-Manar TV serves as an important channel through which responsibility for the terrorist attacks carried out in the Palestinian Authority (including suicide bombing attacks) can be claimed and its broadcasts provide a stage for vicious incitement and anti-Israeli (and sometimes anti-Semitic) propaganda.
**Hezbollah encourages Palestinian suicide bombing terrorism**

Praise for Palestinian suicide bombing terrorism after the attack carried out by Muhammad Nasr, a Palestinian Islamic Jihad terrorist who blew himself up at the Wall Street café in Kiryat Motzkin near Haifa on August 12, 2001 (Al-Manar TV, August 18, 2001).

**Hezbollah announces an era of Palestinian suicide bombing terrorism**

In a fervent speech given on the anniversary of the IDF’s withdrawal from Lebanon, Nasrallah called upon the Palestinians to continue the confrontation with Israel. He emphasized that it was Hezbollah which had begun the era of suicide bombing attacks as the main way of forcing Israel to surrender. The word *muqawamah* (“active resistance”) appears several times in red lettering behind his head (Al-Manar TV, May 25, 2006).
1. The messages Hezbollah sends to its target audiences have **internal contradictions and weaknesses** which, when exposed in the past, caused the organization to react with anger. Hezbollah’s Lebanese enemies often make use of the weaknesses.

2. The most important are the following:

   A. **Hezbollah’s overwhelming dependence on Iran (and Syria), and its global aspirations (symbolized by the globe on its emblem), which are in direct contradiction to the national-Lebanese image Hezbollah tries to create for itself:**

   1) For those reasons, many Lebanese, the Arab-(mostly Sunni) Muslim world and the international community do not consider Hezbollah an independent organization with its own policies and agenda, but rather one operated by extra-Lebanese forces which use it to advance their own interests and goals, which are far different from those of Lebanese nationalism.

   2) In the face of Hezbollah’s attempts to stress its independence and to minimize or obscure its overwhelming dependence on the support, aid and instructions it receives from beyond the Lebanese borders, there are nevertheless the massive amounts of visible military, financial and political aid it receives from Iran and Syria, and its radical Iranian Shi’ite Islamic ideology.

   3) All of the above contradict Hezbollah’s Lebanese nationalism and its independence propaganda, and make it more difficult for the organization to wage the battle for hearts and minds. That has been

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20 In an unusual admission, Hezbollah’s deputy secretary general sheikh Na’im Qassem said that the organization’s policies, especially those relating to attacks, need religious authorization from the leader in Iran. He said that even the organization’s activities in the last war, including firing rockets at Israeli civilians in the north of the country, received religious authorization from Iran (Iranian television channel Al-Kawthar, April 15, 2007).
especially true during recent years, when in both the West and the Arab world fears have grown regarding Iran’s aspirations for regional hegemony, and there has been increasing criticism of Bashar Assad’s regime in Syria, Iran’s strategic ally.

The Revolutionary Guards emblem  Hezbollah emblem

Left: the emblem of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. Right: the emblem of Hezbollah, established by the Revolutionary Guards and operated by the Quds Force. The similarity between them is obvious, and includes an upraised arm holding an assault weapon, the symbol of the revolution; militant verses from the Qur’an, which lend an air of radical Islam; the globe of the earth in the background gives militant Islam a global aspect; a book, most probably the Qur’an; and leaves sprouting from it, possibly a symbol of peace, perhaps intended to soften its militant message.

B. Hezbollah’s inability to transcend its sectarian Shi’ite roots, a situation diametrically opposed to the non-sectarian image it tries to project. The social infrastructure upon which the organization rests is the Shi’ite community; Hezbollah’s internal Lebanese interests are a function of Shi’ite interests; its concepts were taken from Shi’ite Islam and its ideology is radical Shi’ite Islam; its leadership and operatives are Shi’ite and it operates under the aegis of Shi’ite Iran. Therefore the Lebanese government and members of other ethnic and religious groups in Lebanon (Maronite Christians, Druze and Sunni Muslims) regard Hezbollah as an obviously Shi’ite sectarian organization. As a result, they are not willing to
join its ranks (Hezbollah attempts to include other communities have met with resounding failure). They view Hezbollah and its activities as endangering, in the long run, their interests and Lebanon’s sectarian balance. The organization’s radical Shi’ite Islam also creates fundamental difficulties when it comes to marketing its propaganda to pro-Western Arab countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan, and even to pragmatic secular sectors in Palestinian society. They regard both radical Shi’ite and Sunni Islamic movements as dangerous and threatening.

C. The contradiction between the radical revolutionary Islamic ideology Hezbollah represents and the fundamental pragmatism characteristic of most of the Lebanese population, regardless of sectarian affiliation. The pragmatism, bourgeois outlook and love of the good life of many Lebanese of all sects are fundamentally opposed to Hezbollah’s Iranian ideology and its strict behavior codes. That contradiction exists not only between Shi’ite Hezbollah and the other communities in Lebanon, but also within the Shi’ite community itself, and it is manifested by the ideological and political rivalries between Hezbollah and the Amal movement, which represents pragmatic Shi’a in Lebanon. There is also clear contraction between the broad criminal activity undertaken by Hezbollah operatives (drugs, counterfeiting, smuggling cars, etc.), and the organization’s ideology.

D. The contradictions between Hezbollah’s militant jihadism and the national interests of Lebanon and of the entire Shi’ite community:

1) There are fundamental contradictions between jihad, “resistance” (muqawamah) and martyrdom (shahadah), and the interests of Lebanon as an independent, sovereign state:

21 At the end of the 1990s, during the military confrontation in the security zone in south Lebanon, Hassan Nasrallah appealed to members of all the other sectarian groups to join forces with the Islamic Resistance to turn it into the “Lebanese Resistance,” not limited to the Shi’ite community. Hezbollah announced the establishment of the “Lebanese companies for resistance to the Israeli occupation” and called upon members of all religions to join. It was a feeble attempt to increase Hezbollah’s power base and gain legitimacy, and it failed miserably.
2) Between Hezbollah’s desire to continue its existence as a military organization, and the provision of the Taif Agreement of 1989 according to which all ethnic militias are to be disarmed;

3) Between the Lebanese government’s aspirations for the country’s economic rehabilitation and Hezbollah’s military operations, which create insecurity and political instability and drive away foreign investors and tourists;

4) Between the Lebanese government’s interest in maintaining a stable regime and a national army to enforce its rule over all of Lebanon, along with the Shi’ites (especially in south Lebanon) who want to live a routine, tranquil life without poverty and distress, and Hezbollah’s interests to maintain a military force as an alternative to a Lebanese army, to preserve its militant character, to control large areas in Lebanon and to prepare for the next round with Israel;

5) Between the fact that there is no real conflict of interests between Israel and Lebanon, and the fact that Hezbollah is militant and, inspired by Iranian ideology and policy, aspires to destroy Israel;

6) Between Lebanon’s interest (especially among the Maronite Christians) to maintain good relations with the United States, France (which has traditionally been Lebanon’s patron) and other Western countries, a situation anchored in centuries of history, and Hezbollah’s anti-Western ideology, inspired by Iran and not by Lebanese interests.

3. Another weakness is that according to Western public opinion, Hezbollah is a terrorist organization. Despite its integration into internal Lebanese politics, Hezbollah is not regarded by Western public opinion as a legitimate Lebanese political organization, especially not by the United States. The reasons for that include its past involvement in deadly attacks against American and French targets and the abduction of Western hostages; its building an extensive military infrastructure with Iranian and Syrian aid, including the enormous rocket arsenal which was used against Israeli civilians in the second Lebanon war; the anti-Semitic statements it makes and its avowed striving to
destroy the state of Israel. All of the above reinforce its image as a terrorist organization and an obvious emissary of the Iranian and Syrian regimes, both considered repellant not only by the United States but also large sectors of the international community.

4. Hezbollah is fully aware of its weaknesses and makes an effort to find responses for them in its battle for hearts and minds. Two of them are to gloss over inconvenient aspects and to avoid relating to problematical issues. 

Hezbollah is especially sensitive to attempts to attack its image as independent and Lebanese-nationalist, and its image as Lebanon’s shield. Two examples are:

A. On June 1, 2006, Lebanese TV LBC, affiliated with the Christian Lebanese Forces, broadcast a satirical program which attacked Hezbollah’s image as Lebanon’s shield and questioned its reliability. The program showed an actor playing the part of Hassan Nasrallah being interviewed by a man dressed as a woman, and poked fun at Hassan Nasrallah’s boasting about Hezbollah’s ability to maintain a balance of terror with Israel. According to the script, liberating the Shebaa Farms was nothing more than an excuse for attaining long-term goals, and the launching of rockets from Lebanon into Israel while refraining from taking responsibility was irresponsible. The program incited a wave of riots within the pro-Hezbollah Shi’ite population in Beirut and the series was quickly taken off the air on the grounds that the station’s broadcasting schedule was full.
Liberating the Shebaa Farms is merely an excuse to pursue other objectives

“Sayyid Nasrallah, if the Shebaa Farms are liberated, do you then intend to give up your weapons?”

“After the Shebaa Farms we will liberate Abu Hassan’s garden in Detroit, USA...”

Launching rockets into Israel without taking responsibility

“They left me alone and told me to go to Israel, but I don’t know how to get there...”

“I’m crying because no one adopted me” [i.e., no one claimed responsibility for firing the rocket].
According to an ITIC Special Bulletin about Hezbollah’s scout movement (the Iman Al-Mahdi Scouts), based on material seized during the second Lebanon war, the scout movement is a tool for radical Shi’ite Islamic indoctrination and is used to inculcate Hezbollah’s “battle legacy” in Shi’ite youth to prepare the next generation of Hezbollah operatives (see below). After the Bulletin appeared, Hezbollah instituted a media counterattack which described it as a compilation of “fabrications and mistakes.” An announcement issued by the Al-Mahdi Scout Movement stated that the movement was cultural and multi-sectarian in nature and membership was open to all Lebanese and not specifically to Shi’ites. However, it also stated that “Israel is a cancerous growth...We will continue to educate [our children on the basis of] the culture of resistance...” until the liberation of Jerusalem and all Palestine.

22 For further information see our September 11, 2006 Bulletin entitled “Hezbollah’s Shi’ite youth movement, ‘The Imam al-Mahdi Scouts,’ has tens of thousands of members Hezbollah’s Shi’ite youth movement, ‘The Imam al-Mahdi Scouts,’ has tens of thousands of members. According to captured documents, they are indoctrinated with the principles of radical Iranian Islam. That indoctrination includes the personality cult of Iranian Leader Ali Khamenei and Hezbollah’s ‘battle legacy...’” at http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/hezbollah_scouts_e.pdf.
Hezbollah’s claim: “the Al-Mahdi Scout Movement is cultural and multi sectarian…”

Al-Mahdi cub scouts marching in Beirut on Jerusalem Day, inspired by Iran. The man in the camouflage suit is a Hezbollah operative (Jemal Saidi for Reuters, November 21, 2003).

Weapons in the battle for hearts and minds

Overview

1. During the 25 years of its existence, Hezbollah has devised a variety of tools and methods to wage its battle for hearts and minds, depending on the target audience. Some of them are the following:

   A. A direct appeal to Shi’ite supporters, using Hassan Nasrallah’s undeniable talents as a speaker and propagandist: Nasrallah, with the aid of other senior Hezbollah members, customarily appeals to the organization’s supporters (especially Shi’ites) on political, religious or social occasions and during ceremonies. The events are routinely held in halls, religious and social institutions, and are attended by hundreds of participants. In exceptional circumstances Hezbollah holds mass rallies (such as the “victory rally” after the second Lebanon war) with hundreds of thousands of supporters.

23 One of Nasrallah’s favorite venues is the Sayyid al-Shuhada’ Complex, in the Shi’ite Southern Suburb of Beirut.
B. A widespread media empire: In the 1980s and 90s Hezbollah, with massive funding from Iran, constructed a media empire for disseminating propaganda to its various target audiences. The network includes Al-Manar TV, Radio Nur, newspapers, Websites and publishing houses. Hezbollah is an extraordinary example of a terrorist organization which has constructed a communications empire for propaganda purposes.

C. Clever use of Lebanese, Arab and Western communications: Hezbollah either manages to insert its “news” into the broadcasts of other media or blocks information from reporters who are not willing to accept the rules Hezbollah dictates. “Factual information,” the product of the organization’s spokesmen and propaganda network, is selective and laced with propaganda. Hezbollah exploits Lebanese and foreign media to reach foreign target audiences outside Lebanon.

D. A cultural-educational system for the indoctrination of radical Islam among Shi’ites in Lebanon, especially the younger generation: to that end Hezbollah (with Iranian support) established a vast network of educational, religious and cultural institutions, including kindergartens, elementary schools, religious and trade high schools, religious colleges, teachers’ seminaries, etc. The organization’s most important target audience is its own operatives, regardless of rank and level, to whom internal memoranda are sent with exclusively tailored information. The memoranda deal with topics on the organization’s agenda, both military and political, in which various aspects of the given issue are analyzed from both Israel’s position and Hezbollah’s.

Hezbollah’s media empire

2. Lebanon has traditionally been an important center of Arab media. Thus Hezbollah faces stiff competition from the dozens of other newspapers, television channels and radio stations operating in Lebanon, some of whose professional level is high. That competition, and Hezbollah and Iran’s awareness of the importance of propaganda, have forced Hezbollah to
continually upgrade its communications capabilities, especially television and the Internet.

3. Hezbollah’s entire communications network has a common, uniform propaganda strategy determined by Hassan Nasrallah. It is centralized and no allowance is made for differences of opinion or their expression. Senior Hezbollah members and the organization’s functionaries (such as members of the Lebanese parliament) are often interviewed, and express only such opinions as have been predetermined by Nasrallah.

4. Most often interviewed are Sheikh Na’im Qassem, Hezbollah’s deputy secretary general; Sheikh Nabil Qaouk, responsible for Hezbollah’s southern sector; Nawaf al-Mousawi, responsible for international relations; Mahmoud Komati, a member of the political bureau; Mohammed Yazbek, a member of the Shura Council, Hezbollah’s its top decision-making authority; Hashem Safi al-Din, head of the Political Council; Mohammed Ra’ed, head of the Resistance Faithful faction, and other faction members.

**Al-Manar TV**

![Al-Manar TV’s logo](image)

5. The flagship of Hezbollah’s media empire is its satellite television channel, Al-Manar (“the beacon”). It began on June 3, 1991, as a small land-based
television station, and initially operated with the help of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. During its first years it operated illegally. In 1997 it was officially listed as The Lebanese Media Group – Al-Manar.

6. Al-Manar TV is propagandist in nature and its broadcasts reflect Hezbollah’s ideology and political agenda. It is both professional and effective, and popular not only in Lebanon but throughout the entire Arab-Muslim world, including the Palestinian Authority. It broadcasts news in Arabic, English and French, documentary series, various talk shows, music, etc. Its headquarters are in Beirut and it has offices in several Middle Eastern countries, including in the Palestinian Authority-administered territories, and an international network of reporters.

7. Al-Manar TV developed during the 1990s, at the height of Hezbollah’s terrorist-guerilla campaign against Israel. It served the campaign’s needs by broadcasting directly from the battlefield. Al-Manar photographers were embedded in the organization’s squads operating in the security zone in south Lebanon as part of Hezbollah’s battle information department. That was done even if it meant risking their lives. They brought the Lebanese, Arab and Israeli viewer photographs of attacks on IDF and South Lebanese Army posts and showed how land mines were laid. The pictures raised Hezbollah operatives’ morale and upgraded the image of the organization’s military achievements. The broadcasts were received in Israel and contributed to disagreements in Israeli society over the continued policy of maintaining the security zone.24 Today as well Hezbollah battle information photographers and reporters accompany Hezbollah operatives on military actions.

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24 Hezbollah’s battle information department began its operations on September 18, 1986. It became fundamental to Hezbollah and is part of the indoctrination received by children and adolescents (see below).
8. Al-Manar TV began to bloom in 2000, after the IDF withdrew from Lebanon. **On May 25, 2000, the day the IDF left the security zone and nine years after the establishment of Al-Manar, its satellite channel was launched**, and since December 2000 it has broadcast 24 hours a day. The new satellite capabilities meant its broadcasts were received further afield. In addition, it had more air time, the studios were renovated and its news programs were given a facelift. **It was transformed from a local Lebanese station to a pan-Arab channel, popular throughout the Arab-Muslim world and among Muslim communities in the West.**

9. Hezbollah holds the stocks in the communications company operating Al-Manar TV, whose chairman of the board of directors and director general is **Abdallah Kassir**. Hezbollah uses Al-Manar **to disseminate the organization’s radical Islamic worldview and its hostility toward Israel and the West.** In 1992 a high-ranking Ali Dahir, the station’s first general manager, stated that “Hezbollah had founded the station to express the views of the oppressed... and advocate a mass media that respects Islamic moral and Muslim traditions.” Therefore, he continued, “the goal of our station is to show the facts, focus on our hostility and hatred for Israel and its

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racist government system, whose downfall we see as one of our fundamental principles.”

10. **Al-Manar’s broadcasts systematically provide backing and publicity for the terrorist campaign waged by Hezbollah and the Palestinian terrorist organizations against Israel.** Since the inception of the terrorist campaign against Israel (the second intifada) in September 2000, Al-Manar has served as a source of inspiration for the terrorist organizations (the “Palestinian resistance”) and even calls itself “the resistance channel.” Much of its programming is devoted to the Palestinian issue. It gives detailed coverage of the terrorist attacks carried out by the Palestinian terrorist organizations, enables them to use it as a forum to claim responsibility for attacks, including suicide bombing attacks, and also broadcasts anti-Israeli propaganda to Israeli Arabs.27

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11. Brent Sadler, CNN’s Beirut bureau chief, who visited Al-Manar TV in Beirut shortly after the beginning of the terrorist campaign against Israel, was deeply impressed by its anti-Israeli propaganda capabilities. He wrote that Al-Manar was meticulous in its choice of photographs dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the violence in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, and edited them to make them dramatic and one-sided.

12. Al-Manar’s objective is to enlist popular support for the Palestinians and to incite the Palestinians to take the path Hezbollah took, which led to Israel’s withdrawal from south Lebanon. The station employees claimed to be the first Arabs to use effective psychological warfare against the Israelis. One of them said they tried to plant the idea in the minds of those living in the PA-administered territories that the successes of Lebanon could be repeated to liberate their land in Gaza and the West Bank (Brent Sadler for CNN, October 26, 2000).

13. In its prime-time broadcasts (including music), Al-Manar is not only blatantly anti-Israeli and expresses its desire to destroy the “Zionist entity,” but it is also virulently anti-Semitic, which has let a number of countries (among them the United States, France and Spain) to ban its broadcasts (see below). In addition, it disseminates anti-American propaganda and encourages suicide bombing attacks, especially since March 2003, when the Americans and their allies invaded Iraq. A year and half before, on September 11, 2001, Al-Manar closely covered the attack on the World Trade Center and helped spread the calumny that the terrorist attacks in the United States were carried out by the Jews, Israel and the Israeli intelligence service (Mossad).
Al-Manar TV’s hate industry

Anti-Israeli propaganda

Israel is worse than the Nazis: the inscription under the picture reads “This is the equation.”

Anti-Semitic propaganda

A still shot from the trailer for a series called Al-Shatat (“The Diaspora”). Produced in Syria and broadcast by Al-Manar TV, it is blatantly anti-Semitic with the goal of sending anti-Israeli and anti-Jewish messages to prime-time viewers during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. The subtitle reads: “Al-Manar's best show for the month of Ramadan.” (October 2003)
Pictures from “The Diaspora,” which also contained references to the blood libel (Al-Manar TV, October 2003).

“And we say, kill anyone who is not an Israeli.”

“Stab him before the lead kills him.”

The important question is, would Herzl be satisfied...

...with planning to take over only Palestine...

Fostering the myth of the Jewish plot to take over the world: a quiz show broadcast by Al-Manar called “My opinion... Your opinion.” Questions are directed to the viewing audience at home. One of the questions was, “would Herzl have been satisfied with taking over only Palestine, or as he wrote in his book, did he dream of taking over the whole world?” (Al-Manar TV, November 4, 2003, aired on Israeli TV Channel 10 the following day).
Anti-American propaganda

Part of a broadcast frequently rerun on Al-Manar: The Statue of Liberty with a skull for a face, a knife instead of a torch and with cannons at its feet (Al-Manar TV, October 2002).

Al-Manar broadcasts during the second Lebanon war

14. During the second Lebanon war Al-Manar TV spearheaded Hezbollah’s battle for hearts and minds. Its broadcasts, which were rife with propaganda and psychological warfare, accompanied the organization’s rocket fire into Israel and the war on the ground in south Lebanon, and resounded throughout the Arab-Muslim world, even in Israel and the West. The Israeli Air Force bombed a building housing Al-Manar but it continued on the air using alternate broadcasting sites which had been prepared in advance (for further information see below, “The battle for hearts and minds during and after the second Lebanon war”).
European and American measures taken against Al-Manar

15. Between 2000 and 2004 Al-Manar TV uninterruptedly disseminated anti-Israeli, anti-Semitic and anti-American propaganda to the Arab-Muslim communities throughout the world. **Its programs were broadcast globally by means of a multi-national satellite system:** Telestar 5 to North America; **NSS (New Skies Satellites) 806** to South America; **Arabsat 3A** to the Middle East, North America and parts of Europe; **Hotbird 4** (a subsidiary of **Eutelsat**) to North Africa and Europe, including France; **NSS 803** to Africa and parts of Europe; **Nilesat** to the Middle East, and parts of North Africa and Europe; **Hispasat** to Spain, various other European countries and South America; and **Asiasat** to the Asian countries.

16. The last straw, and what led Western countries, especially France, to take practical steps against Al-Manar, was **an anti-Semitic series called “The Diaspora,” which was broadcast during October and November 2003,** and viewed by Muslim communities in Europe.28 Following the broadcasts France’s television and radio authority decided, as of March 17, 2004, to ban Al-Manar’s programs from French TV. Attempts made by the Lebanese government through diplomatic channels to have the ban revoked were unsuccessful. It was ratified by the French supreme court on December 13, 2004, when it was determined that the channel’s programming violated French anti-incitement laws and thereby endangered public order.

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17. **France was followed by other European Union countries and by the United States:**

A. On March 17, 2005, the representatives of more than 25 of the national boards of radio and television supervision of European Union countries decided to act against television channels broadcasting incitement to hatred, racism and xenophobia. Following the decision, on March 17, 2005, **Holland** banned the satellite company NSS 803, whose head offices are in the Hague, from airing Al-Manar’s programs. In July 2005 **Spain** ordered the cessation of Hezbollah’s broadcasts via Hispasat.

B. On March 23, 2006, the Treasury Department of the United States announced it was activating Executive Order 13224 against Al-Manar TV, Radio Nur and the Lebanese Media Group, the Lebanese corporation of which Al-Manar and Radio Nur are subsidiaries. According to Stuart Levy, Treasury Undersecretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, **Al-Manar TV and Radio Nur are Hezbollah’s media wing, supporting the organization’s terrorist activities.** The Executive Order gave the Treasury Department and American law enforcement agencies the legal tools it needed to combat Al-Manar TV and Radio Nur, including confiscating their assets in the United States.

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**PRESS ROOM**

March 23, 2006
JS-4134

**U.S. Designates Al-Manar as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist Entity Television Station is Arm of Hizballah Terrorist Network**

For further information see our Bulletin entitled “Another limitation placed by the international community on broadcasts emanating from Hezbollah’s Al-Manar TV station The American Department of the Treasury designated Hezbollah’s Al-Manar TV and Radio Al-Nour as terrorist entities pursuant to Executive Order 13224, which gives it the tools to enforce sanctions against their activities in the United States,” at [http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/almanar_e0306.pdf](http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/almanar_e0306.pdf).
The heading of the Treasury Department announcement

18. The rationale behind the measures taken by the United States against Al-Manar TV and Radio Nur:

A. According to Stuart Levy, “Any entity maintained by a terrorist group – whether masquerading as a charity, a business, or a media outlet is as culpable as the terrorist group itself.” That is, as far as the American administration is concerned, there is no essential difference between Hezbollah (and other terrorist organizations) and the media, social and financial bodies belonging to it.

B. The American announcement was accompanied by a kind of “indictment” of Al-Manar and Radio Nur, and its main points were: Hassan Nasrallah and Hezbollah’s operational council are in charge of the budgets for both Al-Manar TV and Radio Nur; prominent Hezbollah activists hold stock in the company operating them; Al-Manar TV employs Hezbollah operatives and one of them was even involved in collecting intelligence for the organization; Al-Manar and Radio Nur are involved in raising funds for Hezbollah. In addition to supporting Hezbollah, Al-Manar TV supports the Palestinian terrorist organizations on the American list of designated terrorist groups, and provides funds for a Palestinian Islamic Jihad “charitable society.”

19. For France, Holland, Spain and the European Union, the scales were tipped toward banning Al-Manar by the anti-Semitic content of its broadcasts. The American considerations were different and more a matter of principle: Al-Manar was an integral part of Hezbollah, designated as a terrorist organization, directed by Iran and responsible, before September 11, 2001, for the deaths of more Americans than any other such organization.

30From http://www.omedia.org/Show_Article.asp?DynamicContentID=1795&MenuID=681&ThreadID=1014003.
20. The steps taken by the international community beginning in 2005 were a severe blow, although not a decisive one, to Al-Manar’s ability to market its programs beyond Lebanon and the Middle East. The two remaining weak spots in the ban on Al-Manar’s broadcasts are the Arab satellite companies. **Arabsat** (a pan-Arab company, most of whose shareholders are Saudi Arabians) and **Nilesat** (owned by Egyptians) enable their subscribers in the Middle East and southern Europe to receive Al-Manar’s broadcasts. Since Saudi Arabia and Egypt **do not prevent Al-Manar’s** propaganda programs from being received by subscribers, Hezbollah is very careful not to broadcast anything that might offend either regime. At the beginning of the second Lebanon war Egypt and Saudi Arabia were critical of Hezbollah, but did nothing to keep Al-Manar off the air.

![Al-Manar's trailer](image)

“And now...Al-Manar TV reaches you...around the world” (Al-Manar’s trailer before limitations were placed on its broadcasts, June 10, 2004).

**Hezbollah’s Internet presence**

21. **The Iranian regime** makes extensive use of the Internet, which it regards as an effective tool for spreading information and propaganda to various target audiences in the Middle East and around the world. To that end Iran has developed an impressive Internet presence of sites in Farsi, Arabic and English, and their uniform editorial policy is tailored to serve Iranian
strategic needs.31 (The Palestinian and Islamic terrorist organizations also use
the Internet as an important tool to spread their ideology.32)

22. In addition to Websites directly under its control, Iran also supports
Hezbollah’s Internet network, where preference is given to sites in Arabic. The
network is another component indirectly operated in the propaganda-
indoctrination campaign being waged by the Iranian regime.

23. Hezbollah appeared on the Internet for the first time in 1997. It has been
inspired, funded and given technical support by Iran. At first the organization
had two sites, one affiliated with Al-Manar TV and the other called “Support
for the Islamic Resistance.” Immense resources were invested in expanding
both of them during the past decade and turning them into a vast Internet
network. The network is an important weapon in Hezbollah’s battle for hearts
and minds, since it can reach audiences in the Middle East and beyond.

31 For further information see our December 18, 2008 Bulletin entitled “The Iranian regime
operates many Arabic-language Internet sites to spread its radical Islamic ideology to the
Arab and Muslim populations around the world The Iranian regime makes a great effort to
export Khomeini’s radical Islamic ideology,” at http://www.terrorism-
info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/iran_int_e.pdf.

32 For the importance of the use of the Internet for the dissemination of terrorist organization
ideology, especially the Islamic organizations, including Al-Qaeda, see Matti Steinberg, “The
Theology and Strategy of Al-Qaeda and the Global Jihad,” (Hebrew), Part 1, Keshet
Hahadasha, No. 12 (Summer 2005), pp. 66-75; also see Gabriel Weimann, Terror on the
Internet: the New Arena, the New Challenges, United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006
(Foreword by Bruce Hoffman,Washington); for the influence of the Internet on Muslims to
join the jihad, see “Online Fatwas Incite Young Muslims to Jihad,” MEMRI (Middle East
Media Research Institute), October 26, 2006,
http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP133506.
24. All 15-20 of Hezbollah’s Websites are operated according to a uniform information-propaganda strategy integrated into Iran’s battle for hearts and minds. As can be expected, the sites emphasize what the organization is interested in inculcating. Hezbollah’s target audiences are located in the Middle East (primarily Lebanon but even including Israel) and around the world, especially the Arab-Muslim communities in Western countries. The sites appear in a number of languages: Arabic (the organization’s top priority), English (its second priority), and French, Farsi and Hebrew.
25. A study performed by the ITIC and published in December 2006\textsuperscript{33} showed that the Webhosts of most of Hezbollah’s leading Websites were in Arab-Muslim countries in the Middle East (Syria, Iran, Lebanon, Kuwait, Qatar). A number of hosts were also found in the United States and Sweden. Prominent among them was the \textbf{Syrian Telecommunications Establishment}, which hosted the “Islamic Resistance” site, Hezbollah’s leading news site.

26. \textbf{Hezbollah’s internet network can be divided into five main groups:}

   A. \textbf{Central news sites:} The leading site is \textit{Al-Muqawamah [al-Islamiyyah]} (The [Islamic] Resistance). It can be accessed through other addresses, among them \textit{Ghaliboun} (“victors,” a word in the Qur’an verse which appears in Hezbollah’s motto), \textit{Al-‘udwan al-Isra‘ili ala’-Lubnan} (“Israeli aggression toward Lebanon”), \textit{Moqavemat} (“resistance” in Farsi\textsuperscript{34}), \textit{Hezbollah TV, Nasrallah}. The addresses change every so often.

   B. \textbf{Hezbollah media sites:} Al-Manar TV, Radio Nur, Al-Intiqad (a Hezbollah publication).

   C. \textbf{Additional Hezbollah news sites:} \textit{Wa’ad} (The promise), \textit{Sumoud} (Steadfastness).

   D. \textbf{Local town and village sites in south Lebanon:} Bint Jbeil, Deir Qanoun al-Nahar, Houleh.

   E. \textbf{Sites belonging to social organizations and designated sites:} \textit{Mua’ssasat al-shaheed} (The shaheed institution), \textit{Kashafat} (Scouts of) \textit{Imam al-Mahdi}, Jihad and Shahadah, Samir al-Kuntar (a site for the purposes of promoting the release of a convicted murderer

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\textsuperscript{33} For further information see our December 2003 Bulletin entitled “Terrorism and Internet: Hezbollah’s widespread use of the Internet as a means to distribute anti-Israeli, anti-Jewish, and anti-American incitement,” at \url{http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/hezbollah_int_e.pdf}.

\textsuperscript{34} An exceptional Website with an Iranian address appearing in four different languages, none of which is Farsi.
currently in an Israeli prison), and the Dar al-Hadi publishing house site (recently inactive).

27. Using the above, Hezbollah reports the activities of its leaders, shows video clips and operational activities, and relates and responds to reports about activities or incidents considered relevant to the organization. The sites are used to foster Hassan Nasrallah’s personality cult, to praise and glorify terrorist attacks and the shaheed myth, to spread hate propaganda against Israel and call for its destruction, and to disseminate anti-Semitic propaganda and hatred for the United States. The sites are also used for purposes of psychological warfare.\(^{35}\) It should be noted that Hezbollah’s media have their own Websites (especially Al-Manar), enabling the organization to spread its propaganda directly to the West, circumventing the limitations placed on it when Al-Manar TV’s broadcasts were banned in Europe and the United States.

28. Most of Hezbollah’s Websites crashed or were crashed during the second Lebanon war. However, after the war the organization upgraded its Websites significantly and added new, technologically improved sites with frequent updating.\(^{36}\) Local Websites have been launched to reinforce the relationship between Hezbollah headquarters in Beirut and its supporters in south Lebanon, and to glorify the shaheeds who came from south Lebanon villages.

29. Hezbollah’s Internet network is exceptional in its extent and quality, and far exceeds those of local terrorist organizations. It is another expression of the support Iran gives Hezbollah expressed, in our assessment, by the enormous sums of money needed to operate it at a high technological level in several languages.

\(^{35}\) For example, in 1997, when Hezbollah’s Internet network was taking its first steps, it posted a picture of a soldier holding a Lebanese child with a subtitle reading “Israeli terrorism.” The Israeli media reported that the soldier belonged to the IDF even though it was not specifically stated. It was a deliberate – and successful – piece of Hezbollah disinformation. An examination of the facts showed that the man was a member of the Lebanese civil defense force in the village of Qana and not an IDF soldier.

\(^{36}\) Some of the sites are interactive. The Radio Nur and Wa’ad sites allow surfers to listen to their broadcasts. The Al-Manar site makes it possible to view its programs.
30. In our assessment, Iran provides the necessary support because it views Hezbollah’s Internet network as an additional means of spreading the ideology of Tehran’s radical Islamic regime into Lebanon, the Middle East and throughout the world. Tehran has left its fingerprints on several Hezbollah Websites along with echoes of its anti-Israeli, anti-Semitic and anti-American propaganda. However, Hezbollah, as opposed to Hamas, has no Website (or other media) in Farsi, most likely, in our assessment, to hide its identification with Iran.

31. In addition to Hezbollah’s Websites, there are sites and blogs which identify (or are identified) with Hezbollah in Spanish in Latin America. Their orientation is clearly South American, but they also call themselves “Hezbollah,” use its symbols and terminology and identify with its messages of violence and hatred. Among them are a number of Websites and blogs in Latin America and Venezuela, and one in El Salvador.

Examples of propaganda on Hezbollah’s Websites

Anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic propaganda

Anti-Semitic cartoons from the Moqavemat home page (October 31, 2006), taken from the Soviet Union before its disintegration. Left: A spider with the face of a stereotype Jew and “Zionism” written on its back in Russian. The strands of the web read “Sabotage in the workplace,” “Lies,” “Provocation,” “The Jewish Question,” “Anti-Communism” and “Anti-Sovietism.” In the web is a Star of David. Right: The arms of an octopus, the symbol of the Jewish plot to take over the world, appear in the background next to the Star of David. The overall message is that the Jews are responsible for the ills of the world.
Anti-American propaganda

Left: A swastika composed of American flags with an Israeli flag at the center and the caption “Axis of Evil” (Moqavemat home page, November 1, 2006). Right: George Bush as a vampire, sucking the blood of the United States, symbolized by the Statue of Liberty (Wa’ad home page, November 7, 2006).

Incitement against the leaders of Israel and the United States

32. Almost from its inception Hezbollah established a radio station called Sawt al-Islam (The Voice of Islam), and sometimes Sawt al-Iman (The Voice of Faith) or Sawt al-mustadh’afin (The Voice of the Oppressed). In 1991 it changed its name to Sawt al-Nur (The Voice of Light). It complements Al-Manar TV and targets the Lebanese.

The home page of Radio Nur’s Website (March 2007) gives its programming schedule and displays its logo along with a picture of children waving Lebanese flags, the body of a dead Lebanese child and a little girl behind bars. The message: suffering, injustice, hatred for the enemy and Hezbollah’s “Lebanese patriotism.”
33. In 1983 Hezbollah began publishing a Friday paper called Al-Ahed (The Covenant). The paper, which always features the portrait of the Ayatollah Khomeini (and after his death, that of his heir, Ali Khamenei), became the organization’s main ideological tool. By means of its political and religious editorials, its Shi’ite worldview in day-to-day affairs, and columns about culture, religion and politics, Hezbollah shaped the opinions of its members.

34. Today the newspaper is still published on Fridays but is called Al-Intiqad al-Ahed. It is sometimes quoted as Al-Ahed and sometimes as Al-Intiqad (Criticism). Its editor-in-chief is Ibrahim al-Musawi. Since 1991 the organization has also published a Shi’ite Islamic monthly called Baqiyyat Allah (The legacy of Allah), which deals with matters of religion.

Books, pamphlets and information and guidance material

35. Hezbollah often publishes books, pamphlets and information and guidance material which are distributed throughout Lebanon and the Arab-Muslim world. Their objective is to spread Iran’s brand of radical Islam, to encourage
terrorist attacks and to foster hatred for Israel, the Jewish people, the United States and the West. Some of the publications are meant for the general Lebanese and Arab-Muslim public and some only for members of the organization.

36. Some of the books and other publications are Iranian Shi’ite Islamic ideological material translated into Arabic and distributed by publishers in Lebanon, some of them belonging to Hezbollah and some of them institutions and publishers affiliated with Hezbollah and Iran. Some of the publications do not specifically refer to Lebanon, and when there is a reference, it is modest and marginal compared with those of an overall Islamic character.37

A selection of publications found in south Lebanese villages during the second Lebanon war glorifying the ideology and deeds of the leaders of the Iranian Islamic Revolution, headed by Leader Ali Khamenei. Not only Hezbollah operatives are inculcated with radical Iranian Shi’ite ideology, but Lebanese Shi’ites of all ages as well.

37 For further information see our October 10, 2006 Bulletin entitled “Hezbollah publications found during the second Lebanon war in south Lebanon inculcate the radical ideology of the Islamic revolution in Iran,” at http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/hezbollah_e_pub.pdf.
The Dar al-Hadi publishing house

37. Hezbollah’s most important publishing house is Dar al-Hadi, which does not connect itself formally with the organization. It is named after Hadi Nasrallah, son of Hassan Nasrallah, who was killed by the IDF in south Lebanon in September 1997. Dar al-Hadi publishes books about Hezbollah, religion and the legacy of the Ayatollah Khomeini, as well as anti-Israeli, anti-Zionist and anti-Semitic propaganda.

38. One of its most important books was an authorized study of Hezbollah written by sheikh Na’im Qassem, Hassan Nasrallah’s second in command, and published in Beirut in 2002, called *Hezbollah – Methods, the Experience, the Future*; it was also translated in English. Sheikh Na’im Qassem devoted an entire chapter to suicide bombing terrorism and analyzing the fatwa (religious Muslim edict) enabling them to be carried out. He viewed them as “the main source of strength on which [we can] rely, and their effectiveness has already proven itself.” He praised the achievements gained by suicide bombing attacks in Lebanon, however, he noted that the “weapon” should be used selectively, and only when they will cause the enemy heavy losses. They should not be used, he said, in “routine” activities.

The front cover of sheikh Na’im Qassem’s book: Hezbollah operatives on their knees in prayer, most likely before a battle, with the Dome of the Rock in the background, symbolic of both Islam and the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation. Despite Hezbollah’s attempts to represent itself as a purely Lebanese organization, there is nothing Lebanese about the front cover.

38 *Hizbullah, The Story from Within*, Saqi Books, London, 2005. The cover of the English edition was changed to play down its Islamic message, and shows a demonstration of Hezbollah supporters waving the organization’s flag.
39. Dar al-Hadi often publishes pro-Iranian Shi‘ite Islamic books fostering the image of the Iranian Leader Ali Khamenei side by side with anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic books. Some examples are:

A. *The Exalted of the Nation [i.e., true Muslims] and the Fateful Moments*

The book, which was seized by IDF forces in the town of Ainata on August 15, 2006, was written by Ali Khamenei himself, and published by Dar al-Hadi in Beirut in 2000 (first printing). It deals with his philosophy. Pages 17-19 deal with the idea of *jihad* in the sense of fighting on the battlefield for the sake of Islam, devotion to Allah and every action which takes place as part of the confrontation with the enemy.

B. *The Secrets of the Evil Ones*

The front cover: “The Secrets of the Evil Ones, the Jews’ Kabbala, their secret organizations and their desire to take over the world”
The book was published in Beirut by Dar al-Hadi in 2004. It is blatantly anti-Semitic and presents a ridiculous and wholly imaginary hypothesis about Jewish plots to corrupt and take over the world by means of secret organizations based on the Kabbala.\(^{39}\) Its objective is to make the reader aware of the Jewish “plots” to increase hatred of the Jews and justify acts of violence against them.

**C. Jewish Zionist Racism and its Religious Ideological Perspective: A study of the religious and historical background of the racist acts of the Zionist entity in Palestine, Lebanon, etc.**

The front cover, bearing symbols of Judaism and a man behind bars, symbolizing the Arab prisoners in Israeli jails

The book was written by Ali Hassan Tahe and published by Dar al-Hadi in 2002 (first printing). It repeats a routine claim found in anti-Semitic Islamic literature that Judaism is not a monotheistic religion, with the implication that Jews are infidels and **may therefore be killed freely**. The implication is that Muslims must fight a war to the death against them, as is customary regarding infidels.

\(^{39}\) What is the Kabbala, find it.
D. *Our Campaign against the Jews, Past and Present*

The front cover, showing soldiers carrying green flags, the color of Islam. The message: Muslims will conquer the seven-branched candelabrum (the Menorah), symbol of Judaism and the State of Israel.

The book was published by Dar al-Hadi in 2005 (first printing) and deals with anti-Semitic hate propaganda. Its central claim is that the Jewish religion is corrupt, and that is the reason for the confrontation between Judaism and Islam. The book is also anti-American and anti-Christian.
Other publishing houses

40. In Lebanon there are other cultural centers and publishing houses operated by Iran and Hezbollah or closely connected with them. They publish radical Iranian-inspired ideological material and foster Khamenei’s personality cult. Prominent among them is the **Iman Khomeini Cultural Center** which publishes, among other things, ideologically oriented books. Hezbollah’s scout organization, the Imam al-Mahdi scouts, also issues books and other publications. For example:

A. *Qaa’di* (My Leader) \(^\text{40}\)

![The front cover]

*Qaa’di* was published by the Imam al-Mahdi Scouts, Hezbollah’s youth movement, and includes biographical information about ‘Ali Khamenei. He is represented as a **role model for youth and an example of a dedicated jihad fighter** who made a major contribution to the first stages of the Islamic revolution in Iran.

\(^\text{40}\) The term Ca’adi designates, especially in the current context, i.e., Ali Khamenei, both a political and military leader.
The front cover

The back cover, advertising a selection of books sold in Lebanon about Ali Khamenei

The booklet, which was seized by IDF forces in the village of Kila on August 7, 2006, was published by the Markaz Bequiyyat Allah al-‘Azam lil-Dirasat in Beirut in 2000. It contains three speeches by Khamenei and is one of his 14 books issued by the publishing house which were translated into Arabic. A Reappraisal of The Path of Eloquence was translated in Qom, an Iranian city holy to Shi‘ite Muslims.

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41 The term nahj al-balagha (‘the path of eloquence) refers to a collection of Shi‘ite religious books, including the sayings of ‘Ali bin Abu Talib, the fourth Caliph and first Shi‘ite Imam of Islam. He was famous for his eloquence.

42 A publishing house specializing in Shi‘ite religious books and which promotes books about Iran’s Islamic Revolution, especially the works of the Ayatollah Khomeini and Ali Khamenei. It apparently also has connections with Hezbollah. See http://baabooks.com/index.php?language=ar.
C. America [is] the Source of Terrorism

The front cover: on the background of burning American flag and Israeli flags, weeping Palestinians and the Dome of the Rock. On the right side there is a prominent picture of Ali Khamenei.

The back cover: pictures from the PA-administered territories: a wounded boy, a girl in front of a razed house and a child kissing a martyr. At the upper right is a picture of Ali Khamenei, and at the bottom is the Hezbollah emblem, showing that the organization published the booklet.

The pictures are meant to show that Iran and Hezbollah protect the Palestinian people and defend it against the “injustices” inflicted on it by Israel because of American policy.

The booklet was published by Hezbollah and seized by the IDF in the eastern sector of south Lebanon on August 12, 2006. It contains the text of the speech Khamenei gave on March 17, 2002, reflecting the Ayatollah Khomeini’s perception of the United States as the source of oppression, corruption, imperialism and terrorism in the world. Israel, as an American ally, participates in its policies.
D. *The Mosque in the Reflections of the Imam Khomeini*

The booklet, which was seized by IDF forces in the village of Maroun al-Ras on July 26, 2006, was published by the Imam Khomeini Cultural Center in Beirut in 2002. It surveys the importance of prayer, of the religious man and of meeting in the mosque to spread the ideology of the Islamic Revolution. It notes the political, social, educational and *jihad* roles of the mosque which is regarded, among other things, a means of disseminating the spirit of *jihad* and of meeting for the sake of the Islamic wars.

E. *Milestones in the Life of the Imam Khomeini and his Holy War*

The booklet was seized by the IDF in the village of Dir Sirhan on August 24, 2006 and published by the Imam Khomeini Cultural Center in Beirut in 1999. It is an illustrated biography of the Ayatollah Khomeini and was apparently
intended to provide adolescents with information about his deeds. It describes a series of events in which Khomeini participated, the most important of which were the overthrow of the Shah and the Iran-Iraq war. The booklet ends by referring to the work of the Ayatollah Khomeini as being continued by the Leader ‘Ali Khamenei.

**Leaflets, flyers and pamphlets**

41. Among the material seized during the second Lebanon war were leaflets calling for contributions to Hezbollah and indoctrination pamphlets intended especially for Lebanese Shi’ite youth. The material was issued by a Hezbollah institution called The Islamic Resistance Support Association. It was founded in 1989 as a permanent fund-raising institution. It also plays an important role in the battle for hearts and minds, especially among the younger generation, by distributing leaflets and collection boxes printed with Hezbollah propaganda. For example:

The letterhead of the Islamic Resistance Support Association. The word “support” appears in red. The first letter is drawn so that the upper part is a rifle and the lower is a pen. The upper part of the emblem shows a stylized globe of the world topped by the Dome of the Rock, a motif appearing in the emblems of both Hezbollah and the Revolutionary Guards. It is also commonly found on the emblems of Islamic “charitable societies” to emphasize, apparently, the global nature of their activities.

43 For further information see our August 25, 2006 Bulletin entitled “Documents captured during the second Lebanon war reveal how Hezbollah raises funds and at the same time furthers its propaganda and indoctrination campaign, stressing the younger generation,” at http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/hezbollah_funds.pdf.
The front and back of an Islamic Resistance Support Association leaflet found in the village of ‘Aita al-Sha’ab during the second Lebanon war

The front: “Contributions support the destruction of Israel.” A collection box in the form of the Dome of the Rock. Coins drop in and bullet drop out, cracking a Star of David, the symbol of the State of Israel.

Hezbollah as the “defender of the homeland:” Donation guidelines under the heading “Your support [is] a mark of honor. Your participation [is] a sign of pride. Together we will defend the homeland...”

A flyer found in the village of Itarun issued in honor of Resistance and Liberation Day, celebrated every May 25 to commemorate the withdrawal of the IDF from the security zone. On the background of a Lebanese flag, imprisoning the lower red stripe and almost obliterating the cedar tree, is an arm holding an upraised assault rifle, which symbolizes Hezbollah’s belligerent activist message. The flag symbolizes the organization’s Lebanese aspect.

42. In the village of ‘Aita al Sha’ab a kind of kit for children was found. It contained a quiz with prizes for the correct answers and a call to contribute
to Hezbollah. The quiz was called “The competition of the youth of victory – 2006” and the six-part kit was produced by the Islamic Resistance Support Association. The center is a call for contributions, illustrated by coins dropping into a collection box and turning into bullets. The Arabic reads, “You support [with your contribution means] you show resistance.”

A Hezbollah indoctrination quiz for young people

43. The kit includes a 10-question quiz for indoctrinating youth. The questions read as follows:

1) To what did the honorable Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah compare the heroic confrontation, during which the Islamic resistance completely destroyed the two [Israeli] posts, al-'Abassiya and al-Ghajar?
2) Who is the most senior Lebanese [imprisoned] in the jails of the Israeli enemy.

3) Who said: “[Our] position is the weapon, but a handshake means recognition [of Israel]?”

4) Where did the Zionist enemy planes hit sheikh ‘Abbas Musawi, his wife and baby son Hussein?

5) Which farm [of those mentioned] does not belong to the Sheba’a Farms?

6) When did the heroic battle of Maidun take place?

7) Where did the istishhadi [suicide bomber], sheikh Ass’ad Bero, carry out his heroic action? 44

8) Who said: “We defeated Hezbollah” [just] after 13 Zionist soldiers were killed in the Shihin [a village in south Lebanon] action?

9) When did the Islamic resistance execute the high-ranking collaborator ‘Akel Hashem [head of the western brigade of the South Lebanese Army, murdered by Hezbollah]?”

10) On September 18, 1986, the Islamic resistance penetrated an enemy post, and for the first time [in Hezbollah attacks] a battle information camera was used for filming operational footage. 45 What was the name of the post?

An illustration from the “competition of the youth of victory – 2006”

44 Assad Bero was a suicide bomber who blew himself up next to an IDF convoy near the Fatma Gate in the Metulla region on August 19, 1988, killing seven IDF soldiers. Hezbollah turned him into a role model.

45 Hezbollah embeds teams of battle information photographers in the squads which attack Israel, aware of the great importance of visual material in the battle for hearts and minds.
The title reads, “The competition of the youth of victory – 2006,” under which there is a child waving a Hezbollah flag over an Israeli tank with one hand and making the V sign for victory with the other. At the bottom left there is a note to the effect that the competition will held to celebrate Islamic Resistance Week [i.e., Hezbollah week], dedicated to the memory of the deaths as martyrs (istishhad) of two of the organization’s leaders.

A calendar with radical Iranian Shi’ite Islamic messages

44. During the second Lebanon war calendars for 2006 were seized which had also been distributed by Hezbollah’s Iman Al-Mahdi Scouts, containing radical Iranian Shi’ite Islamic messages. For example, the main events for the month of April were Islamic Unity Week and Leader’s Day (honoring Leader Ali Khamenei).
April 2006, with a picture of Khamenei in the upper left-hand corner and “Leader's Day” in large letters in the center.

A shaheed instruction booklet for writing a will

Left: The front cover, showing a sniper and a memorial candle. At the right are frames of a movie of a devout Muslim praying. Center: The last page of the booklet, containing a quote from Khomeini in praise of the death of a martyr for the sake of Allah and Islam (shahadah). Right: The back cover, with the inscription “Allah, I am coming to you, meet me when you are satisfied with [my deed]. I need your pity and absolution, please, receive me in the best way possible, may my meeting with you be pleasant, desire to meet me and assign me the death of a martyr as the means of [enabling] my meeting with you.”

45. The booklet, which was seized by IDF forces in the village of Maroun al-Ras on July 16, 2006, was published by Hezbollah and intended to serve as a guide for Hezbollah operatives in writing their wills. There is a form to be filled out which asks for personal details, the name of the heir and the requested burial place. It also contains an appeal to parents and siblings, an
appeal to jihad fighters in general and thoughts about jihad, as well as praise for jihad and self-sacrifice for the sake of Islam.

**Fostering Khamenei’s personality cult**

46. *The text of a speech of the honorable imam, the commander al-Sayyid Ali Khamenei, may he have a long life, relating to recent events*  

The leaflet, which was seized by the IDF in the village of Rajamin on August 10, 2006, was published by Hezbollah. Publisher and date are not noted, but according to the contents it was written in 2003 or possibly later. In his speech Khamenei condemns the mass murders carried out throughout the world in which he includes what he calls “the actions of the Zionist enemy in Palestine.” Regarding the United States, he says that the terrorist attacks against it were a response to its striving to rule the world.

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46 “May he have a long life,” literally, “May we take refuge in his shadow for a long time,” an expression of honor and awe for an admired Shi’ite Muslim leader.
Exploiting Lebanese, Arab and Western media

47. Hezbollah makes extensive use of the technique of **news-based propaganda**, that is, reporting what seems to be news, sometimes even attractive news, so that its neutral and hostile target audiences will accept it and in turn use it themselves. However, the information distributed by Hezbollah is clearly **selective and rife with propaganda** (see below, “The battle for hearts and minds during and after the second Lebanon war”).

48. Hezbollah’s news-based propaganda is systematically distributed to the Lebanese, Arab and Western media by the organization’s “information” department, its senior members and skilled spokesmen. The use made of the propaganda by Arab and Western media enables Hezbollah to increase the volume of its messages beyond what its own media can provide. Hezbollah works with the various media in the following ways:

A. **The Lebanese media**: Hezbollah continually and systematically supplies the written and electronic Lebanese media with its own information. It provides them with speeches and statements made by Hassan Nasrallah and with announcements from its information department. Lebanese newspapers sympathetic to Hezbollah, or with pro-Syrian leanings, often give the organization a forum to express itself (for example, **Al-Akhbar, Al-Safir** and **Al-Diyyar**). The Lebanese media, including those belonging to Hezbollah’s opponents, often give Hezbollah a forum when the issue is **its fighting against the IDF**. That could be clearly seen during the second Lebanon war, when Lebanon’s written and electronic media (LBC TV, for instance) gave Hezbollah propaganda prominent coverage and in general refrained from criticizing.

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47 A Lebanese daily supporting Iran and Hezbollah which began publishing during the second Lebanon war and which has become the most important mouthpiece of Hezbollah journalism in Lebanon. **Ibrahim al-Amin**, a journalist who expresses Hezbollah positions, moved to Al-Akhbar from Al-Safir.
the organization. (Only after the war was anti-Hezbollah criticism in
the rival media renewed, and even increased.)

B. The Arab media: Hezbollah makes extensive use of the Arab media,
exploiting their correspondents stationed in Beirut. The written and
electronic Arab media, most prominently popular Al-Jazeera TV,
frequently provide a forum for Hezbollah’s propaganda and interview its
leaders, especially on topics touching upon the campaign against Israel.
How Hezbollah exploits Al-Jazeera TV through Ghassan bin Jiddoo, the
channel’s Beirut chief, was made obvious during the second Lebanon
war. Hezbollah gave Al-Jazeera an exclusive interview and allowed its
correspondent to tour south Lebanon and interview Hezbollah
operatives. During the war Hezbollah spokesmen often appeared all the
Arab news channels, including Al-Jazeera TV, Al-Arabiya TV, the pro-
American Al-Hura, Al-‘Alam (an Arabic-language Iranian channel) and
others. Thus Hezbollah had an important media stage which it exploited
to represent Israel’s “aggression” against Lebanon, and which enabled it
to spread its messages throughout the Arab-Muslim world, giving it a
significant media advantage. The Arab press, including newspapers
published in London, also gave Hezbollah a great deal of coverage.48

C. The Western media: Hezbollah habitually feeds “information” to
the Western media, often through correspondents stationed in Beirut.
Representatives of Hezbollah’s propaganda department are in contact
with journalists, arrange their visits to south Lebanon and make it
possible for them to interview Hassan Nasrallah and organization
operatives (in line with his interests). During the second Lebanon war,
Hassan Nasrallah appointed an English-speaking press officer named
Hussein Nablusi, who briefed the Western press corps in Beirut and
gave them a guided tour of Beirut’s Southern Suburb to illustrate the
harm done to the civilian population (while glossing over the fact that the
military infrastructure had been located within that population and that

48 For example, the popular Arab newspaper Al-Sharq al-Awsat, which is printed in
London, between July 13 and August 16, published photographs from the war on the front
page. With the exception of two, every picture showed the death and destruction in Lebanon
caused by Israeli attacks. (From Marvin Kalb’s article on the media war between Israel and
Hezbollah in 2006, p. 13.)
Hezbollah used them as human shields). Western correspondents stationed in Lebanon often relay information from Hezbollah without having the tools necessary to verify it. It can be assumed that the narrow angle of vision of the local Western correspondents, their fears for their own safety and their interest in keeping the lines of communication with Hezbollah open were what often made them give an unbalanced and biased picture of the organization.

49. **One of Hezbollah’s strongest levers of influence is its sometimes exclusive access to information about events in Lebanon** and the confrontation between Lebanon and Israel. That was exploited by Hezbollah to **supervise the correspondents stationed in Beirut and to influence what they wrote**. They did so by preventing or granting access to information, sometimes exclusively, that Hezbollah was interested in spreading.

50. Marvin Kalb described the way Hezbollah used foreign correspondents during the second Lebanon war: 49

“Reporters always complain about access; specifically in this war they complained about not having had enough access to the battlefield. Their complaints were directed primarily at Israel, which tried to accommodate the needs of hundreds of foreign correspondents attempting to cover the conflict. **Complaints were rarely directed at Hezbollah, which controlled media access with a bookkeeper's rigidity.** Once, Hezbollah conducted a media tour of Beirut’s Southern Suburb, inhabited by Shiite supporters whose homes and apartments had been badly damaged during Israeli air strikes 50. The point was to again use the media as a weapon in the propaganda war for public approval, **and the media did not mind being used, though they were forced to pay a price.** Foreign correspondents were warned, on entry to the tour, that they could not wander off on their own or ask questions of any of the residents. **They could only take pictures of**

49 Marvin Kalb, pp. 18-19. The boldface type was inserted by the authors of this study.

sites approved by their Hezbollah minders. Violations, they were told, would be treated harshly. Cameras would be confiscated, film or tape destroyed, and offending reporters would never again be allowed access to Hezbollah-controlled areas.

“So far as we know, of all the reporters taken on this guided tour, reminiscent of the Soviet era, only CNN’s Anderson Cooper described the rigid ground rules for what they were – an attempt to create and control a story51. And Hezbollah succeeded. All of the other reporters followed the Hezbollah script: Israel, in a cruel, heartless display of power, bombed innocent civilians. Casualties were high. Devastation was everywhere. So spoke the Hezbollah spokesman; so wrote many in the foreign press corps…”

51. Another description of the degree to which Hezbollah controlled the foreign press in Lebanon during the second Lebanon war was given by Captain Avihai Edri, head of the Arab media desk for the IDF spokesman:52

“I heard about Hezbollah control of the media from one of the foreign correspondents, [who said] that every foreign correspondent in Lebanon had two Hezbollah members guarding him. I don’t know [how] true that was, but [during the war] one of them was talking to one of his journalists [in Lebanon] through a microphone in her ear, and he said to her: ‘Why do you keep whispering to me?’ Later on she told him, ‘There were Hezbollah members sitting next to me, and I didn’t want to get into trouble.’”

51 Anderson Cooper.

52 Comments made during a symposium held at the Israel Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration Center on December 26, 2006, called “The second Lebanon war, open intelligence and the media, open and hidden” (from Mabat Malam (Hebrew), a periodical dealing with intelligence and security, No. 48, March 2007 (henceforth “Open intelligence”).
The differences between education and indoctrination

52. **Education** is an activity designed to change human behavior (in the widest sense of the term) through a system of values, opinions, beliefs and (critical) thought processes which it desires to impart.\textsuperscript{53} **Indoctrination** is an educational system designed to inculcate a doctrine\textsuperscript{54} while preventing the target audience of the inculcation from making a critical evaluation of claims or independently making up its own mind.\textsuperscript{55}

53. During the Cold War, when education became an arm of government propaganda, especially in the Soviet Union and the satellite countries, the term *indoctrination* was censured (and aroused disgust) in the liberal Western democratic countries. The censure was of its biased and one-sided teaching and educating methods, whose objective was to influence people’s desires, actions and thoughts. Such educational methods were designed to ensure a **slanted result in accordance with a preordained worldview** (as opposed to democratic educational methods, which allow for self-criticism and a search for proof).

54. **Indoctrination** is one of the main tools used by the terrorist organizations in their battle for hearts and minds, and is part of their campaign against Israel and the Western world. The tool is intended is to **shape the perceptions of the internal target audience** in accordance with the ideologies and doctrines of the various organizations. Iran and Hezbollah carry out a wide variety of activities in Lebanon, especially among...


\textsuperscript{54} **Doctrine**: a system of unproven but cohesive rulings used as the basis in principle for a belief or ideology. Doctrines are usually religious, political or military and their application is linked to an active plan of action.

the Shi’ites (with the emphasis on the younger generation) to indoctrinate radical Iranian Shi’ite Muslim ideology and its activist, militant anti-Israel, anti-Western values.

55. To that end, Iran established a broad network of educational, religious and cultural institutions in Lebanon, which it views as the primary means of enlisting the younger generation into the Hezbollah’s ranks and of shaping an Islamic Lebanese society at some time in the future. Its institutions import radical Iranian Shi’ite Muslim ideology in its entirety into Lebanon. Hezbollah serves as its exclusive contractor, having no significant ideological input of its own. Iran’s emissaries were involved in establishing the network: the Revolutionary Guards, the cultural attaches in the Iranian embassies in Damascus and Beirut and the Imam Khomeini Cultural Center, whose home base is in Iran.

56. Sheikh Subhi Tufayli, who was a high-ranking Hezbollah figure when Hezbollah was established, testified as to the place and importance of education in Hezbollah’s path of indoctrination. In an interview printed in a Lebanese paper he said that education begins at a very early age, when children visit the mosques where they learn the Qur’an, Islamic law, and to pray and fast. Later they take courses in [Islamic] culture. The mature students receive guidance, direction and training in the use of weapons, since Muslims live in “a world full of wolves at a time when a great attack is being waged on Islam and on the honor of Muslims by the whole world.”

57. Hezbollah’s indoctrination system, which began in the 1980s in the mosques and the husseiniyahs (a kind of religious Shi’ite community center for cultural, religious, educational and social activities take place) and it was soon enlarged. By the end of the 1980s it included kindergartens, elementary schools and religious and technical high schools, religious colleges and

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teachers’ seminaries. All of them were built with generous funding from Iran, which carried over into their day-to-day activities as well (Iran even paid student tuitions and provided scholarships). Descriptions of some of the institutions and bodies dealing with indoctrination follow:

**Religious institutions (khawzas)**

58. A *khawza* is a Shi’ite religious institution, many of which were established in Shi’ite centers in Iraq (such as Najaf) and Iran (such as Qom). By the beginning of the 1970s the *khawzas* began to be built in Lebanon in the Shi’ite population centers in Beirut, the Bequa’a Valley and south Lebanon. They instructed students in the fundamentals of activist Shi’ite Islamic ideology, and after the Islamic Revolution in Iran became institutions for teaching the ideology of the Ayatollah Khomeini. Some of those active in establishing the *khawzas*, among them Abbas al-Musawi and Muhammad Yazbek, later became high-ranking Hezbollah members.

59. The *khawza* in Sidiqin, a village south of the Litani River, received special attention from Iran and was named for the Imam al-Mahdi (“the hidden imam”). In his book *Hezbollah between Iran and Lebanon*, Shapira has the following to say:

“Judging from appearances one might think that [the *khawza* in the village of Sidiqin] was in Iran: enormous pictures of Khomeini and his then heir-apparent, Montazeri, decorated the building and could be seen from afar, as if to display those to whom the students and teachers gave their loyalty. However, it was in south Lebanon and stood on the front line with Israel, damaged in bombardments more than once. For Iran, the *khawza* in Sidiqin was the model for the Islamic struggle…”

57 Shapira, pp. 140-141.

58 Sheikh Abd al-Muni’m Mienna, head of the *khawza* in Sidiqin in south Lebanon, one of the most prominent *khawzas* in the country, testified that the “*khawza* is committed to the teaching of Khomeini, adheres to his path and graduates aware students loyal to Khomeini’s Islam and the perception of an Islamic state. Their role is to lead the rest of society in that direction…” *Ibid.*, p. 142.


61 According to the *khawza* director Sheikh Abd al-Muni’m Mienna, more than 30 of its students were killed “in the struggle for Islam.” (Shapira, p. 230)
60. **The Imam Khomeini Cultural Center** was founded in 1991 and **its head office is in Iran**. The main branch in Lebanon is in the Shi’ite neighborhood of Haret Hreik, Hezbollah’s stronghold, in Beirut’s Southern Suburb, and it has other branches throughout the country. The Center deals with translating and spreading the religious legacy of the Ayatollah Khomeini and the Iranian Islamic Revolution, and with fostering the “culture of resistance” (i.e., the culture of terrorism).

61. The Center has four departments: The library, which is composed of two separate areas, one for men and the other for women. Each area has several thousand titles and a reading room. There is also a computerized archive and a collection of video tapes and CDs containing various religious and cultural lessons, including those dealing with activist Iranian Shi’ite ideology. There are books about Islamic culture, especially those focusing on Khomeini’s ideology. The public relations department maintains connections with other cultural centers, researchers, writers and academician. The center includes an exhibition of books by Khomeini and Khamenei and about the Islamic Revolution in Iran.

62. The Imam Khomeini Educational Center issues books and other publications of an ideological nature and books written to enhance the images of the Ayatollah Khomeini and his heir, Leader Khamenei (for a detailed description see above, “Books, pamphlets, and information and guidance material”).
Hezbollah’s scout movement

63. As part of the investment made in the education of the younger generation, Hezbollah has a scout movement called the Imam al-Mahdi Scouts. The movement is one of the means used by Hezbollah to indoctrinate Khomeini’s radical Shi’ite Islam and the personality cults of Khomeini and Khamenei. Its ideology is based on hostility to Israel to the point of destroying it, the importance of jihad and the willingness of its followers to sacrifice themselves for the sake of Allah as part of the jihad against Israel.

64. The objective of the indoctrination is to prepare the Imam al-Mahdi scouts to join the operative ranks of Hezbollah when they reach the age of 17. In point of fact, more than 120 former al-Mahdi scouts have become shaheeds (including suicide bombers) during Hezbollah’s violent campaign against Israel.
Fostering the personality cults of Nasrallah and Khamenei among children and adolescents

Al-Mahdi Scouts marching in the streets in Lebanese cities. At the right, there are posters of Hassan Nasrallah, Ali Khamenei and Khomeini (Al-Manar TV, October 20, 2006)

The front cover of Sharon the Evil One, published by the Imam al-Mahdi Scouts as part of a series of books for children and adolescents with titles such as The Jihad Boys and Sayyid Abbas Musawi, the Chief Shaheed of the Islamic Resistance.

The front cover of a coloring book called I Will Use My Weapons to Defend My Homeland. Right: Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah above a fighter looking through a pair of binoculars and wearing a helmet inscribed “We are all [pledged] to the homeland.” Center: A seven-branched candelabrum, a Jewish symbol, whose flames are burning the Israeli flag. The message is that Hezbollah has defeated Israel for the sake of the Lebanese homeland.
65. Hezbollah even uses computer games for indoctrination. For example, on March 14, 2007, Al-Manar broadcast a program called Open Studio. Its subject was the development of computer games which would send the message that the second Lebanon war was a realization of Hassan Nasrallah’s promise to secure the release of Lebanese soldiers held by Israel by means of abducting IDF soldiers (Al-Manar TV, March 14).

66. The name of the game was The Kept Promise (Hezbollah’s name for the second Lebanon war), which participants in the program claimed had been developed by young residents of south Lebanon. They also stated that the company producing the game would issue a beta version by the end of March 2007, and it would include all the battles fought by Hezbollah and the IDF day by day during the 33 days of fighting. In addition, they said that the game would have a “toned-down” version for young children and one for adults which would include pictures of blood and killing.

A computer game called “The Kept Promise” (as seen on Al-Manar TV, March 14, 2007)

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62 That is, his promise to secure the release of Lebanese prisoners by abducting IDF soldiers.
Fostering contact with student organizations

67. Another channel through which Iranian and Hezbollah shape the perception of the Shi’ite Lebanese younger generation is student organizations, reflecting Iran’s interest in student welfare. In a special ceremony held in the Iranian embassy in Beirut, sheikh Na’im Qassem, one of the heads of Hezbollah and Hassan Nasrallah’s deputy, bid farewell to students with outstanding grades by telling them to “integrate your Islamic studies with modern scientific research…” “Your brothers in Iran,” he reminded them “have great hopes for you because you represent the line of the Islamic resistance.”

68. In April 2007 Hassan Nasrallah spoke before 1,700 male and female students who had finished their university studies (in our assessment, most of them Shi’ites). The ceremony was held at the Sayyid al-Shuhadaa center Beirut’s Southern Suburb, and its theme was “The graduating class of the martyrs of the kept promise [Hezbollah’s name for the second Lebanon war].” Nasrallah handed out diplomas to some of the graduates. He congratulated their parents on their having made the effort, in spite of the war, to enable their children to finish their studies, and in particular praised the families of the students who had died in the war. To the students he said: “Your success is a message, in every sense of the word, expressing the genuine aspects of the jihad path you have chosen to tread…” (Al-Manar TV, April 8, 2007).

63 Shapira, p. 143.
Indoctrinating Hezbollah operatives

69. Hezbollah operatives, regardless of rank and status, are the organization’s most important target audience. The organization customarily sends them internal memoranda for their eyes only.

70. One of the documents seized during the second Lebanon war was a “weekly political analysis,” issued by Hezbollah for limited distribution to important functionaries within the organization (“members of the councils and those assigned to head departments and sections”). Hezbollah is scrupulous in its field security: every “weekly political analysis” recipient is required to destroy the memorandum after it has been read and the recipients’ names are in code.
The first page of the June 1, 2006 issue of the “weekly political analysis (a document seized by the IDF in Maroun al-Ras on July 26, 2006, during the second Lebanon war)
71. The June 1, 2006 issue of the “weekly political analysis” was distributed to Hezbollah operatives about a month and a half before the beginning of the second Lebanon war. It is written tersely and to the point and analyzes, from Hezbollah’s point of view, the developments occurring on the three fronts most important to both Hezbollah and Iran: the Lebanese, Palestinian and Iraqi. It also relates to internal Israeli developments and their implications for Hezbollah and Lebanon in general.

72. The main points of the analysis are:

A. Lebanon:

1) The analysis begins with what it calls “the despicable crime committed by the intelligence services of the Israeli enemy in the heart of Sidon against two jihad warriors, the brothers Mahmoud and Nidal al-Majzoub...”. The reference was to the death of Mahmoud Majzoub, a senior Palestinian Islamic Jihad terrorist operative and his bodyguard who were killed when a charge in their car blew up. The memorandum notes that the event was considered “a security success for the Israeli enemy” and that it exposed “a grave security breach” that had to be examined seriously. A connection is made between the deaths and the revival of the activities of Hezbollah opponents in Lebanon (The February 14th group).

2). The memorandum goes on to analyze the “day of battle” between the IDF and Hezbollah on May 28, 2006, which began with rocket fire at an Israeli Air Force base on Mt. Meiron and ended with exchanges of fire between the IDF and Hezbollah along the Lebanese border.64 While Hezbollah spokesmen publicly denied any connection between the organization and the rocket fire, in an internal memorandum Hezbollah took responsibility for

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64 For further information see our May 29, 2006 Bulletin entitled “Katyusha rockets fired deep into the Galilee led to a day of exchange of heavy fire between the IDF and Hezbollah, the most significant since Israel withdrew from Lebanon (May 2000),” at http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/hezbollah_be0506.pdf.
the event and even explained to its operatives the logic of the strategy behind it and Israel’s logic.

3) “Bombing the air control base at Mt. Meiron, near Safed, sent an exceptional message to the Israeli entity...[one] with strategic importance. The bombing clearly showed the extent of our ability and willingness to reach targets deep within the Israeli entity and to hit them with precision. In that respect, bombing Safed was a decisive experience in re-emphasizing the balance of deterrence, especially in all respects of the defense of the security heart of Lebanon...”

4) “...the response of the resistance [Hezbollah] preserves the existing equation: the shelling of northern Palestine (i.e., northern Israel) in retaliation for turning Lebanese civilians into targets [i.e., by implication in retaliation for the deaths of the Majzoub terrorist brothers, represented as Lebanese “civilians”]. In addition, it at least forced [Israel] to obey the international efforts relating to the cease fire.”

5) The analysis claimed the anti-Syrian camp which opposes Hezbollah (the February 14 group) was trying to make political capital out of the confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah by raising the demand that the Palestinians and Hezbollah disarm. That was the context, according to Hezbollah, in which the letter sent by Lebanese prime minister Fuad Siniora to the Arab rulers should be viewed. In his letter, Siniora asked them to support him and his followers in pressuring Syria to deal with the issue of Palestinian weapons outside the refugee camp. The memorandum stated that:

“The Israeli [enemy] tried to provide fire support for The February 14 group’s negative stance [both] in relation to the weapons [in the hands of] the resistance [Hezbollah][and] the Palestinians. In addition, the Israeli [enemy] tried to send a message regarding the necessity to strictly preserve the cease fire
and to prevent the resistance’s weapons from being used in any possible confrontation with Iran…”

B. The Palestinian arena: The memorandum analyzes Israel’s intensive operational activity in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the military and political struggle being waged between Hamas (and the organizations supporting it) and Fatah/Abu Mazen. Hezbollah’s stated interpretation of the cause of the struggle is that “The current fierce conflict between Hamas and Fatah focuses on political options. That is because Fatah, Mahmoud Abbas and their allies, in coordination with...the international committee of four [the Quartet] and some of the Arabs sides, especially Egypt and Jordan, strive to extort concessions from Hamas and its government...regarding recognition of Israel, abandoning [the path of] resistance and adherence to agreements [already] signed, which Hamas refuses to do…”

C. Israel:

1) The response to the rocket fire (which according to the internal memorandum was in fact carried out by Hezbollah) the Israeli Air Force attacked two targets belonging to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command, a pro-Syrian Palestinian terrorist organization headed by Ahmad Jibril. Hezbollah’s interpretation of the attack on the PFLP-GC bases was that Israel was trying to assert its authority over the organization (and not over Hezbollah) to cause internal dissention among the organizations, and to raise the problem of the Palestinian weapons located outside the refugee camps, but without bringing about a counter-reaction from Hezbollah.

2) Hezbollah, for its part, responded with artillery and sniper fire and May 28, 2006, was a day of battle between Israel and Hezbollah, during which the IDF attacked about 20 Hezbollah strongholds along the border with air and artillery fire. Hezbollah interpreted the Israeli response as an attempt by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to strike at Hezbollah and have it viewed as an achievement. According to the memorandum, “the Israeli
enemy’s new prime minister needs that achievement to provide himself with the aura his personality lacks, for he is not a member of the [narrow] circle of historic Zionist prime ministers…”

D. Iraq: The analysis gives a short survey of the deteriorating security situation in Iraq despite the establishment of a permanent government, and poses questions regarding the security services of Iraq and the American army (called “the occupation army”) to control the situation. Most of the analysis is devoted to praise for the visit of Mottaki, the Iranian foreign minister in Iraq, which “clearly overshadowed the political arena in Iraq during the past week…” His visit was designed “to emphasize the importance and might of the presence and role of the Islamic Republic [of Iran] in Iraq, as opposed to the reduction of the Arab role in Iraq.” Iran is “a central player in the Iraqi arena” and part of the solution for Iraq, not part of its problem, as the Americans have tried to show. Thus the war in Iraq is viewed through Iranian eyes and the memorandum does not provide an independent Hezbollah analysis.

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65 Following Hezbollah’s logic, the organization should have expected Israel to respond aggressively to the provocative attack on July 12, 2006, in which two IDF soldiers were abducted. That is in opposition to Hassan Nasrallah’s post-war claim that had he known that there was a one percent chance that the abduction of the soldiers would lead to the war he would not have had it carried out (see below).
The battle for hearts and minds during and after the second Lebanon war

Hezbollah’s main propaganda messages during and after the second Lebanon war

1. The second Lebanon war, like that which preceded it, was also a virtual war, fought with equal intensity on the field and in the media, on TV screens and in human perception. During and after the war Hezbollah waged an intensive and successful propaganda campaign against Israel, making shrewd use of the media empire it had built up over the years, especially Al-Manar TV. The battle for hearts and minds was primarily directed at the Lebanese and Arab-Muslim target audiences, but it was also meant to influence Western and Israeli public opinion.

2. Hezbollah sent a number of messages to its various target audiences:

   A. The delegitimization of IDF actions in Lebanon: Israel was harming innocent Lebanese civilians and destroying civilian infrastructures in Lebanon. What was glossed over was that Hezbollah was using Lebanese civilians as human shields by situating their military infrastructures within densely populated civilian areas. The message was picked up and repeated by Arab and Western media and by human rights’ organizations, which devoted a great deal of attention to the suffering of Lebanese civilians and the foreign nationals who fled from Lebanon.

   B. Psychological warfare directed at the Israeli target audience: Its objectives were to lower morale, cause panic, increase fears of Hezbollah’s rocket fire and reinforce Hezbollah’s image as an organization that both does what it says it will and has impressive operational capabilities. That was done by monitoring the results of the rocket fire, providing wide media coverage for those results, making continuous reference to the
places in the heart of Israel “still” not bombarded and to Hezbollah’s intention to bombard them in the future.

Propaganda and psychological warfare aimed toward Israeli public opinion during the second Lebanon war

“…For more than 18 days, two million Israelis have been forced to leave their homes or to live in bomb shelters, and the number will grow with the increase [of our rocket fire] when we start [firing rockets] beyond Haifa…”

Hassan Nasrallah speaking on Al-Manar TV, July 29, 2006

The names of the Israeli towns and cities attacked and to be attacked, as shown in an Al-Manar TV clip frequently broadcast during the second Lebanon war. The names in Hebrew are aimed at Israeli viewers. Among the names are those of major cities in Israel, including, Tel Aviv-Jaffa, Ramat Gan, Petah Tikva, Netanya and Hadera.
Left: An apartment house in Haifa destroyed by a Hezbollah rocket, the picture broadcast by Al-Manar TV during the second Lebanon war. Right: The threat of the rocket fire “[far] beyond Haifa,” i.e., the center of the country. The subtitle in Hebrew is Hezbollah’s (from a film produced by Hezbollah’s battle information department, broadcast by Al-Manar TV during the second Lebanon war).

C. **Emphasizing the legitimacy of Hezbollah’s continued existence as an organization with a military infrastructure which “defends Lebanon,”** especially in view of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 and the growing internal Lebanese criticism of its existence as an armed organization: That was done by claiming that Israel’s “aggression” against Lebanon showed the need for an armed “resistance” which would defend it. That would be done while avoiding confrontation with the Lebanese Army and UNIFIL, which were deployed in south Lebanon after the war in accordance with Resolution 1701.

D. **Justifying the abduction of the two IDF soldiers which led directly to the war** and shrugging off Hezbollah’s responsibility for the war and the destruction wrought on Lebanon. That was done in view of the scenes of ruin and the accusations hurled at Hezbollah after the war by its opponents in Lebanon: they argued that the war did not break out because of the abduction of the two soldiers but rather was a move planned by Israel in advance. The abduction, according to Hezbollah’s argument, was not intended to lead to a crisis and war but was

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66 As noted above, Hezbollah calls the war “the promise that was kept,” that is, Hassan Nasrallah’s promise to secure the release of Lebanese [terrorist] prisoners by means of abducting IDF soldiers to use as bargaining chips.
rather a legitimate action, and it was Israel’s response which was out of proportion. The Israeli response was not what Hezbollah had expected.

Al-Manar TV spearheads Hezbollah’s media

3. Spearheading the battle for hearts and minds has been Al-Manar TV, which survived and continued broadcasting even after the Israeli Air Force had hit its building in the Shi’ite neighborhood Haret Hreik in Beirut’s Southern Suburb. Al-Manar had a large viewing audience in Israel and in the Arab-Muslim world, and broadcast interviews with Hassan Nasrallah during and after the war. Its broadcasts of factual information (such firing on the Israeli warship across from the Beirut shore) were accompanied by large amounts of propaganda including elements of psychological warfare.
An aerial photograph of the Al-Manar TV building in Haret Hreik, attacked by the Israeli Air Force. Al-Manar continued broadcasting from alternative studios which had been prepared in advance. At first there were technical difficulties but after a week it was again broadcasting at a high level.

4. Al-Manar TV’s broadcasts during the second Lebanon war included:

A. Frequent reports of the fighting in south Lebanon and the rocket fire into Israel: The commentators boasted of Hezbollah’s success in launching long-range rockets into Israeli population centers, equating the Israeli and Hezbollah threats. They also boasted of the “surprises” the organization had in store for Israel. Al-Manar often showed offensive pictures of the dead and wounded, and scenes of the destruction of Israeli buildings (sometimes with fractured Hebrew subtitles) to reinforce the psychological effect of the rocket fire and fighting in south Lebanon on Israeli morale.
Live coverage of rocket fire at Afula

A long-range Khaybar (302 mm, made in Syria) rocket launched at Afula (Al-Manar TV, July 28, 2006). It was apparently fired from north of the Litani River.

B. Hassan Nasrallah as media star: During the war Nasrallah granted six interviews, four of them to Al-Manar, one to Al-Jazeera TV and one to a Lebanese channel called New TV. He apparently did not go to the TV studios but rather recorded the interviews in advance or used a cell phone. In any case, the interviews received broad coverage not only from Lebanese media but from Arab, world and Israeli media as well. In point of fact, Nasrallah (and Al-Manar TV) to a great extent succeeded in taking over the TV tubes, even in Israel, thereby gaining an advantage in the battle against Israel for hearts and minds.

C. Horrific pictures of dead and wounded Lebanese civilians: Al-Manar showed many grisly pictures, giving extensive coverage to funerals and scenes of bombed houses and facilities. On the other hand, only on rare occasions were Hezbollah operatives, bases and weapons shown. That was done to represent Israel as

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67 Hezbollah chose the name Khaybar for the Syrian rockets because of its anti-Jewish Islamic connotations. Khaybar was a fertile oasis in the Hijaz settled by Jews. In 628 AD Muhammad’s army invaded. The Jews surrendered after their allies betrayed them in the decisive battle and deserted to Muhammad. Those Jews who remained in Khaybar were serfs on their own lands and were expelled during the era of Omar, the second Caliph. In modern times the battle of Khaybar as come to signify the victory of Islam over the Jews, used as a threat to Israel by Hezbollah and Hamas.

68 The advantage was made even greater by the lack of an Israeli commentator of sufficient stature to provide the various audiences with an answer to the attractiveness of Hassan Nasrallah.
“aggressive” and thus to cause the international community to exert pressure on it, while ignoring Hezbollah’s extensive military infrastructure, the broad use the organization made of Lebanese civilians as human shields and the deliberate firing of rockets at Israeli population centers.69

D. **Broadcasts from an open studio**: Al-Manar TV often enabled Lebanese civilians and citizens of the Arab countries to come on camera and praise Hassan Nasrallah and Hezbollah, and call for the leaders of the Arab world to support the Lebanese. Every day it broadcast a large number of songs praising Hezbollah and its operatives. They were accompanied by scenes of Hezbollah’s operational activity and calls for the struggle against Israel to be continued through the “resistance” (terrorism).

E. **Film clips as part of Hezbollah’s psychological warfare aimed at the Israeli viewing public**: Al-Manar TV broadcast films emphasizing Hezbollah’s ability to hit Israel’s sensitive spots. To make the message clearer and stronger Hezbollah integrated successful rocket and missile hits (the attack on the warship opposite Beirut’s shore, the hits in Haifa). The films were subtitled in Hebrew, sometimes ungrammatical and incorrect.

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A film designed to create an image of a defeated IDF (subtitles in fractured Hebrew)

According to the movie’s subtitles: “retarded commanders, defeated soldiers, and what about the reserve units?” The Hebrew is defective and virtually untranslatable (Al-Manar TV, August 7, 2006).

During the war Hezbollah added **new correspondents** to its ranks of commentators who surveyed the developments in Lebanon. They were deployed throughout the country and reported events in real time. Al-Manar often transmitted special news flashes, exploiting its advantage of being in control of the Shi’ite areas in which its military infrastructure was located and where the fighting was going on in south Lebanon.\(^{70}\)

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\(^{70}\) In a discussion which took place at the Israel Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration Center, Oded Granot, Israeli TV Channel 1’s senior Arab commentator said: “...my conclusions are extremely unpleasant. I remember that during the war I listened to the other side not only to find out what they were saying but also to learn what was going on, and where things were headed...Nasrallah announced the attack on the warship. I tried to find out if it had really happened, and I was told that it was just nonsense...” (“Open Intelligence and the Media”). Nevertheless, the information received by the Israeli, Arab and Western correspondents was selective and reflected Hezbollah’s viewpoints. Oded Granot gave an example of an announcement by Nasrallah that another warship had been attacked, that one off Tyre, which was untrue, but reports of it appeared as breaking news headlines on the Arab stations for hours afterwards.
Hezbollah prepares more surprises for Israel (Al-Manar TV, August 11, 2006)

Hassan Nasrallah prepares a surprise

The destruction of the Israeli warship Sa’ar

Afula is within firing range

Anti-tank missiles

Hassan Nasrallah promises to surprise Israel. The black frames bear numerals in Arabic script from one to six. The large number of question marks is designed to create tension and expectation among Israeli viewers regarding the surprises yet to come.
Blocking access to information from foreign correspondents

5. During the war Hezbollah managed to focus world attention on “Israeli aggression” and the destruction it caused to Lebanon, and at the same time to gloss over the use it made of Lebanese civilians as human shields by locating its military infrastructure among them and launching rockets close to residential dwellings. It was successful because it prevented the press corps stationed in Beirut from taking photographs of Hezbollah operatives, its military infrastructure and rocket fire from populated areas.

6. Marvin Kalb writes the following:71

“Rarely did the media use photographs to show that Hezbollah fired its weapons from residential neighborhoods in clear violation of international law. This was rare, because Hezbollah did not allow reporters to film such military activity. Yet, on July 30, the Sunday Herald Sun in Australia did just that7. It published photos that, in its own words, ‘damn Hezbollah’ for conducting military operations in populated suburbs. In one photo of a ‘high density residential area,’ ‘Hezbollah was shown preparing launch pads for ‘rockets and heavy caliber weapons.’ In another men were firing an anti-aircraft gun ‘meters from an apartment block’ where laundry was drying on a balcony. The newspaper said that the photos were ‘exclusive,’ shot by a ‘visiting journalist and smuggled out by a friend.’ The photos had to be smuggled out of Beirut, because Hezbollah would never have allowed them to be shot- they proved that Hezbollah was in fact conducting military operations from heavily populated Beirut suburbs, which was considered a war crime.”

71 Marvin Kalb, pp. 27-28.
The “divine victory” myth campaign

7. To indoctrinate its various target audiences with the myth of the “divine victory,” even before the war had ended (and more so afterwards), Hezbollah began an extensive propaganda campaign. Its themes were praise for the organization’s military capabilities, justification for the abduction of the IDF soldiers and a glossing over of Israel’s achievements.

8. The campaign was waged in Hezbollah’s written and electronic media, with an active part taken by Hezbollah supporters in Lebanon. Giant signs and posters in Arabic, English and French were hung throughout the country, praising the “divine victory.” Al-Manar TV and Radio Nur often lauded the “victory” and played songs of praise for Nasrallah and Hezbollah (for example, one called “Your victory shook the world”).

9. The campaign had three main components:

   A. Israel’s operational failures, which contributed to the success of Hezbollah’s battle for hearts and minds: The one Hezbollah boasted of most was Israel’s failure to stop (or even significantly reduce) the rocket fire up to the last day of the war. To that were added the IDF’s military failures in south Lebanon and in taking care of the Israeli civilian population. Thus Hassan Nasrallah boasted: “The July war was a world war against the resistance, but we won it, defeating all those who hoped in vain that we would be defeated, destroyed, exterminated...” (Al-Manar TV, April 8, 2007).

   B. The harsh internal criticism of the IDF and political leadership in Israel after the war: The criticism and failures served as grist for Hezbollah’s propaganda mill. It contributed to the myth of the “divine victory” and the claim that Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert was “drowning in a sea of defeat.”

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72 Beyond its religious connotations, the term also sounds like praise for Hassan Nasrallah, since “nasr min allah” (“divine victory”) sounds like “Nasrallah.”
also made similar intensive use of the Winograd Committee Report and its echoes in Israeli society.

C. The whitewashing of Israel’s achievements during and after the war: Israel successfully hit Hezbollah’s long-range rocket launchers; Israeli Air Force capabilities were made known; the Lebanese Army and an upgraded UNIFIL were deployed throughout south Lebanon, making it difficult for Hezbollah to operate; Hezbollah’s posts along the border in south Lebanon were destroyed; Hezbollah’s infrastructure in Beirut was damaged; Hezbollah received serious criticism in both Lebanon and the Arab world. Those achievements were not sufficiently emphasized in Israel (because of the enormous amount of criticism of the IDF and the government) and thus were not always picked up in Lebanon and the Arab world, and were not sufficient to undermine the myth of the “divine victory.”

**After the war: fostering the myth of the “divine victory”**

Hezbollah supporters (some of them carrying flags) watch an organization parade in the southern suburb of Beirut. At the lower left the banner covering the building front reads “the victory comes from Allah” (Amin Sayyidi for Reuters, September 22, 2006).

A convoy of Italian UNIFIL troops passing south of Beirut next to a sign reading “the divine victory” (Mohamed Azakir for Reuters, September 3, 2006).
A cartoon from www.moqawama.org: the Israeli warship Sa’ar, a Merkava tank (made in Israel) and an Apache helicopter in the waiting room of “The Center for Plastic Surgery...”

References to the findings of the Winograd Committee

Ehud Olmert, Prime Minister; Amir Peretz, Defense Minister, Dan Halutz, Chief of Staff

Al-Manar TV, May 1, 2007
10. As the dust settled after the second Lebanon war, and as the Lebanese internalized the pictures of ruin and destruction of their country, criticism increased regarding the price Lebanon was forced to pay for Hezbollah’s military escapade. The organization has been forced more and more often to face the accusations of its opponents in Lebanon for having dragged the country into a needless war, and to deflect the demands that it disarm and implement UN Security Council Resolution 1701.

11. Because of the accusations hurled against Hezbollah by its Lebanese opponents, Hassan Nasrallah was forced to switch to defensive propaganda and to provide a response to their criticism, then and now. He admitted that he had been mistaken in his assessment of Israel’s reaction to the abductions, saying that had he known the action (legitimate in his view) would lead to a war, he would not have carried it out. He also made the false claim that the abduction upset an Israeli-American plan to attack Lebanon in October 2006 and forced Israel to move against Hezbollah before it had finished its preparations. The defensive propaganda was accompanied by a political initiative (manipulated by demonstrations and protests) to overthrow the Lebanese government and hold early elections, or, to establish a government in which Hezbollah would have the power to veto decision.
Nasrallah grants an interview to Lebanese TV channel New TV (August 27, 2006)

Interviewer: “...If I were to ask you on July 11 (the day before the two Israeli soldiers were abducted) if you thought there was a one percent chance that the abduction would lead to a war such as the one that broke out, would have you gone ahead with it?

Hassan Nasrallah: “I would say no, without a doubt, no!”
Appendix

A selection of ITIC bulletins dealing with the various aspects of Hezbollah’s battle for hearts and minds\textsuperscript{73}

1. “Terrorism and Internet: Hezbollah’s widespread use of the Internet as a means to distribute anti-Israeli, anti-Jewish, and anti-American incitement as part of the war for the hearts and minds,” December 3, 2006, at http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/hezbollah_int_e.pdf


\textsuperscript{73} All the Information Bulletins appear on the ITIC Website. The list is accurate to April 2007.


